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Vietnamese
Organized Crime in
the Czech Republic
Miroslav Nožina · Filip Kraus
Crime Prevention and Security Management
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Tunbridge Wells, UK
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security management.
Vietnamese
Organized Crime
in the Czech Republic
Miroslav Nožina Filip Kraus
Institute of International Relations Sinophone Borderlands - Interaction at the
Praha, Czech Republic Edges, Department of Asian Studies
Faculty of Arts, Palacky University
Olomouc, Czech Republic
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
1 Introduction 1
6 Conclusions137
B
ibliography145
Index165
v
About the Authors
ix
x Abbreviations
For decades, the Vietnamese criminals have been easily crossing state
borders, creating networks and introducing new modi operandi of criminal
activities to the host countries. As a result, Vietnamese crime has become a
problem in the Southeast Asian countries, Australia, the United States,
Canada and the Russian Federation. Regarding Vietnamese organised
crime groups in the European Union (EU) countries, their presence was,
for example, recorded in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands. Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Vietnamese criminal networks, which are frequently active interna-
tionally, are engaged in a broad spectrum of criminal activities such as
human smuggling and the trade in human beings, managing the trade in
illicit commodities, money laundering, violations of customs and tax
laws, other forms of economic crime, violent crime, theft, counterfeiting
activities, trafficking in weapons, production of and trafficking in drugs,
wildlife crime and so forth.
In the Czech Republic, the Vietnamese diaspora has existed since the
1950s, and the number of its members has steadily grown, especially
since the 1989 Velvet Revolution. Currently, approximately 65,000 peo-
ple of Vietnamese origin are legally living in the country. It is the third
biggest Vietnamese diaspora in the EU countries, after those in France
and Germany.
Together with the new immigrants from Vietnam, new kinds of crime
have appeared in the CR as well. During the 1990s and 2000s, the
Vietnamese criminal networks fully developed their organisational struc-
ture within the diaspora and established the modi operandi of their crimi-
nal activities. Their bosses, who frequently merge together legal and
illegal activities, create parallel power structures within the Vietnamese
diaspora, and some of them were able to establish corrupt ties to the
Czech public administration.
In order to address the deficiency in the research of Vietnamese organ-
ised crime, the authors of this study carried out a research programme
that took place between 2007 and 2019 mainly at the Institute of
International Relations, Prague. Since 2019, Filip Kraus also carried his
own research that took place within the research project Sinophone
Borderland—Interactions at the Edges. Within the researches, several
1 Introduction 3
The key actors who connect the legal and illegal elements of the
diasporas are “respectable men”—strong personalities acting as both legal
businessmen and criminal bosses—who make use of considerable eco-
nomic power and maintain corruption networks, patron-client ties, and
groups of criminal delinquents. As such, the “respectable men” create
parallel power structures that enforce their will within the diaspora and
they are respected for their ability to “mediate” disputes among the dias-
pora members.
Not only economic pressure and expected profits but also a solidarity
born from the village mentality and the complicated network of mutual
“gratitudes”, while rejections of a request for a counter-service for a
respectable man are not frequent in Vietnamese communities, are the
motion behind the engagement of diaspora members (who are basically
without criminal backgrounds) in criminal activities organised by these
strong men. The roles of various criminal delinquents and violent gangs
in the scheme of Vietnamese diasporic life and the roots of the tolerance
of a criminal underground within the diaspora are clearly visible in the
light of these facts.
This interpenetration makes the situation more complicated and allows
for further intrusion of criminal networks into Vietnamese communities.
Many criminal activities are just cubes in a complicated mosaic of the
Vietnamese diaspora’s life. One of the main problems in combatting the
Vietnamese organised crime is the inability of security forces to separate
the “legal” and the “criminal” components within the diaspora. The
“stage of ambiguity” frequently leads to the criminal stigmatisation of
whole ethnic communities, and also to an inability to trace the criminal
activities, especially in their transnational dimension.
To answer the question of the role of criminal networks in the
Vietnamese diaspora, we argue that legal and illegal activities are in a
dialectical unity in Vietnamese communities. The necessity to break this
unity is the main condition for efficient suppression of the Vietnamese
criminal activities within the diaspora.
10 M. Nožina and F. Kraus
1
The research project was called Mezinárodní organizovaný zločin v České republice (International
Organised Crime in the Czech Republic) and was supported by the Research Support Scheme of
the Open Society Foundation (RSS No.: 84/1999).
