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Pragmatism and Organization Studies
Pragmatism and
Organization
Studies
Philippe Lorino
1
3
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■ PREFACE
The cover of this book is Kandinsky’s 1943 painting “The Arrow.” It shows
deep consonances between Kandinsky’s art and pragmatist thought. In both
cases, human experience is viewed as ongoing movement, materialized in the
picture by the arrow, and emergence of forms. Kandinsky, the father of
abstraction, and the pragmatists, severe critics of Cartesian representational-
ism, advocate non-representational semiotic mediation to explore disorienting
chaos and make “the consonance of ‘tomorrow’” emerge from “today’s dis-
sonance” (Kandinsky, 1911, p. 21). Signs inhabit pragmatist thought and
Kandinsky’s painting, some recognizable (arrow, lyra), others more enigmatic,
inseparably combining what pragmatists call “habit” (familiar experience) and
“inquiry” (exploring disruptive situations).
Why pragmatism? Why pragmatism today? Perhaps my own long, twisting,
and turning road to pragmatism can shed some light on today’s pragmatist turn.
A long time ago (in the 1980s), I was a senior civil servant in the admin-
istration of the French government with a background in mathematics and
engineering. For several years, I was in charge of coordinating public policies
(e.g. research and development, education, work regulations) that dealt with
the technological transformation of manufacturing industries (e.g. the intro-
duction of robotics, computer-aided design, computer-integrated manufac-
turing, etc.). During this mandate, I became convinced that the main obstacle
to implementing new manufacturing technologies in beneficial conditions was
neither technical (all the required technologies were available on the market
and production engineers had the required competences) nor financial (firms
had satisfactory profit rates and investment capacity), but, rather, organiza-
tional: The Fordian forms of organization inherited from the past prevented
our taking full advantage of the fantastic potential of the flexibility and
reactiveness afforded by new technologies.
At that time, two contrasting tendencies predominated in the world
of manufacturing management—and probably still do today. First, new
computer-based technologies allowed the amplification and perfection of
Taylorian principles of organization by replacing human workers with auto-
mated equipment, considered to be more skilled and reliable, as declared by an
advertisement published in a trade review in 1982: “Having trouble finding
skilled machinists? Try a skilled machine!” (Shaiken, 1984, p. 53). When such a
substitution proved impossible, these “new Taylorian” managers used advanced
vi PREFACE
only significant cost driver was the volume of production and sales, and
ignored the growing cost of complexity.
I became more and more interested in the link between management
techniques and organizational forms. I was particularly fascinated by the
systematic obliteration of real situated activity, and more specifically, collect-
ive activity, ignored or confused with formally described tasks in the main-
stream managerial culture, but also in a large part of organization and
management research. In 1989—I was by then working in a manufacturing
company—I published a book in which I tried to show that organizational
archetypes are deeply rooted in supposedly “scientific” management tools.
A key feature of these archetypes was the ignorance of collective practical
experience and the identification of so-called “organization,” as a social
structure and a specific area of knowledge, with the production of formal
and static models. I tried to convince managers and scholars that “perform-
ance” was not a “scientific measurement,” but a continual collective effort to
understand, through systems of signs, situated activity as a complex, value-
creating process. At the end of a talk in a university, a professor of economics
asked me if I knew of Charles Sanders Peirce. I had never heard the name. My
colleague explained to me that my view of management tooling and practices,
inspired by my experience of manufacturing automation and by the “quality”
movement in management, echoed Peirce’s theory of sign and signification.
That was the beginning of a long, sometimes difficult but increasingly exciting
exploration of the pragmatist universe . . .
Why this lasting companionship with Peirce, Dewey, James, Mead, Follett,
Lewis, and their more recent continuators? Actually, pragmatism brought me
the main contribution one can expect from theory: It helped me to understand
the situations I was experiencing—in particular, the complex ones—and to
engage this understanding in later experience. Over the years, I continually
went back and forth, from doing field research in such areas as evaluation
systems or nuclear safety management to deepening my study of the pragma-
tist framework. Strangely enough, it took me twenty years to realize that
there was actually a strong link between the quality and continuous improve-
ment managerial circles and the pragmatist philosophers. Around 2012,
I discovered that Shewhart and Deming, the pioneers of manufacturing quality
and continuous improvement, had been disciples of pragmatist philosophers.
