A Better Metro Manila?: Towards Responsible Local Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development 1st Edition Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

A Better Metro Manila?
: Towards
Responsible Local Governance,
Decentralization and Equitable
Development 1st Edition Teresa S.
Encarnacion Tadem
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A Better Metro
Manila?
Towards Responsible Local
Governance, Decentralization
and Equitable Development
Edited by
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem
Maria Ela L. Atienza
A Better Metro Manila?
“This book edited by Teresa Encarnacion Tadem and Maria Ela Atienza is very
timely. It sheds light to one of the burning issues of our time, a better Metro
Manila within the context of local governance, decentralization and equitable
development.
Indeed, the search for appropriate politico-administrative institutions for
Metro Manila — then known as the Greater Manila Area (GMA) — continues
to this day even after half a century of existence. Metro Manila’s experience is
an excellent study of how institutions continue to evolve given the challenges
of metropolitanization and rapid urbanization. These range from rapid popula-
tion growth, pollution, flood control, traffic, housing, urban decay, solid waste
management, etc. The imperatives of robust inter-local cooperation among the
component local governments, and clear lines of authority and responsibility —
vertical and horizontal — are indispensable if metropolitan institutions are to be
responsive. Similar concerns have been addressed by metropolitan institutions in
Jakarta, Bangkok, Seoul and Tokyo. A continuing concern over the decades is
the debate whether Metro Manila should evolve into a local government similar
to its counterparts in the region.
This book is a must reading for public administration and governance
scholars and practitioners who want to understand the Philippine experience
on metropolitan governance not only in the Philippines but in Asia as well.”
—Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., Ph.D., Professor Emeritus and former Dean, National
College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines
Diliman
“As Tadem and Atienza convincingly assert, the framework of decentralized local
governance in the Philippines is at a crossroads. Urban governance presents
particularly daunting challenges, and nowhere more so than in the megalopolis
of Metro Manila. When the Local Government Code was passed in 1991, the
Philippines’ urban population totalled roughly 30 million persons; today it is
some 53 million. Since the Metro Manila Development Authority was created in
1995, the population over which it watches has grown by roughly 50% (to some
14 million persons).
Across the chapters of this landmark volume, the authors present innovative
and timely reform proposals across a range of policy realms: health, educa-
tion, housing, water service and water supply, flood mitigation and disaster risk
management, solid waste management, urban farming and land use planning,
and revenue generation. This volume thus offers a critical first step toward “a
better Metro Manila” as it provides policy guidance toward the goal of more
responsible local governance and more equitable development outcomes. There
are, literally, at least fourteen million reasons why the conclusions of the book
should be closely heeded.”
—Paul D. Hutchcroft, Professor of Political Science and Social Change, Coral
Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem ·
Editors
A Better Metro
Manila?
Towards Responsible Local Governance,
Decentralization and Equitable Development
Editors
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem Maria Ela L. Atienza
Department of Political Science Department of Political Science
University of the Philippines Diliman University of the Philippines Diliman
Quezon City, Philippines Quezon City, Philippines
ISBN 978-981-19-7803-6 ISBN 978-981-19-7804-3 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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Preface
This book emanates from the research project of the University of the
Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS),
the Department of the Interior and Local Government-National Capital
Region (DILG-NCR), and the Office of the Quezon City Mayor, the
output of which was a report entitled “Federalism and the National
Capital Region: Specific Governance Concerns,” which ran from 2018
to 2019. Based on the 2018 DILG-NCR research project document,
the study was in support of the DILG through the Local Government
Academy’s (LGA) task in leading the development and implementation
of information and education campaigns and technical studies during the
time when the Duterte administration was promoting a shift to a federal
form of government. The project was part of the National Capital Region
(NCR) Peace and Order Council (PROC), which was then chaired by
former Quezon City Mayor Herbert M. Bautista.
Thus, we would like to thank DILG-NCR for funding the project
and DILG-NCR Regional Director Maria Lourdes L. Agustin and Helen
A. Verzosa, Division Chief, Local Government Capability Development
Division. Special thanks also to Raymond Gerard E. de Asis, DILG-NCR
Research Coordinator. Raymond shepherded this project on behalf of
the DILG-NCR since its inception and until he went on study leave in
2019. We wish to also thank Maria Jasmin D. Diaz, DILG-NCR Assistant
Research Coordinator, who ably took over as research project coordinator
from Raymond. We are especially grateful that DILG-NCR allowed us to
v
vi PREFACE
develop and transform the components of our final report further into
academic pieces for publication into an edited book.
Our deepest appreciation also to Former Quezon City Mayor Herbert
M. Bautista, the over-all proponent of this research project which was his
“brainchild.” Former Mayor Bautista actively participated in the project’s
conceptualization and provided valuable inputs to the various topics
covered by this research project through a series of meetings with and
presentations by the research project leaders. We are also deeply grateful
to the former mayor in encouraging us to come out with academic
publications based on our research report.
It is with deep gratitude that Palgrave MacMillan has agreed to
publish this book. We are particularly grateful to Vishal Daryanomel,
Palgrave MacMillan’s Senior Commissioning Editor, who oversaw the
review process and provided us with additional comments and sugges-
tions, and to Uma Vinesh for her professional assistance in the book’s
production. Thank you also to the three anonymous reviewers of the
original draft book manuscript for their valuable inputs in improving the
manuscript.
We started the project with many more governance topics and writers
from different disciplines involved. However, due to multiple commit-
ments, the list of topics and writers who committed to the project until
the submission to DILG-NCR became shorter. We are, thus, particu-
larly very grateful to the chapter contributors of this book for agreeing
to transform their respective UP CIDS-DILG-NCR reports into book
chapters and their patience in being with us in every step for this book
project even as we were in the midst of a global pandemic and varying
types of lockdowns which have affected our working and living condi-
tions. We thank them for their patience in revising their chapters several
times to address all substantive and technical comments.
Our special thanks also to our very hardworking research assistant
Jesam Jimenez, from the UP CIDS Program on Social and Political
Change (PSPC), who was with us in this project since the beginning
until the book production. UP CIDS PSPC hosted the research and book
projects for UP CIDS.
Finally, our deep gratitude goes to the following past and present
UP CIDS Staff who provided this research and book projects with the
needed administrative, finance, publications, and library support: Joyce
Dimayuga, Rose Punay, Dominador de la Cruz, Ellen Cometa, Ace Molo,
Clarisse Culla, Klara Bilbao, Mikhail Aggabao, Joseph Cruzado, Virna
PREFACE vii
Guano, Zylyka Gendraule, Winston Ayon-Ayon, Patrick Cariño, Sueyen

Austero, Terence Estrella, Janus Nolasco, Mika Ramirez, and Nathaniel
Candelaria.
Quezon City, Philippines Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

September 2022 Maria Ela L. Atienza
Contents
1 Introduction: The Search for Alternative Models

for Responsible Local Governance 1
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem and Maria Ela L. Atienza
2 The Evolving Empowerment of Local
Governments and Promotion of Local Governance
in the Philippines: An Overview 29
3 Where the Gaps Are: Reexamining the Framework
of Multilevel Governance to Improve the Delivery
of Key Public Services in Metro Manila 87
Kevin Mark R. Gomez, Joey R. Loristo,
and Fatima Joy O. Pamittan
4 Where the Gaps Are: Assessing Alternative Models
of Governance to Improve the Delivery of Key Public
Services in Metro Manila 125
Kevin Mark R. Gomez and Fatima Joy O. Pamittan
5 Decentralisation Experiences in the Philippines: Social
Services Sectors and the Local Government Code
of 1991 157
Jan Robert R. Go
ix
x CONTENTS
6 The State of Health, Health Service Delivery,

and Equity of Access in Metro Manila: Challenges
and Possible Ways Forward 193
7 Basic Education and Federalism: Implications
and Options for the National Capital Region 221
Elvin Ivan Y. Uy and Dina Joana S. Ocampo
8 Ensuring the Affordability of Socialized
Housing: Toward Livable and Sustainable
Homes for the Filipino Poor 259
Chester Antonino C. Arcilla
9 Reclaiming Public Services: Giving Back Ownership
and Control of Water Services to the Public Sector 291
Eduardo C. Tadem and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem
10 Alternative Water Sources for Metro Manila for Water
Security and Resilience 325
Guillermo Q. Tabios III
11 Urban Dimensions of Floodings and Holistic Flood
Risk Management: Case of Pasig-Marikina River
Basin in Metro Manila 347
Guillermo Q. Tabios III
12 Urban Environmental Governance and Sustainable
Development: Empowering National and Local
Governments for Solid Waste Management
in the Philippines 371
Maria Lourdes Genato Rebullida
and Jalton Garces Taguibao
13 Urban Farming and Land Use Governance in Metro
Manila 407
Kristian Karlo Saguin and Mark Angelo Cagampan
14 IRA and Local Fiscal Governance in the Philippines 443
Rogelio Alicor L. Panao
CONTENTS xi
15 Risk Transfer Mechanism: Charting a Strategy

on Local Insurance 465
Dennis G. de la Torre and Erwin A. Alampay
16 Reforms and Ways Forward for Responsible
Governance, Decentralization, and Equitable
Development 489
Maria Ela L. Atienza and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem
Index 519
List of Contributors
Erwin A. Alampay National College of Public Administration and

Governance, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philip-
pines
Chester Antonino C. Arcilla Department of Social Sciences, University
of the Philippines Manila, Manila, Philippines
Maria Ela L. Atienza Department of Political Science, College of Social
Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon
City, Philippines
Mark Angelo Cagampan Independent Scholar, Quezon City, Philip-
pines
Dennis G. de la Torre Resilience Institute, University of the Philip-
pines, Quezon City, Philippines
Jan Robert R. Go Department of Political Science, College of Social
City, Philippines
Kevin Mark R. Gomez Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Pasay,
Philippines
Joey R. Loristo Center for Policy and Executive Development, National
College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG), University
of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines
xiii
xiv LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Dina Joana S. Ocampo College of Education, University of the Philip-

pines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines
Fatima Joy O. Pamittan College of Engineering, University of the
Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines
Rogelio Alicor L. Panao Department of Political Science, College of
Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman,
Quezon City, Philippines
Maria Lourdes Genato Rebullida Department of Political Science,
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines
Kristian Karlo Saguin Department of Geography, College of Social
City, Philippines
Guillermo Q. Tabios III Institute of Civil Engineering, College of
Engineering, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philip-
pines
Eduardo C. Tadem Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman,
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem Department of Political Science, College
of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman,
Jalton Garces Taguibao Department of Political Science, College of
Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman,
Elvin Ivan Y. Uy Philippine Business for Social Progress, Mandaluyong
City, Philippines
List of Figures
Chapter 3
Fig. 1 Metro Manila’s urban sprawl (Source Maps rendered based
on data collated from Reyes 1998, Shatkin 2006, Magturo
2012, Bueza 2019b, Choguill 2001, Mercado 1998, Regmi
2017, Lustre 2015) 95
Fig. 2 Metropolitan governance framework (Source Mercado
and Manasan 2002) 110
Chapter 4
Fig. 1 The Districts of Metro Manila (Source Map rendered
by authors) 128
Fig. 2 Percent distribution of Gross Regional Domestic Product
(as of 2016) (Source Original diagram by authors based
on data from Philippine Statistics Authority [2017]. “Gross
Regional Domestic Product.”) 129
Fig. 3 Framework of Relationships Among Public and Private
Institutions in the NCR (Source Original figure rendered
by the authors.) 133
Fig. 4 Crime incidents in Metro Manila (Source Maps rendered
based on collated data from the Philippine National Police-
NCR [ncrpo.pnp.gov.ph]) 135
Fig. 5 Health facilities in Metro Manila 136
Fig. 6 Literacy Rate in Metro Manila 139
xv
xvi LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 7 TVIs in Metro Manila (Source Maps rendered based

