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T h e Ox f o r d H a n d b o o k o f

GERMAN
P OL I T IC S
The Oxford Handbook of

GERMAN
POLITICS
Edited by
KLAUS LARRES, HOLGER MOROFF,
and RUTH WITTLINGER
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
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In Memory of Prof. Ruth Wittlinger
 Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables  xi

List of Contributors  xiii

Introduction  1
Klaus Larres, Holger Moroff, and Ruth Wittlinger

PA RT I : L E A DI N G S C HOL A R S A N D T H E I R
I N T E R P R E TAT ION S OF G E R M A N H I S TORY
F ROM WOR L D WA R I I TO T H E P R E SE N T
1. Encounters with Modernity: The German Search for Alternatives in
the Twentieth Century  7
Konrad H. Jarausch
2. From Post-​National Democracy to Post-​Classical Nation-​State  24
Heinrich August Winkler
3. Emotional Styles in Post-​War German Politics  33
Ute Frevert
4. The Development of Germany After 1945  45
Klaus von Beyme

PA RT I I : G E R M A N Y DU R I N G
T H E C OL D WA R E R A
5. Atlantic Integration and ‘Ever Closer Union’: West Germany, the US,
and European Unity during the Cold War  59
Klaus Larres
6. Germany and the Soviet Union during the Cold War Era  82
Peter Ruggenthaler
viii   Table of Contents

7. The Governmental System and Political History of the GDR  103

Gert-​Joachim Glaessner
8. The End of the Cold War and the Process of German Unification  119
Larissa R. Stiglich

PA RT I I I : G E R M A N Y SI N C E 1 9 90

P OL I T IC A L I N ST I T U T ION S A N D
C ON ST I T U T IONA L DE SIG N
9. The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service  139
Ray Hebestreit and Karl-​Rudolf Korte
10. The German Bundestag: Core Institution in a Parliamentary
Democracy  161
Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer and Sven T. Siefken
11. The Federal System and the Länder  179
Arthur Benz
12. The German Legal System and Courts  196
Russell A. Miller
13. The ‘Old Five’: The Bonn Parties in the Berlin Republic  216
David F. Patton
14. Germany’s Political Parties—​the Newcomers  234
Hartwig Pautz

P OL I T IC A L E C ON OM Y A N D P OL IC Y- M
​ AKING
15. The German Economic Model: From Germany’s Social Market
Economy to Neo-​liberalism?  251
Christian Schweiger
16. Germany’s Trading System and Export-​Driven Economy  265
Andreas Busch
17. Germany’s Banking and Financial System  285
Janine Jacob
 Table of Contents    ix

18. The German Welfare State  304

Peter Starke
19. The Immigration System and the Rule of Law  323
Dietrich Thränhardt
20. The Merkel Era: Environmental Politics and the ‘Energiewende’
(Energy Transition)  339
Carl Lankowski

C U LT U R E A N D S O C I E T Y
21. Demographics and Generational Transition and Politics  367
Reinhold Sackmann
22. Religion and the Churches  381
Detlef Pollack and Olaf Müller
23. Jewish Life and Politics in Post-​War Germany  396
Joseph Cronin
24. Identity and Diversity in Post-​Unification Germany  416
Priscilla Layne
25. German Literature, Theatre, and Film since 1990  432
Michael Braun
26. German Art After 1990  450
Marion Deshmukh

PA RT I V: G E R M A N Y I N G L OBA L A F FA I R S

G E R M A N Y A N D E U ROP E
27. German Foreign Policy: Roots, Reasonings, and Repercussions  469
Holger Moroff
28. Franco-​German Relations and the European Integration Process
since 1990  491
Carine Germond
x   Table of Contents

29. Germany and EU Foreign Policy  509

Sebastian Harnisch
30. Germany in the EU: An Assertive Status Quo Power?  529
Patricia Daehnhardt

