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GLOBAL
POLITICAL TRANSITIONS

Awkward Powers:
Escaping Traditional Great
and Middle Power Theory
Edited by
Gabriele Abbondanza · Thomas Stow Wilkins
 Global Political Transitions

Series Editors
Imtiaz Hussain, Independent University of Bangladesh, Dhaka,
Bangladesh
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School of International Studies, Singapore, Singapore
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Gabriele Abbondanza · Thomas Stow Wilkins
Editors

Awkward Powers:
Escaping Traditional
Great and Middle
Power Theory
Editors
Gabriele Abbondanza Thomas Stow Wilkins
Department of Government and Department of Government and
International Relations International Relations
University of Sydney University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW, Australia Sydney, NSW, Australia

ISSN 2522-8730 ISSN 2522-8749 (electronic)

Global Political Transitions
ISBN 978-981-16-0369-3 ISBN 978-981-16-0370-9 (eBook)
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 Acknowledgements

The idea behind this book owes much to our belief that the structure of
the international system is ever-changing, and that traditional categories
informing the global hierarchies are struggling to keep up with the pace of
such change. We do not aim to ‘reinvent the wheel’ of International Rela-
tions theory, but rather it is our hope that the new concept of Awkward
Powers will prompt a fresh debate in the discipline, and one that will lead
to a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the multiple power shifts
of the twenty-first century. To that end, it seeks to challenge traditional
middle and great power theory in order to refine and update it, while
shedding light on a number of significant but understudied states.
The core idea behind the Awkward Powers developed informally at
the end of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) World
Congress of Political Science, held in Brisbane in 2018. Conversations
with colleagues with whom we previously collaborated led us towards
the unexplored topic of Awkward Powers. On this basis we were able
to forge a research team of contributors, including new participants, to
achieve an impressive roster of case studies, based upon their respective
specialisms. We would like to express our gratitude for the hard work of
all of our chapter contributors—colleagues old and new—without which
the volume could not have been realised. The book is testament to their
dedication and professionalism. Selected initial findings were presented at
the 2019 Australian Political Science Association (APSA) conference in

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Adelaide, where we received encouragement and precious feedback on

the project, for which we thank the colleagues involved.
We are also grateful for the sustained support of the staff at Palgrave
Macmillan: Vishal Daryanomel, our commissioning editor, who first heard
of our book proposal at APSA and supported us thereafter; Naveen
Dass and his colleagues at Springer Nature for their invaluable assis-
tance throughout the project; and A/Prof. Allan Patience and Dr. David
Walton, who we now know have reviewed our drafts and provided the
flattering reviews.
Last, but surely not least, we are most indebted to our partners and
families. For their love and constant support, we remain deeply grateful.

Sydney, February 2021 Gabriele Abbondanza

Thomas Stow Wilkins
 Contents

Part I Introduction
1 The Case for Awkward Powers 3
Gabriele Abbondanza and Thomas Stow Wilkins

Part II Awkward Great Powers

2 The Odd Axis: Germany, Italy, and Japan as Awkward
Great Powers 43
Gabriele Abbondanza
3 India: An Awkward Great Power? 73
Emilian Kavalski
4 A Liminal and Transitional Awkward Power: Brazil
Betwixt the Great and Middle Powers 95
Thomas Stow Wilkins and Lucas P. Rezende

Part III Awkward Middle Powers

5 Thailand as an Awkward Middle Power 131
Amy Freedman
6 Middle Power Awkwardness? Indonesia’s Norm
Entrepreneurship in ASEAN 151
Sarah Teo

vii
viii CONTENTS

7 Malaysia as an Awkward Middle Power 177

Jonathan Ping
8 The Equivocal Power of South Africa 199
Yolanda Kemp Spies
9 Between a Regional Hegemon and a Middle Power:
The Case of Nigeria 221
Jiye Kim
10 The Normative Awkwardness of Pakistan 243
Dorothée Vandamme
11 Neither This Nor That: Understanding North Korea
via Role Theory 261
Virginie Grzelczyk
12 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: A Rentier Middle Power
in Pursuit of Global Leadership of the Islamic
Community 285
Aleksandar Mitreski
13 Awkward and Peculiar: On Israel Flying Above Its
Designated Positional Pigeonhole 305
Gil Merom
14 Singapore as an Awkward “Little Red Dot”: Between
the Small and Middle Power Status 329
Peng Er Lam
15 Belgium: The Capacities of a Middle Power,
but the Ambitions of a Small Power? 349
Marion Jacques, Tanguy Struye de Swielande,
and Tanguy de Wilde d’Estmael

