An Examination of the Singular in

Maimonides and Spinoza: Prophecy,

Intellect, and Politics 1st ed. Edition
Norman L. Whitman
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An Examination of the
Singular in Maimonides
and Spinoza
Prophecy, Intellect, and Politics

Norman L. Whitman
An Examination of the Singular in
Maimonides and Spinoza
 Norman L. Whitman

An Examination of the
Singular in
Maimonides and
Spinoza
Prophecy, Intellect, and Politics
Norman L. Whitman
Department of History, Humanities, and Languages
University of Houston - Downtown
Houston, TX, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-49471-1    ISBN 978-3-030-49472-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49472-8

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For Lindsey
 Acknowledgments

My best friend, greatest love, and confidante, Lindsey Reymore, enriches

my life in so many ways, including this work. Her beautiful and critical
mind invigorates my passion for inquiry and is a resource from which to
develop myself. I rely on her so much, and I am grateful for her review of
this work.
Of course, I must also thank my teacher and friend, Idit Dobbs-­
Weinstein, for her instruction and care; she is in many ways the source of
this project. Most of all, I thank her for instilling in me the awareness that
philosophy is a difficult practice of striving to manage one’s living and
thinking so that one does not succumb to pleasing prejudice and dogma.
Essential to this way of philosophizing is a critical engagement with
ethical-­political inheritances so as to have some self-awareness and equity.
As she has often noted, pace Walter Benjamin, to think and live philo-
sophically, we must read history against the grain.
With friends like Michael Brodrick, one can achieve so much. He is a
true and selfless friend, who read many drafts of this work and provided
constructive feedback. More than that, his caring friendship enables me to
continue to strive. Likewise, I must thank my dear and oldest friend, David
Lummus, for reviewing the last two chapters as well as my close friend,
Terry Boyd.
Additionally, I must thank my academic colleagues. In particular, I
would like to acknowledge the Chair of the History, Humanities, and
Languages Department at the University of Houston–Downtown, and
my friend, Jeffrey Jackson, who discussed with me the ideas presented in
this book. Also, I am grateful to have engaging colleagues at UHD, such

vii
viii Acknowledgments

as Andrew Pavelich and Joseph Westfall, who create an enriching environ-

ment for philosophy. Others of note in the field of academic philosophy,
who provided helpful feedback on conference papers that became chapters
in this work, are Julie Klein, Jason Aleksander, and Sean Erwin.
Finally, I am forever grateful to my mother, Seranoosh Assadurian
Whitman, and my late father, Thomas Whitman, whose boundless love
continually affects me so as to grow, learn, and inquire.
 Book Abstract

This work presents an alternative reading of the respective works of Moses

Maimonides and Baruch Spinoza. It argues that both thinkers are primarily con-
cerned with the singular perfection of the complete human being rather than with
attaining only rational knowledge. Complete perfection of a human being expresses
the unique concord of concrete activities, such as ethics, politics, and psychology,
with reason. The necessity of concrete historical activities in generating perfection
entails that both thinkers are not primarily concerned with an “escape” to a meta-
physical realm of transcendent or universal truths via cognition. Instead, both are
focused on developing and cultivating individuals’ concrete desires and activities
to the potential benefit of all. This book argues that rather than solely focusing on
individual enlightenment, both thinkers are primarily concerned with a political
life and the improvement of fellow citizens’ capacities. A key theme throughout
the text is that both Maimonides and Spinoza realize that an apolitical life under-
mines individual and social flourishing.

ix
 Contents

1 Introduction  1

2 Prophecy and Intuition: Singular Knowledge in

Maimonides’ and Spinoza’s Philosophy 11

3 Out of Many: Prophecy and Sovereign Authority

in Maimonides’ and Spinoza’s Politics 47

4 A Singular Method: A Healing of the Soul and an

Emendation of the Intellect109

5 The Demand of the Concrete: The Non-­Contingency

of Language169

6 The “Place” of Reason227

Bibliography267

Index275

xi
 Abbreviations

Abbreviations of Spinoza’s works are:

E Ethics (P=Proposition, C=Corollary, and Schol=Scholium)
TdIE  Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (Numbers=Paragraph
Section)
TTP Theological-Political Treatise
TP Political Treatise
Letter Letters
PPC Descartes’ “Principles of Philosophy” and Appendix Containing

Metaphysical Thoughts
Primary texts used for E, TdIE, PPC, and Letter: Baruch Spinoza, The
Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. 1, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley. (Princeton
University Press, 1985) and Baruch Spinoza, The Collected Works of
Spinoza, Vol. 2, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton University Press,
2016). Primary text used for TTP and TP: Baruch Spinoza, Spinoza:
Complete Works, ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley et al.
(Hackett Publishing, 2002). For Spinoza’s original Latin texts, see Spinoza
Opera: Im Auftrag der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Ed. Carl
Gebhardt, Vols. 1–4 (Carl Winter-Verlag, 1972).
Abbreviations of Maimonides’ works are:
Guide The Guide of the Perplexed
EC Eight Chapters
Primary texts used for the Guide: Moses Maimonides, The Guide of
the Perplexed, Vols. 1 and 2, trans. Shlomo Pines (University of Chicago

xiii
xiv Abbreviations

Press, 1963). Primary text used for EC: Moses Maimonides, Eight Chapters
in Ethical Writings of Maimonides, eds. Raymond L. Weiss and Charles
Butterworth, trans. Raymond L. Weiss and Charles Butterworth (Dover,
1975), 59–104. Please note that at times I switch from Curley’s transla-
tion to Samuel Shirley’s translation of Spinoza as well as from Pines’ trans-
lation to the Ralph Lerner, Muhsin Mahdi, and Joshua Parens’ translation
of Maimonides.
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Why and What Is the Singular

When describing the greatest perfection of knowledge, virtue, and politi-
cal unity in their works, Moses Maimonides and Baruch Spinoza consis-
tently emphasize that these perfections have a quality that is singular, i.e.
irreducible and unique. These perfections are singular in that they do not
have the status as merely one among many. These perfections can neither
be fully reduced to nor exhaustively explained by images or rational uni-
versal concepts, since both kinds of explanation situate perfection in some
sense as one among many. An imaginative explanation situates perfection
as a common image or opinion equal to others, and a rational explanation
relates any perfection to a universal metaphysical reality that is ideally
indifferent in application or identical in status.
Even as philosophers committed to the necessity of reason, curiously,
Maimonides and Spinoza argue that a discursive science built on universal
demonstrations and concepts cannot fully express ultimate perfection,
whether intellectual, ethical, or social. Both philosophers argue that
explaining individuals and specific contexts through the use of abstractions
which are drawn from those very same contexts would distort rather than
fully express those specific concrete realities. For both, the complete sup-
pression of natural individual circumstances so as to merely attain a univer-
sal transcendent ideal reality and perfection seems incomplete and
unproductive for human perfection, i.e. the knowledge and the good of a
concrete individual or society. Nevertheless, both philosophers

© The Author(s) 2020 1

N. L. Whitman, An Examination of the Singular in Maimonides
and Spinoza, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49472-8_1
2 N. L. WHITMAN

consistently reject imaginative explanations as too errant, accidental, and

disruptive to provide stability and activity for the perfection of individuals
and society.
Despite their critiques of imaginative influences and the extrinsic mate-
rial conditions that they involve, both philosophers argue that imagination
and material conditions have an important part to play in whether an indi-
vidual expresses perfection. Nonetheless, imagination and embodied con-
ditions cannot express perfection merely as image or passive representation.
Instead, imagination and one’s concrete form of living must be “trans-
formed”1 into a singular expression that actively resists reduction to either
errant image or a transcendental. Through this process, the actuality (or
activity) present in passive modes of representation and concrete condi-
tions may become intrinsic, necessary, and as (self-) active as possible, i.e.
“perfect.”
However, a singular irreducible expression does not fully detach from
concrete conditions and actualities; the activity intrinsic in a singular per-
spective concurrently relates to and expresses physical conditions in a most
perfect way. As a result, singularity does not represent transcendence and
a complete suppression of physical activities/actualities but, rather, a ren-
dering of these activities/actualities under their most active and expressive
perspective. The achievement of this mode of living cannot be merely
reduced to the mere acquisition of correct opinions or universal truths,
since these would again represent a passive, extrinsic mode of living and
orientation. The mere having of knowledge is too static to express singular
perfection. Thus, both emphasize that in order to achieve singular
“moments”2 of perfection, one must not only acquire virtuous and intel-
lectual truths but also must continually strive by these truths as maxims so
that an intrinsic (philosophical) way of life actually determines and intrin-
sically guides one’s life. The continual enactment of knowledge and virtue
is essential to perfection, which, again, implies concrete management of
and support from one’s conditions/context, but more importantly, this
enactment implies the constant appetitive commitment to live
intelligently.
When individuals are able to perfect themselves with exceptional and
careful self-management, they themselves become singular people. For
both philosophers, these singular individuals have been commonly defined
as prophets, sages, virtuous sovereigns, or perfect philosophers. For
Maimonides and Spinoza, not only do these unique individuals express
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

absolute singular knowledge, they also embody singular ethical-political

virtue. Singular ethical-political virtue entails that a wise individual has
managed their unique embodied historical, physical, and psychological
conditions so as to generate and institute wisdom to perfect themselves
and others. Whereas some have argued that for Maimonides and Spinoza,
human perfection is solely derived from cognition of metaphysical truths,3
I argue that by examining the instances in which Maimonides’ and
Spinoza’s address the singular, it reveals that historical, physical, psycho-
logical, and political conditions must be incorporated and properly man-
aged to generate intellectual and ethical perfection. As a result, concrete
conditions, such as history, politics, and ethical habituation, rather than
being ancillary to metaphysical cognition, are primary or, at the very least,
must be coordinated with metaphysical truth to generate intellectual and
human perfection. A key claim that my work advances is that metaphysics
and abstract reason alone cannot generate intellectual and human perfec-
tion. Rather, concrete conditions must be recognized as necessary for and,
subsequently, included properly to achieve singular intellectual, ethical,
and political virtue. Examining the singular allows us to see how each
thinker is concerned more with the perfection of the complete individual,
including the concrete sensible faculties and conditions.

A Skeptical Tradition
In general, this work aligns with a skeptical reading of Maimonides and
Spinoza.4 Most notably, Shlomo Pines and, more recently, Josef Stern
have argued that Maimonides’ philosophy is concerned primarily with a
way of living that in some way must engage with concrete practices, condi-
tions, and subjects such as ethics, politics, and psychology to achieve com-
plete happiness and human perfection.5 Inspired by others, who see
Spinoza’s philosophy as similarly concerned with ethical-political flourish-
ing, such as Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, I read Spinoza as well from a skeptical
perspective. Dobbs-Weinstein argues, as I do, that, for Spinoza, ethical-­
political flourishing must be concurrent with intellectual understanding so
that together they generate complete perfection.6
As these and other scholars have detailed, a skeptical reading primarily
entails that, for Maimonides and Spinoza, knowledge of metaphysical real-
ities cannot be fully attained and verified by an embodied knower through
demonstrative reason. In particular, universals that ground rational dem-
onstrations are products of human embodied knowers abstracting from
4 N. L. WHITMAN

particulars, and these abstractions can neither fully guarantee nor fully
capture a metaphysical reality as presented in the abstract content of a
universal. Although I agree with a skeptical reading of these thinkers and
will present skeptical interpretations of Maimonides and Spinoza in this
text, nonetheless, this work does not claim that metaphysics per se is
impossible for Maimonides and Spinoza. Instead, it follows the lead of
Maimonides and Spinoza, who consistently argue that the cognition of
metaphysical and rational truths is insufficient to generate complete hap-
piness and perfection for individuals and communities. Throughout the
text, I will demonstrate how they consistently return to the question of
individual and social perfection from the perspective of the singular, which
requires the “transformation” of concrete activities into an irreducible and
unique expression. An important question that supports a skeptical read-
ing is that if the attainment or cognition of metaphysical truths is so real
and perfecting, why do both thinkers continually return to focus on con-
crete activities, and subsequently, highlight the difficulty in attaining per-
fection without proper and continual management of physical conditions?
Of course, by reading these two thinkers from a skeptical perspective,
and emphasizing their shared focus on the singular, I draw these two
thinkers rather close but so have recent scholars. In particular, Warren Zev
Harvey has provided a seminal reading of Spinoza as a Maimonidean.7
Shlomo Pines, the originator of the skeptical interpretation of Maimonides,
notes a close affinity between Maimonides and Spinoza: “[Spinoza] does
Maimonides the honour, rarely or never vouchsafed to him in modern
times, to disprove him […] [H]e is able to do this because he is prepared
to adopt some of the presuppositions of Maimonides. He also pays
[Maimonides] the, in a sense, greater compliment of adapting some of his
ideas.”8 Recently, Jeffrey Bernstein has argued that Leo Strauss did not see
Maimonides and Spinoza as radically opposed thinkers, but that for
Strauss, Spinoza carries Maimonidean premodern thought into the mod-
ern era, thereby making Spinoza, to a considerable extent, premodern (i.e.
Maimonidean).9
Despite these scholars’ works on the kinship between Maimonides
and Spinoza, many others dispute a deep similarity between Maimonides
and Spinoza. Chief among these critiques is Joshua Parens’ book,
Maimonides and Spinoza: Their Conflicting Views of Human Nature.10
Additionally, a common view is that Spinoza’s critique of Maimonides in
the Theological-­Political Treatise reveals a profound rejection of
Maimonides’ philosophy, particularly Maimonides’ view of religion and
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