on collated data from Open Data Philippines [data.gov.ph]) 142
Fig. 8 Susceptibility of LGUs to groundshaking, liquefaction,
and landslide (Source Maps rendered based on data
collected from PHIVOLCS) 143
Fig. 9 Ranking of LGUs on peace and order (Source Authors’
own figure) 144
Fig. 10 Ranking of LGUs in the provision of health services (Source
Authors’ own) 145
Fig. 11 Ranking of LGUs in the provision of basic education
(Source Authors’ own) 145
Fig. 12 Ranking of LGUs on disaster susceptibility (Source Authors’
own) 146
Chapter 5
Fig. 1 Structure of local governments in the Philippines 2019
(Source Atienza, Go, and Esmeralda 2019) 161
Fig. 2 IRA dependence of municipalities (average), 2009–2016
(Data Source Bureau of Local Government Finance; graph
by the author) 171
Chapter 7
Fig. 1 Basic and functional literacy rates 224
Fig. 2 Total enrollment (in Millions) 224
Fig. 3 Net Enrollment Rates (NER) 225
Fig. 4 Completion rates and NAT scores 225
Fig. 5 DepEd annual budget 226
Fig. 6 Spending per public school student 226
Fig. 7 Total enrollment in NCR (in Millions) 228
Fig. 8 Share of public education in NCR Enrollment (in %) 228
Fig. 9 Net Enrollment Rates in NCR 229
Fig. 10 Completion rates and NAT scores in NCR 229
Fig. 11 Governance and basic education cycles in select countries 230
Fig. 12 Basic education as exclusive power of the federal
government 236
Fig. 13 School-based management framework 237
Fig. 14 Basic education as a shared power of federal and regional
governments 238
Fig. 15 SEF per capita by DepEd SDO in NCR 247
LIST OF FIGURES xvii
Chapter 8
Fig. 1 Summary of the NHA socialized housing functions (Source
Author’s creation) 264
Fig. 2 Socialized housing price ceiling, mean incomes,
and affordable housing of the poorest 30% Filipino families,
2000–2015 (Source Author’s computations using data
from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)’s Family
Income and Expenditure Survey for years 2000, 2003,
2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015) 268
Fig. 3 Uniform annual amortizations as a percent of mean
annual incomes of the poorest 30%, 2000 to 2015 (Source
Author’s computations using data from the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA)’s family income and expenditure
survey for years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015) 268
Chapter 10
Fig. 1 Potential alternative water sources for Metro Manila (Source
Authors’s creation) 327
Fig. 2 Angat River system with Umiray transbasin tunnel
and proposed Sumag and Biliway watershed flow
augmentation (Source Tabios and David [2014]) 328
Fig. 3 Location of existing groundwater permits issued
by the National Water Resources Boards (NWRB)
as of 2012 (Source Author’s creation based on NWRB data) 331
Fig. 4 Groundwater heads in 2055 for base case (existing
NWRB groundwater permits) and case with increased
extraction rates (1.5 times base case extraction rates)
from 3d groundwater model simulations. Initial heads
in 2016 are also plotted. (Source Author’s creation based
on groundwater simulation studies by the author) 332
Fig. 5 Laguna Lake and surrounding watersheds delineated
into 668 sub-basins for watershed modeling and simulation
for water balance studies (Source Tabios [2018]) 333
Fig. 6 Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River Basin in the eastern slope
of Sierra Madre (Source Tabios 2020) 337
Fig. 7 Alternative water resources system configurations
of Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos River system in the proposed New
Centennial Water Project in 2012 subjected to project
sequencing and staging with optimization-simulation
studies (Source Tabios [2020]) 338
xviii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 8 Resulting project sequencing and staging of the alternative

water resources system configurations of Kaliwa-Kanan-Agos
River Basin to meet the projected water demands (in MLD)
of Metro Manila (Source Tabios [2020]) 341
Fig. 9 Pampanga River Guagua-Pasac River Basins: Drainage Area
of 10,710 km2 composed of 11 major basins. For modeling
studies, the river basin is delineated into 960 sub-basins.
(Source Author’s creation) 342
Fig. 10 Long-term, average daily flow (in m3 /sec) of Lower
Pampanga River Basin from watershed hydrology model
simulation of the entire Pampanga River with 40 years
of daily rainfall data (1972–2012) (Source Author’s creation
based on hydrologic study by the author) 343
Fig. 11 Long-term, 80 percent-of time, dependable daily
flows (in m3 /sec) of Lower Pampanga River Basin
from watershed hydrology model simulation of the entire
Pampanga River with 40 years of daily rainfall data
(1972–2012) (Source Author’s creation based on hydrology
study by the author) 344
Chapter 11
Fig. 1 Pasig-Marikina River Basin of Metro Manila, Philippines
(Source Tabios, 2020) 349
Fig. 2 Major Flood-Prone Areas in Metro Manila (Source Tabios,
2010 from a JICA report) 350
Fig. 3 TS Ketsana hourly rainfall fields from 8AM to 2PM
on September 26, 2009 by multiquadric spatial
interpolation (Source Tabios, 2020) 351
Fig. 4 Flooding extent, pictures and flood computations
during TS Ketsana on September 26, 2009; Flood
Inundation Levels around Marikina River during TS
Ketsana (Source Tabios, 2020) 352
Fig. 5 Laguna Lake Level at Angono station during TS Ketsana
(Source Tabios, 2020) 353
Fig. 6 Laguna Lake Levels at Angono stations during TS Gener
Fig. 7 Residential area and commercial establishments
inside the floodplains or meander loops of Marikina River
(Source GoogleMap) 354
LIST OF FIGURES xix
Fig. 8 Another development in a meander loop with Rosario weir

structure for diverting Marikina River flows into Laguna
Lake through Manggahan Floodway (Source GoogleMap) 355
Fig. 9 Manggahan Floodway looking upstream toward Marikina
River (Source Department of Public Works and Highways) 356
Fig. 10 Local drainage channels with constricted outlet
into the major waterway and a river that disappeared, thus
obliterating drainage outlet from this area (Sources 10a,
Laguna Lake Development Authority; 10b, Prof. Siringan,
University of the Philippines—Marine Science Institute) 357
Fig. 11 Residential subdivision within Laguna Lake and settlements
inside the floodplains of Napindan River connected
to Laguna Lake (Source Laguna Lake Development
Authority) 358
Fig. 12 Forest denudation and quarrying in the upper Marikina
River basin responsible for increased soil erosion
and sediment load to rivers (Source Laguna Lake
Development Authority) 358
Fig. 13 Constriction along Pasig River around Makati City
of Metro Manila due to river sedimentation from soil
erosion and sediment load from upland watersheds (Source
Prof. Siringan, University of the Philippines—Marine
Science Institute) 359
Fig. 14 Changes in Laguna Lake bathymetry during the period
1939 to 1968 as well as the period 1968 to 1998.
Average depth (from MLLW) in 1939 is 2.52m,
and in 1998 is 2.24m. (Source Prof. Siringan, University
of the Philippines—Marine Science Institute) 360
Fig. 15 Conceptual alignment of proposed Marikina stormwater
tunnel to Agos River and/or all the way to Pacific Ocean
Fig. 16 Time series plot of Laguna Lake water level
from 2008–2011 showing Typhoon Ondoy and 2012
Habagat events (Source JICA , 2018) 365
Chapter 12
Fig. 1 Policy, Governance, and Sustainable Development:
Empowering Government for Solid Waste Management 376
Fig. 2 Devolution -- Hierarchy of Solid Waste Management
Responsibilities 385
Fig. 3 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority Structure 386
xx LIST OF FIGURES
Chapter 13
Fig. 1 Demonstration farm and nursery in Marikina (Photo
by Mark Angelo Cagampan) 413
Fig. 2 Urban farming using plastic container bottles in Caloocan
(Photo by Mark Angelo Cagampan) 414
Chapter 14
Fig. 1 IRA and public welfare spending in cities 460
Fig. 2 IRA and public welfare spending in provinces 460
Chapter 15
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework on DRFI (Source Authors’ creation) 468
Fig. 2 QC premium vs. risk transfer allocation, 2016–2018 477
List of Tables
Chapter 3
Table 1 Exclusive powers of federal and regional governments
under the Bayanihan Constitution 102
Table 2 Metro-wide services/functions across eight metropolitan
arrangements 108
Chapter 4
Table 1 Elementary and Secondary Schools in Metro Manila 140
Table 2 State and Local Universities and Colleges in Metro Manila 141
Chapter 5
Table 1 Composition of the local health boards for municipalities
and cities 166
Table 2 Dependence on internal revenue allotment for cities
in the National Capital Region, 2009–2016 169
Table 3 Total expenditures on health for cities and municipalities,
2009–2016 (in million pesos) 170
Table 4 Composition of the local school boards for municipalities
and cities 175
Table 5 Total collection of Special Education Fund, cities
and municipalities, 2009–2016 (in million pesos) 178
xxi
xxii LIST OF TABLES
Table 6 Total expenditures on education for cities

and municipalities, sourced from SEF, excluding
capital outlay, 2009–2016 (in million pesos) 178
Table 7 Total expenditures on education under capital outlay
for cities and municipalities, sourced from SEF, 2009–2016
(in million pesos) 179
Chapter 7
Table 1 Median Years of Completed Education by Wealth Quintile
and by Sex 227
Table 2 Net Attendance Ratios (NAR) by wealth quintile and by sex 227
Table 3 Comparison of Basic Education Governance in Ten
Countries 232
Table 4 Family income, labor force data, and median years
of completed education (female and male) by region 240
Table 5 NCR Revenues and Expenditures (in PhP Millions) 241
Table 6 Revenues and expenditures by LGU in NCR (in PhP
millions) 242
Chapter 8
Table 1 Socialized housing price ceilings adjustments 267
Table 2 Income deciles with average family incomes, expenditures,
savings, and affordable housing loans in 2015 269
Table 3 National Capital Region income deciles with average family
incomes, expenditures, savings, and affordable housing
loans in 2015 271
Table 4 Actual graduated amortization schedule for a PhP 450,000
loan at 4.5@ interest 272
Table 5 Actual graduated amortization schedule of a PhP 240,000
loan at 4.5% interest 272
Table 6 National Capital Region income classes with average family
incomes, expenditures, and savings given actual housing
expenses/amortizations in 2015 273
Table 7 Daily food and transportation expenses
of an above-minimum wage work relocated
in a off-city relocation in Rodriquez, Rizal 279
LIST OF TABLES xxiii
Chapter 10
Table 1 Reliability analysis of Angat Reservoir in terms of daily
releases to Ipo Dam for MWSS domestic water supply at 46
and 50 CMS MWSS demand for cases: (1) without Biliway
and Sumag; (2) with Biliway and Sumag with tunnel
capacity of 10 CMS; and (3) with Biliway and Sumag
with tunnel capacity of 15 CMS 329
Table 2 Long-term daily means of 110 sub-basin inflows
(in m3 /sec and MLD) that flows into Laguna Lake 335
Table 3 Results of reservoir optimization-simulation and reliability
analysis with Kaliwa Low Dam only (The optimum target
release is 15 CMS which implies that an aggressive
reservoir release rule [high target release] will result
in less flow reliability but too passive release rule will
result in lower firm water yield but have higher reliability
especially at 85 percent-of-time.) 339
Table 4 Results of reservoir optimization-simulation and reliability
analysis with Laiban Dam (upstream) and Kaliwa Low
Dam (downstream) in series (The optimum target release
is 20/20 which means 20 CMS for Laiban Dam and 20
CMS for Kaliwa Low Dam. The releases at Laiban Dam
goes to Kaliwa Low Dam so only the water supply
reliability of Kaliwa Low Dam is meaningful to deliveries
to Metro Manila.) 340
Chapter 11
Table 1 Flood control design level of protection in terms
of return period and other pertinent information of major
Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH) flood
control projects in the Philippines (Source DPWH website) 361
Table 2 Traditional Science and Sustainability in the Context
of Flood Management (The first 4 columns were adapted
from Yoshikawa, 2011) 367
Chapter 13
Table 1 Metro Manila local government units and current urban
agriculture offices, ordinances, and projects 416
Table 2 Selected national policies, plans, and programs related
to urban farming 426
xxiv LIST OF TABLES
Chapter 14
Table 1 Descriptive summary of variables for cities 453
Table 2 Descriptive summary of variables for provinces 455
Table 3 IRA and local income generation 458
Table 4 IRA and public welfare spending 459
Chapter 15
Table 1 World Bank-GFDRR Disaster Risk Management
Framework 470
Table 2 Disaster risk financing and insurance policy alternatives
and benefits 471
Table 3 Lead agencies for disaster prevention and mitigation 474
Table 4 Key risk transfer-related strategies, PDP 475
Table 5 Philippine DRFI strategy, local level 476
Table 6 Quezon City LDRRMF and risk transfer expenditure 476
Table 7 Quezon City estimated premium vs. risk transfer
expenditure, 2016–2018 478
Table 8 Quezon City LDRRMF budget items on risk transfer,
2016–2018 478
Table 9 Humanitarian assistance actions related to DRFI, Quezon
City LDRRMP 480
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: The Search for Alternative