Part IV Conclusion
16 What Makes an Awkward Power? Recurrent Patterns
and Defining Characteristics 375
Thomas Stow Wilkins and Gabriele Abbondanza

Index 405
 Notes on Contributors

Dr. Gabriele Abbondanza is a Sessional Lecturer and Unit Coordinator

at the Department of Government and International Relations, Univer-
sity of Sydney (Australia). His research interests include regional, middle,
and great power theory, national power, Australian and Italian foreign
and security policy, and irregular migration. He is co-editor, with Thomas
Stow Wilkins, of Awkward Powers: Escaping Traditional Great and Middle
Power Theory (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), and he is the author of Italy
as a Regional Power (2016) and The Geopolitics of Australia in the New
Millennium (2013), both published by Aracne. His journal articles have
been published by European Political Science, Australian Journal of Inter-
national Affairs, History of Political Thought, and The International Spec-
tator, among the others. Dr. Abbondanza currently teaches a number of
courses related to International Relations and Security Studies.
Prof. Tanguy Struye de Swielande is Professor of International Rela-
tions at UCLouvain (Belgium) and Director of the Centre d’Etude des
Crises et Conflits Internationaux. His research includes great and middle
powers, the concept of power, strategic foresight, and US-China rela-
tions and Indo-Pacific. He is the editor of the book series “Scène
internationale” (Presses Universitaires de Louvain).
Prof. Tanguy de Wilde d’Estmael is Professor of Geopolitics and Inter-
national Relations at UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) in
Belgium and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe of Bruges. His

ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

research topics include EU and Belgian foreign policy, EU-Russia and

EU-China relations, culture and International Relations. He is the editor
of the Peter Lang books series “Geopolitics and Conflict Resolution”.
Prof. Amy Freedman is Professor and Chair of the Political Science
Department at Pace University, in New York City (USA). She is also a
research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute of Columbia
University. Her research looks at non-traditional security and regional
relations in Southeast Asia, as well as at domestic political issues like
democratization, and ethnic and religious politics in Malaysia, Indonesia
and Thailand. Two of her recent publications include the edited volume
Religion and Politics in Southeast Asia (Pace University Press, 2020), and
“Migration and Contentious Politics in Southeast Asia”, in International
Relations and Diplomacy (2020).
Dr. Virginie Grzelczyk is a Reader in International Relations at Aston
University (UK) and the Head of School of Social Sciences and Humani-
ties. She holds a M.A. and Ph.D. in Government and Politics from the
University of Maryland, and a M.A. in Diplomacy and Security from
Ewha University. Virginie’s research focuses on security relationships over
the Korean Peninsula, and especially about North Korea, with publica-
tions spanning the Six-Party Talks process, North Korea’s energy Secu-
rity Dilemma, Korean identity in the context of reunification, and the
concept of crisis in Northeast Asia. She is the author of North Korea’s New
Diplomacy: Challenging Political Isolation in the 21st Century (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2018). Her latest project focuses on the Politics of Toys
in Conflict and Post-Conflict Spheres, including both North and South
Korea, and has been supported by a Leverhulme Research Fellowship.
Marion Jacques is a Research Assistant at UCLouvain (Belgium) and is
currently working on a Ph.D. thesis about small powers security issues and
the use of strategic foresight by public entities as a method to anticipate
new threats, especially those linked to the coming climate change.
Prof. Emilian Kavalski is the Li Dak Sum Chair Professor in China-
Eurasia Relations at the University of Nottingham Ningbo, China. He is
also the Book Series Editor for Routledge’s “Rethinking Asia and Inter-
national Relations” series. Emilian’s work explores the interconnections
between the simultaneous decentring of International Relations by post-
Western perspectives and non-anthropocentric approaches. Emilian is the
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi

author of four books, most recently: The Guanxi of Relational Interna-

tional Theory (Routledge, 2018), and he is the editor of eleven volumes,
including World Politics at the Edge of Chaos (State University of New
York Press, 2016).
Dr. Jiye Kim is engaged in research and teaching in the Department
of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney,
and the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie
University (Australia). Her research focuses on maritime disputes and
international norms. She teaches various courses from Asia-Pacific Poli-
tics to International Relations and Security. Her research appeared in
The Pacific Review, Pacific Affairs, Strategic Analysis, The Diplomat, The
Conversation (USA and Australia editions), East Asia Forum and other
international platforms.
Dr. Peng Er Lam is Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Insti-
tute, National University of Singapore, with a Ph.D. from Columbia
University. His articles on comparative politics in Asia with a focus on
Japan and Singapore have appeared in Pacific Affairs, Asian Survey,
Asian Affairs, Japan Forum, and Government and Opposition. His books
include two monographs: Japan’s Peace Building Diplomacy in Asia:
Searching for an Active Political Role (Routledge, 2009), and Green Poli-
tics in Japan (Routledge, 1999), as well as edited and co-edited volumes:
Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: Continuity and Change
(Lexington Books, 2020), China-Japan Relations in the 21st Century:
Antagonism Despite Interdependency (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), Japan’s
Relations with Southeast Asia: The Fukuda Doctrine and Beyond (Rout-
ledge, 2013), and Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power
(Routledge, 2006). He is an Executive Editor of International Relations
of the Asia-Pacific and Asian Journal of Peacebuilding.
Dr. Gil Merom is Senior Lecturer at the Centre for International Secu-
rity Studies (CISS) and the Department of Government and International
Relations, University of Sydney, Australia. His research interests include
world politics, international security, national security, state and society,
democratic wars, strategy, norms, asymmetric conflicts, intelligence and
Israeli security. His recent research focused on collateral damage, and his
current research deals with the DNA of the IDF.
Aleksandar Mitreski is a Researcher and Ph.D. Candidate at the Depart-
ment of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

(Australia). His research examines civil-military relations in the Gulf Arab

monarchies, with a particular focus on the United Arab Emirates. Aleksan-
dar’s other research interests include international security, terrorism and
cybersecurity. Prior to his Ph.D. studies, Aleksandar worked as a Senior
Analyst at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis in the
United Arab Emirates, where he researched political and security issues in
the Middle East and North Africa region.
A/Prof. Jonathan Ping is an Associate Dean and Associate Professor
at Bond University (Australia). He is a graduate of the University of
Melbourne and received his Ph.D. from the University of Adelaide. He is
a political economist who specialises in the study of statecraft. In this area
he has developed the first unifying theory of the middle power concept—
hybridisation theory—as presented in his book Middle Power Statecraft.
His work on statecraft has most recently been applied to China in the
books China’s Strategic Priorities and Chinese Engagements. His current
research focus is on great power statecraft theory, middle power statecraft
theory, and a theory of the nature of hegemony in and from Asia. He is
Founder and a Director of the East Asia Security Centre. He has worked
and undertaken research for government and non-government sectors.
Dr. Ping teaches courses on Political Economy, Asia and Security at Bond
University.
Dr. Lucas P. Rezende is an Adjunct Professor at the Department of
Economics and International Relations from the Universidade Federal
de Santa Catarina (UFSC), Brazil. He was a post-doctorate intern at
the International Relations Institute (IRI) from the Universidade de São
Paulo (USP), Brazil, and was a Visiting Fellow at the German Insti-
tute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), in Hamburg, Germany. He
specialises in Civil-Military Relations, International Theory and Security,
and Brazilian Foreign and Defence Policies. He has published widely
in Brazilian IR and Political Science journals, such as Contexto Interna-
cional, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional and Revista Brasileira
de Estudos de Defesa, which he was also Chief-Editor for 2 mandates
(2014–2018). His Ph.D. dissertation was awarded by Brazilian Ministry
of Defence and published by the Universidade de Brasília Press (Sobe e
Desce – Explicando a Cooperação em Defesa na América do Sul, 2015).
A/Prof. Yolanda Kemp Spies was trained as a diplomat at the South
African Foreign Ministry and at Oxford University, UK. She practised
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii

diplomacy for 19 years and lived and worked on four continents before
she joined academia. She completed her doctorate in International Rela-
tions in 2005, after which she designed a Master of Diplomatic Studies
programme for the University of Pretoria. She directed the programme
until 2016. From 2016 to 2019 she lectured in Masters programmes
at Webster University’s Ghana campus. Her academic specialisation and
publications include Diplomacy, Foreign Policy Analysis, International
Organizations, International Law, Conflict Resolution, Changing Global
Power Relations, African Politics and Ethics in International Relations.
During 2019 she published two books on the theory and practice of
diplomacy: ‘Global Diplomacy and International Society’; and ‘Global
South Perspectives on Diplomacy’. She joined Zayed University in Abu
Dhabi during January 2020, as Associate Professor of International
Studies.
Dr. Sarah Teo is Research Fellow with the Regional Security Architec-
ture Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
(RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Her
research interests include multilateral security and defence cooperation
in ASEAN and the Asia Pacific, middle powers in the Asia Pacific, as
well as IR theory. She is the co-author, with Ralf Emmers, of Security
Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific (Melbourne University
Publishing, 2018) and co-editor, with Bhubhindar Singh, of Minilater-
alism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-
Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN (Routledge, 2020). Her
articles have also been published in peer-reviewed journals including The
Pacific Review, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, and Australian
Journal of International Affairs, as well as platforms such as East Asia
Forum, Channel NewsAsia and PacNet.
Dr. Dorothée Vandamme is Lecturer at the Université de Mons and
Visiting Lecturer at the Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium).
Her work focuses on Pakistan and the evolving Asian regional context,
with an emphasis on international social dynamics, and the intercon-
nections between the global and local levels. She recently co-edited
‘Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century: New Framework, New
Cases’ (with Thomas Stow Wilkins, David Walton and Tanguy Struye
de Swielande; Routledge, 2019); and ‘Power in the Power in the 21st
Century: Determinants and Contours’ (with Tanguy Struye de Swielande;
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2015).
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Thomas Stow Wilkins is a Senior Lecturer in International Secu-

rity at the Department of Government and International Relations (GIR)
at the University of Sydney (Australia). He is also a Senior Fellow
(Non-Resident) at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA)
think-tank in Tokyo. He specialises in Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific security
issues, middle powers and alignment theory. He has published widely in
academic journals such as Review of International Studies, The Pacific
Review, and Australian Journal of International Affairs. He co-edited
the volume “Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century: New Theo-
ries New Cases” (Routledge, 2019) and his latest monograph is enti-
tled “Security in Asia Pacific: The Dynamics of Alignment” with Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2019.
 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 International power hierarchies using cluster analysis

(not to scale, see countries’ lists for each category) (Source
Authors’ creation) 10
Fig. 1.2 A diagram for the identification of potential awkward
powers (Source Authors’ creation) 22
Fig. 1.3 International power hierarchies (not to scale)
and the parallel presence of awkward powers:
either neglected by middle and great power theory
or occasionally spanning through both (Source Authors’
creation) 26
Fig. 9.1 GDP (current USD) of Sub-Saharan top 20 economies
in 2017 (Source Author’s creation based on data
from World Bank, “World Bank Open Data”) 224

xv
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Germany, Italy, and Japan against great power theory’s
definitional criteria (Source Author’s creation) 63
Table 7.1 Number of rankings in or above the middle power
bracket 1975–2000 186
Table 10.1 Statistical indicators applied to Pakistan, 2020 (most
recent numbers available) 246
Table 10.2 A summary of Pakistan’s different classifications 252
Table 10.3 Jordaan’s middle powers constitutive and behavioural
characteristics applied to Pakistan, 2020 253
Table 13.1 Total US Foreign Aid Obligations to Israel: 1946–2019
and the 2020 Request current, or non-inflation-adjusted,
dollars in millions 320
Table 13.2 Percentage breakdown of selected years of Israli global
export 1950–2014 321
Table 14.1 Asia Power Index: top 10 338
Table 16.1 Awkward powers’ distinguishing characteristics 400

xvii
 PART I

Introduction
 CHAPTER 1

The Case for Awkward Powers

Gabriele Abbondanza and Thomas Stow Wilkins

A Global Order in Flux

The international system is currently undergoing a tumultuous struc-
tural change due to shifting power balances and disruptive events, not
least the COVID-19 pandemic.1 After almost fifty years of Soviet-
American Cold War bipolarity, followed by a brief “unipolar moment” of
US pre-eminence, an inexorable process towards multipolarisation, long

1 Hal Brands and Francis J. Gavin, eds., COVID-19 and World Order: The Future
of Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2020); Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global
Order,” Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order.