prophecy—an argument developed by Steven Frankel.11 Suffice it to say,

given my previous argument that Maimonides and Spinoza share a focus
on singular perfection, I believe both have similar views of human nature,
contra Parens. Furthermore, in this work, I show that Maimonides’ and
Spinoza’s understandings of prophecy and a prophet law-giver, in fact,
share a strong commitment to a naturalistic foundation for politics and
religion. This work does not seek to directly refute the proposed diver-
gence between Maimonides and Spinoza. Instead, it seeks to offer a
reading of Maimonides and Spinoza through examination of a shared
commitment to the singular.
Whereas some scholars have addressed and examined the importance of
singularity in Maimonides and Spinoza’s works, in many instances, they
have only focused on a specific topic.12 Additionally, these scholars have
not expressed their analysis under a systematic theme such as the concept
of the singular. Using the concept of the singular to guide interpretation
of Maimonides and Spinoza provides a more systematic and coherent rep-
resentation of the importance and use of this idea in these thinkers.
Notably, this interpretation suggests that a more complete representation
of Maimonides and Spinoza cannot be based solely on the primacy of
metaphysics and abstract rationalism. This challenges many accepted views
of Maimonides and Spinoza and provides an alternative view. Not only will
the examination of the singular in this work provoke a possible reinterpre-
tation of each philosopher but also of their respective kinship to each
other. As a result, it suggests greater commonalities between Maimonides
and Spinoza through their shared commitment to a singular notion of
truth and the good. Hopefully, this examination provides a new analytic
concept and highlights texts in each thinker, some commonly known and
less so, so that readers can approach these thinkers and their texts in a new
critical light.
Finally, this work aims to appeal to readers who are interested in shared
philosophical concerns present in the medieval and early modern periods
as well as continuity between the two, despite many claims that modern
philosophy is radically different and novel. In particular, it suggests an
implicit Maimonidean influence on Spinoza’s thought, which can be
traced back to Judeo-Arabic medieval thought. In light of this, this book
appeals to readers who are interested in non-Western foundations to
Spinoza’s thought, contrary to a dominant view that Spinoza derived the
majority of his innovations by responding to Christian and Cartesian
sources. This text understands Jewish philosophy not merely as a
6 N. L. WHITMAN

secondary influence on major currents of philosophical thought but as a

vibrant and important resource to understand major philosophical prob-
lems dealt with by a major secular thinker such as Spinoza.

Outline of Chapters
As this work is an examination of the idea of the singular in various topics
addressed by Maimonides and Spinoza, chapters may seem to be indepen-
dent of one another. However, I have tried to unify the connection of
topics as much as possible by building on and referencing different chap-
ters throughout, so as to show the richness and explanatory power of the
concept of the singular. Below is an outline of what to expect and how
chapters may be unified.
Second chapter: This chapter demonstrates how for Maimonides and
Spinoza, perfect knowledge can neither be captured solely by rational nor
imaginative means; examining how both eschew the reduction to either
reveals a conceptual space in which the notion of the singular inhabits.
Distilling how the singular operates to perfect both rational and imagina-
tive activities shows how intellectual perfection must be unique and involve
concrete conditions, including ethical-political conditions.
Third chapter: The political philosophies of both thinkers show exem-
plary expressions of why ethical-political conditions are needed to gener-
ate (singular) perfection and that reason alone is unable to secure
perfection. Nevertheless, if properly instituted and induced by social con-
ditions, reason is required to achieve individual and social perfection; rea-
son must be concurrent with social affects so that both can induce singular
perfection of individuals and society by properly structuring the concrete
desires of individuals. The concurrence of reason and political affects itself
shows that virtuous societies are also singular, in that they are incapable of
being reduced to mere imaginative associations or to indeterminate ratio-
nal precepts.
Fourth chapter: Focusing on Maimonides’ and Spinoza’s respective
epistemic methods reveals that rather than relying solely on the develop-
ment of abstract reasoning so as to develop individual perfection, both
philosophers develop therapeutic ethical-epistemic methods that seek to
induce singular occasions of understanding in the continual management
of one’s life. For both, method addresses and affects the concrete health
and living of each individual so that they generate and express from their
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

concrete conditions singular understanding and virtue. As a part of the

philosophical way of living, method cannot be a detached scheme that
reduces wisdom to an adept manipulation of abstract concepts but rather
must enter into and transform the striving of potential knowers so that
they prudentially seek singular perfections whenever possible. Both phi-
losophers use the idea and love of God in their methods not only as a
means to emend and restrain improper expectations of knowledge but also
to redirect the desire to know, so that an awareness of one’s singular living
is primary and should be continually cultivated.
Fifth chapter: The demand to continually address and cultivate con-
crete conditions so as to achieve singular perfection reveals that both phi-
losophers are concerned with language, history, and culture. Rather than
being contingent and disposable conditions to one’s individual and social
perfection, these concrete realities are in a way necessary, or rather non-­
contingent, to the achievement of intellect and virtue. That is, these con-
ditions cannot be merely disposable stages to rational enlightenment, but
rather, they affect and orient one’s striving from which one may express
singular understanding of one’s concrete historical context. Nevertheless,
one must maintain an ambivalent or philosophical perspective toward
these conditions, especially language, in order to express the strength of
mind to manage these historical affects and use them to generate philo-
sophical awareness. In particular, a wise individual must strive to maintain
a cautionary awareness to language so that she is not drawn by her passive,
but nonetheless, inescapable determinations. Although linguistic determi-
nations and the value-claims they transmit are necessary because of our
political natures, we must strive to control and rule them so as to generate
a singular understanding resistant to mere passive reduction to social prej-
udices and egotistic evaluations.
Sixth chapter: A more skeptical reading of Maimonides and Spinoza
will be presented in which I argue that reason and cognition of metaphysi-
cal truths derives from concrete concerns and activities. Because the
amoral and a-rational foundation of human existence initiates the very
need for reason and metaphysical order to guide and perfect our lives, the
place of reason and metaphysics is in our continual striving. That perfec-
tion is not located in a metaphysical realm per se but in the singular, irre-
ducible activity of concrete individuals.
8 N. L. WHITMAN

Notes
1. The term “transformed” does not fully capture the sense of the change
because actual conditions are both passive and active so that under one
aspect they may be passive and under another they are active. As a result,
conditions rendered active and singular are not necessarily completed by
achieving some teleological final state separate from the very activity pres-
ent in immediate conditions. It would be inaccurate to say also that the
“transformation” is completely irreversible, since actual conditions can
revert to passive states so that in order to maintain an active and singular
expression requires much work, ruling of present conditions, and contin-
ual striving. Nevertheless, a transformation in some sense occurs when
one’s way of living resists reduction to passive representations and extrinsic
conditions that would extinguish or diminish one’s singular reality.
2. Although singular perfection is expressed through concrete conditions and
requires their realities from which to manifest itself, nevertheless, singular
expressions are not reduced to mere temporal moments (duration) and
imagistic representations of duration. The irreducible and unique quality
of singular expressions is immediate and irreducible to any common stan-
dards of judgment such as time, aggregate of parts, and so on.
3. Heidi Ravven argues that Maimonides and Spinoza are committed to
moral intellectualism in which one only seeks the cognition of universal
theoretical truths so as to perfect oneself. The attainment or cognition of
these universal theoretical truths transforms and can be the only source by
which to perfect the whole person. She discounts ethics and habits as sec-
ondary or trivial to the achievement of intellectual and human perfection.
See Ravven (2014, 142 and 151). Despite this, Ravven argues elsewhere
that Spinoza is not a rationalist and is committed to a materialist ethics in
which reason is deployed so as to educate and reform desire. Reason trans-
forms the material desires and activities so as to generate intellect and free-
dom. See Ravven (1990). I agree with the second analysis presented by
Ravven, but I will argue that ethical-political affects and critical epistemic
practices are required to manage and realize the limits of reason so as to
generate singular self-understanding.
4. See Pines (1979). See also Stern (2013).
5. Whereas Shlomo Pines argues that Maimonides supports primarily a bios
praktikos, or a political way of life, as the avenue to perfection and happi-
ness, diminishing the role of the intellectual life in attaining this, Josef
Stern argues that Maimonides still supports an intellectual life as a regula-
tive ideal (or “spiritual exercise”) that can guide one to express perfec-
tion—although, Stern does argue that concrete activities and care of self
must be included in the achievement of happiness. See Pines (1979, 100),
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

and see Stern (2013, 7–8). My work attempts to bring these two positions
closer with an understanding of the singular. Singular perfection includes
both ethical-political actions and intellectual apprehension/activity.
Nevertheless, I would characterize my work ultimately as advocating for a
bios praktikos, since the issue of desire is central to human ethical-political
and intellectual perfection; desire and ignorance must be managed via eth-
ical-political affects so that one strives by reason and for intellect.
6. See Dobbs-Weinstein (1994). In this article, Dobbs-Weinstein explains
how both Maimonides and Spinoza are acutely aware of the need to
address authority and ethical-epistemic practices so as to generate intel-
lectual perfection.
7. Harvey (1981).
8. Pines (1968, 3). See also Frankel (2014, 79). For an exposition on Shlomo
Pines’ connection of Maimonides to Spinoza, see Harvey (2012).
9. Bernstein (2015, 136–138). Bernstein notes that both seek contemplative
apprehension (i.e. immediately affective intuition or intellect) rather than
merely rational or imagistic knowledge. Ibid. (141–142).
10. Parens (2012).
11. See Frankel (2014).
12. For example, Heidi Ravven develops Etienne Balibar’s concept of tran-
sindividuality to argue that there is a singular dimension in Spinoza’s rela-
tional autonomy where individual and society merge but so as to generate
unique individual actions and intellectual self-understanding not polluted
by extrinsic pursuits and modes of perception. Ravven also suggests a con-
nection between Spinoza’s relational autonomy and Maimonides’ political
philosophy. See Ravven (2019). I agree generally with Ravven’s analysis
that singular self-understanding derives from one’s relation to one’s con-
crete environment, but in this work, I examine how those concrete foun-
dations induce and inform virtue and intellect. This may be something that
Ravven would reject given her position that Maimonides and Spinoza are
committed to moral intellectualism.
Concerning Maimonides, Idit Dobbs-Weinstein has developed the con-
cept of providential participation to explain how there are singular
“moments” of perfection in a way “separate” from but informed by prior
material conditioning/activity. See Dobbs-Weinstein (1995, 181).

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 CHAPTER 2

Prophecy and Intuition: Singular Knowledge

in Maimonides’ and Spinoza’s Philosophy

In Book II, Chapter 38 of The Guide of the Perplexed, Moses Maimonides

describes a true prophet as someone capable of achieving theoretical
apprehension without doubt.1 For Maimonides, a true prophet does not
rely on philosophical tools to achieve ultimate or divine wisdom and to
overcome doubt associated with sensation. The prophet does not grasp
divine causes through theoretical premises alone and by a discursive sci-
ence. Despite this diminished role of philosophical reason, Maimonides
does not then equate true prophecy with mere imaginings derived from
common experience. Instead, he argues carefully that the imaginative fac-
ulty of the elect is perfected by an emanation from the active intellect.
That is, an elect individual has the proper bodily proportions in his or her
brain so that the imaginative faculty may manifest divine wisdom immedi-
ately when the active intellect emanates to the individual’s constitution at
that specific moment.2 Divine truth is imparted singularly to an elect per-
son without mediation—neither from a discursive, theoretical science nor
from the imaginings of common experience. In his discussion of true
prophecy, Maimonides describes three types of knowledge or perception3
available to humans: imagination, theoretical or discursive reasoning, and
immediate prophetic wisdom. Among these three possibilities, prophetic
wisdom is selected as the truest and absolute form of knowledge.
Baruch Spinoza argues in a similar way that there are three levels of
knowledge: knowledge from common experience (knowledge ex auditis et
signis and ab experientia vaga), knowledge from demonstration

© The Author(s) 2020 11

N. L. Whitman, An Examination of the Singular in Maimonides
and Spinoza, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49472-8_2
12 N. L. WHITMAN

(discursive reason), and intuitive knowledge (a singular essence or defini-

tion).4 The first two levels of Spinoza’s hierarchy correspond to the com-
ponents of Maimonides’ prophet’s knowledge (imagination and discursive
reasoning), whereas the third, intuitive knowledge, corresponds to
Maimonides’ divine wisdom or prophetic perfection. In this chapter, I will
examine the similarities between Maimonides’ divine or prophetic knowl-
edge and Spinoza’s account of intuitive knowledge. In particular, I will
investigate why each believes a non-discursive or singular form of knowl-
edge represents the pinnacle of wisdom. Developing this latter point will
demonstrate how both Maimonides and Spinoza are concerned with the
ethical perfection of the wise rather than the mere attainment of rational
certainty.5
A comparative analysis of these two thinkers will be fruitful in giving a
more complete representation of each thinker. It will show that rather
than being solely concerned with metaphysics, Maimonides and Spinoza
incorporate metaphysics equally into ethics, politics, and an embodied
psychology. For both thinkers, the contemplation of abstract metaphysics
is not the end of human perfection. Instead, human intellectual perfection
only occurs when metaphysical truth is expressed through the complete
and concrete existence of a wise individual. This entails that metaphysics
as a separate philosophical enterprise is an ill-conceived project for both
Maimonides and Spinoza. In Spinoza’s case, this is especially elucidating,
as many have interpreted Spinoza as solely concerned with metaphysical
contemplation.

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Knowing

The distinction employed by Maimonides and Spinoza between extrinsic
and intrinsic forms of perception and knowledge enables us to better
understand their shared concerns. Both see this distinction as essential to
understanding and achieving human intellectual perfection. For both,
extrinsic perceptions and kinds of knowledge imply certain properties such
as being common, bodily, mediated, affecting, passionate, and unre-
strained, whereas intrinsic perceptions and kinds of knowledge entail
properties such as being unique, self-moving, intrinsic, active, free, and
necessary. Both employ this distinction to emphasize the perfecting transi-
tion of knowledge from mediated, extrinsic, dependent passions and per-
ceptions to unique, intrinsic, active, free ideas. Nevertheless, for
Maimonides and Spinoza, the movement from extrinsic to intrinsic
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 13

perceptions and ideas does not entail a complete disassociation between

the two stages of knowing. Both aspects are required for the perfection of
the intellect. Without undergoing extrinsic and mediated forms of know-
ing (sense-based perceptions and passions), intrinsic knowledge (intellect)
cannot be attained. For both philosophers, perfect knowledge is also the
perfecting of the different stages and aspects of human knowing, includ-
ing extrinsic forms of knowing such as the imagination.
For Maimonides, what ultimately establishes and sustains the relation
between extrinsic and intrinsic forms of knowing is the excessive overflow
from the providential Creator to natural, embodied, human knowers.6
This overflow expresses the metaphysical relation of God to the material
world in which essential, intrinsic causes are not readily accessible to a
mediated, existential order described by imagined ends and discursive rea-
son. Although understanding essential causes may seem initially random
or entirely extrinsic from the finite knowers’ perspective, due to God’s
overarching providence and all-encompassing power, this overflow does
not imply that causes are contingent for finite, individual knowers.7 Rather,
God’s providential wisdom and all-encompassing power affects human
individuals throughout their different modes of knowing—each aspect
receiving God’s perfect and perfecting order according to its capacity and
power. Intrinsic and self-generating knowledge represents a form of con-
junction with God’s agency, whereas extrinsic knowledge or perception
represents an inability to fully express and participate in God’s power and
providence, thereby appearing as if to be dependent on an extrinsic order
and power.
Similarly, Spinoza argues that a distinction between extrinsic and intrin-
sic develops from the power and necessity of the ultimate singular cause:
God, Nature, or Substance. According to Spinoza, God’s power generates
every mode within every attribute. Although God cannot be properly
described by modal causality and cannot be completely reduced to specific
attributes, nevertheless, God’s power must determine each singular mode
through a mediated order of extrinsic causes from which an intrinsic essen-
tial cause for each mode may manifest itself.8 Within the modal causality of
thinking, human minds are subject to passions and images because they
are unable to adequately and fully express God via determinate, projected
ends and by discursive reasoning alone. Nonetheless, they may achieve
singular, intellectual knowledge by rendering their concrete conditions
well-defined and concurrent with (and expressive of) God’s necessity.
14 N. L. WHITMAN

For Maimonides and Spinoza, congruence of one’s overall existence,

including mind and body, with God’s providence or necessity implies an
ethical dimension to the achievement of knowledge. Both thinkers argue
that knowledge must be achieved by appropriately managing one’s mate-
rial conditions and embodied psyche so as to generate and manifest divine
or singular intellection. Since a wholly rational or demonstrative method
is unable to achieve human intellectual perfection, the wise must also rely
on ethical practices and devices to achieve wisdom. In the process of
achieving intellectual perfection, the appropriate and useful ethical tools
that a wise individual uses to secure and generate wisdom at the same time
perfect her ethical life. Not merely is there intellectual perfection, but
intellectual perfection also entails the utmost ethical or moral perfection of
the wise.

Maimonides’ Prophetic Knowledge

Central to Maimonides’ understanding of divine excess and its relation to
knowledge is that natural reason or demonstrative science can neither fully
detach from mediated and composite bodily existence nor can it fully
express divine providence via ideal concepts.9 As he notes in The Guide of
the Perplexed, Book I, Chapter 72:

[…] [The] proprium of man only [is] the rational faculty—I mean the intel-
lect, which is the hylic intellect[.] […] None of the individual animals
requires for its continued existence reflection, perspicacity, and governance
of conduct.10

Continuing, he states that:

[…] The rational faculty is a faculty subsisting in a body and is not separable
from it, whereas God, may He be exalted, is not a faculty subsisting in the
body of the world […] For the governance and the providence of Him, may
He be exalted, accompany the world as a whole in such a way that the man-
ner and true reality of his accompaniment are hidden from us; the faculties
of human beings are inadequate to understand this.11

For Maimonides, the rational faculty is neither able to address the medi-
ated causes fully nor manifest how divine providence directly determines
and orders the unique conditions in which an individual is embodied. The
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 15

rational faculty only abstracts universal forms by which it constructs theo-

retical premises to order and govern natural diversity associated with
material affections. Yet, by these abstract means, one guided solely by rea-
son cannot appropriately address the singular conditions and sensible par-
ticulars, either completely incorporating them into an ideal end or
eradicating their errant effects.

Now as the nature of the human species requires that there be those differ-
ences among individuals belonging to it and as, in addition, association is
necessary for this nature, it is by no means possible that this association
should be accomplished except—and this is necessarily so—through a ruler
who gauges that actions of the individuals, perfecting that which is deficient
and reducing that which is excessive, and who lays down actions and moral
habits for all of them to practice always in the same way, until the natural
diversity is hidden through the multiple points of conventional accord, and
so that society becomes well-ordered. Therefore, I say that the Law, although
it is not natural, has a basis in what is natural. It was a part of the wisdom of
the deity with regard to the continuance of this species, that He put it into
its nature […] that individuals belonging to it should have the faculty of
ruling. Among them there is one to whom that governance has been
revealed by prophecy directly; he is the prophet or the one who lays down
the nomos.12

Maimonides explains that the necessary association among diverse indi-

viduals requires an extra-natural law or rule that can order the natural and
material existence of individuals without the law itself being reduced to
the natural world as a merely particular, limited, and potentially excessive
or errant perspective. The Law is singular in its ability to address the par-
ticulars; yet, it also maintains a non-errant perspective. The need for the
Law shows that diverse particulars cannot be properly addressed by uni-
versal truth or good. To maintain accord among diverse individuals, con-
ventional, common, and concrete methods must be communicated to all
so that doubt may be reduced and overcome for order.
Discursive reason may be a tool to convey to a group of potentially wise
individuals universal and necessary knowledge of nature; yet, as abstract
and commonly held, reason cannot descend to the particulars. It only
communicates generally valid premises derived from individual instances.

For the intellect divides the composite things and differentiates their parts
and makes abstractions of them […] It is by means of the intellect that the
16 N. L. WHITMAN

universal is differentiated from the individual, and no demonstration is true

except by means of universals.13

By their very existence, universals reveal an inability to address composite

existence directly. Demonstrations do not explain composite existence
directly but rather only through abstract universals can rational certainty
be produced. Nonetheless, universals originate from the process of
abstracting from concrete particulars, and this process cannot instantiate
ready-made ideas and thus circumvent an intellectual engagement with
sensible particulars.
Having been derived from concrete, composite individuals, yet unable
to descend back to that level, reason requires help to address the necessity
or providence of particular causes without itself reducing to errant, com-
posite matter.14 Errancy defines matter and is the primary cause for lim-
ited, deficient, and inconsistent perspectives of Nature. Maimonides has a
very low opinion of matter and its ability to distract, confuse, cause doubt,
and undermine order:

The nature and true reality of matter are such that it never ceases to be
joined to privation; hence no form remains constantly in it […] Solomon said
in his wisdom […] likening matter to a married harlot[.]15

Only an individual capable of bridging the gap between the two realms
can address the necessity of particulars neither as errant matter nor as mere
instantiations of universals.
For Maimonides, the prophet has the unique ability (through prophetic
knowledge) to bridge the immediate and divine (i.e. simple divine unity)
and concrete particulars without diminishing the relevance of either for
explaining the necessity of particular events.

Know that the true prophets obtain theoretical apprehension without

doubt. By theory [or speculation] alone, man is unable to grasp the causes
from which that known thing necessarily follows. This has a counterpart in
their giving information as regards matters about which man, using only
common conjecture and divination, is unable to give information.16

As Maimonides stresses in the above passage, someone who relies on

purely theoretical premises will be unable to grasp unique causes because
of the general nature of that theoretical knowledge. Someone who relies
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 17

on common conjecture (i.e. commonly agreed upon images and hypotheti-

cals as to what will probably happen) similarly cannot provide an appropri-
ately unique explanation of events. Instead, prophetic knowledge is able to
bring both imagination and reason together by receiving a form of divine
excess or providence that perfects both the imagination and reason at once
and immediately. That is, without doubt, whereas doubt derives from rely-
ing on extrinsic forms of knowledge such as common conjecture or prior
rational instruction.

For the very emanation that flowed to the imaginative power [or faculty] (so
as to render it perfect so that its act brings about its giving information as to
what will happen and its apprehending of matters as though they had been
perceived by the senses and had reached this imaginative faculty from the
senses) also perfects the act of the rational power [or faculty], so that its acts
bring about its knowing things that are true; and it achieves this apprehen-
sion as if it had apprehended it by starting from theoretical premises. […] It
is even more fitting that this pertain to the rational faculty. For the active
intellect truly emanates only to it [that is, to the rational faculty], and that is
what brings it into actuality. It is from the rational faculty that the emanation
comes to the imaginative faculty. How then could the perfection of the
imaginative faculty reach this measure [that is] the apprehension of what has
not reached it from the senses, without the rational faculty being affected in
a similar way [that is] apprehending without having apprehended by way of
premises, inference, and reflection?17

Divine emanation that induces prophetic wisdom has the characteristic

that it is able to draw both imagination and reason away from extrinsic
sensible sources or prior inferences so that their specific powers or faculties
are able to intrinsically generate results that are wholly based on their
agency. This intrinsic expression directly manifests a unique or singular
reality that does not allow imagination or reason to digress past its unique
and immediate conditions; any digression or errancy would pull the two
faculties apart so that an appropriately singular focus on the immediate is
occluded. As a result, prophetic knowledge perfects both imagination and
reason: imagination is no longer forced to address extrinsic sensations and
reason receives imaginative forms that are intrinsically determined, i.e.,
images that are suitable to the generation of knowledge (disposed to an
internal agency) rather than errant opinions and passions. In the case of
prophetic knowledge, the prophet does not have to prove the rational and
divine order by showing how natural diversity and resistance by sensibles
18 N. L. WHITMAN

and images can be overcome to produce agreement and order. The imme-
diate reception of divine knowledge perfects the mediated faculty of the
prophet (i.e. his imagination) without a requirement to remove doubt
associated with sensible particulars.
Nevertheless, with his account, Maimonides seems to generate a new
problem: how are we to distinguish the perfect knowledge and virtuous
imagination of a prophet from the imaginings and ravings of one claiming
divine knowledge and insight? Maimonides responds:

I have stipulated […] “the true prophets,” in order not to involve myself
with people […] who are utterly devoid of rational [notions] and knowl-
edge, but have mere imaginings and thoughts. Perhaps they […] are merely
opinions that they once had had and of which traces have remained impressed
upon their imaginings together with everything else that is in their imagina-
tive faculty. But after they voided and annulled many of their imaginings, the
traces of these opinions remained alone and reappeared to them; and they
thought them to be something that had unexpectedly occurred to them and
something that had come from outside. According to me, they are compa-
rable to a man who had with him in his house thousands of individual ani-
mals. Then all of them except one individual, which was one of those that
were there, went out of that house. When the man remained alone with that
individual, he thought that it had just now come to his house […] This is
one of the positions that are sophistical and destructive. How many among
those who have aspired to obtain discernment have perished through this!
[…] Therefore one ought not to pay attention to one whose rational faculty
has not become perfect and who has not attained utmost theoretical perfec-
tion. For only one who achieves theoretical perfection is able to apprehend
other objects of knowledge when the divine intellect emanates to him. It is
he who is truly a prophet.18

Central to Maimonides’ response is that images that are merely traces indi-
cating extrinsic and inaccessible causes do not manifest the potentially
intrinsic aspect of the imaginative power. Instead, they deceptively indicate
intrinsic power by seeming to be spontaneous manifestations when in fact
they generate great confusion and express the greatest weakness of the
imagination, enslavement to extrinsic causes that do not have contrary
images to resist and void errant movements based on them. Although
these spontaneous images appear to manifest an intrinsic, self-generating
truth, since they are material images that by definition may be eradicated,
their tenuous status can entail an exclusion of and by of other images. The
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 19

errancy and exclusionary nature of these images and opinions lead to

sophistical and destructive results both for the supposed “prophet” and
others. Using a purely imagistic standard derived from extrinsic sources as
a tool for discernment establishes a primarily antagonistic relationship
between the “knower” and others, who have competing images and dog-
mas. As a result, the false prophet not only is incorrect but dangerous to
himself and others. Opposed to sophistical and dogmatic prophecy, imagi-
native forms that have been intrinsically related so that they do not project
an external sensible to be sought or desired align with reason and intel-
lectual perfection.
To further block the relativism of imaginings and their sophistical uses,
Maimonides argues that images do not have a positive content that trans-
parently presents truth even if one’s image seems very vigorous, truthful,
and demands attention and commitment. Following his claim that the
rational faculty must be perfected and involved at the same time in pro-
phetic truth, he argues that images and bodily faculties producing them
should only be non-defective.19 As long as images do not exceed their rank
as subordinate to and ordered by reason, they will enable the truth and
perfection possible for an individual at a particular moment to be expressed
by him or her. On the other hand, allowing images to run rampant and
determine other imaginings (as though they were a ruling force) corrupts
the order possible within natural individuals and their imaginative facul-
ties. As a result, the deficiency of images, their continual application and
seeming truth, must be checked so as to enable their perfection.
Maimonides advocates revealing imagery that resists easy appropriation
by the imagination’s tendency to mimetically and discursively repeat
representations.

It behooves rather to educate the young and to give firmness to the deficient
in capacity according to the measure of their apprehension. […] [T]hese
true opinions [of religion] were not hidden, enclosed in riddles, and treated
by all men of knowledge with all sorts of artifice through which they could
teach them without expounding them explicitly, because of something bad
being hidden in them, or because they undermine the foundations of Law,
as is thought by ignorant people who deem that they have attained a rank
suitable for speculation. Rather have they been hidden because at the outset
the intellect is incapable of receiving them; only flashes of them are made to
appear so that the perfect man should know them.20
20 N. L. WHITMAN

As Maimonides explained, images that resist appropriation to the imagina-

tion’s tendency to seek extrinsic causes and sources are the best for intel-
lectual perfection because by definition that is what perfection is: the
restraint of the imagination so that an intrinsic and unique generation of
knowledge may occur. For within Maimonides’ account, the imagination
has a vital role in providing an active vehicle through which an immediate,
prophetic, truth may pierce, or as he is fond of saying, appear as a flash of
divine wisdom.21 When the imagination is overburdened by many images
and constant confusion, it proceeds to discursively seek or desire many
projected and false ends. A corrupt image undermines the imagination’s
ability to participate in an intrinsic action, and thereby, perfect its nature
along with reason. This is why Maimonides states:

This is what the Sages intended to signify by their dictum, Whoever considers
four things, and so on, completing the dictum by saying, He who does not have
regard for the honor of his Creator; whereby they indicated what we have
already made clear: namely, that man should not press forward to engage in
speculative study of corrupt imaginings.22

Pressing forward with corrupt imaginings as the basis for inquiry subjects
the unique nature of God’s necessity to the determinate ends and improper
desires of finite individuals. As Maimonides notes, the honor of the creator
must be respected and used as a rhetorical device to limit improper actions.
Nonetheless, natural or discursive reason does not then have free reign
or an unlimited scope of application to determine divine order or provi-
dence. Discursive reason and rational certainty cannot provide a universal
method to generate intellect and achieve prophetic wisdom.23 For
Maimonides, reason must restrain its propensity to project an object of
knowledge, which really for Maimonides expresses an imagined external
source. Furthermore, attaining this imagined end or ultimate source of
wisdom in fact would not only occlude or extinguish intellect but also
pervert the individual’s appetitive faculty, much to his or her demise.

If, on the other hand, you aspire to apprehend things that are beyond your
apprehension; of if you hasten to pronounce false, assertions the contradic-
tories of which have not been demonstrated or that are possible, though
very remotely so […] you will not only not be perfect, but will be the most
deficient among the deficient; and it shall so fall out that you will be over-
come by imaginings and by an inclination toward things defective, evil, and
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 21

wicked—this resulting from the intellect’s being preoccupied and its light’s
being extinguished.24

Desire for absolute certainty that is attained by grasping one projected

truth or rational concept and by which one judges all possible truths, for
Maimonides, perverts reason’s (intrinsic) power and rank at the same time
blocking intellect’s expression of providence for the specific conditions. A
universal rational or demonstrative method would subordinate divine
necessity and providence of God to human judgments as to what is pos-
sible according to generally valid premises. For Maimonides, for an indi-
vidual to use a projected measure (which itself is derived from possible
existence) to validate natural possibility undermines the unique necessity
of God and subsequently the intrinsic ability of reason to perfect itself and
express intellectual or prophetic knowledge.

When points appearing as dubious occur to him or the thing he seeks does
not seem to him to be demonstrated, he should not deny and reject it, has-
tening to pronounce it false, but rather should persevere and thereby have
regard for the honor of his Creator. He should refrain and hold back. This
matter has already become clear. The intention of these texts set down by
the prophets and the Sages […] is not, however, wholly to close the gate of
speculation and to deprive the intellect of the apprehension of things that it
is possible to apprehend—as is thought by the ignorant and neglectful, who
are pleased to regard their own deficiency and stupidity as perfection and
wisdom, and the perfection and the knowledge of others as a deficiency and
a defection from Law, and who thus regard darkness as light and light as
darkness. Their purpose, in its entirety, rather is to make it known that the
intellects of human beings have a limit at which they stop.25

Similar to imaginative corruption, the intellect is corrupted when undue

haste and desire draw the focus of reason from intrinsic conditions and
actions to extrinsic objects. Central to this understanding is that reason
itself may express an appetitive dimension.26 If reason is enlisted to seek an
extrinsic object as though it could achieve certainty from its possession,
the individual is susceptible to opinion and dogma rather than finding
genuine knowledge. Since opinion is a material image potentially voided
by other opinions, the individual uses the search for rational certainty to
exclude and eliminate possibly dissident opinions, thereby solidifying a
dogma and prejudice. As Maimonides notes:
22 N. L. WHITMAN

With regard to such things there is a multiplicity of opinions, disagreement

arises between the men engaged in speculation, doubts crop up; all this
because the intellect is attached to an apprehension of these things, I mean
to say because of its longing for them; and also because everyone thinks that
he has found a way by means of which he will know the true reality of the
matter. Now it is not within the power of the human intellect to give a dem-
onstration of these matters.27

Rather than being given immediate perfection and eternal truth at birth,
human beings must seek their perfection, which implies an appetitive
dimension. Desire for a power or source that would perfect oneself is
solely intellectual in the case of humans. This is demonstrated by the very
fact that knowledge is what humans ultimately seek or desire, and unlike
animals, sensation or imagination cannot satisfy our natures. Human
(intellectual) perfection is derived from the perfecting and the “prior”
eternal agency of the Agent Intellect with which human intellects may
conjoin or express.
Yet, the appetitive dimension to human knowing must be managed
carefully lest corruption, errancy, and prejudice overtake one’s mind. If
approached from an imaginative standard which is to be absolutely
acquired and possessed, a longing for divine truth leads to an unhealthy
and destructive attachment to truth whereas an appropriate attachment to
one’s source of perfection requires humility, self-effacement, and critical
self-reflection upon one’s rational abstractions and projections. A wise
individual must be aware that imagistic and externalized projections mas-
querading as divine truth to be possessed can easily intrude into one’s
rational pursuits. By being expressions of one’s concrete embodied desire
for personal perfection, these projections are very hard to emend with
general, abstract concepts. One’s perfection and desire is most dear to
each individual, and so he or she may closely cling to perceived intellectual
and divine opinions (“prophecy”) and vigorously defend them against any
other image.
An essential method to emend (rational) prejudices requires that an
individual must give up on their egotistic and imagistic knowledge so that
intellect may express true intrinsic power/truth. This is why Maimonides
advocates that each individual direct all his thoughts to God and love God
with all his heart.28 This aids in restraining rational or speculative preju-
dices from dominating and entails that thinking is not dispassionate to
one’s existence and Nature. One cannot be stoic and hope to achieve
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 23

intellectual perfection either in the form of dispassionate contemplation or

ascetic dismissal of desire. As a result, reason conceived solely as an abstract
activity cannot emend concrete prejudices. God’s providence and absolute
power must be employed to restrain and orient the complete individual
including his or her mental faculties (appetition, imagination, and reason)
to a total love and contemplation of God.29
If not, the need to have and to assert a single authoritative opinion
subjects the inquirer to the passions driving group consensus and deceives
the learner to believe that others’ extrinsic circumstances (i.e. imaginative
conditions that produced their so-called opinions) can be transferred and
translated to the learner’s unique conditions and intellect. This supposed
teaching indicates at once anti-intellectual and imagistic notions both in
the so-called wise teacher and ignorant student.

Consider, therefore, you who are engaged in speculation, if you give the
preference to the quest for truth and cast aside passion, blind following of
authority, and obeisance to what you are accustomed to hold great. Your
soul should not be led into error by the circumstances of these men
engaged in speculation, neither by what has happened to them nor by
what has come from them. For they are like one who flees from torrid heat
into fire.30

Rather than following the authoritative dogma of others for the hope of
certainty, Maimonides ends Book I of the Guide of the Perplexed with an
ethical maxim to resist extrinsic sources as the basis for one’s own pro-
phetic knowledge or intellect. In fact, Maimonides’ ethical demand implies
that one may only achieve prophetic knowledge when his or her psyche is
ordered and restrained from extrinsic pursuits. As a result, prophetic and
ethical perfection are coordinated. Without one, the other cannot mani-
fest or express itself from properly restrained and internally ordered facul-
ties: a well-ordered and coordinated imagination and reason. Generating
this ordered relationship is divine excess. As Maimonides was fond of not-
ing, only one who first and foremost honors his or her creator will be able
to restrain his or her unethical, damaging, and errant passions which seek
improper acquisition of imaginative or discursive ends. Divine excess can-
not be reduced to imaginative opinions, errant experiences, or even
demonstrative certainty, which itself is a form of imaginative projection.
Instead, divine providence and excess expressed by prophetic perfection
only manifests itself when providence is used to check or block mimesis.
24 N. L. WHITMAN

Thereby, an appropriate engagement with and expression of providence

can render those finite conditions (producing errancy) singular or unique
in relation to this divine necessity.

Spinoza’s Intuitive Knowledge

Like Maimonides, Spinoza argues that one’s mind or soul has two aspects:
one extrinsic and the other intrinsic. Extrinsic affections indicate how the
mind is subject to causes unconducive to its intrinsic power.

[T]he fictitious, the false, and the other ideas have their origin in the imagi-
nation, i.e., in a certain sensation that are fortuitous, and (as it were) discon-
nected; since they do not arise from the very power of the mind, but from
external causes, as the body (whether waking or dreaming) receives various
motions. […] [I]t is something different from the intellect, and in which the
soul has the nature of something acted on. For […] it is something random,
by which the soul is acted on, and […] we are freed from it with the help of
the intellect.31

Although it may seem from the above passage that Spinoza advocates for
a purely rational truth, independent of experience, this is not so. Spinoza
stresses throughout his works that sensation and images are not removed
or annihilated by true or adequate ideas.32 Rather, adequate ideas provide
the means for the mind or soul to achieve intrinsic perfection and action
by restraining and transforming images into a rational, and possibly, intel-
lectual order.

And here, in order to begin to indicate what error is, I should like you to
note that the imaginations of the Mind, considered in themselves contain no
error, or that the Mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but only
insofar as it is considered to lack an idea that excludes the existence of those
things that it imagines to be present to it. For if the Mind, while it imagined
nonexistent things as present to it, at the same time knew that those things
did not exist, it would, of course, attribute this power of imagining to a
virtue of its nature, not to a vice—especially if this faculty of imagining
depended on its own nature, i.e. […] if the Mind’s faculty of imagining
were free.33

In a strikingly similar manner, Spinoza seems to follow Maimonides in

arguing that imagination is not in-itself false, and thereby, it cannot be
wholly defective. Like Maimonides, imagination has a nature or power,
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 25

and therefore, it must be real in some way. It is resistant to intellectual

ideas only when it seeks extrinsic sources as if real. Akin to Maimonides’
description of false spontaneity in the story of a thousand animals, Spinoza
argues that without another more adequate or appropriate image to
exclude and void the errancy of a fantastical image, one’s imagination
becomes enslaved to the projection of that image as if real and directs its
desire and faculties toward extrinsic sources rather than intrinsic powers.
In fact, to have intrinsic power entails that the imagination or mind would
be able to exclude an errant image. In this case, mind would express an
intrinsic action and the necessity of one’s reality rather than a dependency
on extrinsic and seemingly contingent sources—reflected most aptly by
conflicted passions, doubt, and mental confusion. That is, in the vein of
Maimonides’ argument, being susceptible to destructive forces and sophis-
tical devices.
For Spinoza, freedom indicates necessity or agreement with God’s or
Nature’s order, much like how an individual relates to providence in
Maimonides’ philosophy.34 When intrinsically related to this order or
necessity, an individual and his or her mind, including imagination, may be
free. The complete individual and his or her different aspects are included
in this reality and must relate to other aspects or expressions of this reality
such as reason and intellect. As a result, Spinoza notes that imagination is
an aspect of mind insofar as mind regards bodies in a certain way:

[…] the affections of the human Body whose ideas present external bodies
as present to us, we shall call images of things, even if they do not reproduce
the figures of things. And when the Mind regards bodies in this way, we shall
say that it imagines.35

Spinoza’s language of “we shall call” and “regards … in this way” indi-
cates that imagination is merely a certain aspect of mind. The distinction
between mind and imagination is perspectival since both aspects represent
actual ways the mind involves and expresses Nature. As the body under-
goes affections which indicate external bodies as present so the mind
merely involves and expresses (i.e. regards) that condition under the aspect
of thought. As a potentially active aspect for mind and intellect, imagina-
tion, like for Maimonides, has a role to play for intellect.36
Mirroring Maimonides’ position, Spinoza argues that an unrestrained
imagination (or mind) which engages in discursive or mimetic errancy
undermines its own powers. Engaging in errant seeking or inquiry
26 N. L. WHITMAN

confuses the mind so that an intrinsic action of the intellect cannot express
itself. First, Spinoza notes that an imagination which assumes that its
images can supply a measure to reality not only undermines the order of
nature but also moves the individual to seek extrinsic means to achieve
perfection. In fact, this seeking is destructive to the very intrinsic power
and perfection that he or she desires. The movement to extrinsic sources
and, subsequently, the confusion produced that these sources will provide
a sufficient basis for perfection undermines the intellect’s intrinsic ability
to reflect on itself:

We avoid, moreover, another great cause of confusion which prevents the

intellect from reflecting on itself—viz., when we do not distinguish between
the imagination and intellection, we think that the things we more easily
imagine are clearer to us, and think we understand what we imagine. Hence,
what should be put later we put first, and so the true order of making prog-
ress is overturned, and no conclusion is arrived at legitimately.37

For Spinoza, an unrestrained imagination projects its images as determi-

nate ends for Nature. This contravenes Nature’s necessity because now a
finite measure establishes and verifies all existential possibility.38
Additionally, it also occludes how the necessity of Nature, as expressed by
an intellectual order, truly indicates and determines how each singular
mode produces another. Instead, a contingent and finite measure under-
mines how true causality operates. By being unrelated to God’s necessity
(whether under reason or intellect),39 an image cannot then be determined
as necessary. As a result, images are not conducive to generating deduc-
tions that actually explain God’s necessity and so block the intellect’s
agreement with that necessity.
In the Appendix to Ethics I, Spinoza’s major discussion of teleology, he
argues that final causes and a teleological order of Nature are derived from
images and individuals’ experience of contingent existence, which really
represent their inadequate understanding of and agreement with Nature.

[…] [A]ll the notions by which ordinary people are accustomed to explain
nature are only modes of imagining, and do not indicate the nature of any-
thing, only the constitution of the imagination […] they have names, as if
they were of beings existing outside the imagination. […] For many are
accustomed to arguing […] if all things have followed from the necessity of
God’s most perfect nature, why are there so many imperfections in nature?
Why are things corrupt […] [T]hose who argue in this way are easily
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 27

answered. For the perfection of things is to be judged solely from their

nature and power; things are not more or less perfect because they please or
offend men’s senses, or because they are use to, or are incompatible with,
human nature. […] [T]hose who ask “Why God did not create all men so
that they would be governed by the command of reason?” I answer only
“because he did not lack material to create all things, from the highest
degree of perfection to the lowest;” or, to speak more properly, “because the
laws of his nature have been so ample that they sufficed for producing all
things which can be conceived by an infinite intellect” […] These are the
prejudices I undertook to note here.40

Ignorant, ordinary people, prone to imagistic thinking, assume that

Nature’s excessive power must be curtailed and comport with their pro-
jections of order (teleology). This order primarily expresses their desire,
based on inadequate images and confusion, to achieve perfection. They
project their individual feelings of beauty, love, and pleasure, which are
limited images and finite standards, onto Nature. Subsequently, they are
baffled why Nature does not agree with their images and final causes. Final
causes represent a limit to Nature’s power and the possibility that they
could possess an ultimate truth. This ultimate truth would represent a
resting point that may alleviate not only intellectual confusion but also
emotional conflict, which is the basis of intellectual confusion.41 But much
like Maimonides, Spinoza notes that Nature does not lack power and so
must produce all modes despite human conceptions as to what should or
should not exist. Human conceptions of order are merely fantasies and
inadequate expressions of their desires based on extrinsic perceptions
and images.
Neither can a discursive and demonstrative form of reason provide the
necessary determination to one’s intellectual and concrete conditions so
that an intrinsic intellectual judgment may express itself. Although reason
can relate and order particular causes to effects via certain universals or
abstract notions, it conceives the actuality of particulars through general
properties that can confuse the intellect with a false sense of certainty.

[T]he same difference that exists between the essence of one thing and the
essence of another also exists between the actuality or existence of the one
thing and the actuality or existence of the other. […] Therefore, the more
generally existence is conceived, the more confusedly also it is conceived,
and the more easily it can be ascribed fictitiously to anything. Conversely,
the more particularly [singularly] it is conceived, then the more clearly it is
28 N. L. WHITMAN

understood, and the more difficult it is for us, [even] when we do not attend
to the order of Nature, to ascribe it fictitiously to anything other than the
thing itself.42

As Spinoza notes, the essence or definition of a thing, the proper object

for intellectual apprehension, can be improperly unrestrained from actual-
ity or real conditions. As a result, the wide-ranging applicability of this
type of improper essence or concept would not only undermine Nature’s
necessary order but occlude the intrinsic power of the intellect to express
real determination and, subsequently, its own well-defined actions.

Therefore, so long as we are dealing with the Investigation of things, we

must never infer anything from abstractions, and we shall take very great
care not to mix up the things that are only in the intellect with those that are
real. But the best conclusion will have to be drawn from some particular
affirmative essence, or, from a true and legitimate definition. For from uni-
versal axioms alone the intellect cannot descend to singulars, since axioms
extend to infinity, and do not determine the intellect to the contemplation
of one singular thing rather than another.43

Continuing, Spinoza notes that singulars must be concrete or physical:

[…] From this we can see that above all it is necessary for us always to
deduce all our ideas from Physical things, or from the real beings, proceed-
ing, as far as possible, according to the series of causes, from one real being
to another real being, in such a way that we do not pass over to abstractions
and universals, neither inferring something real from them, nor inferring
them from something real. For to do so either interferes with the true prog-
ress of the intellect.44

A complement to Spinoza’s position is that the human intellect, like

Maimonides’ intellect, has a limit. For Spinoza, the human intellect can
neither know Nature completely nor all the singular knowables that would
perfect its intellect and intrinsic power to the level of God.

For to conceive them [singular things] all at once is a task far beyond the
powers of the human intellect. But to understand one before the other, the
order must be sought, as we have said, not from their series of existing, nor
even from the eternal things. For there, by nature, all these things are
at once.45
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 29

Instead, as a part of Nature and God’s intellect, the human intellect must
proceed from one true and adequate idea to the next. For Spinoza, the
human intellect is produced, i.e. natura naturata, and, thus, is not abso-
lutely prior to affections, i.e. it is not natura naturans. As Spinoza notes:
“I think I have demonstrated clearly and evidently enough that the intel-
lect, though infinite, [refers] to natura naturata, not to natura natur-
ans.”46 Only God or Nature, i.e. natura naturans or naturing nature,
exists prior to its affections and is absolutely infinite: an infinity without
limit and an ultimate cause of every possible attribution. Attributions
(made by a mind or intellect) indicate that affections occur with and within
an intellectual mode and that attributions cannot present an unmediated
and absolutely prior cause. Therefore, attributions, definitions, or descrip-
tions show that a mind or intellect is historical.47 Throughout Letter 9,
Spinoza uses the term “description” interchangeably with the term “defi-
nition” to indicate that a concrete experience generates an intellectual
understanding of ideata or perceived objects.48 For Spinoza, a definition
as a human attribution does not reduce the defined object to extrinsic
referents or an absolute foundational truth.

[T]o explain by an example how one and the same thing can be designated
by two names […] I offer two: (i) I say that by Israel I understand the third
patriarch; I understand the same by Jacob, the name which was given him
because he had seized his brother’s heel[.]49

For Spinoza, definitions must express an actuality of experience. As a

result, many definitions may express this actuality lest a linguistic defini-
tion presumes to correspond to a single absolute reality. For example, the
meaning and actuality of Jacob or Israel does not reduce to either perspec-
tive so that his dual meanings can be used to generate perspectives or
aspects of the thing defined; any absolute perspective would assume that it
captured the reality of Jacob/Israel and could deduce absolute truths or
attributes from a secure foundational perspective. Spinoza’s genetic defini-
tions have the potential to acknowledge not only that an individual gener-
ated them but also that the generation was from a demand placed upon
the knower by the concrete singular experience. That is, the knower
expresses a perspective on reality yet acknowledges the perspective as a
singular and concrete perspective. Thus reality is not reduced to a total-
izing static perspective. As a result, definitions are not absolute concepts
that must agree with or correspond to an absolutely determined reality.
30 N. L. WHITMAN

The human intellect is perfected by its intrinsic actions when it appropri-

ately agrees with those concrete and amenable conditions—not exceeding
them with improper imaginative projections or unrestricted universals.
Like Maimonides, Spinoza realizes that intellectual perfection also
entails ethical perfection of the wise, since the wise not only express intrin-
sic actions of mind but are able to and actually do restrain errant affections
so that an individual is most active and free.

Next, the more the mind knows, the better it understands its own powers
and the order of Nature. The better the mind understands its own powers,
the more easily it can direct itself and propose rules to itself; the better it
understands the order of Nature, the more easily it can restrain itself from
useless pursuits. In these things, as we have said, the whole of the Method
consists.50

Similarly, Spinoza understands that mediated and practical tools and hab-
its are needed to structure an individual’s concrete conditions and percep-
tions so that intellect or perfection, as Spinoza notes, will easily manifest
itself.51 These tools provide means by which the mind does not weary itself
in useless pursuits or potentially excessive practices that lead to an unre-
strained imagination or dogmatism.

[Method] is understanding what a true idea is by distinguishing it from the

rest of the perceptions; by investigating its nature, so that from that we may
come to know our power of understanding and so restrain the mind that it
understands, according to that standard, everything that is to be under-
stood; and finally by teaching and constructing certain rules as aids, so that
the mind does not weary itself in useless pursuits.52

Examples of useless pursuits include the endeavors for riches, sensual plea-
sure, or honor among the so-called wise.

By persistent meditation, however, I came to the conclusion that, if only I

could resolve, wholeheartedly, [to change my plan of life], I would be giving
up certain evils [bad things or mala] for a certain good […] But all those
things men ordinarily strive for, not only provide no remedy to preserve our
being, but in fact hinder that preservation […] Furthermore, these evils
[bad things or mala] seemed to have arisen from the fact that all happiness
and unhappiness was placed in the quality of the object to which we cling
with love. For strife will never arise on account of what is not loved, nor will
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 31

there be sadness if it perishes, nor envy if it is possessed by another, nor fear,

nor hatred—in a word, no disturbances of the mind. […] For though I
perceived these things so clearly in my mind, I still could not, on that
account, put aside all greed, desire for sensual pleasure and love of esteem.53

Additionally, like Maimonides, Spinoza understands that the idea of God

can provide a powerful force to block and emend unruly desires based on
inadequate understanding. He notes:

[T]o restrain the mind from confusing false, fictitious, and doubtful ideas
with true ones. It is my intention to explain this fully here, so as to engage
my Readers in the thought of a thing so necessary [God] […].54

Finding and using this kind of idea is the basis for Spinoza’s search to find
a “good, capable of communicating itself, and which alone would affect
the mind, all others being rejected.”55 Much like Maimonides, Spinoza’s
idea of God is neither an image to be mimetically appropriated by the
imagination nor a concept of discursive reason whereby one would reduce
Nature to a specific rational order. Instead, the idea of God expresses the
absolute necessity of Nature outside of human projections and reductions,
and thereby, it demands of the wise the recognition of the limits of imagi-
nation and reason. Similar to Maimonides’ demand to honor the creator,
Spinoza’s idea of God instills restraint so that one may be congruent with
Nature by expressing singular ideas which in turn are ordered by the laws
of Nature.

[W]e learned which is the best perception [God], by whose aid we can reach
our perfection [and] we learned which is the first path our mind must enter
on to begin well—which is to proceed in its investigation according to cer-
tain laws, taking as a standard a given true idea. If this is to be done prop-
erly, the Method must, first show how to distinguish a true idea from all
other perceptions[.]56

It may seem curious that the idea of God would be described as a percep-
tion, an affection to which the human mind is passive. Yet, this perception
implies that the human mind cannot have full control over Nature and
that the human mind has a limit. Instead, the idea of God places a demand
on (human) thinking so that one may express intrinsic actions or adequate,
active ideas in agreement with the necessity of Nature and that singular
human’s necessity within that active order.
32 N. L. WHITMAN

Much like Maimonides, Spinoza advocates for humility from the human
knower.57 God or Nature must be respected, and humility is an important
component to intellectual and ethical perfection. In a remarkable passage,
Spinoza seemingly agrees with Maimonides’ understanding of the true
prophet as someone able to use God to instill humility so that some in the
populace may achieve intellectual and ethical perfection.

Because men rarely live from the dictates of reason, these two affects,
Humility and Repentance, and in addition, Hope and Fear, bring more
advantage than disadvantage. […] If weak-minded men were all equally
proud, ashamed of nothing, and afraid of nothing, how could they be united
or restrained by any bonds? […] The mob is terrifying, if unafraid. So it is
no wonder that the Prophets, who considered the common advantage, not
that of the few, commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence so
greatly. Really, those who are subject to these affects can be guided far more
easily than others, so that in the end they may live from the guidance of
reason, i.e., may be free and enjoy the life of the blessed.58

Not only does humility lead to common advantage through conventional

accord, but it has the ability to lead capable minds to freedom and blessed-
ness, i.e. the highest intellectual perfection derived from, or “bestowed
by,” God’s truth and power.59 This clearly indicates that understanding
God and achieving human perfection cannot be solely attained by a ratio-
nal contemplation of God. There must be an ethical and political dimen-
sion to understanding divine truth.
In her impressive work on the relation between Maimonides’ and
Spinoza’s understanding of prophetic imagination, Heidi Ravven explains
how both Maimonides and Spinoza support the use of imaginative, ethical
doctrines to help form a community maximally capable of generating phi-
losophers. Nevertheless, I disagree with Ravven’s position that Spinoza
sees ethical praxis, including Mosaic religious doctrines, as merely laying
down practices on which the philosopher may reflect. As a result of her
interpretation, Ravven argues that any ethical rule would do for Spinoza if
it generated philosophical reflection.60 She argues that philosophical reflec-
tion is in some sense self-determining outside ethical-political conven-
tions, and thereby supererogatory:

For Spinoza, instead, the ethical doctrine and virtuous society envisioned in
the Bible address only practice—yet a practice that, when adequately
reflected upon, is seen to conform implicitly to rational principles and also
 2 PROPHECY AND INTUITION: SINGULAR KNOWLEDGE IN MAIMONIDES’… 33

to point beyond ethics and praxis to their theoretical foundations.

Philosophy, scientific theory, is left untouched, giving those who have the
capacity for further understanding the freedom necessary to envision and
live the supererogatory philosophical life.61

I believe that Ravven’s position ignores the constitutive effect of concrete

historical conditions on one’s imagination and intellect. Additionally, it
suggests that philosophers may be privileged and somehow separate from
the masses. I would argue that Maimonides and Spinoza are more closely
linked than Ravven indicates, because both realize that affects not only
constitute imaginative concepts but also inform intellectual understand-
ing. Both are concerned with managing imaginative affects not merely as
errant problems to be overcome but to be directed and restrained accord-
ing to the historical meanings and prejudices of the time so that as many
as possible may express intellectual activity in and from their concrete his-
torical context/affects.
The philosopher is not apart from the masses. He or she needs extra-­
rational rules or habits to generate understanding.62 Given one’s suscepti-
bility to his or her affects and desires, he or she consistently needs political
and ethical training so that not only is social harmony secured but also
philosophical activity as a social-political activity may express itself. I would
argue that given the historical nature and limitations of the human intel-
lect, a wise individual must rely on ethical-imaginative forms that may
non-discursively generate singular truths. I am concerned that Ravven
presents an improper duality between pure theoretical philosophy and
mere imaginative confusion. Although Ravven provides a good account of
Maimonides’ and Spinoza’s understanding of prophetic imagination and
its relation to ethics and politics, my account develops Maimonides’ and
Spinoza’s understanding of the non-discursive aspects of knowing to show
how the philosopher or the wise are more closely linked to the masses.
This explains why early in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect,
rather than merely advocating for individual, rational contemplation of
God, Spinoza argues for an ethical and political project by which not only
Spinoza, or the wise, may be perfected but by which others in the com-
munity may be perfected as well. Spinoza requires intellectual perfection
to be entwined with political actions that improve the total community.

[13] But since human weakness does not grasp that [eternal or divine] order
by its own thought, and meanwhile conceives a human nature much stronger
34 N. L. WHITMAN

and more enduring than his own, and at the same time sees that nothing
prevents his acquiring such a nature, he is spurred to seek means that will lead
him to such a perfection. Whatever can be a means to his attaining it is called
a true good; but the highest good is to arrive—together with other individuals
if possible—at the enjoyment of such a nature. What that nature is we shall
show in its proper place: that is the knowledge of the union that the mind
has with the whole of Nature. [14] This, then, is the end I aim at: to acquire
such a nature, and to strive that many acquire it with me. That is, it is part of
my happiness to take pains that many others may understand as I understand,
so that their intellect and desire agree entirely with my intellect and desire. To
do this it is necessary, first to understand as much of Nature as suffices for
acquiring such a nature; next, to form a society of the kind that is desirable,
so that as many as possible may attain it as easily and surely as possible.63

The initial lack of access to the intellectual order of God requires an extrin-
sic pursuit for knowledge. Yet, the highest good for humans—human per-
fection—is not individual contemplation. Instead, a social-political
engagement generates the highest intellectual good, and it is indispens-
able. In point of fact, as Spinoza states, mere knowledge of Nature is
subordinated to a political nature that will enable social-intellectual
engagement. Knowledge of Nature is beneficial insofar as it suffices to gen-
erate a social-political nature capable of producing individual and social
awareness and knowledge. Politics is essential for Spinoza’s concept of
perfection because human-shared perfection(s) requires continual nego-
tiations of singular interests. Distinct singular interests imply a diverse
polis not easily reduced to a simple political or natural identity. As a result,
a more perfect society is not guaranteed—it is a possibility, as Spinoza
notes—so it must be continually generated by virtuous and perfecting
actions. The agreement among individuals’ intellects and desires should
indicate tolerance and involvement of unique others in the attainment of
knowledge and social well-being. This at the same time entails individual
restraint, ethical virtue, and wisdom throughout the populace. Thus,
Spinoza should not be interpreted as advocating for a complete reduction
of others’ minds and pursuits to one’s own.
Etienne Balibar argues that Spinoza’s use of the Latin term convenien-
tia for political usefulness and accord requires knowledge of the singular
difference of other unique, individuals:

In Reason the Other is conceived as useful not in spite of his singularity or

difference, but because this singularity is implied by the general laws of
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Title: L'Écrivain

Author: Pierre Mille

Release date: November 29, 2023 [eBook #72256]

Language: French

Original publication: Paris: Hachette, 1925

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK L'ÉCRIVAIN

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LES CARACTÈRES DE CE TEMPS

L’ÉCRIVAIN
PAR
PIERRE MILLE

A PARIS
Chez HACHETTE

HUITIÈME MILLE
 LES CARACTÈRES DE CE TEMPS

LE POLITIQUE, Par Louis Barthou, de l’Académie

Française. — LE PAYSAN, Par Henry Bordeaux, de
l’Académie Française. — LE DIPLOMATE, Par J.
Cambon, de l’Académie Française. — LE BOURGEOIS,
Par Abel Hermant. — LE PRÊTRE, Par Monseigneur
Julien, Évêque d’Arras. — LE FINANCIER, Par R.-G.
Lévy, Membre de l’Institut. — L’HOMME D’AFFAIRES,
Par Louis Loucheur. — L’ÉCRIVAIN, Par Pierre Mille.
— LE SAVANT, Par le Prof. Ch. Richet, Membre de
l’Institut. — L’AVOCAT, Par Henri-Robert, de
l’Académie Française, Ancien Bâtonnier. — L’OUVRIER,
Par Albert Thomas, Etc.

Tous droits de traduction, de reproduction et d’adaptation réservés

pour tous pays.
Copyright by Librairie Hachette, 1925.