The strange loop is then completed: I travelled from management to pragma-
tist philosophy through continuous improvement practices, while pragmatist
ideas had travelled from philosophy to organization management through the
same continuous improvement practices . . .
I think that today the key pragmatist concepts and methods—such as
semiotic mediation, habit, inquiry, dialogical transaction, abduction, valu-
ation, and process—are more topical and necessary than ever. Pragmatist
theses have been neglected for some time in the world of organizations and
viii PREFACE
(Le Monde) What role can social sciences play in this return to innovation?
(Latour) It is simply impossible to do anything without them. They—amongst other
elements—are what assures the necessary capacity to probe, to produce public will in
situations that become more and more complex. Therefore I would say, as a good
pragmatist, that organizing that type of probing/testing is the very definition of public
life. If you follow the great masters of pragmatism, for example John Dewey, we need
the political sphere precisely because we do not know the consequences of our actions.
(Latour’s concluding words). We must find other types of collective intellectual work;
above all, give a different attention to the inquiry. (Latour, 2013a, my translation)
Pragmatism was born as a radical critique of Cartesian idealism and its key
theses: dualism, representationalism, and abstraction from experience. There-
fore I felt it important to analyze the relationship between pragmatism and a
very influential theoretical stream that perpetuates the Cartesian tradition in
organization studies: cognitivism (Herbert Simon), and its major concepts
(bounded and procedural rationality, computational approach to thought,
artificialism, routines). Along the same lines, I also tried to examine from a
pragmatist perspective some important organization theories (routines,
organizational learning, sharedness, organizational knowledge) that have, at
least in some phases of their historical trajectory, referred to cognitivism.
After a historical introduction (Chapter 1), the book presents the key con-
cepts of pragmatism and their potential relevance for organization research:
mediation (Chapter 2), habit (Chapter 3), inquiry (Chapter 4), trans-action
(Chapter 5), community of inquiry (Chapter 6), abduction (Chapter 7), and
valuation (Chapter 8). The close relationship between pragmatism and the
processual perspective on organizations is analyzed in Chapter 9 and the his-
torical impact on managerial ideas and practices in Chapter 10.
With this book, I hope to share what I have learnt from pragmatist authors
with a large number of scholars and managers: their vigorous contribution to
some of the most debated themes in the area of organization and management
studies, and, more generally, their convincing and useful critique of dualism,
static abstraction, and idealism.
■ REFERENCES
Bernstein, R. J. (2010). The Pragmatic Turn. Cambridge, UK, and Malden, MA: Polity
Press.
Davidson, J. (1993). Bakhtin as a Theory of Reading. Technical report no. 579.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Emirbayer, M., and Maynard, D. W. (2011). Pragmatism and ethnomethodology.
Qualitative Sociology, 34, 221–61.
Engeström, Y., Miettinen, R., and Punamäki, R.-L. (1999). Perspectives on Activity
Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
PREFACE xi
Eskin, M. (2000). Ethics and dialogue: In the Works of Levinas, Bakhtin, Mandel0 shtam,
and Celan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Glock, H.-J. (1986). Vygotsky and Mead on the Self, meaning and internalisation,
Studies in Soviet Thought, 31(2), 131–48.
Holland, D., and Lachicotte, W., Jr. (2007). Vygotsky, Mead, and the New Sociocultural
Studies of Identity. In H. Daniels, M. Cole, and J. V. Wertsch (eds.) The Cambridge
Companion to Vygotsky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–35.
Kandinsky, W. (1984). Letter to Schönberg, January 18, 1911, in J. Hahl-Koch (ed.),
Arnold Schoenberg / Wassily Kandinsky: Letters, Pictures and Documents. London:
Faber & Faber.
