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MARX, ENGELS, AND MARXISMS
The Migration Turn

and Eastern Europe
A Global Historical Sociological Analysis
Attila Melegh
Marx, Engels, and Marxisms
Series Editors
Marcello Musto, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
Terrell Carver, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
The Marx renaissance is underway on a global scale. Wherever the critique
of capitalism re-emerges, there is an intellectual and political demand for
new, critical engagements with Marxism. The peer-reviewed series Marx,
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centuries, labour and social movements, Marxist analyses of contemporary
issues, and reception of Marxism in the world.
Attila Melegh
The Migration Turn

and Eastern Europe
A Global Historical Sociological Analysis
Attila Melegh
Institute of Social and Political
Sciences
Corvinus University of Budapest
Budapest, Hungary
Demographic Research Institute
Budapest, Hungary
ISSN 2524-7123 ISSN 2524-7131 (electronic)

Marx, Engels, and Marxisms
ISBN 978-3-031-14293-2 ISBN 978-3-031-14294-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14294-9
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Titles Published
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of Marx and Engels’s “German Ideology” Manuscripts, 2014.
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chapter,” 2014.
3. Alfonso Maurizio Iacono, The History and Theory of Fetishism,
2015.
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Critique of Marxism, 2016.
5. Domenico Losurdo, Class Struggle: A Political and Philosophical
History, 2016.
6. Frederick Harry Pitts, Critiquing Capitalism Today: New Ways to
Read Marx, 2017.
7. Ranabir Samaddar, Karl Marx and the Postcolonial Age, 2017.
8. George Comninel, Alienation and Emancipation in the Work of
Karl Marx, 2018.
9. Jean-Numa Ducange & Razmig Keucheyan (Eds.), The End of
the Democratic State: Nicos Poulantzas, a Marxism for the 21st
Century, 2018.
10. Robert X. Ware, Marx on Emancipation and Socialist Goals:
Retrieving Marx for the Future, 2018.
11. Xavier LaFrance & Charles Post (Eds.), Case Studies in the Origins
of Capitalism, 2018.
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vi TITLES PUBLISHED
12. John Gregson, Marxism, Ethics, and Politics: The Work of Alasdair
MacIntyre, 2018.
13. Vladimir Puzone & Luis Felipe Miguel (Eds.), The Brazilian
Left in the 21st Century: Conflict and Conciliation in Peripheral
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Political Theory, 2019.
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Metaphysics of Domination, 2019.
16. August H. Nimtz, Marxism versus Liberalism: Comparative Real-
Time Political Analysis, 2019.
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dini (Eds.), Financial Speculation and Fictitious Profits: A Marxist
Analysis, 2019.
18. Shaibal Gupta, Marcello Musto & Babak Amini (Eds.), Karl
Marx’s Life, Ideas, and Influences: A Critical Examination on the
Bicentenary, 2019.
19. Igor Shoikhedbrod, Revisiting Marx’s Critique of Liberalism:
Rethinking Justice, Legality, and Rights, 2019.
20. Juan Pablo Rodríguez, Resisting Neoliberal Capitalism in Chile:
The Possibility of Social Critique, 2019.
21. Kaan Kangal, Friedrich Engels and the Dialectics of Nature, 2020.
22. Victor Wallis, Socialist Practice: Histories and Theories, 2020.
23. Alfonso Maurizio Iacono, The Bourgeois and the Savage: A
Marxian Critique of the Image of the Isolated Individual in Defoe,
Turgot and Smith, 2020.
24. Terrell Carver, Engels before Marx, 2020.
25. Jean-Numa Ducange, Jules Guesde: The Birth of Socialism and
Marxism in France, 2020.
26. Antonio Oliva, Ivan Novara & Angel Oliva (Eds.), Marx and
Contemporary Critical Theory: The Philosophy of Real Abstraction,
2020.
27. Francesco Biagi, Henri Lefebvre’s Critical Theory of Space, 2020.
28. Stefano Petrucciani, The Ideas of Karl Marx: A Critical Introduc-
tion, 2020.
29. Terrell Carver, The Life and Thought of Friedrich Engels, 30 th
Anniversary Edition, 2020.
30. Giuseppe Vacca, Alternative Modernities: Antonio Gramsci’s Twen-
tieth Century, 2020.
TITLES PUBLISHED vii
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Raya Dunayevskaya’s Intersectional Marxism: Race, Gender, and
the Dialectics of Liberation, 2020.
32. Marco Di Maggio, The Rise and Fall of Communist Parties in
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34. Ryuji Sasaki, A New Introduction to Karl Marx: New Materialism,
Critique of Political Economy, and the Concept of Metabolism, 2021.
35. Kohei Saito (Ed.), Reexamining Engels’s Legacy in the 21st
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alienated World, 2021.
37. Marcello Musto, Karl Marx’s Writings on Alienation, 2021.
38. Michael Brie & Jörn Schütrumpf, Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolu-
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39. Stefano Petrucciani, Theodor W. Adorno’s Philosophy, Society, and
Aesthetics, 2021.
40. Miguel Vedda, Siegfried Kracauer, or, The Allegories of Improvisa-
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41. Ronaldo Munck, Rethinking Development: Marxist Perspectives,
2021.
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of Jean Jaurès: On Socialism, Pacifism and Marxism, 2021.
43. Elisa Marcobelli, Internationalism Toward Diplomatic Crisis: The
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Theory of “Labour Notes,” 2021.
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(Eds.), Wealth and Poverty in Contemporary Brazilian Capitalism,
2021.
49. Paolo Favilli, Historiography and Marxism: Innovations in Mid-
Century Italy, 2021.
viii TITLES PUBLISHED
50. Levy del Aguila Marchena, Communism, Political Power and

Personal Freedom in Marx, 2021.
51. V Geetha, Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar and the Question of Socialism
in India, 2021.
52. Satoshi Matsui, Normative Theories of Liberalism and Socialism:
Marxist Analysis of Values, 2022.
53. Kei Ehara (Ed.), Japanese Discourse on the Marxian Theory of
Finance, 2022.
54. Achim Szepanski, Financial Capital in the 21st Century, 2022.
55. Stephen Maher, Corporate Capitalism and the Integral State:
General Electric and a Century of American Power, 2022.
56. Rémy Herrera, Confronting Mainstream Economics to Overcome
Capitalism, 2022.
57. Peter McMylor, Graeme Kirkpatrick & Simin Fadaee (Eds.),
Marxism, Religion, and Emancipatory Politics, 2022.
58. Genevieve Ritchie, Sara Carpenter & Shahrzad Mojab (Eds.),
Marxism and Migration, 2022.
59. Fabio Perocco (Ed.), Racism in and for the Welfare State, 2022.
60. Dong-Min Rieu, A Mathematical Approach to Marxian Value
Theory: Time, Money, and Labor Productivity, 2022.
61. Adriana Petra, Intellectuals and Communist Culture: Itineraries,
Problems and Debates in Post-war Argentina, 2022.
Titles Forthcoming
Vesa Oittinen, Marx’s Russian Moment

Kolja Lindner, Marx, Marxism and the Question of Eurocentrism
George C. Comninel, The Feudal Foundations of Modern Europe
Spencer A. Leonard, Marx, the India Question, and the Crisis of
Cosmopolitanism
Joe Collins, Applying Marx’s Capital to the 21st century
Jeong Seongjin, Korean Capitalism in the 21st Century: Marxist Analysis
and Alternatives
Marcello Mustè, Marxism and Philosophy of Praxis: An Italian Perspective
from Labriola to Gramsci
Shannon Brincat, Dialectical Dialogues in Contemporary World Politics: A
Meeting of Traditions in Global Comparative Philosophy
Francesca Antonini, Reassessing Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire: Dictatorship,
State, and Revolution
Thomas Kemple, Capital after Classical Sociology: The Faustian Lives of
Social Theory
Xavier Vigna, A Political History of Factories in France: The Workers’
Insubordination of 1968
Marie-Cecile Bouju, A Political History of the Publishing Houses of the
French Communist Party
Mauro Buccheri, Radical Humanism for the Left: The Quest for Meaning
in Late Capitalism
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x TITLES FORTHCOMING
Tamás Krausz, Eszter Bartha (Eds.), Socialist Experiences in Eastern

Europe: A Hungarian Perspective
Martin Cortés, Marxism, Time and Politics: On the Autonomy of the
Political
João Antonio de Paula, Huga da Gama Cerqueira, Eduardo da Motta
e Albuquer & Leonardo de Deus, Marxian Economics for the 21st
Century: Revaluating Marx’s Critique of Political Economy
Zhi Li, The Concept of the Individual in the Thought of Karl Marx
Lelio Demichelis, Marx, Alienation and Techno-capitalism
Salvatore Prinzi, Representation, Expression, and Institution: The Philos-
ophy of Merleau-Ponty and Castoriadis
Agon Hamza, Slavoj Žižek and the Reconstruction of Marxism
Éric Aunoble, French Views on the Russian Revolution
Terrell Carver, Smail Rapic (Eds.), Friedrich Engels for the 21st Century:
Perspectives and Problems
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Socialist Youth
Alexandros Chrysis, The Marx of Communism: Setting Limits in the Realm
of Communism
Paul Raekstad, Karl Marx’s Realist Critique of Capitalism: Freedom,
Alienation, and Socialism
Alexis Cukier, Democratic Work: Radical Democracy and the Future of
Labour
Christoph Henning, Theories of Alienation: From Rousseau to the Present
Daniel Egan, Capitalism, War, and Revolution: A Marxist Analysis
Emanuela Conversano, Capital from Afar: Anthropology and Critique of
Political Economy in the Late Marx
Marcello Musto, Rethinking Alternatives with Marx
Vincenzo Mele, City and Modernity in George Simmel and Walter
Benjamin: Fragments of Metropolis
David Norman Smith, Self-Emancipation: Marx’s Unfinished Theory of the
Working Class
José Ricardo Villanueva Lira, Marxism and the Origins of International
Relations
Bertel Nygaard, Marxism, Labor Movements, and Historiography
Marcos Del Roio, Gramsci and the Emancipation of the Subaltern Classes
Marcelo Badaró, The Working Class from Marx to Our Times
Tomonaga Tairako, A New Perspective on Marx’s Philosophy and Political
Economy
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Matthias Bohlender, Anna-Sophie Schönfelder, & Matthias Spekker,

Truth and Revolution in Marx’s Critique of Society
Mauricio Vieira Martins, Marx, Spinoza and Darwin on Philosophy:
Against Religious Perspectives of Transcendence
Jean Vigreux, Roger Martelli, & Serge Wolikow, One Hundred Years of
History of the French Communist Party
Aditya Nigam, Border-Marxisms and Historical Materialism
Fred Moseley, Marx’s Theory of Value in Chapter 1 of Capital: A Critique
of Heinrich’s Value-Form Interpretation
Armando Boito, The State, Politics, and Social Classes: Theory and History
Anjan Chakrabarti & Anup Dhar, World of the Third and Hegemonic
Capital: Between Marx and Freud
Hira Singh, Annihilation of Caste in India: Ambedkar, Ghandi, and Marx
Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro, An Introduction to Ecosocialism
Acknowledgements
I started writing this book in January 2017, and many people have
assisted me in this endeavor ever since. Diana Mishkova, the head of
the Sofia-based Institute of Advanced Studies, invited me to be a guest
for two months in 2017, which set me on this intellectual journey and
was the actual starting point for the research that I summarize in this
book. Chris Hann, who has always been a great inspiration for my ideas,
offered me a four-month stay in Halle at the Max Planck Institute of
Social Anthropology in 2019, where not only him but also many of
his outstanding colleagues commented on my early arguments, proving
particularly formative. Ulf Brunnbauer has also been very helpful and
assisted me in various ways as part of a collaboration with The Leibniz
Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg. I also
owe a lot to some of my critics and readers. Just to name a few of
them: Iván Szelényi, Antal Örkény, Tamás Krausz, Erzsébet Szalai, Raquel
Varela, József Böröcz, Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro, Péter Szigeti, György
Lengyel, Lika Tsuladze, Ágnes Hárs, András Kováts, Márk Éber, Attila
Antal, Katalin Kovács, Beáta Nagy, Endre Sík, Dorottya Mendly, Dóra
Gábriel, Ayman Salem, Kari Polanyi Levitt, Dragana Avramov, Robert
Cliquet, Sonia Lucarelli, Michela Ceccoruli, MIhály Sárkány, Joseph
Salukvadze, Giorgi Gogsadze, Arland Thornton, Tamás Kiss, Radhika
Desai, and Margie Mendell made valuable comments on my work in
various phases. I owe a lot to two friends and colleagues who have sadly
since passed away: I miss the conversations and, very importantly, the
xiii
xiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
“vicious” remarks of Claude Karnoouh and Győző Lugosi. It would