Models for Responsible Local Governance
1 Introduction
When Rodrigo Roa Duterte ran for the Philippine presidency in 2016,
his battle cry was the “war on drugs,” i.e., to eliminate drug pushers
and users in the country using what he did in Davao City, where he was
mayor for 16 years, as the template. By doing this, he projected himself as
the embodiment of how a city mayor from Mindanao is able to do good
in his own constituency, giving him the political capital to run for the
highest position in the country. His second battle cry, which also drew
the attention of his supporters, was the underdevelopment of Mindanao,
a situation they accused “imperial Manila” of propagating, that is, the
resources of the south are being siphoned off to the capital city and region
T. S. E. Tadem (B) · M. E. L. Atienza

Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon
City, Philippines
e-mail: tetadem@up.edu.ph
M. E. L. Atienza
e-mail: mlatienza@up.edu.ph
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
T. S. E. Tadem and M. E. L. Atienza (eds.), A Better Metro Manila?,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7804-3_1
2 T. S. E. TADEM AND M. E. L. ATIENZA
as a form of “internal colonialism.” There was thus a need to give devel-

opment priority to Mindanao and consequently also to the Visayas. This
earned the support of the Visayans and the Mindanaoans who through the
years have felt isolated and/or even abandoned by the national capital.
Both campaign slogans echoed the importance of local governance.
That is, the drug war can be controlled at the local level so as not to esca-
late to the national level. Meanwhile, the marginalization of Mindanao
highlights how local governance should be given impetus through institu-
tional changes at the national level, i.e., greater devolution and autonomy
which will require amendments of existing laws like the 1991 Local
Government Code and/or the organic act creating the political region of
Muslim Mindanao or federalism which will require constitutional change.
Federalism was also used by Duterte and his supporters during the 2016
presidential campaign to address the problem of minority Muslims in
the south. According to Duterte and his allies, there was a need to
further localize political power at the grassroots and federalism was the
institutional set-up which will address the pressing problems of Muslim
Mindanao, particularly the need to find peace in the area. The Duterte
Administration (2016–2022) also presented federalism as the panacea to
addressing issues of poverty and underdevelopment elsewhere. This gave
the incentive to the formation of both government and non-government
initiatives to look into the different facets and features of federalism for
the country.
As a result, task forces were constituted by the government and polit-
ical parties among others to look into the transition of the Philippines to
a federal form of government. It was under this effort that the Depart-
ment of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), through the Local
Government Academy (LGA), took on the task of “leading the develop-
ment and implementation of information and education campaign and
technical studies for the transition to a federal form of government” (UP
CIDS-DILG-NCR Terms of Reference 2018). Studies have thus emerged
with regard to this. A Consultative Committee to Review the 1987
Constitution was also formed through Executive Order No. 10 in 2016
but whose members were only appointed by the President in 2018. The
Consultative Committee (2019) came out with “Power to the People:
Bayanihan Federalism, Power to the Regions (A Draft Constitution for a
Strong, Indissoluble Republic).”
Focus was also placed on Article X (Local Government) of the 1987
Constitution, which the President of the Constitutional Commission
1 INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE … 3
of 1986 which drafted the 1987 Constitution, Cecilia Muñoz Palma,

described as one which “devolves the powers of imperial Manila to the
provinces and cities in the hinterland in a clear reversal of the colo-
nial policy of over centralization” (Mendoza and Ocampo 2017, 33).
Furthermore, in one of the earliest Supreme Court decisions on Article
X, the Supreme Court “echoed a political sentiment to add flourish to
legal interpretation” (Mendoza and Ocampo 2017, 33). It wrote that
while the 1987 Constitution does not usher in a regime of federalism,”
it does “break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of local governments… to liberate the local governments from the
imperialism of Manila” (Mendoza and Ocampo 2017, 33).
All these efforts have brought calls to study the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991 or Republic Act 7160 (referred to hereafter as
the 1991 LGC), which devolves significant powers and responsibilities
to local governments and which some have viewed as revolutionary, “not
because it gives powers and responsibilities to the local government units,
but because it does so swiftly” (Tapales 1993, 22; see also Republic Act
No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991). Arguments have also arisen
to point out that there is no need for the Philippines to shift to a federal
form of government, but what is needed is to do the following: (1)
examine the provisions of the 1991 LGC to see whether these have been
implemented or not; if not, what are the reasons for these; and (2) if
indeed there are shortcomings to the 1991 LGC, to look for a recourse
to amend these.
Both advocates of federalism and those for reexamining the 1991 LGC,
however, agree that there is interest in the general public to address what-
ever obstacles there are at the moment which hinder the empowerment
of local governments. Devolution of power from the central govern-
ment to local government units (LGUs), as pointed out, continues to
be the major pathway to further the country’s democratization process
and development efforts.
However, the shift to a full federal form that was promised by Pres-
ident Duterte was abandoned midpoint during his administration. Even
the President’s economic managers argued against the cost of the shift
to a federal form of government. The Consultative Committee’s draft
Bayanihan Constitution was rejected by the President’s own allies in
Congress with the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passing their
own watered-down version of the draft Constitution, i.e., House leaders
removed the progressive provisions in the draft Bayanihan Constitution
like term limits, ban on political dynasties, and party system reform, and
the Senate not even prioritizing discussions about a federal Constitution
before the May 2019 mid-term elections. Even the President, in his July
2019 State of the Nation Address (SONA), no longer discussed feder-
alism and later clarified that federalism may not happen during his term.
Instead, an inter-agency task force he created and led by the DILG began
focusing on proposing “surgical amendments” to the 1987 Constitution
after his 2019 SONA (Atienza 2019, 2020, 133–134).
2 The Continuous Search

in Addressing the Shortcomings
of Decentralization in the Philippines
Despite Duterte’s abandonment of his federalism promise, however, the
call for a federal form of government has opened up a Pandora’s box
in reexamining the state of the country’s decentralization process. More
specifically, to what extent has it indeed empowered LGUs to take charge
of decision-making at the local level with regard to what they view are
their development needs and the political structures needed to pursue
this? This book, A Better Metro Manila? Towards Responsible Local
Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development, thus aims
to contribute to the discussions and debates which emerged from this.
Historically, the Philippines experienced a highly formalized centralized
governance structure under a unitary state during the Spanish (1521–
1898) and American (1989–1945) colonial periods. This includes the
Commonwealth Period (935–1945) as the country transitioned into
“independence.” With the granting of the independence by the Ameri-
cans to the Philippines in 1945, the country witnessed several attempts to
decentralize power but only to be halted by the advent of the martial law
period (1972–1986). The 1986 People Power which ousted the Marcos
dictatorship revived the trend toward decentralization culminating with
the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code (1991 LGC) which
couched decentralization as the embodiment of people empowerment1
(Tapales 1993; de Guzman et al., 1998; Batario 2001).
1 A more detailed discussion of this is found in Tadem and Atienza, Chapter 2.

Continuing challenges to the Local Government Code of 1991.2

Upon the implementation of the 1991 LGC, it would be only a matter
of time when studies emerged in highlighting the continuing challenges
which decentralization was confronting under the 1991 LGC. Studies
revealed that although it has been said that the 1991 LGC has brought
forth greater democratization and development from below, such efforts
have also been greatly hindered by the continuing centralization of
finances, human resources, and technical capacity which are not passed on
to LGUs. LGUs continue to complain of inadequate financing which has
undermined local autonomy. Furthermore, national development plan-
ning and budgeting continue to favor national agencies and the central
government still determines the development priorities to be pursued by
LGUs (Panganiban 1998; Legaspi 1996; Legaspi and Cabo 1996; Mehta
and Buendia 2004; Atienza 2006).
Aside from examining these obstacles to economic decentralization,
studies also assessed the continuing problem of patronage politics at the
local level where local politicians continue to perpetuate a problem of
patronage producing a “culture of dependency.” At the national level,
studies also pointed out that it also does not help that Congress continu-
ally provides appropriations for local programs and “pork barrel.” These
also revealed that although the 1991 LGC viewed the important role
of civil society with LGUs in counteracting political patronage, unfortu-
nately there is still much to be desired on this matter. This is because
the relationship between these two parties are marked by animosities and
mistrust. Although there seems to be inroads with regard to this, NGO
representatives taking part in the decision-making processes in the LGUs
seem to be more of the exception rather than rule. Moreover, research
findings have shown that the representatives of NGOs and POs in local
special bodies, e.g., local health boards, are sometimes determined by
local officials themselves or those who are close to the local officials
(Tapales et al. 1996; Legaspi 1996; Budd 2005; Batario 2001; Atienza
2006; Hutchcroft 2010).
Moreover, research on decentralization since People Power also
focused on a reality that decision-making powers and financial resources
were concentrated in Metro Manila, i.e., the National Capital Region
2 Further details of the shortcomings of the 1991 LGC will be expounded on in Tadem
and Atienza, Chapter 2.
(NCR). An adverse effect of this was the failure of the government to

adequately deliver basic services to the people in the peripheries.
Federalism as a panacea to the shortcomings of the 1991 LGC.
It is within this context that the proposal for a federal form of govern-
ment to contribute to a more enhanced and effective decentralization
emerged from some sectors, including the Duterte administration. Conse-
quently, studies have examined as a probable solution to addressing basic
issues of local government, e.g., inefficient and ineffective social services
and the persistence of inequalities in development which exist between
the national and local governments and within LGUs despite devolu-
tion. Moreover, some studies assessed whether federalism is indeed the
cure for the lack of genuine autonomy of LGUs which is stymied by the
inadequate fiscal transfers from the central government. Studies have also
zeroed in on the federalism advocated by President Duterte. Aside from
highlighting regional inequalities, he sees a federalism which will recog-
nize socio-cultural, ethnic and identity differences with special attention
on the Muslim areas in the south but also including other regions outside
Metro Manila. Thus, a major difference of the proposed federal structure
of the Duterte administration is to move from the devolution structure
of the 1991 LGC under the 1987 Constitution, which still recognizes
the existence of two special autonomous regions, i.e., the Bangsamoro
and the Cordilleras, to a full transformation of the entire country into a
full federal arrangement (Araral et al. 2017; Pimentel 2017; Tigno 2017;
Brillantes 2017; Manasan 2017; Miral 2017a; Hutchcroft 2017; Atienza
2019, 2020).
Elsewhere in the country, the major concern continues to be political
decentralization whereby the LGUs or regions will play a bigger role in
national decision-making particularly in accelerating economic develop-
ment. There is the view that federalism should also address the problem
of patronage politics and the dominance of the elites in both politics
and the economy; together with breaking up the overconcentration of
political power in the hands of a few is also the persistent monopoly of
fiscal resources in the center (Araral et al. 2017; Pimentel 2017; Tigno
2017; Brillantes 2017; Manasan 2017; Miral 2017a; Olivar and the FEF
Study Group on Constitutional Reforms 2017; Oxales 2017; Hutchcroft
2017; Atienza 2019, 2020). However, what many of the proponents of
federalism as well as those who advocated greater devolution and more
powers to the special autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao created
by law in 1989 (which eventually led to a new autonomous law passed
by Congress in 2018 and approved in 2019 through a plebiscite that

