Received: 1 October 2018 Revised: 9 July 2019 Accepted: 12 July 2019

DOI: 10.1002/bdm.2147

RESEARCH ARTICLE

To be at the tail of the lions or the head of the foxes?

Judith Avrahami1 | Ayala Ezer1 | Werner Güth2,3 | Nour Kardosh1 | Yaakov Kareev1 |

Uri Zak1

1
The Federmann Center for the Study of
Rationality, The Hebrew University of Abstract
Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Agents seeking an opportunity for profit often have to compete with others who pur-
2
Economics Department, LUISS Guido Carli,
sue the same opportunity. When having to choose between a number of opportuni-
Rome, Italy
3
Max Planck Institute for Research on
ties differing in their value and if individuals differ in their chances of outperforming
Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany others, the choice can be cognitively and emotionally demanding. We explore choice

Correspondence
Judith Avrahami, The Federmann Center for
the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Edmund Safra
Campus, Jerusalem 9490101, Israel.
Email: judith.avrahami@mail.huji.ac.il
Funding information
Israel Science Foundation, Grant/Award Num-
ber: 996/15
between opportunities using stylized Lions–Foxes games. In such a game, each of
three players, with different odds of beating others, has to choose one of two con-
tests that offer different rewards. After game theoretically analyzing the games,
which we have experimentally employed, we report four experiments that vary in
choice elicitation (repeated play or strategy method), in players' matching (random
strangers or partners) and in rewards. Regarding contest choices, we found the choice
of the higher value (and seemingly more prestigious) contest to be positively related
to winning odds, contrary to what four out of the five (mixed, partially mixed, or pure)
equilibria predict. Participants started out rather optimistic, with a large majority
choosing the higher value option, but with experience, they approached the only via-
ble of two pure strategy equilibria. Still, mixing continued via reacting to past play and
outcome, apparently balancing dissatisfaction from choosing either contest.

K E Y W OR D S

choice dynamics, interactive choice behavior, Lions–Foxes game

1 | I N T RO D U CT I O N
We explored situations in which several agents seek to attain a
valuable asset or opportunity for profit, available at a few separate
contest locations. With varying values of the assets/opportunities,
only agents who choose the same contest compete for its available
asset(s). Choice of contest poses a dilemma. Although all agents may
prefer the more lucrative one, this may be inefficient as not all agents
can succeed and the asset(s) available in other, unchosen, contests will
be lost. To answer the question of who would avoid the more lucrative
option is particularly difficult when the ability of all agents and hence
their chances of winning are equal. But even when agents differ in
ability and thereby in their chances to outperform the others, the
question remains. Agents may randomly select their contest, choose
differently across time, or insist on the better contest hoping that
others would avoid it; as a result, all others may or may not stay away
from the better contest.
Here, we ask which contest agents choose and what determines
their choice. In that, our study differs from what is usually explored
in contest studies, namely, how those in the same contest compete
(for a review, see Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015). To
better understand contest preferences, we let agents decide repeat-
edly; we can thus find out how choices evolve over time.
Our scenario applies to a variety of field situations. Tennis players
often choose between more and less prestigious tournaments;
university applicants who have been accepted by several universities
must decide whether to study in a more or less prestigious one.
Entrepreneurs, planning to establish a business, like an optician shop
or a café, may select a venue in a more or less frequented area
knowing that, although the clientele is larger in the former, also the

J Behav Dec Making. 2019;1–18. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/bdm © 2019 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1
2 AVRAHAMI
competition would be fiercer there. Even in small prize, frequently
occurring, competitive situations (like online photography competi-
tions or short story competitions), individuals may have to choose
between engaging in a higher or lower prize competition. In these
examples, the more lucrative venues offer larger prizes, but the
chances of winning those prizes are lower because higher prize venues
are likely to attract more and better qualified competitors. In sum, con-
test choice is difficult because one's winning chances depend not only
on one's own noisy performance but also on the performance of those
who choose to compete in the same contest.
The choice dilemma has been addressed for centuries. In the Jew-
ish scripture, the sage Matiah Ben Harash said, “Be the tail of the lions
not the head of the foxes” (Pirkei Avot 20:4 [our translation]). In con-
trast, Julius Caesar, when crossing the Alps through a village with
few inhabitants, said, “For my part, I had rather be the first man among
these fellows, than the second man in Rome” (Lives of the Noble Gre-
cians and Romans, Plutarch, translated by John Dryden). The latter
quote provides advice similar to that of the current saying: “Better
to be the head of the dog than the tail of the lion” (Spears, 2005,
McGraw–Hill dictionary of American idioms and phrasal verbs).
1 from reaction to the outcome of a previous round, for example, to
The contradiction between the advice in the Jewish proverb and
that of the Roman and American proverbs may have to do with differ-
ent situations and different types of benefits. The Jewish proverb is
concerned with a choice between institutes of higher learning and
the knowledge or skills they provide, assuming that studying in higher
level institution is more beneficial (see, however, the study by Berg
Dale & Krueger, 2002, for a different conclusion.) The Roman proverb
may relate to power: to its spoils or to the power to control other peo-
ple while not being controlled oneself. It may thus reflect on the char-
acter of the person uttering the proverb. For example, highly
competitive people may hate not being top ranked and, therefore, pre-
fer a less demanding competition. Risk seekers, on the other hand,
may prefer more demanding competitions.
Concern with status was explored by Frank (1984, 1985). In his
book, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Sta-
tus (1985), he argued that in their quest for status, humans consider
not only their potential global rank but also their local rank, attaching
higher weight to the latter. Thus, people often forgo a possibly higher
wage in a high‐paying firm aspiring, instead, to the top position in
another, lower paying firm.
To study situations like those discussed above, we employ the
Lions–Foxes game, a game with three players who differ in their exog-
enously assigned ability and who choose independently between two
contests; the contests differ in the rewards they offer for those who
2 Table 2.
outperform the others engaged in the same contest.
1
Addressing the same dilemma, another sage in the Jewish scriptures says the exact opposite:
“Be the head of the fox rather than the tail of the lion” (Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin, 4:8).
2
The decision involved in our experimental setup shares some elements with animal foraging.
When foraging for food that is unequally distributed in different locations, the stronger for-
agers have a greater chance of attaining the food in the location of their choice (e.g., Fretwell
& Lucas, 1970; for review, see Kennedy & Gray, 1993 ). Our setup differs from studies of for-
aging, which usually focus on equally strong competitors (e.g., Goldstone & Ashpole, 2004;
Sokolowski & Tonneau, 2004).
ET AL.
TABLE 1 The likelihood of each player outperforming other(s)
p(S beats I) .6528
p(S beats W) .7778
p(I beats W) .6528
p(S beats both I and W) .5664
p(I beats both S and W) .2978
p(W beats both S and I) .1358
What behavior can be predicted in such a situation? In line with
experimental findings of market entry games (e.g., Camerer &
Lovallo, 1999; Rapoport, 1995), we may expect behavior to be
driven by optimism, on the basis of ignoring the abilities and aspira-
tions of the other players in the group. We may also expect behav-
ior to correspond to social intuition, by which the strong is entitled
to the higher prize, the weak only to the lower prize, and the inter-
mediate, aspiring to a share in the higher prize, to relent when fail-
ing. Another possibility is that players would adopt behavior that
conforms to an equilibrium of the game. Such behavior could result
actual rewards or to a comparison of actual rewards with counter-
factual ones.
Equilibrium behavior in the Lions–Foxes game depends, of course,
on parameters. For example, if the reward in the Lions' contest is far
greater than that available in the Foxes' contest, the Lions' contest
may be preferred by all agents, even the weakest one whose chance
of winning is lowest. Other parameters determine how actual perfor-
mance depends on ability and noise, which we operationalize by the
mean and range of the distribution from which the actual individual
performance value is randomly drawn. For our study, we chose param-
eters that would ensure suitable equilibrium benchmarks.
In the following, we refer to players with different ability distribu-
tions as having different strength: Weak (W), Intermediate (I), and
Strong (S). We refer to the two contests as Lions (L) and Foxes (F).
Players' strengths were defined as continuous flat intervals, with the
intervals of adjacent roles having an overlap of 5/6 (see below for
more details). Abilities thus determined the players' respective likeli-
hoods of beating others and collecting the reward in their chosen con-
test. The likelihood of the different players beating others is presented
in Table 1.
With the rewards having the value of 14 or 10 experimental points
in the Lions' contest and the Foxes' contest, respectively, the chosen
parameter constellation implies the expected payoffs presented in
Two pure equilibria are obvious from the payoff matrix (and are
marked in bold). Three additional equilibria have been calculated:
one fully mixed and two partially mixed (for an explanation on how a
mixed equilibrium is calculated, see Appendix A). Predicted play and
earnings for the five equilibria are presented in Table 3.3
3
The values presented here apply to Experiments 1 and 2; as will be discussed below, they
differ for Experiments 3 and 4.
AVRAHAMI ET AL. 3

TABLE 2 Payoffs table TABLE 3 Predicted rate of choosing Lions (earnings in parentheses)
according to each of the equilibria for the current parameters
Strong plays L Strong plays F
Equilibrium Weak Intermediate Strong
Intermediate Intermediate

L F L F Pure 1 0 (3.5) 0 (6.5) 1 (14.0)

Weak L 1.9, 4.2 7.9 3.1, 10.0, 10.9 L 4.9, 9.1, 10.0 14.0, 3.5, 6.5 Pure 2 1 (4.9) 1 (9.1) 0 (10.0)
F 10.0, 4.9, 9.1 3.5, 6.5, 14.0 F 2.2, 14.0, 7.8 1.4, 3.0, 5.6 Partly mixed 1 .39 (4.1) 1 (10.2) .25 (8.7)

Note. The first, second, and third numbers represent the payoffs of the Partly mixed 2 1 (5.1) .68 (6.7) .49 (8.9)
Weak, Intermediate, and Strong, respectively. Fully mixed .98 (5.0) .69 (6.7) .50 (8.9)

In three of the equilibria—one of the pure equilibrium and two of

Seale, & Winter, 2002).5 Another important difference is the risk in
the mixed equilibria—one of the players insists on choosing the better
the result of the “contest” between players that enter the same
contest. If it is the strongest player who does it, the other two should
contest, which comes on top of the strategic uncertainty regarding
best choose the lesser contest; if it is the intermediate or the weakest
the behavior of other players (which is common also to market entry
player who insist on choosing the better contest, the other two are
games). Extensions of the market entry game involve two markets
expected to mix. In each of these equilibria, the player who insists
rather than one market (Rapoport, Seale, & Winter, 2000) and
on the better one earns more than in any of the other equilibria. But
asymmetry in rewards (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). However, unlike
would the others comply? In the other two equilibria, either the stron-
the Lions–Foxes game, such market entry scenarios do not feature
gest player chooses the lesser contest, in which case both other
a choice between markets offering different prizes and
players would choose the better contest, or all mix.
involving competition between agents with unequal chances of
Strict equilibria discourage any unilateral deviation and would ren-
winning.
der any coordination on one of them as rather reliable. Although, in
The Lions–Foxes game may seem similar to the Minority of
general, the set of strict equilibria may be empty, our setup allows
Three game (e.g., Challet & Zhang, 1997; Chmura & Güth, 2011)
for two strict equilibria. Granting priority to strict equilibria would
because a player alone at a contest is sure to win the prize available
avoid equilibrium mixing but call for equilibrium selection (for a gen-
at that contest. However, unlike in the Minority game, in the Lions–
eral theory of equilibrium selection, see Harsanyi & Selten, 1988).
Foxes game, players can win even when not alone and alternative
However, given that each of the strict equilibria has social implica-
contests offer different rewards. For example, being alone in the
tions, one that is in line with social intuition and the other in line with
Foxes' contest is rewarding, but being together with others in the
social concerns, such aspects may affect behavioral equilibrium selec-
Lions' contest and winning is even better. Similar questions have
tion without applying equilibrium selection theory, which rests on phil-
been examined in theoretical studies asking which contest structures
osophical intuitions about perfect rationality.4
induce higher levels of agents' effort (e.g., Amegashie & Wu, 2006;
We paid particular attention to the rewards earned by the different
Mathews & Namoro, 2008; Moldovanu & Sela, 2006). Unlike those
agents and to how the weaker agents fared in comparison to their
studies, we focused only on the choice of contest and not on money
stronger peers, in the tradition of our previous work (Avrahami &
invested or effort exerted in a given contest.
Kareev, 2009; Avrahami, Kareev, Todd, & Silverman, 2014; Hart,
Before describing the four experiments, let us summarize the var-
Avrahami, Kareev, & Todd, 2015), to answer questions like the follow-
ious predictions regarding possible determinants of behavior in
ing: Are the benefits available in the two contests used efficiently? Are
Lions–Foxes situations:
earnings relatively equitable or do they amplify the differences in abil-
ity levels, as is often the case in the field?
• optimism, causing participants to choose the Lions contest irre-
The Lions–Foxes game should not be confused with a market
spective of their ability relative to that of their opponents (and, in
entry game (Selten & Güth, 1982)—a situation much studied by
the experiment with fixed partners, also as a negotiation strategy)
psychologists and economists (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Kahneman,
1988; Rapoport, 1995). In most market entry experiments, players • social intuition by which choice of the Lions contest would be pos-

either enter a market at a cost or stay out of it. The rewards from itively correlated with ability

entering decrease when more players enter the market but are (in • the equilibria of the game
most studies) equal for all who enter. The cost of entering the • reactivity to the outcome of choice, which would lead to impulse
market is either the same for all players or different (e.g., Rapoport, balancing

4
Behaviorally mixed strategy equilibria seem counterintuitive because own mixing depends
on others’ rather than own payoffs as own mixing is responsible for rendering others indiffer-
ent when having to mix. Note that this is avoided by impulse balancing equilibria to which we
will refer in more detail later.
5
Selten and Güth (1982) used market entry games with asymmetric entry costs to test, theo-
retically, whether equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi & Selten, 1988) actually predicts that
only candidates with relatively low costs will enter the market.
4 AVRAHAMI
2 | O V E R V I E W O F T HE EX P E R I M E N T S
In each of the four experiments, participants were exogenously
assigned different “abilities,” which determined their chances of
outperforming their competitors. We informed participants not only
of the (monetary) rewards available at each contest but also of their
own and their competitors' abilities, and their expected performance.
“Performance” was randomly selected from a participant's ability
interval, which was uniform, with all of the three intervals partially
overlapping one another by 5/6 (for two adjacent abilities). As a result,
even the participant with the lowest ability could outperform any
other competitor (see Table 1 above).
If there were more than one participant in a contest, their relative
performance levels determined who would win. If only one participant
chose a contest, this participant got the reward of that contest, irre-
spective of performance. If a contest was not chosen at all, its rewards
were lost.
In Experiments 1, 2, and 3, we implemented repeated play with full
information feedback following every round; namely, the choice, per-
formance, and reward of all three players in the group were provided.
We could thus explore not only average choice behavior but also the
dynamics of play. In Experiment 4, players made three different
choices with no outcome feedback between choices. Experiments 1
and 3 implemented random rematching of participants into three‐
player groups (strangers design), whereas in Experiment 2, we
employed the partners design. In Experiments 1 and 2, we relied on
the same parameters, but in Experiment 3, we used a new prize struc-
ture to test the robustness of our findings. We further tested whether
contest choice is related not only to assigned strength but also to cer-
tain personality traits. In all four experiments, the prizes and the over-
lapping ability intervals were commonly known.
3 | EXPERIMENT 1
In this experiment, participants made the contest choice repeatedly
and were given feedback about outcomes after every round. Partici-
pants were not only informed about their own performance and earn-
ings but also about the choices, performance, and earnings of the
other two participants in their triad. Thus, they could appreciate how
good6 their choice was.
Each participant played in total 36 successive rounds in three
blocks of 12 rounds each. Over the three blocks, participants were
assigned all three roles: Weak, Intermediate, and Strong. Roles were
rotated on the basis of a Latin Square, such that all sequential orders
of the three roles were implemented. Thus, each participant provided
12 binary choices (Lions or Foxes) for each of the three strength
levels. The intervals defining the participants' strength were (1–7),
(2–8), and (3–9) for the Weak, the Intermediate, and the Strong,
respectively; the strength intervals were continuous to render ties
6
Later on, we will discuss in detail the fact that “how good a choice is” can have a variety of
interpretations.
ET AL.
zero‐probability events. For the players' chances of beating each
other, see, again, Table 1.
The prizes offered in the Lions' contest were 21, 7, and 7 NIS (New
Israeli Shekel) for the players ranked first, second, and third, respec-
tively. The prizes offered in the Foxes' contest were 17, 7, and 7
NIS. These prizes correspond to a single prize—of 14 or 10 NIS—
awarded only to the winners of the competitions (as specified in Sec-
tion 1) and a fixed show‐up fee of 7 NIS awarded to all.
3.1 | Method
The experiment was run in the RatioLab of the Hebrew University, a
laboratory for running computerized studies involving interactive deci-
sion making tasks. The sessions involved groups of 12 participants.
The exchange rate of points to NIS (worth approximately $0.28 at
the time) was 1 to 1.
3.1.1 | Participants
Forty‐eight students of the Hebrew University participated in the
experiment. Of the participants, 56.3% were female and 97.9% were
undergraduates. Mean age was 24.23 (SD = 2.27). Three randomly
selected rounds, one from each block, were used to determine pay.
Participants earned, on average, 42.58 NIS.
3.1.2 | Procedure and materials
Participants were seated in separate cubicles in the lab and could read
the instructions on a computer screen while the experimenter read
them aloud (for a translation of the Hebrew instructions, see Appendix
B). The instructions emphasized that, in each round, the participant
would be matched anew with two other, randomly selected partici-
pants, all with different strength levels and that all three would have
to choose, simultaneously and privately, the contest in which to com-
pete in that round. Participants were informed of the three strength
levels, their own strength, and how their performance in a round
would be determined that if they happened to be the only one who
chose a contest, they would win its first prize (irrespective of perfor-
mance), and that if a contest was not chosen by any participants, its
prize would not be awarded. They were informed that changes in
strength would occur after Round 12 and after Round 24 and would
be announced in advance. Questions were answered in private.
Participants entered their age, gender, and level of study (under-
graduate or graduate) before playing. In each round, the first screen
depicted the two contests as rectangles, with the prizes of each
marked at the top of the rectangles, and three avatars were stationed
at the bottom of the screen. A player's own avatar was green, and
those of the others were orange. The lower part of each avatar
displayed the strength interval of the player represented by that ava-
tar (see Figure B1).
After all of the players had made their choices, the screen changed.
Each avatar moved to the rectangle representing the chosen contest,
with the randomly determined performance appearing on its “body”
AVRAHAMI ET AL.
and the reward earned appearing in its “head” (see Figure B2). When
all of the players had pressed “continue,” a new round started.
After each block of 12 rounds, a participant's strength changed. To
draw the participants' attention to the change, the avatars flickered
and a message announcing the change appeared on the screen. When
the experiment ended, the outcomes of three randomly drawn rounds,
one from each of the participants' strength levels, were used to deter-
mine what a participant earned. Participants were paid and thanked.
Each session lasted approximately 30 min.
3.2 | Results and discussion
3.2.1 | Choice proportions
Participants chose Lions in.37, .56, and.78 when Weak, Intermediate,
and Strong, respectively. With a positive relation between strength
level and choice of Lions, the results are in stark contradiction to four
out of the five equilibria but are to some extent in line with the pat-
tern of 0, 0, and 1 of the first equilibrium (Pure 1) in terms of its pos-
itive relation to strength.
Another way to appreciate the correspondence to equilibrium
behavior is to examine the frequency of the profiles of play within
matched triads in a round (i.e., based on the choices made by three
participants; see Table 4). In this table, capital letters stand for choice
—F (Foxes) and L (Lions)—and the subscripts stand for the role of the
chooser—W (Weak), I (Intermediate), and S (Strong). The most popular
patterns are those with a positive relation between strength level and
choice of Lions, but the pattern FWLILS is more popular than FWFILS.
The inefficient profile LWLILS, in which all choose Lions, ranks third.
One might argue that the pattern of choices does not match the
equilibrium perfectly because participants needed time to converge
to that equilibrium. We therefore present, in Figure 1, the likelihood
of choosing Lions over the different rounds of the experiment, sepa-
rately at each strength level. Figure 1 shows that there was, indeed,
some weak convergence toward Pure 1: When Strong, participants
tended to choose Lions more often, whereas when Intermediate, they
tended to choose it less frequently. The choice frequencies when
Weak did not change systematically.
The correlation between Pure 1 confirmation and round was posi-
tive but weak, r(576) = .11, p < .001. For the two inefficient profiles
(FWFIFS and LWLILS) lumped together, the frequency hardly diminished
over the rounds, r(576) = −.06, p = .175.
3.2.2 | Earnings
Participants earned (in addition to the seven points for show up) 4.9
points when Weak, 6.7 when Intermediate, and 9.9 when Strong. In
terms of equity, although the gap between earnings at different
TABLE 4 Frequency of each of the eight profiles of the triads' choices in Experiment 1
FWFIFS FWFILS FWLIFS
Frequency (%) 6 22 7 27
5
FIGURE 1 Choosing Lions across rounds of Experiment 1, data
presented separately for each strength level (data smoothed by
kernel weighted local polynomial) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
strength levels was rather large, it was smaller than predicted by the
Pure 1 equilibrium, indicating behavioral tendencies that led to greater
equity.
3.2.3 | Choice dynamics
Given that the pattern of choices changed across rounds, a question
arose as to what drove participants to adapt their choices. Specifically,
what aspect of an outcome in the previous round drove participants to
switch their choice in the following round?
We regard choice switches as an indication of dissatisfaction with
the current choice (or anticipation of dissatisfaction should the same
contest be chosen again) and ask: What led to dissatisfaction? Was
it when having chosen against their better judgment—for instance,
would Strong switch from a choice of Foxes and Weak from a choice
of Lions? Or was it a matter of dissatisfaction with the outcome of the
current choice (e.g., not having won the high prize) or finding oneself
with others in the same contest? In the latter case, one might be more
dissatisfied when together with both others than when together with
just one other. To find out, we use probit regressions to assess what
factor best predicts choice switches.
In light of the above‐mentioned causes for dissatisfaction, we con-
sidered two types of factors that could drive players to switch contest.
One type refers to the situation in a round and another to the specific
outcome of a round. Situational factors were the role assigned to the
participant (i.e., the strength level) and the choice made. Outcome fac-
tors were the number of points won in the current round and how
crowded the chosen contest has been. We believe that these factors
cover all the information available in a round. We further considered
FWLILS L WF I F S L WF I L S L WL I F S L WL I L S
3 13 5 16
6 AVRAHAMI ET AL.

