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Thatcherism in the
21st Century
The Social and
Cultural Legacy
Edited by
Antony Mullen
Stephen Farrall
David Jeffery
Thatcherism in the 21st Century
Antony Mullen • Stephen Farrall
David Jeffery
Editors

Thatcherism in the
21st Century
The Social and Cultural Legacy
Editors
Antony Mullen Stephen Farrall
Department of English Studies Department of Criminology and Social
Durham University Sciences
Durham, UK University of Derby
Derby, UK
David Jeffery
Department of Politics
University of Liverpool
Liverpool, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-41791-8    ISBN 978-3-030-41792-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41792-5

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
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 Contents

1 Introduction  1
Antony Mullen, Stephen Farrall, and David Jeffery

Part I Ideologies  13

2 The Ideological Composition of the Parliamentary

Conservative Party from Thatcher to May 15
Timothy Heppell

3 Intellectual Reactions to Thatcherism: Conceptions

of Citizenship and Civil Society from 1990–2010 35
Edmund Neill

4 Data-Driven Government: The Triumph

of Thatcherism or the Revenge of Society? 55
Kieron O’Hara

Part II Regions  75

5 ‘Rolling Back the Frontiers of the State, Only to See

Them Re-imposed in Docklands?’: Margaret Thatcher,
Michael Heseltine and the Contested Parenthood of
Canary Wharf 77
Jack Brown

v
vi Contents

6 ‘The Jezebel Who Sought to Destroy Israel in a Day’:

Margaret Thatcher’s Impact on the Northern Ireland
Peace Process, 1984–1990 99
Fiona McKelvey

7 ‘The Iron Lady? She Devastated the Country’:

Former Scottish Steelworkers’ Narratives of Unions,
Community and Thatcherism117
James Ferns

8 Thatcherism and Wales: Impacts and Legacies139

Sam Blaxland

Part III Attitudes 157

9 The Political Socialisation of Thatcher’s Children:

Identifying the Long Reach of Thatcherite Social and
Economic Values and Perceptions of Crime159
Emily Gray, Maria Grasso, and Stephen Farrall

10 Margaret Thatcher and the Rhetorical Road to Brexit185

Andrew S. Roe-Crines

11 Thatcher’s Legacy and Social Security209

Ruth Davidson

Part IV Interpretations 229

12 Thatcher’s Young Men and the End of the Party: Parody,

Predictions and Problems in Literary Representations of
Thatcherism231
Dominic Dean
 Contents  vii

13 The Politics of The Iron Lady251

Antony Mullen

14 ‘Death of a Member’, 10 April 2013267

Martin Farr

Index293
 List of Contributors

Sam Blaxland Swansea University, Swansea, UK

Jack Brown King’s College London, London, UK
Ruth Davidson King’s College London, London, UK
Dominic Dean University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
Stephen Farrall Department of Criminology and Social Sciences,
University of Derby, Derby, UK
Martin Farr Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
James Ferns Strathclyde University, Glasgow, UK
Maria Grasso Department of Politics and International Relations,
University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Emily Gray Department of Criminology and Social Sciences,
University of Derby, Derby, UK
Timothy Heppell University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
David Jeffery Department of Politics, University of Liverpool,
Liverpool, UK

ix
x LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Fiona McKelvey Belfast, UK

Antony Mullen Department of English Studies, Durham University,
Durham, UK
Edmund Neill New College of the Humanities, London, UK
Kieron O’Hara University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
Andrew S. Roe-Crines University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
 List of Figures

Figs. 9.1–9.9 Smoothed cohort effects from Generalized Additive

Models (GAMs) 174
Figs. 9.10–9.14 Smoothed cohort effects from Generalized Additive
Models (GAMs) 180

xi
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 The ideological composition of the PCP 1990 using the
Norton typology 17
Table 2.2 The wet-dry distinction and the economic policy ideological
divide19
Table 2.3 The PCP and the economic policy ideological
(wet-dry) divide 1992 to 2010 20
Table 2.4 The parliamentary Conservative Party and the European
Question(s) 1992 to 2017 24
Table 2.5 The PCP and social, sexual and moral issues 1992–2017 28
Table 9.1 Political generations 167
Table 9.2 Age, period and cohort models: right-authoritarian values 169
Table 9.3 Wald tests for intergenerational differences from the age,
period and Cohort models 172
Table 9.4 Age period and cohort models: fear of crime and concern
about neighbourhood disorder 176
Table 9.5 Wald tests for intergenerational differences from the age,
period and cohort models 179
Table 11.1 Unemployment attitudes 223
Table 11.2 Priority for extra government spending on benefits 224

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Antony Mullen, Stephen Farrall, and David Jeffery

Margaret Thatcher died in London on 8th April 2013, aged 87. Her death
brought to a close the final chapter of her life. Her final years, in stark
contrast to her global prominence throughout the eighties and most of
the nineties, were markedly private. She gave up public speaking in 2002
following several minor strokes and, though she was able to record a
eulogy for Ronald Reagan’s funeral in 2004, her health deteriorated so
substantially in the years that followed that planning for her own funeral
commenced in 2009. Around the same time, Carole Thatcher spoke
openly of her mother’s dementia. By 2011, the severity of Thatcher’s con-
dition led to the closure of her office in the House of Lords, an act
described by the Daily Telegraph as a sign of her ‘final and irrevocable
withdrawal from public life’ (Walker 2011). Yet, despite her drawn out
physical decline and subsequent death, Thatcher remains a prominent and
influential figure in British politics. She continues to inspire those on the

A. Mullen (*)
Department of English Studies, Durham University, Durham, UK
S. Farrall
Department of Criminology and Social Sciences, University of Derby, Derby, UK
e-mail: s.farrall@derby.ac.uk
D. Jeffery
Department of Politics, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
e-mail: d.jeffery@liverpool.ac.uk

© The Author(s) 2020 1

A. Mullen et al. (eds.), Thatcherism in the 21st Century,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41792-5_1
2 A. MULLEN ET AL.

right who claim to be guided by her memory, while eliciting passionate

opposition from those who cite her as an enduring reason to oppose the
Conservatives: this volume elaborates upon both examples in chapters by
Martin Farr and James Ferns, respectively.
The importance still attributed to Thatcher is such that British political
commentators continue to ask, in relation to contemporary events and
debates, ‘what would Maggie do?’. Would she have supported the UK’s
withdrawal from the European Union? Would she have maintained a close
relationship with the USA during Donald Trump’s presidency? Would she
agree with the government of the day’s approach to housing policy? Would
she favour local enterprise zones? All of these are examples of genuine
questions asked by journalists and academics, demonstrating the extent to
which a series of recent, unrelated political situations have been consid-
ered through the prism of Thatcher’s anticipated approach to them. The
varied nature of these questions, and of the types of people posing them,
highlights that to ask ‘what would Maggie do?’ is not simply an obsession
of the right or of pro-Thatcher fanatics, but a line of enquiry considered
worthwhile by mainstream journalists and academics of different political
persuasions to Thatcher’s own.
The premiership of Theresa May, the UK’s second female Prime
Minister, highlighted a gendered element to the curious practice of imag-
ining Thatcher’s approach to contemporary problems. May’s premiership
was accompanied by multiple articles which considered the extent to
which she was like Thatcher, particularly in its earlier days when the pro-­
Brexit tabloid press supported her (as comparisons to Thatcher in such
media, though gendered, are also invariably favourable).1 One of the most
striking examples of this came on January 18th 2017, when the Daily
Mail published on its front page a cartoon image of May standing on the
White Cliffs of Dover, with a Union flag behind her and a Thatcher-esque
handbag on her arm, accompanied by a headline which proclaimed her

1
It should also be acknowledged though that there were serious questions raised about the
extent to which May’s premiership put an end to Thatcherism. These debates were not con-
cerned with the sex of the two women in question, but with whether May’s ostensible shift
to the left—economically at least, with suggestions of an industrial strategy, government
intervention in the economy and workers on boards (some of which did not materialise)—
signaled the end of neoliberal thinking within the Conservative Party. Contributors to this
debate include Eliza Filby (2016), Raffy Marshall (2016) and Jason Cowley (2017). George
Trefgarne (2017) was among the few who argued that Theresa May’s economic and indus-
trial policies would have had Mrs Thatcher’s support.
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

“the New Iron Lady” (Slack 2017). In the run up to the 2017 general
election, May’s popularity ratings—the highest since records began—
caused speculation that the Conservatives might gain seats in Labour’s
industrial heartlands (Maidment 2017). In response, Labour candidates in
areas where Thatcher was unpopular consciously linked May and Thatcher
in an effort to counteract May’s apparent popularity with their largely
Brexit supporting electorate. Labour MP Karl Turner—seeking re-­election
in Kingston upon Hull East—hired a billboard and displayed upon it a
poster which showed May with Thatcher’s hair superimposed over her
own. The accompanying caption read: ‘Be Afraid. Be Very Afraid. They’re
the Same Old Tories.’ By the end of May’s premiership though, after she
had lost her parliamentary majority and failed (in her own terms) to deliver
Brexit, Thatcher supporters like Lord Dobbs were keen to contrast May
and Thatcher (as if attempting to rescue the latter’s reputation by disas-
sociation), with comments about how Thatcher would not ‘have got us
anywhere near this mess’ (Morrison 2019). The swathe of Conservative
victories in former Labour heartlands did not materialise until the general
election of 2019, when Boris Johnson won what one Sky News presenter
described on election night as “a majority of Thatcherite proportions”.
Evidently the continued preoccupation with Margaret Thatcher in
British politics—broadly defined—is not the sole preserve of those on the
right who seek to emulate her. Her contemporary significance is also bol-
stered by those who oppose her and the ways they continue to deploy her
image, the journalists for whom Thatcher is the go-to figure for recent
historical comparison, and academics whose interest in her continues to
generate new and insightful takes on her premiership, style of leadership
and long-term influence.
The essays in this collection are less concerned with hypotheticals about
what Margaret Thatcher might do today, focusing instead upon how we
can understand the legacy of what she did do and how that manifests in the
present moment. With perspectives from a range of academic disciplines,
the book is divided into four main thematic sections:

• Ideologies—the first and most obvious element of Thatcherism’s

legacy is surely its ideological transformation of the Conservative
Party and, arguably, aspects of British politics more broadly. This sec-
tion is concerned with the ideological influence of Thatcherism and
how intellectual, political and social responses to it reveal the com-
plex nature of that influence.
4 A. MULLEN ET AL.

• Regions—the legacy of Thatcherism is not universal across the UK’s

four constituent nations. In recognising this, this section draws upon
archival findings and oral histories to offer new perspectives on
Thatcherism’s impact upon, or within, four specific geographic local-
ities: Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London.
• Attitudes—to what extent have Thatcher and Thatcherism altered
social attitudes in twenty-first century Britain? This section addresses
this question with a focus upon contemporary society’s orientation
towards issues as diverse as Europe and welfare, examining the role
that Thatcherism played in shifting public attitudes.
• Interpretations—if we are truly to understand the legacies of
Thatcher and Thatcherism today, then we must look beyond narrow
scholarly debates to understand how the period of British politics
dominated by Thatcher is recounted and represented in popular
accounts with which the public is more accustomed. This section
considers how the idea of Thatcher has been (re-)constructed by par-
liamentarians, filmmakers and authors of fiction and how such repre-
sentations are imbued (sometimes subtly) with ideas of Thatcher’s
long-term impact on British political life.

Each of these sections provides a way of conceptualising, assessing and

measuring ‘legacy’. Before we can approach questions of Thatcherism’s
legacy, though, we must consider first what we mean by it. Scholarly defi-
nitions of Thatcherism vary across, and even within, academic disciplines.
We do not attempt to offer a single answer to the question ‘what is
Thatcherism?’ here but, in what is an intentionally interdisciplinary collec-
tion, it is necessary to consider several conceptual frameworks in relation
to which Thatcherism can be understood. We do so briefly, providing only
the necessary foundations for the chapters in this collection. What follows
are three different but complementary, overlapping strands of the -ism: an
exploration of Thatcherism’s neoliberal facets, its social and moral con-
cerns, and its relationship with nationalism.

Thatcherism and Neoliberalism

Neoliberal thought is one of the key elements of the Thatcher project,
informing the philosophical basis of how Thatcherites believe the econ-
omy should be organised. Andrew Gamble argues that neoliberalism, the
revival of ‘market liberalism as the dominant public philosophy and to create
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

the conditions for a free economy by limiting the scope of the state’, com-
prised one of the three overriding objectives of the Thatcherite political
project—the other two being to deliver electoral success and restoring the
‘authority and competence’ of the state to act (Gamble 1994, 4).
The centrality of neoliberalism to Thatcherite thought—and the reason
why it is such a useful lens for analysing Thatcherism—is due to two key
factors. The first is the global rise of New Right ideology, of which
Thatcherism was a key example and Thatcher a key proponent. Here, we
can analyse the importance and impact of neoliberalism in a comparative,
international perspective. The second is the socio-economic context in
which Britain found itself, now known as the Winter of Discontent, and
which Thatcher used as a spring-board to justify her economic reforms,
specifically the desire to boost economic growth, reduce inflation and cur-
tail trade union power (Crines et al. 2016, 31). Neoliberalism is important
because it is not a sui generis position, but a reaction to the effects of the
so-called ‘post-war consensus’.
The centrality of neoliberal thought to the Thatcherite project was also
recognised by Thatcher herself—a point perfectly surmised by the story
from when Thatcher was Leader of the Opposition, berating a ‘leftish
member of the Conservative Research Department by fetching out a copy
of The Constitution of Liberty from her bag and slamming it down on the
table, declaring “this is what we believe”’ (Margaret Thatcher Foundation
2019). Neoliberalism is a vital lens through which to analyse Thatcherism
because it was the very economic philosophy within which Thatcher situ-
ated her own economic policy programme.
This is not to say, however, that all policy reform lived up to the neolib-
eral ideal. In some key respects Thatcher continued the policies of the
much-derided ‘post-war consensus’: the NHS, the education system, pen-
sions, parks, libraries, museums and even the Royal Mail all survived the
Thatcher era more or less intact (Reitan 2003). Gamble also cautions
against the idea of seeing the Thatcher administrations as a radical neolib-
eral government. Tax cuts were slower than they could have been, there
was a failure to make deep cuts in state spending, and few programmes
were terminated altogether. Similarly, the establishment of a monetarist
policy regime arguably predates the Thatcher governments, and to the
extent that it ‘served important ideological and political needs … it was
less important as a guide to policy’ (Gamble 1994, 228–230).
6 A. MULLEN ET AL.