2
These research projects were Organised crime in the Vietnamese Diaspora (No. 407/09/1291;
2009–2011) and Global Prohibition Regimes: Theoretical Refinement and Empirical Analysis
(No. 13-26485S; 2013–2016), which were supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic.
12 M. Nožina and F. Kraus
3
Migrace z oblasti Blízkého východu, subsaharské Afriky a Asie: geopolitické a bezpečnostní
souvislosti, důsledky a doporučení pro ČR (Migration from the Near East, Sub-Saharan Africa and
Asia: the Geopolitical and Security Context, Implications and Recommendations), Technologická
agentura ČR (TAČR ÉTA TL01000432).
4
Within the research project called Sinophone Borderlands—Interaction at the Edges. The research
project is funded by the European Regional Development Fund (reg. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_01
9/0000791).
2 Theoretical Background, Research Methods and Information… 13
Bibliography
Adamoli, S., Di Nicola, A., Savona, E. U., & Zoffi, P. (1998). Organised Crime
Around the World. Helsinki: European Institute for Crime Prevention
and Control.
2 Theoretical Background, Research Methods and Information… 15
(Ed.), Vietnamese, Mongols, and Ukrainians in the CR. Labor Migraton, Living
Conditions, Cultural Specificities. Prague: Ministry of Interior of the Czech
Republic].
Martínková, Š., Pechová, E., & Kocourek, J. (2012). Aktuální sociálně-
ekonomická situace a problémy Vietnamců v Chomutově. Zpráva z výzkumu
2011/2012 v Ústeckém kraji. Praha: Open Society Fund [The Current Social
and Economic Situation and the Problems of the Vietnamese in Chomutov. A
2011/2012 Research Report from the Region Ústí. Prague: Open Society Fund].
Mazyrin, V. M. (2004). V’etnamtsy v Rossii: obraz zhizni, problemy, perspektivy.
In N. N. Bektimirova & V. A. Dolnikova (Eds.), Indokitai: tendencii razvitiya.
Moskva: ISAA-Moskovskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet [Vietnamese in
Russia: Their Life, Problems, Perspectives. In N. N. Bektimirova &V. A. Dolnikova
(Eds.), Indochina: Development Tendencies. Moscow State University].
Morselli, C. (2009). Inside Criminal Networks. New York: Springer.
Morselli, C., Petit, K., & Giguère, C. (2006). The Efficiency/Security Trade-Off
in Criminal Networks. Social Networks, 29(1), 143–153.
Nguyen Tung. (2001). Vietnamci v Praze. Praha: SVO–ČR [Vietnamese in
Prague. Prague: SVO–ČR].
Nožina, M. (2000b). Vietnamese Organized Crime in the Czech Republic.
Perspectives, 15(4), 16–30.
Nožina, M. (2003a). Mezinárodní organizovaný zločin v České republice
[International Organized Crime in the Czech Republic]. Praha: Themis.
Nožina, M. (2003b). Crossroads of Crime: The Czech Republic Case. In
E. C. Viano, J. Magallanes, & L. Bridel (Eds.), Transnational Organized
Crime: Myth, Power and Profit (pp. 147–156). Durham, NC: Carolina
Academic Press.
Nožina, M. (2010a). Crime Networks in Vietnamese Diasporas. The Czech
Republic Case. Crime, Law and Social Change, 53(3), 229–258.
Nožina, M. (2010b). Potírání kriminality ve vietnamské diaspoře. In P. Drulák
& V. Střítecký (Eds.), Hledání českých národních zájmů. Praha: Ústav mez-
inárodních vztahů [Suppression of Crime in the Vietnamese Diaspora. In
P. Drulák & V. Střítecký (Eds.), The Search for the Czech National Interests.
Prague: Institute of International Relations].
Nožina, M. (2013). Vietnamese Crime Structures and Criminal Activities in the
Czech Republic. European Police Science and Research Bulletin, 8(Summer),
18–20. Retrieved November 10, 2019, from https://bulletin.cepol.europa.
eu/index.php/bulletin/article/view/66/59.
20 M. Nožina and F. Kraus
3.1 Introduction
According to official statistics of the Vietnamese State Committee of
Vietnamese Overseas, there are about 4 million people of Vietnamese
descent currently living, working and/or studying in nearly 103 countries
and territories around the world. The Việt Kiều, overseas Vietnamese liv-
ing in diaspora, are concentrated mainly in 21 countries in North
America, North-West Europe, Eastern Europe (including Russia), South-
East Asia, North-East Asia and Australia. Vietnamese people are also liv-
ing in other regions, such as South and West Asia, the Middle East, Africa
and South America. There are approximately 1.5 million Vietnamese
residents in the United States, 250,000 in Canada and 245,000 in
Australia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam 2012: 29). As for
Asian countries, it is estimated that 600,000 Vietnamese are living in
Cambodia, 200,000 in Tai-wan, 143,000 in South Korea, 136,000 in
Japan, and 70,000 in Malaysia. In Europe, approximately 350,000
Vietnamese are living in France, 150,000 in Germany, 140,000 in Russia,
55,000 in the United Kingdom and 50,000 in Poland (Tyabaev et al.
2016: 2).
the Middle East and Africa, and also to the United States and Australia
(MFA 2009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam 2012: 16; Thuy
Huong 2012).
The Vietnamese residents in the Czech Republic belong to the third
and fourth category of migrants. These categories have many specifics in
both legal and illegal spheres of Vietnamese migrant communities’ lives.
To understand these specifics, this chapter goes back to the history of
mutual relations between the then Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
(CSSR) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as study programmes
for foreigners and massive exports of the Vietnamese labour force to
Czechoslovakia were organised during Czechoslovakia’s communist era.
In the same time period, the first Vietnamese criminal networks were
established in the CSSR.
After the fall of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia in 1989, a
lot of the Vietnamese students and workers living in the country opted
not to return home. They established a base for new waves of Vietnamese
economic migrants, and the number of the members of the Vietnamese
diaspora in the Czech Republic then gradually grew to its current size.
The diaspora dramatically increased especially after 2006, when the
Czech labour market was opened to the massive and weakly controlled
imports of Vietnamese workers organised by labour agencies.
The formation of the Vietnamese diaspora in the Czech Republic after
the “Velvet Revolution” in 1989 is depicted as an ever-changing process
containing legal, semi-legal and illegal strategies that were formed in reac-
tion to the changing economic, social, legal and administrative environ-
ments in the transforming Vietnam and the Czech Republic, and also in
reaction to the situations in the countries of the emigrants’ transfers. The
various social agents (such as family and kin, but also migration networks
operating on both legal and illegal bases) along with the previous indi-
vidual experiences and individual decision making of migrants also play
important roles in the process.
The transfers of migrants between Vietnam and the Czech Republic
have been organised by various migration networks. These groupings
have several typical features: they operate on illegal, semi-legal and legal
bases; they act as official agencies on one hand and as crime organisations
on the other, frequently merging legal and illegal activities together; they
26 M. Nožina and F. Kraus
the Central Trade Union Council (Ústřední rada odborů) and the
Czechoslovak government (Vasiljev 1989b; Nožina 2003a: 189).
Czechoslovakia was also one of the important sources of weapons and
military materials for the North Vietnamese army and the Viet Cong in
the course of the Indochina war. Also the plastic explosive SEMTEX,
which today is widely used by terrorists all over the world, was developed
by the Czechoslovak company Synthesia Semtín upon a Vietnamese
request for war purposes in 1964. At the time, it was considered as an
analogue of the American explosive C4 (Nožina 2003a: 189).
After the war, economic and political relations between the two coun-
tries grew further. Within the CMEA, Czechoslovakia exported indus-
trial goods to Vietnam and realised investment projects in regard to it in
exchange for raw materials and agriculture products. At the beginning of
the 1980s, the Vietnamese government started to export members of the
Vietnamese labour force to the CSSR. Within three to six months, the
young Vietnamese workers (who were usually in the 18–20 age group
and therefore not former soldiers from the Indochina war, as is frequently
suggested in the press) received their basic language and professional edu-
cation in Vietnam. Then, they were transported to the CSSR, where they
continued in their language studies for another three to six months and
also in their professional education, which could be prolonged according
to the specific employers’ requirements. After that, they were distributed
into textile, chemical and industrial factories or agricultural cooperatives
across the Czechoslovak territory. Their contracts usually lasted for four
years (sometimes prolonged to seven years) (Vasiljev 1989b; Nožina
2003b: 189). Although official data on this does not exist, it is estimated
that between 70,000 and 120,000 Vietnamese participated in the pro-
gramme and around 30,000 Vietnamese had been living in Czechoslovakia
at any moment within the period of 1980–1989. In 1990, when the
Czechoslovak–Vietnamese programme was cancelled, there were still
20,000 Vietnamese residents in the country (Brouček 2002: 12–13).
Overall, the programme worked well by the middle of the 1980s. The
first waves of students and workers were composed of carefully selected
young people with communist backgrounds (i.e. members of the com-
munist youth organisation and the Communist Party) nearly exclusively
from North and North-Central Vietnamese regions (Son La, Dienbienphu,
28 M. Nožina and F. Kraus
Hanoi, Langson, Haiphong, etc.). In the second half of the 1980s, how-
ever, the programme gradually declined and both sides started to widely
exploit the situation. Czechoslovakia employed Vietnamese workers in
unpopular and low-paying jobs, and the Vietnamese co-ordinators of the
programme were engaged in the organisation of paid migration and
black-market activities. Especially in the second half of the 1980s, the
“quality” of the workers gradually declined because of the low interest in
the programme among potential volunteers, and the selection became
formal. Some rumours of the Vietnamese police collecting new “volun-
teers” among juvenile delinquents on Hanoi and Saigon streets circulated
at the time (Nožina 2003a: 190).
It is hard to estimate when the first Vietnamese criminal networks in
the CSSR were established. For political reasons, the Czechoslovak gov-
ernment and security forces closed their eyes to the situation and now, we
have no data about it. But it was probably in the second half of 1980s
when the Vietnamese small-scale entrepreneurs started their illegal activi-
ties in order to supplement their decreasing incomes. At the time,
Vietnamese workers received only 40–50% of their real wages. A part of
the rest of the money was paid to their families in Vietnam, but a consid-
erable part of it was taken by the Vietnamese government to “cover work-
ers’ travel expenses”—in other words, to cover the Vietnamese foreign
debt. As a result, the living standard of the Vietnamese workers was not
satisfactory and a lot of the workers looked for additional incomes (VCS
1999). However, the migrant workers were allowed to work only in their
assigned positions and under the control of their supervisors.
Consequently, they turned to semi-legal or illegal activities supplying the
Czech black market with products. The Vietnamese quickly discovered a
huge demand on the part of the Czech people for “Western” fashion
commodities such as clothes, digital watches or electronics. Thus they
started to manufacture and sell fake popular brand name garments, espe-
cially jeans, from stolen textile materials produced in the CSSR factories
for export, and, as the second main source of their additional income,
they imported and sold various goods, especially watches and cheap elec-
tronics, with fake brand names from Asia.
These originally small-scale entrepreneurial activities accelerated when
the Vietnamese Embassy in Prague entered the business. According to
3 Vietnamese Migration to the Czech Republic… 29
The final amount of money paid for a transfer from Vietnam to another
country depends on the number of required services, but the amount of
money needed to solve the problems of the administrative process usually
ranges from US$4000 to US$20,000 in the Czech Republic, but it can
rise up to US$40,000—or even US$50,000 when the final destination is
a more attractive West European country such as the United Kingdom
(MI 2007; VCS 2009–2013, 2017, 2019; Smatana 2017; PCR-NCAOC
Report 2018a:17; Quynh Le 2019).
30 M. Nožina and F. Kraus
In the majority of cases, the fees must be paid even before any process
leading to the emigrant’s departure (legal or illegal) starts. In cases of
illegal transfers, the emigrant’s family in Vietnam pays the fee according
to the location of the migrant at the time or upon the migrant’s arrival at
the final destination (VCS 2009, 2012, 2019). To obtain the required
amount of money, the migrant must collect money from his family mem-
bers or borrow the money from various financial institutions, including
informal ones. This is so particularly in some poorer localities, such as
Nghe An Province, Ha Tinh Province, and Quang Binh Province, from
where a substantial part of the migrants to the Czech Republic is recruited
(Nožina and Kraus 2012: 119).
So why are a lot of Vietnamese people willing to dip their families into
a big debt and run a high risk of losing all of their family’s property? The
reasons lie in the economic situation of Vietnam, the efforts of many
ordinary Vietnamese to improve their lives and ensure a better future for
their children, the Vietnamese government’s policy of support of eco-
nomic migration abroad, and the dubious activities of numerous broker
agencies profiting from the migration.
During the 1980s, as a result of the three wars in Indochina, an inef-
ficient state-planned economy, and the bad politico-economic situation
in the Communist Eastern Bloc, the Vietnamese economy stood over its
own perdition. Due to the ill-realised land and financial reforms, people
from many Vietnamese provinces faced starvation or great economic dif-
ficulties (The Economist 2002; Crosette 1988). The GDP per capita did
not reach US$200 (Nožina and Kraus 2012: 83), the annual rate of infla-
tion soared to over 700% and the value of Vietnamese exports did not
constitute even half of the total value of the country’s imports, which
barely reached US$1221 million. Due to military expenditures, the bud-
get resources were almost depleted, government revenues were low and
the fiscal deficit was large and persistent (Arkadie and Mallon 2003: 67).
As a result of the bad economic situation, wide-scale reforms (đổi mớ i)
were launched at Hanoi’s Sixth Communist Party Congress in December
1986. The resulting new Vietnamese economic model, which can be
characterised as a multi-sector socialist-oriented market economy using
both directive and indicative planning, was partly successful. The eco-
nomic situation of Vietnam improved in the coming years; however, a
3 Vietnamese Migration to the Czech Republic… 31
number of new economic and social problems were born under the new
conditions, affecting primarily the lower strata of Vietnamese society.
Old Communist ideas about the equality of people fell into oblivion and
the đổi mớ i reforms transformed the Vietnamese early socialist welfare
state into a type of transitional hybrid economic-political system, which
G. Vidal characterised as “free enterprise for the poor and socialism for
the rich” (Vidal 1972: 153). On one hand, a new political-economic elite
benefitting from đổi mớ i was born in Vietnam, and on the other hand,
the increasing costs and devaluing currency started to push low-paid
workers and low-income families into poverty. The differences between
the poor and the rich in Vietnam have deepened since the introduction
of this policy. According to an analysis of the Institute of Social Sciences
Information in Hanoi, currently in Vietnam an income of a rich family
is 25 times higher than an income of a poor household. Many families,
especially in the countryside, still fail to achieve a decent standard of liv-
ing (Nožina and Kraus 2012: 87).
The ongoing stratification of the Vietnamese society is further accom-
panied by a strong population growth, growing unemployment and
changing roles of the individual, the family and the state in the social and
economic life of Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese population rose
from 49 million in 1976 to 98 million in 2019. As a result, the ratio of
eligible working-age people was 55.6% in 2019 (Countrymeters 2019).
This figure shows a big potential for Vietnam’s economic growth, but it
also exerts pressure on the unemployment rate. According to official sta-
tistics, the unemployment rate has been low and stable in Viet Nam,
slightly increasing from 1.96% in 2012 to 2.26% in 2017. This means
that nominaly, the majority of people have a job. However, the quality of
employment remains limited with a large-scale informal economy, low-
labour productivity and low-income levels. The unemployment is high,
especially among young people. In 2016, young people made up 48.9%
of the unemployed (ILO 2018). Many others are employed in “vulnera-
ble occupations”, as they are employed only occasionally, self-employed
or involved in family businesses where their labour generates only a low
profit (Thanh Nien News 2013).
The đổi mớ i transformation from the centrally planned economy to
the market-oriented economy led to a reduction of the state intervention
32 M. Nožina and F. Kraus
in the job market and a loss of social security for many Vietnamese indi-
viduals. However, the strong control of the state bureaucratic apparatus
over the daily life of Vietnamese people continues. The Communist Party
of Vietnam controls the central government, all major political and social
organisations, and executes its power through the branched but ineffec-
tive bureaucratic apparatus. Many people’s activities still have to be
approved by government officials, and independent initiatives are
restricted (HRW 2019). The relative indefeasibility of the Vietnamese
administrative system together with the relatively underpaid bureaucratic
apparatus leads to a situation where corruption and clientelism exist at
many levels of the state bureaucratic system. (Nožina and Kraus 2012:
88; GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal 2017). After more than three
decades of đổi mớ i, despite the economic recovery and continuing eco-
nomic growth, Vietnam remains a country where, in the words of
Angsuthanasombat (2008: 2), “poverty, unemployment, limited access to
education, and a desire among people to improve their lifestyles are all
strong push factors for Vietnamese to go and work abroad”.
Although the controlled export of the Vietnamese labour force ended
with the disintegration of the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s, the prac-
tice of Vietnamese families feeding their budgets with money sent as remit-
tances from their relatives abroad survived. The practice was further
supported by money first directly imported by the Việt Kiều from Western
countries and then sent home after the situation became more liberal
thanks to đổi mới, when the Vietnamese government relaxed the existing
strict prohibition regimes connected to travelling inside and outside of
Vietnam. Those families who received support from relatives living abroad
could have a much better living standard than their neighbours and friends.
These differences were striking, and households receiving such support
were quickly noticed by their neighbours. Over time, it became a matter of
prestige to have a family member working and earning money abroad.
The đổi mớ i transformation led to the reduction of the state interven-
tion in the job market and the cancelation of the state-provided social
security for many Vietnamese. As a result, the Vietnamese family again
became a basic socio-economic unit. Collecting money and sending
selected young men and women to the West so that they would be able
to support their families back home started to look like a “good
3 Vietnamese Migration to the Czech Republic… 33
investment for the future” (VCS 2007). Many Vietnamese families have
been copying the pattern (Mai Thi Thu 2013).
The experience of the Vietnamese government has been similar. The
Vietnamese government incorporated foreign investment and economic
migration into its new economic strategy and relaxed migration prohibi-
tion regimes. This policy was highly successful. Currently, approximately
500,000 Vietnamese workers are working abroad in more than 40 coun-
tries and territories worldwide while supporting their families back home.
These countries include the Czech Republic, Taiwan, Japan, the Republic
of Korea, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Russia and
Australia, among others (Nožina and Kraus 2012: 121–123; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam 2012: 22–27). Between 1993 and 2014,
Viet Nam’s total received remittances were about US$96.66 billion, with
an average rate of US$4.4 billion per year, accounting for 6.8% of the
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). The remittances reached
US$712 billion in 2014, which places the country among the top eleven
remittance recipient countries in the word (Vietnamnet 2015). It can be
expected that the interest of the Vietnamese government in the profits
coming from economic migration will continue in the future in the light
of these numbers.
The strong interest of the Vietnamese people in economic migration
and the governmental support created a broad operation space for various
agents organising the migration. The agents recruit the migrants, process
their visa and working permits, execute their transfers, and provide voca-
tional and basic language training to them. The research revealed that
extensive advertisement and recruiting activities for working abroad are
organised in poor regions where many potential emigrants live. The
advertising process has both formal and informal procedures.
The interviews with the visa applicants at the Czech Embassy in Hanoi
indicate that the majority of the migrant workers obtain information
about the working and living conditions (and employment opportuni-
ties) in the Czech Republic from their friends and countrymen. It is a
part of Vietnamese culture to share information about economic oppor-
tunities, including those related to working migration. During their
occasional visits to Vietnam, in order to maintain the respectable appear-
ances of their families, who are the recipients of the remittances, the
34 M. Nožina and F. Kraus
At the end of the 1980s, the communist states of Central Europe, includ-
ing Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, embarked upon a process of
fundamental political, social and economic transformation. After the for-
mer hegemon the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the Central European
states’ newly established democratic governments turned to the West.
The borders were opened, and the far-reaching rapid economic transfor-
mation was launched with extensive transfers of property, the creation of
the free market and circulation of capital. As in other countries, the trans-
formation was accompanied by significant socio-economic problems
such as a high degree of unemployment, ubiquitous corruption and crime
or falling living standards of certain social strata.
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VAINAJA
»Sano, jalkapallopeli
yhä jatkuuko joukkueen,
kun kaikki tietävät minun
pois iäksi lähteneen?»
III
KAUNAS
1.
me junassa tutustuimme;
me tulimme Puolasta päin;
pater Spielmanis kutsui minut
ja minä tietysti jäin —
me pohdimme probleemoita rannalla kulkien ja teemme
välipäätöksen, että paha on ihminen…
2.
Ammuimme kivääreillämme
sinne puitten taa.
Metsässä, metsässä oli
hyvin valoisaa.
TIVOLI
Poltin huolettomasti
loppuun sikaarin.
Nousin ja lähteissäni
häntä hyvästelin.
IV
TRIPOLIS
1. Miss Annabel
2. Fatiman kuolo.
Hän oli ylen ruma. Hän katsoi mua toisella silmällään. Hänen
toisen silmänsä kohdalla — se rumensi koko pään — oli
hirveä sininen kupla vain, ja sen minä nytkin nään kun
kirjoitan hänen haudalleen, joka näyttää muilta unohtuneen
vain hiekkaan: Birgitta.