a combination of outcome factors under two concepts of response to
outcome: one to the actual outcome in both contests and one to the
expected outcome (see below for more details). The predictor vari-
ables are defined as follows.
“Role” is defined in terms of the indicator variables, Strong and Weak,
which are compared with the Intermediate. “Choice” is defined as a
binary variable—Chose Lion—with “1” corresponding to having chosen
Lions. “Points” is the number of points earned, and “Crowdedness” is
the number of other players who chose the same contest (0, 1, or 2).
Responses to outcomes in the Lions–Foxes game could be
interpreted in two different ways. In both interpretations, the current
choice by all players in the triad is taken as given. The interpretations
differ in terms of which performance they take into account, perfor-
mance that actually took place in the round, or expected performance.
The former, corresponding to the notion of regret, is based on compar-
ing what one has won in the chosen contest to what one would have
won in the nonchosen contest, given the current choice and current
performance of all three. The second, more rational, best responding
interpretation relies on judging which contest is more promising—the
chosen or the nonchosen contest—given the current choice and
expected performance of all three players. Both drivers to switching
are based on the question of whether one would have earned more
(or was expected to earn more) had one chosen otherwise and, if so,
by how much. We calculated the degree of regret or best responding
by calculating the difference between what one would have earned (or
could expect to earn) in the nonchosen contest and what was (or was
expected to be) earned in the chosen one. Both Regret and Best
Responding were assigned a positive value only in cases in which
there was a reason to switch. Otherwise, they were each assigned a
value of 0 (see, e.g., Avrahami, Güth, & Kareev, 2005, who also use
this practice).
We tested four models to predict the likelihood of switching:
• only strength level indicators
• adding to Model 1 the interaction between strength level and the
current choice
• adding to Model 2 the number of points won and the crowdedness
of the chosen contest
• replacing points won and crowdedness with degrees of Regret and
Best responding
The results of the four models are presented in Table 5.
It is evident from Model 1 in Table 5 that overall, when Strong,
participants switched less often than when either Intermediate or
Weak (with no difference between the latter two). The interactions
in Model 2 in Table 5 show that, following a choice of Lions, Strong
switched less often (than Intermediate), whereas Weak switched
more often. The results of Models 1 and 2 are practically confirming
a sanity check. Regarding Model 1, given that Strong showed a clear
preference for one of the two contests, Strong was indeed expected
to switch less overall. As for Model 2, given that Strong chose Lions
over half of the time and Weak chose Lions less than half of the
time, we would expect that Strong would switch less often than
Intermediate after choosing Lions and that Weak would switch
more often.

TABLE 5 Output of a probit regression predicting contest switching based on one's own strength, choice, points won, the number of compet-
itors at the chosen contest, Regret, and Best Responding for Experiment 1

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Strong −0.13731*** (0.03612) 0.16646*** (0.06272) 0.17538*** (0.06343) 0.16184** (0.06455)
Weak 0.01273 (0.02974) −0.11602*** (0.03873) −0.12955*** (0.04030) −0.11082*** (0.03830)
Chose Lion −0.06319 (0.05355) −0.07999 (0.05410) −0.06732 (0.05296)
Strong*Chose Lion −0.39618*** (0.08754) −0.36052*** (0.08883) −0.38319*** (0.08927)
Weak*Chose Lion 0.29735*** (0.05491) 0.28716*** (0.05432) 0.29247*** (0.05325)
Points −0.01006*** (0.00324)
Crowdedness 0.01599 (0.02612)
Regret 0.00982*** (0.00375)
Best Responding −0.00495 (0.00479)
Observations 1,584 1,584 1,584 1,584
2
Pseudo R .015 .0712 .0843 .0761

Note. All regressions report marginal effects from a probit estimation, with all other variables in the model held at their means. The dependent variable was
whether or not there has been choice switching in the following round. Standard errors, clustered by player, are shown in parentheses. The variance infla-
tion factor level (testing multicollinearity) of the relation between Regret and Best Responding (for this and for similar analyses in the following experi-
ments) never exceeded 1.8 (far below the permissible 5).
*Statistical significance at the 10%.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
AVRAHAMI ET AL.
Reactions to the outcome of a round are introduced in Model 3;
specifically, the points won and the crowdedness of the chosen con-
test. The higher the number of points won, the less inclined the partic-
ipants were to switch. However, crowdedness, although positively
related to switching, is insignificant.
Model 4, in which points and crowdedness were replaced by
Regret and Best Responding, shows that Regret is a good predictor
of switching. Given the strong effect of points won, it is not surprising
that Regret turned out to be significant. It is also not surprising that,
given the meager effect of crowdedness, Best Responding did not
explain much.
To summarize, Experiment 1 revealed some tendency for players
to move toward the Pure 1 equilibrium with experience but clearly
not toward the more equitable Pure 2 equilibrium. One might argue
that, because participants knew that everyone will be Strong in one
third of the experiment and could then attempt to earn as much as
possible, prosocial considerations were irrelevant. Moreover, because
of the random matching protocol, participants had little chance to
coordinate their behavior within triads to reach, for example, the more
equitable Pure 2 equilibrium. We, therefore, conducted another,
almost identical, experiment with two differences: Both the triads
and the roles remained fixed throughout the experiment. The reason
for constant roles and fixed triads was to see whether the most
privileged participant, assigned to the role of Strong, would exhibit
other regarding motives by choosing Lions less often. The reason for
fixing triads was to see whether the better chances to predict the
others' choices would promote best responding and hence lead to
fewer inefficient profiles.
4 | EXPERIMENT 2
4.1 | Method
Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 in that both triads and
players' roles were randomly determined only once, at the beginning
of the experiment, and then remained fixed throughout, which obvi-
ously allows for repeated game effects, for example, due to reputation
formation. Additionally, a questionnaire measuring empathy (a partial
Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1983) was administered at the
end of the experiment. To guarantee a reasonable payoff for partici-
pants who were Weak throughout the experiment, the exchange rate
of points to NIS in this experiment was 1 point = 1.50 NIS (which did
not affect the equilibrium predictions).
4.1.1 | Participants
Forty‐eight students of the Hebrew University participated in this
experiment. Of those participants, 47.9% were female and 97.9%
TABLE 6 Frequency of each of the eight profiles of the triads' choices in Experiment 2
FWFIFS FWFILS FWLIFS
Frequency (%) 3 25 5 27
7
were undergraduates. Mean age was 23.56 (SD = 2.27). Participants
earned, on average, 64.76 NIS.
4.2 | Results and discussion
4.2.1 | Choice proportions
Weak, Intermediate, and Strong participants chose Lions in.40, .51,
and.85, respectively. As in Experiments 1, the results were in stark
contradiction to four out of the five equilibria but partly in line with
the pattern of FWFILS of the first equilibrium (Pure 1).
The frequencies of the profiles of play are presented in Table 6.
The most popular patterns were, again, those with a positive relation
between strength level and the choice of Lions. The pattern FWLILS
remained slightly more popular than Pure 1 (FWFILS). The frequency
of the inefficient profiles—FWFIFS and LWLILS—was smaller here
(17%) than in Experiment 1 (where it was 22%).
Here, too, one may wonder how choices evolved with experience
on the basis of fixed triads and constant roles. The likelihood of choos-
ing Lions across rounds is presented in Figure 2. There was no trend
toward Pure 1 over time. In fact, the correlation between Pure 1
behavior and round was nonexistent, r(576) = 0, p = .930. At the same
time, the frequency of the combined inefficient profiles (FWFIFS and
LWLILS) diminished across rounds, r(576) = −.21, p < .001.
4.2.2 | Earnings
Participants earned (in addition to the seven points for show up) 5.6,
6.5, or 10.1 points if they were Weak, Intermediate, or Strong, respec-
tively (compared with 4.9, 6.7, and 9.9, respectively, in Experiment 1).
Although Weak participants earned somewhat more in this
FIGURE 2 Choice of Lions over the course of Experiment 2 by
strength level [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FWLILS L WF I F S L WF I L S L WL I F S L WL I L S
4 18 4 14
8 AVRAHAMI ET AL.