have been so good to remain in further discussion with them. I am
especially grateful to Margit Feischmidt, who, in addition to making
careful and thorough observations about my text from both professional
and linguistic points of view, has been a great, supportive, and patient
companion throughout this period. I am also grateful to my colleagues
who assisted me with data and methodological issues: namely, thanks to
Marcell Kovács, Zoltán Csányi, László Zöldi, Attila Papp Z., Benedek
Kovács, Csaba Tóth Gy., and Lajos Bálint. I owe a lot to my workplaces,
my outstanding colleagues. Special thanks to Petra Aczél, Tamás Bartus,
and Zoltán Szántó at Corvinus University, and Zsolt Spéder and Péter
Őri at the Demographic Research Institute. Their help was also essential.
My greatest respect is due to Ágnes Törő and Júlia Boros, who worked
on the Hungarian version of the text, which helped me immensely with
improving the English version as well. I also benefited from related joint
research projects, during which I cooperated with Márton Hunyadi, Anna
Vancsó, and Zoltán Ginelli, among others. Special thanks to the extraordi-
nary community of the Polányi Center; they gave me a lot of inspiration.
At the end of this book project, Kyra Lyublyanovics was not only an
excellent translator, but her tireless editorial help and remarks shaped and
sharpened my arguments and made this book a book. Concerning the
final phase of editing, I would like to express my gratitude to Simon
Milton, who polished the text and whose meticulous corrections have
made the text readable and far more exact.
I am also grateful to my kids, who not only helped me at certain points,
but who were also patient with me.
Nevertheless, none of the above persons can be blamed for any
mistakes or confusion that remain in the book; this responsibility is solely
mine.
Praise for The Migration Turn and
Eastern Europe
“A timely and most sharp Polányian and Marxist unpacking and contex-
tualisation of migration and population politics since the 1980s, Attila
Melegh’s precious and thorough analytical intervention defogs migration
issues from the pervasive false choice between chauvinistic delirium and
callous utilitarianism that throttles the current public imaginary in much
of the world. He accomplishes this politically important demystification
by shedding much needed light on the ruthless capitalist roots behind
the latest intensification of worldwide mass dislocations.”
—Salvatore Engel Di-Mauro, Professor, Department of Geography, SUNY
New Paltz. Editor-in-Chief of Capitalism Nature Socialism
“Having passed from socialist modernization to capitalist peripherality,

embattled nations in Eastern Europe have come to exemplify new
patterns of exploitative mobility, accompanied by populist socio-political
discourses linking migration to population management. Attila Melegh’s
holistic approach to these dynamics is global in its coverage, rigorous
empirically, sophisticated theoretically, and deeply humanist in its ethical
inspiration.”
—Chris Hann, Emeritus Director, Max Planck Institute for Social
Anthropology, Fellow, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge
xv
xvi PRAISE FOR THE MIGRATION TURN AND EASTERN EUROPE
“An outstanding book that is extremely valuable from a scholarly point

of view. It provides a global analysis of migration issues, on a Marxian
basis, focusing on Eastern Europe. The author places the question of
migration in the context of the universal development of the last half
century, with extraordinary historical and theoretical knowledge. This is
an indispensable book in the literature on the subject.”
—Tamás Krausz, Professor Emeritus, Eötvös Lóránd University, winner of
the Isaac Deutscher prize in 2015
“This is an essential book. An interdisciplinary analysis of one of the most

challenging and complex subjects of our time—migrations under decline
capitalism. The book brings in-depth knowledge of migration theories,
detailed empirical data, and numerous case studies from Eastern Europe.”
“Attila Melegh is one of the most specialized author of migrations,
with this book we have a Manual to understand the management of the
world workforce; also, central, going beyond numbers, the impact in the
way of live of millions of people in the world; the rise f central political
questions (extreme right chauvinism and resistance to this); we find in
this serious, dense oeuvre clues for transformation of the world in a sense
of equality, the end of inequalities and solidarity.”
—Raquel Varela, Labour Historian, Professor Universidade Nova de
Lisboa
“What has astonished me when reading Attila Melegh’s new book is that
it succeeds in addressing so many of the key questions of contemporary
migration studies, across a vast canvas, and yet remains highly accessible
and readable—I devoured it in a single sitting. Whether in the interpre-
tation of migration debates or analysis of migration data, Melegh’s book
brims with insight and theoretical curiosity. His theses on migration in the
age of global marketisation, and on the role of Eastern European regimes
in promulgating a xenophobic response, are major contributions.”
—Gareth Dale, is a Reader in Political Economy, Brunel University
Contents
1 Introduction: Trillion-Dollar Bill or a Nightmare? 1

1.1 A Polarizing Debate on Migration 2
1.2 Formulating the Problem; Overview of the Analysis 8
1.3 General Theoretical Questions and Hypotheses 10
1.3.1 A Dynamic Unity of Historical Processes 10
1.3.2 The Concept of Marketization 11
1.3.3 Lukács: Reification 13
1.3.4 Gramsci: Hegemony and Historical-Political
Blocs 14
1.3.5 Polányi: Double Movement, Fictitious
Commodity, and Embeddedness 16
1.3.6 The Social Background of Migration Conflicts
and Competition 18
1.3.7 Inner Reflexivity 19
Bibliography 20
2 The Migration Turn and Demographic Discourses
in the 1980s 27
2.1 The Migration Turn from the 1980s Onwards
and Opening-Up to Globalization 27
2.2 The Internal Tensions and Contradictions of Global
Population Discourses in the 1980s Concerning
Migration 30
xvii
xviii CONTENTS
2.2.1 Historical Introduction. Free Markets

and an Abortion Ban Instead of Progress:
Neoconservatism and the New Era 30
2.3 Discursive Patterns of the Elites, Biopolitics,
and the Opening-Up to Globalization 33
2.3.1 Biopolitics, Transnational Demography
and Migration Discourses: A Note on Sources,
Concepts, and Methodology 33
2.3.2 The Rise of Migration as a Distinct Discursive
Category in the 1960s and 1970s: National
Modernization and Urban Migration 39
2.3.3 Crisis and Coloniality: The Malthusian
Discourses in Population Policy
and Demographic Analyses 44
2.3.4 From Internal to External Migration:
Immigration Panic and the Ambivalence
of Migration as a Crisis Management Tool
in Malthusian Discourse 51
2.3.5 Demographic Transition and Migration
in the 1980s. Further Contradictions 58
2.3.6 Socialist Modernization Discourses
and Demographic Sovereignty in the 1980s 66
2.3.7 Conservative Demographic Discourses
and Migration in the 1980s 74
2.3.8 Ethnic-Narodnik Discourses Based on Ethnic
Competition and the Question of Migration 78
2.3.9 Revitalization Discourses and Migration 82
2.3.10 Developmentalist Critical Discourses
and Migration 87
2.3.11 Discursive Patterns in the 1980s: An Overview
of Discursive Elements and Their Historical
Consequences 93
Bibliography 95
3 Historical Material Structures and Processes 107
3.1 Demographic Changes, Increasing Welfare
Competition and Global Marketization 107
3.1.1 Market Euphoria 107
CONTENTS xix
3.1.2 Towards Historical-Materialist Macro-Models

of Migration 108
3.1.3 Has Emigration Globally Increased? Changes
in the Proportions and Number of Emigrants
After 1990 111
3.1.4 The Rise in the Intensity of Migration
and Population Aging: Shortages in Care
Work and Increasing Competition for Welfare 118
3.1.5 The Rise in Migration and Cumulative
Causation 125
3.1.6 Modernization Factors and Increasing
Migration Capacity 126
3.1.7 Rising Levels of Migration: Factors Associated
with World-Systems Theories 132
3.1.8 Further Potential Factors: Unemployment
and the Evolution of Wage Differences 137
3.1.9 Opening-Up to Global Markets and Migration
Levels: The Construction of Multivariate
Historical Models 141
3.2 Why Europe? Europe’s Place in the World’s
Demographic, Economic, and Migration Processes 147
3.2.1 Key Macro-Processes Related to the Migration
Turn in Europe 148
3.2.2 Net Migration on a Continental Level 150
3.2.3 The Historical Evolution of Global Migration
Links Between 1990 and 2010: Changes
in the Migration Network of Europe
and the Other Continents 152
3.2.4 The Historical Conjunction Between
the Increase of Migration, Population Decline,
and Economic Marginalization 161
3.2.5 Was It Really Such a Great Shock? Some
Spatial Aspects of the Most Recent Refugee
Crisis and Europe’s Involvement in Granting
Asylum 164
3.3 Why Eastern Europe? The Place of Eastern Europe
in the Demographic, Economic, and Migration
Processes of the World 172
xx CONTENTS
3.3.1 Neoliberal Capitalism and the Eastern

European Transformation: In the Footsteps
of Polányi 172
3.3.2 Net Migration Patterns Within Europe 174
3.3.3 Eastern Europe and Marketization:
Population Decline, Unequal Exchange,
and Emigration 178
3.4 Varieties of Migratory Capitalisms Within Eastern
Europe and Key Elements of a Potential Typology 185
3.4.1 East-Central European Countries in Defense
of Relative Prosperity: The Shift from Sending
Country to Destination Status in the Richest
Countries of the Former Socialist Bloc (Type
1: Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia,
and Slovenia) 189
3.4.2 Sending and Receiving: Fictitious Migration
Exchange and the Migration Competition
Hypothesis in the East-Central European
Group, with Special Reference to Hungary 201
3.4.3 The Globalization Shock and Eastern
European Countries in an Emigration Trap
(Type 2: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland,
Romania, and Serbia) 211
3.4.4 Diverging Migratory Capitalisms
of Post-Soviet States: From Managed
Neoliberalism to Total Collapse: Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Armenia,
Georgia, and Ukraine (Type 3) 219
3.4.5 Transformation Crises in Ukraine, Moldavia,
Armenia, and Georgia (Type 3) 227
3.4.6 Summary of the Historical Material
Background 232
Bibliography 236
4 Discursive Changes 253
4.1 Revolt of the Masses? Geo-Cultural Maps, Blocs,
and the Evolution of Public Views in Eastern European
Societies 253
CONTENTS xxi
4.2 Growing Fears of Migration or Growing Dissent

in Europe? Further Opinion Polls and Divisions
on the Continent 259
4.3 Marketization and the Discourses of Global
and Professional Elites 268
4.3.1 The Stagnating Importance of Migration
as a Topic 268
4.3.2 Politics of Migration and Growing
Polarization in Global Population Policies 272
4.4 International Migration as an Abstract Market
Category and the Discursive Context of the Polarizing
Debate 274
4.4.1 From National Migration Markets to Global
Markets: Establishing Migration as a General
Market Category 274
4.4.2 The Theoretical Background of Migration
as an Abstract Market Category: Reification,
Fictitious Commodities, Fictitious Exchanges,
and Neoliberal Rationality 279
4.4.3 The Bloc in Support of Marketization, and Its
Actors: Market Rationality and the Idea
of Exploiting Migration as Supported
by World Bank Documents 283
4.4.4 The Utilitarian Management of Migration
and the Evolution of Population Discourses
and Policies 293
4.4.5 The Anti-migrant Bloc: Fears and Changes 315
Bibliography 332
5 Conclusion 343
5.1 Eastern Europe and the Fear of Population
Replacement 343
5.2 Global Implications 351
Bibliography 354
Appendix 357
Index 421
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Frequency of the term “migration debate” in Google

Books database between 1960 and 2019 (Source Ngram
Viewer, 2021) 7
Fig. 2.1 Relative changes in the number of migrants and global
population, 1960–1990 (Source Global Bilateral
Migration [2021]) 28
Fig. 2.2 Frequency of the terms “migration,” “emigration,”
and “immigration” in digitized English-language books,
1800–2019 (Source Ngram Viewer [2021]) 40
Fig. 2.3 Relative and absolute number of documents in World
Bank sources containing the term “migration,”
1947–1990 (Source World Bank [2020]) 41
Fig. 2.4 Changes in the relative frequency of the terms
“migration,” “modernization,” and “urbanization”
between 1960 and 1990 in the Google Books corpus
(Source Ngram Viewer [2021]) 44
Fig. 2.5 Number of periodicals focusing on migration launched
between 1960 and 1990, according to social scientific
databases of libraries (Source Author’s calculations based
on the Electronic Journals Library in the Max Planck
Institute for Social Anthropology. Accessed: June 5, 2019) 45
Fig. 2.6 Number of papers according to geographical areas
examined in the journal Demográfia, 1958–1968
and 1980–1990 (Source Author’s calculation) 74
xxiii
xxiv LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 3.1 Change in the proportion of the migrant stock living

outside their country of birth to the total population
(migration rate, %), 1990–2019 (Source United Nations
[2019a: International Migrant Stoc; United Nations
2019b]) 112
Fig. 3.2 Changes in global migrant stock living outside their
country of birth, absolute numbers, 1990–2019 (Source
United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock]) 113
Fig. 3.3 Absolute number of vulnerable people in the world,
1980–2019, UNHCR data (per thousand people)
(Source UNHCR [2019] and United Nations [2019c:
International Migrant Stock]) 116
Fig. 3.4 Proportion of refugees and asylum seekers in the total
population and the total stock of migrants, 1990 (Source
United Nations [2019c: International Migrant Stock]) 117
Fig. 3.5 Changes in per capita health expenditure and gross
domestic product, 2000–2017 (2000 = 100%) (Source
Author’s calculation based on World Bank [2020]) 120
Fig. 3.6 Redistribution rates and changes in the old-age
dependency ratio, 2002–2017 (2000 = 100%) (Source
Author’s calculation based on World Bank [2020]) 121
Fig. 3.7 Changes in the rural population and agricultural
employment rates, 1990–2018 (Source Author’s
calculation based on World Bank [2020]) 122
Fig. 3.8 Total global fertility rate and migration rate, 1990–2019
(Source United Nations [2019a: International Migrant
Stock, 2019b: World Population Prospects]) 128
Fig. 3.9 Global GDP per capita (constant 2015 USD)
and emigration rates, 1990–2019 (Source United Nations
[2019a: International Migrant Stock] and UNCTAD
[2020]) 129
Fig. 3.10 Inequality of world’s countries in terms of GDP
per capita: Standard deviation (2015 constant USD)
and relative standard deviation (%) of GDP per capita
of world’s countries, 1995–2019 (Source Author’s
calculation based on UNCTAD [2020]) 131
Fig. 3.11 Average number of years spent at school and global
emigration rate, 1990–2019 (Source United Nations
[2019a: International Migrant Stock] and Wittgenstein
Centre Human Capital Data Explorer [2022]) 132
LIST OF FIGURES xxv
Fig. 3.12 Migration rate and inflow of foreign direct investment (9

year moving average) and inward stock 10 years earlier,
as a proportion of GDP, 1990–2019 (Source UNCTAD
[2020] and United Nations [2019a: International
Migrant Stock, 2019b: World Population Prospects]) 136
Fig. 3.13 Exports as a proportion of GDP and global emigration
rates, 1990–2019 (Source UNCTAD [2020] and United
Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock, 2019,
2019b: World Population Prospects]) 137
Fig. 3.14 Global labor-force participation rates for men and women
aged 15–64, ILO model 1990–2019 (Source World Bank
[2020]) 139
Fig. 3.15 Migration rate and unemployment, 1990–2019 (Source
World Bank [2020]) 140
Fig. 3.16 FDI (inward flow) as a proportion of GDP, 1990–2018
(Source UNCTAD [2020]) 149
Fig. 3.17 Net migration rates in major regions, 1950–2015
(per 1000 inhabitants) (Source United Nations [2017b:
World Population Prospects]) 151
Fig. 3.18 Proportion of migrant stock in Europe in relation
to the total population, and the share of global migrant
stock in the global population, 1990–2015 (Source
United Nations [2015: International Migrant Stock]) 162
Fig. 3.19 Population, migration (migrant stock as related
to the total population), and economic weight
of Europe and Central Asia, 1990–2015 (Source Author’s
calculations based on United Nations [2017a: Trends],
World Bank [2020], and United Nations [2017b: World
Population Prospects]) 163
Fig. 3.20 Regional distribution of refugee applications registered
in Europe by country of origin, 1985–2018 (Source
Eurostat [2019]) 165
Fig. 3.21 Refugee applications by geographical area as a share
of total applications, 1985–2018 (Source Eurostat [2019] 166
Fig. 3.22 Absolute number of refugees crossing borders and asylum
seekers in the world and in Europe (Source United
Nations [2019c: International Migrant Stock, 2019]) 167
Fig. 3.23 First asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States
in 2014 by sending country, over 10,000 applications.
Absolute numbers (total: 563,345) (Source Eurostat
[2019]) 168
xxvi LIST OF FIGURES

Absolute numbers (total: 1,257,150) (Source Eurostat
[2019]) 169
Absolute numbers (total: 654,900) (Source Eurostat
[2019]) 170
in 2019 by sending country, over 10,000 applications
(Source Eurostat [2019]) 171
Fig. 3.27 Net migration of post-socialist Eastern European
countries (per 1000 people), 1950–2020 (Source United
Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects]) 175
Fig. 3.28 Net migration of countries within non-socialist Central
and Western Europe, 1950–2020 (migration flow/1000,
absolute numbers), 1950–2020 (Source United Nations
[2019b: World Population Prospects]) 176
Fig. 3.29 Net migration of Northern European countries in,
1950–2020 (migration flow/1000, absolute numbers),
1950–2020 (Source United Nations [2019b: World
Fig. 3.30 Net migration of Southern European countries,
1950–2020 (migration flow/1000, absolute numbers),
Fig. 3.31 Rise of emigration and increase in FDI (%) in Eastern
Europe: FDI-to-GDP ratio (1980–2010) and outward
migration stock ratios, delayed by 10 years (1990–2019)
in Eastern European countries (Source United Nations
[2019a: International Migrant Stock] and World Bank
[2020]) 180
Fig. 3.32 Population change in Eastern European countries
between 1960 and 2019 compared to 1990 (1990 =
100%). Interannual estimates (Source World Bank [2020]) 181
Fig. 3.33 Taxes and social contributions as a proportion of GDP
(%) in select Eastern European countries and the EU
as a whole, 1993–2017 (Source Author’s calculation,
LIST OF FIGURES xxvii
Fig. 3.34 Social expenditure as a proportion of GDP (%)

in countries in Eastern Europe and in destination
countries, 1999–2018 (Source OECD Social Spending
[2021]) 185
Fig. 3.35 Proportion of foreign-born immigrants in the population,
1990–2019. For the Czech Republic, the data indicate
foreign citizenship (Source Author’s calculation based
on United Nations [2019a: International Migrant Stock]) 186
Fig. 3.36 Proportion of emigrants born in Eastern Europe
in relation to the sending population, 1990–2019 (Source
Author’s calculation, United Nations [2019b: World
Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant
Stock]) 187
Fig. 3.37 Net migration East-Central European countries (per 1000
people), 1950–2010 (Source United Nations [2019b:
World Population Prospects]) 189
Fig. 3.38 FDI-to-GDP ratio in 1980–2010 and the proportion
of emigration stock to sending population in 1990–2019
(Source Author’s calculation, World Bank [2020], United
Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects, 2019a:
International Migrant Stock]) 192
Fig. 3.39 Contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP,
1990–2010 (Source World Bank [2012]) 194
Fig. 3.40 Immigrating foreign citizens and population size
in the Czech Republic, 2000–2019 (Source OECD
Statistics [2021] and World Bank [2020]) 196
in Slovakia, 2000–2019 (Source OECD Statistics [2021]
and World Bank [2020]) 197
in Slovenia, 2000–2019 (Source OECD Statistics [2021]
and World Bank [2020]) 198
in Hungary, 1980–2017 (Source Hungarian Central
Statistical Office, demographic tables) 200
Fig. 3.44 Distribution of Hungarian emigrants by highest level
of education compared to the resident population
in 2013 (Labor-force survey) (Source Blaskó and Gödri
[2014] and Melegh et al. [2014]) 204
Fig. 3.45 Distribution of Hungarian emigrants according to their
activity in 2013 (Source Blaskó and Gödri [2014]
and Melegh et al. [2014]) 205
xxviii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 3.46 Distribution of foreign-born population living in Hungary

in 2016 according to their countries of origin (Source
Author’s calculation, HCSO Microcensus [2016]) 207
Fig. 3.47 Level of education and competence in the Hungarian
language for individuals aged 25–64 in 2016 (Source
Fig. 3.48 Share of population aged 25 and over having completed
tertiary education by time of arrival and country of origin
in 2016 in Hungary (Source Author’s calculation, HCSO
Microcensus [2016]) 209
Fig. 3.49 Employment rates of immigrants in Hungary in the age
group 15–64 according to time of arrival, country
of origin, and Hungarian language skills in 2016 (Source
Fig. 3.50 Net migration in countries that remained sending regions
(per 1000 people), 1950–2010 (Source United Nations
[2019b: World Population Prospects]) 212
Fig. 3.51 FDI-to-GDP ratio in 1980–2010 and proportion
of emigrants relative to the sending population,
1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculations, World Bank
[2020] and United Nations [2019b: World Population
Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock]) 216
Fig. 3.52 Net migration in countries that used to be destination
areas but turned into sending regions (per 1000 people),
of emigrants in 1990–2019 in Estonia (Source Author’s
calculation, World Bank [2020], United Nations [2019b:
World Population Prospects], and United Nations
[2019a: International Migrant Stock]) 222
of emigrants in 1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation,
World Bank (2020) and United Nations [2019b: World
Population Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant
Stock]) 226
Fig. 3.55 Net migration in countries that used to be immigrant
destinations but turned into sending regions: Ukraine,
Georgia, Moldavia, and Armenia, 1950–2010 (Source
United Nations [2019b: World Population Prospects]) 228
LIST OF FIGURES xxix
Fig. 3.56 FDI-to-GDP ratio, 1980–2010 and share of emigration,

1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation, World Bank
[2020] and United Nations [2019b: World Population
Prospects, 2019a: International Migrant Stock]) 230
Fig. 4.1 Proportion of respondents who indicated that they
do not want immigrants and foreign workers
as neighbors. Average national, population-weighted
rates by region and period 1990–2020 (Source Author’s
calculations based on European Values Study [2017a,
2017b] and Haerpfer et al. [2014, 2022]) 255
Fig. 4.2 Rejection of immigrants and foreign workers as neighbors.
Average national rates for longer periods in Eastern
Europe and post-Soviet member states, 1990–2020
(Source European Values Study [2017a, 2017b]
and Haerpfer et al. [2014, 2022]) 258
Fig. 4.3 Weighted average proportion of respondents
in comparable European countries answering that “Only
few or no immigrants should be allowed to enter
from non-European countries,” ESS 2002–2018 (Source
Author’s calculation based on European Social Survey
[2018]) 261
Fig. 4.4 Proportion of respondents who said that only few
or no immigrants should be allowed to enter
Europe from non-European countries, by country,
ESS 2002–2018 (Source Author’s calculation based
on European Social Survey [2018]) 262
Fig. 4.5 Changes in rejection of migrants from non-European
poor countries, in 2002–2006 and 2016–2018 (difference
in percentage points) (Source Author’s calculation based
on the European Social Survey [2018]) 263
Fig. 4.6 Proportion of respondents considering migration
an important European or national issue, 2004–2020
(Source Author’s calculation, Eurobarometer [2021].
*When two surveys existed, the rounded arithmetic
average is shown in the figure) 264
Fig. 4.7 Attitudes towards migrants in Hungary, Romania,
and in the Hungarian communities of Transylvania
(Source Unpublished data provided by Tamás Kiss [2016]) 267
Fig. 4.8 Mentions of the words “migration,” “emigration,”
and “immigration” in Google Books between 1960
and 2019 (Source Ngram Viewer [2021]) 269
xxx LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 4.9 Number and proportion (%) of documents that used

the term “migration” between 1991 and 2019 (Source
Fig. 4.10 Proportion of articles on the topic of migration
in the Population Index bibliography, 1986–1999 (Source
Author’s calculation based on Population Index [2000]) 271
Fig. 4.11 Direction of immigration policies (Source World
Population Policies [2015, p. 110]) 272
Fig. 4.12 Nature of emigration policies (Source World Population
Policies [2015, p. 122]) 273
Fig. 4.13 Frequency of the terms “international migration”
and “urban migration” in the Google Books database
(Source Ngram Viewer [2021]) 275
Fig. 4.14 Launch dates of migration-themed periodicals,
1990–2019 (Source Author’s calculation based
on the Electronic Journals Library at the Max Planck
Institute for Social Anthropology) 278
Fig. 5.1 Prevalence of main discursive formations and themes
in the Hungarian press dealing with migration,
2014–2018 (Proportion of occurrences in %; single
articles may contain multiple formations) (Source Melegh
et al., 2019) 345
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Themes addressed and terms used in World Bank

documents, 1947–1989 42
Table 2.2 Themes of articles referring to Malthus in Population
Index 1986–1990 50
Table 3.1 Number of refugees and asylum seekers, 1980–2019 115
Table 3.2 Estimated number of migrants (per 1000 inhabitants)
within and between regions, 2005–2010 159
Table 3.3 Per capita GDP (constant 2015 US dollars)
in East-Central European countries, relative
to the world average (1990–2010) 190
Table 3.4 Agricultural employment as a share of total employment
in the sample countries (1990–2010) 193
Table 3.5 Immigration of foreign citizens to Hungary, 1980–2010 199
Table 3.6 Activity rates of 15–64-year-olds by country of birth
in Hungary, 2016 209
Table 3.7 Per capita GDP (in constant 2015 US dollars) for each
country of this type relative to the world average
(1990–2010) 214
Table 3.8 Proportion of agricultural employment in the sample
countries (1990–2010) 217
Table 3.9 Estonia’s GDP per capita (constant 2015 US dollars)
as a share of the world average (1990–2010) 221
Table 3.10 Per capita GDP (constant 2015 US dollars) of each
country in this type relative to the world average
(1990–2010) 224
xxxi
xxxii LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.11 Proportion of agricultural employment in the sample

countries (1990–2010) 226
Table 3.12 Per capita GDP (constant 2015 US dollars) of Type 3
countries relative to the world average (1990–2010) 229
Table 3.13 Share of agricultural employment in the sample
countries (1990–2010) 231
Table 4.1 Aggregate variables of attitudes towards immigrants
in some European countries 262
Table 4.2 Themes and terminology in World Bank documents,
1990–2019 277
Table 4.3 The 2015 population policies of countries classified
in 1986 as following Malthusian discourses 294
in 1986 as following the demographic transition
discourse 298
in 1986 as following socialist modernization discourses 301
in 1986 as conservative discourses 307
in 1986 as following the revitalization discourses 309
in 1986 as following the pro-development discourses 311
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Trillion-Dollar Bill

or a Nightmare?
This book concentrates on a historical sociological analysis of the migra-

tion turn that has been occurring since the 1980s until the present day.
In this global historical analysis, the ultimate focus will be on Eastern
Europe, but in a global and historical context, in order to show what
historical interactions have been evolving, and what historical role has
been taken by various actors in the process we call the migration turn.
In this book, the term “migration turn” means, on the one hand, that
globally, and in many places locally, the intensity of emigration and
immigration has substantially increased as a result of globalization and,
very importantly, it means the further marketization of societies. On
the other hand, the migration turn means that migration as a discursive
theme and category has been reconfigured and has gained new mean-
ings, and previous population discourses have been recomposed in the
period concerned. The population discourses have not only changed, but
certain discursive blocs have been created and the debate on migration
has become increasingly polarized. Thus, migration has become not only
a key public and scientific issue but also an engine of political change,
dividing elites and public opinion throughout the world. In this multi-
layered and complex migration turn, Eastern Europe has played an active
role, which historical contribution deserves special attention. This book
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer 1

Nature Switzerland AG 2023
A. Melegh, The Migration Turn and Eastern Europe, Marx, Engels,
and Marxisms, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14294-9_1
2 A. MELEGH
ventures to undertake this task via analyzing some key historical, socio-
material, and discursive processes. Due to the heated and controversial
debates presently ongoing, it was important to revisit some of the most
basic data and their implications. This was an exercise not without its
surprises.
1.1 A Polarizing Debate on Migration

In the last few years, the issue of migration has come into the focus
of political debate worldwide, and a migration turn has taken place.
Virtually all influential media outlets report on migration issues inces-
santly. Global TV channels, Western, Asian, African, Latin American as
well as Russian and international newspapers and news outlets address
on daily basis problems associated with migration and immigration, as
well as emigration, migration politics, borders, walls, fences, migrant
workers, and refugees. Analyses and reports show strong tendencies to
polarization. Factions emerge, and debates become increasingly heated
and vigorous. Migration as a process and migrants as abstract, en masse
subjects are no longer embedded socially and discursively into their proper
societal contexts, but have been elevated to a mythological status. During
these debates, migrants and the groups allegedly supporting and control-
ling them have become mythical enemies or heroes of development who
deserve recognition along with the social groups that integrate them.
Concepts associated with migration and migrants embody and reflect
complex phenomena in society—like the “great replacement,” the death
of nations or of Europe, the borderless world, anti-globalization, racism,
and market and developmental anomalies—in accordance with the faction
that uses them. A growing number of political actors view the problems,
processes, and agents of migration as a mythical battleground of identity
politics, without real social context.
The Economist, a newspaper dedicated to the free market, has argued
in editorials and video reports that migration is not only acceptable,
but may be a valuable asset, representing an easy means of supporting
economic policies. The influential financial newspaper released a video
entitled “How migration could make the world richer” in November
2019 (The Economist, 2019). This video demonstrates that, in their view,
flinging the gates open to migrants is not only an economic and demo-
graphic necessity and a moral obligation in defense of the vulnerable, but
has the potential to generate billions of dollars in profit. This migration
1 INTRODUCTION: TRILLION-DOLLAR BILL ... 3
should be properly managed in order to secure the gains and cohesion of

societies and that of the European Union (The Economist, 2018).
In a similar spirit, the George W. Bush Institute released another
analysis in 2016 stating that the advantages of immigration outweigh
its costs (Orrenius, 2016). In 2018, the ILO, a United Nations
agency, and OECD, representing wealthy countries, tabled political
proposals for developing countries that would enable them to exploit
the “development potentials” inherent in immigration that other-
wise are wasted in relation to the informal labor market (OECD,
2018).
In addition to economic advantages, potential demographic benefits
are also frequently brought up in connection with migration processes.
The 2015 International Migration Report issued by the UN in 2016
stated that international migration significantly slows down or can even
stop population loss in many parts of the world (IMR 2015, 2016). Thus,
it slows down population aging and has the potential to remedy some of
its consequences (IMR 2015, 2016, 22–23). Should migration take place
in a regulated and well-managed way, it may contribute to the realiza-
tion of millennium development goals (IMR 2015, 2016, 25). According
to population projections about the European Union, growing migration
itself is still insufficient and population aging must be tackled by the more
efficient integration of immigrants as well as by addressing fertility prob-
lems (Amran et al., 2019). It is not only international organizations and
research centers that focus on this problem, but investors and business
circles also explore these issues. For example, financial policy analysts at
the Swedish Riksbank argue that immigration has the potential to solve
problems posed by the “pressures” of an aging population (“Citizenship
Amendment Bill,” 2019). The online magazine Quartz that writes for
business circles stated that for Eastern European countries that have lost
a significant portion of their population, such as Lithuania, Latvia, and
Romania, immigration would be advantageous and a necessity (Mohdin,
2018).
Views in support of so-called replacement migration have often been
confronted with fierce opposition, and some consider migration a night-
mare that will lead to a complete exchange of populations. In November
2016, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute re-published an opinion
that had originally been written for the Huffington Post, in which the
Rohingya refugee situation was interpreted as a migration nightmare
(Coyne, 2016). From the early 2010s onwards, a theory by Renaud
4 A. MELEGH
Camus called the Le Grand Remplacement (great replacement), which

expresses fears of an exchange of “White Europeans” for migrants, has
increasingly gained a foothold. This idea has become a central theme for
many right-wing extremist parties and groups across North America and
Europe. A notable example of the latter is the Génération identitaire, a
now banned movement that started off in France in 2012 but which has
since spread to many countries that aims to protect “white Christianity”
by violent means.
The fear of migration as a process of the demographic replacement
of “races” is not limited to Western nationalists. It is also prevalent in
the words and acts of politicians and groups supporting Hindu funda-
mentalism—e.g., in connection with the recent immigration laws in India
(“Citizenship Amendment Bill,” 2019). It also occurs in Myanmar, where
the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion (MaBaTha in
Burmese) continuously fuels fears about immigration and differences
in fertility (Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar, 2017). Some are
convinced that we are witnessing a new wave and upswing of nationalism
on a global scale, which makes migration a key issue in the social and
economic context of neoliberalism (Banks & Gingrich, 2006; Berezin,
2009; Feischmidt, 2014; Joppke, 2021; Kalb, 2011; Martínez Saavedra,
2019).
In this global dispute, Europe, and particularly Eastern Europe, gained
a prominent position at the beginning of the so-called refugee wave. CNN
reported on “the beginning of Europe’s immigration nightmare” as early
as in 2013 (Koser, 2013). An editorial in the New York Times on August
31, 2014, discussed “Europe’s migration crisis” (“Europe’s Migration
Crisis,” 2014).
Undefined “immigration” that poses a serious cultural, social, or secu-
rity threat to “Europe” has become a recurring theme among politicians.
Political actors and governments in Eastern Europe have taken the lead in
this matter. Miloš Zeman’s 2018 election campaign in the Czech Republic
used a “stop immigration!” slogan and conveyed the message that “we
must protect our culture” against “an organized invasion” (Dražanová,
2018). The far-right Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) that
made it to parliament in 2015 and joined the government in 2019 capi-
talized on concerns of a “demographic crisis,” dropping fertility rates and
outmigration, and translated these topics into votes through a flare-up in
distrust and repulsion of Russians and non-Europeans (Tiido, 2015, 45).
Hungary’s majority government has become a key actor among

Eastern European political forces that proclaim the fight against an
“external enemy” and urge the solution of the demographic crisis by
“internal” means. A statement by Hungary’s prime minister from January
2015 is illuminative in this regard:
Immigration and its cultural consequences should be discussed much more

openly and frankly, in a completely straightforward manner,” the prime
minister said to a reporter from M1 News. “Economic immigration is a
bad thing for Europe, it should not be viewed as potentially beneficial,
because it brings only trouble and danger to the European people, and
so immigration must be stopped; this is the viewpoint of Hungary…We
don’t want to see any significant minority among us who have a cultural
character and background different to our own, but we would like to keep
Hungary as Hungary. (MTI, 2015)1
The following excerpt also shows how this perspective is composed

and how it links the European and Hungarian “demographic crisis” to a
biopolitical fight:
Europe is getting weaker and weaker, and is on the brink of having to fight
even for its regional status… Demographic crisis… A community that is
unable to reproduce itself renounces its right to exist. This problem cannot
be solved from the outside by means of smart tricks and settling down
people, because through this we would give up our national identity…
Our house is on fire, too. (Orbán, 2017)
The next excerpt from an interview with the Speaker of the National
Assembly of Hungary also sheds light on the discursive elements in this
argument:
…the world as we have known it for thousands of years, based on a specific

set of traditional values…this world is falling apart. And this has terrifying
consequences; namely, the vision of the death of the nation that inspired
the (nineteenth-century) literature of the Reform Era is actually very close
now. Not only for Hungarians, by the way, but the situation is similar for
all native populations of Europe, within reasonable time we won’t be able
1 All quotations from works listed in the bibliography as published in Hungarian were
translated by Kyra Lyublyanovics.
6 A. MELEGH
to stop the demographic decline, but sooner or later we will disappear…

You can see that while the global population is increasing, and so in a
certain way there is overpopulation, population decline is occurring only
in Europe, and sooner or later this will lead to an invasion of people who
see this place as a potential living space for themselves. (Interview with
László Kövér, 2015)
In addition to these arguments for and against migration, there is a

tertium datur perspective that sees the market system as the root cause
of the so-called migration problem and emphasizes that capitalism creates
paradoxical and tense situations and exploits immigrants. In this argu-
ment, it is not the negative or positive view of migration that is the key
aspect but rather the aim of showing the systemic interrelations of migra-
tion processes and confronting free-market ideas and nationalist control.
For example, Pröbsting puts it this way in a 2015 paper on migration and
super-exploitation:
Migration is a central issue in most advanced capitalist countries in the

Western world. Today migrants represent a significant sector both of the
labor force […] as well as of the population. Essentially, migration is
part of the fundamental process of the super-exploitation of the so-called
Third World by imperialist monopoly capital. Just as the monopoly capital
extracts surplus profits from the semi-colonial world, there is also an appro-
priation of extra profits through migration. Imperialist capital draws profit
by paying the migrant workers below the value of their labor force in
several ways. As a result, migrants can be characterized as ‘a nationally
oppressed layer of super-exploited labour force.’ (Pröbsting, 2015, p. 329)
Céline Cantat also scrutinizes the neoliberal turn, the international-

ization of capitalism, and the creation of the Other in the ideological
construction labeled as “Europeanism,” and explains what contradictions
have led to the creation and rejection of a general “migrant Other”
(Cantat, 2016). Accordingly, migration and migrants as a general cate-
gory have become a focal point for ideas and associated with fierce
debate.
The intensity of the debate is reflected both in political clashes and in
the growing interest and research in this topic in scholarly circles. This
is difficult to demonstrate using empirical means. However, the relative
frequency of the term “migration debate” in English-language academic
books published around the globe (which have made their way into the
vast database of Google Books) has been on the rise since the 1970s,
and the frequency of the word “migration debate” reached a historic
peak in the period of globalization from the 1980s onwards. The term
“migration” accounts for 0.002% of all words in such publications in this
period; that is, its frequency has doubled since the 1960s (Fig. 1.1; see
also Fig. 2.1 later, in Chapter 2).
Why is the migration debate intensifying during the period of glob-
alization? Why has it become a central theme in political, public, and
intellectual disputes in certain regions, and why this way, and this time?
Why have anti-migrant discourses gained a foothold in certain regions, as
opposed to open-border policies in others, and what historical conditions
have facilitated these changes? Why has this occurred in this particular
period, and through which historical mechanisms can these debates and
their polarization be linked to the processes of marketization?
These historical sociological and political-demographic issues make up
the backbone of this book; these will be addressed both from a discur-
sive and a historical and socio-material perspective. The whole debate
and its flaring-up is the subject of my analysis because I believe—as
opposed to many other scholars who conduct research into nationalism—
that the interaction shall be examined in its entirety. The new wave
of nationalism cannot exist without the pro-globalization, open-border
policy arguments, and the discursive critiques that challenge it (Berezin,
2009; Feischmidt, 2014; Harvey, 2005; Kalb, 2011). Nationalist and
Fig. 1.1 Frequency of the term “migration debate” in Google Books database
between 1960 and 2019 (Source Ngram Viewer, 2021)
8 A. MELEGH
non-nationalist factions and their associated formations must be consid-

ered and analyzed jointly in the given historical and socio-material space
and time.
1.2 Formulating the Problem;

Overview of the Analysis
This book argues that the global migration debate and the radicalization
of Eastern European, especially Hungarian, population discourses can be
interpreted as a reaction to deeply embedded historical processes in a
global–local space of interaction. The central statement in this book is
that the migration turn and the polarized migration debate are a result
of marketization and the role that market institutions now globally play
in society. Marketization creates a global migration market both on a
conceptual and on a material level and brings forth ideas and discourses
about managing and controlling markets in the context of a given histor-
ical situation. The free movement of capital, the requirement of meeting
global market demand, and the associated discourses of the elite play a
key role in this turn, although, as will be demonstrated, changes in the
public opinion also influence it. The ultimate focus is Eastern Europe, but
a global perspective is maintained in order to avoid the trap of Eurocen-
trism. The radicalization of “anti-migration” discourses in Eastern Europe
and some other parts of the world, as opposed to a “pro-migration”
perspective, can be interpreted and understood on the basis of histor-
ical dynamics involving material and discursive changes. In addition to
studies on new nationalism, other analyses of populism and elites in soci-
ology and political anthropology are all relevant for my analysis (Antal,
2019; Best et al., 2012; Fabry, 2019; Hann, 2016, 2019; Körösényi,
2019; Krekó, 2018; Mihályi & Szelényi, 2019; Scheiring, 2020; Sík,
2016; Sík & Lázár, 2019; Szalai, 2014, 2019; Szelényi & Mihályi, 2019).
Here I draw on all these approaches. Of course, the present book only
involves a specific contribution from historical and political demography
to the extremely complex and fertile intellectual debate on the political
and social transformation, the rise of authoritarianism.
Three major themes are discussed in the book. First, I look at the
discursive scenario that existed at the beginning of the period of global-
ization based on an analysis of policy-related and academic literature on
population development and migration. How was migration addressed,
and what was the dominant framework within which concepts and ideas
were formulated in the discourse of the elite and in demographic reports?

Then I address societal changes in the past 30–40 years, with special
emphasis on marketization and social disembeddedness until the 2010s.
After examining the global historical and material conditions, I focus
on historical and socio-material processes in Europe and, especially, in
Eastern Europe.
My starting point is an observation made by Karl Polányi: if the ideas
and practice of a free market become predominant, then the demand for
social control and nationalism will increase (Polanyi, 1945, 2001). For
the case of Eastern Europe, Polányi was even more specific, writing the
following as early as in 1945:
If the Atlantic Charter really committed us to restore free markets where

they have disappeared, we might thereby be opening the door to the
reintroduction of a crazy nationalism into regions from which it has disap-
peared. We should not only be importing unemployment and starvation
into the liberated regions simply by ‘liberating’ the local markets; we
should also be burdening ourselves with the responsibility of having thrown
back the people into the anarchy out of which, by their own exertions, they
had just emerged. (Polanyi, 1945, p. 89)
This double movement can be forceful if the market system and

marketization process are not met with an effective and integrated coun-
terbalancing. I examine major demographic and migration processes on
a global, a continental, and an Eastern European scale. I aim to answer
the question what factors (e.g., foreign investment, changes in income
levels, deruralization, etc.) drive outmigration (and, through it, immigra-
tion) in an age of globalization using a multivariate model, and I examine
what focal points of tension have been formed globally and region-
ally. Furthermore, seeing the prominent role and fragmentary state of
Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet bloc in this process, I aim to identify
concrete historical development trajectories in the region in connec-
tion with the rising levels of migration in the global model. I review
the uniform yet in some ways varying reactions reflected by opinion
polls and political debates in the societies of Eastern Europe. Finally, I
connect the historical and socio-material analysis and its results to discur-
sive changes in the period of globalization in order to pinpoint migration-
and demography-related discursive transformations, contradictions, and
their impact on historical processes. The final goal is to present a fair
10 A. MELEGH
understanding of the intensifying and polarized conflict between pro-

migration, pro-open-border policies, and the anti-migration nationalist
faction as a multivariate, complicated process understood as a complex
historical event. However, before I start my analysis, it is pivotal to address
a few theoretical issues and aspects.
1.3 General Theoretical

Questions and Hypotheses
Below, I provide the general theoretical and conceptual background of
my argument and historical sociological analysis. Specific methodological
concerns and details on the use of empirical data will be reviewed when
concrete analyses are described.
Taken together, we have the following key theoretical assumptions:
1. Historical developments should be seen in their totality and unity.

2. The marketization of societies is a process in which market tech-
niques and market discourses occur beyond the capitalist exchange
of commodities.
3. This process leads to reification, as understood very clearly by
George Lukács as early as in the first half of the 1920s.
4. The concept and the approach of Gramsci are also important for
seeing how discursive blocs evolved as parts of historical-political
blocs.
5. Polányi additionally provided key concepts for us via introducing the
terminology of double movement, fictitious goods, and embedded-
ness.
6. Finally, conflicts around migration must be seen as outcomes of
competition in societal spheres.
1.3.1 A Dynamic Unity of Historical Processes

The analysis that follows is a historical, historical sociological one. Demo-
graphic and migratory processes, related institutional frameworks and
discourses, can only be understood as parts of wider social change (de
Haas, 2010; Fairclough, 2001; Livi-Bacci, 2017). There is considerable
difference in the analysis of historical processes between authors who write
about the mechanisms of ideas and consciousness and those who focus on
historical and socio-material developments. My study aims to break with

this traditional disparity and reaches back to perspectives based on earlier
Marxist interpretative models that stress the dynamic unity of material
and ideational processes and structures. Beyond key ideas of Gramsci and
Lukács, the social philosophical background of this study rests, first of
all, on the historical framework created by Fernand Braudel and Philip
Abrams. Braudel used the concepts of structural history and event history
simultaneously, as well as the idea of “conjunctural history” (Braudel,
1980, p. 75). The latter could mean for us the rhythm of expansion and
contraction, like the opening-up versus the closing-down phases in the
era of globalization. I will demonstrate that concepts of opening-up and
marketization cycles, when national economies are massively transformed
via foreign direct investment and related institutional changes, are very
useful for understanding rising levels of migration.
The concept of structuration is also very important to us methodolog-
ically, as, according to Philip Abrams referring to Anthony Giddens, it
contains.
…a theory built round the idea of the ‘fundamentally recursive character

of social life’ and designed precisely to express ‘the mutual dependence of
structure and agency’ in terms of process in time. (Abrams, 1983, p. xvii,
see also pp. ix–xiv, 190–192)
Through this, it becomes possible to capture the dynamics of discursive

and material structures and the role of agency—most importantly, that of
the political elites, in actively formulating competing historical-political
blocs in the face of migration: selective cultural closure versus opening-up.
Finally, we should also cite here Ulf Brunnbauer and Grandits
(Brunnbauer & Gradits, 2013), who consider real “historical events,”
including the rise of new nationalism, to be a consequence of complex
connections between temporalities and structures. This analysis interprets
the debate on migration and the transformation of Eastern Europe as a
historical event and as the joint result of material and discursive structures.
1.3.2 The Concept of Marketization

In this book, marketization means the expansion of the market logic to
social spheres previously not dominated by the market. As Karl Polányi
put it, marketization means the further expansion of market society
12 A. MELEGH
(Hann, 2018; Joppke, 2021; Polanyi, 2001). These relationships are not
the ones of the “normal” supply-and-demand guided market exchange of
market goods, but refer to the expansion of such models to other social
spheres. This term implies various changes and developments in human
societies. One of them is the privatization and market control of economic
activity or services previously managed and coordinated under some form
of social, communal, or state ownership. These include the marketization
of pension, health care, and public utilities. I treat similarly the “exter-
nalization” of previously familial or household duties, like care for the
elderly or other members of such groups. It may be equally important that
certain social relationships, such as those facilitated by social media and
infosociety, are increasingly dominated by market interests. In a certain
respect, we should also consider the freer movement of foreign capital
and that of foreign investment (the increasing role of global markets), as
such processes are intimately linked to marketization and, most impor-
tantly, privatization. In these processes, due to inherent destruction and
market and profit logic, the role of international migrants increases, and
this we need to look at closely in this book.
Among other changes, one crucial transformation is the rise of the
global care industry. This also shows that this is a cumulative process
(marketization leads to further marketization). Losing jobs due to priva-
tization, the decline of welfare systems, the informalization of labor
markets, and stripping people’s capacity to care about close family
members leads to fictitious exchanges of care migrants, meaning that—
for instance—women in Romania move to Italy to undertake such
duties, while there is a need to “import” care workers for instance from
the Philippines or from Ukraine (Aulenbacher, 2020; Gábriel, 2022;
Melegh & Katona, 2020).
We can observe the same marketization process when new market roles
and tasks emerge, like those associated with international labor agencies,
who for instance take over the role of organizing care work from social,
religious, or other charitable organizations and actors. These are powerful
and dynamic processes, which are inherently material and ideational at
the same time. It is also important to note that there have been waves
of marketization in global history, thus there have been historical periods
of expansion and of contraction too (e.g., after World War II) (Braudel,
1980; Burawoy, 2020; Chase-Dunn et al., 1999, 2000; Hann, 2019). In
this analysis, I focus only on the most recent cycle of opening-up, while
I acknowledge that there were similar periods—for example, in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Brunnbauer, 2016).
1.3.3 Lukács: Reification

Lukács linked the analysis of consciousness to the expansion of
commodity relations and the reification that inevitably follows from
it. If the market dominates, the consciousness of society is imbued
with commodity relations and rationalization, engendering a process of
reification:
… this development of the commodity to the point where it becomes the

dominant form in society did not take place until the advent of modern
capitalism… The commodity can only be understood in its undistorted
essence when it becomes the universal category of society as a whole.
Only in this context does the reification produced by commodity relations
assume decisive importance both for the objective evolution of society and
for the stance adopted by men towards it. (Lukács, 1971, p. 86)
This means that marketization is a general process. It is expansive and it

penetrates and informs social relations and associated forms of conscious-
ness, including migration and the concepts associated with it. Among
other aspects, it is also very important within this process that there is
a tendency to rationalize social life in its totality:
We are concerned above all with the principle at work here: the principle
of rationalisation based on what is and can be calculated.… The capitalist
process of rationalisation based on private economic calculation requires
that every manifestation of life shall exhibit this very interaction between
details which are subject to laws and a totality ruled by chance. It presup-
poses a society so structured. It produces and reproduces this structure in
so far as it takes possession of society. (Lukács, 1971, p. 102)
One of the main claims in this book is that in this process of marketi-
zation, the market integration of migration advanced more and more,
a global labor market emerged, and this is associated with a rational,
abstract, and universalized market category in terms of its “management.”
It was reified, to use Lukács’s term. Such processes have also happened
earlier, in the later nineteenth century, but a new cycle started in this
regard after 1980.
14 A. MELEGH
It is important to note, before a more substantial analysis, that the

scholarly literature on migration demonstrates the importance of this
development. According to Xiang and Lindquist, the strengthening of the
market infrastructure of migration is one of the key drivers of the increase
in migration levels themselves (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014). In an article
from 2001, John Salt directly referred to an emerging global migration
business:
Finally, there are grounds for suggesting a rethink of the concept of inter-
national migration. An alternative view is that it is a diverse international
business, wielding a vast budget, providing hundreds of thousands of jobs
world-wide, and managed by a set of individuals, agencies and institutions
each of which has an interest in promoting the business. (Salt, 2001, p. 32)
This leads to the reification not only in the market exchange of labor,
but also in scholarly circles, governments, international organizations, and
entities, which also applied a market language and mode of thinking
when they started developing concepts like “managed migration.” It
is important to clarify that science itself has an inherent tendency to
create abstract categories, but here the point is not just abstractness but
understanding the complex phenomenon, including family migration and
seeking asylum, as based on or to be integrated into market rationality on
collective and individual levels.
In my view, this development transforms the discourse on migration
and polarizes the debate. There are protagonists of such rationality and
there are those who challenge this approach, at least partially (like nation-
alist isolation or the developmentalist critique of the market). Therefore,
there are discursive blocs in support of market transformation and open
borders, while there are also blocs that promote strict border measures
and state control, and there are those blocs that call into question marke-
tization and market relations due to their perceived cultural and social
consequences.
1.3.4 Gramsci: Hegemony and Historical-Political Blocs

Gramsci’s train of thought was very similar to that of Lukács’ in this
regard. The concept of a historical-political bloc that connects elements
of structure and consciousness in a dynamic frame will prove useful in this
analysis. Gramsci argues:
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Under the act of July 17, 1862.
August 4, 1862—The President ordered a draft of three hundred
thousand militia, for nine months unless sooner discharged; and
directed that if any State shall not, by the 15th of August, furnish its
quota of the additional 300,000 authorized by law, the deficiency of
volunteers in that State will also be made up by special draft from the
militia. Wednesday, September 3, was subsequently fixed for the
draft.
May 8, 1863—Proclamation issued, defining the relations of aliens
to the conscription act, holding all aliens who have declared on oath
their intention to become citizens and may be in the country within
sixty-five days from date, and all who have declared their intention to
become citizens and have voted.
June 15, 1863—One hundred thousand men, for six months, called
to repel the invasion of Maryland, West Virginia, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania.
October 17, 1863—A proclamation was issued for 300,000
volunteers, to serve for three years or the war, not, however,
exceeding three years, to fill the places of those whose terms expire
“during the coming year,” these being in addition to the men raised
by the present draft. In States in default under this call, January 5,
1864, a draft shall be made on that day.
February 1, 1864—Draft for 500,000 men for three years or during
the war, ordered for March 10, 1864.
March 14, 1864—Draft for 200,000 additional for the army, navy
and marine corps, ordered for April 15, 1864, to supply the force
required for the navy and to provide an adequate reserve force for all
contingencies.
April 23, 1864—85,000 one hundred day men accepted, tendered
by the Governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin;
30,000, 20,000, 20,000, 10,000 and 5,000 being tendered
respectively.
UNION MILITARY LEGISLATION.

1861, July 22—The President was authorized to accept the services
of volunteers, not exceeding five hundred thousand, for a period not
exceeding three years. July 27, this authority was duplicated.
1861, July 27—Nine regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one
of artillery, added to the regular army.
1861 August 5—Passed bill approving and legalizing the orders of
the President respecting the army and navy, issued from 4th of
March to that date.
1862, July 17—Authorized the President, when calling forth the
militia of the States, to specify the period of such service, not
exceeding nine months; and if by reason of defects in existing laws or
in the execution of them, it shall be found necessary to provide for
enrolling the militia, the President was authorized to make all
necessary regulations, the enrollment to include all able-bodied male
citizens between eighteen and forty-five, and to be apportioned
according to representative population. He was authorized, in
addition to the volunteers now authorized, to accept 100,000
infantry, for nine months; also, for twelve months, to fill up old
regiments, as many as may be presented for the purpose.
1863, February 7—Authorized the Governor of Kentucky, by the
consent and under the direction of the President, to raise twenty
thousand volunteers, for twelve months, for service within the limits
of the State, for repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, and
guarding and protecting the public property—two regiments to be
mounted riflemen. With the consent of the President, these troops
may be attached to, and become a part of, the body of three years’
volunteers.
1863, March 3—The conscription act passed. It included as a part
of the national forces, all able-bodied male citizens of the United
States, and persons of foreign birth who shall have declared on oath
their intention to become citizens under and in pursuance of the laws
thereof, between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five years, except
such as are rejected as physically or mentally unfit for the service;
also, the Vice-President, the judges of the various courts of the
United States, the heads of the various executive departments of the
Government, and the Governors of the several States; also, the only
son liable to military service, of a widow dependent upon his labor
for support; also, the only son of aged or infirm parent or parents,
dependent upon his labor for support; also, where there are two or
more sons of aged or infirm parents, subject to draft, the father, or if
he be dead, the mother, may elect which son shall be exempt; also,
the only brother of children not twelve years old, having neither
father nor mother, dependent upon his labor for support; also, the
father of motherless children under twelve years of age, dependent
upon his labor for support; also, where there are a father and sons in
the same family and household, and two of them are in military
service of the United States as non-commissioned officers,
musicians, or privates, the residue of such family; provided that no
person who has been convicted of any felony shall be enrolled or
permitted to serve in said forces. It divided the forces into two
classes: 1st, those between twenty and thirty-five and all unmarried
persons above thirty-five and under forty-five; 2d, all others liable to
military duty. It divided the country into districts, in each of which
an enrollment board was established. The persons enrolled were
made subject to be called into the military service for two years from
July 1, 1863, and continue in service for three years. A drafted person
was allowed to furnish an acceptable substitute, or pay $300, and be
discharged from further liability under that draft. Persons failing to
report, to be considered deserters. All persons drafted shall be
assigned by the President to military duty in such corps, regiments,
or branches of the service as the exigencies of the service may
require.
1864, Feb. 24—Provided for equalizing the draft by calculating the
quota of each district or precinct and counting the number
previously furnished by it. Any person enrolled may furnish an
acceptable substitute who is not liable to draft, nor, at any time, in
the military or naval service of the United States; and such person so
furnishing a substitute shall be exempt from draft during the time for
which such substitute shall not be liable to draft, not exceeding the
time for which such substitute shall have been accepted. If such
substitute is liable to draft, the name of the person furnishing him
shall again be placed on the roll and shall be liable to draft in future
calls, but not until the present enrollment shall be exhausted. The
exemptions are limited to such as are rejected as physically or
mentally unfit for the service; to persons actually in the military or
naval service of the Government, and all persons who have served in
the military or naval service two years during the present war and
been honorably discharged therefrom.
The separate enrollment of classes is repealed and the two classes
consolidated.
Members of religious denominations, who shall by oath or
affirmation declare that they are conscientiously opposed to the
bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the rules
and articles of faith and practice of said religious denomination, shall
when drafted, be considered non-combatants, and be assigned to
duty in the hospitals, or the care of freedmen, or shall pay $300 to
the benefit of sick and wounded soldiers, if they give proof that their
deportment has been uniformly consistent with their declaration.
No alien who has voted in county, State or Territory shall, because
of alienage, be exempt from draft.
“All able-bodied male colored persons between the ages of twenty
and forty-five years, resident in the United States, shall be enrolled
according to the provisions of this act, and of the act to which this is
an amendment, and form part of the national forces; and when a
slave of a loyal master shall be drafted and mustered into the service
of the United States, his master shall have a certificate thereof; and
thereupon such slave shall be free, and the bounty of one hundred
dollars, now payable by law for each drafted man, shall be paid to the
person to whom such drafted person was owing service or labor at
the time of his muster into the service of the United States. The
Secretary of War shall appoint a commission in each of the slave
States represented in Congress, charged to award to each loyal
person to whom a colored volunteer may owe service a just
compensation, not exceeding three hundred dollars, for each such
colored volunteer, payable out of the fund derived from
commutations, and every such colored volunteer on being mustered
into the service shall be free. And in all cases where men of color
have been enlisted, or have volunteered in the military service of the
United States, all the provisions of this act so far as the payment of
bounty and compensation are provided, shall be equally applicable,
as to those who may be hereafter recruited. But men of color, drafted
or enlisted, or who may volunteer into the military service, while
they shall be credited on the quotas of the several States, or sub-
divisions of States, wherein they are respectively drafted, enlisted, or
shall volunteer, shall not be assigned as State troops, but shall be
mustered into regiments or companies as United States colored
troops.”
1864, Feb. 29—Bill passed reviving the grade of Lieutenant-
General in the army, and Major General Ulysses S. Grant was
appointed March 2d.
1864, June 15—All persons of color shall receive the same pay and
emoluments, except bounty, as other soldiers of the regular or
volunteer army from and after Jan. 1, 1864, the President to fix the
bounty for those hereafter mustered, not exceeding $100.
1864, June 20—The monthly pay of privates and non-
commissioned officers was fixed as follows, on and after May 1:
Sergeant majors, twenty-six dollars; quartermaster and
commissary sergeants of Cavalry, artillery, and infantry, twenty-two
dollars; first sergeants of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, twenty-four
dollars; sergeants of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, twenty dollars;
sergeants of ordnance, sappers and miners, and pontoniers, thirty-
four dollars; corporals of ordnance, sappers and miners, and
pontoniers, twenty dollars; privates of engineers and ordnance of the
first class, eighteen dollars, and of the second class, sixteen dollars;
corporals of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, eighteen dollars; chief
buglers of cavalry, twenty-three dollars; buglers, sixteen dollars;
farriers and blacksmiths, of cavalry, and artificers of artillery,
eighteen dollars; privates of cavalry, artillery and infantry, sixteen
dollars; principal musicians of artillery and infantry, twenty-two
dollars; leaders of brigade and regimental bands, seventy-five
dollars; musicians, sixteen dollars; hospital stewards of the first
class, thirty-three dollars; hospital stewards of the second class,
twenty-five dollars; hospital stewards of the third class, twenty-three
dollars.
July 4—This bill became a law:
Be it enacted, &c. That the President of the United States may, at
his discretion, at any time hereafter call for any number of men as
volunteers for the respective terms of one, two, and three years for
military service; and any such volunteer, or, in case of draft, as
hereinafter provided, any substitute, shall be credited to the town,
township, ward of a city, precinct, or election district, or of a county
not so subdivided towards the quota of which he may have
volunteered or engaged as a substitute; and every volunteer who is
accepted and mustered into the service for a term of one year, unless
sooner discharged, shall receive, and be paid by the United States, a
bounty of one hundred dollars; and if for a term of two years, unless
sooner discharged, a bounty of two hundred dollars; and if for a term
of three years, unless sooner discharged, a bounty of three hundred
dollars; one third of which bounty shall be paid to the soldier at the
time of his being mustered into the service, one-third at the
expiration of one-half of his term of service, and one-third at the
expiration of his term of service. And in case of his death while in
service, the residue of his bounty unpaid shall be paid to his widow,
if he shall have left a widow; if not, to his children; or if there be
none, to his mother, if she be a widow.
Sec. 8. That all persons in the naval service of the United States,
who have entered said service during the present rebellion, who have
not been credited to the quota of any town, district, ward, or State, by
reason of their being in said service and not enrolled prior to
February twenty-four, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, shall be
enrolled and credited to the quotas of the town, ward, district, or
State, in which they respectively reside, upon satisfactory proof of
their residence made to the Secretary of War.
“CONFEDERATE” MILITARY LEGISLATION.
February 28, 1861, (four days before the inauguration of Mr.

Lincoln)—The “Confederate” Congress passed a bill providing—
1st. To enable the Government of the Confederate States to
maintain its jurisdiction over all questions of peace and war, and to
provide for the public defence, the President be, and he is hereby
authorized and directed to assume control of all military operations
in every State, having reference to a connection with questions
between the said States, or any of them, and Powers foreign to
themselves.
2d. The President was authorized to receive from the several States
the arms and munitions of war which have been acquired from the
United States.
3d. He was authorized to receive into Government service such
forces in the service of the States, as may be tendered, in such
number as he may require, for any time not less than twelve months,
unless sooner discharged.
March 6, 1861—The President was authorized to employ the
militia, military and naval forces of the Confederate States to repel
invasion, maintain rightful possession of the territory, and secure
public tranquillity and independence against threatened assault, to
the extent of 100,000 men, to serve for twelve months.
May 4, 1861—One regiment of Zouaves authorized.
May 6, 1861—Letters of marque and reprisal authorized.
1861, August 8—The Congress authorized the President to accept
the services of 400,000 volunteers, to serve for not less than twelve
months nor more than three years after they shall be mustered into
service, unless sooner discharged.
The Richmond Enquirer of that date announced that it was
ascertained from official data, before the passage of the bill, that
there were not less than 210,000 men then in the field.
August 21—Volunteers authorized for local defence and special
service.
1862, January—Publishers of newspapers, or other printed matter
are prohibited from giving the number, disposition, movement, or
destination of the land or naval forces, or description of vessel, or
battery, fortification, engine of war, or signal, unless first authorized
by the President or Congress, or the Secretary of War or Navy, or
commanding officer of post, district, or expedition. The penalty is a
fine of $1,000 and imprisonment not over twelve months.
1862, February—The Committee on Naval Affairs were instructed
to inquire into the expediency of placing at the disposal of the
President five millions of dollars to build gunboats.
1862—Bill passed to “regulate the destruction of property under
military necessity,” referring particularly to cotton and tobacco. The
authorities are authorized to destroy it to keep it from the enemy;
and owners, destroying it for the same purpose, are to be
indemnified upon proof of the value and the circumstances of the
destruction.
1862, April 16—The first “conscription” bill became a law.
1864, February. The second conscription bill became a law.
The Richmond Sentinel of February 17, 1864, contains a synopsis
of what is called the military bill, heretofore forbidden to be printed:
The first section provides that all white men residents of the
Confederate States, between the ages of seventeen and fifty, shall be
in the military service for the war.
The second section provides that all between eighteen and forty-
five, now in service, shall be continued during the war in the same
regiments, battalions, and companies to which they belong at the
passage of this act, with the organization, officers, &c., provided that
companies from one State organized against their consent, expressed
at the time, with regrets, &c., from another State, shall have the
privilege of being transferred to the same arm in a regiment from
their own State, and men can be transferred to a company from their
own State.
Section three gives a bounty eight months hence of $100 in rebel
bonds.
Section four provides that no person shall be relieved from the
operations of this act heretofore discharged for disability, nor shall
those who furnished substitutes be exempted, where no disability
now exists; but exempts religious persons who have paid an
exemption tax. * * *
The tenth section provides that no person shall be exempt except
the following: ministers, superintendents of deaf, dumb, and blind,
or insane asylums; one editor to each newspaper, and such
employees as he may swear to be indispensable; the Confederate and
State public printers, and the journeymen printers necessary to
perform the public printing; one apothecary to each drug store, who
was and has been continuously doing business as such since October
10, 1862; physicians over 30 years of age of seven years’ practice, not
including dentists; presidents and teachers of colleges, academies
and schools, who have not less than thirty pupils; superintendents of
public hospitals established by law, and such physicians and nurses
as may be indispensable for their efficient management.
One agriculturist on such farm where there is no white male adult
not liable to duty employing fifteen able-bodied slaves, between
sixteen and fifty years of age, upon the following conditions:
The party exempted shall give bonds to deliver to the Government
in the next twelve months, 100 pounds of bacon, or its equivalent in
salt pork, at Government selection, and 100 pounds of beef for each
such able-bodied slave employed on said farm at commissioner’s
rates.
In certain cases this may be commuted in grain or other
provisions.
The person shall further bind himself to sell all surplus provisions
now on hand, or which he may raise, to the Government, or the
families of soldiers, at commissioner’s rates, the person to be allowed
a credit of 25 per cent. on any amount he may deliver in three
months from the passage of this act; Provided that no enrollment
since Feb. 1, 1864, shall deprive the person enrolled from the benefit
of this exemption.
In addition to the above, the Secretary of War is authorized to
make such details as the public security requires.
The vote in the House of Representatives was—yeas, 41; nays, 31.
GUERRILLAS.
1862, April 21—The President was authorized to commission such