created a new, geographically larger Bangsamoro Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao [Atienza 2020, 133]) missed were more legal and
institutional reforms. Furthermore, there should be focus also on more
agency-related reforms as well as efforts to address inequality of access
to public services and development even within the so-called highly
urbanized areas, including Metro Manila.
Although the Duterte Administration succeeded in having Congress
pass the Bangsamoro Basic Law in 2018 to further strengthen the
autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, there emerged the lack of
public support and awareness for federalism. As mentioned earlier, the
President abandoned the federalism project in 2019. It nevertheless
opened up opportunities to (re)examine the current shortcomings and
limitations of the 1991 LGC and how to address this given the current
governance structure. Moreover, debates about federalism became an
opportunity to examine what governance measures currently exist in
a multilevel form of governance which can be further enhanced, e.g.,
metropolitan arrangements as well as new ones which can be learned from
experiences of countries with forms of federalism.
3 Background of the Book

Based on the above context, A Better Metro Manila? Towards Respon-
sible Local Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development
thus aims to contribute to efforts to examine the strengths and limita-
tions of the 1991 LGC and the 1987 Constitution’s Article X in light
of the Duterte administration’s initial push for federalism and contin-
uing quest for more responsible local governments. The book’s chapters
emanate from the outputs of the research project of the University of the
Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS),
the Department of the Interior and Local Government-National Capital
Region (DILG-NCR), and the Office of the Quezon City Mayor, to
study the advantages and disadvantages of federalism in the context of
NCR or Metro Manila. The research project was part of a set of research
projects which fed into the DILG-NCR study on the “The Administrative
Region of the Republic of the Philippines: A Study on the Implications
of Federalism in the National Capital Region and Considerations for
Forming the Federal Administrative Region” (DILG-NCR). This research
endeavor, in particular, was “initiated to come up with solid policy recom-

mendations for the writers of the Federal Constitution and to provide
inputs for creating a federal state out of the National Capital Region”
(UP CIDS-DILG-NCR Terms of Reference 2018). Furthermore, the
outputs of the study are intended to “be used by Constitutional framers,
legislators and policymakers in establishing a state in the NCR…” (UP
CIDS-DILG-NCR Terms of Reference 2018).
This study was, thus, made in light of the Duterte Administration’s
initial advocacy for federalism because it looks on the implications of
the progress or lack of progress in the decentralization and devolu-
tion in the country in general, and the reforms and future directions
that policymakers and stakeholders may take vis-à-vis the development
problems the country faces. These include the lack of resources, coor-
dinated planning, peace and order, as well as the risks of the unknown
in the shift to federalism. The focus on NCR is also of utmost impor-
tance because the Philippines is generally Metro Manila-centric and it
is viewed as the microcosm of the bigger geopolitics that is the Philip-
pines. The repercussions of what happens in Metro Manila also affects
the other regions in the country. While the current national administra-
tion had already abandoned its federalism plans when the project was
wrapping up, it is important to continue evaluating the current status
of decentralization and considering possible reforms (whether through
constitutional change, constitutional amendments, ordinary legislation, or
other actions) to improve governance, delivery of services, and democra-
tization particularly in the context of Metro Manila. After all, governance
reforms should not be the monopoly of a specific administration or pres-
idency. At the same time, it is important to look at the challenges highly
urbanized settings face in the pursuit of responsible governance, effective
decentralization, and equitable development.
Data gathering for the chapters were completed prior to the onset of
the COVID-19 pandemic.
4 Governance as the Framework of Analysis

The project team was guided by the objectives set forth by DILG-NCR
(de Asis 2018). The major concern was the nature of the governance
structure for the NCR which would make its LGUs more effective in
the performance of their tasks and responsibilities. In relation to this,
federalism was the proposed governance structure at the time the project
began. Thus, the team was made to examine the possible regional person-
ality of the NCR should it become a federal state. In so doing, the
project had the following general objectives: (1) to examine the strong
and weak points of governance in the NCR and, hence, to identify areas
to reform; (2) to identify the functions of the national and regional/state
governments and identify which functions can be devolved to the NCR
or to its respective LGUs; and, (3) to consolidate existing literature on
decentralization and address gaps.
Given the above objectives and questions, this book project adopted
“responsible governance” as its overarching framework. Governance
generally refers to “the various ways through which social life is coor-
dinated” (Heywood 2019, 74). Government is seen “as one of the
institutions, involved in governance” and “it is possible to have gover-
nance without government” (Rhodes 1996 as cited in Heywood 2019,
74). Heywood (2019, 74) further adds that “The wider use of the term
reflects a blurring of the state/society distinction, resulting from changes
such as the development of new forms of public management and the
growth of public–private partnerships.” Thus, this book volume specifi-
cally refers to responsible governance where “responsible” is defined as
the issue of accountability and the legal or moral obligation to carry out
the duty and “where one is answerable for one’s behavior.” Moreover,
responsible means “having to account for one’s actions to an authority or
a superior” (Cowie 1989, 1077).
With the broad and comprehensive scope of what governance means,
this book volume adopts the transdisciplinary approach as highlighted
by Tabios (Chapter 11). This approach puts importance into looking
at governance in a holistic manner which cuts across disciplines, e.g.,
from the natural sciences to the social sciences. Thus, although gover-
nance is generally in the purview of the disciplines of political science in
general and of public administration in particular, a more comprehensive
understanding of the term, particularly as it applies to decentralization
and equitable development, is enriched by the other disciplines. For this
volume, these include among others the following: economics, geography,
engineering, urban planning, education, and area studies.
Two approaches to governance. This transdisciplinary approach cuts
across the two frameworks to the structural models of governance as laid
out by Gomez et al. (Chapter 3) on “(Re)Configuring Metro Manila.”
These are the multilevel governance framework and the metropolitan
arrangements framework.
The multilevel governance framework is defined as “a complex policy

process in which political authority is distributed at different levels of
territorial aggregation” (Heywood 2019, 393). Multilevel governance has
both a “vertical conception” and a “horizontal conception.” The former
“takes account of the interdependence of actors in the policy process at
subnational, national and transnational levels, creating a fluid process of
negotiation” (Heywood 2019, 393). The latter characterizes the more
complex nature of multilevel governance as it derives from “‘horizontal’
developments such as the growth of relationships between states and non-
state actors, and the emergence of new forms of public–private forms of
public partnership” (Heywood 2019, 393). Thus, this volume extensively
examines the concept of multilevel governance and its models for Metro
Manila and how these impact social services delivery.
Another key aspect of multilevel governance addressed in the chapters
is the continuing enormous impact of the national government despite
efforts to decentralize powers under the 1991 LGC. One finds this in
the book’s discussions on health, education, and water privatization, as
national agencies continue to dominate social service delivery (see Tapales
1993; Tapales et al. 1998; Batario 2001). This is also seen in urban
development concerns such as solid waste management, flood mitiga-
tion, urban farming and land use where the national government plays an
important role. Moreover, in terms of funding for these social services, the
IRA shares from the national government are inadequate for most of the
LGUs to do this on their own. Because of this, the less endowed LGUs
that cannot collect enough local revenues continue to rely on the national
government for funding for social services delivery and urban develop-
ment projects. This financial quandary will not automatically end with the
increase in national tax allotment of LGUs due to a recent Supreme Court
decision which begins implementation in 2022 unless other reforms are
made (discussed by Atienza in Chapter 6). (For further discussions on
the IRA, see also Panganiban 1998; Legaspi and Cabo 1996; Manasan
2017; Brillantes 2017; Capuno 2017; Mendoza and Ocampo 2017;
Miral 2017a, b.) A major concern, therefore, is what multilevel gover-
nance model can do to facilitate a broad-ranging collaboration among
the various levels of governance. This refers not only to government
agencies and national and local officials but also other stakeholders, e.g.,
communities, the private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs)
(see Brillantes 1994; Tapales 1996; Atienza 2006).
As for the metropolitanization framework, this allows for a subnational-

level government (as opposed to central government) provision of services
characterized by economies of scale and externalities. Furthermore,
Mercado and Manasan (2002, 37) observed that the 1991 LGC very
much embodies the concept of metropolitan arrangement whereby under
Chapter 3, Section 33 “Local government units may through appropriate
ordinances, group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts.”
There are, however, also advantages and disadvantages to the metropoli-
tanization approach as strengthened by the 1991 LGC. The former notes
that this will give greater and broader powers and functions to the LGUs
but the latter points out that this may also lead to re-centralization, i.e.,
a threat to the autonomy of LGUs (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 37).
In general, however, Manasan and Mercado stress that this can be viewed
not as re-centralization but rather as a refinement of the decentralization
thrust. For Rebullida and Taguibao (Chapter 12) on solid waste manage-
ment, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) epitomizes
the metropolitanization arrangement as it plays an important role in this
aspect.
Strengthening the institutional framework for responsible local
governance. To render these frameworks more effect in facilitating
responsible governance, the book’s chapters emphasized the need to also
strengthen the institutional framework of local governance particularly in
the areas of social services delivery and urban development. Gomez and
Pamittan (Chapter 4), Go (Chapter 5) who covers both health and educa-
tion, Atienza (Chapter 6) on health, and Uy and Ocampo (Chapter 7)
on education note that LGUs’ social service delivery is epitomized in
the establishment of multi-sectoral special bodies to encourage local-level
participation.
For Tadem and Tadem (Chapter 9) on water privatization, it is the
strengthening of the LGUs with the support of the communities and
CSOs that can provide an alternative to the current dismal state of water
privatization. Benefits have mainly accrued to the private concessionaires
at the expense of the public in general and the urban poor in partic-
ular. Panganiban (1998) cautioned on privatization in general with regard
to delivering the needed public service goods at the expense of the
consumers, e.g., higher rates for water and electricity.
The strengthening of institutions through decentralization also looks
into how institutions can be more effective in terms of realizing economic
growth as well as addressing issues which arise from rapid urban develop-
ment, thus, the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of LGUs to
address the urban dimensions of flooding (Tabios, Chapter 11) as well as
a more effective solid waste management which is also environmental-
friendly (Rebullida and Taguibao, Chapter 12). Empowering LGUs
through the decentralization of power also means the LGUs are to
provide the institutional framework to make the most use of the growing
scarce urban land available to communities who might want to farm
(Saguin and Cagampan, Chapter 13).
Another important component of effective decentralization is financing
for local governments to adequately perform the tasks of social service
delivery and urban development concerns. Generally, there is a need to
examine the advantages and disadvantages of fiscal decentralization as
noted by Panao (Chapter 14). A proposal, in particular, to help mitigate
local government resources in times of disasters is the strategy on local
insurance risk as examined by dela Torre and Alampay (Chapter 15). As
pointed out by Kuhonta (2011, 10), “state capacity and intervention is
pertinent in the strengthening of institutions to transform society.”
Responsible governance and equitable development. The strength-
ening of institutions through decentralization, however, is not an end
in itself. An important end goal of responsible governance is to bring
forth equitable development. This becomes most pertinent because in
Philippine society, as elsewhere, there has been rapid growth but it is
an exclusive one. This resulted in the widening gap between the rich
and the poor. Wide socio-economic inequalities are further enhanced in
Metro Manila and other urban centers because of rapid urbanization and
migration.
The reality of the socio-economic inequalities which exists in Philippine
society today is further mirrored in the 2017 Forbes Richest Filipinos
survey. It demonstrated that:
the top 50 richest Filipinos in 2016, have a total wealth of USD304.8