experiment, earning disparities across roles hardly changed in spite of
constant roles and fixed triads.
We found no correlation between a participant's empathy level, as
measured using the questionnaire, and the rate of choosing Lions, nei-
ther overall nor specifically for Strong participants. The correlations
between empathy and choice of Lions' for the participants of different
strength levels were as follows: Weak: −0.17 (p = .54), Intermediate:
0.26 (p = .33), and Strong: 0.10 (p = .72).
4.2.3 | Choice dynamics
Regression analyses similar to those performed in Experiment 1 were
conducted to explain what drove choices and specifically switching
from a previous choice. The same four models were used again to find
the determinants of switching and are presented in Table 7.
The results of Models 1 and 2 for the data from Experiment 2 are
similar to those found in Experiment 1, even though switching after
choosing Lions was not significantly more frequent for Weak than
for Intermediate in this experiment.
The main difference between Experiment 2 and Experiment 1 is
revealed in Model 3. Participants reacted not only to the number of
points won but also to crowdedness, via a tendency to switch when
in a crowded contest. This more strategic consideration is also
reflected in Model 4, in which the effect of best responding super-
sedes that of regret.
The simple manipulation used in Experiment 2—constant roles and
fixed triads—supported one of our predictions, namely, that behavior
would be more efficient. We also saw that accounting for crowded-
ness, an aspect of best responding, triggers this greater efficiency.
The manipulation did not support our social concerns expectation:
Choices were not less greedy, and empathy was not related to choice.
Experiments 1 and 2 used the same reward structure and revealed
rather similar patterns of behavior. But, would a different reward
structure elicit different behavior? We conducted a third experiment
with payoffs that do not question both pure equilibria but affect the
mixed equilibria.
5 | EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 was designed to test whether changing the contest
prizes would affect behavior. Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, in which
there was practically only one prize in each contest, in Experiment 3,
each contest offered three different prizes. The situation modeled in
Experiment 3 corresponds to a situation found in many (field) enter-
prises, whose employees are incentivized via rank‐dependent earn-
ings. Still, the incentive structure may be steeper in one firm than in
another, and it is not clear how agents of different ability would
choose which firm to join. To model this situation, the rewards offered
at the Lions' contest were 20, 8, and 4 and the rewards offered at the
Foxes' contest were 16, 10, and 6, this time with no show‐up fee
added (see payoff matrix in Table 8). Note that the first prize is still
higher in Lions than in the Foxes, but the opposite is true for the sec-
ond and third prizes. In other words, whereas it is still best to be first
in Lions, being second or third is better in Foxes. Moreover, the sums
of the prizes are the same in both contests. Therefore, Lions can be
regarded as the riskier choice. Unlike previously, here, whoever
expects not to come out first will not be indifferent between the
two contests (as in Experiments 1 and 2 where they would earn only
the show‐up fee in both contests). Will one take the chance of win-
ning the higher prize in Lions or focus on being second or third by

TABLE 7 Regression analyses explaining choice switching in Experiment 2

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Strong −0.11943* (0.06828) 0.22228** (0.09979) 0.20186** (0.09072) 0.18105* (0.09578)
Weak 0.04107 (0.05834) −0.01338 (0.07790) −0.00766 (0.07398) −0.00695 (0.07449)
Chose Lion 0.00340 (0.06926) −0.05490 (0.06373) −0.03015 (0.06516)
Strong*Chose Lion −0.44098*** (0.12292) −0.36198*** (0.11178) −0.35083*** (0.11962)
Weak*Chose Lion 0.12759 (0.10750) 0.10630 (0.09745) 0.11418 (0.10249)
Points −0.00662*** (0.00226)
Crowdedness 0.09646*** (0.02009)
Regret 0.00538 (0.00383)
Best Responding 0.01521*** (0.00498)
Observations 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680
2
Pseudo R .0199 .0694 .1004 .0847

Note. All regressions report marginal effects from a probit estimation, holding all other variables in the model at their means. The dependent variable was
whether or not the player switched his or her last choice. Standard errors, clustered by player, are shown in parentheses.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
AVRAHAMI ET AL. 9

TABLE 8 Payoff matrix for Experiment 3 for Weak, Intermediate, figures to those of Experiment 1 (.37, .56, and.78, respectively) reveals
and Strong players (pure equilibria are shown in bold) some movement in the direction of the first pure equilibrium, Pure 1.

Strong plays L Strong plays F Further indication that the pattern of the Pure 1 equilibrium was
more popular in Experiment 3 can be found in the frequency of this
Intermediate Intermediate
profile within triads (see Table 10). Here, for the first time, the most
L F L F
prevalent pattern was FWFILS.
Weak L 7.4, 10.4, 10.7, 16.0, L 12.2, 15.8, 20.0, 12.1, One may wonder why Pure 1 equilibrium was more popular in
14.3 17.3 16.0 13.9
Experiment 3. The simple answer is that, in Experiment 3, the prizes
F 16.0, 12.2, 12.1, 13.9, F 11.3, 20.0, 8.6, 10.6,
15.8 20.0 14.7 12.1 for the second and third places in Foxes were higher than those in
Lions. This may explain why Weak and Intermediate were more
Note. The sums are larger here than in the previous experiments because
inclined in this experiment to choose Foxes than they were in the pre-
no show up fee was added.
vious experiments. Looking at choice behavior over time, one can see
opting for Foxes? We expected the weaker players to be more likely that participants moved toward this pattern over the course of the
to choose Foxes than in Experiments 1 and 2. rounds (see Figure 3).
Game theoretic predictions for the values of Experiment 3 are sim- Indeed, the correlation between the Pure 1 profile and round in
ilar, but not identical, to those of Experiments 1 and 2. The pure equi- Experiment 3 was somewhat higher than in Experiment 1. At the same
libria are the same, but the mixed equilibria are somewhat different time, convergence to the equilibrium is still very modest, r(576) = .14,
(see Table 9). Note that to calculate mixed and partially mixed equilib- p = .001. As in the other experiment that employed a strangers design
ria for Experiment 3, one has to know not only the likelihood of win- (Experiment 1), the correlation between the inefficient profiles and
ning the first prize but also the odds of winning the second prize and round is weak and insignificant, r(576) = −.06, p = .176.
the third prize; the full probability table is presented in Appendix C.
5.2.2 | Earnings
5.1 | Method
Earnings in this experiment were 12.39, 13.63, and 16.00 for Weak,
5.1.1 | Participants, procedure, and materials Intermediate, and Strong players, respectively. In relative terms, payoff
differences of roles are smaller than in the previous experiments.
Of the 48 participants, 58.3% were female and 100% were undergrad-
uates. Mean age was 23.81 (SD = 2.20). The exchange rate of points to
NIS was 1 to 1, and participants earned, on average, 42.65 NIS. Both
5.2.3 | Choice dynamics
the procedure and the materials were identical to those used in Exper-
The four models predicting choice switch were tested and are pre-
iment 1, with the exception of the rewards.
sented in Table 11.

5.2 | Results and discussion

5.2.1 | Choice proportions

The proportion of participants choosing Lions is.34, .43, and .81 when
Weak, Intermediate, and Strong, respectively. Comparison of these

TABLE 9 Predicted likelihood of choosing the Lions' contest in

Experiment 3 (with predicted earnings in parentheses) according to
each of the equilibria

Equilibrium Weak Intermediate Strong

Pure 1 0 (12.1) 0 (13.9) 1 (20.0)

Pure 2 1 (12.2) 1 (15.8) 0 (16.0)
Partly mixed 1 .40 (11.78) 1 (17.7) .09 (15.3)
Partly mixed 2 1 (12.3) .66 (13.7) .40 (15.3)
FIGURE 3 Choice of Lions across the rounds of Experiment 3 by
Fully mixed .98 (12.2) .67 (13.7) .41 (15.3)
strength level [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

TABLE 10 Frequency of each of the eight profiles of the triads' choices in Experiment 3

FWFIFS FWFILS FWLIFS FWLILS L WF I F S L WF I L S L WL I F S L WL I L S

Frequency (%) 6 32 6 23 5 14 3 12
10 AVRAHAMI ET AL.