G. Abbondanza (B) · T. S. Wilkins

Department of Government and International Relations,
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences,
University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: gabriele.abbondanza@sydney.edu.au
T. S. Wilkins
e-mail: thomas.wilkins@sydney.edu.au

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
G. Abbondanza et al. (eds.), Awkward Powers: Escaping Traditional
Great and Middle Power Theory, Global Political Transitions,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-0370-9_1
4 G. ABBONDANZA AND T. S. WILKINS

predicted, has resumed.2 This is apparent through two distinct but inter-
twined developments. Firstly, we are witnessing an unprecedented shift
of power “eastwards”, predicated upon the rise of China and India as
potential “next superpowers”,3 at a time where the United States and
the “West”, in general (including Europe and Japan), are in relative
decline.4 Secondly, the power shift is by no means exclusively confined
to this “easternisation” (or rather: “Asianisation”).5 Other states across
the world are now scaling the ranks of the international hierarchy. This
“rise of the rest”6 includes new power centres such as Brazil, Nigeria, and
Iran, to name but a sample (what Khanna dubs the “Second World”).7
“Power” in the international system is therefore being redistributed, and
the Western-dominated system and the liberal international order it has
upheld is diminishing and increasingly challenged by alternative centres
of power.8
Given this remarkable state of flux in the arena of global politics, it
is therefore incumbent for scholars and analysts to undertake a clear-eyed
reappraisal of such changes and tease out the ramifications. If international
relations (IR) scholarship is to have continued relevance in interpreting
global politics, it must intervene to shed light on the changing nature of
the international power hierarchies that no longer conform to long-held

2 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (1999):
35–49; Dilip Hiro, After Empire: The Birth of a Multipolar World (New York: Nation
Books, 2010).
3 Piya Mahtaney, India, China and Globalization: The Emerging Superpowers and the
Future of Economic Development (Berlin: Springer, 2007).
4 See Gideon Rachman, Easternization: Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline From Obama
to Trump and Beyond (New York: Other Press, 2017); Parag Khanna, The Future Is Asian
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019); Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere:
The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (London: Hachette UK, 2009).
5 See, for example, Enrico Fels, Shifting Power in the Asia–Pacific? The Rise of China,
Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance (Berlin: Springer, 2016).
6 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World: And the Rise of the Rest (London: Penguin
UK, 2009).
7 Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order
(London: Allen Lane, 2009).
8 Amitav Acharya, The End of the American World Order (New York: Wiley, 2018);
Riccardo Alcaro, John Peterson, and Ettore Greco, eds., The West and the Global Power
Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2016); Richard Falk, Power Shift: On the New Global Order (London: Zed Books, 2016).
 1 THE CASE FOR AWKWARD POWERS 5

(and cherished) perceptions. Such an undertaking is needed more than

ever as a theoretical and analytical compass in times of acute uncertainty,
and the power categories that have heretofore framed our discourses are
thus in need of serious reassessment. Through such a fresh reappraisal we
can build a more accurate picture of the true state of the power structure
that obtains in the current world system, and examine the implications
this entails.

Measuring “National Power”

Before introducing the book’s leitmotiv concept of “awkward powers”, it
is necessary to contextualise “power” in IR and outline how to measure
it, since international power hierarchies are (nominally) predicated upon
this complex process. As Mearsheimer attests ‘Power is at the heart of
international politics, yet there is considerable disagreement about what
power is and how to measure it’.9 It is not the purpose of this volume
to comprehensively rehearse the expansive debates on the nature of
power—commonly known as “power analysis”10 —which are amply, if not
conclusively, covered in the relevant literature (see below). Nevertheless,
it is useful to briefly review them in this introductory chapter to pave the
way for the more specialised discussions on measuring power that follow.
First, we must deal the perennial and essentially contested concept of
“power” itself as a currency of international politics. From a chronolog-
ical perspective, it was Dahl who presented the original understanding of
power as the ability of one state to cause another state to do something
that it wouldn’t have otherwise done, through what is conventionally
defined as “relational power”.11 Later, Hart built on this coercive inter-
pretation and produced the well-known definition of power as control

9 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton,
2001), 55.
10 Stefano Guzzini, “The Use and Misuse of Power Analysis in International Theory,”
in Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories, ed. R. Palan (London: Routledge,
2000), 53–66.
11 Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioural Science 2, no. 3 (1957):
201–215.
6 G. ABBONDANZA AND T. S. WILKINS