billion. This is approximately 25% of the country’s GDP. The top 10 richest
Filipinos already constitute 17% of the GDP of $53 billion. This is in stark
contrast to 24% of the Filipino people who are rated below the poverty line
according to a 2017 Social Weather Station survey. Moreover, according to
this SWS survey 50% of the Filipino people rated themselves poor. (Canivel
2018, A5)
Moreover, “more than a year into the COVID-19 pandemic that

caused that economic hardships around the world, the Philippines’ 50
richest people grew their combined wealth by 30 percent to USD79
billion (equivalent to about PhP4 trillion at the current exchange
rate)” (Dumlao-Abadilla 2021). While the billionaires in the Philippines
continue to grow in their wealth, the majority are left to wallow with
socio-economic inequalities which characterize society’s mundane needs
such as lack of access to basic social services.
The majority depend on government for equitable development but
as Gomez, Loristo, and Pamittan (Chapter 3) show, decentralization has
not led to a uniform development in the Philippines leading to inter- and
intra-LGUs’ disparities in basic public services. Equitable development
also means benefitting the marginalized sectors of society like the urban
poor and women. As for the IRA, Panao (Chapter 14) notes that there is
the issue of interregional inequality when it comes to central government
fund transfers to LGUs. As Gomez, Loristo, and Pamittan (Chapter 3),
Gomez and Pamittan (Chapter 4), Atienza (Chapter 6), Uy and Ocampo
(Chapter 7), and Arcilla (Chapter 8) mention, the 1991 LGC provides
mechanisms to address these but there is still the glaring issue of lack of
access and equity in public services in Metro Manila, like other places in
the country. In the case of NCR’s urban development, as elaborated by
Saguin and Cagampan (Chapter 13), there is a need to address the issue
of land use planning and the manner of allocation of land resources as
equitably as possible among competing stakeholders.
At the very core of the obstacle to equitable decentralization is the
nature of development which the Philippines has embarked on and
mirrored in the experience of the evolution of Metro Manila; this develop-
ment model has reverberated throughout the country. This was a depen-
dent development which was spawned by an export-driven economy
benefitting mainly U.S. economic interests and an elite few (Caoili 1999;
see Tadem and Atienza, Chapter 2).
To address the problem of urban development and population growth,
various supra-administrative bodies were formed since the post-World War
II period (see Tadem and Ateinza, Chapter 2) to address Metro Manila’s
problems which these brought about. These problems included perva-
sive poverty, inadequate housing and transportation, deteriorating health
and sanitation conditions, among others. What also emerged was the very
wide gap among other LGUs and Metro Manila with regard to their
inherent revenue-generation capacities. During martial law and the final
years of the Marcos dictatorship (1972–1986), for instance, Metro Manila

was given by the national administration further priority concern with
regard to social services delivery and as a showcase for the country’s drive
for modernization. It viewed this as consistent with its export-oriented
national development strategy (Mercado and Manasan 2002, 264). Under
the Corazon Aquino Administration (1986–1992), on the other hand,
Metro Manila expanded beyond its previous legal boundaries and there
was a need to explore metropolitan governance structures to address
its current and lingering problems. This need for appropriate alternative
structures and models remain today.
But the implementation of national and local governance structures
to facilitate decentralization at the local levels may fall to naught if the
same type of economic development is pursued, i.e., one which is exter-
nally dependent as epitomized by the movement of influential members of
the business community together with like-minded politicians to further
open up the economy but neglects the local economy and does not result
in equitable development. This move toward further liberalization, as
part of a neo-liberal framework, was intensified during the martial law
period. This development framework is also coupled with the principles
of market-economy and privatization. The principal neo-liberal goal is
to “roll back the frontiers of the state” in the belief that unregulated
market capitalism will deliver efficiency, growth, and widespread pros-
perity (Heywood 2019, 36, 152). Neo-liberalism assumes a level playing
field and is generally concerned with growth and not equity. Given the
dominance of political dynasties in the country and the wide gap between
the rich and the poor, this kind of development model could very well be
a hindrance to decentralization efforts and responsible local governance.
Failure to address this will also further perpetuate the unequal alloca-
tion of resources in favor of Metro Manila, where the elites congregate,
and will continue to see the impoverishment of the country’s peripheries,
particularly those in Mindanao. Of course, there are various solutions
being tested and offered to bring about equitable regional development
and sustainable peace in Mindanao—which we will not discuss exhaus-
tively here as we are focusing on Metro Manila governance. Suffice to
say at this point that for as long as unequal development is not resolved,
the development process will be stymied especially in the provinces whose
population will continue to troop to Metro Manila in search for greener
pastures. The violent conflicts and war in Muslim Mindanao has also seen
the exodus of thousands of Muslim refugees to NCR. This has made it
quite a challenge for Metro Manila. Despite being the richest region in the
country, the major problems of urbanization, e.g., unemployment, inad-
equate public infrastructure and services and housing, and environmental
degradation among others, persist.
Even within Metro Manila, there continues to exist the inequality
of rich LGUs, like Makati and Quezon City, vis-à-vis poor LGUs, like
Navotas and Malabon. Economically, a solution to the inequality is by
increasing the IRA from the current 40% of national internal revenue
taxes. However, the formula for IRA distribution in the 1991 LGC also
requires amendments as currently, it favors LGUs with higher popula-
tion and larger geographical size, i.e., richer LGUs. There should be an
equalization formula that supports poorer LGUs and encourages them
to perform. Local government officials have expressed that “the funds
would not be enough for any equally dramatic improvements in local
government service.” This is despite the fact that LGUs will be receiving
more than P200 billion in additional funds starting 2022 as a result
of the Supreme Court ruling (Salaverria 2021). As Quirino Governor
Dakila Cua, president of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines
expressed, this amount “would have to be divided among 81 provinces,
146 cities, 1,488 municipalities and 42,000 barangays.” In other words,
LGUs would still need the help of the national government for the
effective delivery of services of its devolved functions (Salaverria 2021).
Aside from the IRA, joint LGU and private sector ventures are also
viewed as a strategy to spur development at the local level. Caution
is, however, also placed with regard to the kind of development which
is to be pursued. Privatization, for example, has been pushed by the
national government to be an efficient solution to addressing under-
development. But this too has political repercussions, e.g., removal of
socialized pricing structures (Panganiban 1998). The specter of the reper-
cussions of a dependent development seems eminent as found in some of
the proposals for federalism to further open up sectors in the economy
for foreign investors. There is the assumption that foreign investors bring
in more employment for locals but not necessarily as foreign investments
can be capital-intensive or may bring in foreign labor as in the case of
recent Chinese investors.
It is in this context that equitable development is a primary consid-
eration in the search for alternative models of governance for a more
people-centric development. Non-negotiable, therefore, in this endeavor
is the institutionalization of political participation of all stakeholders. In
examining social services delivery and socio-economic inequalities, impor-

tance is also placed on national laws which are supposed to complement
the provisions of the 1991 LGC to address these.
Particular frameworks highlighted in the chapters that link respon-
sible governance and decentralization to equitable development are the
following: (1) a human security framework in Atienza’s Chapter 6 on
health; (2) a human rights framework in Arcilla’s Chapter 8 on housing;
and (3) a critique of the neo-liberal framework and water privatization
in Tadem and Tadem’s Chapter 9. The human security framework which
is applied to the issue of decentralization and health services by Atienza
borrows from the UNDP classification of human security which mainly
includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community,
and political security. Citing Mani (2005), Atienza notes that human
security’s major concerns are the vulnerable, particularly those suscep-
tible to poverty, disease, conflict, and disempowerment (Mani 2005). In
particular, she points out that health is a security issue in highly urban
Metro Manila with poor, marginalized, and informal settlers unable to
access health services. With regard to decentralization, the human secu-
rity framework plays a crucial role as it combines top-down protection
and bottom-up empowerment approaches. The former refers to the issue
of responsible governance while the latter looks at empowerment as a
means toward equitable development. Atienza argues that there is a need
to establish mechanisms at different levels of government, adding that
these institutional reforms have to be coupled with an enabling environ-
ment to empower the crucial actors and stakeholders in health planning,
service delivery, and monitoring.
Arcilla (Chapter 8) utilizes a human rights approach to housing as
a social service and the right of every individual to own a house. In
Philippine society, the problem of affordable housing particularly for
the poorest of 30% families is enormous. Arcilla critiques the domi-
nant approach to socialized housing through the private production of
off-city resettlements because it violates the human right of Filipinos
to own a house. This has “created livelihood displacement, increased
transportation and living costs, and social service inaccessibility” for the
poor (Chapter 8). The human rights framework advocates for socialized
housing units which are affordable and are located in accessible city reset-
tlement, with access to livelihood, water and electricity, and other basic
needs.
The private production of homes and the issue of unaffordable

socialized housing brings the issue of private investors delivering social
services. The neo-liberal development paradigm which espouses this
carries the philosophy that private is better than public. Tadem and Tadem
(Chapter 9) on reclaiming public services and water privatization dispute
this assertion. It cites studies which show how privatization of a social
service like water in over 1,600 cities in 45 countries, including in Metro
Manila, has failed. Evidence reveals that with privatization, the costs of
water have gone up accompanied by the inefficiency in the delivery of
water services and lay-offs among other adverse effects. The ones who
have suffered the most in Metro Manila are the urban poor. They either
cannot afford the water prices or the private concessionaires have failed
to install the water pipes in the slums which they deem as “unprofitable.”
Chapter 9 thus offers alternative approaches by which water services could
be delivered by the public sector, i.e., through the joint effort of the local
government and the community and if possible, the national government.
A theme this carries as in the human security framework is the need to
empower the marginalized sectors of society and in the case of Metro
Manila, these are mainly the urban poor.
What has emerged from this research process is the consensus on the
bias to reclaim the public service value of decentralization to the people
that local governments should serve, and the implied advocacy of empow-
ering local governments because they are closer to the people. These
values permeate all the studies in this volume in light of also realistically
recognizing the challenges posed by the design and inequities in power,
resources, and other factors, between the national and local governments.
Thus, the stress on responsible local governance by strengthening the
decentralization process to attain an important goal which is equitable
development.
Decentralization, equity, and popular participation. In addition
to strengthening institutions, the issue of equity in social services
delivery and urban development needs addressing. This is highlighted
in the volume’s chapters on social services delivery in health, education,
housing, and water. Again, focus is also placed on the importance of the
state, which for Kuhonta (2011, 10) plays a crucial role in producing a
redistributive agenda in these areas as they require massive state coordi-
nation and planning. The success of such restructuring is to ensure “that
the economy continues to grow and that those whom the redistributive
program disfavors are not so thoroughly marginalized” (ibid.).
The institutionalization of powers in LGUs under the 1991 LGC