TABLE 11 Output of a probit regression predicting switching one's choice in Experiment 3

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Strong −0.17484*** (0.03867) 0.16055*** (0.06072) 0.15246** (0.06057) 0.12395** (0.05994)
Weak −0.04175 (0.03078) −0.07228* (0.04046) −0.08560** (0.04144) −0.07036* (0.04010)
Chose Lion 0.10295** (0.05145) 0.08558* (0.05098) 0.08726* (0.05068)
Strong*Chose Lion −0.49786*** (0.07910) −0.44030*** (0.07938) −0.43997*** (0.08355)
Weak*Chose Lion 0.11093** (0.05169) 0.10130** (0.05138) 0.10310** (0.05192)
Points −0.01182*** (0.00312)
Crowdedness 0.00546 (0.02070)
Regret 0.01587*** (0.00404)
Best Responding −0.00462 (0.00592)
Observations 1,584 1,584 1,584 1,584
2
Pseudo R .0229 .0821 .0972 .096

Note. All regressions report marginal effects from a probit estimation, holding all other variables in the model at their means. The dependent variable was
whether or not the player switched his or her last choice. Standard errors, clustered by player, are shown in parentheses.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.

As can be seen in Table 11, in Experiment 3, Models 1 and 2 told
the same story they told in Experiments 1 and 2. Models 3 and 4
mainly replicated the results of Experiment 1: Repeated random
matching of the triads seems to cause participants to disregard crowd-
edness. That is, a crucial aspect of Best Responding lost influence here
too (and unlike in Experiment 2), and participants focused mainly on
the points won. Regret, in contrast, captured the reaction dynamics
very well.
The experiments reported so far used repeated choice to study of
the dynamics of choice. However, in many life situations, such choices
are made infrequently without the possibility to directly react to feed-
back from a previous choice. Furthermore, as reasoned in Section 1
when considering Caesar's preference, the choice to be the tail of
the Lions or the head of the Foxes may be related to personal charac-
teristics such as competitiveness and risk attitude. In the next experi-
ment, participants made a choice of contest only three times—once for
each strength level—receiving no feedback between choices and then
responded to questionnaires assessing their competitiveness and risk
attitude. We wanted to find out whether without path dependence
competitiveness, the urge to win would drive participants to choose
Foxes, whereas risk seeking would lead them to choose Lions.
6 | EXPERIMENT 4
In this experiment, participants made a single choice at each of the three
strength levels. Participants made the three choices between the Lions'
and the Foxes' contests knowing the strength level of both of the other
competitors in their triad and the rewards in both contests. In addition,
participants were asked to indicate, given their first strength level, how
often they would choose each contest if they were to play the game 100
times; the latter number might shed light on participants' intention to
employ mixing. In addition, participants responded to three question-
naires assessing competitiveness and risk attitude.
The experiment was run individually on the internet: We therefore
attempted to make the procedure as easy to imagine as possible. To
this end, strength levels were operationalized via dice of different
ranges and performance as the outcome of their roll. Integer numbers
on the Weak die ranged from 1 to 6; on the Intermediate die, they
ranged from 2 to 7; and on the Strong die, they ranged from 3 to 8.
Ties were resolved by further rolls of the tied dice.7 Note that the
overlap in expected performance is the same as in the previous exper-
iments but the resolution of ties, which are relatively common,
changes the players' chances of beating each other. The new values
are presented in Table 12.
The reward to the winner in the Lions' contest was 140 NIS (about
$38.90); the reward in the Foxes' contest was 100 NIS (about $27.70).
Because we had no way to pay participants online and they had to
come to collect their fee, we feared that the usual pay would not be
worth collecting and students would not participate. Therefore, the
game was actually played out and rewarded for only 25% of partici-
pants, which allowed us to promise high payoffs.8 The payoff matrix
for all eight combinations of choices between Lions and Foxes made
by the three players is presented in Table 13.
The game in Experiment 4 has three equilibria: two pure ones,
which are the same as before, and one partially mixed one that slightly
7
The reason for further rolls (rather than breaking the tie at random) was that we expected it
to be easier to imagine. This difference in the resolution of a tie slightly changed the bench-
marks of the game; see below.
8
This maintains the one‐off interactive Aspect and its payoffs but obviously adds an addi-
tional chance element.
AVRAHAMI ET AL.
TABLE 12 The likelihood of each player outperforming other(s) in
Experiment 4
p(S beats I)
p(S beats W)
p(I beats W)
p(S beats both I and W)
p(I beats both S and W)
p(W beats both S and I)
differs from the related mixed one for the previous experiments. There
exists no second partially mixed equilibrium nor a fully mixed one. The
predictions for the choice of Lions and earnings, by strength level, are
presented in Table 14.
Following the choice task, participants provided their gender and
age and answered three questionnaires: one measuring competitive-
ness (Hypercompetitiveness Attitude Scale; Ryckman, Hammer,
Kaczor, & Gold, 1990) and two measuring attitudes toward risk (The
Domain‐Specific Risk‐Taking, DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006; and
the lottery choice task, Holt & Laury, 2002).
6.1 | Method
6.1.1 | Participants
One hundred and forty‐three participants (69.2% females) were
recruited through various social networks or by email. The mean age
of the participants was 26.7 years (SD = 4.24).
6.1.2 | Materials and procedure
The participants performed the task online, using Qualtrics (Provo,
UT).9 They were informed that they would have to choose whether
to take part in Contest A, which offered its winner a prize of 100
NIS, or Contest B, which offered its winner a prize of 140 NIS. They
were also informed that two other participants—each with a different
die—would face the same choice and that the winner of the prize for a
particular contest would be one of the participants taking part in it.
(for a translation of the instructions, see Appendix D).
Participants were then presented with three choices between
Contest A and Contest B, with a different strength level assigned to
them for each choice. They were reminded of their own strength for
each choice (i.e., the possible roll outcomes of the relevant die), as well
as of the strengths of the other two contestants. Order of own
strength was randomly determined by a draw from three lines of a
Latin Square. After their first choice, participants were asked how
many times they would choose each of the contests, if they were to
make the choice 100 times at the same strength; the latter task was
not incentivized. The choice frequencies, adding up to 100, allow to
directly test the mixed strategy equilibrium. The first choice, the
9
The questionnaires for this paper were generated using Qualtrics software© 2018 Qualtrics.
Qualtrics and all other Qualtrics product or service names are registered trademarks or trade-
marks of Qualtrics, Provo, UT, USA (https://www.qualtrics.c).
11
makeup of 100 choices for the first strength level and the next two
choices each appeared on a separate computer screen. Following the
.6774 choice task, participants answered the three personality
questionnaires.
.8125
Participants knew this when deciding; they also knew that
.6774
the formation of triads, to determine actual play and its outcome,
.6022 of only those participants eligible for payment would be made in
.2855 public with place, date, and time announced in advance via email.
.1123 All participants were entitled to their earnings for Holt and
Laury's lottery choice task (4.70 NIS on average), but as it happened,
none of them bothered to collect them unless they were eligible
for a prize in the Lions–Foxes game. All participants were
informed of their earnings and encouraged to come and collect their
rewards.
6.2 | Results and discussion
Contest choices were related to strength level again. Participants
chose Lions at a rate of.45 when they were Weak, .77 when they were