over resources, actors, and outcomes.12 Strange then brought to promi-

nence the idea of power as the—sometimes unintentional—creation and
control of structures which political actors inhabit and must operate in.13
This “structural power” was conceived within the neorealist paradigm,
though some affinities can be found with neoliberalism’s understanding of
international power through complex interdependence theory.14 In addi-
tion to the above, Baldwin explored the multidimensionality of power,
which further contributes to the initial difficulty in defining it,15 and sets
the stage for the complexity of properly quantifying power.
Scholars have concomitantly sought to extrapolate from these basic
premises a way of capturing and measuring a state’s national power. In its
modern conceptualisation, national power specifically examines a state’s
assets (power as “property” or “attribute”), as opposed to a state’s rela-
tions with other countries, their actual exertion of influence, or their
roles within a global superstructure. In accord with this book’s aims,
national power is therefore the most appropriate prism through which this
malleable concept will be understood, as it is fundamental to the produc-
tion of a ranked hierarchy of powers, with countries being assigned a
nominal (prefix) descriptor—“super”, “great”, “middle”, and so forth—
on this basis (see the following section). It was classical realist Morgenthau
who first formulated the “elements of national power”, which comprised
of geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, armed forces, popula-
tion, natural character, government effectiveness, and diplomacy.16 This
basic point of departure remains central to the study of national power,
and it portended subsequent efforts to add new dimensions to this
field, including the distinction between “latent” or “aggregate” power

12 Jeffrey Hart, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International

Relations,” International Organization 30, no. 2 (1976): 289–305.
13 Susan Strange, “International Political Economy: The Story So Far and the Way
Ahead,” in An International Political Economy, eds. W. Ladd Hollist and F. L. Tullis
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 13–25.
14 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).
15 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in Handbook of Interna-
tional Relations, eds. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002),
177–191.
16 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: A. A. Knopf, 1948), 80–109.
 1 THE CASE FOR AWKWARD POWERS 7

(resources) and “actualised”, “realised”, or “effective” power (capabili-

ties),17 thus paving the way for a more precise and nuanced understanding
of how national power can be assessed.
Since then, a number of authors have applied quantitative approaches
to the assessment of power to enhance the process of systematising
and measuring such power attributes/assets. The great majority of these
are ontologically realist in their conception, and prioritise military and
economic indicators depicting “hard power”,18 which is likely a function
of the severe strategic environment that prevailed during the Cold War
period in which they were developed. As strategic tensions abated with the
end of the Cold War, quantitative approaches became more cognisant of
the emerging liberalist and constructivist elements that could be fruitfully
incorporated alongside the conventional hard power-orientated approach
heretofore dominant in the study of IR. Such nuanced understand-
ings of national power measurements are to be found primarily in the
efforts of Chinese analysts—including Huang19 —which explicitly incor-
porate liberalist criteria such as political and diplomatic impact, as well as
constructivist elements including cultural, societal, and ideational influ-
ence. The Chinese conception of national power is therefore significant,
as it provides a more comprehensive application of soft power, assessed
alongside the more conventional hard power indicators. In recent years, a
more analytically (and theoretically) eclectic approach has emerged, addi-
tionally supported by the availability of big data analytics, which have
given a new boost to quantitative approaches. To wit, contemporary

17 Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations
(New York: Basic Books, 1975), 9.
18 Among the many who have provided quantitative means and/or well-known formulas
for the estimation of national power, see Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); Abramo F. K. Organski, World Politics
(New York: A. A. Knopf, 1958); Frank Clifford German, “A Tentative Evaluation of World
Power,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 4, no. 1 (1960): 138–144; J. David Singer, Stuart
Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major-Power War,
1820–1965,” in Peace, War and Numbers, ed. B. M. Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972),
19–48; Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press, 1975).
19 Shuofeng Huang, Zonghe guoli xinlun [New Study on Comprehensive National
Power] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1999).
8 G. ABBONDANZA AND T. S. WILKINS

indexes20 of national power include Chang’s economic model (CEM),21

the National Power Index (NPI),22 the many iterations of the Compre-
hensive National Power index (CNP),23 the Power Index (PI),24 the
Military Strength Index (MSI),25 the Soft Presence Indicator (SPI),26 the
Global Presence Index (GPI),27 and the International Influence Ranking
(IIR).28
It should be noted that the above indices are by no means infallible—
nor could they be, considering the multifaceted nature of power just
noted—although there is a degree of relative consistency in the rankings
they produce, as states with large economies generally possess substantial
military capabilities and, with them, considerable political and diplomatic
impact. In other words, statistics can only tell part of the story and
must be necessarily contextualised. Cultural influence, on the other hand,
is a more recent addiction to the power equation, reflecting construc-
tivist tenets, and is less easily quantifiable. In a similar fashion to the
constructivist paradigm, which is considered most useful in explaining IR