G E R M A N Y A N D T H E WOR L D
B E YON D E U ROP E
31. German Multilateralism After the Cold War  561
James Sperling
32. Germany and NATO  589
Markus Kaim
33. German-​American Relations from 1945 to the Present  606
Klaus Schwabe
34. Three Chancellors and Russia: German-​Russian Relations since 1990  626
Stephen F. Szabo
35. A Quarter Century of German Relations with the Indo-​Pacific  639
Volker Stanzel

PA RT V: L O OK I N G BAC K WA R D
A N D F ORWA R D
36. Angela Merkel in Power: How Influential Was the Merkel Era?  659
Stefan Kornelius
37. Leaders in Partnership: Germany in the Biden Era  672
Jackson Janes

Index 687
 List of Figures and Tables

Figures

Figure 9.1 Basic structure of a Federal Ministry 156

Figure 10.1 Bills in the Bundestag 1949–​2021 (per electoral period) 170
Figure 10.2 Small interpellations in the Bundestag 1949–​2021 (per electoral period) 172
Figure 10.3 The iceberg model of parliamentary control by the Bundestag 174
Figure 11.1 Cooperative federalism and intergovernmental relations 189
Figure 16.1 Current account in per cent of GDP, 1990–​2016 276
Figure 17.1 Major income items for all German banking groups as percentage
of operating income 294
Figure 18.1 Social spending as a percentage of GDP, 2019 or latest, 32 OECD
countries 306
Figure 18.2 Total social (employer +​employee) contributions as a percentage of
the gross wage, 1970–​2020 309
Figure 18.3 Annual harmonized unemployment rates, 1990–​2017 310
Figure 19.1 Aussiedler immigration since 1950 by country of origin 329
Figure 29.1 EU foreign policy process: changing patterns of EU-​member state
interaction 511
Figure 29.2 Eurobarometer—data on Germans’ support for the CFSP relative to
the EU average 516

Tables

Table 4.1 Dominant actors and aims in the transformation of East Germany 49
Table 4.2 Comparison of the years 2000 and 2016 (Finanzbericht, 2016,
pp. 402ff) 53
Table 9.1 Chancellors of the Federal Government of Germany since 1949 141
xii    List of Figures and Tables

Table 9.2 Ministries and Ministers in the Scholz government

(as of January 2022) 143
Table 9.3 Coalitions since 1949 147
Table 11.1 Division of powers between federal and Länder level under the
German Basic Law 185
Table 17.1 Number of German reporting credit institutions 287
Table 17.2 Savings deposits market shares by bank category 289
Table 17.3 German banks’ foreign exposure 295
Table 18.1 Composition of public social spending, spending on different
branches in per cent of GDP and in per cent of total social spending
(in brackets), 2017 306
Table 18.2 Net replacement rates (net benefits as a percentage of an average
production worker’s net wage), selected benefits, 2010 (sickness and
pensions) and 2019 or latest (unemployment) 307
Table 19.1 ‘Migration background’ statistics in 2019 334
Table 19.2 People with migration background in labour market sectors (per
cent, 2019) 336
Table 21.1 Total fertility rate, life expectancy at birth, net migration balance,
population growth, and median age in Germany and the UK
(1990–​2019) 369
Table 22.1 Adherents of churches/​religious communities in Germany 388
Table 22.2 Churchliness and religiosity in West and East Germany, 1990–​2017/​18 389
Table 31.1 Multilateral aid, 1990–​2019 565
Table 31.2 Expenditures on international public health, including Covid 567
Table 31.3 Institutional and regional aid contributions 570
Table 31.4 Personnel contributions to OSCE missions and UN peace-​keeping
operations (2012–​20) 577
Table 31.5 NATO operations: participation and risk, 1996–​2014 578
Table 31.6 NATO operations, 2015–​18 579
Table 31.7 NATO exercises, 2015 580
 List of Contributors

BENZ, Arthur—​is Professor Emeritus of Comparative Politics and German

Government at the Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany. His publications
on federalism and multi-​level governance include Policy Change and Innovation
in Multilevel Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021); Föderale
Demokratie (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2020) and Constitutional Change in
Multilevel Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
BEYME, Klaus von (1934-2021)—was Professor of Political Science Emeritus at
the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of Heidelberg. He
received many awards and held many Chairs and visiting professorships, including at
Tübingen, Frankfurt, Paris, Stanford, the European University Institute in Florence,
Melbourne, Moscow. His recent publications include Rightwing Populism: An Element
of Neodemocracy (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019); Berlin. Von der Hauptstadtsuche zur
Hauptstadtfindung (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019); Migrationspolitik. Über Erfolge und
Misserfolge (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2020).
BRAUN, Michael—​is Professor of German Literature at the University of Cologne, and
serves as head of the literary section at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin. His
publications include Wem gehört die Geschichte? Erinnerungskultur in Literatur und Film
(Müüenster and Freiburg, Aschendorff Verlag, 2013); Probebohrungen im Himmel. Zum
religiösen Trend in der Gegenwartsliteratur (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 2018); ‘Inventing
the Present. Time Codes in Post-​War Lyric Poetry’, in Germanistik in Ireland 15 (2020),
pp. 95–​112.
BUSCH, Andreas—​is Professor of Comparative Politics and Political Economy at
the University of Göttingen. Previously he was Reader in European Politics at the
University of Oxford and John F. Kennedy Memorial Fellow at the Center for European
Studies at Harvard University. His main research interests focus on institution-​centred
analyses, especially regulatory and public policy as well as comparative analysis of pol-
itical systems and network policy. His publications include Banking Regulation and
Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and Netzpolitik. Ein einführender
Überblick, co-​edited with Tobias Jakobi and Yana Breindl (Wiesbaden: Springer
VS, 2018).
CRONIN, Joseph—​is a Lecturer in Modern German History at Queen Mary University
of London. His research focuses on Jewish life in Germany after the Holocaust,
including Holocaust memory culture and the history of anti-​Semitism. His first book is
xiv   List of Contributors

Russian-​speaking Jews in Germany’s Jewish communities: 1990–​2005 (London, Palgrave

Macmillan, 2019).
DAEHNHARDT, Patricia—​is a Senior Researcher at the Portuguese Institute of
International Relations of NOVA University, Lisbon, and guest professor at the same uni-
versity. She is also Adviser at the National Defense Institute (IDN) in Lisbon, Portugal.
Her publications include ‘Tectonic Shifts in the Party Landscape? Mapping Germany’s
Party System Changes’, in Marco Lisi (ed.), Party System Change, the European Crisis
and the State of Democracy (London: Routledge, 2019); ‘German Foreign Policy, the
Ukraine Crisis, and the Euro-​Atlantic Order: Assessing the Dynamics of Change’,
German Politics (2018); ‘Germany, the EU and a Transforming Domestic Political Arena’,
in Charlotte Bretherton and Michael Mannin (eds), The Europeanization of European
Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
DESHMUKH, Marion F. (1945–​2019)—​was the Robert T. Hawkes Professor
Emerita of History at George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, and long-​standing
Chair of the Department of History and Art History. Her publications include Max
Liebermann: Modern Art and Modern Germany (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); Max
Liebermann and International Modernism: An Artist’s Career from Empire to Third
Reich, co-​
edited with Françoise Forster-​ Hahn and Barbara Gaehtgens (Oxford:
Berghahn, 2011); co-​curator with Irene Guenther of the exhibition, Postcards from the
Trenches: Germans and Americans Visualize the Great War (The Printing Museum,
Houston, TX, 2014-​15).
FREVERT, Ute—​is Director of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in
Berlin, where she founded the Center for the History of Emotions in 2008. Prior to that,
she was Professor of German History at Yale University. Her publications include Men
of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel (London: Polity, 1995), A Nation
in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society (Oxford: Berg,
2004), and The Politics of Humiliation: A Modern History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2020).
GERMOND, Carine S.—​is Professor of European Studies at the Norwegian
University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim. Her publications include
Partenaires de raison? Le couple France-​Allemagne et l’unification de l’Europe, 1963–​1969
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014); Luciano Bardi, Wojciech Gagatek, Carine Germond,
Karl Magnus Johansson, Wolfram Kaiser (2020), The European Ambition. The Group
of the European People’s Party and European Integration (Baden Baden: Nomos) in
Luciano Bardi et al. The European Ambition: The Group of the European People’s Party
and European Integration (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020); ‘An Emerging Anti-​Reform
Green Front? Farm Interest Groups Fighting the “Agriculture 1980” Project, 1958–​1972’,
European Review of History (2015) 22(2), pp. 433–​50.
GLAESSNER, Gert-​Joachim—​is Professor Emeritus at the Social Science Institute of
the Humboldt Universität Berlin. His main research fields are the German Democratic
Republic (GDR), the German political system, and the connection between freedom
 List of Contributors    xv

and security in democratic societies. His publications include Freiheit und Sicherheit.
Eine Ortsbestimmung (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016); German
Democracy. From Post World War II to the Present Day (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006);
Sicherheit in Freiheit. Die Schutzfunktion des demokratischen Staates und die Freiheit der
Bürger (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2003).
HARNISCH, Sebastian—​is Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy
at the University of Heidelberg. His publications include The Politics of Resilience and
Transatlantic Order: Enduring Crisis? co-​edited with Gordon Friedrichs and Cameron
Thies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019); Foreign Policy as Public Policy? Premises and Pitfalls
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2019); The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign
Policy Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
HEBESTREIT, Ray—​is Research Coordinator at the NRW School of Governance
and Program Coordinator at the Institute of Political Science at the University of
Duisburg-​ Essen. His publications include Partizipation in der Wissensgesellschaft.
Funktion und Bedeutung diskursiver Beteiligungsverfahren (Wiesbaden: Springer VS,
2013); ‘Partizipation und politisches Entscheiden. Politische Beteiligung im Kontext
aktueller Entscheidungszumutungen in der Politik’, with Karl-​Rudolf Korte, in Lothar
Harles and Dirk Lange (eds), Zeitalter der Partizipation. Paradigmenwechsel in Politik
und politischer Bildung? (Schwalbach: Wochenschau Verlag. 2015), pp. 22–​38; ‘Das
Institutionengefüge des bundesdeutschen Regierungssystems’, with Karl-​ Rudolf
Korte, in Andres Kost, Peter Massing, and Marion Reiser (eds), Handbuch Demokratie
(Frankfurt: Wochenschau Verlag. 2020), pp.157–​74.
JACOB, JANINE—​works as an adviser for Ralph Brinkhaus, member of the German
Federal Parliament since 2009 and the chairman of the CDU/​CSU parliamentary
group from 2018 to 2022. She previously worked as a business consultant to a finan-
cial consulting firm in the area of finance and risk management. She received her PhD
in 2015 from the Hertie School of Governance. Her published dissertation is entitled
Hybrid System: A Political Science Perspective on the Transformation Process of the
German Financial System During the 2000s (Berlin: Hertie School of Government,
2015): https://​www.econ​biz.de/​Rec​ord/​from-​bank-​based-​hyb​rid-​sys​tem-​politi​cal-​scie​
nce-​pers​pect​ive-​the-​tra​nsfo​rmat​ion-​proc​ess-​the-​ger​man-​financ​ial-​sys​tem-​dur​ing-​
the-​2000s-​jacob-​jan​ine/​1001​1416​668.
JANES, Jackson—​is Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in
Washington DC. He was President of the American Institute for Contemporary German
Studies (AICGS) at Johns Hopkins University/​SAIS in Washington, DC, from 1994 to
2018. His most recent publications include ‘Transatlantic Relations Under President
Joe Biden’ (Zeitschrift für Aussen-​und Sicherheitspolitik, March 2021); ‘Biden’s Grosse
Herausforderung’ (Sirius: Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen, March 2021); ‘Die USA
und Deutschland,‘ in Länderbericht USA (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung,
June 2021).
xvi   List of Contributors

JARAUSCH, Konrad H.—​ is the Lucy Professor of European Civilization at the

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. From 1998 to 2006 he was the director
of the Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History, Potsdam (ZZF). He has authored
and edited more than forty books on modern German and European history. His
publications include Embattled Europe: A Progressive Alternative (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2021); Broken Lives: How Ordinary Germans Experienced the 20th
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Out of Ashes: A New History of Europe
in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).
KAIM, Markus—​is a Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. He is also an adjunct lecturer at the University of
Zurich, at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, and at Bucerius Law School,
Hamburg, and was a Helmut Schmidt Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of
the United States in Washington DC 2019–​ 2020. His publications include In
Search of a New Relationship: Canada, Germany and the United States, with Ursual
Lehmkuhl (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2005); Die Europäische Sicherheits-​und
Verteidigungspolitik: Präferenzbildungs-​und Aushandlungsprozesse in der Europäischen
Union, 1990–​2005 (Baden-​Baden: Nomos, 2007); Great Power and Regional Order: The
United States and the Persian Gulf (London: Routledge, 2016).
KORNELIUS, Stefan—​is Political Editor of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, one of Germany’s
leading daily newspapers. In his reporting career, he has covered Germany’s Christian
Democratic Party (CDU), the chancellorships of Helmut Kohl and Angela Merkel, and
defence issues in Europe. From 1996 to 1999, he served as the paper’s Washington corres-
pondent. His publications include a foreign policy biography of Angela Merkel, entitled
Angela Merkel: The Chancellor and Her World (London: Alma Books, 2013), which has
been translated into thirteen languages.
KORTE, Karl-​Rudolf—​is Professor of Political Science and holds the Chair for the
Political System of the Federal Republic of Germany and Modern State Theories at the
University of Duisburg-​Essen. He is also Director of the NRW School of Governance
at the University of Duisburg-​Essen. His publications include Gesichter der Macht.
Über die Gestaltungspotenziale der Bundespräsidenten (Frankfurt/​New York: Campus,
2019); Coronakratie. Demokratisches Regieren in Ausnahmezeiten, co-​ edited with
Martin Florack and Julia Schwanholz (Frankfurt/​New York: Campus, 2021); Handbuch
Regierungsforschung, co-​edited with Martin Florack (2nd edn, Wiesbaden: Springer
VS, 2022).
LANKOWSKI, Carl—​retired as director of European area studies from the US
Foreign Service Institute in Washington, DC, in 2020. He served as research director
at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) and was a fac-
ulty member at American University prior to that. His publications include Europe’s
Ambiguous Unity: Conflict and Consensus in Post-​Maastricht Europe, co-​edited with
Alan Cafruny (Boulder: Lynn Riener Publishers, 1997); Germany and the European
 List of Contributors    xvii