Thatcherism and Neoconservatism

The links between Thatcherism and neoconservatism are well established
(see Hay 1996; Levitas 1986 and Gamble 1994, most obviously). The
conservative aspects of Thatcherite thinking have, if anything, been left in
the shadows following the focus on neoliberalism which has dominated
debates and critiques of late. Thatcher’s conservativism was routed in her
admiration for and of England of the 1930s (see Green 1999) and found
expression via her support for the reintroduction of the death penalty and
the rhetorical attacks on homosexuals working in schools (which later
underpinned the legislation aimed at preventing teacher’s from ‘promot-
ing’ homosexuality to school children). This neoconservatism, however,
had a sometimes uncomfortable relationship with neoliberalism.
Sometimes the two homed in on the same topic—such as, for example, the
sale of council houses to their tenants. This appealed to neoconservatives
because it helped to support the aspirations of families, whilst it also
appealed to neoliberals as it was an attached on public ownership of assets.
On other matters, however, these instincts clashed. Pushing back the
restrictions of what could be bought on a Sunday (the Sunday Trading
Laws) appealed to neoliberals. Shops were, after all, a fixed cost, so being
able to sell on a Sunday meant that additional revenue could be won,
which appealed to neoliberals. Neoconservatives saw things rather differ-
ently, however. Sundays were days of both worship (during the 1980s it
was jokingly remarked that the Church of England was the Conservative
Party at prayer) and of rest. As such, selling things on a Sunday (which
implied employing people to do the selling) breached the ‘rest’ maxim,
whilst eating into the time for prayer.
But her conservative instincts went further than the narrowly defined
topics of morality (for which read religious values, heterosexuality and no
sexual relationships outside of marriage), and embraced topics which bor-
dered on neoliberal concerns, such as the ‘duty’ to find work (irrespective
of where it was—hence Norman Tebbit’s quip about his father getting on
his bike to look for work), or how well it was paid or what it entailed doing
(hence the emphasis on ‘flexible working’). These elements of her neocon-
servatism thus buttressed her thinking on neoliberalism, helping to create
a virtuous circle (at least within Conservative Party thinking). Yet some of
the (at least initially neoliberal) economic policies were doing great dam-
age to some core pillars of neoconservative thinking. Families and com-
munities were (at least some of them) thrown into disarray, especially after
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

the miners’ strike of 1984–1985 and the wave of pit closures which fol-
lowed this, and the job losses in associated industries such as the railways.
Wherever and whenever one looks at Thatcherism as a critique of society,
as an ideological construct, and (or ‘or’) a set of policy and legislative
activities, one finds symmetries and contradictions.

Thatcherism and Nationalism

Nationalism is of major importance to Thatcherism and was central to
Thatcher’s own social outlook. In her assessment of the country’s prob-
lems in the late 1970s, Thatcher diagnosed that something fundamental
to the British character had been lost. The 1960s and 1970s were, in her
view, marked not just by economic decline but by a decline in social stan-
dards which contrasted with the Victorian values which had informed her
own upbringing. Her promise to the country was not simply economic
rescue, but a return to these values and the return of ‘true’ Britishness. In
her own words, Thatcher’s mission was to change the ‘heart and soul’ of
the nation—while economics might have provided ‘the method’, renew-
ing British pride and reviving a lost sense of national identity was the
objective (Thatcher 1981). Thatcher presented many of the neoliberal and
neoconservative principles which underpinned her political project as an
intrinsic aspect of Britishness. In 1999, she compounded this by stating
that while she had been influenced by neoliberals like Milton Friedman
and Friedrich von Hayek, her ‘approach’ in the 1980s ‘lay deep in human
nature, and more especially the nature of the British people’
(Thatcher 1999).
If Thatcherism’s aim was to alter Britain’s place in the world and to
restore it to the former greatness Thatcher attributed to it, then it was—at
least on Thatcher’s own terms—successful in doing so. This was made
clear in the Conservative Party’s choice of campaign slogan during the
1987 general election: ‘Britain is Great Again. Don’t Let Labour Wreck
It’. But while Thatcher’s nationalism may have contributed to the success
of her political project (particularly on her own terms), it was not without
its critics. In 1997, Stuart Hall wrote that Thatcherism was ‘grounded in’
a ‘narrow, national definition of Englishness, of cultural identity’, adding
that ‘When Thatcherism speaks, frequently asking the question “Are you
one of us?” Who is one of us? Well, the numbers of people who are not
one of us would fill a book’ (1997, 26). Hall’s argument was that the
8 A. MULLEN ET AL.

definition of Britishness posited by Thatcherism equated to South East

Englishness (something reinforced by the sections of this book on Wales
and Scotland in particular) and that it served to exclude more people than
it sought to include.

Thatcherism in the Twenty-First Century

This collection is the first major publication of the Thatcher Network, an
interdisciplinary research group which aims to promote the study of
Margaret Thatcher and Thatcherism. At the time of writing, the network
has held conferences at the universities of Durham (2017), Liverpool
(2018) and Derby (2019).2 For the most part, the essays in this collection
have their roots in the discussions held at the first two conferences and
there is, consequentially, a disparate range of disciplinary perspectives and
methodological approaches throughout the book. They are, however, all
underpinned by a mutual consideration of the legacy of Margaret Thatcher
and Thatcherism the twenty-first century.
The first section of the book opens with Timothy Heppell’s assessment
of Thatcherism’s ideological legacy among Conservative Party MPs.
Heppell demonstrates that while there are some clear signs of Thatcherism
having triumphed over its critics—those often termed ‘Wets’—on the
issue of the economy, its ideological legacy beyond the economic sphere is
much more complex. Edmund Neill’s chapter provides a historical account
of intellectual responses to Thatcherism, focusing particularly upon
debates about citizenship and civil society in the period 1990–2010. In
doing so, Neill reveals that Thatcherism retained much influence—as an
idea—long after Thatcher left office, but that thinkers on the right (as well
as the left) have increasingly questioned some of the assumptions which
underpin it. Kieron O’Hara locates Thatcher’s often misrepresented ‘no
such thing as society’ comment, and her wider reflections upon the notion
of the individual, within the history of conservative thought and, subse-
quently, within contemporary debates about big data and cyberculture.
O’Hara argues that Thatcher’s promotion of a certain style or notion of
2
If proof of Thatcher’s divisiveness was required, the second conference (in Liverpool) was
met with opposition from that institution’s student Marxist society and members of the local
Momentum branch (the Jeremy Corbyn support group within the Labour Party), both of
which planned to protest the conference; some of the latter group also threatened to commit
acts of violence against its delegates. Reports of these threats featured on the regional BBC
Radio news reports and in the Daily Mail (Martin 2017).
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

individualism could have unwittingly given way to a new type of digital

modernity with ‘the individual’ at its heart.
‘Regions’ begins with Jack Brown’s chapter on the birth of Canary
Wharf and its association with Thatcherism. Brown uses new archival
materials to challenge established accounts of the relationship between
Thatcherism and Canary Wharf’s development, with a focus upon the role
of Michael Heseltine. The chapter challenges not just misconceptions
about the ‘Thatcherite’ origins of Canary Wharf, but about the Thatcher
government’s relationship with interventionist policies more broadly.
Fiona McKelvey’s chapter is similarly underpinned by new materials made
available in UK and Irish archives. McKelvey explores the reasons behind
the sense of ambivalence in Northern Ireland which followed Thatcher’s
death, particularly among the Unionist community which admired her
stance against the IRA, but not her role in laying the groundwork for the
Good Friday Agreement. James Ferns uses oral history interviews with
former steelworkers in Scotland to provide a comprehensive account of
their experience and understanding of Thatcherism, and how that informs
a sense of post-industrial identity within communities once reliant upon
heavy industry. Sam Blaxland similarly combines oral history interviews
with archival research in his examination of Thatcher’s legacy in twenty-­
first century Wales (up to, and including, the 2019 general election).
Blaxland demonstrates that, while Thatcher’s personal interest in Wales
may have been limited, her governments introduced significant policies to
strengthen Welsh identity which indirectly paved the way for devolution
and the formation of the Welsh Assembly.
Emily Gray, Maria Grasso and Stephen Farrall’s chapter opens the
‘Attitudes’ section of the book. The chapter uses an age, period and cohort
analysis to investigate the phenomenon of ‘Thatcher’s Children’, demon-
strating that individuals who came of age during the Thatcher/Major
years had markedly more conservative (or ‘Thatcherite’) social attitudes
towards issues including crime and punishment and the economy than the
generation that first elected Thatcher. Andrew Crines’ chapter gives con-
sideration to the claim that Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech, and sub-
sequent Eurosceptic interventions from the House of Lords, helped to set
the UK on the path to Brexit. Through an analysis of her rhetoric, particu-
larly post-1990, Crines shows how Thatcher inspired a new generation of
Eurosceptic Conservatives who perceived rejecting the EU as a central
part of conservatism. Finally, Ruth Davidson examines how Thatcherism
10 A. MULLEN ET AL.