20 This is not meant to be a comprehensive list, although only reliable indicators with
clear research methodologies are included. These indexes are complementary to the more
traditional means of measuring national power, introduced by the post-World War II
authors mentioned above.
21 Chin-Lung Chang. 2004. “A Measure of National Power,” Paper presented at the
2004 International Seminar at the National University of Malaysia.
22 “NPI,” National Power Project, accessed September 25, 2020, https://web.archive.
org/web/*/http://www.nationalpower.info/npi.
23 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Global Politics and Security Report (2015)
(Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2015).
24 “2019 Military Strength Ranking,” Global Firepower, accessed September 25, 2020,
http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp.
25 Credit Suisse, The End of Globalization or a more Multipolar World? (Zurich: Credit
Suisse, 2015).
26 Portland Communications, Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2018
(London: Portland Communications, 2018).
27 Real Istituto Elcano, Elcano Global Presence Report 2018 (Madrid: Real Istituto
Elcano, 2018).
28 “Most influential countries 2019,” US News, Y&R’s BAV, and the University of
Pennsylvania, accessed September 25, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countr
ies/best-international-influence.
 1 THE CASE FOR AWKWARD POWERS 9

when assessed in combination with realist and/or liberalist viewpoints,29

the measurement of states’ cultural influence ought to be considered a
complement to more established estimates of hard and soft power.
In sum, realist understandings of power measurement remain predomi-
nant—at least as a general point of departure—and liberalist and construc-
tivist criteria are relatively new additions to national power measurement.
As will be evident as this chapter unfolds, however, many of them explic-
itly relate to newer definitional criteria for both middle power theory and
great power theory, which therefore renders them remarkably useful for
a more holistic understanding of national power and power hierarchies
alike, as the latter are often a product of the former.

The Conventional Power Hierarchy

IR theory operates on the assumption that states can be assigned an
appropriate category to distinguish their place in the hierarchy of approx-
imately 200 states, informed by both the metrical indexes mentioned
above and specific predictions on their behavioural patterns according
to their classification. In this sense, the former provide a predominantly
quantitative facet of power and the latter embody a more qualita-
tive one, along with their correspondingly quantitative and qualitative
research methodologies, which, when combined, are widely deemed as
a more effective approach by political science theorists.30 Consequently,
despite the nominal, de jure equality of states enshrined in the United
Nations (UN) Charter, the international system is conventionally codified
through a de facto hierarchy broadly reflective of the respective power and
influence of its countries.
Traditionally, IR scholarship formulated a fivefold configuration
(Fig. 1.1), comprising in descending order: (1) “superpowers”, (2) “great
powers”, (3) “middle powers”, (4) “regional powers”, and (5) “minor
powers”, which are identified through a multitude of criteria. While
these categories are by no means hard and fast, and are regrettably

29 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: Complex Interactions, Competing Interests
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 18.
30 Sidney Tarrow, “Bridging the Quantitative–Qualitative Divide,” in Rethinking Social
Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, eds. H. E. Brady and D. Collier (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 171–179.
10 G. ABBONDANZA AND T. S. WILKINS

Fig. 1.1 International power hierarchies using cluster analysis (not to scale, see
countries’ lists for each category) (Source Authors’ creation)

often used/misused interchangeably, including alongside other alterna-

tive descriptors (such as “major powers”), they maintain a widespread
traction in the IR discourse, in policy and diplomacy circles, and even
among journalists. Nevertheless, discrepancies in usage aside, they provide
a valuable reference point for discussing power hierarchies/categories.
As such, they must be necessarily interpreted through their theoretical
frameworks and related definitional criteria (the two elements being inex-
tricably entwined), since it is against these traditional categories that the
“awkwardness” of the case study states included in this volume will be
refracted.

(i) Firstly, Superpowers occupy the apex of the international hier-

archy, with military and economic capabilities, political leverage,
and technological accomplishment second to none. In Spykman’s
original conceptualisation, the demonstration of a superior global
exertion of power was of paramount importance,31 drawing from

31 Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1944).
 1 THE CASE FOR AWKWARD POWERS 11

a geographical determinism that was also shared by contempo-

rary authors such as Fox, who described the “super-empowered
nation” as a state with superior military power, dominance in
diplomatic relations, and global reach.32 Following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the United States is usually credited as the only
superpower,33 with China likely an “emerging” or “rising” one.34
For the purposes of this work, such an ambiguity in defining
China’s (but potentially also the European Union’s and Russia’s)35
international status could well attract the appellation “awkward
superpower”.
(ii) Secondly, Great powers represent a select few states with substan-
tial hard and soft power capabilities, global interests, and some
form of external acknowledgement that confirms a widespread
acceptance of their standing. However, their definitional criteria
and the accompanying behavioural patterns within IR are not met
by universal agreement in great power theory (GPT),36 and a
few publications are a testament to the difficulty in conceptu-
alising great powerhood, which scholars have sometimes treated
as self-evident. By way of example, both Brzezinski37 and Fels38
published broad and useful treatises, though with no specific
definitional criteria listed in them. More to the point, Kennedy