Intermediate, and .90 when they were Strong, demonstrating a posi-
tive relation between strength level and the likelihood of choosing
Lions. A comparison of the choice proportions with the predictions
presented in Table 14 reveals that here too the data corresponded
only to the first, Pure 1 equilibrium, the only one with a positive rela-
tionship between strength level and choosing Lions. Participants'
responses to the question about how often they would choose Lions
(and how often they would choose Foxes) if they were given 100
chances to choose also positively correlated with their respective
strength levels (r = .31, p < .001). The proportions of choosing Lions
were.53, .73, and.77, when Weak, Intermediate, and Strong, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, some participants indicated they would choose
Lions in 100% of the time: 7% answered this when their first choice
was as Weak, 15% when as Intermediate, and 18% when as Strong.
Participants' responses to this question were highly correlated (at r =
0.727, p < .001) to their choice of Lions in their first choice task. Six
participants, whose choice of Lions and Foxes did not add to 100,
were discarded from this analysis.
We looked again at the profiles of choices and their frequencies,
but here, they corresponded to the three choices made by each partic-
ipant. The eight profiles are presented in Table 15. Two groups of pro-
files capture the vast majority of the cases. Out of 143 participants, 68
(47%) exhibited complete insensitivity to strength via flat choice pro-
files FWFIFS (nine cases) or LWLILS (59 cases), choosing the same con-
test irrespective of strength. The latter group of participants (41%) can
be regarded as insisting on choosing Lions, most likely in the hope that
others will not. This hope was partly fulfilled; among the others, Lions
was chosen in 6%, 61%, and 83% when Weak, Intermediate, and
Strong.
Another group of 68 participants, those with FWFILS or FWLILS,
exhibits a monotonic pattern, with the likelihood of choosing Lions
weakly increasing with strength. The four remaining profiles of only
seven participants are negligible. Altogether, these choice patterns
12
TABLE 13 Payoffs for Experiment 4 in the order Weak, Intermedi-
ate, and Strong, with the pure equilibria shown in bold
Strong plays L Strong plays F
Intermediate Intermediate
L F L F
Weak L 16, 40, 84 26, 100, 114 L 45, 95, 100 140, 32, 68
F 100, 45 95 32, 68, 140 F 19, 140, 81 11, 29, 60
hardly support any specific equilibrium, even FWFILS, the profile cor-
responding to Pure 1, was selected by only 14% of the participants.
How are patterns of choice related to the personal characteristics
that we measured? We tested the correlations between the average fre-
quencies of choosing Lions and the three personality measures: com-
petitiveness, the DOSPERT measure of risk seeking, and the Holt and
Laury measure of risk seeking. We tested these correlations separately
for each role and also across all three roles. Additionally, we tested the
correlation between insistently choosing Lions and the personality mea-
sures. The 3 × 5 pairwise correlations are presented in Table 16. As can
10
be seen in the table, choice behavior is not driven by personality traits.
6.2.1 | Earnings
Recall that the game was actually played out—with random matching
and actual dice—for only 25% of the participants. We, therefore,
report the expected earnings for all participants, on the basis of
strength‐dependent actual choices. These are 55.25, 58.05, and
93.88, when Weak, Intermediate, and Strong (respectively). The small
difference between the earnings of Weak and Intermediate suggests
that Intermediate chose Lions too often, thereby letting Weak do bet-
ter than expected.
The results of Experiment 4 indicate that choice behavior is not
driven by personality traits but by the roles—Weak, Intermediate,
and Strong. Altogether and in line with common sense, the probability
of choosing Lions was positively related to strength. This observed
relationship is in contradiction to two of the three equilibria. Once
again, the actual proportions of choosing Lions differ from those pre-
dicted by the only viable equilibrium, Pure 1, which predicts that Lions
will be avoided by Weak and Intermediate players, whereas actu-
ally.45 and.77 of them, respectively, chose it.
7 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
In Lions–Foxes games, players differ in their chances of beating one
another in the chosen contest. We studied what affects contest
choice and its dynamics. Four experiments were run to observe
10
To ascertain that participants completed the questionnaires consistently, we computed cor-
relations between the measures and the subscales. We found a positive and significant corre-
lation between the overall DOSPERT scores and the scores for the DOSPERT subscales
(ranging from 0.3 to 0.6) and between the subscales themselves, with the exception of the
ethical subscale. There was also a correlation between the DOSPERT score and gender
(0.4), with females being less risk seeking than males, which replicates previous findings
(Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). We found no correlation between the DOSPERT score and
the Holt and Laury risk measure nor between either of those scores and competitiveness.
AVRAHAMI ET AL.
TABLE 14 Predicted rate of choosing Lions (earnings in parentheses)
according to each of the equilibria for the parameters implemented in
Experiment 4
Equilibrium Weak Intermediate Strong
Pure 1 0 (32) 0 (68) 1 (140)
Pure 2 1 (45) 1 (95) 0 (100)
Partly mixed 1 .47 (38) 1 (101) .24 (90)
contest choice in various scenarios. We also administered a variety
of personality measures in an attempt to understand what drives indi-
vidual choice behavior.
We found behavior in this game to be rather insensitive to
matching protocol and payoff manipulations and unrelated to person-
ality traits. Changes in matching protocol and payoff parameters had
only minor effects on choice behavior, and personality traits had none.
In view of experimental methodology, this can be regarded as good
news: details of protocol and payoff parameters do not question the
main qualitative findings. This raises the question what does deter-
mine game playing behavior.
Game theoretically, the different equilibria of the Lions–Foxes
game could account for behavior. We considered five (or three) equi-
libria of the games. All equilibria but one have been clearly rejected:
Those rejected all predict a negative relationship between strength
level and the choice of the more rewarding Lions contest, whereas
the observed relationship is positive. Even the single equilibrium that
somewhat corresponds to the data (Pure 1) did not portray the
observed behavior very well. The weak tendency toward this equilib-
rium over time is possibly confounded with an inclination to decrease
inefficiency, namely, to avoid cases in which all three players choose
the same contest and lose the prize offered in the other.
What we did find is a clear positive relation between ability and
choice of Lions that sits well with social intuition about Strong being
entitled to earn more. This may also explain why the only equilibrium
that came somewhat close to observed behavior is the one with a pos-
itive relation to ability.
We also found that, with no information concerning the outcome
of choice, 41% of the participants were optimistic enough to choose
Lions irrespective of ability (Experiment 4). This raises the question
whether participants were optimistic also in the first round of the
repeated choice experiments, as observed, for example, by Rapoport
and colleagues (Rapoport, 1995; Rapoport et al., 2002). Table 17 pro-
vides an answer to this question showing that, indeed, participants
started out more optimistic than they turned out to be later. At the
same time, this optimism is still moderated by ability. This initial opti-
mism observed here, may be the same optimism or neglect of the
intentions of others, which, according to Camerer and Lovallo
(1999), could explain why so many new businesses quickly fail.
Analyzing the dynamics of repeated play, we found clear reactivity
to feedback; specifically, a tendency to switch choice as a reaction to
an outcome that could, in hindsight, seem wrong. Reactivity to missed
opportunities has been observed before. For example, Grosskopf,
Erev, and Yechiam (2006) demonstrated the role of information about
AVRAHAMI ET AL. 13