also highlights the importance of the empowerment of the citizenry at
the local level in terms of equity which is not brought about by mere
economic growth. This is complemented by other landmark laws toward
this end. Thus, the chapters on health, education, socialized housing,
water services delivery, solid waste management, and urban farming and
land use stress key 1991 LGC provisions which encourage people’s partic-
ipation, i.e., the concerned communities, CSOs and the private sector
with their respective LGUs. This produces an environment of demo-
cratic decision-making and in the process, allows the harnessing not only
of local but also of national government resources for social services
and development for all. A crucial end goal is sustainable and equitable
development.
The effective implementation of popular participation at the local level
in the 1991 LGC would also be greatly facilitated by political reforms,
e.g., the anti-political dynasty bill. Political dynasties have concentrated
political and economic power at the national and local levels among a few.
The problem is that majority of the members of Congress hail from polit-
ical dynasties and have thus refused to act on any reform efforts. These
same actors have also stymied attempts to reform and institutionalize the
electoral and party systems as a counterfoil to political dynasties.
Regarding development, a recent proposal to addressing LGUs’
inequality is by increasing the base of the IRA (now national tax allot-
ment due to the Supreme Court ruling) from the national income. This
hopefully will spur both local-level development and proposals for LGU-
private sector joint ventures. Of course, LGUs’ capacity to raise their
own revenues and implement appropriate and sustainable development
plans should also be strengthened. But as earlier mentioned, LGUs claim
that this funding increase is still inadequate to fully pay for all the social
services supposed to be devolved at the local level (Salaverria 2021). We
must also question the kind of development to be pursued. Privatization,
for example, has been pushed by the national government as an efficient
solution to addressing underdevelopment. But this too has political reper-
cussions, such as the rise of the cost of basic utilities (Panganiban 1998;
see also Tadem and Tadem’s Chapter 9 for additional literature).
A Better Metro Manila: Responsible Local Governance, Decentral-
ization and Equitable Development addresses all these concerns by first
providing an overview of the continuing pertinence of the search for
alternative models for empowering local governance. Tadem and Atienza
(Chapter 2) zero in on the experience with regard to strengthening LGUs

in the Philippines, with a focus on Metro Manila. Although the book
chapters are country- and region-specific, these may very well reverberate
in other countries, specifically with highly urbanized areas, in the world
currently confronting the challenges of the needs of megacities.
Case studies are grouped into three clusters which constitute this
volume, namely, Cluster One on Social Services Delivery; Cluster Two on
Urban Development; and Cluster Three on Financing Local Governance.
Cluster One contains chapters on the following topics: (1) re(onfiguring)
Metro Manila through models for development, i.e., federalism and
metropolitan arrangements to facilitate better social service delivery; (2)
mapping the state of services in the Philippines; (3) a study of social
services and the 1991 LGC; (4) the state of health services delivery; (5)
socialized housing; (6) public education; (7) reclaiming public services in
the water sector; and (8) alternative water sources for Metro Manila.
Cluster Two contains chapters on: urban flooding and holistic flood
risk management; urban solid waste management; and urban farming and
urban land use dilemma in Metro Manila. Cluster Three includes two
chapters, one on fiscal decentralization and another concerning a strategy
for local insurance risk transfer mechanism.
The book’s conclusion focuses on reforms, constraints, challenges, and
ways forward for policy research in Metro Manila. It highlights the chal-
lenges currently confronted by Metro Manila on efforts to strengthen
responsible local governance, effective and efficient decentralization, equi-
table development, and even the inevitability of the evolution of the
current metropolitan governance arrangement into a full metropolitan
government.
5 Significance of the Study

Despite past studies on implementation of the 1991 LGC, particularly
on the state of social services delivery, i.e., health, education, and solid
waste management (see Tapales 1996; Tapales et al. 1996, 1998; Bril-
lantes 1994; Legaspi 1996; Sayos et al. 2002; Batario 2001; Pineda 2002;
Atienza 2006; Brillantes and Flores 2012), the studies in this book come
amidst the debate on whether there is a need to do the following: (1)
efficiently and effectively implement the provisions of the 1991 LGC; (2)
amend the 1991 LGC; or (3) shift to a federal system of governance.
Furthermore, this book revisits the overarching themes of decentraliza-

tion and local governance, which continue to face challenges even after
the enactment of the 1991 LGC. The issues are further highlighted in
the context of the most urban, highly developed, but heavily populated
region in the country, i.e., NCR. Given that the 1991 LGC marked its
30th year of existence in 2021, this book offers policy recommendations
based on previous as well as present studies.
As such, this book volume seeks to update previous studies which have
already been done on the 1991 LGC, many of which are overly legal-
istic, formally institutionalist, and technical. This current work recognizes
the significance of the law but goes further by closely examining how
it affects social services and urban development. A number of decen-
tralization studies in the Philippines have also focused on political and
administrative aspects pointing out shortcomings of fiscal decentralization
(see de Guzman and Reforma 1988; Legaspi 1996; Batario 2001). This
volume, thus, seeks to provide an expanded and more recent indicative
picture of Philippine devolution and its impact on society still undergoing
rapid urban expansion.
Consider urban farming and land use, an understudied topic with
regard to the impact of the 1991 LGC. Urban farming, the topic of
Saguin and Cagampan’s Chapter 13, is now viewed as a new coping
strategy for the people in terms of food supply, security, and recreation.
Urban farming has become a crucial measure as a survival strategy for
Filipino families in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and all the lock-
down measures which have stymied the flow of food, e.g., vegetables, to
the cities.
Local risk insurance is another overlooked topic. Yet, it constitutes
an essential part of building disaster resilience and facilitating recovery
for people and their communities. Local risk insurance, written by Dela
Torre and Alampay (Chapter 15), then becomes more crucial in light
of the COVID-19 pandemic as it seeks to help address the shortage of
government funds needed in dealing with the damages caused by humans
and natural hazards. In the case of COVID-19, the government has been
distributing and borrowing money for its social amelioration programs to
help those who have lost their jobs and the temporary shutdown or total
collapse of business establishments.
A third underappreciated and less studied topic is the impact of the
1991 LGC on water services. This is particularly so in the context of
decentralization and water privatization. Water privatization, a national
policy, has fallen short of its promises to the detriment of Metro Manila
residents, especially the urban poor. There have been calls to reclaim
public services like water back to government, particularly, by LGUs
that know the needs of their communities best. Tadem and Tadem
(Chapter 9), therefore, highlight the alternatives for water privatization
which bring together the local governments in partnership with citizens’
movements. Another issue of importance, which is touched on by Tabios
(Chapter 10), is the need to look for alternative sources of water for NCR.
This issue is not touched on by the 1991 LGC, but has to be confronted
by LGUs. The growing need for metropolitanization which has also been
encouraged by the 1991 LGC, whereby LGUs can combine resources
for a more effective and efficient delivery of social services, is a model
looked upon by which to address this problem. The topic also brings to
light how these LGUs will harness the support of the national govern-
ment toward this endeavor, leading to the reexamination of the debate of
re-centralization vis-à-vis devolution of power to LGUs.
All in all, this book seeks to contribute to the now currently shelved
debate, but possibly will reemerge in the near future or medium-term
again, on the proposed shift to a federal form of government and attempts
to foresee the implications of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Further-
more, the state of decentralization as assessed by the chapters and their
policy recommendations can help policymakers by serving as a guide on
how a federal system or other hybrid alternative arrangements may unfold
in practice.
Finally, this book usefully provides multidisciplinary perspectives on
responsible local governance. Although a number of research projects
have been undertaken and published on assessing the implementation
of the 1991 LGC, these publications have generally been from the
perspectives of the following disciplines: (1) political science, (2) public
administration; and (3) economics. This book continues to draw from
the specialists in these disciplines, but their studies are complemented
by authors whose expertise are in the areas of geography, education,
engineering, and area studies, among others. The value of the insights
provided for in the book, however, goes beyond these disciplines as it
can also be used by scholars in the fields of sociology and urban plan-
ning among others. By multidisciplinarity here, we mean that the whole
book draws on the knowledge from different disciplines on Metro Manila
governance and responsible local governance; however, we hope that
the findings will contribute in the future to further interdisciplinarity by
linking various disciplines in their analyses and syntheses of findings and

recommendations on the subject.
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Araral, Eduardo, Jr., Paul D. Hutchcroft, Gilberto M. Llanto, Jonathan E.
Malaya, Ronald U. Mendoza, and Julio C. Teehankee. 2017. Debate on
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Atienza, Maria Ela L. 2006. “Local Governments and Devolution in the Philip-
pines.” In Philippine Politics and Governance: An Introduction, edited by Noel
M. Morada and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Quezon City: Department of
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———. 2019. “From ‘Big Bang’ to Incremental Changes to the 1987 Philippine
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proposal originated.
57. If the House of Representatives passes any proposed law,

and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with
amendments to which the House of Representatives will not
agree, and if after an interval of three months the House of
Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes
the proposed law with or without any amendments which have
been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the
Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with
agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the
House of Representatives simultaneously. But such dissolution
shall not take place within six months before the date of the
expiry of the House of Representatives by effluxion of time.
If after such dissolution the House of Representatives again
passes the proposed law, with or without any amendments which
have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the
Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with
agree, the Governor-General may convene a joint sitting of the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. The
members present at the joint sitting may deliberate and shall
vote together upon the proposed law as last proposed by the
House of Representatives, and upon amendments, if any, which
have been made therein by one House and not agreed to by the
other, and any such amendments which are affirmed by an
absolute majority of the total number of the members of the
Senate and House of Representatives shall be taken to have
been carried, and if the proposed law, with the amendments, if
any, so carried is affirmed by an absolute majority of the
total number of the members of the Senate and House of
Representatives, it shall be taken to have been duly passed by
both Houses of the Parliament, and shall be presented to the
Governor-General for the Queen's assent.
58. When a proposed law passed by both Houses of the

Parliament is presented to the Governor-General for the
Queen's assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion,
but subject to this Constitution, that he assents in the
Queen's name, or that he withholds assent, or that he reserves
the law for the Queen's pleasure. The Governor-General may
return to the house in which it originated any proposed law so
presented to him, and may transmit therewith any amendments
which he may recommend, and the Houses may deal with the
recommendation.
59. The Queen may disallow any law within one year from the
Governor-General's assent, and such disallowance on being made
known by the Governor-General by speech or message to each of
the Houses of the Parliament, or by Proclamation, shall annul
the law from the day when the disallowance is so made known.
60. A proposed law reserved for the Queen's pleasure shall not
have any force unless and until within two years from the day
on which it was presented to the Governor-General for the
Queen's assent the Governor-General makes known, by speech or
message to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by
Proclamation, that it has received the Queen's assent.
CHAPTER II. THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT.
61. The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the

Queen and is exerciseable by the Governor-General as the
Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and
maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the
Commonwealth.
62. There shall be a Federal Executive Council to advise the

Governor-General in the government of the Commonwealth, and
the members of the Council shall be chosen and summoned by the
Governor-General and sworn as Executive Councillors, and shall
hold office during his pleasure.
63. The provisions of this Constitution referring to the
Governor-General in Council shall be construed as referring to
the Governor-General acting with the advice of the Federal
Executive Council.
64. The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer

such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the
Governor-General in Council may establish. Such officers shall
hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They
shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall
be the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth. After
the first general election no Minister of State shall hold
office for a longer period than three months unless he is or
becomes a senator or a member of the House of Representatives.
{160}
65. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Ministers of

State shall not exceed seven in number, and shall hold such
offices as the Parliament prescribes, or, in the absence of
provision, as the Governor-General directs.
66. There shall be payable to the Queen, out of the

Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Commonwealth, for the
salaries of the Ministers of State, an annual sum which, until
the Parliament otherwise provides, shall not exceed twelve
thousand pounds a year.
67. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the appointment

and removal of all other officers of the Executive Government
of the Commonwealth shall be vested in the Governor-General in
Council, unless the appointment is delegated by the
Governor-General in Council or by a law of the Commonwealth to
some other authority.
68. The command in chief of the naval and military forces of

the Commonwealth is vested in the Governor-General as the
Queen's representative.
69. On a date or dates to be proclaimed by the

Governor-General after the establishment of the Commonwealth
the following departments of the public service in each State
shall become transferred to the Commonwealth:—Posts,
telegraphs, and telephones: Naval and military defence:
Lighthouses, lightships, beacons, and buoys: Quarantine. But
the departments of customs and of excise in each State shall
become transferred to the Commonwealth on its establishment.
70. In respect of matters which, under this Constitution, pass

to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth, all powers
and functions which at the establishment of the Commonwealth
are vested in the Governor of a Colony, or in the Governor of
a Colony with the advice of his Executive Council, or in any
authority of a Colony, shall vest in the Governor-General, or
in the Governor-General in Council, or in the authority
exercising similar powers under the Commonwealth, as the case
requires.
CHAPTER III. THE JUDICATURE.
71. The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in

a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of
Australia, and in such other federal courts as the Parliament
creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal
jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice,
and so many other Justices, not less than two, as the
Parliament prescribes.
72. The Justices of the High Court and of the other courts
created by the Parliament—
(i.) Shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council:

(ii.) Shall not be removed except by the Governor-General in
Council, on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in
the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of
proved misbehaviour or incapacity:
(iii.) Shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may

fix; but the remuneration shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
73. The High Court shall have jurisdiction, with such

exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament
prescribes, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments,
decrees, orders, and sentences—
(i.) Of any Justice or Justices exercising the original

jurisdiction of the High Court:
(ii.) Of any other federal court, or court exercising federal

jurisdiction; or of the Supreme Court of any State, or of any
other court of any State from which at the establishment of
the Commonwealth an appeal lies to the Queen in Council:
(iii.) Of the Inter-State Commission, but as to questions of

law only: and the judgment of the High Court in all such cases
shall be final and conclusive. But no exception or regulation
prescribed by the Parliament shall prevent the High Court from
hearing and determining any appeal from the Supreme Court of a
State in any matter in which at the establishment of the
Commonwealth an appeal lies from such Supreme Court to the
Queen in Council. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the
conditions of and restrictions on appeals to the Queen in
Council from the Supreme Courts of the several States shall be
applicable to appeals from them to the High Court.
74. No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council from

a decision of the High Court upon any question, howsoever
arising, as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional
powers of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States,
or as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of
any two or more States, unless the High Court shall certify
that the question is one which ought to be determined by Her
Majesty in Council. The High Court may so certify if satisfied
that for any special reason the certificate should be granted,
and thereupon an appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council on
the question without further leave. Except as provided in this
section, this Constitution shall not impair any right which
the Queen may be pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal
prerogative to grant special leave of appeal from the High
Court to Her Majesty in Council. The Parliament may make laws
limiting the matters in which such leave may be asked, but
proposed laws containing any such limitation shall be reserved
by the Governor-General for Her Majesty's pleasure.
75. In all matters—
(i.) Arising under any treaty:
(ii.) Affecting consuls or other representatives of other

countries:
(iii.) In which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being

sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party:
(iv.) Between States, or between residents of different

States, or between a State and a resident of another State:
(v.) In which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an

injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth:
the High Court shall have original jurisdiction.
76. The Parliament may make laws conferring original

jurisdiction on the High Court in any matter—
(i.) Arising under this Constitution, or involving its
interpretation:
(ii.) Arising under any laws made by the Parliament:
(iii.) Of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction:
(iv.) Relating to the same subject-matter claimed under the

laws of different States.
77. With respect to any of the matters mentioned in the last

two sections the Parliament may make laws—
(i.) Defining the jurisdiction of any federal court other than

the High Court:
(ii.) Defining the extent to which the jurisdiction of any

federal court shall be exclusive of that which belongs to or
is invested in the courts of the States:
(iii.) Investing any court of a State with federal

jurisdiction.
{161}
78. The Parliament may make laws conferring rights to proceed

against the Commonwealth or a State in respect of matters
within the limits of the judicial power.
79. The federal jurisdiction of any court may be exercised by

such number of judges as the Parliament prescribes.
80. The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of

the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and every such trial shall
be held in the State where the offence was committed, and if
the offence was not committed within any State the trial shall
be held at such place or places as the Parliament prescribes.
CHAPTER IV. FINANCE AND TRADE.
81. All revenues or moneys raised or received by the Executive

Government of the Commonwealth shall form one Consolidated
Revenue Fund, to be appropriated for the purposes of the
Commonwealth in the manner and subject to the charges and
liabilities imposed by this Constitution.
82. The costs, charges, and expenses incident to the

collection, management, and receipt of the Consolidated
Revenue Fund shall form the first charge thereon; and the
revenue of the Commonwealth shall in the first instance be
applied to the payment of the expenditure of the Commonwealth.
83. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the

Commonwealth except under appropriation made by law. But until
the expiration of one month after the first meeting of the
Parliament the Governor-General in Council may draw from the
Treasury and expend such moneys as may be necessary for the
maintenance of any department transferred to the Commonwealth
and for the holding of the first elections for the Parliament.
84. When any department of the public service of a State

becomes transferred to the Commonwealth, all officers of the
department shall become subject to the control of the
Executive Government of the Commonwealth. Any such officer who
is not retained in the service of the Commonwealth shall,
unless he is appointed to some other' office of equal
emolument in the public service of the State, be entitled to
receive from the State any pension, gratuity, or other
compensation, payable under the law of the State on the
abolition of his office. Any such officer who is retained in
the service of the Commonwealth shall preserve all his
existing and accruing rights, and shall be entitled to retire
from office at the time, and on the pension or retiring
allowance, which would be permitted by the law of the State if
his service with the Commonwealth were a continuation of his
service with the State. Such pension or retiring allowance
shall be paid to him by the Commonwealth: but the State shall
pay to the Commonwealth a part thereof, to be calculated on
the proportion which his term of service with the State bears
to his whole term of service, and for the purpose of the
calculation his salary shall be taken to be that paid to him
by the State at the time of the transfer. Any officer who is,
at the establishment of the Commonwealth, in the public
service of a State, and who is, by consent of the Governor of
the State with the advice of the Executive Council thereof,
transferred to the public service of the Commonwealth, shall
have the same rights as if he had been an officer of a
department transferred to the Commonwealth and were retained
in the service of the Commonwealth.
85. When any department of the public service of a State is

transferred to the Commonwealth—
(i.) All property of the State of any kind, used exclusively

in connexion with the department, shall become vested in the
Commonwealth; but, in the case of the departments controlling
customs and excise and bounties, for such time only as the
Governor-General in Council may declare to be necessary:
(ii.) The Commonwealth may acquire any property of the State,

of any kind used, but not exclusively used in connexion with
the department: the value thereof shall, if no agreement can
be made, be ascertained in, as nearly as may be, the manner in
which the value of land, or of an interest in land, taken by
the State for public purposes is ascertained under the law of
the State in force at the establishment of the Commonwealth:
(iii.) The Commonwealth shall compensate the State for the

value of any property passing to the Commonwealth under this
section; if no agreement can be made as to the mode of
compensation, it shall be determined under laws to be made by
the Parliament:
(iv.) The Commonwealth shall, at the date of the transfer,

assume the current obligations of the State in respect of the
department transferred.
86. On the establishment of the Commonwealth, the collection

and control of duties of customs and of excise, and the
control of the payment of bounties, shall pass to the
Executive Government of the Commonwealth.
87. During a period of ten years after the establishment of

the Commonwealth and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise
provides, of the net revenue of the Commonwealth from duties
of customs and of excise not more than one-fourth shall be
applied annually by the Commonwealth towards its expenditure.
The balance shall, in accordance with this Constitution, be
paid to the several States, or applied towards the payment of
interest on debts of the several States taken over by the
Commonwealth.
88. Uniform duties of customs shall be imposed within two

years after the establishment of the Commonwealth.
89. Until the imposition of uniform duties of customs—
(i.) The Commonwealth shall credit to each State the revenues

collected therein by the Commonwealth.
(ii.) The Commonwealth shall debit to each State—
(a) The expenditure therein of the Commonwealth

incurred solely for the maintenance or continuance, as at
the time of transfer, of any department transferred from
the State to the Commonwealth;
(b) The proportion of the State, according to the
number of its people, in the other expenditure of the
Commonwealth.
(iii.) The Commonwealth shall pay to each State month by month

the balance (if any) in favour of the State.
{162}
90. On the imposition of uniform duties of customs the power

of the Parliament to impose duties of customs and of excise,
and to grant bounties on the production or export of goods,
shall become exclusive. On the imposition of uniform duties of
customs all laws of the several States imposing duties of customs
or of excise, or offering bounties on the production or export
of goods, shall cease to have effect, but any grant of or
agreement for any such bounty lawfully made by or under the
authority of the Government of any State shall be taken to be
good if made before the thirtieth day of June, one thousand
eight hundred and ninety-eight, and not otherwise.
91. Nothing in this Constitution prohibits a State from

granting any aid to or bounty on mining for gold, silver, or
other metals, nor from granting, with the consent of both
Houses of the Parliament of the Commonwealth expressed by
resolution, any aid to or bounty on the production or export
of goods.
92. On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade,

commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means
of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely
free. But notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, goods
imported before the imposition of uniform duties of customs
into any State, or into any Colony which, whilst the goods
remain therein, becomes a State, shall, on thence passing into
another State within two years after the imposition of such
duties, be liable to any duty chargeable on the importation of
such goods into the Commonwealth, less any duty paid in
respect of the goods on their importation.
93. During the first five years after the imposition of

uniform duties of customs, and thereafter until the Parliament
otherwise provides—
(i.) The duties of customs chargeable on goods imported into a

State and afterwards passing into another State for
consumption, and the duties of excise paid on goods produced
or manufactured in a State and afterwards passing into another
State for consumption, shall be taken to have been collected
not in the former but in the latter State:
(ii.) Subject to the last subsection, the Commonwealth shall

credit revenue, debit expenditure, and pay balances to the
several States as prescribed for the period preceding the
imposition of uniform duties of customs.
94. After five years from the imposition of uniform duties of

customs, the Parliament may provide, on such basis as it deems
fair, for the monthly payment to the several States of all
surplus revenue of the Commonwealth.
95. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the