32 William T. R. Fox, The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet
Union—Their Responsibility for Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944).
33 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (1999):
35–49.
34 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
35 Rockwell A. Schnabel and Francis X. Rocca, The Next Superpower? The Rise of Europe
and Its Challenge to the United States (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Steven
Rosefielde, Russia in the 21st Century: The Prodigal Superpower (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
36 Gabriele Abbondanza, “Middle Powers and Great Powers Through History: The
Concept from Ancient Times to the Present Day,” History of Political Thought 41, no. 3
(2020), 397–418.
37 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power
(London: Hachette UK, 2012).
38 Enrico Fels, Shifting Power in the Asia–Pacific? The Rise of China, Sino-US
Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance (Berlin: Springer, 2016).
12 G. ABBONDANZA AND T. S. WILKINS

published a best-seller on great power history,39 though without

providing a single applicable definition of what a great power actu-
ally is. Since then, GPT has progressed considerably, and yet while
there is a general agreement on great power behaviour,40 there is
still no firm definitional consensus. Such shortfalls are all the more
surprising since Wight identified great power theory as ‘one of the
central questions of international politics’.41
Among those who have sought to define such states, theo-
rists championing the prevailing role of military power include
Modelski,42 who concluded that a country can be deemed a
great power only if able to fight a “great war”—thus focusing
predominantly on military criteria, and implicitly relying on esti-
mates of military capability—and Mearsheimer,43 who presented
a similarly restrictive definition. Another, larger group of scholars
argued for a wider understanding of the elements that constitute
hard power, therefore extending the necessary requirements to
the economic sphere, as well as to other parameters transcending
classical realism. Posen and Ross specified the need for “substan-
tial industrial and military potential” as an inclusion criterion,44
and Waltz listed superior placements in demographic, geographic,
resource, economic, military, and political terms,45 thus widening
the scope of great powerdom, though still limiting it to the

39 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).
40 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton,
2001); Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System: 1495–1975 (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 2015). On the topic of great powers’ definitional parameters,
it should be noted that Ranke’s dated criterion of self-sufficiency against all other powers
is unrealistic for any state in contemporary IR, and is therefore not useful for current
hierarchies.
41 Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1978), 41.
42 George Modelski, Principles of World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1972).
43 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton,
2001).
44 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,”
International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 5–53.
45 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979),
131.
 1 THE CASE FOR AWKWARD POWERS 13

ambit of realism. Moreover, Buzan and Wæver listed gross national

product (GNP), military spending, nuclear arsenals, and inter-
national recognition,46 while Danilovic outlined the criteria of
“power capabilities, global scope and status”.47 The above authors
therefore tend to depict great powers as states with top-tier mili-
tary and economic means, above any other consideration. They
often characterise their conduct in the international system as
being fiercely protective of such status, prepared to engage in
aggression when they have “the capability as well as the incentive”
to maximise their power, and paying close attention to alliances
and the balance of power.48
A further strand of GPT builds onto these fundamental
criteria, in order to incorporate also elements that are exoge-
nous to realism, pertaining instead to liberalism and, in more
recent years, to constructivism as well. Such is Huntington’s
position, who stressed superiority under economic, military, diplo-
matic, ideological, technological, and cultural parameters,49 and
Schweller’s, who on the other hand underlined the increasing
importance of international prestige, technological-scientific devel-
opment, culture, environmental development, economic strength,
and international aid, thus deviating from realist boundaries.50
Bull’s work, upholding the concept of great power manage-
ment,51 can also be placed in this less rigid definitional cate-
gory. In a bid towards a more theoretically eclectic approach, an

46 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International
Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11.
47 Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major
Powers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 225–228.
48 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton,
2001), 37–40.
49 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (1999):
35–49.
50 Randall L. Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and
Positional Conflict Over Scarce Resources,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strate-
gies After the Cold War, eds. E. B. Kapstein and M. Mastanduno (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999), 28–68.
51 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2002).
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