officers as he may deem proper, with authority to form bands of
partisan rangers, in companies, battalions or regiments, either as
infantry or cavalry, to receive the same pay, rations, and quarters,
and be subject to the same regulations as other soldiers. For any
arms and munitions of war captured from the enemy by any body of
partisan rangers, and delivered to any quartermaster at designated
place, the rangers shall pay their full value.[18]
The following resolution, in relation to partisan service, was
adopted by the Virginia Legislature, May 17, 1862:
Whereas, this General Assembly places a high estimate upon the
value of the ranger or partisan service in prosecuting the present war
to a successful issue, and regards it as perfectly legitimate; and it
being understood that a Federal commander on the northern border
of Virginia has intimated his purpose, if such service is not
discontinued, to lay waste by fire the portion of our territory at
present under his power.
Resolved by the General Assembly, That in its opinion, the policy
of employing such rangers and partisans ought to be carried out
energetically, both by the authorities of this State and of the
Confederate States, without the slightest regard to such threats.
By another act, the President was authorized, in addition to the
volunteer force authorized under existing laws, to accept the services
of volunteers who may offer them, without regard to the place of
enlistment, to serve for and during the existing war.
1862, May 27—Major General John B. Floyd was authorized by the
Legislature of Virginia, to raise ten thousand men, not now in service
or liable to draft, for twelve months.
1862, September 27—The President was authorized to call out and
place in the military service for three years, all white men who are
residents, between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five, at the time
the call may be made, not legally exempt. And such authority shall
exist in the President, during the present war, as to all persons who
now are, or hereafter may become eighteen years of age, and all
persons between eighteen and forty-five, once enrolled, shall serve
their full time.
THE TWENTY-NEGRO EXEMPTION LAW.
1862, October 11—Exempted certain classes, described in the

repealing law of the next session, as follows:
The dissatisfaction of the people with an act passed by the
Confederate Congress, at its last session, by which persons owning a
certain number of slaves were exempted from the operation of the
conscription law, has led the members at the present session to
reconsider their work, and already one branch has passed a bill for
the repeal of the obnoxious law. This bill provides as follows:
“The Congress of the Confederate States do enact, That so much of
the act approved October 11, 1862, as exempts from military service
‘one person, either as agent, owner, or overseer, on each plantation
on which one white person is required to be kept by the laws or
ordinances of any State, and on which there is no white male adult
not liable to military service, and in States having no such law, one
person, as agent, owner, or overseer on such plantation of twenty
negroes, and on which there is no white male adult not liable to
military service;’ and also the following clause in said act, to wit: ‘and
furthermore, for additional police of every twenty negroes, on two or
more plantations, within five miles of each other, and each having
less than twenty negroes, and on which there is no white male adult
not liable to military duty, one person, being the oldest of the owners
or overseers on such plantations,’ be and the same are hereby
repealed; and the persons so hitherto exempted by said clauses of
said act are hereby made subject to military duty in the same manner
that they would be had said clauses never been embraced in said
act.”
THE POSITION OF DOUGLAS.
After the President had issued his first call, Douglas saw the
danger to which the Capitol was exposed, and he promptly called
upon Lincoln to express his full approval of the call. Knowing his
political value and that of his following Lincoln asked him to dictate
a despatch to the Associated Press, which he did in these words, the
original being left in the possession of Hon. George Ashmun of
Massachusetts:
“April 18, 1861, Senator Douglas, called on the President, and had
an interesting conversation, on the present condition of the country.
The substance of it was, on the part of Mr. Douglas, that while he was
unalterably opposed to the administration in all its political issues,
he was prepared to fully sustain the President, in the exercise of all
his Constitutional functions, to preserve the Union, maintain the
Government, and defend the Federal Capitol. A firm policy and
prompt action was necessary. The Capitol was in danger, and must
be defended at all hazards, and at any expense of men and money.
He spoke of the present and future, without any reference to the
past.”
Douglas followed this with a great speech at Chicago, in which he
uttered a sentence that was soon quoted on nearly every Northern
tongue. It was simply this, “that there now could be but two parties,
patriots and traitors.” It needed nothing more to rally the Douglas
Democrats by the side of the Administration, and in the general
feeling of patriotism awakened not only this class of Democrats, but
many Northern supporters of Breckinridge also enlisted in the Union
armies. The leaders who stood aloof and gave their sympathies to the
South, were stigmatized as “Copperheads,” and these where they
were so impudent as to give expression to their hostility, were as
odious to the mass of Northerners as the Unionists of Tennessee and
North Carolina were to the Secessionists—with this difference—that
the latter were compelled to seek refuge in their mountains, while the
Northern leader who sought to give “aid and comfort to the enemy”
was either placed under arrest by the government or proscribed
politically by his neighbors. Civil war is ever thus. Let us now pass to
THE POLITICAL LEGISLATION INCIDENT TO THE WAR.
The first session of the 37th Congress began July 4, 1861, and
closed Aug. 6. The second began December 2, 1861, and closed July
17, 1862. The third began December 1, 1862 and closed March 4,
1863.
All of these sessions of Congress were really embarrassed by the
number of volunteers offering from the North, and sufficiently rapid
provision could not be made for them. And as illustrative of how
political lines had been broken, it need only be remarked that
Benjamin F. Butler, the leader of the Northern wing of Breckinridge’s
supporters, was commissioned as the first commander of the forces
which Massachusetts sent to the field. New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio
—the great West—all the States, more than met all early
requirements. So rapid were enlistments that no song was as popular
as that beginning with the lines:
“We are coming, Father Abraham,
Six hundred thousand strong.”
The first session of the 37th Congress was a special one, called by
the President. McPherson, in his classification of the membership,
shows the changes in a body made historic, if such a thing can be, not
only by its membership present, but that which had gone or made
itself subject to expulsion by siding with the Confederacy. We quote
the list so concisely and correctly presented:
MEMBERS OF THE 37TH CONGRESS.
March 4, 1861, to March 4, 1863.

Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine, President of the Senate.
SENATORS.
Maine—Lot M. Morrill, Wm. Pitt Fessenden.

New Hampshire—John P. Hale, Daniel Clark.
Vermont—Solomon Foot, Jacob Collamer.
Massachusetts—Charles Sumner, Henry Wilson.
Rhode Island—James F. Simmons,[19] Henry B. Anthony.
Connecticut—James Dixon, Lafayette S. Foster.
New York—Preston King, Ira Harris.
New Jersey—John B. Thomson,[19] John C. Ten Eyck.
Pennsylvania—David Wilmot, Edgar Cowan.
Delaware—James A. Bayard, Willard Saulsbury.
Maryland—Anthony Kennedy, James A. Pearce.[19]
Virginia.[19]
Ohio—Benjamin F. Wade, John Sherman.
Kentucky—Lazarus W. Powell, John C. Breckinridge.[19]
Tennessee—Andrew Johnson.
Indiana—Jesse D. Bright,[19] Henry S. Lane.
Illinois—O. H. Browning,[19] Lyman Trumbull.
Missouri—Trusten Polk,[19] Waldo P. Johnson.[19]
Michigan—Z. Chandler, K. S. Bingham.[19]
Iowa—James W. Grimes, James Harlan.
Wisconsin—James R. Doolittle, Timothy O. Howe.
California—Milton S. Latham, James A. McDougall.
Minnesota—Henry M. Rice, Morton S. Wilkinson.
Oregon—Edward D. Baker,[19] James W. Nesmith.
Kansas—James H. Lane, S. C. Pomeroy.
REPRESENTATIVES.
Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, Speaker of the House.

Maine—John N. Goodwin, Charles W. Walton,[19] Samuel C.
Fessenden, Anson P. Morrill, John H. Rice, Frederick A. Pike.
New Hampshire—Gilman Marston, Edward H. Rollins, Thomas
M. Edwards.
Vermont—E. P. Walton, Jr., Justin S. Morrill, Portus Baxter.
Massachusetts—Thomas D. Eliot, James Buffinton, Benjamin F.
Thomas, Alexander H. Rice, William Appleton,[19] John B. Alley,
Daniel W. Gooch, Charles R. Train, Goldsmith F. Bailey,[19] Charles
Delano, Henry L. Dawes.
Rhode Island—William P. Sheffield, George H. Browne.
Connecticut—Dwight Loomis, James E. English, Alfred A.
Burnham,[19] George C. Woodruff.
New York—Edward H. Smith, Moses F. Odell, Benjamin Wood,
James E. Kerrigan, William Wall, Frederick A. Conkling, Elijah
Ward, Isaac C. Delaplaine, Edward Haight, Charles H. Van Wyck,
John B. Steele, Stephen Baker, Abraham B. Olin, Erastus Corning,
James B. McKean, William A. Wheeler, Socrates N. Sherman,
Chauncey Vibbard, Richard Franchot, Roscoe Conkling, R. Holland
Duell, William E. Lansing, Ambrose W. Clark, Charles B. Sedgwick,
Theodore M. Pomeroy, Jacob P. Chamberlain, Alexander S. Diven,
Robert B. Van Valkenburgh, Alfred Ely, Augustus Frank, Burt Van
Horn, Elbridge G. Spalding, Reuben E. Fenton.
New Jersey—John T. Nixon, John L. N. Stratton, William G.
Steele, George T. Cobb, Nehemiah Perry.
Pennsylvania—William E. Lehman, Charles J. Biddle,[19] John P.
Verree, William D. Kelley, William Morris Davis, John Hickman,
Thomas B. Cooper,[19] Sydenham E. Ancona, Thaddeus Stevens, John
W. Killinger, James H. Campbell, Hendrick B. Wright, Philip
Johnson, Galusha A. Grow, James T. Hale, Joseph Baily, Edward
McPherson, Samuel S. Blair, John Covode, Jesse Lazear, James K.
Moorhead, Robert McKnight, John W. Wallace, John Patton, Elijah
Babbitt.
Delaware—George P. Fisher.
Maryland—John W. Crisfield, Edwin H. Webster, Cornelius L. L.
Leary, Henry May, Francis Thomas, Charles B. Calvert.
Virginia—Charles H. Upton,[19] William G. Brown, John S. Carlile,
[19]
Kellian V. Whaley.
Ohio—George H. Pendleton, John A. Gurley, Clement L.
Vallandigham, William Allen, James M. Ashley, Chilton A. White,
Richard A. Harrison, Samuel Shellabarger, Warren P. Noble, Carey
A. Trimble, Valentine B. Horton, Samuel S. Cox, Samuel T.
Worcester, Harrison G. Blake, Robert H. Nugen, William P. Cutler,
James R. Morris, Sidney Edgerton, Albert G. Riddle, John Hutchins,
John A. Bingham.
Kentucky—Henry C. Burnett,[19] James S. Jackson,[19] Henry
Grider, Aaron Harding, Charles A. Wickliffe, George W. Dunlap,
Robert Mallory, John J. Crittenden, William H. Wadsworth, John W.
Menzies.
Tennessee—Horace Maynard,[19] Andrew J. Clements,[19] George
W. Bridges.[19]
Indiana—John Law, James A. Cravens, W. McKee Dunn, William
S. Holman, George W. Julian, Albert G. Porter, Daniel W. Voorhees,
Albert S. White, Schuyler Colfax, William Mitchell, John P. C.
Shanks.
Illinois—Elihu B. Washburne, Isaac N. Arnold, Owen Lovejoy,
William Kellogg, William A. Richardson,[19] John A. McClernand,[19]
James C. Robinson, Philip B. Fouke, John A. Logan.[19]
Missouri—Francis P. Blair, Jr., James S. Rollins, John B. Clark,[19]
Elijah H. Norton, John W. Reid,[19] John S. Phelps,[19] John W. Noell.
Michigan—Bradley F. Granger, Fernando C. Beaman, Francis W.
Kellogg, Rowland E. Trowbridge.
Iowa—Samuel R. Curtis,[19] William Vandever.
Wisconsin—John F. Potter, Luther Hanchett,[19] A. Scott Sloan.
Minnesota—Cyrus Aldrich, William Windom.
Oregon—Andrew J. Thayer.[19]
Kansas—Martin F. Conway.
MEMORANDUM OF CHANGES.
The following changes took place during the Congress:
IN SENATE.
Rhode Island—1862, Dec. 1, Samuel G. Arnold succeeded James F.

Simmons, resigned.
New Jersey—1862, Dec. 1, Richard S. Field succeeded, by
appointment, John R. Thompson, deceased Sept. 12, 1862. 1863,
Jan. 21, James, W. Wall, succeeded, by election, Richard S. Field.
Maryland—1863, Jan. 14, Thomas H. Hicks, first by appointment
and then by election succeeded James A. Pearce, deceased Dec. 20,
1862.
Virginia—1861, July 13, John S. Carlile and Waitman T. Willey,
sworn in place of Robert M. T. Hunter and James M. Mason,
withdrawn and abdicated.
Kentucky—1861, Dec. 23, Garrett Davis succeeded John C.
Breckinridge, expelled December 4.
Indiana—1862, March 3, Joseph A. Wright succeeded Jesse D.
Bright, expelled Feb. 5, 1863, Jan. 22, David Turpie, superseded, by
election, Joseph A. Wright.
Illinois—1863, Jan. 30, William A. Richardson superseded, by
election, O. H. Browning.
Missouri—1861, Jan. 24, R. Wilson succeeded Waldo P. Johnson,
expelled Jan. 10. 1862, Jan. 29, John B. Henderson succeeded
Trusten Polk, expelled Jan. 10.
Michigan—1862, Jan. 17, Jacob M. Howard succeeded K. S.
Bingham, deceased October 5, 1861.
Oregon—1862, Dec. 1, Benjamin F. Harding succeeded Edward D.
Baker, deceased Oct. 21, 1862.
IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Maine—1862, December 1, Thomas A. D. Fessenden succeeded

Charles W. Walton, resigned May 26, 1862.
Massachusetts—1861, December 1, Amasa Walker succeeded
Goldsmith F. Bailey, deceased May 8, 1862; 1861, December 2,
Samuel Hooper succeeded William Appleton, resigned.
Connecticut—1861, December 2, Alfred A. Burnham qualified.
Pennsylvania—1861, December 2, Charles J. Biddle qualified;
1862, June 3, John D. Stiles succeeded Thomas B. Cooper, deceased
April 4, 1862.
Virginia—1861, July 13, John S. Carlile resigned to take a seat in
the Senate; 1861, December 2, Jacob B. Blair, succeeded John S.
Carlile, resigned; 1862, February 28, Charles H. Upton unseated by a
vote of the House; 1862, May 6, Joseph Segar qualified.
Kentucky—1862, December, 1, George H. Yeaman succeeded
James S. Jackson, deceased; 1862, March 10, Samuel L. Casey
succeeded Henry C. Burnett, expelled December 3, 1861.
Tennessee—1861, December 2, Horace Maynard qualified; 1862,
January 13, Andrew J. Clements qualified; 1863, February 25,
George W. Bridges qualified.
Illinois—1861, December 12, A. L. Knapp qualified, in place of J. A.
McClernand, resigned; 1862, June 2, William J. Allen qualified, in
place of John A. Logan, resigned; 1863, January 30, William A.
Richardson withdrew to take a seat in the Senate.
Missouri—1862, January 21, Thomas L. Price succeeded John W.
Reid, expelled December 2, 1861; 1862, January 20, William A. Hall
succeeded John B. Clark, expelled July 13, 1861; 1862, May 9, John
S. Phelps qualified.
Iowa—1861, December 2, James F. Wilson succeeded Samuel R.
Curtis, resigned August 4, 1861.
Wisconsin—1863, January 26, Walter D. McIndoe succeeded
Luther Hanchett, deceased November 24, 1862.
Oregon—1861, July 30, George K. Shiel succeeded Andrew J.
Thayer, unseated.
Louisiana—1863, February 17, Michael Hahn qualified; 1863,
February 23, Benjamin F. Flanders qualified.
Lincoln, in his message, recited the events which had transpired

since his inauguration, and asked Congress to confer upon him the
power to make the conflict short and decisive. He wanted 400,000
men, and four hundred millions of money, remarking that “the
people will save their government if the government itself will do its
part only indifferently well.” Congress responded by adding an
hundred thousand to each request.
There were exciting debates and scenes during this session, for
many of the Southern leaders remained, either through hesitancy or
with a view to check legislation and aid their section by adverse
criticism on the measures proposed. Most prominent in the latter list
was John C. Breckinridge, late Vice-President and now Senator from
Kentucky. With singular boldness and eloquence he opposed every
war measure, and spoke with the undisguised purpose of aiding the
South. He continued this course until the close of the extra session,
when he accepted a General’s commission in the Confederate army.
But before its close, Senator Baker of Oregon, angered at his general
course, said in reply to one of Breckinridge’s speeches, Aug. 1st:
“What would the Senator from Kentucky, have? These speeches of
his, sown broadcast over the land, what clear distinct meaning have
they? Are they not intended for disorganization in our very midst?
Are they not intended to destroy our zeal? Are they not intended to
animate our enemies? Sir, are they not words of brilliant polished
TREASON, even in the very Capitol of the Republic?” [Here there were
such manifestations of applause in the galleries, as were with
difficulty suppressed.]
Mr. Baker resumed, and turning directly to Mr. Breckinridge,
inquired:
“What would have been thought, if, in another Capitol, in another
republic, in a yet more martial age, a Senator as grave, not more
eloquent, or dignified than the Senator from Kentucky, yet with the
Roman purple flowing over his shoulders, had risen in his place,
surrounded by all the illustrations of Roman glory, and declared that
the cause of the advancing Hannibal was just, and that Carthage
ought to be dealt with in terms of peace? What would have been
thought if, after the battle of Cannæ, a Senator there had risen in his
place, and denounced every levy of the Roman people, every
expenditure of its treasure, and every appeal to the old recollections
and the old glories?”
There was a silence so profound throughout the Senate and
galleries, that a pinfall could have been heard, while every eye was
fixed upon Breckinridge. Fessenden exclaimed in deep low tones, “he
would have been hurled from the Tarpeian Rock!”
Baker resumed:
“Sir, a Senator himself learned far more than myself, in such lore,
(Mr. Fessenden) tells me, in a low voice, he would have been hurled
from the Tarpeian Rock.” It is a grand commentary upon the
American Constitution, that we permit these words of the Senator
from Kentucky, to be uttered. I ask the Senator to recollect, to what,
save to send aid and comfort to the enemy, do these predictions
amount to? Every word thus uttered, falls as a note of inspiration
upon every Confederate ear. Every sound thus uttered, is a word,
(and falling from his lips, a mighty word) of kindling and triumph to
the foe that determines to advance.
The Republicans of the North were the distinctive “war party,” i. e.,
they gave unqualified support to every demand made by the Lincoln
administration. Most of the Democrats, acting as citizens, did
likewise, but many of those in official position, assuming the
prerogative of a minority, took the liberty in Congress and State
Legislature to criticise the more important war measures, and the
extremists went so far, in many instances, as to organize opposition,
and to encourage it among their constituents. Thus in the States
bordering the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, organized and individual
efforts were made to encourage desertions, and the “Knights of the
Golden Circle,” and the “Sons of Liberty,” secret societies composed
of Northern sympathizers with the South, formed many troublesome
conspiracies. Through their action troops were even enlisted in
Southern Indiana, Illinois and Missouri for the Confederate armies,
while the border States in the Union sent whole regiments to battle
for the South. The “Knights of the Golden Circle” conspired to release
Confederate prisoners of war, and invited Morgan to raid their
States. One of the worst forms of opposition took shape in a
conspiracy to resist the draft in New York city. The fury of the mob
was several days beyond control, and troops had to be recalled from
the front to suppress it. The riot was really political, the prejudices of
the mob under cover of resistance to the draft, being vented on the
negroes, many of whom were killed before adequate numbers could
be sent to their succor. The civil authorities of the city were charged
with winking at the occurrence, and it was afterwards ascertained
that Confederate agents really organized the riot as a movement to
“take the enemy in the rear.”
The Republican was as distinctively the war party during the Great
Rebellion, as the Whigs were during the Revolution, the Democratic-
Republicans during the War of 1812, and the Democrats during the
War with Mexico, and, as in all of these war decades, kept the
majority sentiment of the country with them. This is such a plain
statement of facts that it is neither partisan to assert, nor a mark of
party-fealty to deny. The history is indelibly written. It is stamped
upon nearly every war measure, and certainly upon every political
measure incident to growing out of the rebellion.
These were exciting and memorable scenes in the several sessions
of the 37th Congress. During the first many Southern Senators and
Representatives withdrew after angry statements of their reasons,
generally in obedience to calls from their States or immediate homes.
In this way the majority was changed. Others remained until the
close of the first session, and then more quietly entered the rebellion.
We have shown that of this class was Breckinridge, who thought he
could do more good for his cause in the Federal Congress than
elsewhere, and it is well for the Union that most of his colleagues
disagreed with him as to the propriety and wisdom of his policy. If all
had followed his lead or imitated his example, the war would in all
probability have closed in another compromise, or possibly in the
accomplishment of southern separations. These men could have so
obstructed legislation as to make all its early periods far more
discouraging than they were. As it was the Confederates had all the
advantages of a free and fair start, and the effect was traceable in all

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The Migration Turn and Eastern

Europe: A Global Historical

The Migration Turn

The Migration Turn

ISSN 2524-7123 ISSN 2524-7131 (electronic)

Cover illustration: Thankful Photography/Alamy Stock Photo

1. Terrell Carver & Daniel Blank, A Political History of the Editions

31. Kevin B. Anderson, Kieran Durkin & Heather Brown (Eds.),

50. Levy del Aguila Marchena, Communism, Political Power and

Vesa Oittinen, Marx’s Russian Moment

Tamás Krausz, Eszter Bartha (Eds.), Socialist Experiences in Eastern

Matthias Bohlender, Anna-Sophie Schönfelder, & Matthias Spekker,

“vicious” remarks of Claude Karnoouh and Győző Lugosi. It would

“Having passed from socialist modernization to capitalist peripherality,

“An outstanding book that is extremely valuable from a scholarly point

“This is an essential book. An interdisciplinary analysis of one of the most

1 Introduction: Trillion-Dollar Bill or a Nightmare? 1

2.2.1 Historical Introduction. Free Markets

3.1.2 Towards Historical-Materialist Macro-Models

3.3.1 Neoliberal Capitalism and the Eastern

4.2 Growing Fears of Migration or Growing Dissent

Fig. 1.1 Frequency of the term “migration debate” in Google

Fig. 3.1 Change in the proportion of the migrant stock living

Fig. 3.12 Migration rate and inflow of foreign direct investment (9

Fig. 3.24 First asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States

Fig. 3.34 Social expenditure as a proportion of GDP (%)

Fig. 3.46 Distribution of foreign-born population living in Hungary

Fig. 3.56 FDI-to-GDP ratio, 1980–2010 and share of emigration,

Fig. 4.9 Number and proportion (%) of documents that used

Table 2.1 Themes addressed and terms used in World Bank

Table 3.11 Proportion of agricultural employment in the sample

Introduction: Trillion-Dollar Bill

This book concentrates on a historical sociological analysis of the migra-

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer 1

1.1 A Polarizing Debate on Migration

should be properly managed in order to secure the gains and cohesion of

Camus called the Le Grand Remplacement (great replacement), which

Hungary’s majority government has become a key actor among

Immigration and its cultural consequences should be discussed much more

The following excerpt also shows how this perspective is composed

…the world as we have known it for thousands of years, based on a specific

to stop the demographic decline, but sooner or later we will disappear…

In addition to these arguments for and against migration, there is a

Migration is a central issue in most advanced capitalist countries in the

Céline Cantat also scrutinizes the neoliberal turn, the international-

non-nationalist factions and their associated formations must be consid-

1.2 Formulating the Problem;

were formulated in the discourse of the elite and in demographic reports?

If the Atlantic Charter really committed us to restore free markets where

This double movement can be forceful if the market system and

understanding of the intensifying and polarized conflict between pro-

1.3 General Theoretical

1. Historical developments should be seen in their totality and unity.

1.3.1 A Dynamic Unity of Historical Processes

historical and socio-material developments. My study aims to break with

…a theory built round the idea of the ‘fundamentally recursive character

Through this, it becomes possible to capture the dynamics of discursive

1.3.2 The Concept of Marketization

I acknowledge that there were similar periods—for example, in the late

1.3.3 Lukács: Reification

… this development of the commodity to the point where it becomes the

This means that marketization is a general process. It is expansive and it

It is important to note, before a more substantial analysis, that the