Russia’s Strategy in Libya

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The world’s attention may be focused on the coronavirus pandemic. But Russia continues its
complicated game in Libya.

In early March 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel
emphasised their shared commitment to a ceasefire in Libya after both leaders arranged a phone call
to discuss the conflict. Russia’s endorsement of a political solution in Libya reaffirmed its longstanding
official position. The Russian Foreign Ministry expounded on this view on 25 March when it listed
Libya as a conflict that needed to be suspended due to the coronavirus pandemic.

Russia’s rhetorical support for a peace settlement in Libya has been greeted with skepticism, as the
Kremlin-aligned Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organisation, has deployed between 1,400 to
2,000 private military contractors (PMCs) to support the Libya National Army (LNA) chieftain Khalifa
Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli. Yet it is an oversimplification to claim that Russia’s rhetoric about
peace in Libya is mere obfuscation, as Moscow’s strategy towards the Libyan conflict is multifaceted
in nature. Russia is militarily supporting Haftar in order to increase its geopolitical influence in LNA-
controlled areas, but it is also trying to present itself as a diplomatic arbiter in order to burnish its
regional status and secure lucrative nationwide reconstruction contracts.

Although Russia balanced positive relations with the UN-recognised Government of National Accord
(GNA) and LNA from 2016 to 2018, Moscow provided material support for Haftar’s offensive against
Tripoli in April 2019. Unlike the UAE and Egypt, Russia did not support Haftar because it believed that
the LNA possessed the capabilities to unite Libya under his rule. Instead, Russia backed Haftar’s
offensive to help the LNA achieve enough military success to bolster its stature in diplomatic
negotiations. As Russia had assisted the LNA with PMCs and supplied banknotes to eastern Libya in
order to ease the region’s liquidity crisis, Moscow hoped that the legitimisation of LNA control over
eastern and southern Libya would ensure that it gained preferential access to oil reserves held by
Haftar’s forces and revive Gaddafi-era basing agreements on Libya’s Mediterranean coast.

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Due to Russia’s preference for a finite LNA offensive and uncertainties about Haftar’s leadership
capabilities, Moscow has maintained a diplomatic backchannel with the GNA. As Haftar’s offensive
continued, Russia maintained positive relations with the LNA through PMC deployments, which are
reportedly financed by Saudi Arabia, and stepped up its arbitration role in Libya. On 13 January,
Russia hosted diplomatic negotiations on Libya, but these talks failed, as Haftar left Moscow without
signing a ceasefire agreement. In spite of this setback, Russia has regularly engaged with European
leaders on the Libyan peace process, as it seeks to extend its leadership on conflict resolution
initiatives in Syria to a new theatre. Russia also hopes that its contributions to the peace process will
appease GNA officials, such as Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, who accused Moscow of fomenting
instability in Libya, and allow it to secure lucrative nation-wide reconstruction contracts, such as the
$2 billion Benghazi-to-Sirte railway line.

Although Haftar’s refusal to accept a ceasefire and countervailing pressure from the UAE’s embassy
in Moscow have undermined Russia’s diplomatic efforts, the Kremlin’s strategy in Libya has also
been complicated by Turkey’s growing assertiveness in the conflict. On 2 January, the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey rubber-stamped troop deployments to Libya for a one-year mandate, in order to
enforce Ankara’s maritime security deal with the GNA and derail the momentum of Haftar’s offensive.
Russia strongly opposed Turkey’s military intervention in Libya. On 3 January, Russian State Duma
Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Leonid Slutsky expressed concern about Turkey’s actions, and
warned that Ankara’s troop deployments ‘may deepen the crisis and deteriorate the situation’.

Russia’s concerns about Turkey’s military intervention in Libya featured prominently during Putin’s
meeting with his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 8 January. After that meeting, Turkey
and Russia helped broker a temporary ceasefire in Libya on 12 January, which culminated in the
aborted negotiations in Moscow one day later. In spite of this episode of Russia–Turkey cooperation,
escalating tensions between the two countries over Idlib spilt over to Libya. On 17 February, Erdogan
accused Russia of ‘managing the war in Libya at the highest level’, and claimed that the Russian
government was behind the Wagner Group’s PMC deployments. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Mikhail Bogdanov immediately dismissed Erdogan’s assertions, and Moscow’s close ally, Syrian
President Bashar Al-Assad, formally aligned with Haftar against Turkey on 2 March.

Old Rival, Potential Friends

After Russia–Turkey tensions dissipated over Syria due to the 5 March ceasefire in Idlib, the public
war of words between Russian and Turkish officials on Libya ground to a halt. Despite this de-
escalation, the short-term prospects of Russia–Turkey cooperation in Libya are remote, as both
countries disagree on Haftar’s place in Libya’s political future. In Turkey, Haftar is widely viewed as a
rogue warlord who lacks popular legitimacy and depends on external military support. Senior Russian
officials, such as Russian ambassador to Turkey Alexei Yerkhov, dispute this Turkish narrative by
arguing that Haftar controls too large a portion of Libya to be ignored and that the GNA has lost its
legitimacy by aligning with Islamist militias.

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In spite of the intransigence of both sides, the current state of cold peace between Russia and Turkey
could morph into renewed cooperation. If the US remains detached from the Libyan conflict and
European powers continue to advance conflicting agendas in Libya, Russia and Turkey could see an
opportunity to marginalise Western powers through cooperation on a Libyan peace settlement. The
persistence of the Astana talks, in spite of continued strategic competition between Russia and
Turkey in Syria, provides a model for this form of diplomatic cooperation, and Turkish officials viewed
the 8 January Putin–Erdogan ceasefire negotiations on Libya as a noteworthy display of Turkey’s
international status. As 58% of Turks polled in February oppose Erdogan’s decision to deploy Turkish
forces to Libya and Russian public’s focus has been redirected to socioeconomic challenges,
Erdogan and Putin could exert pressure on the GNA and LNA to de-escalate the war in Libya. Due to
the wide array of external players involved in Libya and the independent agency of Libya’s warring
factions, this de-escalation effort may not succeed, but it could cause Russia and Turkey to agree to
deconfliction mechanisms in Libya.

A return to confrontation between Russia and Turkey over Idlib remains the most serious impediment
to bilateral cooperation in Libya. As Russia regards Turkey’s military overextension at a time of
economic weakness as a major vulnerability, Moscow could encourage Haftar to retaliate against
Turkish forces in Libya when Ankara strikes military targets in Syria. The LNA’s downing of a Turkish
drone and strike on Turkey’s Mitiga air base in Tripoli on 3 March during Ankara’s Operation Spring
Shield intervention in Syria reveals Russia’s potential to carry out an asymmetric retaliation, which
could derail Russia–Turkey cooperation on Libya.

Although Russia continues to deploy PMCs on Haftar’s behalf, Moscow’s economic interests in Libya
and long-term geostrategic ambitions in the Middle East are best furthered by a swift de-escalation of
Libya’s protracted conflict. While Libya’s internal factions and their primary external sponsors will
ultimately decide the country’s future, Russia’s hopes for de-escalation in Libya are closely
intertwined with the state of its bilateral relationship with Turkey.

Continued cooperation with Ankara would advance Russia’s strategy in Libya, but renewed
confrontation with Turkey over Syria could reluctantly drag Russia into a prolonged military
intervention in Libya.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate at the University of Oxford’s Department of Politics and
International Relations.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any
other institution.

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