Parliament of the State of Western Australia, if that State be
an Original State, may, during the first five years after the
imposition of uniform duties of customs, impose duties of
customs on goods passing into that State and not originally
imported from beyond the limits of the Commonwealth; and such
duties shall be collected by the Commonwealth. But any duty so
imposed on any goods shall not exceed during the first of such
years the duty chargeable on the goods under the law of
Western Australia in force at the imposition of uniform
duties, and shall not exceed during the second, third, fourth,
and fifth of such years respectively, four-fifths, three-fifths,
two-fifths, and one-fifth of such latter duty, and all duties
imposed under this section shall cease at the expiration of
the fifth year after the imposition of uniform duties. If at
any time during the five years the duty on any goods under
this section is higher than the duty imposed by the
Commonwealth on the importation of the like goods, then such
higher duty shall be collected on the goods when imported into
Western Australia from beyond the limits of the Commonwealth.
96. During a period of ten years after the establishment of

the Commonwealth and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise
provides, the Parliament may grant financial assistance to any
State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks
fit.
97. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the laws in force

in any Colony which has become or becomes a State with respect
to the receipt of revenue and the expenditure of money on
account of the Government of the Colony, and the review and
audit of such receipt and expenditure, shall apply to the
receipt of revenue and the expenditure of money on account of
the Commonwealth in the State in the same manner as if the
Commonwealth, or the Government or an officer of the
Commonwealth, were mentioned whenever the Colony, or the
Government or an officer of the Colony, is mentioned.
98. The power of the Parliament to make laws with respect to

trade and commerce extends to navigation and shipping, and to
railways the property of any State.
99. The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of

trade, commerce, or revenue, give preference to one State or
any part thereof over another State or any part thereof.
100. The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of

trade or commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the
residents therein to the reasonable use of the waters of
rivers for conservation or irrigation.
101. There shall be an Inter-State Commission, with such
powers of adjudication and administration as the Parliament
deems necessary for the execution and maintenance, within the
Commonwealth, of the provisions of this Constitution relating
to trade and commerce, and of all laws made thereunder.
102. The Parliament may by any law with respect to trade or

commerce forbid, as to railways, any preference or
discrimination by any State, or by any authority constituted
under a State, if such preference or discrimination is undue
and unreasonable, or unjust to any State; due regard being had
to the financial responsibilities incurred by any State in
connexion with the construction and maintenance of its
railways. But no preference or discrimination shall, within
the meaning of this section, be taken to be undue and
unreasonable, or unjust to any State, unless so adjudged by
the Inter-State Commission.
103. The members of the Inter-State Commission—
(i.) Shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council:
(ii.) Shall hold office for seven years, but may be removed
within that time by the Governor-General in Council, on an
address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session
praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour
or incapacity:
(iii.) Shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may

fix; but such remuneration shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office.
{163}
104. Nothing in this Constitution shall render unlawful any

rate for the carriage of goods upon a railway, the property of
a State, if the rate is deemed by the Inter-State Commission
to be necessary for the development of the territory of the
State, and if the rate applies equally to goods within the
State and to goods passing into the State from other States.
105. The Parliament may take over from the States their public
debts as existing at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or
a proportion thereof according to the respective numbers of
their people as shown by the latest statistics of the
Commonwealth, and may convert, renew, or consolidate such
debts, or any part thereof; and the States shall indemnify the
Commonwealth in respect of the debts taken over, and
thereafter the interest payable in respect of the debts shall
be deducted and retained from the portions of the surplus
revenue of the Commonwealth payable to the several States, or
if such surplus is insufficient, or if there is no surplus,
then the deficiency or the whole amount shall be paid by the
several States.
CHAPTER V. THE STATES.
106. The Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall,

subject to this Constitution, continue as at the establishment
of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment
of the State, as the case may be, until altered in accordance
with the Constitution of the State.
107. Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has

become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is by this
Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the
Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State,
continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at
the admission or establishment of the State, as the case may
be.
108. Every law in force in a Colony which has become or

becomes a State, and relating to any matter within the powers
of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, shall, subject to this
Constitution, continue in force in the State; and, until
provision is made in that behalf by the Parliament of the
Commonwealth, the Parliament of the State shall have such
powers of alteration and of repeal in respect of any such law
as the Parliament of the Colony had until the Colony became a
State.
109. When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the

Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall,
to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.
110. The provisions of this Constitution relating to the

Governor of a State extend and apply to the Governor for the
time being of the State, or other chief executive officer or
administrator of the government of the State.
111. The Parliament of a State may surrender any part of the

State to the Commonwealth; and upon such surrender, and the
acceptance thereof by the Commonwealth, such part of the State
shall become subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth.
112. After uniform duties of customs have been imposed, a

State may levy on imports or exports, or on goods passing into
or out of the State, such charges as may be necessary for
executing the inspection laws of the State; but the net
produce of all charges so levied shall be for the use of the
Commonwealth; and any such inspection laws may be annulled by
the Parliament of the Commonwealth.
113. All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquids

passing into any State or remaining therein for use,
consumption, sale, or storage, shall be subject to the laws of
the State as if such liquids had been produced in the State.
114. A State shall not, without the consent of the Parliament
of the Commonwealth, raise or maintain any naval or military
force, or impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to
the Commonwealth, nor shall the Commonwealth impose any tax on
property of any kind belonging to a State.
115. A State shall not coin money, nor make anything but gold
and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts.
116. The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing
any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no
religious test shall be required as a qualification for any
office or public trust under the Commonwealth.
117. A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not

be subject in any other State to any disability or
discrimination which would not be equally applicable to him if
he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State.
118. Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the

Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the
judicial proceedings of every State.
119. The Commonwealth shall protect every State against

invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government
of the State, against domestic violence.
120. Every State shall make provision for the detention in its
prisons of persons accused or convicted of offences against
the laws of the Commonwealth, and for the punishment of
persons convicted of such offences, and the Parliament of the
Commonwealth may make laws to give effect to this provision.
CHAPTER VI. NEW STATES.

121. The Parliament may admit to the Commonwealth or establish
new States, and may upon such admission or establishment make
or impose such terms and conditions, including the extent of
representation in either House of the Parliament, as it thinks
fit.
122. The Parliament may make laws for the government of any
territory surrendered by any State to and accepted by the
Commonwealth, or of any territory placed by the Queen under
the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or
otherwise acquired by the Commonwealth, and may allow the
representation of such territory in either House of the
Parliament to the extent and on the terms which it thinks fit.
123. The Parliament of the Commonwealth may, with the consent

of the Parliament of a State, and the approval of the majority
of the electors of the State voting upon the question,
increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of the
State, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, and
may, with the like consent, make provision respecting the
effect and operation of any increase or diminution or
alteration of territory in relation to any State affected.
124. A new State may be formed by separation of territory from

a State, but only with the consent of the Parliament thereof,
and a new State may be formed by the union of two or more
States or parts of States, but only with the consent of the
Parliaments of the States affected.
{164}
CHAPTER VII. MISCELLANEOUS.
125. The seat of Government of the Commonwealth shall be

determined by the Parliament, and shall be within territory
which shall have been granted to or acquired by the
Commonwealth, and shall be vested in and belong to the
Commonwealth, and shall be in the State of New South Wales,
and be distant not less than one hundred miles from Sydney.
Such territory shall contain an area of not less than one
hundred square miles, and such portion thereof as shall
consist of Crown lands shall be granted to the Commonwealth
without any payment therefor. The Parliament shall sit at
Melbourne until it meet at the seat of Government.
126. The Queen may authorise the Governor-General to appoint

any person, or any persons jointly or severally, to be his
deputy or deputies within any part of the Commonwealth, and in
that capacity to exercise during the pleasure of the
Governor—General such powers and functions of the
Governor-General as he thinks fit to assign to such deputy or
deputies, subject to any limitations expressed or directions
given by the Queen; but the appointment of such deputy or
deputies shall not affect the exercise by the Governor-General
himself of any power or function.
127. In reckoning the numbers of the people of the

Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth,
aboriginal natives shall not be counted.
CHAPTER VIII. ALTERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.
128. This Constitution shall not be altered except in the

following manner:—The proposed law for the alteration thereof
must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the
Parliament, and not less than two nor more than six months
after its passage through both Houses the proposed law shall
be submitted in each State to the electors qualified to vote
for the election of members of the House of Representatives.
But if either House passes any such proposed law by an
absolute majority, and the other House rejects or fails to
pass it or passes it with any amendment to which the first
mentioned House will not agree, and if after an interval of
three months the first-mentioned House in the same or the next
session again passes the proposed law by an absolute majority
with or without any amendment which has been made or agreed to
by the other House, and such other House rejects or fails to
pass it or passes it with any amendment to which the
first-mentioned House will not agree, the Governor-General may
submit the proposed law as last proposed by the
first-mentioned House, and either with or without any
amendments subsequently agreed to by both Houses, to the
electors in each State qualified to vote for the election of
the House of Representatives. When a proposed law is submitted
to the electors the vote shall be taken in such manner as the
Parliament prescribes. But until the qualification of electors
of members of the House of Representatives becomes uniform
throughout the Commonwealth, only one-half the electors voting
for and against the proposed law shall be counted in any State
in which adult suffrage prevails. And if in a majority of the
States a majority of the electors voting approve the proposed
law, and if a majority of all the electors voting also approve
the proposed law, it shall be presented to the
Governor-General for the Queen's assent. No alteration
diminishing the proportionate representation of any State in
either House of the Parliament, or the minimum number of
representatives of a State in the House of Representatives, or
increasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of
the State, or in any manner affecting the provisions of the
Constitution in relation thereto, shall become law unless the
majority of the electors voting in that State approve the
proposed law.
----------CONSTITUTION OF AUSTRALIA: End--------
CONSTITUTION OF AUSTRIA: Parliamentary reform of, 1896.
See (in this volume)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1895-1896.

A Better Metro Manila?: Towards Responsible Local Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development 1st Edition Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

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A Better Metro Manila?: Towards Responsible Local Governance, Decentralization and Equitable Development 1st Edition Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

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A Better Metro Manila?

ISBN 978-981-19-7803-6 ISBN 978-981-19-7804-3 (eBook)

Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com

Guano, Zylyka Gendraule, Winston Ayon-Ayon, Patrick Cariño, Sueyen

Quezon City, Philippines Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

1 Introduction: The Search for Alternative Models

6 The State of Health, Health Service Delivery,

15 Risk Transfer Mechanism: Charting a Strategy

Erwin A. Alampay National College of Public Administration and

Dina Joana S. Ocampo College of Education, University of the Philip-

Fig. 7 TVIs in Metro Manila (Source Maps rendered based

Fig. 8 Resulting project sequencing and staging of the alternative

Fig. 8 Another development in a meander loop with Rosario weir

Table 6 Total expenditures on education for cities

Introduction: The Search for Alternative

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem and Maria Ela L. Atienza

T. S. E. Tadem (B) · M. E. L. Atienza

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

as a form of “internal colonialism.” There was thus a need to give devel-

of 1986 which drafted the 1987 Constitution, Cecilia Muñoz Palma,

2 The Continuous Search

1 A more detailed discussion of this is found in Tadem and Atienza, Chapter 2.

Continuing challenges to the Local Government Code of 1991.2

(NCR). An adverse effect of this was the failure of the government to

by Congress in 2018 and approved in 2019 through a plebiscite that

3 Background of the Book

endeavor, in particular, was “initiated to come up with solid policy recom-

4 Governance as the Framework of Analysis

The multilevel governance framework is defined as “a complex policy

As for the metropolitanization framework, this allows for a subnational-

the top 50 richest Filipinos in 2016, have a total wealth of USD304.8

Moreover, “more than a year into the COVID-19 pandemic that

years of the Marcos dictatorship (1972–1986), for instance, Metro Manila

examining social services delivery and socio-economic inequalities, impor-

The private production of homes and the issue of unaffordable

The institutionalization of powers in LGUs under the 1991 LGC

(Chapter 2) zero in on the experience with regard to strengthening LGUs

5 Significance of the Study

Furthermore, this book revisits the overarching themes of decentraliza-

linking various disciplines in their analyses and syntheses of findings and

57. If the House of Representatives passes any proposed law,

58. When a proposed law passed by both Houses of the

CHAPTER II. THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT.

61. The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the

62. There shall be a Federal Executive Council to advise the

64. The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer

65. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Ministers of

66. There shall be payable to the Queen, out of the

67. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the appointment

68. The command in chief of the naval and military forces of

69. On a date or dates to be proclaimed by the

70. In respect of matters which, under this Constitution, pass

CHAPTER III. THE JUDICATURE.

71. The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in

(i.) Shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council:

(iii.) Shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may

73. The High Court shall have jurisdiction, with such

(i.) Of any Justice or Justices exercising the original

(ii.) Of any other federal court, or court exercising federal

(iii.) Of the Inter-State Commission, but as to questions of

74. No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council from

75. In all matters—

(i.) Arising under any treaty: