Regional Organizations and

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GOVERNANCE AND LIMITED STATEHOOD

Regional Organizations and

Democracy, Human Rights,
and the Rule of Law
The African Union, Organization
of American States, and the
Diffusion of Institutions
Sören Stapel
 Governance and Limited Statehood

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Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Berlin, Germany
This ground-breaking monograph series showcases cutting edge research
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 Sören Stapel

Regional
Organizations
and Democracy,
Human Rights,
and the Rule of Law
The African Union, Organization
of American States, and the Diffusion
of Institutions
Sören Stapel
University of Freiburg
Freiburg, Germany

Governance and Limited Statehood

ISBN 978-3-030-90397-8 ISBN 978-3-030-90398-5 (eBook)
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To Nuer
 Acknowledgments

In writing a book, you accumulate many debts. I have every intention of

honoring the help, support, and love that I have received over the years.
Now that I am putting the list of names into writing, however, I realize
that it has become a great deal longer.
First and foremost, I thank Tanja A. Börzel for her invaluable advice
and mentorship. In her acknowledgments to States and Regions in the
European Union, Tanja contemplates that writing a book is in many
ways similar to planning and building a house. I have often recalled this
comparison over the years. These momentous projects usually start out
with big plans and lofty dreams. Yet, you have to constantly revise and
re-design your plans because the construction manuals do not provide
all the answers you need or you have to find different and new material
or you lack the necessary resources or you realize that your ideas simply
are not or no longer feasible. In short, projects often develop in unpre-
dictable and unexpected ways. Having gone through the process now
myself, I think what cannot be underlined enough is that, in the end, it
is an arduous process and laborious work to take the project all the way
over the finish line. However, I could not agree more that, once you set

vii
viii Acknowledgments

in place the final brick and the construction holds, you realize how much
you have accomplished.
Over the years, my colleagues and friends Mathis Lohaus, Diana
Panke, Thomas Risse, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Kai Striebinger have
shaped my thinking about regionalism in many ways. I will forever be
grateful for the support from Anke Draude and Vera van Hüllen. You
probably have no idea how much your help has meant to me when I
needed words of encouragement.
I discussed initial ideas about this research project in a series of
mini-workshops with my colleagues and friends from the Berlin Grad-
uate School for Transnational Studies: Tobias Belschner, Tobias Bunde,
Sophie Eisentraut, Patrick Gilroy, Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, Maurits
Meijers, Luise Müller, Gil Murciano, Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar, and
Zoe Williams. Many more colleagues have provided helpful comments
on draft versions of this book or commented on the project on different
occasions. I would like to thank Aron Buzogany, the late Stephen
Clarkson, Brooke Coe, Barbara Fritz, Linnéa Gelot, Merran Hulse,
Markus Jachtenfuchs, Anja Jetschke, Helge Jörgens, Johan Karlsson
Schaffer, Andrea Liese, Harrison Kalunga Mwilima, Andrea Ribeiro
Hoffmann, Kilian Spandler, Jonas Tallberg, Anna van der Vleuten, and
Michael Zürn.
This book is a result of research conducted at the Kolleg-
Forschergruppe (KFG) “The Transformative Power of Europe?” and
the Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 700 “Governance in Areas of
Limited Statehood” at Freie Universität Berlin. I gratefully acknowl-
edge the financial support from the German Research Foundation
(DFG). Many thanks to Anne Morgenstern, Ina Nordwald, Katja
Pomianowicz, Astrid Roos, and Lisa van Hoof-Maurer as well as Eric
Stollenwerk and Anne Hehn for their invaluable support. The heavy
work of data collection and coding was supported by Heba Ahmed,
Lukas Blasius, Luisa Braig, Sophie Eisentraut, Christian Gerber, Michael
Giesen, Ieva Grumbinaite, Sonja Kaufmann, Laura Krug, Nadja Nickel,
Stefan Rinnert, Markus Sattler, Klara Schwobe, Elisabeth Spiegel, Jan
Souverain, Dorothea Stroh, Nora Szabo, Inga Tessendorf, and Nadine
Zillich. During my research stays in Addis Ababa, Gaborone, Monte-
video, and Washington, DC, many practitioners helped me better
 Acknowledgments ix

understand the decision-making processes in regional organizations. I

particularly benefitted from the help of librarians and registrars in navi-
gating the AU and OAS archives in Addis Ababa and Washington, DC,
respectively.
Over the years of conducting the research and writing up the
manuscript, I changed positions several times and very much enjoyed
working with and benefitted from the tremendous support from my
colleagues at Freie Universität Berlin (Carina Breschke, Sven Hilgers,
Kaja Kreutz, Julia Langbein, Luise Linke-Behrens, Ines Stavrinakis, and
Judith Winkler), the University of Gothenburg (Joe Anderson, Neva
Leposa, Theo Aalders, Gustav Aldén Rudd, Bizusew Ashagrie, Jan Bach-
mann, Alexandra Bousiou, Carolina Cardoso, Anja Franck, Richard
Georgi, Wassim Ghantous, Hortense Jongen, Minoo Koefoed, Hanna
Leonardsson, Martin Lundqvist, Vanessa Martin, Bernard Musembi,
Elisabeth Olsson, Evie Papada, Swati Parashar, Isabell Schierenbeck,
Savina Sirik, Nora Stappert, Sanna Strand, Sara van der Hoeven,
Arne Wackenhut, Amalie Ravn Weinrich, Sally Wennergren, and Claes
Wrangel), the University of Jena (Steve Biedermann, Franziska Sandt,
and Katja Vollenberg), and the University of Freiburg (Simone Ahrens,
Julia Gurol, Ingo Henneberg, Franziska Hohlstein, Stefan Lang, Frank
Mattheis, Gurur Polat, Anna Starkmann, and Anke Wiedemann).
Last but not least, I am very grateful to the professional team at
Palgrave Macmillan. Special thanks go to Anne-Kathrin Birchley-Brun,
Manikandan Murthy, Karthika Purushothaman, and Alina Yurova for
their excellent management of the production process during a chal-
lenging year.
More important than the intellectual and institutional help has been
the moral support I received from my family and friends. My parents,
siblings, nephews, niece, and in-laws made sure that there is more than
academia in life. I am incredibly fortunate to have received the positive
influence, inspiration, and encouragement from my wonderful friends
Alex, Ali, Anne, Bernd, Claudi, Clödchen, Chris, Dandy, Effi, Fabian,
Inga, Jan, Jonas, Julian, Jürgen, Lisa, Nadine, Nadja, Marisa, Resi, Sebi,
Sonja, Stefan, Toschel, Ulli, and Yvonne. I appreciate your love, kindness,
and generosity.
x Acknowledgments

Finally, words hardly express how grateful I am to my adventure-

loving, burden-bearing, laughter-sharing, and success-celebrating spouse.
Thank you for being you. I could not wish for a better companion that
knows how to make life a brighter and nicer place for everyone else. I
dedicate this book to you, Tobias.
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
2 Explaining the Adoption and Design of Regional
Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law
Institutions 33
3 Patterns of Regional Democracy, Human Rights,
and Rule of Law Institutions 89
4 Accounting for Variation in the Adoption and Design
of Regional Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule
of Law Institutions: A Spatial Econometric Approach 151
5 The Organization of American States: Pioneering
the Adoption and Design of Regional Institutions 201
6 The Organization of African Unity and African Union:
Following the Design of Reference Models 237
7 Conclusion 277

xi
xii Contents

Appendix 297
References 301
Index 341
 Abbreviations

AAEA African Association of Electoral Authorities

ACDEG African Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance
ACHPR The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
AfCHPR African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights
AfDB African Development Bank
AGA African Governance Architecture
ALADI Latin American Integration Association
ALF African Leadership Forum
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
CAN Andean Community
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CELAC Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CJI Inter-American Juridical Committee
CoD Community of Democracies

xiii
xiv Abbreviations

CoE Council of Europe

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COW Correlates of War
CSCE Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSO Civil Society Organization
CSSDCA Conference on Security, Stability Development and Co-
operation in Africa
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
DEAU Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit
DPA Department Political Affairs
EAC East African Community
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECHR European Court of Human Rights
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
IADC Inter-American Democratic Charter
ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IEC Independent Electoral Commission
IO International Organization
LAS League of Arab States
MERCOSUR Common Market of the South
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC Nordic Council
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-governmental Organization
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization of African Unity
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACHR Permanent Arab Commission for Human Rights
PIF Pacific Islands Forum
PSC Peace and Security Council
REC Regional Economic Community
RO Regional Organization
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
 Abbreviations xv

SADC Southern African Development Community

SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAR Spatial-Autoregressive
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SICA Central American Integration System
SIRG Summit Implementation Review Group
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UDP Unit for the Promotion of Democracy
UN United Nations
UNASUR Union of South American Nations
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNSD United Nations Statistics Division
USMCA United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
WDI World Development Indicators
 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Adoption of regional democracy, human rights, and rule

of law institutions 7
Fig. 3.1 First adoption of regional institutions 102
Fig. 3.2 Most frequent adopters of regional institutions 104
Fig. 3.3 Designs of regional institutions over time 109
Fig. 3.4 Designs of regional institutions in across regions 113
Fig. 3.5 Designs of regional institutions across types of regional
organizations 127
Fig. 3.6 Designs of regional institutions across functions
of regional organizations 133

xvii
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Types and functions of ROs 37

Table 2.2 Dimensions and standards of democracy institutions 45
Table 2.3 Dimensions and standards of human rights institutions 46
Table 2.4 Dimensions and standards of the rule of law
institutions 49
Table 2.5 Contiguity and social spaces of ROs 65
Table 2.6 Type of adopter and instance of institutional
development and innovation 68
Table 3.1 ROs in the sample data set 96
Table 4.1 Adoption of regional democracy institutions—spatial
lag probit models 163
Table 4.2 Adoption of regional human rights institutions—spatial
lag probit models 165
Table 4.3 Adoption of regional rule of law institutions—spatial
lag probit models 167
Table 4.4 Scope of regional institutions—Poisson regression 176
Table 4.5 Strength of instruments of regional
institutions—Ordered logistic regression models 179
Table 4.6 Logical combinations for the presence of standards
in two ROs 184

xix
xx List of Tables

Table 4.7 Similarity of regional designs—spatial-autoregressive

(SAR) models 189
Table A.1 List of regional organizations 297
 1
Introduction

“African Union peacekeeping forces go under the UN flag, so why not

ASEAN? We just have to check how they do it,” Malaysian Defense
Minister Hishammuddin Hussein told reporters after chairing a meeting
of defense ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) at Langkawi, Malaysia, on March 16, 2015. The reference to
such a peacekeeping force came as a surprise to the occasional observer
of ASEAN. The organization’s member states are notoriously reluctant
to adopt such far-reaching instruments for their fear that the underlying
norms and the application of instruments would clash with ASEAN’s
longstanding principle of non-interference in each other’s domestic
affairs (Narine 2002; Kuhonta 2006; Coe 2019; Spandler 2019; Davies
2021). However, Hussein’s remarks show, at least to some extent, that
ASEAN member states and the current rotating ASEAN chair consid-
ered the potential of such a regional peacekeeping force and the ways
regional peacekeeping forces are designed, based on the African Union’s
approach.
On December 20, 2011, the member states of the Southern Common
Market (MERCOSUR) adopted the Montevideo Protocol. This protocol
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1
Switzerland AG 2022
S. Stapel, Regional Organizations and Democracy, Human Rights,
and the Rule of Law, Governance and Limited Statehood,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90398-5_1
2 S. Stapel

has re-adjusted MERCOSUR’s democratic clause and further speci-

fied the definition of democracy and potential instruments that can
be applied in cases of misconduct of the member states. The political
decision to introduce the new protocol was reached after representa-
tives of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) had adopted
their very own democratic clause. The then president pro tempore
of MERCOSUR announced in the organization’s Forum of Political
Consultation and Coordination, the main decision-making body for
political cooperation in MERCOSUR, that the “Protocol on Demo-
cratic Commitment [was] approved on November 26 in the framework
of UNASUR. In this context, he underlined the desirability of consid-
ering a revision of the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment
in MERCOSUR, in line with the progress made in the South American
context” (MERCOSUR 2010).1
In yet another region, member states of the Southern African Devel-
opment Community (SADC) discussed, in 1992, a document that “pre-
sented a well-researched, comprehensive, and sophisticated perspective
on economic integration, comparing various models and selecting the
one deemed most suitable for Southern Africa” (Nathan 2012: 27). The
SADC Secretariat sought to kick-start the process of political and secu-
rity co-operation in the early 1990s. Their ideas were closely modeled
after the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
(Nathan 2012: 28–29). Initially, the proposed institutional setup was
swiftly approved by bureaucrats and some member states of SADC.
However, a competing alternative approach toward political and secu-
rity cooperation was introduced by a number of member states shortly
thereafter. Because of sharp dividing lines between these two groups of
member states, long-lasting negotiations ensued about the right course
of action. The revised Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-
operation featured design elements from both competing proposals and
was then introduced in 2001 (Nathan 2012).2

1 Interviews with representatives from the General Secretariat of MERCOSUR and a

representative from the civil society in Montevideo, March 2015.
2 Interview with representative from the General Secretariat of SADC, November 2014.
 1 Introduction 3

Regional organizations (ROs), such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and

SADC, have gained a prominent role in promoting, assisting, protecting,
and defending minimum standards of democracy, human rights, and the
rule of law in their member states and sometimes also third countries
(Börzel and van Hüllen 2015; Wobig 2015; Pevehouse 2016). They
complement the activities of powerful states and international organi-
zations (Magen et al. 2009; Youngs 2010). Today, almost every RO seeks
to promote and protect standards for democracy, human rights, and
the rule of law at the national level, irrespective of its original purpose,
including simple free trade agreements.
When ROs address democracy, human rights, and the rule of law,
they introduce regional institutions, defined as a set of rules and stan-
dards that govern the behavior of states of a RO and of states within a
RO. They not only face the choice to adopt regional institutions but
also define the content and instruments (the institutional design). As
the three observations illustrate, ROs closely observe the activities of
peer organizations when they adopt and design human rights regimes,
democracy clauses, and rule of law provisions. The outcomes of these
processes differ, however. They may result in similar activities as the
adoption of regional institutions in the case of MERCOSUR shows.
ROs may also agree upon adapted versions of the reference source, for
instance the design of regional institutions in the case of SADC. Even the
non-adoption and outright rejection of the reference model frequently
happen. After all, the instrument of a regional peacekeeping force has
never materialized in ASEAN.
The rise of regional institutions is characterized by a dual trend. On
the one hand, ROs have increasingly adopted regional institutions to
promote and protect standards of democracy, human rights, and rule
of law in their member states over time. Regional democracy, human
rights, and rule of law institutions have spread globally. On the other
hand, when ROs address democracy, human rights, and the rule of law,
they tend to adopt, promote, and protect norms and standards very
similar to the approaches of other ROs. This overall trend hides impor-
tant and persistent variation regarding the specific design features of the
institutions for promoting and protecting democracy, human rights, and
the rule of law. From these considerations follows the question that I
4 S. Stapel

address in this book: Why and how do ROs adopt and design regional
democracy, human rights, and rule of law institutions?
In short, the interplay of demands and diffusion accounts for the
global adoption and the design of regional democracy, human rights,
and rule of law institutions. Demands and diffusion do not take effect
independently of each other, but they intersect and supersede each other
with regard to both the adoption and the design of regional institutions.
The interplay varies across types of adopters and across instances of insti-
tutional designing. Diffusion becomes more important from pioneers
to early followers to late adopters and across multiple instances of re-
designing institutions. At the same time, demand factors cannot be
neglected. They influence the adoption and institutional designs by
pioneering ROs. Additionally, they take effect across various instances
of re-designing institutions, where (the lack of ) demand limits diffu-
sion effects. As a consequence, demands can be conceived of as both
enabling factors for and constraining factors of diffusion. Demands are
enabling diffusion as first innovators set the path for diffusion of both
adoption and design. Yet demands also constrain diffusion processes of
following and late adopters regarding the adoption and design of regional
institutions. Demands and diffusion affect each other.
Regional democracy, human rights, and rule of law institutions have
important real-world repercussions. This book addresses the adoption
and design of regional institutions but not their effects and effectiveness
in promoting and protecting fundamental governance standards. These
regional institutions nevertheless are consequential for states and their
citizens. Regional institutions affect states. They define and prescribe
how member states should act. ROs and their institutions socialize
member states into certain behavior and themselves spread norms and
standards. ROs function as conduits and catalysts for societal change
(Kelley 2012; Greenhill 2015). While this certainly holds true for many
standards and norms at the regional and international level (Tallberg
et al. 2020), regional democracy, human rights, and rule of law insti-
tutions especially matter in times of democratic backsliding and the
renewed rise of authoritarian practices around the globe. They prevent,
curb, and correct the disregard and violation of fundamental standards
 1 Introduction 5

and rights through various means, and make their occurrence increas-
ingly costly and more difficult in the first place (Sadri 2019). Regional
institutions also affect the citizens. Most directly, regional institutions
take effect in national law-making and change the fundamental rules of
the game. In the absence of implementation and compliance, however,
regional institutions may serve as focal points. They raise awareness
and provide important benchmarks for assessing appropriate behavior
of governments, especially in their interaction with citizens. Regional
institutions empower citizens with powers and capacities to hold govern-
ments accountable for their actions, often marginalized and those most
directly affected by governmental malpractice (Helfer and Voeten 2014;
Witt 2019; Weiss 2021). It is therefore important to understand when,
why, and how regional democracy, human rights, and rule of law
institutions spread around the globe.
The book’s contribution is threefold. Empirically, the book provides a
comprehensive overview of the institutions that ROs adopt and design
to promote and protect democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
Regional institutions have spread globally. Their designs have become
increasingly similar, and yet particularities persist. The empirical contri-
bution draws on two novel and unique data sets on regional human
rights, democracy, and rule of law institutions. The GTRO adoption
data set comprises information when ROs adopted democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law institutions for all 73 ROs in the world (Panke
et al. 2020). The GTRO design data set catalogs provisions that capture
various aspects with respect to the standards (content) and instruments
(mechanisms) of regional institutions based on 288 primary documents
for a representative sample of 23 ROs. This is the most detailed assess-
ment of the design of regional democracy, human rights, and rule of
law institutions to date. The data sets are characterized by a broad scope
of analysis, a comprehensive coverage of ROs, a long time period (1945–
2020), and the type of data that has been collected. This makes it possible
to observe patterns in the adoption and design of regional institutions
across several dimensions. This comprehensive overview is combined
with and complemented by in-depth case studies about the making and
change of regional institutions in two ROs.
6 S. Stapel

Theoretically, the book focuses on a timely and important aspect

and explores why and how ROs adopt and design regional democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law institutions. The book develops and
tests multiple explanations. It takes on an agency-centered approach
conceptualizing the adoption and design of regional institutions as an
institutional choice by member states and regional actors. The book
identifies factors that generate the demand of states for regional insti-
tutions, on the one hand, and factors that shape its institutional design,
on the other. The book maintains that demands from relevant actors as
well as diffusion from external sources take effect at the same time, and
it clarifies how the interplay of demands and diffusion plays out in the
adoption and design of regional institutions. The theoretical argument
combines the hitherto juxtaposed explanatory factors of demands and
diffusion. Moreover, the book does not provide separate explanations for
democracy, human rights, and rule of law institutions but offers a single
approach to explain the adoption and design of all three fundamental
governance standards.
Methodologically, I assess the consistency of the evidence with the
theoretical expectations through quantitative analyses and two case
studies. While existing contributions usually draw insights from single
case studies or comparative case studies, only few rely on statistics to
analyze and explain the adoption and design of regional democracy,
human rights, and rule of law institutions. Moreover, the mixed-method
design allows for combining the descriptive analysis of adoption and
design patterns and multivariate statistical analysis of explanatory factor
with in-depth accounts of the underlying motivations of relevant actors
and decision-making processes at critical junctures for two carefully
selected cases.

The Puzzle
Regional organizations have increasingly adopted regional democracy,
human rights, and rule of law institutions over time (Fig. 1.1). Shortly
after the end of World War II, a small number of ROs has pioneered the
adoption of regional institutions. The Organization of American States
 1 Introduction 7

Fig. 1.1 Adoption of regional democracy, human rights, and rule of law
institutions

(OAS), the Council of Europe (CoE), and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) made references to the norms in their founding
treaties, or they adopted particular human rights institutions (Mower
1991; Brummer 2014). Few ROs followed these pioneers over the next
four decades. Only around the end of the Cold War, there has been a
surge of regional charters, declarations, and resolutions. Regional democ-
racy, human rights, and rule of law institutions have proliferated since
the mid-1980s and during the 1990s. Some ROs even adopt these insti-
tutions comparatively late and after they have existed for several years,
such as ASEAN and SAARC. By the year 2020, more than 40 ROs have
adopted institutions that promote and protect at least one of the three
standards in their member states. At the same time, there is a group of
about 20 ROs that have not adopted any of the three standards thus far.
In addition to the sheer number of ROs, these fundamental standards are
being adopted, promoted, and protected in all regions. Regional human
rights, democracy, and rule of law institutions have spread globally.
8 S. Stapel

In terms of their design, regional democracy, human rights, and rule

of law institutions have increased in precision, broadened in scope, and
were equipped with a diverse set of mechanisms to induce compliance
(Börzel and Stapel 2015). Some ROs only make a superficial reference to
these standards in the form of norm recognition (Tallberg et al. 2020).
Moreover, many ROs have operationalized the designs over time and
have laid out the various standards and instruments that member states
should adhere to in the domestic context. The number of standards
multiplied, were concretized, and were put into detail. With regard
to the compliance and enforcement mechanisms, ROs often combine
fora for dialogue and exchange with more intrusive instruments, such as
sanctions, regional courts, and military force.
Continental political ROs from Africa, Europe, and the Western
Hemisphere3 have set the path for the designs of regional institutions to
promote and protect fundamental principles in their member states. Sub-
regional, economic, and welfare-oriented organizations have comple-
mented these pioneering efforts around the turn of the millennium.
Their institutional designs have increased in precision and broadened
in scope over time. By contrast, ROs from Asia, can be considered late
adopters of precise and broad designs. Despite their adoption of these
three standards, four ROs remain objectors to precise and broad regional
institutions (APEC, NAFTA/USMCA, Nordic Council, and SCO).
Similarities in the design of regional institutions have equally
increased. When ROs become active in promoting and protecting
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, they tend to adopt,
promote, and protect norms and standards very similar to the approaches
of other ROs. Regional human rights institutions are a case in point. If
a RO adopts a human rights institution, it is very likely that this insti-
tution will cover fundamental political and civil rights or economic and
social rights. Nevertheless, regional particularities persist. Some norms
and instruments are present in only a few ROs or in one region, such
as the prohibition of unconstitutional changes of government (standard)

3 The Western Hemisphere refers to states and organizations in the Americas (Caribbean,
Central America, North America, and South America). The term should not be mistaken
for the Western world. When referring to the Western Hemisphere, I follow the standard
terminology used in academic and governmental sources in North and Latin America.
 1 Introduction 9

in ROs located in the Western Hemisphere and in Africa (Wobig 2015)

or the right to militarily intervene in the domestic affairs of the member
states (instrument) in African ROs (Hartmann and Striebinger 2015).
Others are part of an evolving norm and form part of an established tool
kit by now, such as election observation missions (Hyde 2011b). They
achieved universal acceptance, and regional actors regularly refer to the
standards. Apart from norms that have gained such a prescriptive status
(Risse et al. 1999), similar contents tend to cluster regionally (Börzel and
Stapel 2015).
The proliferation of regional institutions and the dual trend of
growing similarities and persisting particularities of regional institutions
to promote and protect fundamental standards in their member states
challenge conventional explanations for institutional change by regional
and international organizations. The main dividing lines between these
literatures revolve around the assumptions of independent and interde-
pendent decision-making. However, probing their explanatory power,
none of the dominant theoretical approaches in the literature can
account on its own for the emergence and design of regional democracy,
human rights, and rule of law institutions.
On the one hand, the bulk of the literature assumes independent
decision-making in ROs. The demands of regional actors, both member
states and somewhat autonomous regional actors, feature prominently
in this strand of the literature. First, classic works of human rights and
democracy norms at the international and regional level have shown that
domestic demands are decisive in the timing of norm adoption. Newly
democratizing states either try to lock-in democratic norms and bind
themselves to democracy and human rights (Moravcsik 2000; Pevehouse
2002; Pevehouse 2005; Simmons 2009) or member states seek to curb
negative externalities that stem from their cooperation partners’ disregard
of these norms (Lake 1997; Jetschke 2019). Second, the rational design
of international institutions literature argues that the demands from
member states shape the outcomes. Institutional designs vary according
to constellations of a number of factors, such as distribution and enforce-
ment problems (Koremenos et al. 2001). Given the various backgrounds
and needs of ROs and their member states, institutional designs should
differ in the various regions.
10 S. Stapel

Theoretical explanations built on independent decision-making can

account for why the institutional designs vary in scope and enforce-
ment mechanisms. After all, it is an institutional choice based on
interests and motivations of member states (Koremenos et al. 2001;
Hooghe et al. 2019). Meanwhile, the other two empirical observations
presented in the introduction—spatial and temporal clustering of adop-
tions and increasing similarities as well as persisting particularities in
design—pose a serious challenge to this literature. Vast similarities in
content and instruments do not sustain this argument. Demands are not
uniform in ROs, and we need to take into account the various prefer-
ences and strategies of actors involved in the decision-making processes.
Demands may clash, and outcomes are negotiated by multiple actors at
the regional level. This should lead to distinct patterns of adoption and
design. For instance, ROs differ in their regime composition. The pres-
ence of democratizing states or negative externalities alone often do not
result in the adoption of regional human rights, democracy, and rule
of law institutions. The demands of non-democratizing member states
equally need to be analyzed. Especially when considering instances of re-
designing regional institutions, such as in the ASEAN and MERCOSUR
cases mentioned above, domestic concerns may fade into the back-
ground. Theoretical accounts that draw on independent decision-making
can hardly account for the fact that ROs become active at about the
same time and that their design choices have converged over time. The
demands and problems of ROs around the globe are not this similar so
that we would expect to find similar outcomes at similar points in time.
Instead, actors seem to heavily rely on reference models from external
sources.
On the other hand, the processes of and consequences from inter-
dependent decision-making of ROs provide theoretical indications to
understand the spread of adoptions and designs. Diffusion processes
have been prominently featured with regard to human rights norms
(Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Kelley 2008 ; Jetschke
2009; Hyde 2011a; Greenhill 2015) and regionalism (Risse 2016; Lenz
and Burilkov 2017; Agostinis 2019; Lenz 2021; Reiss 2022). The diffu-
sion literature argues that the adoption of a particular model of prior
adopters increases the likelihood of adoption by other, interdependent
 1 Introduction 11

actors (Strang 1991; Jahn 2006; Simmons et al. 2008; Gilardi 2012).
Moreover, global script approaches theorize the influences of modern
world practices on (domestic) systems and their expansion over time
(Meyer and Rowan 1977; Wotipka and Ramirez 2008). Both approaches
take a similar stance in the sense that they understand the spread of ideas
and innovations as processes, although the former underlines the connec-
tivity of two or more adopters and the latter emphasizes the creation
of prescriptive practices by the world polity. They also mostly agree
that interdependent actors converge on the motivations, processes, and
outcomes.
Yet, these approaches cannot fully account for the observed patterns
of adoption and institutional design. They have some explanatory power
with regard to the global spread of regional institutions but they cannot
explain why a number of ROs have not introduced any democracy,
human rights, and rule of law standards so far. Diffusion approaches
would also be capable of predicting why the designs of regional insti-
tutions have become increasingly similar. Yet, they have a hard time
accounting for persisting particularities, especially those particularities
that manifest themselves as distinctive features of regional institutions
in various regions. In spite of increasing similarities, democracy and
rule of law standards so far lack a central institutionalization of norms,
and even human rights institutions vary considerably across regions. The
same holds true for instruments that ROs have introduced to encourage
compliance in the member states. Moreover, we need to conceptualize
the various connections of ROs and the factors that led regional actors
to rely on and adapt reference models to understand the effect that diffu-
sion processes have on the design of regional institutions (Solingen 2012;
Sommerer and Tallberg 2019).

The Argument
I argue that the interplay of demands and diffusion plays a significant
role for the timing of adoption and the design of regional democracy,
human rights, and rule of law institutions. Demands and diffusion do
not take effect independently of each other but complement each other.
12 S. Stapel

Demands originate in the member states of ROs. Following their

interests, states adopt and design institutions to further their own goals
and to achieve distinct benefits (Keohane 1984; Abbott et al. 2000; Kore-
menos et al. 2001; Jupille et al. 2013). Member states can be driven
by different motivations to adopt regional institutions, including the
desire to lock-in recent democratic achievements at the regional level
(Moravcsik 2000; Pevehouse 2002; Closa and Palestini 2018), to alleviate
concerns over legitimacy with respect to domestic and international audi-
ences (Söderbaum 2004; Kirschner and Stapel 2012), or to curb negative
externalities that arise in the from democratic breakdown and massive
human rights violations (Lake 1997; Jetschke 2019). Hence, regional
institutions are often adopted in the aftermath of democratic transitions,
domestic legitimacy crises, and domestic or transnational conflicts of
member states. In these moments, member states seek to secure future
benefits or to cope with collective action problems.
The configuration of member states and their demands influence
the likelihood of achieving an agreement and to design regional insti-
tutions. Preference heterogeneity and potential enforcement problems
make cooperative agreement unlikely (Koremenos et al. 2001). To resolve
their differences or to address concerns about the potential defection
from the agreement, states rely on issue linkage as part of package deals
(Martin 1994; Aggerwal 1998; Slapin and Gray 2014; Allee and Elsig
2016) or they make credible commitments which raise the costs for
defection (Fearon 1997; Simmons 2002; Allee and Elsig 2016). In their
attempts to cope with preference heterogeneity and to overcome poten-
tial enforcement problems, ROs specify the content of standards, increase
the scope of standards covered in the agreement, and introduce more
severe compliance mechanisms. In other words, regional institutions
become more precise, broader in scope, and include stronger compliance
mechanisms.
At the same time, ROs are influenced by other organizations through
diffusion processes (Risse 2016; Sommerer and Tallberg 2019). Diffusion
occurs when an institutional innovation in one political entity system-
atically conditions and alters the probability of the adoption of the
 1 Introduction 13

same innovation in the remaining political entities (Strang 1991). Diffu-

sion scholars hence accentuate processes of interdependent decision-
making. Conventional approaches expect convergence as the outcome,
for instance the adoption of the same institution or similar designs.
A growing literature, however, argues that similarities or even a fully
fledged copy-catting are rather unlikely. The possible outcomes of diffu-
sion include convergence, adoption, adaptation, translation, localization,
and resistance (inter alia Acharya 2004; Zwingel 2012; Duina and Lenz
2016; Draude 2017; Zimmermann 2017).
Moreover, actors do not react to all potential source materials. They
have to pick and choose from a variety of potential reference models.
Diffusion processes do not happen in a vacuum but materialize through
connections between actors. I conceptualize the connections between
actors as social spaces, understood as structures of interdependence and
spatial contiguity. These can be further differentiated as geographic
spaces, spaces of self-identification, and spaces of material interaction.
When actors share any of these spaces or perceive to do so, they are
more likely affected from diffusion. Thus, ROs adopt institutions and
produce similar institutional designs following diffusion processes if
they are located in the same region, belong to the same type of RO
(structural self-identification), serve similar primary functions (func-
tional self-identification), and those organizations that directly interact
with each other, for example through shared member states and direct
exchange (material interaction).
The interplay of demands and diffusion can explain the proliferation
of regional democracy, human rights, and rule of law institutions as well
as increasing similarities and persisting particularities with regard to their
institutional design. Demands and diffusion intersect, and they comple-
ment and supersede each other with regard to both the adoption and
the design of regional institutions. The interplay of demands and diffu-
sion, however, is not uniform. Their interplay varies for different types of
adopters (pioneer, early follower, late adopter) and the particular instance
of institutional innovation (adoption, first institutional design, instances
of re-designing institutions).
Diffusion processes supersede the demands of actors in the adoption
of regional democracy, human rights, and rule of law institutions. The
14 S. Stapel

pioneering RO acts according to the demands and preference constella-

tion of its member states. The more ROs have adopted regional insti-
tutions, the more likely diffusion processes take effect when ROs share
social spaces (region, type, functions, and interaction). The following
ROs are affected by the decisions of their peers and likely act less
demand-driven. Late adopters are most affected as many ROs have
adopted regional institutions and it has become the appropriate course
of action. Taken together, diffusion becomes more likely from pioneers
to early followers and late adopters.
The interplay of demand and diffusion equally varies according to
the instance of institutional designing. The first innovator indepen-
dently designs regional institutions according to demands and preference
constellations of member states. The choices over institutional designs
by following ROs will likely be conditioned by prior decisions of
socially contiguous actors. While early followers take into account the
existing reference model and have to accommodate potentially addi-
tional demands at the same time, late adopters find a broad range of
reference models and can selectively choose from alternative models.
Furthermore, diffusion processes are equally important when regional
actors re-design institutions. The effect of diffusion processes might also
affect the pioneering RO when it seeks to re-design the original insti-
tutions, subject to the availability of reference models at the time of
re-designing the regional institution.
The interplay of demands and diffusion does not lead to the fully
fledged takeover of reference models for two reasons. Diffusion only
occurs between ROs that are located in the same region, belong to the
same type, serve similar primary functions, and those organizations that
directly interact with each other. While ROs belong to different social
spaces at the same time and diffusion process transcend these social
spaces, it is highly unlikely that ROs converge on a single predomi-
nant model of promoting and protecting democracy, human rights, and
the rule of law. Moreover, the member states still pursue their interests.
Demands facilitate or hamper the effect of diffusion process as institu-
tional designs are adjusted to preferences and demands of member states
in the receiving, affected RO. Demands and diffusion affect each other.
 1 Introduction 15

The Research Design

Empirically, I employ a mixed-method strategy to examine the adoption
and design of regional institutions to promote and protect democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law. The quantitative parts capture the
broader picture of patterns of adoption and design for a large number
of ROs over an extended period of time (1945–2020). Based on this
information, I explore the explanatory power of a number of factors.
I supplement the analysis with two in-depth case studies that draw on
qualitative material from a variety of sources, including official docu-
ments, interviews, and archives. This allows for tracing in detail the
decision-making processes in ROs and the underlying motivations of
relevant actors in a limited number of cases. The case selection varies
for each step in the analysis. Together, the mixed-method approach
combines the comparative advantages of both approaches (see Lieberman
2005; Hesse-Biber 2010) and allows for comprehensively assessing the
adoption and design of regional institutions.
In the first step, I analyze the patterns of adoption and institu-
tional design on the basis of two novel and unique data sets. The
GTRO adoption data base indicates when ROs referred to the democ-
racy, human rights, and the rule of law. The information was retrieved
through computer-assisted manual coding of RO primary law, such
as founding treaties, treaty changes, annexes, and protocols, as well as
relevant secondary legislation, such as charters, policy, and strategy docu-
ments. The data set covers the whole population of 73 ROs. Moreover,
the GTRO design data set comprises information about the formal rules,
standards, and instruments that ROs have incorporated in their institu-
tions to promote and protect democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law in their member states. The data is available for a carefully selected
sample of 23 ROs over the last 75 years or since their establishment.
The GTRO design data set is the most detailed attempt at cataloging
the design of regional institutions to date. It covers 254 individual stan-
dards across eleven dimensions of democracy, human rights, and the rule
of law based on a manual, double-blind content analysis of 288 docu-
ments (primary law and relevant secondary law). The data set also allows
16 S. Stapel

for assessing the breadth of scope, precision, and the strength of instru-
ments as features of institutional designs. Both data sets are available
for the time period 1945–2020. This nuanced and detailed information
allows for making comparisons between the three fundamental stan-
dards, over time, across regions, and across type and primary functions
of ROs. Moreover, descriptive patterns provide first insights into the
explanatory factors that underlie the different phases that characterized
the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights, and rule of
law standards in the twentieth century and early twenty-first century.
The second part puts the explanation of the interplay of demands and
diffusion to an empirical test. In order to comprehensively gauge their
explanatory power, I collect different pieces of evidence and proceed
in three steps. First, I focus on the causal effects of demands and
diffusion on the adoption of regional institutions by 73 ROs. Second,
the analysis turns to particular design features to promote and protect
democracy, human rights, and rule of law and explains why institu-
tional designs differ in scope, precision, and strength of instruments
between 23 ROs. In a third step, the similarities and persisting particu-
larities of institutional designs of 23 ROs are examined in greater detail.
In each step, I apply times-series cross-sectional multivariate statistics,
particularly spatial econometric modeling techniques. Individually and
collectively, the different pieces of evidence allow for carefully weighing
the explanatory power of the interplay of demands and diffusion for the
adoption and design of regional democracy, human rights, and rule of
law institutions.
While large N analyses capture the broader picture and general
patterns, the in-depth investigation of decision-making processes serves
to supplement and underpin the previous findings. In the third step of
the analysis, I, therefore, analyze within-case and cross-case variation for
a limited number of cases and over a limited period of time (diachronic
and synchronic comparisons). A process-oriented approach unpacks how
the interplay of demands and diffusion affects the adoption, design and
re-design of regional institutions and how this effect varies with regard
to the type of adopter and instance of institutional design innovation.
The two cases are selected from the sample of 23 ROs covered in
the GTRO design data set. I focus on democracy clauses and rule of
 1 Introduction 17

law standards, which often go hand in hand. I follow more directly

the organizations’ understandings of democracy, and hence the analysis
includes standards that may be considered to be rule of law standards
in other contexts. On the downside, I do not further consider human
rights regimes in the case studies. Both ROs have incorporated democ-
racy and rule of law institutions but followed different trajectories in
the adoption and design of regional institutions. Whereas the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) was one of—if not the—pioneering
RO for the adoption and design of regional democracy institutions, the
Organization of African Unity/African Union largely follows the general
patterns and can be characterized as an early follower. They neverthe-
less converged on a similar institutional design over time. The two case
studies allow for assessing within-case variation over time with regard
to multiple adoptions and instances of re-designing institutions and for
gauging the explanatory power of the interplay of demands and diffu-
sion. Moreover, I showcase the multiple entanglements and interactions
between both ROs.
This approach complements existing studies. Many contributions have
explored when and why ROs adopt and design particular institutions.
First, the majority of these studies zoom in on prominent ROs, such
as the European Union (Freyburg et al. 2009; Lavenex and Schim-
melfennig 2011; Youngs 2010; van Hüllen 2015), Council of Europe
(von Staden 2009; Hillebrecht 2014b), ASEAN (Tan 2011; Aguirre
and Pietropaoli 2012; Ciorciari 2012; Davies 2013; Freistein 2013;
Davies 2018; Poole 2019), African Union (Welch 1981; Kannyo 1984;
Okere 1984; Murray 2009; Uwazuruike 2020), and the OAS (Buer-
genthal 1970; Farer 1997; Cameron 2003; McCoy 2012; Heine and
Weiffen 2014; Engstrom 2019). A few other ROs have received less
attention, including ECOWAS (Nwogu 2007; Alter et al. 2013; Hart-
mann 2017; Stoddard 2017), the OSCE (Brett 1996; Thomas 2001),
and the Arab League (An-Na’im 2001; Sadri 2019). The majority of
ROs, however, have not been covered in the literature thus far. Second,
some studies take a comparative approach in their analysis of ROs for
the individual standards, such as human rights (Weston et al. 1987;
Mower 1991; de Schutter 2008; Hawkins and Jacoby 2010) and democ-
racy (McMahon and Baker 2006; Hawkins 2008; Legler and Tieku
18 S. Stapel

2010; van der Vleuten and Ribeiro-Hoffmann 2010; Genna and Hiroi
2015; Wobig 2015; Closa and Palestini 2018). Only few contributions
take a comparative approach across a large number of ROs and across
multiple standards (inter alia, Börzel and van Hüllen 2015; Coe 2019;
Tallberg et al. 2020). None of them takes into account the full universe
of ROs. Moreover, most studies draw on qualitative sources, and very
few have employed statistics. Mixed-method approaches are even scarcer.
Consequently, insights into general trends and patterns over time and
across regions combined with in-depth knowledge about the processes
of decision-making remain in short supply.

The Implications
The results of this book have important implications for the fields
of comparative regionalism and global governance.
First, the book addresses institutional change in international poli-
tics. The interplay of demand and diffusion accounts for the patterns
of adoption and design of regional institutions. When ROs design and
revise their institutions, they accommodate the demands from member
states and are affected by diffusion processes. The findings in the book
show that both approaches are complementary. In contrast to the broader
literature on institutional change, the proliferation of institutions and
their design are not only dependent on the demands and interests of
states. Neither does diffusion alone explain why and how institutions
come about. The combination of both explanatory factors accounts for
the adoption and design of regional institutions over the past 75 years.
Hence, the literature would benefit from taking into consideration that
both sets of explanatory factors take effect at the same time and that
they influence each other. Hence, our existing knowledge needs to
be revisited in light of the insights about diffusion effects. We need
to reassess the influence of diffusion processes in regional and inter-
national organizations as an additional explanatory factor. Also, this
challenges the fundamental assumption of independent observations (the
Galton’s problem, see Jahn 2006) and has methodological consequences
for undertaking comparisons of IOs if the assumption no longer holds.
 1 Introduction 19

Second, the book presents a truly comparative approach to the study

of comparative regionalism and takes up efforts to de-center and provin-
cialize the European Union in comparative regionalism research in
general and the study of diffusion between ROs in particular. The find-
ings sustain claims that ROs interact and influence each other, and
that their interactions have tangible effects on policy-making processes
and institutional output. The book contributes to the burgeoning liter-
ature in comparative regionalism that treats regional projects in their
own right and not in relation to the EU as the “gold standard” of
regional integration (Breslin and Higgott 2000). It adds to and comple-
ments our understanding of inter-regional relationships (Hänggi et al.
2006; Rüland 2010; Baert et al. 2014; Meissner 2019; Lopez Lucia and
Mattheis 2021) as well as broader external influences on ROs around
the globe (Katzenstein 2005; Krapohl 2017; Muntschick 2017; Stapel
and Söderbaum 2020). Moreover, whereas the majority of studies looks
into how the EU model diffuses to other parts in the world (Jetschke
2009; Risse 2016; Jetschke 2017; Lenz and Burilkov 2017; Lenz 2018;
Piccolino 2020; Theodoro Luciano 2020; Lenz 2021), the book defies
an EU-centric view of diffusion between ROs. Rather it contributes to
the literature by addressing diffusion processes between ROs at large and
South-South diffusion in particular. The findings underline that diffu-
sion between ROs is likely and potentially also more prevalent than
existing studies with a dominant EU-focus suggest. In addition to the
analysis of how ROs take over institutional features and bodies from each
other, it seems worthwhile to investigate the spread of policies and other
institutional innovations. It challenges widely held beliefs about policy-
making in ROs and regional contexts as well as the agency and role of
regional and national actors. By going beyond the analysis of formally
codified agreements in the case study analysis, the findings showcase
the various ways actors seek to influence decisions about policies and
institutions at the regional level.
Third, the book contributes to and challenges our understanding of
democracy, human rights, and rule of law promotion and protection by
international actors. In particular, many ROs have taken up the task to
address fundamental governance standards in their member states—and
20 S. Stapel

thus joined forces with IOs, powerful states, and the most prominent
ROs, including the OAS, CoE, AU, and OSCE. Yet, the book challenges
existing explanations why ROs adopt and design these regional institu-
tions in the first place. The generalizability of analyses that are based on
observations from a few prominent cases remains limited, as the find-
ings in the book show. The proliferation of regional democracy, human
rights, and rule of law institutions also pose new questions. The effects
and effectiveness of regional institutions deserve further attention. Given
the interplay of demands and diffusion in decision-making processes
and institutional designing, one might ask if and under what conditions
diffused regional institutions also lead to similar effects, and if and how
they contribute the effectiveness of ROs. Moreover, the proliferation of
regional institutions results in a dense, overlapping institutional environ-
ment, where multiple ROs have acquired largely similar competencies
and mandates.

Organization of the Book

The book is structured in six chapters.
In Chapter 2, I define the scope of inquiry by developing the analyt-
ical and theoretical frameworks that guide the empirical analysis. I first
introduce the concept regional democracy, human rights, and rule of
law institution as well as the adoption and design of regional institu-
tions. I elaborate the analytical dimensions of precision and breadth of
institutions, and strength of instruments. Regarding the content of these
institutions, I provide a detailed presentation of which standards will
be considered under the broader democracy, human rights, and rule of
law areas. The second part of this chapter develops a set of theoretical
expectations based on the literature on institutional change and insti-
tutional design. I first introduce a series of demand factors that follow
the assumption of independent decision-making before outlining inter-
dependent decision-making and diffusion processes. Finally, I describe
the interplay of demands and diffusion and how this logic applies to
regional institutions.
 1 Introduction 21

Chapter 3 serves to analyze the patterns of adoption and design of

regional democracy, human rights, and rule of law institutions. I first
introduce the two data sets on GTRO adoption and GTRO design. I lay
out in detail the general design of these data sets, the selection of ROs,
and the steps in the process of data collection and data handling. After-
wards, I turn towards presenting the adoption of regional institutions
over time as well as the design of regional institutions over time, across
regions, and across types and functions of ROs. In a last step, I assess the
consistency of the evidence with the theoretical expectations. The anal-
ysis shows that regional institutions have proliferated around the world
and are present in all regions. Moreover, there is also a trend towards
more precise and broader institutions, while there is no distinct pattern
with regard to enforcement mechanisms. Despite increasing similarities
of institutional designs, particularities persist, particularly across regions
and across type of ROs.
In Chapter 4, the theoretical expectations are put to an empirical test
based on multivariate statistical analysis. In three steps, I analyze the
adoption of institutions, the selection of specific design features (breadth
of scope, strength of instruments), and the similarity of institutional
designs. Each part begins with the operationalization of key variables,
discusses the model specification, and presents the results. The evidence
confirms that demands and diffusion drive the adoption and design of
regional institutions. It also lends support to the interplay of demands
and diffusion.
Chapter 5 turns to the first case study of the pioneering RO of regional
democracy clauses, the OAS. I first present how the organization has
adopted and designed its democracy and rule of law institutions over
time. At the core of the chapter lies the analysis of explanatory factors
that have contributed to various institutional innovations. Initially, the
member states solely followed their demands and designed the democ-
racy clause accordingly. At later instances of institutional re-designing,
demands still mattered but the OAS was increasingly influenced by avail-
able reference models from organization in the same region and that
share a similar type.
In Chapter 6, I focus on the Organization of African Unity and
its successor, the African Union. The OAU/AU adopted democracy
22 S. Stapel

and rule of law standards comparatively late. I first assess the devel-
opment of democracy and rule of law institutions. As expected by the
theoretical explanations, the OAU/AU has been influenced by refer-
ence models from the very beginning. Moreover, I find several pieces of
evidence where the OAU/AU directly relied on reference models when
it developed and designed protocols that specified and broadened the
institutional design. At the same time, the variegated demands from
member states equally feature in the decision-making process and shape
the adoption and design of regional institutions.
In the conclusion in Chapter 7, I provide a synthesis of the find-
ings and their theoretical and practical implications. I also point out
avenues for future research. These revolve around further developing the
present theoretical argument and extend it to the study of causal diffu-
sion mechanisms, varieties of outcomes of diffusion processes based on
the interplay of demand and diffusion, and questions of effectiveness.

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Another random document with
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 No doubt, Caleb profoundly agreed with this characterisation of
Letizia, held he up never so plump a protestant hand.
“Oh, do give your consent to our marriage,” he gurgled. “I know
that there is a difference of religion. But I have ventured to think once
or twice that you could overlook that difference. I have remarked
sometimes that you did not appear to attach very great importance to
your religion. I’ve even ventured to pray that you might come in time
to perceive the errors of Romanism. In fact, I have dreamed more
than once, ma’am, that you were washed in the blood of the Lamb.
However, do not imagine that I should try to influence Letizia to
become one of the Peculiar Children of God. I love her too dearly,
ma’am, to attempt any persuasion. From a business point of view—
and, after all, in these industrious times it is the business point of
view which is really important—from a business point of view the
match would not be a very bad one. I have a few humble savings,
the fruit of my long association with you in your enterprises.”
Caleb paused a moment and took a deep breath. He had reached
the critical point in his temptation of Madame Oriano, and he tried to
put into his tone the portentousness that his announcement seemed
to justify.
“Nor have I been idle in my spare time, ma’am. No, I have devoted
much of that spare time to study. I have been rewarded, ma’am. God
has been very good to me and blessed the humble talent with which
he entrusted me. Yes, ma’am. I have discovered a method of using
chlorate of potash in combination with various other chemicals which
will undoubtedly revolutionise the whole art of pyrotechny. Will you
consider me presumptuous, ma’am, when I tell you that I dream of
the moment when Fuller’s Fireworks shall become a byword all over
Great Britain for all that is best and brightest in the world of
pyrotechny?”
Madame Oriano’s eyes flashed like Chinese fire, and Caleb,
perceiving that he had made a false move, tried to retrieve his
position.
“Pray do not suppose that I was planning to set myself up as a
manufacturer of fireworks on my own. So long as you will have me,
ma’am, I shall continue to work for you, and if you consent to my
marrying your Letizia I shall put my new discovery at your service on
a business arrangement that will satisfy both parties.”
Madame Oriano pondered the proposal in silence for a minute.
“Yes, you can have Letizia,” she said at last.
Caleb picked up the hand that was hanging listlessly over the
coverlet and in the effusion of his gratitude saluted it with an oily
kiss.
“And you’ll do your best to make Letizia accept me as a husband?”
he pressed.
“If I say you can have Letizia, caro, you willa have her,” the mother
declared.
“You have made me the happiest man in England,” Caleb oozed.
Whereupon he walked on tiptoe from the room with a sense even
sharper than usual that he was one of the Lord’s chosen vessels, a
most peculiar child even among the Peculiar Children of God.
Just when the hot August day had hung two dusky sapphire lamps
in the window of the room, Madame Oriano, who had been lying all
the afternoon staring up at the shadows of the birds that flitted
across the ceiling, rang the bell and demanded her daughter’s
presence.
“Letizia, devi sposarti,” she said firmly.
“Get married, mamma? But I don’t want to be married for a long
time.”
“Non ci entra, cara. Devi sposarti. Sarebbe meglio—molto meglio.
Sei troppo sfrenata.”[7]

[7] “That doesn’t come into it, my dear. You must get
married. It would be better—much better. You are too
harum-scarum.”
 “I don’t see why it should be so much better. I’m not so harum-
scarum as all that. Besides, you never married at my age. You never
married at all if it comes to that.”
“Lo so. Perciò dico che tu devi sposarti.”[8]

[8] “I know that. That’s why I say that you must get married.”

“Thanks, and who am I to marry?”

“Caleb.”
“Caleb? Gemini! Caleb? Marry Caleb? But he’s so ugly! And he
don’t wash himself too often, what’s more.”
“Bello non é ... ma che importa? La bellezza passa via.”
“Yes, I daresay beauty does pass away,” said Letizia indignantly.
“But it had passed away from Caleb before ever he was born.”
“Che importa?”
“I daresay it don’t matter to you. But you aren’t being expected to
marry him. Besides, you’ve had all the beaux you wanted. But I
haven’t, and I won’t be fobbed off with Caleb. I just won’t be, and you
may do what you will about it.”
“Basta!” Madame Oriano exclaimed. “Dissa talk is enough.”
“Basta yourself and be damned, mamma,” Letizia retorted. “I won’t
marry Caleb. I’d sooner be kept by a handsome gentleman in a big
clean cravat. I’d sooner live in a pretty house he’d give me and drive
a crimson curricle on the Brighton Road like Cora Delaney.”
“It does not import two pennies what you wish, figlia mia. You willa
marry Caleb.”
“But I’m not in love with him, the ugly clown!”
“Love!” scoffed her mother. “L’amore! L’amore! Love is mad. I have
hadda so many lovers. Tanti tanti amanti! Adesso, sono felice? No!
Ma sono vecchia assai. Yes, an old woman—una vecchia miserabile
senza amanti, senza gambe—e non si fa l’amore senza gambe,
cara, ti giuro—senza danaro, senza niente.”
Sans love, sans legs, sans money, sans everything, the old
woman dropped back on her pillows utterly exhausted. A maid came
in with candles and pulled the curtains to shut out the dim grey into
which the August twilight had by now gradually faded. When the
maid was gone, she turned her glittering, sombre eyes upon her
daughter.
“You willa marry Caleb,” she repeated. “It willa be better so—molto
meglio cosi. Gli amanti non valgono niente. All who I have been
loving, where are dey now? Dove sono? Sono andati via. Alla gone
away. Alla gone. You willa marry Caleb.”
Letizia burst into loud sobs.
“But I don’t want to marry, mamma.”
“Meglio piangere a diciasette che rimpiangere a sessanta,”[9] said
Madame Oriano solemnly. “You willa marry Caleb.”

[9] “Better to weep at seventeen than to repine at sixty.”

Letizia felt incapable of resisting this ruthless old woman any

longer. She buried her head in the gaudy satin coverlet and wept in
silence.
“Allora dammi un bacio.”
The obedient daughter leaned over and kissed her mother’s lined
forehead.
“Tu hai già troppo l’aria di putana, figlia mia. Meglio sposarti.
Lasciammi sola. Vorrei dormire. Sono stanca assai ... assai.”[10]

[10] “You have already too much the air of a wanton, my

daughter. Better to get married. Leave me alone. I want to
sleep. I’m very tired.”
 Madame Oriano closed her eyes, and Letizia humbly and
miserably left her mother, as she wished to be left, alone.
 CHAPTER IV
MARRIED LIFE
So, Caleb Fuller married Letizia Oriano and tamed her body, as
without doubt he would have succeeded in taming the body of any
woman of whom he had lawfully gained possession.
Madame Oriano did not long survive the marriage. The effort she
made in imposing her will upon her daughter was too much for a
frame so greatly weakened. Once she had had her way, the desire to
live slowly evaporated. Yet she was granted a last pleasure from this
world before she forsook it for ever. This was the satisfaction of
beholding with her own eyes that her son-in-law’s discovery of the
value of chlorate of potash as a colour intensifier was all that he
claimed for it. That it was likely to prove excessively dangerous when
mixed with sulphur compounds did not concern this pyrotechnist of
the old school. The prodigious depth and brilliant clarity of those new
colours would be well worth the sacrifice of a few lives through
spontaneous ignition in the course of manufacturing them.
The first public demonstration that Caleb gave was on the evening
of the Fifth of November in a Clerkenwell tea-garden. It is unlikely
that Madame Oriano ever fully comprehended the significance of
these annual celebrations. If she ever did wonder who Guy Fawkes
was, she probably supposed him to be some local English saint
whose martyrdom deserved to be commemorated by an abundance
of rockets. As for Caleb, he justified to himself some of the pleasure
that his fireworks gave to so many people by the fact that the chief
festival at which they were employed was held in detestation of a
Papist conspirator.
On this particular Fifth of November the legless old lady was
carried in an invalid’s chair through the press of spectators to a
favourable spot from which she could judge the worth of the
improved fireworks. A few of the rabble jumped to the conclusion
that she was a representation of Guy Fawkes himself, and set up the
ancient chorus:

Please to remember the Fifth of November

Gunpowder treason and plot;
We know no reason why gunpowder treason
Should ever be forgot!
A stick and a stake for King George’s sake,
A stick and a stump for Guy Fawkes’s rump
Holla, boys! holla, boys! huzza-a-a!

Madame Oriano smiled grimly when Caleb tried to quiet the

clamour by explaining that she was flesh and blood.
“Letta dem sing, Caleb. Non fa niente a me. It don’ta matter
notting to me.”
A maroon burst to mark the opening of the performance. This was
followed by half-a-dozen rockets, the stars of which glowed with
such greens and blues and reds as Madame Oriano had never
dreamed of. She tried to raise herself in her chair.
“Bravo, Caleb! Bravissimo! Ah dio, non posso più! It is the besta
colore I havva ever seen, Caleb. E ottimo! Ottimo, figlio mio.”
She sat entranced for the rest of the display; that night, like a
spent firework, the flame of her ardent life burnt itself out.
The death of his mother-in-law allowed Caleb to carry out a plan
he had been contemplating for some time. This was to open a
factory in Cheshire on the outskirts of his native town. He anticipated
trouble at first with the Peculiar Children of God, who were unlikely to
view with any favour the business of making fireworks. He hoped,
however, that the evidence of his growing prosperity would presently
change their point of view. There was no reason to accuse Caleb of
hypocrisy, or to suppose that he was anything but perfectly sincere in
his desire to occupy a high place in the esteem of his fellow
believers. Marriage with a Papist had in truth begun to worry his
conscience more than a little. So long as Letizia had been a
temptation, the fact of her being a daughter of Babylon instead of a
Peculiar Child of God had only made the temptation more
redoubtable, and the satisfaction of overcoming it more sharp. Now
that he was licensed to enjoy her, he began to wonder what effect
marriage with a Papist would have on his celestial patron. He felt like
a promising young clerk who has imperilled his prospects by
marrying against his employer’s advice. It began to seem essential
to his salvation that he should take a prominent part in the prayer-
meetings of the Peculiar Children of God. He was ambitious to be
regarded himself as the most peculiar child of all those Peculiar
Children. Moreover, from a practical standpoint the opening of a
factory in the North should be extremely profitable. He already had
the London clients of Madame Oriano; he must now build up a solid
business in the provinces. Fuller’s Fireworks must become a byword.
The King was rumoured to be ill. He would be succeeded by another
king. That king would in due course have to be solemnly crowned.
Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds, and many other large towns
would be wanting to celebrate that coronation with displays of
fireworks. When the moment arrived, there must be nobody who
would be able to compete with Fuller and his chlorate of potash.
So to Brigham in Cheshire Caleb Fuller brought his wife. In some
fields on the outskirts of the town in which he had spent a poverty-
stricken youth he built his first sheds, and in a dreary little street
close to Bethesda, the meeting-house of the Peculiar Children of
God, he set up his patriarchal tent. Here on a dusty September dawn
just over two years after her last public appearance at “Neptune’s
Grotto,” Letizia’s eldest daughter was born. The young wife of Caleb
was not yet thoroughly tamed, for she produced a daughter exactly
like herself and called her Caterina in spite of the father’s objection
to a name associated with the wheels of which he made so many.
Not only did she insist on calling the child Caterina, but she actually
took it to the nearest Catholic chapel and had it baptised by a priest.
It happened about this time that one of the apostles of the
meeting-house was gravely ill, and Caleb, who had designs on the
vacant apostolic chair, decided that his election to it must not be
endangered by the profane behaviour of his young wife. When he
remonstrated with her, she flashed her eyes and tossed her head as
if he were still Caleb the clerk and she the spoilt daughter of his
employer.
“Letizia,” he said lugubriously, “you have destroyed the soul of our
infant.”
“Nonsense!”
“You have produced a child of wrath.”
“My eye!” she scoffed.
Caleb’s moist lips vanished from sight. There was a long silence
while he regarded his wife with what seemed like two pebbles of
granite. When at last he spoke, it was with an intolerable softness.
“Letizia, you must learn to have responsibilities. I am frightened for
you, my wife. You must learn. I do not blame you entirely. You have
had a loose upbringing. But you must learn.”
Then, as gently as he was speaking, he stole to the door and left
Letizia locked behind him in her bedroom. Oh, yes, he tamed her
body gradually, and for a long time it looked as if he would tame her
soul. She had no more daughters like herself, and each year for
many years she flashed her eyes less fiercely and tossed her head
less defiantly. She produced several other children, but they all took
after their father. Dark-eyed Caterina was followed by stodgy
Achsah. Stodgy Achsah was followed by podgy Thyrza. These were
followed by two more who died almost as soon as they were born, as
if in dying thus they expressed the listlessness of their mother for this
life. Maybe Letizia herself would have achieved death, had not the
way Caleb treated little Caterina kept her alive to protect the child
against his severity.
“Her rebellious spirit must be broken,” he declared, raising once
more the cane.
“You shall not beat her like this, Caleb.”
“Apostle Jenkins beat his son till the child was senseless, because
he stole a piece of bread and jam.”
“I wish I could be as religious as you, Caleb,” said his wife.
 He tried to look modest under the compliment.
“Yes,” she went on fiercely, “for then I’d believe in Hell, and if I
believed in Hell I’d sizzle there with joy just for the pleasure of seeing
you and all your cursed apostles sizzling beside me.”
But Letizia did not often break out like this. Each year she became
more silent, taking refuge from her surroundings in French novels
which she bought out of the meagre allowance for clothes that her
husband allowed her. She read French novels because she
despised the more sentimental novelists of England that were so
much in vogue at this date, making only an exception in favour of
Thackeray, whom she read word for word as his books appeared.
She was learning a bitter wisdom from literature in the shadows and
the silence of her wounded heart. After eight years of married life she
bore a son, who was called Joshua. There were moments when
Letizia was minded to smother him where he lay beside her, so
horribly did this homuncule reproduce the lineaments of her loathed
husband.
Meanwhile, the factory flourished, Caleb Fuller became the
leading citizen of Brigham and served three times as Mayor. He built
a great gloomy house on the small hill that skirted the mean little
town. He built, too, a great gloomy tabernacle for the Peculiar
Children of God. He was elected chief apostle and sat high up in
view of the congregation on a marble chair. He grew shaggy
whiskers and suffered from piles. He found favour in the eyes of the
Lord, sweating the poor and starving even the cows that gave him
milk. Yes, the renown of Fuller’s Fireworks was spread far and wide.
The factory grew larger year by year. And with it year by year waxed
plumper the belly and the purse of Caleb himself, even as his soul
shrivelled.
In 1851 after twenty years of merciless prosperity Caleb suffered
his first setback by failing to secure the contract for the firework
displays at the Great Exhibition. From the marble chair of the chief
apostle he called upon the Peculiar Children of God to lament that
their Father had temporarily turned away His countenance from
them. Caleb beat his breast and bellowed and groaned, but he did
not rend his garments of the best broadcloth, because that would
have involved his buying new ones. The hulla-balloo in Bethesda
was louder than that in a synagogue on the Day of Atonement, and
after a vociferous prayer-meeting the Peculiar Children of God went
back to their stuffy and secretive little houses, coveting their
neighbours’ wives and their neighbours’ maids, but making the best
of their own to express an unattainable ideal. Horrid stuffy little
bedrooms with blue jets of gas burning dimly through the night-time.
Heavy lumps of humanity snoring beneath heavy counterpanes.
Lascivious backbiting of the coveted wives and maids on greasy
conjugal pillows. Who in all that abode of prurient respectability and
savage industrialism should strip Caleb’s soul bare? Who should not
sympathise with the chief apostle of the Peculiar Children of God?
Yet, strange to say, Caleb found that God’s countenance
continued to be averted from his own. He was still licking the
soreness of his disappointment over the Exhibition fireworks when
one morning in the prime of June his eldest daughter left the great
gloomy house on the hill, never to return. While Caleb stormed at his
wife for not taking better precautions to keep Caterina in bounds, he
was aware that he might as well be storming at a marble statue. He
lacked the imagination to understand that the soul of Letizia had fled
from its imprisonment in the guise of Caterina’s lissom body. But he
did apprehend, however dimly, that henceforth nothing he might say
or do would ever again affect his wife either for good or for ill.
Cold dark eyes beneath black arched brows surveyed him
contemptuously. He had never yet actually struck Letizia; but he
came near to striking her at that moment.
“She wanted to go on the stage.”
“A play-actress! My eldest daughter a play-actress!”
“Alas, neither she nor I can cup those drops of blood she owes to
you. But her soul is hers and mine. You had no part in making that.
Even if you did crawl over my body and eat the heart out of me, you
slug! Do what you like with the others. Make what you can of them.
But Caterina is mine. Caterina is free.”
 “As if I had not suffered enough this year,” Caleb groaned.
“Suffered? Did you say that you had suffered?” His wife laughed.
“And what about the sufferings of my Caterina all these years of her
youth?”
“I pray she’ll starve to death,” he went on.
“She was starving to death in this house.”
“Ay, I suppose that’s what the Church folk will be saying next. The
idle, good-for-nothing slanderers! Not content with accusing me of
starving my cows, they’ll be accusing me of starving my children
now. But the dear Lord knows....”
“You poor dull fool,” Letizia broke in, and with one more glance
from her cold dark eyes she left him.
Caterina had as dissolute a career as her father could have feared
and as miserable an end as he could have hoped, for about twelve
years later, after glittering with conspicuous shamelessness amid the
tawdry gilt of the Second Empire, she died in a Paris asylum
prematurely exhausted by drink and dissipation.
“Better to die from without than from within,” said her mother when
the news was brought to Brigham.
“What do you mean by that?” Caleb asked in exasperated
perplexity. “It’s all these French novels you read that makes you talk
that high-flown trash. You talk for the sake of talking, that’s my
opinion. You used to talk like a fool when I first married you, but I
taught you at last to keep your tongue still. Now you’ve begun to talk
again.”
“One changes in thirty-four years, Caleb. Even you have changed.
You were mean and ugly then. But you are much meaner and much
uglier now. However, you have the consolation of seeing your son
Joshua keep pace with you in meanness and in ugliness.”
Joshua Fuller was now twenty-six, an eternal offence to the eyes
of his mother, who perceived in him nothing but a dreadful reminder
of her husband at the same age. That anybody could dare to deplore
Caterina’s life when in Joshua the evidence of her own was before
them enraged Letizia with human crassness. But Joshua was going
to be an asset to Fuller’s Fireworks. Just as his father had perceived
the importance of chlorate of potash in 1829, so now in 1863 did
Joshua perceive the importance of magnesium, and the house of
Fuller was in front of nearly all its rivals in utilising that mineral, with
the result that its brilliant fireworks sold better than ever. The
Guilloché and Salamandre, the Girandole and Spirali of Madame
Oriano, so greatly admired by old moons and bygone multitudes,
would have seemed very dull affairs now. Another gain that Joshua
provided for the business was to urge upon his father to provide for
the further legislation about explosives that sooner or later was
inevitable. With an ill grace Caleb Fuller had complied with the
provisions of the Gunpowder Act of 1860; but, when the great
explosion at Erith occurred a few years later, Joshua insisted that
more must be done to prepare for the inspection of firework
establishments that was bound to follow such a terrific disaster.
Joshua was right, and when the Explosives Act of 1875 was passed
the factory at Brigham had anticipated nearly all its requirements.
By this time Joshua was a widower. In 1865, at the age of twenty-
eight, he had married a pleasant young woman called Susan
Yardley. After presenting him with one boy who was christened
Abraham, she died two years later in producing another who was
christened Caleb after his grandfather.
The elder of these two boys reverted both in appearance and in
disposition to the Oriano stock, and old Mrs. Fuller—she is sixty-
three now and may no longer be called Letizia—took a bitter delight
in never allowing old Mr. Fuller to forget it. She found in the boy, now
a flash of Caterina’s eyes, now a flutter of Madame Oriano’s eyelids.
She would note how much his laugh was like her own long ago, and
she would encourage him at every opportunity to thwart the
solicitude and defy the injunctions of Aunt Achsah and Aunt Thyrza.
When her son protested against the way she applauded Abraham’s
naughtiness, she only laughed.
“Bram’s all right.”
 “I wish, mamma, you wouldn’t call him Bram,” Joshua protested.
“It’s so irreverent. I know that you despise the Bible, but the rest of
us almost worship it. I cannot abide this irreligious clipping of
Scriptural names. And it worries poor papa terribly.”
“It won’t worry your father half as much to hear Bram called Bram
as it’ll worry poor little Bram later on to be called Abraham. That
boy’s all right, Josh. He’s the best firework you’ve turned out of this
factory for many a day. So, don’t let Achsah and Thyrza spoil him.”
“They try their best to be strict, mamma.”
“I’m talking about their physic, idiot. They’re a pair of pasty-faced
old maids, and it’s unnatural and unpleasant to let them be for ever
messing about with a capital boy like Bram. Let them physic young
Caleb. He’ll be no loss to the world. Bram might be.”
Joshua threw his eyes up to Heaven and left his unaccountable
mother to her own unaccountable thoughts. He often wondered why
his father had never had her shut up in an asylum. For some time
now she had been collecting outrageous odds and ends of furniture
for her room to which none of the family was allowed access except
by special invitation. Ever since Caterina had run away old Mrs.
Fuller had had a room of her own. But she had been content with an
ordinary bed at first. Now she had procured a monstrous foreign
affair all gilt and Cupids and convolutions. If Joshua had been his
father he would have taken steps to prevent such a waste of her
allowance. He fancied that the old man must be breaking up to allow
such furniture to enter the house.
Not long after the conversation between Joshua and his mother
about Bram, a travelling circus arrived at Brigham on a Sunday
morning. The Peculiar Children of God shivered at such a
profanation of the Sabbath, and Apostle Fuller—in these days a truly
patriarchal figure with his long white food-bespattered beard—
preached from the marble chair on the vileness of these sacrilegious
mountebanks and the pestilent influence any circus must have on a
Christian town. In spite of this denunciation the chief apostle’s own
wife dared to take her elder grandchild on Monday to view from the
best seats obtainable the monstrous performance. They sat so near
the ring that the sawdust and the tan were scattered over them by
the horses’ hoofs. Little Bram, his chin buried in the worn crimson
velvet of the circular barrier, gloated in an ecstasy on the
paradisiacal vision.
“Brava! Bravissima!” old Mrs. Fuller cried loudly when a demoiselle
of the haute école took an extra high fence. “Brava! Bravissima!” she
cried when an equestrienne in pink tights leapt through four blazing
hoops and regained without disarranging one peroxide curl the
shimmering back of her piebald steed.
“Oh, grandmamma,” little Bram gasped when he bade her good
night, “can I be a clown when I’m a man?”
“The difficulty is not to be a clown when one is a man,” she
answered grimly.
“What do you mean, grandmamma?”
“Ah, what?” she sighed.
And in their stuffy and secretive little bedrooms that night the
Peculiar Children of God talked for hours about the disgraceful
amount of leg that those circus women had shown.
“I hear it was extremely suggestive,” said one apostle, smacking
his lips with lecherous disapprobation.
“Was it, indeed, my dear?” the dutiful wife replied, thereby offering
the man of God an opportunity to enlarge upon the prurient topic
before he turned down the gas and got into bed beside her.
“Bram was very naughty to go to the circus, wasn’t he, Aunt
Achsah?” young Caleb asked in a tone of gentle sorrow when his
pasty-faced aunt leaned over that Monday night to lay her wet lips to
his plump pink cheeks.
“Grandpapa was very cross,” Aunt Achsah mournfully replied,
evading the direct answer, but implying much by her expression.
“Gran’papa’s not cross with me, is he, auntie?” young Caleb asked
with an assumption of fervid anxiety.
 “No, my dear child, and I hope that you will never, never make
your dear grandfather cross with you.”
“Oh, I won’t, Aunt Achsah,” young Caleb promised, with what Aunt
Achsah told Aunt Thyrza was really and truly the smile of one of
God’s most precious lambs.
“Thyrza, Thyrza, when that blessed little child smiles like that,
nobody could deny him anything. I’m sure his path down this vale of
tears will always be smoothed by that angelic smile.”
She was talking to her sister in the passage just outside young
Caleb’s bedroom—he had already been separated from his elder
brother for fear of corruption—and he heard what she said.
When the footsteps of his aunts died away along the passage, the
fat little boy got out of bed, turned up the gas, and smiled at himself
several times in the looking-glass. Then he retired to bed again,
satisfied of his ability to summon that conquering smile to his aid
whenever he should require it.
 CHAPTER V
TINTACKS IN BRIGHAM
On a wet and gusty afternoon in the month of March, 1882, Bram
Fuller, now a stripling of sixteen, sat in one of the dingiest rooms of
that great gloomy house his grandfather had begun to build forty
years before. It looked less stark, now that the evergreen trees had
grown large enough to hide some of its grey rectangularity; but it did
not look any more cheerful in consequence. In some ways it had
seemed less ugly at first, when it stood on top of the mean little hill
and was swept clean by the Cheshire winds. Now its stucco was
stained with great green fronds and arabesques of damp caused by
the drip of the trees and the too close shrubberies of lanky privet and
laurel that sheltered its base. Old Mr. Fuller and his son were both
under the mistaken impression that the trees planted round Lebanon
House—thus had the house been named—were cedars. Whereas
there was not even so much as a deodar among the crowd of
starveling pines and swollen cryptomerias. Noah’s original ark
perched on the summit of Ararat amid the surrounding waters
probably looked a holier abode than Lebanon House above the sea
of Brigham roofs.
The town had grown considerably during half a century, and old
Mr. Fuller had long ago leased the derelict pastures, in which his
cows had tried to eke out a wretched sustenance on chickweed and
sour dock, to accommodate the enterprising builder of rows of little
two-storied houses, the colour of underdone steak. The slopes of the
hill on which the house stood had once been covered with fruit-trees,
but the poisoning of the air by the various chemical factories, which
had increased in number every year, had long made them barren.
Joshua had strongly advised his father to present the useless slopes
to Brigham as a public recreation ground. It was to have been a
good advertisement both for the fireworks and for the civic spirit that
was being fostered by the Peculiar Children of God. As a matter of
fact, Joshua himself had some time ago made up his mind to join the
Church of England as soon as his father died. He was beginning to
think that the Bethesda Tabernacle was not sufficiently up-to-date as
a spiritual centre for Fuller’s Fireworks, and he was more concerned
for the civic impression than the religious importance of the gift. On
this March afternoon, however, the slopes of Lebanon were still a
private domain, for old Mr. Fuller could never bring himself to give
away nine or ten acres of land for nothing. He was much too old to
represent Brigham in Parliament himself, and it never struck him that
Joshua might like to do so.
So, Bram Fuller was able to gaze out of the schoolroom window,
to where, beyond the drenched evergreens hustling one another in
the wind, the drive ran down into Brigham between moribund or
skeleton apple-trees fenced in on either side by those raspberry-
tipped iron railings that his grandfather had bought so cheaply when
the chock-a-block parish churchyard was abolished and an invitingly
empty cemetery was set apart on the other side of the town for the
coming generations of Brigham dead. Bram was still a day-boy at the
grammar school, and as this afternoon was the first half-holiday of
the month he was being allowed to have a friend to tea. Jack
Fleming was late, though. There was no sign of him yet coming up
the slope through the wind and wet. Bram hoped that nothing had
happened to keep him at home. He was so seldom allowed to
entertain friends that Jack’s failure to appear would have been an
overwhelming disappointment. He looked round the schoolroom
dejectedly. Never had it seemed so dingy and comfortless. Never
had that outline portrait of Queen Victoria, filled in not with the
substance of her regal form, but with an account of her life printed in
minute type, seemed such a futile piece of ingenuity; never had the
oilcloth seemed infested with so many crumbs, nor the table-cloth
such a kaleidoscope of jammy stains.
Old Mrs. Fuller had been right when she recognised in the baby
Bram her own race. She and he had their way, and Abraham was
never heard now except in the mouth of the grandfather. Yes, he was
almost a perfect Oriano, having inherited nothing from his father, and
from his mother only her pleasant voice. He was slim, with a clear-
cut profile and fine dark hair; had one observed him idling gracefully
on a sun-splashed piazza, he would have appeared more
appropriate to the setting than to any setting that Brigham could
provide. He was a popular and attractive youth with a talent for
mimicry, and a gay and fluent wit. His young brother, who fortunately
for the enjoyment of Bram and his friend had been invited forth
himself this afternoon, was a perfect Fuller save that he had
inherited from his mother a fresh complexion which at present only
accentuated his plumpness. All the Fuller characteristics were there
—the greedy grey eyes, the podgy white hands, the fat rump and
spindle legs, the full wet lips and slimy manner. To all this young
Caleb could add his own smile of innocent candour when it suited his
purpose to produce it. At school he was notorious as a toady and a
sneak, but he earned a tribute of respect from the sons of a
commercial community by his capacity for swopping to his own
advantage and by his never failing stock of small change, which he
was always willing to lend at exorbitant interest on good security.
Bram was badly in debt to his young brother at the present moment,
and this added something to the depression of the black March
afternoon, though that was lightened at last by the tardy arrival of his
expected friend with the news that Blundell’s Diorama had arrived in
Brigham and would exhibit itself at seven o’clock.
“We must jolly well go, Bramble,” Jack declared.
Bram shook his head despondently.
“No chink!”
“Can’t you borrow some from young Caleb?”
“I owe him two and threepence halfpenny already, and he’s got my
best whalebone-splice bat as a security till I pay him back.”
“Good Lord, and I’ve only got sixpence,” Jack Fleming groaned.
“Anyway, it’s no use,” Bram went on. “The governor wouldn’t let
me go into Brigham on a Saturday night.”
“Can’t you find some excuse?”
Bram pondered for a few seconds.
 “I might get my grandmater to help.”
“Well, buck up, Bramble. It’s a spiffing show, I hear. They’ve got
two girls with Italian names who play the guitar or something. We
don’t often get a chance of a decent evening in Brigham.”
“You’re right, Jack. All serene! Then I’ll have a try with the
grandmater. She’s such an old fizzer that she might manage it.”
Bram went up cautiously to old Mrs. Fuller’s room. She was
seventy now, but still able to hate fiercely her octogenarian husband
who was for ever browsing among dusty commentaries on the Old
Testament nowadays, and extracting from the tortuous fretwork of
bookworms such indications of the Divine purpose as the exact date
and hour of the Day of Judgment. He was usually clad in a moth-
eaten velveteen dressing-gown and a smoking cap of quilted black
silk with a draggled crimson tassel. The latter must have been worn
as a protection to his bald and scaly head, because not a puff of
tobacco smoke had ever been allowed to contend with the odour of
stale food that permeated Lebanon House from cellar to garret.
The old lady was sitting by the fire in her rococo parlour, reading
Alphonse Daudet’s new book. Her hawk’s face seemed to be not so
much wrinkled as finely cracked like old ivory. Over her shoulders
she wore a wrap of rose and silver brocade.
“Why, Bram, I thought you were entertaining visitors this
afternoon.”
“I am. He’s downstairs in the schoolroom. Jack Fleming, I mean.”
“Is that a son of that foxy-faced solicitor in High Street?”
Bram nodded.
“But Jack’s rather decent. I think you’d like him, grandmamma.”
“Ah, I’m too old to begin liking new people.”
Bram kicked his legs together, trying to make up his mind what line
to adopt for enlisting the old lady’s sympathy.
“Blundell’s Diorama is here,” he announced at last.