Il a été tiré de cet ouvrage soixante exemplaires sur papier de

Hollande, numérotés de 1 à 60.
 L’ÉCRIVAIN

CHAPITRE PREMIER

CONSULTATION

La mère de Pamphile est chez moi. Encore qu’elle ait pris son air
le plus sérieux, je lui dis qu’elle est charmante.
« Vous pouvez, dit-elle, vous dispenser de ces compliments,
adressés à une femme qui a un fils de vingt ans.
— Cela ne fait que quarante…
— Trente-huit ! corrige-t-elle précipitamment… Mais il s’agit bien
de ça ! C’est de mon fils, non pas de moi, que je viens vous parler.
— Pamphile a fait des bêtises ? Il veut en faire ?
— Non. Du moins, je ne crois pas : il prétend écrire.
— Écrire ? A qui ? A une dame ? Au Président de la République ?
— Ne feignez pas l’incompréhension. Il veut écrire. Devenir
écrivain, homme de lettres, enfin.
— Et vous, qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ? Et son père ?
— Cela ne nous déplaît pas… Mais à vous ?
 — A moi non plus…
— C’est que vous avez toujours l’air de rire… On a bien tort de
vous demander conseil !
— Je ne ris pas, je souris. Je souris de satisfaction. J’admire
comme la bourgeoisie se réconcilie successivement avec toutes les
forces qui sortent d’elle, mais dont pourtant, durant bien longtemps,
elle s’est méfiée, qu’elle considérait comme en révolte ou en
dissidence. Ah ! tout est bien changé, depuis seulement la fin du
second Empire ! Au temps du second Empire jamais une famille
bourgeoise, ayant la prétention de se respecter, n’aurait donné à sa
fille un officier. On estimait que tous les officiers étaient « des piliers
de café ». Ils devaient rester célibataires, ou se marier dans des
familles militaires. La guerre de 1870 a changé cela. Tout le monde
étant obligé de servir, on a pris l’habitude de l’uniforme, il n’a plus
épouvanté.
« En second lieu la bourgeoisie s’est annexé les peintres. On
s’est aperçu que Cabrion pouvait se faire de confortables revenus.
Le prix de ses tableaux montait, il devenait un beau parti ; il a été
reçu dans les salons. Mais les poètes et les romanciers ont attendu
plus longtemps à la porte. Le poète, surtout, paraissait un animal
particulièrement inquiétant, une malédiction pour ses géniteurs.
Baudelaire écrivit là-dessus des vers magnifiques.
— En vérité ?
— En vérité. Je vous les lirai un autre jour…
« Trente ans au moins encore après que les peintres étaient
entrés, ou pouvaient entrer, pour peu que cela leur convînt, dans le
bercail bourgeois, les poètes, les romanciers, les journalistes ne
fréquentaient guère que le café, comme jadis les militaires. C’est au
café qu’a vécu la littérature, que s’est faite la littérature, jusqu’à la fin
du symbolisme. A cette heure elle l’a déserté. Elle a conquis sa
place dans le monde, elle en profite largement.
— Vous vous en plaignez ?
— Moi ? Non. J’estime même que ce n’est point uniquement par
considération, par respect des sommes qu’il est permis d’attendre de
leur profession — le métier de poète me semble condamné, sauf
exception, à demeurer peu lucratif — que le monde accueille les
écrivains. C’est d’abord pour s’en orner, pour s’excuser, par une
parure intellectuelle, d’autres ostracismes, et de la vénération qu’il
continue d’avoir pour l’argent. C’est aussi parce que la société
contemporaine, se sentant ou se croyant plus menacée
qu’auparavant dans ses assises organiques, éprouve le besoin de
s’appuyer sur tout ce qui peut, le cas échéant, lui prêter son
concours, tout ce qui a, en somme, la même origine qu’elle. Or, en
France, il ne saurait y avoir d’écrivains, et depuis longtemps en fait il
n’y en a presque pas, qui ne soient issus des classes supérieures ou
moyennes, ou bien qui n’aient, ce qui revient au même, bénéficié de
la formation intellectuelle réservée à ces classes : je veux dire celle
de l’Enseignement secondaire.
— Expliquez-vous plus clairement. Il y a dans ce que vous dites
tant de mots abstraits !…
— J’y vais tâcher. Je ne vous demande pas si Pamphile a été
reçu à son bachot. Ceci n’a aucune importance. Mais il a passé par
le lycée, n’est-ce pas ?
— Il sort de chez les Pères…
— C’est la même chose. On lui a appris mal le latin, pas du tout
le grec, et, quoi qu’on en dise, à peu près le français et
l’orthographe. Le français un peu mieux que l’orthographe et la
ponctuation pour lesquelles les jeunes générations, je ne sais
pourquoi, affectent un singulier mépris : mais on les exige de moins
en moins dans la carrière littéraire. Par surcroît, sans même qu’il
s’en soit douté, il s’est pénétré d’un ensemble de conceptions,
d’idées, de principes sur quoi repose notre art depuis quatre siècles,
et qui lui donne ses lois.
« Si Pamphile était le plus remarquable, même le plus génial des
primaires, je vous dirais : « S’il n’a le diable au corps, qu’il ne se
risque pas à devenir un écrivain. Notre langue est un outil
merveilleux, mais de formation classique, j’oserai presque dire
artificielle. Elle est une langue de société, une langue de gens du
monde, une langue de collège où les murs sont encore tout
imprégnés de latin, même quand on n’y enseigne plus le latin. Il n’en
est pas ainsi en Russie, en Allemagne et dans les pays anglo-
saxons. La littérature y est plus populaire et davantage le patrimoine
de tout le monde. Gorki a été débardeur et cuisinier. Vingt
romanciers américains ont fait leur éducation à l’école primaire, dans
la rue et à l’atelier. Chez nous un Murger ou un Pierre Hamp
resteront des exceptions… » Mais Pamphile a usé ses culottes sur
les bancs d’un lycée : par une sorte de grâce d’état — je vous
assure que je parle sérieusement — cela suffit. S’il a quelque chose
dans le ventre il pourra le sortir sans trop de peine.
— Je vous remercie.
— Il n’y a pas de quoi… Et, dites-moi, ce jeune homme a-t-il des
dispositions ?
— C’est-à-dire qu’il n’est bon à rien. J’entends à rien autre. Il
ferait ça avec un peu plus de goût, comprenez-vous ? Ou plutôt
moins de dégoût.
— On ne saurait mieux définir la vocation. Nos pères ont proféré
des choses excessives sur la vocation, et le terme même, je le
reconnais, y engage. Il suggère un appel irrésistible et secret, un
démon furieux, un dieu sublime, ailé, qui vous emporte… que sais-je
encore ! La vérité est que la vocation est un autre nom pour le
principe du moindre effort qui régit de l’univers entier jusqu’aux
plantes, jusqu’aux minéraux. La vocation consiste à faire ce qui vous
donne le moins de mal, qui vous est le moins désagréable. Toutefois
l’on peut admettre qu’elle se confond, dans certains cas, avec
l’instinct du jeu, c’est-à-dire la recherche d’un plaisir qu’on se donne
gratuitement. Un philosophe distingué, au début du siècle dernier,
était conducteur d’omnibus pour gagner sa vie, et faisait de la
philosophie pour se reposer. Mais ce sont là des exceptions. Le
principe du moindre effort, la recherche de ce qui vous est le plus
facile, suffit. Pamphile préfère écrire à tricoter des bas, ou à
l’administration des contributions indirectes : il n’y a pas autre chose
à lui demander.
 — Mais croyez-vous qu’il réussira ?
— Je ne dis pas cela. Cette profession d’écrivain est l’une de
celles — il y en a d’autres, quand ce ne serait que le commerce et
l’industrie — où nul avancement ne se peut prévoir à l’ancienneté,
où il n’y a pas de retraite. Tant pis pour lui s’il échoue. Il doit le
prévoir et s’y résigner.
« Et il peut rester en route parce qu’il sera trop personnel, ou bien
au contraire trop banal. S’il est trop personnel, qu’il se contente de
l’estime d’un petit nombre. Il la trouvera toujours. Cela ne fera pas
bouillir sa marmite, mais ceci est une autre affaire. S’il est seulement
« ordinaire », son sort ne sera pas trop misérable dans la société
contemporaine. Le journalisme, et même la littérature courante,
exigent un personnel de plus en plus considérable. Il a des chances
de se faire une petite carrière, un petit nom.
— Mais que doit-il écrire, pour commencer, comment publier ?
— Ah ! ça, par exemple, je n’en sais rien. C’est un des mystères
les plus insondables de la profession et le secret est pratiquement
incommunicable… Du reste, envoyez-moi le candidat… »
 CHAPITRE II

LES DÉBUTS DE PAMPHILE

Sur la recommandation de sa mère, Pamphile est venu me voir.