transformed public attitudes to welfare and social security. She shows how
Tony Blair’s New Labour government was not able to counter the moral-
ising narrative surrounding social security spending that Thatcher intro-
duced into public discourse, and that the associated notions of the
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor remain prevalent today.
The book’s final section, ‘Interpretations’, opens with Dominic Dean’s
consideration of how authors of contemporary fiction captured and illus-
trated the complex nature of Thatcherism in their writing, in a way not
achieved by conventional political history. Dean looks to works by Hanif
Kureishi, Alan Hollinghurst and Kazuo Ishiguro as examples which high-
light Thatcherism’s contradictions, such as how its nationalist tendencies
contrast its orientation towards transnational wealth. Antony Mullen then
discusses the significance of the 2011 film The Iron Lady and its implica-
tions for historical narratives about Thatcher and Thatcherism. Mullen
discusses how the film—ostensibly objective, globally successful and
acclaimed for its accurate portrayal—de-politicises Thatcher by distancing
her from much of what she did in office, encouraging viewers to recognise
instead her achievements as a woman. Finally, Martin Farr brings the col-
lection to a close with a carefully curated reconstruction of the parliamen-
tary tributes to Thatcher following her death—an event which served as a
de facto debate about Thatcher’s legacy (and that of her eponymous-ism)
and one which three members of the House of Lords declared would be
of great significance to historians. Focusing upon how different genera-
tions of parliamentarian remembered Thatcher and the period she domi-
nated, Farr brings strands of MPs’ and peers’ speeches together in an
evaluation of what was a highly publicised media spectacle set against the
backdrop of ‘death parties’, worldwide news coverage and a televised
funeral.

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voters-leader-since-late-1970s/.
Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 2019. Thatcher, Hayek & Friedman. Margaret
Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/Hayek.asp.
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28 July. https://www.conservativehome.com/thetorydiary/2016/07/the-
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office-is-closed.html.
 PART I

Ideologies
 CHAPTER 2

The Ideological Composition

of the Parliamentary Conservative Party
from Thatcher to May

Timothy Heppell

This chapter will identify how the ideological composition of the parlia-
mentary Conservative Party (PCP) has evolved over the last three decades.
The rationale for engaging in this type of research is to establish the ideo-
logical legacy of Thatcherism within their parliamentary ranks. Prior to the
advent of Thatcherism, the following assumptions existed about the
Conservative Party vis-à-vis ideology. First, Conservatives tended to deny
that Conservatism was an ideology (Gilmour 1977, 121). Second, rather
than being ideological or dogmatic, Conservatives claimed that they were
pragmatic. This was tied to their belief in the importance of internal party
unity and that oft-used phrase that ‘we have our agreements in public and
our disagreements in private’ (Cowley and Norton 1999, 102). This in
turn explained why academics defined the party as one of non-aligned
political tendencies, rather than one characterised by ideological factions
(Rose 1964). Third, alongside their suspicion towards ideology, which
aided their attempts to demonstrate internal unity, was another

T. Heppell (*)
University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
e-mail: t.heppell@leeds.ac.uk

© The Author(s) 2020 15

A. Mullen et al. (eds.), Thatcherism in the 21st Century,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41792-5_2
16 T. HEPPELL

oft-repeated claim—that loyalty to their leader was their secret weapon

(Garnett 2003, 49).
These claims about the Conservatives were certainly less credible in the
post-Thatcher era then they were in the pre-Thatcher era. First, Thatcher
rejected the pragmatism associated with consensus politics and she pro-
jected herself as an ideologically driven conviction politician (Kavanagh
1987). Second, the fact that Thatcher would ask if fellow Conservatives
were ‘one of us’ (Young 1990) helped to establish a tradition whereby
Conservatives became subcategorised in terms of whether they were
Thatcherite or non-Thatcherite, a development which her successor John
Major thought was immensely damaging (Major 1999). His leadership
tenure would witness the consequences of her approach—i.e. an increase
in ideologically driven conflict (Cowley and Norton 1999). Third, the
claim about loyalty to the party leader was exposed as a myth. Thatcher
was challenged twice (in 1989 and 1990); Major survived a de facto chal-
lenge in 1995; in opposition Iain Duncan Smith was forcibly evicted in
2003 via the confidence motion procedure initiated in 1998; and Theresa
May did survive a confidence motion in December 2018 before eventually
resigning in May 2019 (see Heppell 2008; Dorey et al. 2020; Roe-Crines
et al. 2020). Moreover, ideology would also become a dominant consid-
eration in the selection of the party leadership. Academic studies have
demonstrated a strong correlation between the ideological preferences of
parliamentarians and the candidate for the leadership that they voted for
in the 1975, 1990, 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2016 Conservative Party lead-
ership elections (see Cowley and Bailey 2000; Cowley and Garry 1998;
Heppell and Hill 2008, 2009, 2010; Jeffery et al. 2018).
Back in 1990 Norton (1990, 42) examined the ideological disposition
of the PCP and asked whether Thatcher, and her administrations since
1979, had acted as a ‘transmission belt’ for an increasingly Thatcherite
parliamentary party. Using a range of sources—i.e. division lists, member-
ship of party groupings, public comments in the media and interviews—
Norton positioned each member of the 1987 PCP on an ideological
spectrum of Conservatism. The central theme within the Norton typology
was opinion towards economic management, thus capturing the wet-dry
distinction which was the dominant divide within 1980s Conservatism,
but it was a typology that also captured the divide over social, sexual and
moral matters. At the time the Norton typology was a credible way of
mapping opinion within the PCP. Although it had a number of subcatego-
ries within it (see Table 2.1), it identified how Thatcherism was the
 2 THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY… 17

Table 2.1 The ideological composition of the PCP 1990 using the Norton
typology
Grouping Ideological categorisation N = 372

Critics of 67
Thatcherism
(Wets) Strongly interventionist, pro-European, socially liberal (27)
(Damps) Moderately interventionist, pro-European, socially (40)
liberal
Faithful Loyal to leadership position 217
Populists Interventionist, Eurosceptic, socially conservative 17
Thatcherites 71
(Neo-liberals) Economic dries, social liberals, Eurosceptic (15)
(Thatcher Group) Economic dries, loyalist on morality and Europe (30)
(Tory Right) Economic dries, social conservatives, loyalist on Europe (26)

Source: Norton 1990, 47–52

ideological amalgamation of neo-liberalism in the economic sphere (as

advanced by economic dries) and neo-conservatism as promoted by social
conservatives—or what Gamble described as the free economy and the
strong state (Gamble 1988). The central finding from Norton’s research
was that the Thatcherites were a minority within the PCP (Norton 1990,
43–4, 55).
This chapter updates Norton’s study to assess how the ideological com-
position of the PCP has changed in the parliaments since Thatcher. In
doing so, the chapter will embrace and extend existing academic studies
on the ideological disposition of the PCPs that have followed since 1992.
These studies have developed the Norton typology in the following ways:

• First, by expanding the scale of the research undertaken in order to

position each Conservative parliamentarian. By using a larger num-
ber and wider range of division lists and Early Day Motions in the
subsequent Parliaments, and more extensive use of campaign litera-
ture and interviews, the number of loyalists (or those who cannot be
ideologically categorised) was lower (see for example, Heppell
2002, 2013).
• Second, by modernising the Norton typology to fully engage with
the European ideological policy fault-line. This would come to dom-
inate post-Thatcherite Conservatism, but it was not as central as the
wet-dry distinction at the time when Norton constructed his
18 T. HEPPELL

t­ ypology, and therefore this need to be addressed, as other academics

have identified (see Garry 1995; Heppell 2002; Heppell and
Hill 2005).
• Third, by accepting that the spectrum of opinion within post-­
Thatcherite Conservatism actually covers three distinct ideological
dividing lines—i.e. on economic policy, on European policy and on
social, sexual and moral matters—and that these should be viewed
separately. This is because some Conservatives do not adhere to a
straightforward distinction based on the left of Conservatism being
economically wet, Europhile and social liberal, and the right of
Conservatism being economically dry, Eurosceptic and socially con-
servative. A lot of cross-cutting opinions, or zig-zagging, will exist
across these three ideological dividing lines, showcasing the com-
plexities of contemporary British Conservatism, and the difficulties
that these would create in terms of party management for respective
party leaders after Thatcher.

Given these arguments, the chapter will consider the evidence of conti-
nuity and change in relation to each ideological dividing line separately in
each of the Parliaments since 1992, starting with the economic policy
divide, then the European policy divide, and then the divide over social,
sexual and moral matters.

The Economic Ideological Policy Divide: Wets

versus Dries

Thatcherism was an economic modernisation strategy which was designed

to replace a corporatist economy with an essentially market based econ-
omy (Johnson 1991). This required a rebalancing of the relationship
between labour and capital and addressing the trade union problem—i.e.
organised labour was an obstacle to the effective functioning of the free
market (Dorey 1995). Running parallel to these assumptions would be
the emblematic politics of privatisation, with the sale of state-owned assets
and council homes, being aligned to a wider strategy of economic liberali-
sation (Forrest and Murie 1988; Wolfe 1991). As Thatcherism promoted
the merits of deregulation and enterprise, so individuals and corporations
were incentivised to generate wealth, and to achieve these objectives
 2 THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY… 19

Thatcher made the case for lower direct taxation upon corporate income,
personal wealth and incomes (Riddell 1989).
Not all Conservatives were entirely comfortable with the consequences
of Thatcherite economic medicine. Those Conservatives who raised
doubts about increasing unemployment, or the growing gap between the
wealthiest and the poorest in society, or about regional inequalities, would
incur the wrath of Thatcher. She would justify the inevitability of inequal-
ity and would reject egalitarianism. She could simultaneously praise those
who were the wealth creators in the economy, and argue that if social
deprivation and poverty did exist, it was due to the limitations of those
individuals and not caused by the limitations of the capitalism (Dorey 2011).
Those who did not endorse the Thatcherite approach to the economy
became known as wets, and as a consequence her backers became known
as the dries. The use of the term wets was said to have been coined by
Thatcher as a rebuke for ministers unwilling to fully support her economic
strategy, and those she felt too willing to seek compromise with the trade
unions. A more detailed delineation of the views of wets and dries is
offered in Table 2.2. At its most basic it was clear that the wets were
uncomfortable with the anti-union legislation and the tax and public
expenditure cuts, and they made the case for a more interventionist and
conciliatory approach (Young 1990, 198–202). Over time, Thatcher
would use her Prime Ministerial powers of appointment to undermine
their influence within Cabinet. Leading wets were either (a) dismissed—
e.g. Ian Gilmour in 1981 and Francis Pym in 1983; or (b) resigned—e.g.
James Prior in 1984 and Michael Heseltine in 1986; or (c) they were
retained but marginalised—e.g. Peter Walker held office throughout but

Table 2.2 The wet-dry distinction and the economic policy ideological divide
Non-Thatcherite wet Thatcherite dry

Mixed economy Free market economy

Extended and interventionist state Limited but directive state
Interdependence Independence
Consultative policy making Executive policy making
Pluralist society Individualist society
Trade unions legitimate/constructive Trade unions undemocratic/destructive
Welfare state as universal right Welfare state as safety net
Social obligation Private self-help

Source: Adapted from Smith and Ludlam (1996, 12)

20 T. HEPPELL

in positions regarded by Thatcherites of low importance (Agriculture

1979–1983; Energy 1983–1987 and Wales 1987–1990 (Young
1990, 193–9).
The wet critique of Thatcherism was easily dismissed by the dries. The
leading wets—e.g. Gilmour, Pym and Prior—were closely associated with
Edward Heath. Thatcherites could therefore imply that the wet alternative
was a re-hash of the policy u-turn that fatally undermined the credibility of
the Heath administration of 1970 to 1974 (Holmes 1989, 92, 103–4).
The landslide parliamentary majorities that were secured at the general
elections of 1983 and 1987 validated the Thatcherite approach, thus mar-
ginalising the wets and their arguments (Holmes 1989, 92). For young
and ambitious Conservatives entering the parliamentary party in 1983
(e.g. Peter Lilley or Michael Howard) and 1987 (e.g. John Redwood or
David Davis) there were few career incentives in identifying as a wet, and
many career incentives for identifying as a Thatcherite dry (Table 2.3).
When assessing their numerical strength within the PCP, Norton iden-
tified that they were of roughly equal standing to the Thatcherite fac-
tion—the wets numbering 67 (or 18.0 percent) of the 372 strong
1987–1992 PCP and the Thatcherite dries numbering 71 (or 19.1 per-
cent) (Norton 1990, 41–58). When that process of attitudinal mapping is
applied to the wet-dry distinctions in the subsequent parliaments a very
clear pattern emerges, see Table 2.3. The level of wet representation with
the PCP declined from 33.8 percent in the 1992 Parliament to only 13.6
percent in the 2005 Parliament, and with level of dry representation also
increasing between the 1992 to 2005 Parliaments (from 56.8 to 80.8
percent), so the gap between wet and dry representation increased from
23 percent in the 1992 Parliament, to 67.2 percent. The wet/dry ideo-
logical battle had been the primary ideological battle of the Thatcherite

Table 2.3 The PCP and the economic policy ideological (wet-dry) divide
1992 to 2010
Parliament Agnostic Wet Dry

1992 (n = 331) 31 (9.4%) 112 (33.8%) 188 (56.8%)

1997 (n = 164) 13 (7.9%) 40 (24.4%) 111 (56.8%)
2001 (n = 166) 11 (6.6%) 34 (20.5%) 121 (72.9%)
2005 (n = 198) 11 (5.6%) 27 (13.6%) 160 (80.8%)

Source: Amended from Heppell (2002), Heppell and Hill (2008, 2009, 2010)
 2 THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY… 21

era, and it was clearly won by the dries. The level of wet representation had
diminished to such an extent that academic research on the ideological
mapping of the PCP ceased to assess wet-dry representation after the
study on the 2005 Parliament (see Heppell and Hill 2009; Heppell 2013).