TABLE 15 The eight profiles of Lions–Foxes choices, ordered from Weak to Strong, and their frequencies in Experiment 4

FWFIFS FWFILS FWLIFS FWLILS L WF I F S L WF I L S L WL I F S L WL I L S

Frequency (%) 6 14 1 34 1 1 1 41

TABLE 16 Correlations between choice patterns and personality measures in Experiment 4

Choosing L: all roles Choosing L: Weak choosing L: Intermediate choosing L: Strong Insistent 1 = Insistent

Competitiveness .102 (.224) .033 (.692) .138 (.101) .061 (.471) .028 (.742)
Risk (DOSPERT) −.017 (.837) .060 (.478) −.017 (.837) −.128 (.127) .086 (.308)
Risk (HL) −.102 (.227) −.110 (.191) −.120 (.153) .045 (.596) −.060 (.479)

Note. N = 143; all p values > .10. In all three measures, higher levels indicate higher level of the trait: higher competitiveness and higher risk seeking (p values
in parentheses).
Abbreviations: DOSPERT, The Domain‐Specific Risk‐Taking; HL, Holt and Laury.

TABLE 17 Proportion of choosing Lions on the first round and in the were a better predictor of behavior when a partners design was used
rest of the rounds (partners design, Experiment 2).

First round (by ability in The rest of the rounds Importantly, both versions of the goodness assessment predict the
parentheses) (%) same average behavior: If players tend to switch contest after a
dissatisfying outcome (which, on average, concerns the expected out-
Experiment 1 71% (.56, .75, .81) 57
comes), they would balance experiences of dissatisfaction in both con-
Experiment 2 71% (.56, .62, .94) 58
tests, in line with the Impulse Balance theory (Ockenfels & Selten,
Experiment 3 60% (.50, .56, .75) 52
2005, 2014; Selten et al., 2005; Selten & Buchta, 1994). Therefore,
the pattern of contest choice should correspond to the predictions
of the Impulse Balance equilibrium (see Appendix E for an explanation
forgone payoffs in driving behavior; Hart, Kareev, and Avrahami
of how the Impulse Balance equilibrium is derived). The equilibrium
(2016) showed how reaction to regrettable choices leads to quick
prediction for choosing Lions given the three strength levels and earn-
adaptation to changes in gambles; Kareev, Avrahami, and Fiedler
ings, together with the data observed, is presented in Table 18. Note
(2014) showed such reactivity to elicit fast adaptation to undisclosed
that, because the reward structure was different in Experiment 3
change in the game one was playing and hence to fast recovery to
and the chance of beating others was different in Experiment 4, the
optimal profits, and Selten, Abbink, and Cox (2005), in studying the
Impulse Balance equilibrium predictions for these experiments are
decision task “Purchasing an oil field” by Samuelson and Bazerman
presented separately. It is obvious from Table 18 that the choice fre-
(1985), showed that dissatisfaction with a recent bid is a good predic-
quencies predicted by Impulse Balancing describe the data quite well,
tor of the next bid. Altogether, this could explain why, in our task, par-
though this is less true for Experiment 4, which did not involve
ticipants do not reach the optimum in spite of repeated play.
repeated choices and in which no feedback was provided. Thus, the
Switching when dissatisfied with the outcome of a choice of either
more complicated, three‐asymmetric‐player Lions–Foxes game lends
option would end up in balancing dissatisfaction from the two. It
further support to the role of reactivity to outcome in driving
should therefore be captured by an impulse balance equilibrium that
behavior.
formalizes the idea that people balance impulses that push them in
opposite directions. The Lions–Foxes game offers two ways to assess
the goodness of a choice and hence to asses possible dissatisfaction:
TABLE 18 Rate of choosing Lions (earnings in parentheses), as pre-
one that compares the actual reward won with the reward that could
dicted by Impulse Balance (IB) equilibrium and as observed in the four
have been won had the other choice been made or one that focuses
experiments
on the expected rewards in the chosen and nonchosen contests. Anal-
Weak Intermediate Strong
ysis of the dynamics of play can reveal which definition of the good-
ness of choice better describes participants' behavior. Analysis of IB for Experiments 1 and 2 .42 (4.9) .46 (6.6) .76 (9.9)
overall choice proportions can reveal which abstract model, agnostic Observed in Experiment 1 .37 (4.9) .56 (6.7) .78 (9.9)
to the difference between the two interpretations of goodness, is a Observed in Experiment 2 .40 (5.6) .51 (6.5) .85 (10.1)
better predictor of behavior. IB for Experiment 3 .36 (12.2) .45 (13.5) .77 (16.6)
We found that actual rewards and actual counterfactual rewards
Observed in Experiment 3 .34 (12.4) .43 (13.6) .81 (16.0)
were more useful for predicting behavior in cases of random matching
IB for Experiments 4 .40 (46) .43 (66) .79 (105)
(i.e., strangers design, Experiments 1 and 3) and that expected rewards
Observed in Experiment 4 .45 (55) .77 (58) .90 (94)
14
The choice dynamics described by Impulse Balancing may solve a
mystery related to the gap in earnings between Weak and Strong
players. In all four experiments, the gap between the earnings of those
two groups was much smaller than predicted by the only viable equi-
librium. We wondered how participants managed to guarantee rela-
tively equitable sharing of the rewards. With behavior corresponding
to impulse balancing, it seems that selfish, myopic, responding to the
most recent outcome can explain this pattern of earnings.
One issue that has not been resolved in this study is that the game
did not appear to trigger other regarding concerns (see Cooper &
Kagel, 2016), even when roles and triads were fixed. This is so in spite
of the fact that social concerns have been documented often11 (for
inequ[al]ity aversion in three‐person games, see Bolton & Ockenfels,
1998, and Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). It would be interesting to find
how the game situation could be enriched to elicit some prosocial
behavior. Allowing participants to communicate with one another
before making their choices may be a promising direction.
ACKNOWLEDGEMEN T
The work reported in this paper was supported by the Israel Science
Foundation Grant 996/15 to J. A. and Y. K.
ORCID
Judith Avrahami https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5810-6279
RE FE R ENC E S
Amegashie, J. A., & Wu, X. (2006). Adverse selection in competing all‐pay
auctions. Working paper. Department of Economics, University of
Guelph.
Avrahami, J., Güth, W., & Kareev, Y. (2005). Games of competition in a sto-
chastic environment. Theory and Decision, 59, 255–294. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11238‐005‐2883‐y
Avrahami, J., & Kareev, Y. (2009). Do the weak stand a chance? Distribu-
tion of resources in a competitive environment. Cognitive Science, 33,
940–950. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551‐6709.2009.01039.x
Avrahami, J., Kareev, Y., Todd, P. M., & Silverman, B. (2014). Allocation of
resources in asymmetric competitions: How do the weak maintain a
chance of winning? Journal of Economic Psychology, 42, 161–174.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.11.002
Berg Dale, S., & Krueger, A. B. (2002). Estimating the payoff to attending a
more selective college: An application of selection on observables and
unobservables. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1491–1527.
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935089
Blais, A. R., & Weber, E. U. (2006). A domain‐specific risk‐taking
(DOSPERT) scale for adult populations. Judgment and Decision making,
1, 33–47.
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (1998). Strategy and equity: An ERC‐analysis
of the Güth–van Damme game. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42,
215–226. https://doi.org/10.1006/jmps.1998.1211
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. (1999). Overconfidence and excess entry: An
experimental approach. The American Economic Review, 89, 306–318.
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.1.306
11
Note, however, that the evidence conforming such other regarding concerns rests nearly
exclusively on deterministic interactive experiments; for experiments with crucial
stochasticity like ours, the evidence is at best weak (see Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985; Kagel
& Levin, 2009, for auction experiments).
AVRAHAMI ET AL.
Challet, D., & Zhang, Y. C. (1997). Emergence of cooperation and organiza-
tion in an evolutionary game. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its
Applications, 246(3–4), 407–418. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378‐
4371(97)00419‐6
Chmura, T., & Güth, W. (2011). The minority of three game: An experimen-
tal and theoretical analysis. Games, 2(3), 333–354. https://doi.org/
10.3390/g2030333
Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. (2016). Other‐regarding preferences. The hand-
book of experimental economics, 2, 217.
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence
for a multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 44(1), 113–126. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022‐
3514.44.1.113
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015). A survey of
experimental research on contests, all‐pay auctions and tournaments.
Experimental Economics, 18(4), 609–669. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10683‐014‐9421‐0
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and
cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817–868.
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556151
Frank, R. H. (1984). Are workers paid their marginal products? American
Economic Review, 74(4), 549–571.
Frank, R. H. (1985). Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest
for status. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Fretwell, S. D., & Lucas, H. L. J. (1970). On territorial behavior and other
factors influencing habitat distribution in birds I. Theoretical develop-
ment. Acta Biotheoretica, 19, 16–36.
Goldstone, R. L., & Ashpole, B. C. (2004). Human foraging behavior in a vir-
tual environment. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 508–514. https://
doi.org/10.3758/BF03196603
Grosskopf, B., Erev, I., & Yechiam, E. (2006). Foregone with the wind: Indi-
rect payoff information and its implications for choice. International
Journal of Game Theory, 34, 285–302. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s00182‐006‐0015‐8
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1988). A general theory of equilibrium selection
in games (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Books.
Hart, E., Avrahami, J., Kareev, Y., & Todd, P. M. (2015). Investing even in
uneven contests: Effects of asymmetry on investment in contests. Jour-
nal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(4), 395–409. https://doi.org/
10.1002/bdm.1861
Hart, E., Kareev, Y., & Avrahami, J. (2016). Good times, bad times: Reversal
of risk preferences. Decision, 3(2), 132–145. https://doi.org/10.1037/
dec0000026
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 92, 1644–1655. https://doi.org/10.2307/
3083270
Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (2009). Common value auctions and the winner's
curse. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/
9781400830138
Kahneman, D. (1988). Experimental economics: A psychological perspec-
tive. In R. Tietz, W. Albers, & R. Selten (Eds.), Bounded rational
behavior in experimental games and markets (pp. 11–18). New York,
NY: Springer–Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978‐3‐642‐48356‐1_2
Kareev, Y., Avrahami, J., & Fiedler, K. (2014). Strategic interactions, affec-
tive reactions, and fast adaptations. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 143, 1112–1126. https://doi.org/10.1037/
a0034641
Kennedy, M., & Gray, R. D. (1993). Can ecological theory predict the distribu-
tion of foraging animals? A critical analysis of experiments on the ideal
free distribution. Oikos, 68, 158. https://doi.org/10.2307/3545322
AVRAHAMI ET AL. 15

Mathews, T., & Namoro, S. D. (2008). Participation incentives in rank order Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of
tournaments with endogenous entry. Journal of Economics, 95, 1–23. Jerusalem. Research interests: Decision making in strategic inter-
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712‐008‐0017‐z
actions, the role of uncertainty in resources allocation, and the
Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A. (2006). Contest architecture. Journal of Economic
detection of change.
Theory, 126(1), 70–96. https://doi.org/10.1026/j.jet.2004.10.004
Ockenfels, A., & Selten, R. (2005). Impulse balance equilibrium and feed-
Ayala Ezer is a master student at the School of Education, The
back in first price auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 51,
155–170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.002 Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Ockenfels, A., & Selten, R. (2014). Impulse balance in the newsvendor
game. Games and Economic Behavior, 86, 237–247. https://doi.org/ Werner Güth, PhD (1972 University of Münster) is professor
10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.012 (fama clara) for economics at LUISS University Rome and emeritus
Rapoport, A. (1995). Individual strategies in a market entry game. Group director at the Max‐Planck Institute for Research on Collective
Decision and Negotiation, 4, 117–133. https://doi.org/10.1007/ Goods, Bonn. His research focus is on experimental economics,
BF01410098
decision making theory and behavioral economics.
Rapoport, A., Seale, D., & Winter, E. (2000). An experimental study of coor-
dination and learning in two‐market entry games. Economic Theory, 16,
661–687. Nour Kardos, is a PhD student at the School of Education, The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Rapoport, A., Seale, D., & Winter, E. (2002). Coordination and learning
behavior in large groups with asymmetric players. Games and Economic
Behavior, 39, 111–136. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0885 Yaakov Kareev (PhD University of California, San Diego, 1973) is a
Ryckman, R. M., Hammer, M., Kaczor, L. M., & Gold, J. A. (1990). Construction professor at the School of Education and a member of the Center
of a hypercompetitive attitude scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 55, for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
630–639. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.1990.9674097
Research interests: The detection of regularity and change, the
Samuelson, W. F., & Bazerman, M. H. (1985). Negotiation under the win-
role of uncertainty in the investment of effort and the allocation
ner's curse. Research in Experimental Economics, 3, 105–138.
of resources, repeated individual and strategic decision making.
Selten, R., Abbink, K., & Cox, R. (2005). Learning direction theory and the
winner's curse. Experimental Economics, 8, 5–20. https://doi.org/
10.1007/s10683‐005‐1407‐5 Uri Zak is a PhD student at the Cognitive Science department, The