Koczanowicz, L. (1994). G. H. Mead and L. S. Vygotsky on meaning and the Self,
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 8(4), 262–76.
Latour, B. (2013a). Interview given to the daily Le Monde (Paris), September 22–23.
Latour, B. (2013b). An Inquiry into Modes of Existence—An Anthropology of the
Moderns, transl. C. Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McCarthy, J., and Wright, P. (2007). Technology as Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Shaiken, H. (1984). Work Transformed: Automation and Labor in the Computer Age.
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
■ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
4.1 Introduction 94
4.2 Searching for performance in the cardiology department of a hospital 95
4.3 The pragmatist definitions of inquiry: Belief, doubt, and situation 101
4.4 Inquiring versus controlling and problem-solving frameworks: In
search of a problem 105
4.5 Inquiring as a social process: The community of inquiry 108
4.6 From the “mind first” dualism (thought versus action) to
thought/action integration 109
4.7 The inquiry involves three types of inference: Abduction, deduction,
induction 111
4.8 The inquiry is mediated and mediating 116
4.9 Methodological and managerial implications 118
4.10 Conclusion: Habit and inquiry, a recursive theory of action 119
7 Abduction 189
7.1 Introduction 189
7.2 Historical definitions of abduction 190
7.3 Abduction as a social process 196
CONTENTS xvii
Let us start this book with some stories from two different spheres, intellectual
life and managerial practices, to better understand the longer movement of
ideas, their migrations from field to field and the particular role pragmatism
has played in the history of organization studies.
January 1872: in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a group of intellectuals decides
to establish a philosophical discussion club which they call—in a form of irony
to challenge the idealist tradition of European philosophy—the Metaphysical
Club. For about a year, they meet approximately twice a month and discuss all
kinds of philosophical issues. None of them is academically trained in the
discipline of philosophy, but it is precisely part of their aim to question
the academic tradition of European philosophy and invent a new philosophy
rooted in the experience of life for the young, burgeoning American society.
May 16, 1924: At the Western Electric Company’s Hawthorne Works, a
few months before the famous Hawthorne studies of human productivity, a
young engineer named Walter Shewhart hands his boss, George Edwards,
a one-page memo which will make history in industrial management. The
Hawthorne Works, which manufactures telephone equipment in the Chicago
suburb of Cicero, is the company’s main plant. Shewhart’s document consists
of a diagram and a short text. It sets forth “all of the essential principles and
considerations which are involved in what we know today as process quality
control,” according to Edwards. In fact, its reach is even broader, since it
establishes some of the founding principles of quality management, conceived
as an anti-Taylorian managerial revolution.
What links these two events? Pragmatism. Pragmatism, an anti-Cartesian
revolt by amateur philosophers, and a major inspiration for anti-Taylorian
managerial thought.
This chapter starts by examining the early days of the pragmatist move-
ment: the Metaphysical Club experiment (Section 1.1), and its anti-Cartesian
fight (Section 1.2). It then describes the diffusion and growing influence of
classical pragmatism in the first decades of the twentieth century, sketching a
portrait of the four major figures of that development, Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, while also consider-
ing the significant role played by some of their closest fellow travellers (Josiah
2 PRAGMATISM AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES
Royce, Jane Addams, Mary Parker Follett, and Clarence Lewis) in widening
the pragmatist influence (Section 1.3). The ambiguity of pragmatism’s success,
partly owing to misunderstandings and caricatures of its central tenets, led to
its distortion and vulgarization into the common language understanding of
“pragmatism” (a search for practical success without any founding principle)
and contributed to its relative decline in the intellectual and philosophical field
(Section 1.4). Precisely at the time of this decline, from the 1930s onwards,
pragmatism rather surprisingly began to inspire an anti-Taylorian managerial
movement (Section 1.5). Section 1.6 briefly narrates how “the pragmatist
turn,” a spectacular revival of pragmatist ideas, took place in the last quarter
of the twentieth century, thanks to the efforts of such thinkers as Richard
Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Hans Joas.