The European Ideological Policy Divide: Europhiles

versus Eurosceptics/Soft versus Hard
Euroscepticism/Remainers versus Brexiteers
When Thatcher replaced Heath as Leader of the Conservative Party in
February 1975, she inherited a party in which the majority of Conservatives
were pro-European and the minority anti-Marketeer faction were located
on the backbenchers (Crowson 2007, 109). This was clear from the fact
that when seeking parliamentary consent for the passage of the European
Communities Act in 1972, a total of 40 Conservative parliamentarians
would rebel out of 330 (or 12.1 percent), although a further 75 did not
actually rebel, but were said to hold doubts about entering the commu-
nity—that created a ceiling of 135 of potential anti-Marketeers which at
40.9 percent was still a minority of the PCP (Norton 1978, 208).
Conversely, it was estimated that approaching 200 Conservative parlia-
mentarians were members of the pro-European ‘Conservative Group for
Europe’ (Crowson 2007, 124, 164). Furthermore, the lop-sided result in
the European Community referendum of 1975 undermined the anti-­
European arguments within the PCP, and by the time the Conservatives
reclaimed power in 1979, anti-Marketeer Conservatives were ‘virtually
irrelevant’ in terms of their influence (Ashford 1980, 110–12).
The Thatcher administrations of 1979 to 1990 were critical in the
incremental process of the Conservatives morphing from pro-­Europeanism
to Euroscepticism (see Fontana and Parsons 2015). Key developments in
the mid to late Thatcher era would include the following: first, the cre-
ation of the single European market, second, the case for (and against)
joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and third, the longer-term
question to address of whether or not to proceed towards Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) (Buller 2000). Although Thatcher would later
become identifiable with the Eurosceptic cause, she was a ‘willing partici-
pant’ to the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) (Crowson 2007,
51). With the SEA advancing market liberalisation it was clearly attractive
to Thatcher as not only did it represent the ‘convergence of economic
22 T. HEPPELL

policy across Europe with that of the British Conservative Party’, but it
could also ‘entrench neo-liberalism as a global hegemonic project’ (Gifford
2014, 89–94). However, Thatcher had underestimated the ‘expansionist
elements’ of the SEA, and it formed the ‘basis for spill-­over initiatives’
which the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, could
exploit—e.g. the promotion of a social dimension and harmonisation
around the rights of workers (Gifford 2014, 89). As she came to recognise
her own misjudgement, so her rhetoric moved in a Eurosceptic direction
(Daddow et al. 2019; Roe-Crines and Heppell 2020). She concluded that
(a) the social dimension spill over effects demonstrated that the free mar-
ket philosophy that had underpinned to SEA was being reneged upon;
and (b) the integrationist process being advanced by Delors, which would
advance the power of European institutions, represented a threat to parlia-
mentary sovereignty (Gifford 2014, 96).
Those on the pro-European wing concluded that pooling their sover-
eignty with their European partners and allies, was essential not just for
economic reasons, but for the renewal of British influence on the world
stage. To Eurosceptics, sovereignty was something you either possessed or
you did not, it could not be shared, and to imply otherwise was to misread
the situation—i.e. you were surrendering your sovereignty to a supra-­
national body over which the British would have no real control (Heppell
2002, 303). This ideological battle would be running parallel to develop-
ments that did much to damage the governing credibility of the
Conservatives in the early 1990s. Black Wednesday in September 1992—
which resulted in a humiliating and forced ejection from the ERM—was a
pivotal moment in Conservative Party history, as it did much to stimulate
further Conservative mistrust of further integration within Europe (Kettell
2008). If this damaged their claims to governing competence, then the
parliamentary passage (and ratification) of the Treaty of European Union
fatally undermined their claims to party unity (Baker, Gamble and Ludlam
1993, 1994). Not only were there a significant number of rebellions—at
least fifty backbench Conservative parliamentarians rebelled at least once
during the passage of the legislation—but its eventual passage only
occurred after Major tied it to a vote of confidence in his administration
(in July 1993) (Cowley and Norton 1999). When, later in the Parliament,
eight members of his own parliamentary ranks defied the whip on a bud-
getary contribution division, Major withdrew the whip from them, only to
reinstate it months later without any guarantees about their future loyalty
 2 THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY… 23

(Heppell 2007, 474). The scale of the discontent was laid open to the
electorate in the general election campaign of 1997. On the vexed ques-
tion of the single European currency, the official leadership position had
the following three stages: first, win the general election; second, negoti-
ate the terms for a possible entry into the single currency; and third, if
appropriate conditions for entry are made available then put these to the
people in a referendum. Approximately one third of Conservative candi-
dates decided to reject the official leadership position of negotiate and
decide (or wait and see), and made clear in their electoral campaigning
material, that they would never agree to joining a single European cur-
rency (McAllister and Studlar 2000, 361). An irony existed with regard to
the Conservative Party and Europe: voters were actually closer to the
Conservatives on European policy than they were the more pro-European
New Labour Party, but the Conservatives internal disagreements would
ensure that they could secure no electoral benefit from this (Evans 1998).
Between the end of the Major administration, and the beginning of the
Cameron-led coalition government, a considerable amount of changes
would occur in relation the Conservatives and the European question. It
was increasingly clear that defining the cleavage within the Conservative
Party around the terminology of pro-Europeanism and Eurosceptism was
no longer credible (Cowley and Stuart 2010, 141). Opposition had seen
a process of attitudinal realignment take place. Within this, the pro-­
European Conservative case for contemplating further integration had
been marginalised. Running parallel to this a new distinction was emerg-
ing amongst Euroscepticism between two variants—hard and soft (for a
more detailed discussion on hard and soft Euroscepticism, see Taggart and
Szczerbiak 2008). The hard variant was not just rejecting what they per-
ceived to be the excessively regulatory agenda of the European Union, but
they were arguing the case for a hyperglobalist economy and the opportu-
nities from prioritising the Anglosphere (Wellings and Baxendale 2015).
For those of this rejectionist mindset the case for leaving the European
Union was gradually being made. Those defined as soft Eurosceptics
adopted a revisionist approach—i.e. like their fellow hard Eurosceptics
they opposed any processes of further integration within the European
Union—but they felt that the economic benefits justified continued mem-
bership, and the reform from within was the best strategy (Lynch 2015).
On the hard-soft or rejectionist-revisionist distinction within the PCP,
Cameron and his ministerial ranks were clearly aligned with the soft-­
revisionist faction. The hard or rejectionist faction, however, felt that
24 T. HEPPELL

Cameron had been complacent with regard to the threat from UKIP. They
concluded that his modernising rhetoric, which downplayed immigration,
was being exploited by UKIP. There was clear evidence that the electoral
performance of UKIP improved significantly during the Cameron era, and
that their vote base was primarily (but not exclusively) drawn from disaf-
fected Conservatives (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Their frustrations mani-
fested themselves in parliamentary dissent. During the 2010 to 2015
Parliament, 103 out of 306 Conservative parliamentarians would vote
against the Conservative whip at least once on a European policy related
division (Lynch 2015, 193). Although not his preference, Cameron was
being forced to engage with the debates about the repatriation of powers,
and by 2013 he had mapped out the following strategy—if the
Conservatives won the general election of 2015, then he would aim to (a)
renegotiate our terms of membership within the European Union, and
then he would (b) put those new terms of membership to the people in an
in-out referendum (Heppell et al. 2017, 768).
In the ensuing 2016 European Union referendum the breakdown of
the vote amongst the 330 Conservative parliamentarians of the 2015 PCP
was as follows: 174 (or 52.7 percent) voted remain, 145 (43.9 percent)
voted leave, and 11 (3.4 percent) did not publicly declare their vote
(Heppell et al. 2017). Table 2.4 considers the ideological composition of
the PCP in the six Parliaments between 1992 and 2015, and from this the
speed and scale of the change in attitudes can be identified. That balance
between Europhile (29.6 percent) and Eurosceptic (58.0 percent) forces

Table 2.4 The parliamentary Conservative Party and the European Question(s)
1992 to 2017
Parliament Agnostic Europhile Eurosceptic

(Soft) (Hard)

1992 (n = 331) 41 (12.4%) 98 (29.6%) 192 (58.0%)