Selten, R., & Buchta, J. (1994). Experimental sealed bid first price auctions
with directly observed bid functions. Discussion Paper No. B270. Ger-
many: University of Bonn.
Selten, R., & Güth, W. (1982). Equilibrium point selection in a class of market
entry games. In M. Deistler, E. Fürst, & G. Schwödiauer (Eds.), Games,
economic dynamics, and time series analysis (pp. 101–116). Heidelberg,
Germany: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978‐3‐662‐41533‐7_6
Sokolowski, M. B. C., & Tonneau, F. (2004). Human group behavior: The
ideal free distribution in a three‐patch situation. Behavioural Processes,
65, 269–272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2003.12.003
Spears, R. A. (2005). McGraw–Hill dictionary of American idioms and phrasal
verbs. New York, NY: McGraw–Hill.
Weber, E. U., Blais, A. R., & Betz, N. E. (2002). A domain specific risk‐
attitude scale: Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal
of Behavioral Decision Making, 15, 263–290. https://doi.org/10.1002/
bdm.414
AU THOR BIOG RAPH IES
Judith Avrahami (PhD The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1995)
is a researcher at the School of Education and a member of the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem .Authors' addresses: Judith
Avrahami, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel.Ayala Ezer,
School of Education, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusa-
lem, Israel. Werner Güth, Max Planck Institute for Research on
Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany. Nour Kardosh, School of Edu-
cation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel.
Yaakov Kareev, School of Education and The Center for the Study
of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem,
Israel. Uri Zak, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel.
How to cite this article: Avrahami J, Ezer A, Güth W, Kardosh
N, Kareev Y, Zak U. To be at the tail of the lions or the head of
the foxes?. J Behav Dec Making. 2019:1–18. https://doi.org/
10.1002/bdm.2147
16
APPENDIX A
D E RI V I N G M I X E D S T R A T E G Y E Q U I L I B RI A
To calculate a mixed strategy equilibrium, each player is expected to
be indifferent between choosing either contest, given the choices of
the other two players.
There are eight possible states for every player x, y, and z.
Whichever contest player x chooses, x could be alone, be only with
y, be only with z, or be with both y and z. If alone, x would win the
prize in the chosen contest with certainty; if only with y, player x
would win the prize with the likelihood of x beating y; if with z, with
the likelihood of x beating z; and if with both, x would win with the
likelihood of x beating both y and z.
Multiplying these likelihoods by the size of the prize in either con-
test and by the unknowns designating the probabilities of Py and Pz
that the other two (y and z) would choose, say, Lions (and [1 − Py],
AVRAHAMI ET AL.
[1 − Pz] that they would choose Foxes) and then equating expected
payoff in the two contests, we get one equation. Doing the same for
every player, each with a different pair of the unknown probabilities
of choosing Lions, we get three equations, which can be solved for
the three unknowns.
APPENDIX B
I N S T R U C T I O N S T O T H E P A R T I C I P A N T S OF
E X P E R I M E N T 1 , T R A N S L A T ED F RO M
HEBREW (INSTRUCTIONS TO EXPERIMENTS
2 A N D 3 A R E S I M I L A R WI T H F E W CH A N GE S
T O M A T C H T H E C H A N G E S I N TH E
E X P E R I M E N T S ; S EE TE X T )
Many life situations force a person to decide about entering a compet-
itive dynamic like participating in a sport's tournament (international or
FIGURE B1 The choice screen [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
FIGURE B2 The resolution screen [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
AVRAHAMI ET AL.
local) or choosing a location for a business (a central boulevard or a
side street), when success in one contest is frequently more rewarding
than success in another. In such choices, a person estimates his or her
ability, the ability of the competitors, and which contest they would
choose to participate in and from this his or her chances of winning
each of the contests. Usually, a person with higher abilities has a
higher chance to win a contest, but this win is not guaranteed. We
shall try to simulate such dynamic in the following manner:
In this experiment, we shall ask you to decide whether to join con-
test A or contest B.
Contest A awards the winner with 21NIS and both others with 7
NIS;
Contest B awards the winner with 17NIS and both others with 7
NIS.
Two other participants will choose, in parallel to you, if to join con-
test A or contest B.
In each contest, the winner is determined between those who
chose to join it in the following manner:
Every participant has an “ability” from which “performance” will be
drawn on each round. The player, whose “performance” is highest,
between those who joined the same contest, is the winner in the round.
A participant's “ability” is defined as a range of numbers, and the
participant's “performance” is a number that is randomly drawn, with
equal probability, from that range.
The range of one participant will be between 1 and 7;
The range of one participant will be between 2 and 8;
The range of one participant will be between 3 and 9.
Choice will be made always by three participants with different
ability range.
If only one participant chooses a certain contest, this participant
wins its prize irrespective of his or her performance.
If no participant chooses a certain contest, its prize is not awarded.
In case of a tie, the computer will select the winner randomly.
Game procedure:
The game has two main screens:
The choice screen, in which you will see the contests and the
prizes in each of them and also avatars representing you—in green—
and your competitors—in orange. The range of numbers representing
the ability of every avatar appears at its bottom.
To choose a contest you have to click on one of the two contests.
The result screen, in which you will see what you chose and
what your competitors have chosen in the round. Within each ava-
tar, you will now see the performance drawn for it and the prize
awarded to it.
After every round, the computer will randomly assign you anew two
competitors from among the participants with the appropriate ability.
The game will last for 36 rounds. After every 12 rounds, players'
ability will change such that every player will have, along the experi-
ment, each of the ability levels in a third of the game's rounds. In a
round in which the ability of players changes, your avatar will blink
several times and a notice will appear.
In the end of the game, you will be rewarded for three of the
rounds that you played—one round at each ability level.
17
You will receive a notice about the points that determine the
reward and the value of the reward in NIS.
Do not go back in the game. If you did go back by mistake, return
forward to the point where you have been.
APPENDIX C
I N S T R U C T I O N S T O T H E P A R T I C I P A N T S OF
EXPERIMENT 4, TRANSLATED FROM
HEBREW (GENDER‐ADJUSTED VERSIONS
WERE USED: AFTER PARTICIPANTS ENTERED
T H E I R GE N D E R, T H E Y R E C E I V E D A V E RS I O N
O F T H E TE X T I N WH I C H G R A M M A T I C A L
G E N D E R I NF L E C T I O N S M A T C H E D I T )
In this study, we ask you to decide whether to participate in contest A
or in contest B.
Contest A rewards its winner with 100 NIS;
Contest B rewards its winner with 140 NIS.
Another two participants will choose, in parallel to you, if to partic-
ipate in contest A or in contest B.
In each of the contests, the winner is determined from those who
chose to participate in it in the following way: Every player has a die
that will be rolled for him/her. The player whose value on the die is
highest will win the prize.
The numbers on one die are from 1 to 6, the numbers on a second
die are from 2 to 7, and the numbers on a third die are from 3 to 8.
From those who choose a certain contest, the winner will be the
one whose number on the die is highest. In case of a tie, the dice will
be rolled again.
If only one participant chooses a certain contest, that participant
wins its prize irrespective of the value on her die.
If no participant chooses a certain contest, its prize is not awarded.
First choice
Your “strength” is a die with numbers from 1 to 6*; the other partici-
pants have dice with numbers from 2 to 7 and from 3 to 8. Which con-
test do you choose?
Contest A (100 NIS) ________ Contest B (140 NIS) _________
If you had to make a 100 choices with this strength how often
would you choose each contest?**
Contest A (100 NIS) ________ Contest B (140 NIS) _________
Second choice
…
Third choice
…
*This could have been any of the three strength levels (i.e., any of
the dice).
**This refers only to the first strength level.
18 AVRAHAMI ET AL.

TABLE C1 The likelihood of each player beating the other(s)

p(S beats I) .6528

p(S beats W) .7778
p(I beats W) .6528
p(S beats both I and W) .5664
p(I beats both S and W) .2978
p(W beats both S and I) .1358
p(S is beaten by either I or W) .2978
p(I is beaten by either S or W) .4043
p(W is beaten by either S or I) .2978
p(S is beaten by both I and W) .1358
p(I is beaten by both S and W) .2978
p(W is beaten by both S and I) .5664
To solve the Regret–Balancing equilibrium, we also need the following:
p(S beats both I and W, and I beats W) .3549
p(S beats both I and W, and W beats I) .2114
p(I beats both S and W, and S beats W) .2114
p(I beats both S and W, and W beats S) .0864
p(W beats both S and I, and S beats I) .0864
p(W beats both S and I, and I beats S) .0494

APPENDIX D • When one of the others chose L and another chose F then with the
likelihood that x does not beat the player who joined him in L but
DERIVING REGRET BALANCING EQUILIBRIA
beats the player who chose F.
Impulse balancing equilibria assume that players balance their
impulses to switch from either of their available options. Here, we Case (b) occurs when x chose F and –
focus on balancing regret: A player chooses each option with such
probability that the level of regret from this option is the same as • The other two have chosen F, then with the likelihood that x does
the level of regret from the other option. not beat both, x regrets not having chosen L (the prize of which
We demonstrate how to apply impulse balancing equilibria for the would have been won with certainty).
Lions–Foxes game, with two contests and three players. For concrete-
• When one of the others chose F and another chose L then with the
ness, assume that there is a single prize in each contest—of 14 or 10—
likelihood that x does not beat the player who joined him in F but
in the Lions and the Foxes, respectively.
beats the player who chose L.
There are, basically, three cases in which regret could arise:

a. when choosing L and failing but realizing that one would have won
in F (by 10 points);
b. when choosing F and failing but realizing that one would have won
in L (by 14 points);
c. when choosing F and winning but realizing that one would have
won in L (by 14–10 points).
In equilibrium the regrets in (a) should equal regrets in (b) plus regrets
in (c). Here are the cases in more detail focusing on one player, say x.
Case (a) occurs when x chose L and –
• The other two have chosen L, then with the likelihood that x does
not beat both, x regrets not having chosen F (the prize of which
would have been won with certainty).
Case (c) occurs with the likelihood that x beats both others
and that x chose F, irrespective of what the other two chose. In
all combinations of choices of the other two x regrets not having
chosen L.
Doing the same for the players of all three strength levels
(but with their likelihoods of being first, being above one player
but not above the other, and being third), these cases can be
expressed in three equations with the three unknowns being the
three probabilities by which a player of each strength level chooses
the L location.
The equations become more cumbersome when there are several
contest prizes for L and F: There are more differences between what
has been won to what could have been won. But the basic principle
is the same.