Survey, . . . moved (with his wife) to Washington. The club’s last meeting was
evidently arranged to coincide with their departure” (Menand, 2002, p. 226).
Despite its short-lived and apparently informal existence, the Metaphysical
Club marked a turning point in American intellectual life. Peirce summarized
his contribution to the Club’s discussions in two articles considered today
as founding texts of pragmatism: The Fixation of Belief (1877) and How To
Make Our Ideas Clear (1878). James partly based his first philosophical
essay, Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence, published
in 1878, on the Club’s discussions. The Club members, far from agreeing on all
debated points, “had highly distinctive personalities, . . . but their careers inter-
sected at many points, and together they were more responsible than any other
group for moving American thought into the modern world” (Menand, 2002,
preface p. x). They shared a general revolt against the abstract, closed systems
of European idealism. They wanted to reintegrate the movement of thought
into the general day-to-day movement of human and social experience.
The historians of pragmatism (Menand, 2002; Bernstein, 2010; Misak,
2013b) state several historical factors that may have favored this anti-idealist
uprising in the American intellectual circles based in New England at the end
of the nineteenth century: the influence of Darwin’s theory of evolution
(Darwin’s book On the Origin of Species had been published in 1859, just
thirteen years before the Metaphysical Club was established); the still recent
Civil War, which had ended in 1865; and the particularities of American social
experience in that era of rapid economic and industrial development.
The still new theory of evolution (Dewey, 1910/1951) “embodied an intel-
lectual revolt and introduced a new intellectual temper” (p. 1). The Darwinian
revolution seemed to the pragmatists a decisive step to question the idealist
approach to life and nature: “Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contempor-
ary thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new
intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific revolution that
found its climax in the ‘Origin of Species’” (Dewey, 1910/1951, p. 19). Prag-
matists rejected the idea of fixed and final categories with clear-cut boundaries
and emphasized human beings’ continuity with the rest of nature. They found
support in the Darwinian notion of the “continuity of species,” which postu-
lates that all species are part of a single fluid progression of life, with no
precise, rigid frontier, as idealist views would suggest: “The classic notion of
species carried with it the idea of purpose. Purposefulness accounted for the
intelligibility of nature and the possibility of science. It was . . . the central point
of theistic and idealistic philosophy. The Darwinian principle of natural
selection cut straight under this philosophy” (Dewey, 1951, pp. 9–11). They
rejected the idealist focus on stability and permanency and agreed with the
dynamic and processual approach of evolutionism: “The conceptions that had
reigned in the philosophy of nature and knowledge for two thousand years, the
conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of the mind, rested on the
4 PRAGMATISM AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES
assumption of the superiority of the fixed and final; they rested upon treating
change and origin as signs of defect and unreality. In laying hands upon the
sacred ark of absolute permanency, in treating the forms that had been
regarded as types of fixity and perfection as originating and passing away,
the ‘Origin of Species’ introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was
bound to transform the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of
morals, politics, and religion” (Dewey 1951, pp. 1–2). In particular, Darwinism
supported the pragmatists’ focus on indeterminism, continuity, and change. In
the debate on design versus chance, Peirce held that absolute chance plays a
significant role in the universe, thus opposing the doctrine of necessity which
maintains that “the state of things existing at any time, together with certain
immutable laws, completely determine the state of things at every other time”
(Peirce, 1892/1992a, p. 299).
A second important historical factor was the still-recent Civil War, in which
some of the Club members had personally and actively participated, particu-
larly Oliver Wendell Holmes. As Menand (2002) notes, “for the generation that
lived through it, the Civil War was a terrible and traumatic experience. . . .
To some of them, the war seemed not just a failure of democracy, but a failure
of culture. As traumatic wars do, the Civil War discredited the beliefs and
assumptions of the era that preceded it. The Civil War swept away the Slave
civilization of the South, but it swept away almost the whole intellectual culture
of the North along with it” (p. x). This is why Bernstein (2010) considers that
“the origins of pragmatism can in part be understood as a critical response to the
horrors and excesses of the Civil War” (p. 10).