1997 (n = 164) 11 (6.7%) 14 (8.5%) 139 (84.8%)
2001 (n = 166) 9 (5.4%) 8 (4.8%) 149 (89.8%)
2005 (n = 198) 10 (5.1%) 7 (3.5%) 181 (91.4%)
2010 (n = 306) 64 (20.9%) 7 (2.3%) 235 (76.8%)
154 (50.3%) 81 (26.5%)
Remain/Euro-realists Brexit/Euro-rejectionists
2015 (n = 330) 11 (3.4%) 174 (52.7%) 145 (43.9%)

Source: Amended from Heppell (2002, 2013), Heppell and Hill (2008, 2009, 2010), Heppell et al. (2017)
 2 THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY… 25

when the Conservatives were in power under Major, changed significantly

in opposition. A combination of retirements and defeats in the general
election of 1997 saw Europhile sentiment within the PCP collapse from
98 (or 29.6 percent) to just 14 (8.5 percent). Whilst the Europhile faction
lost 84 from their number, the Eurosceptics faction lost far less (n = 53)
and from a higher base (n = 192), which meant that as a percentage of the
PCP they increased their representation from 58 percent in 1992 to 84.8
percent in 1997. That balance between Europhile and Eurosceptic
remained across the opposition years. Academic research sought to distin-
guish between the soft and hard variants of Euroscepticism only after the
Conservatives were back in power in 2010, where the combined
Eurosceptics forces amounted to 235 Conservatives, but within this 154
(or 50.3 percent) were soft and 81 (26.5 percent) were hard Eurosceptics.
One limitation with the academic research profiling the 2010–2015
Parliament was the relatively high number of neutral or non-definable
Conservative parliamentarians (perhaps a consequence of the very high
number of new Conservative parliamentarians elected in 2010).
Nonetheless the shift between soft Eurosceptics within the 2010 Parliament
(154 at 50.3 percent) was relatively close to the number of soft Eurosceptics
in the post 2015 PCP who voted remain (174 at 52.7 percent). That the
number of hard Eurosceptics in the 2010 PCP (81 at 26.5 percent) was
lower than the percentage in the Brexit referendum (145 at 43.9 percent)
showcases the speed and scale of the moves towards hard Euroscepticism
in the Cameron era. Given that the PCP was close to being evenly
split—43.9 percent leave and 52.7 percent remain—it was clear that seek-
ing parliamentary approval for Brexit would present Cameron’s successor,
May, with significant party management difficulties.

The Social, Sexual and Morality Ideological Policy

Divide: Social Liberal versus Social Conservatives
It could be argued that scepticism towards further European integration
was reflective of neo-conservative thought—i.e. the desires to promote
and protect British national identify, and, aligned to this to preserve British
national sovereignty (see Lynch 1999; Buller 2000). Such sentiments
could also be seen to be aligned to scepticism towards multiculturalism
and populist positioning vis-à-vis immigration, and it is from this perspec-
tive that the alignment between Thatcher(-ism) and Powell(-ism) can be
26 T. HEPPELL

identified (see Fry 1998). Alongside the protection of national identity,

neo-conservatives also believed in authority; the maintenance of law and
order; the sanctity of marriage and the importance of the family. This
focus on morality within neoconservatism reflected their rejection of the
socially liberal reforms of the 1960s, and their view that a correlation
existed between sexual liberation and increasing divorce rates, single par-
enthood and welfare dependency (Durham 1991).
However, not all Conservatives adopted such a traditionalist view as a
clear social liberal-social conservative divide emerged. Thatcherites on the
socially conservative right would, ironically, adopt an interventionist men-
tality, arguing that the state had a key role to play in supporting the family
and protecting traditional moral values (Garry 1995, 172). They would
also make clear their opposition to abortion, freedom of contraception
and homosexual rights. Their views were controversially showcased in
Section 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act, which outlawed the
implied promotion of homosexuality in schools (Moran 2001). Standing
against those of a social conservative persuasion were Conservatives who
could be defined as social liberals—they did not proactively seek to make
the case for liberal causes around gender equality between men and
women, or the advancement of homosexual rights as a core objective of
the political agenda, but they adopted a far less strident tone than their
socially conservative colleagues (Cowley and Garry 1998, 479).
In the post-Thatcherite era, the Conservatives experienced a number of
difficulties when engaging with social, sexual and moral issues. For exam-
ple, the speech that John Major delivered to the 1993 annual Conservative
Party Conference, involved the phrase ‘Back to Basics’, by which Major
meant attitudes towards teaching and law and order. However, his empha-
sis on traditional values left his slogan open to exploitation by the social
conservative wing of the PCP. They decided to use it as a justification for
them to attack single-mothers and preach sexual fidelity. Back to Basics
would become seen as the hypocritical precursor to an avalanche of
sleaze—i.e. allegations of financial and sexual wrong-doing by Conservative
backbenchers in the mid-1990s (Bale 2010, 22–66). Trust was not the
only problematic aspect for the Conservatives. By adopting such a socially
authoritarian position, the Conservatives had allowed themselves to be
portrayed as hectoring, intolerant and outdated. By being perceived as
demonising certain sections of the electorate, for example, single mothers,
homosexuals and immigrants, post-Thatcherite Conservatism came across
as reactive and defined by who and what they opposed, rather than would
 2 THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY… 27

that actually stood for (Norton 2009, 39). In the era of New Labour
hegemony, Thatcherite Conservatism was increasingly felt to be obsessed
with economics. Voters associated them with greed, selfishness and the
profit motive, and felt that they were insufficiently aware of issues around
social justice (Quinn 2008). The Conservative Party, in large part due to
the socially conservative rhetoric, was a brand that was felt to be toxic—
i.e. the ‘nasty party’ (Bale 2010, 283–362).
The media attention that social conservatives could generate with their
views on social, sexual and moral matters, overshadowed those seeking to
promote a socially liberal mindset. The evidence of a social conservative-­
liberal divide was clear in the oppositon era of 1997 to 2005, as all three
Conservative Party leaders—William Hague (1997–2001), Iain Duncan
Smith (2001–2003) and Michael Howard (2003–2005)—experienced
party management difficulties (Hayton 2012). Their parliamentarians
were badly split on the following social, sexual and morality-based issues:
first, on the repeal of Section 28 of the Local Government Act of 1988
under Hague; second, on providing equality for gay and unmarried cou-
ples to adopt children under Duncan Smith; and third, on the Civil
Partnership Bill and the Gender Recognition Bill under Howard
(McManus 2011).
When Cameron won the leadership of the Conservative Party in 2005
it was on a modernising platform (Heppell 2008, 171–94). Central to
modernisation was the notion of brand decontamination, and showcasing
to the electorate that the Conservative Party was changing—i.e. that it
would offer a more inclusive and socially liberal mode of Conservatism
(Quinn 2008). The nasty party imagery could be negated by changing the
focus and emphasis of Conservatism. At the most basic of levels this meant
apologising for the mistakes of the Thatcher era on social, sexual and
moral matters—and so, for example, Cameron spoke at Gay Pride, and
offered an apology for section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988, and
said that his party, and his predecessor had been ‘wrong’ on this issue
(Bale and Webb 2011, 46). So, how successful was Cameron at engineer-
ing a shift towards social liberalism within the PCP?
Table 2.5 identifies those shifts in opinion within the PCP in the period
between 1992 and 2017. During the opposition years social conservative
sentiment within the PCP increased, and for all three of the opposition
Parliaments it was above 70 percent of the PCP. When Cameron suc-
ceeded Howard as Leader of the Conservative Party he inherited a parlia-
mentary party in which social liberal sentiment had fallen to as low as 12
28 T. HEPPELL