Sa mise était d’une élégance raffinée, ce qui ne m’a point déplu :
j’estime qu’un jeune homme doit être de son époque. Il y a trente
ans, je me fusse méfié d’un candidat à la carrière des lettres habillé
comme un homme du monde : la mode, dans la corporation, exigeait
soit une certaine négligence, soit ce qu’on appelait de l’originalité :
un gilet rouge, ou bien un jabot et des manchettes de dentelles.
C’est que les gens de lettres vivaient au café, et loin des femmes.
Aujourd’hui, vers cinq heures, ils sont dans un salon, où l’on en voit,
et de charmantes. Le soir, ils se retrouvent dans un bar qui est en
même temps un dancing, et où il en est d’autres — également
charmantes, et, par l’apparence du moins, presque les mêmes.
Il est à noter du reste que, aux âges reculés où le petit univers
littéraire vivait presque totalement à l’écart du grand univers féminin,
il faisait profession de célébrer l’amour et d’adorer la femme. A cette
heure que la communication est rétablie, la jeune littérature affecte
volontiers de dédaigner l’amour et de remettre la femme à sa place.
Ceci doit être encore affaire de mode.
« … Ainsi, dis-je à Pamphile, vous voulez devenir mon confrère.
Vous m’en voyez très honoré… Quel genre comptez-vous
aborder ? »
 Pamphile me regarda gentiment. La jeunesse d’à présent a
perdu sa timidité devant les ancêtres. Cela tient à ce que ceux qui
sont revenus de la guerre ont vu en face des choses plus
intimidantes ; ils ont conscience aussi de parler au nom de ceux qui
sont morts. Enfin je soupçonne que la fréquentation et la
conversation habituelle des femmes, plus commune de nos jours
qu’autrefois, y est également pour quelque chose. Je ne m’étonnai
donc point de l’assurance de Pamphile, bien qu’il demeurât muet ; il
ne me répondait rien.
« La prose, les vers ? » fis-je pour l’encourager un peu,
généralisant de façon si banale que cela me faisait rougir.
Son regard, qu’il conserve ingénu, malgré la possession qu’il a
de lui, se chargea de quelque commisération :
« Vous savez bien (j’entendis qu’il signifiait : Vous devriez
savoir…) qu’il n’y a plus de différence…
— Comment ?…
— Il ne s’agit plus de vers libre. C’est fini du vers libre… Mais les
tendances actuelles intègrent la poésie, les images qui sont le
propre de la poésie, dans la prose. Et la prose à son tour… »
Si l’on s’embarque dans la théorie, surtout avec les jeunes gens,
on en a pour longtemps ; j’abrégeai :
« Pamphile, vous m’avez sûrement apporté quelque chose…
Montrez !… »
Il ne se fit pas prier. Il était, j’imagine, venu surtout pour ça. Je lus
d’un trait, parce qu’il n’y avait pas de ponctuation :
Contraction des pupilles Voronof — cocktail il y a trop longtemps
que nous sommes là intense vie par en bas visages morts tournoi
d’âmes dans le tournoiement éternité momentanée du désir.
« Ah ! Ah ! fis-je.
— N’est-ce pas ? acquiesça-t-il.
— Pamphile, je vais être franc. J’ai besoin que vous m’éclairiez
un peu ce texte.
 — Il est pourtant d’une limpidité suffisante… « Contraction des
pupilles », ça veut dire que j’entre, venant de la rue obscure, dans un
bar férocement illuminé. Je prends un cocktail très violent… Voronof,
vous comprenez… « Il y a trop longtemps que nous sommes là »,
c’est ce que je dis au bout de cinq minutes. Au bout de cinq minutes
on en a toujours assez, on n’est pas encore adapté. « Intense vie
par en bas, visages morts », ce sont les pieds des danseurs, qui
s’agitent, et leurs figures inertes. « Tournois d’âmes dans ce
tournoiement » : qu’est-ce qui se passe, de danseur à danseuse,
pendant qu’ils tournent ? Et alors : « Éternité momentanée du désir »
se comprend tout seul. C’est le phare au bout de la strophe… Il n’y a
pas de ponctuation parce que tout ça se plaque au même instant sur
l’appareil cérébral.
— Excellent ! » déclarai-je.
Pamphile daigna paraître assez satisfait de mon approbation.
« Maintenant, dites-moi, poursuivis-je, si vous avez l’intention
d’écrire comme ça toute votre vie ? »
Pamphile sourit doucement :
« Mais non, monsieur ! J’écris comme ça pour bien prouver que
je ne suis pas plus bête que les autres de ma génération, que je suis
au courant du procédé littéraire contemporain, et que je sais le
manier. Si j’agissais différemment on croirait que je ne suis pas à la
page… Et puis, voyons : supposez que, de but en blanc, j’écrive un
roman comme Bourget, quel éditeur le publiera ? Et s’il s’en trouve
un par hasard, qui le lira ? Je dois d’abord, dans de petites revues et
par de petites plaquettes, conquérir l’estime de mes pairs, ceux qui
ont le même âge que moi, et affirmer mon nom, mon existence…
Plus tard, je modifierai progressivement ma manière, de façon à
atteindre un autre public, mais je crois que j’en garderai l’essentiel.
— Vraiment ? Pourquoi ?
— Il y a si longtemps que les hommes savent lire qu’ils lisent de
plus en plus vite. Ils ne sautent pas seulement les mots, mais les
paragraphes, les pages. Ils sont dressés à comprendre bien plus
rapidement qu’il y a un siècle. On dit que c’est à cause de la T. S. F.,
de l’auto, de la précipitation de la vie contemporaine. Ça, c’est peut-
être une blague… Toutefois le fait est là… Alors il faut arriver à
l’analyse infinitésimale d’impressions simultanées, comme Marcel
Proust, ou au contraire à la condensation maxima de phénomènes
visuels et cérébraux qui n’ont aucun rapport entre eux, du moins
apparent, dans le temps et dans l’espace, et pourtant s’évoquent, se
compénètrent les uns les autres.
— Pamphile, lui dis-je, votre mère a eu bien tort de me prier de
vous donner des conseils : vous êtes fort ! Vous êtes beaucoup plus
fort que moi ! Pourquoi me demandez-vous des leçons ?
— Je ne vous en demande pas sur ce que je sais, mais ce que
j’ignore…
— Et modeste, avec ça : c’est de l’intelligence !… Laissez-moi
donc alors vous faire une observation. Vous m’avez dit : « Si
j’écrivais un roman comme M. Paul Bourget, quel éditeur le
prendrait ? » Mais n’importe lequel, et tout de suite ! Seulement il ne
vaudrait probablement pas ceux de M. Bourget… Un bon roman
implique une grosse somme d’expériences sociales ou individuelles,
soit directes, soit indirectes. Un roman, c’est toujours le romancier
réagissant contre lui-même ou contre la société. C’est pourquoi
vouloir se mêler d’aborder ce genre difficile avant d’avoir vécu,
revient à prétendre diriger un paquebot avant d’avoir vu la mer. Et
l’on ignore même l’art d’associer et d’exprimer ses propres
sentiments : il y faut du métier, comme en toutes choses.
« Donc, que ces façons de petits poèmes que vous m’apportez,
et qui ne sont, selon vous-même, ni prose, ni vers — mais ça m’est
égal ! — soient pour vous comme un exercice de piano, des
arpèges ! On n’en saurait trop faire. Le poète a le droit d’être
purement subjectif, il peut tout tirer de lui-même, il peut ne rien
connaître de la vie réelle, quotidienne, des hommes et des femmes
de son propre pays et de l’univers. Qu’il les voie à travers lui, c’est
assez. J’oserai même dire que c’est désirable.
« Les petits poèmes que vous venez de me montrer, Pamphile,
ne sont pas meilleurs, je me risque à vous le confier, que ceux que
je pourrais composer, moi qui ne suis pas poète. Mais ils doivent
servir à vous découvrir à vous-même, ce qui est indispensable.
« Et plus tard, plus tard, vous verrez à quoi peut s’appliquer le
métier que vous aurez acquis… Au fait, avez-vous déjà, là-dessus,
une idée ?
— Comment l’entendez-vous ?
— Vous voulez « écrire ». C’est une expression bien vague. Un
historien est un écrivain, lui aussi. Toutefois, mettons l’histoire de
côté, comme aussi la sociologie et la philosophie, et tout ce qui
touche, de près ou de loin, à des sciences plus ou moins exactes.
Mais un journaliste, Pamphile, est aussi un écrivain. Voulez-vous
être un journaliste ?
— Eh ! monsieur, répliqua Pamphile, vous venez de le dire vous-
même : c’est à la vie de me l’apprendre. Dans dix ans, je le saurai. Il
y aura les modalités propres de mon talent, si j’en ai, il y aura mon
plus ou moins de volonté, il y aura les circonstances. Laissez-moi le
temps…
— Pamphile, j’ignore si vous aurez du talent, mais vous êtes un
garçon raisonnable. »
 CHAPITRE III

L’AMATEUR

Depuis que Pamphile s’est résolu d’embrasser la carrière des

lettres, je distingue dans son apparence extérieure, et ses
comportements, des changements appréciables. Il est mis avec
moins de recherche, bien que toujours correctement. Sans les éviter
tout à fait, il néglige la fréquentation de ceux de ses amis à qui la
fortune permet de ne se livrer qu’aux plaisirs. Il accorde sa
subvention à une revue littéraire entreprenante, nouvellement
fondée, et qui d’ailleurs pratique savamment l’art de la publicité ;
mais c’est en se faisant tirer l’oreille, en laissant attendre sa
contribution : il affirme qu’il n’est pas en fonds, que c’est pour lui un
sacrifice assez pénible. Enfin, étant parvenu à placer quelques
« médaillons » dans une feuille quotidienne, qui n’est pas sans
rémunérer, quoique modestement, ses collaborateurs, il ne manque
pas chaque mois d’en aller toucher le prix, à peine suffisant pour
payer sa provision de cigarettes pour la semaine.
Je m’en suis étonné :
« C’est, m’a-t-il confié, que je ne veux point passer pour un
amateur.
— Pamphile, ai-je répondu, un tel souci marque votre prudence.
Toutefois, peut-être celle-ci est-elle excessive ; je dois vous avouer
que, parvenu au déclin de mes jours, je ne distingue pas encore fort
bien ce que c’est qu’un amateur, que ce soit dans l’ordre des Lettres
ou celui des Beaux-Arts.
— La belle malice ! Un amateur est celui qui n’a pas besoin de
peindre, d’écrire ou de sculpter pour vivre !
— Vous allez bien vite. Il convient que je vous arrête : à ce
compte, Marcel Proust, qui jouissait de fort confortables revenus,
était un amateur. Pareillement l’est encore la comtesse Anna de
Noailles. Et même, si vous voulez bien y réfléchir, M. Édouard
Estaunié, élu par l’Académie française comme romancier, mais qui
gagnait fort honorablement sa vie en qualité d’ingénieur des
télégraphes… Je pourrais multiplier ces exemples. Permettez-moi
pourtant de vous rappeler encore que Chateaubriand, un homme de
lettres, n’est-ce pas ? le type au XIXe siècle, avec Alfred de Vigny, du
grand gentilhomme en même temps grand écrivain, touchait du
gouvernement de Sa Majesté Louis XVIII, quand il était
ambassadeur à Londres, quelque chose comme trois ou quatre cent
mille francs par an, beaucoup plus que ce que lui rapporta jamais le
Génie du Christianisme.
— J’entends. En effet, la matière est délicate, et la distinction
entre l’écrivain de profession et l’amateur plus difficile que je ne
pensais… Il faudrait donc dire : « On ne sait pas très bien ce que
c’est qu’un amateur. Est professionnel celui qui, quelles que soient
les ressources qu’il tient d’héritage ou d’emploi, est plus connu
comme artiste ou comme auteur que comme millionnaire, industriel
ou ambassadeur. »
— Soit. Mais vous devez reconnaître avec moi que cette
définition est assez vague. En somme, un bohème, Pamphile, un
bohème bien misérable, sans talent par surcroît, ou n’écrivant avec
talent que fort peu, par insouciance ou paresse, et vivant surtout de
subsides bénévoles, mériterait tout aussi bien, selon ce que vous
dites, d’être taxé d’amateur.
— Non pas ! Pour une raison qui me paraît évidente : qu’il ait du
talent ou n’en ait pas ; qu’il produise, ne produise pas, ou fort peu ;
que sa plume lui procure le pain quotidien ou en soit incapable, cela
ne l’empêche pas de n’être qu’écrivain. Un ouvrier qui chôme,
volontairement ou involontairement, n’en est pas moins un ouvrier, et
n’est que cela.
— A moins qu’il n’ait d’autres cordes à son arc, et qu’on ne le
condamne pour vagabondage spécial. Auquel cas il serait un ouvrier
amateur : cela se voit…
— Je vous parle sérieusement.
— Je vous demande pardon ; il est vrai que le sujet est grave, et
que je n’aurais pas dû plaisanter. Vous avez raison. En fait, si
Rothschild ou le roi d’Angleterre se mettaient à écrire cinq ou six
beaux romans, ou à peindre à fresque comme Michel-Ange, on
serait bien forcé de ne pas les considérer comme des amateurs. Ils
auraient deux professions parallèles, également sérieuses,
reconnues également : celle de banquier ou de souverain, et celle
d’artiste ou d’auteur… Mais alors, où est l’amateur ? Je vous en
supplie, dites-le-moi !
— Vous me troublez. C’est peut-être une espèce qui n’existe pas,
comme celle du serpent de mer.
— Mais le serpent de mer existe ! Du moins cela est assez
probable : on l’a vu, mais on ne l’a pas pris, voilà tout. Et il
semblerait tout d’abord qu’il y ait un degré de plus en faveur de
l’existence de l’amateur : on peut le voir, et le prendre sur le fait.
— En vérité ?
— En vérité ! On pourrait valablement soutenir que l’amateur est
celui qui, ayant écrit n’importe quoi, va trouver un éditeur et, au lieu
d’exiger d’être payé pour son ouvrage, consent à payer pour être
publié. Il peut même aller plus loin, si ses moyens le lui permettent :
il peut dépenser, en publicité, pour faire connaître ses écrits, et leur
procurer des lecteurs, des sommes plus ou moins importantes…
C’est à cet écrivain-là que doit être réservé le nom d’amateur. Inutile
de dire qu’il est tenu, par les véritables professionnels, pour un fléau.
— Je le conçois…
— Oui, oui…
 — Vous n’avez pas l’air d’en être convaincu ?
— C’est que je ne le suis pas ! Pamphile, réfléchissez ! Combien
est-il, par an, de volumes de vers dont les éditeurs ont consenti à
solder les frais d’impression ? Et la plupart de leurs auteurs,
pourtant, ne sont que poètes, rien que poètes. Alors dites que tout
poète est un amateur ! Mais dans ce cas le terme sera un honneur
au lieu d’être une injure.
— Il faudrait donc faire exception pour les poètes ?
— Pour eux seulement, croyez-vous ? Écoutez ! Vous avez
entendu parler des Souvenirs entomologiques de Fabre, vous les
avez peut-être lus ? Fabre fut non seulement un grand esprit
scientifique, subtil et fort, qui s’est aventuré hors des chemins battus,
qui a posé à la théorie évolutionniste de l’origine des espèces des
questions auxquelles celle-ci n’a pas encore répondu. C’était un
grand, un très grand écrivain, dont la langue imagée, à la fois
populaire et latine, ne doit rien à personne : un créateur. Eh bien, les
Souvenirs entomologiques, œuvre de toute sa vie, formaient dix gros
volumes. Durant des années, cet homme sans argent, sans
relations, les a promenés d’éditeur en éditeur. On lui répliquait :
« Des histoires sur les insectes ? Ça n’intéresse personne ! Et dix
volumes ! Écrits par un inconnu, un monsieur qui vit en province, et
dont les thèses, les conclusions, sont en opposition avec celles des
savants les plus autorisés… Nous ne pouvons rien risquer là-
dessus. Combien voulez-vous donner ?… Et encore, nous ne
savons guère si nous accepterions : les « comptes d’auteur », ça
compromet le bon renom d’une librairie ! »
« A la fin, pourtant, Fabre rencontra un éditeur qui lui fit une
proposition d’une générosité inouïe, miraculeuse ! Il consentit à
publier ces gros bouquins à ses frais, à ses risques. Fabre ne
toucherait rien, bien entendu, mais il n’aurait rien à payer. C’était
admirable, inespéré. Il accepta…
« Je me hâte de dire qu’après un succès qui se fit longtemps,
très longtemps attendre, l’éditeur modifia les conditions du traité à
l’avantage du bel et modeste observateur de l’Harmas… Mais enfin,