The specific American social experience of the nineteenth century also
played an important role. America’s rapidly expanding economy and industry
was transforming a young nation into a new international power showing the
first signs of active imperial expansion (e.g. the Mexican war of 1847–1848,
leading to the annexation of Texas, California, Nevada, Colorado, Wyoming,
New Mexico, and Arizona; the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867). The
dazzlingly fast development of the United States looked like a mass-scale social
and economic experiment, the “New World experiment,” encouraging entre-
preneurship, daring, and inventiveness, but at the same time raising new
questions and problems, particularly, as Menand (2002) underlines, the weak-
ening of “the older human bonds of custom and community” and their
replacement with “more impersonal networks of obligation and authority”
(p. xii): “The military defeat of the Confederacy made the Republican Party the
dominant force in national politics after 1865, and the Republican Party was
the champion of business. For more than thirty years, a strong central
government protected and promoted the ascendance of industrial capitalism
and the way of life associated with it. To this extent, the outcome of the Civil
War was a validation, as Lincoln had hoped it would be, of the American
experiment” (Menand, 2002, p. x). John Dewey would later comment that “it
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5
is beyond doubt that the progressive and unstable character of American life
and civilization has facilitated the birth of a philosophy which regards the
world as being in continuous formation, where there is still place for indeter-
minism, for the new, and for a real future” (Dewey, 1925/1988, p. 12).
traditional philosophical quest for absolute certainty, which Dewey calls the
“spectator theory of knowledge,” similar to the epistemology of “truth as
correspondence”: the belief that knowledge of the world consists of having
ideas from outside the observed world that correctly and distinctly represent
and correspond to a completely determinate reality. The pragmatists’ “idea
about ideas” is that “ideas are not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but are
tools—like forks and knives and microchips—that people devise to cope with
the world in which they find themselves” (Menand, 2002, p. xi). To prevent
ideas from becoming ideologies, they proposed a non-foundational, self-
corrective conception of human learning as an always-fallible process.
5. The sharp dichotomies between fact and value, thought and experience,
mind and body, analytic and synthetic, which in the pragmatists’ view
wreck any capacity to grasp the complexity of human and social experience
(Putnam, 1995a).
— — — Oli jälleen toinen kerta, jolloin minä luulin että kaikki oli
mennyttä. Silloin hymyili äiti: »Ei mikään ole hukassa!»… Hänellä on
sydämessään ymmärtämisen lahja. Ei kukaan omista sellaista
ymmärtämyksen taitoa, kuin nainen, jolla on tämä taito. Ei kukaan
muu voi nähdä niin syvälle sieluun. Siksi minä jumaloin äitiäni. Hän
on ainoa nainen, jota jumaloin!… Kaikkia muita kohtaan olen oppinut
uskottomaksi hänestä, joka läksi luotani… Häntä minä katson
suurimmaksi kanssarikollisekseni kaikessa mitä olen rikkonut.
Thora Thammers oli hypähtänyt kiveltä, jolla hän oli istunut. Hänen
huulensa olivat valkoiset, kuin kuihtuneet. Hän oli huomannut että
jotain oli tulossa — oli huomannut sen äänestä, joka muuttui
muuntumistaan, kunnes hän ei sitä enää tuntenut.
Nyt vasta tunsi hän hänet samaksi, joka hän oli ollut muinoin. Oli
kuin hän olisi astunut hänen eteensä muuttumatonna pitkäin,
menneitten aikojen takaa — Thora katsoi häneen sanatonna
kauhusta.
— Minun täytyi sanoa se, sanoi hän vihdoin hiljaa, — se oli kerran
sanottava!
Mitä te ajattelette?
— Huomennako?
*****
Jos sitten sattui että sen, johon hänen sydämensä oli kiintynyt,
täytyi matkustaa liian pian, voi hän itkeä vuolaita kyyneliä — oli kuin
kuolema olisi ollut lähellä.