Table 2.5 The PCP and social, sexual and moral issues 1992–2017
Parliament Agnostic Socially liberal Socially conservative

1992 (n = 331) 0 (0.0%) 101 (30.5%) 230 (69.5%)

1997 (n = 164) 13 (7.9%) 29 (17.7%) 122 (74.4%)
2001 (n = 166) 9 (5.4%) 25 (15.1%) 132 (79.5%)
2005 (n = 198) 28 (14.1%) 25 (12.7%) 145 (73.2%)
2010 (n = 306) 62 (20.2%) 91 (29.8%) 153 (50%)
2015 (n = 330) 63 (19.1%) 148 (44.8%) 119 (36.1%)

Source: Amended from Heppell (2002, 2013), Heppell and Hill (2008, 2009, 2010), Heppell et al. (2017)

percent. The composition of the PCP would change significantly in the

aftermath of the general election of 2010. When adding together new
Conservatives who held onto seats previously held by Conservatives who
did not seek re-election, and the gains made, a total of 147 new
Conservatives entered the parliamentary party in 2010. The new
Conservative parliamentarians were disproportionately socially liberal, and
the balance between socially liberal and socially conservative forces
changed significantly as a result. The impact of the additional new entrants
at the general election of 2015 resulted in the social liberals becoming the
majority in the 2015 Parliament (148 members or 44.8 percent) as com-
pared to 119 social conservatives (or 36.1 percent).
Although this provides evidence of the impact of modernisation, we
have to be cautious about describing this as evidence of the success of
Cameron. That is because the Cameron era would involve a very serious
conflict between the social liberals and social conservatives over same sex
marriage. Cameron would come to regard legislating on this issue as the
greatest achievement of his premiership and it was a significant ‘milestone’
for the Conservative Party in terms of them gaining ownership of a major
piece of socially-liberal reforming legislation (Clements and Field 2014,
523). Cameron was always going to be able to secure his legislative objec-
tive on this matter, especially as the opposition Labour Party were sup-
portive of the legislation. However, the parliamentary debates and divisions
would reveal a raft of social Conservatives who argued that same sex mar-
riage was morally wrong.
Although the same sex marriage debate showcased that the socially
conservative wing of the PCP was very vocal, the fact remains that their
 2 THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY… 29

position was in numerical decline as a consequence of the Cameron era.

However, although this may provide some evidence of progress, this has
to be measured against two additional considerations. First, a patchy and
inconsistent record would emerge in the Cameron era in relation to gen-
der equality. Credit is due in relation to addressing issues around stalking,
violence against women in the domestic sphere, female genital mutilation
and anti-trafficking. However, austerity was pursued without sufficient
consideration of its gendered impact—i.e. austerity would have a dispro-
portionate impact upon women, notably those who were less well off,
single mothers and single pensioners (Campbell and Childs 2015). And,
second, the events in the aftermath of the general election of 2017 could
be said to have done much damage to the socially liberal repositioning that
Cameron had sought to engineer. The Conservatives lost their parliamen-
tary majority as their parliamentary representation fell from 330 (at the
general election of 2015) down to 317, which left them nine below the
magic figure of 326 needed for a majority (Cowley and Kavanagh 2018,
497). May then decided to construct a confidence and supply arrange-
ment with the ten members of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), to
provide her with a sufficient level of parliamentary stability to be able to
govern. However, critics argued that this could be seen as the re-­toxification
of the Conservative brand, given that they were aligning themselves with
a party defined by their hard-line socially conservative views on abortion
and marriage equality, views which seemed at odds with those of the
Cameronite modernising social liberals (Bale and Webb 2018, 50).

Conclusion
Based on the above analysis what patterns can we detect in terms of the
changing ideological composition of the PCP? On the economic policy
ideological divide, it is clear that the Thatcherite dries had triumphed over
the non-Thatcherite wets. So comprehensive was that victory that the
mapping of the wet-dry divide was not deemed worthy of coverage in
academic research after 2010 (as the wets were in single figures).
If the Thatcherite viewpoint triumphed in the economic policy divide,
then a slightly more complicated interpretation has to be offered in rela-
tion to the European policy ideological divide. This is for two reasons.
First, how we position Thatcher on the European question is complicated
by her actions in office and her rhetoric as a former Prime Minister. Some
of her actions in office contributed to the integrationist process, such as
30 T. HEPPELL

her commitment to the SEA, but some of her actions (and rhetoric) from
1988 to 1990 showcased her increasing scepticism about further integra-
tion. Without the constraints of office, Thatcher became a thorn in the
side of her successor, as she simplified the complexities of the European
debate, and became the figurehead of Euroscepticism in the 1990s (as
demonstrated by Andrew Crines later in this collection). Second, it is actu-
ally an oversimplification to talk of the European question, or of being for
or against European integration, because the question changes over time.
When Thatcher became Leader of the Conservative Party the question
was whether to be in the Common Market or not, yet by the end of her
leadership tenure the primary question was whether to join the ERM or
not. To her successor came the associated question of whether to join the
single European currency or not. By the time that Cameron became Prime
Minister, the circumstances had changed—the Eurozone crisis, the
increasing saliency of immigration as an issue for voters, and the electoral
threat from UKIP—made for an environment that was different from the
environment that Thatcher faced. The questions were about the repatria-
tion of powers and redefining their relationship with the European Union,
and if that was not feasible, then the question was whether to leave or not.
Whilst acknowledging these complexities it is clear that late Thatcherism
was defined by a shift towards Euroscepticism. She legitimised
Euroscepticism, and her parliamentarians clearly followed her lead, becom-
ing overwhelmingly Eurosceptic once they were in opposition (Turner
2000, 124).
However, whereas the changes in the positioning of the Conservative
Party on the economic and European policy ideological divides demon-
strate movement towards Thatcherism, the same cannot be said consider-
ing the social, sexual and moral ideological divide. Notwithstanding the
doubts about their commitment to gender equality when in office, and the
divisiveness caused by same sex marriage, what cannot be denied is that
numerically a shift away from social conservatives and towards social liber-
alism had occurred at the parliamentary level. Cameron may have failed to
withstand the tidal wave of Euroscepticism that would overcome his party
at parliamentary level—and also amongst the membership—but this lesser
acknowledged part of his legacy to the Conservative Party, should be
acknowledged. As such, three decades after the fall of Thatcher, a mixed
pattern of development exists in terms of the ideological composition of
the PCP.
 2 THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY… 31

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 CHAPTER 3

Intellectual Reactions to Thatcherism:

Conceptions of Citizenship and Civil Society
from 1990–2010

Edmund Neill

This chapter seeks to investigate the effects of Thatcherism on Britain by

examining its ideological legacy from the 1990s to around 2010, when
the Cameron-Clegg coalition was elected. There continues to be, of
course, a keenly fought debate about the long-term concrete effects of
Thatcherism on British society and politics. Thus, those arguing in favour
of Thatcherism’s transformative effects in practice have stressed the impor-
tance in the 1980s of lowering direct taxation rates, curtailing the power
of trade unions, and the privatisation of major utilities and selling of coun-
cil houses (Evans 1997, 24–39). By contrast, those more sceptical of
Thatcherism’s practical impact have stressed that economic growth in the
Thatcher period was lower than the post-war average, that the overall tax
burden did not decrease, and that aspects of the welfare state (notably the
NHS and education) were stubbornly resistant to change (Jackson 2012,
60). But arguably what marked out the Thatcherite governments of
1979–1997 was not simply what they accomplished in practice, but their

E. Neill (*)
New College of the Humanities, London, UK
e-mail: Edmund.neill@nchlondon.ac.uk

© The Author(s) 2020 35

A. Mullen et al. (eds.), Thatcherism in the 21st Century,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41792-5_3
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