8.
Tuli talvi.
Kesä lupaili käydä oikein hauskaksi. Kaikki olivat hyvillä mielin. Oli
jo alettu maalata koskea.
Oli ehditty ensi päiviin, jolloin oli niin lämmin, että voi täyttä totta
istuskella ulkona.
Thamar rouva oli varsin viehättävä, kun hän nyt istui kysellen
mieheltänsä kaikenmoisia pikkuseikkoja. Hänellä oli erityinen kyky
keksiä tuontapaisia kysymyksiä — eikä kenenkään olisi tarvinnut
niitä arkailla, sillä hän ei koskaan tarkannut vastausta.
Mutta erästä seikkaa ei tirehtööri ollut koskaan oivaltanut. Hänelle
oli niin mieleen tuo, että hänen oli aina päätettävä kaikesta ja että
hänen vaimonsa oli niin tyytyväinen kaikkiin hänen järjestelyihinsä.
Nyt oli kaikki toisin. Nyt oli hänen huolehdittava kaikesta, vaikkei
hän vielä ollut täysin ehtinyt sitä huomata, ollen tuollaisen rakkauden
pauloissa, joka häikäisee ja orjuuttaa, niin kauan kuin se kestää.
Joskus hän sentään tuli ajatelleeksi, kuinka välttämättömiltä hänestä
nyt tuntuivat kaikki nuo vähäiset huolenpidon ilmaukset, joita hän ei
ennen tullut koskaan osoittaneeksi, ja hänen mielessänsä heräsi
kuin hämmästelevä tunne, että hän oli laiminlyönyt jotain, jota ei
voinut enää koskaan hyvittää.
Hän nauroi. Sehän kuului juuri samaan asiaan! Niin, hänen oli ollut
mahdoton olla niitä näkemättä — ja huomaamatta että nykyajan
naiset pyrkivät ratkaisemaan saman tehtävän kuin muinoin
kuningatar Kraaka, mutta vastakkaiseen suuntaan: olla puettu ja
kumminkin alaston. Oli ihmeellistä nähdä, kuinka kunnialliset naiset
kilvan jäljittelivät kuoseja, jotka olivat siveettömäin naisten keksintöjä
tai heitä varten keksittyjä. Erikoisen älykkäältä ei se hänestä
vaikuttanut, mutta kaiketi onkin älykkäisyys jo vanhentunut
ominaisuus… Ennenmuinoinhan poltettiin viisaita naisia!… Erääseen
toiseenkin seikkaan oli hänen huomionsa kiintynyt, nimittäin tuohon
erinomaisen kauhistuttavaan tapaan, millä he kantoivat helmojansa.
Minne olikaan joutunut sulottarien perintö?
Hän jätti lauseensa kesken. Hän tuli ajatelleeksi jotakin, jonka oli
kuullut kerran rouva Thamarilta: että jos ei kenenkään olisi vaikea
olla, niin eihän tietäisikään kuinka hyviä päiviä itse viettää. — Ja
mistä runoilijat sitten kirjoittaisivat? Kaikki ihmiset menehtyisivät
ikävään. — — — Tuota sieti todellakin miettiä!… Ja kun nyt kerran
maailman meno oli järjestetty sillä tavoin… Tietysti oli Luoja
asettanut kaikki sillä tavoin kuin tahtoi sen olevan. —
Mutta väliin voi käydä niin, että lehtori ei enää tiennyt puheensa
alkua eikä loppua, ja nytkään ei hän itse eivätkä naiset tienneet,
kuinka hän oli tullut puhuneeksi — analogia-todistuksista ja sitten
lopettaneeksi puheensa herttaisella myönnytyksellä, että henkisesti
voimakkaat naiset kohoavat ympäristönsä yläpuolelle.
— On kyllä.
Ensi kerran loi nyt Don Miguel rouva Lissiin katseen, joka ei ollut
ehdottomasti ihaileva.
9.