Community: Beyond Containment and Hegemony (ed.) (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1993); Germany’s Difficult Passage to Modernity: Breakdown, Breakup, Breakthrough
(ed.) (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001).
LARRES, Klaus—​is the Richard M. Krasno Distinguished Professor of History and
International Affairs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Previously
he held professorships at Johns Hopkins University/​SAIS, Yale, London University,
and Queen’s University Belfast in the UK, and served as Counselor and Senior Policy
Adviser at the German embassy in Beijing, China. His publications include Churchill’s
Cold War: The Politics of Personal Diplomacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002);
Dictators and Autocrats: Securing Power Across Global Politics (London: Routledge,
2021); Uncertain Allies: Nixon, Kissinger and the Threat of a United Europe (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2022).
LAYNE, Priscilla—​is Associate Professor of German at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill and Adjunct Professor of African and Afro-​American Studies at UNC.
Her publications include the book White Rebels in Black: German Appropriation of Black
Popular Culture (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2018); and articles such
‘Halbstarke and Rowdys: Consumerism, Youth Rebellion, and Gender in the Postwar
Cinema of the Two Germanys’, Central European History (2018) 53(2), pp. 432–​52; and
‘Regulating and Transgressing the Borders of the Berlin Republic in Doris Dörrie’s Die
Friseuse (2010)’, Women in German Yearbook (2015) 31, pp.147–​73.
MILLER, Russell A.—​is J.B. Stombock Professor of Law at Washington and Lee
University in Lexington, Virginia. He is the co-​founder of the German Law Journal,
former Head of the Max Planck Law Network, and inter alia has won a Humboldt
Research Prize in recognition of his years of scholarly engagement with German law. His
publications include The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany
(with Donald Kommers) (3rd edn, Durham: Duke University Press, 2021); Privacy
and Power: A Transatlantic Dialogue After the NSA-​Affair (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2019); Transboundary Harm in International Law: Lessons from the
Trail Smelter Arbitration (with Rebecca Bratspies) (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
MOROFF, Holger—​is Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies at the National Defense
University and an adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. Previously he taught international and comparative politics
at Friedrich Schiller University Jena and at Leibniz University Hannover. His research
focuses on security theories, comparative political corruption, and the international-
ization of anti-​corruption regimes. His publications include European Soft Security
Policies: The Northern Dimension (ed.) (Kauhava: The Finish Institute of International
Affairs, 2002); Fighting Corruption in Eastern Europe: A Multilevel Perspective, co-​edited
with Diana Schmidt-​Pfister (London/​New York: Routledge, 2017); he has also published
numerous articles in scholarly journals and edited volumes.
xviii   List of Contributors

MÜLLER, Olaf—​is a Researcher at the Institute of Sociology and Project Leader at the
Cluster of Excellence ‘Religion and Politics’ at the University of Münster. His research
focuses on the sociology of religion, social change, and political culture. His publications
include articles in the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, and Religion
and Society in Central and Eastern Europe. He has also co-​edited (with Detlef Pollack,
Volkhard Krech and Markus Hero) the Handbuch Religionssoziologie (Handbook of the
Sociology of Religion) (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2018).
PATTON, David F.—​is Joanne Toor Cummings’ 50 Professor of Government and
International Relations at Connecticut College in New London, CT, where he teaches
classes on comparative and European politics. He has published books and articles
on German party politics, reunification, and German foreign policy. His publications
include ‘Party-​Political Responses to the Alternative for Germany in Comparative
Perspective’, German Politics and Society (2020) 38(1), 77–​104; Out of the East: From PDS
to Left Party in Unified Germany (Albany, NY: Suny Press, 2011); and Cold War Politics in
Postwar Germany (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).
PAUTZ, Hartwig—​is Senior Lecturer in Social Sciences at the University of the West
of Scotland. He has published widely on the relationship between policy, politics, and
expertise, in particular with regard to the role of think tanks in policy-​making, as well
as on e-​democracy, the modernization of the Social Democratic Party of Germany
and German party politics more generally. His publications include ‘Germany’, in
Daniele Albertazzi and Davide Vampa (eds), Populism and New Patterns of Political
Competition in Western Europe (London: Routledge, 2020); ‘The German New
Right and Its Think Tanks,’ German Politics and Society (December 2020) 38(4),
pp. 51–​7 1; Think Tanks, Social Democracy and Social Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012).
POLLACK, Detlef—​is Professor of Sociology of Religion at the University of Münster.
He is also deputy speaker of the Cluster of Excellence ‘Religion and Politics’ at the
University of Münster. His research focuses on the sociology of religion, political cul-
ture, democratization in Eastern Europe, new social movements, and systems theory.
His publications include articles in journals such as Sociology of Religion, Social
Compass, Archives de sciences sociales des religions, European Sociological Review,
and many others as well as the recent book, Religion and Modernity: An International
Comparison, co-​authored with Gergely Rosta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
RUGGENTHALER, Peter—​is Deputy Director of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute
for Research on War Consequences in Graz, Austria. Since 2008 he has been a
member of the Russian-​Austrian Historians’ Commission. His publications include
The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin’s Foreign Policy, 1945–​53 (Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books, 2015); Soviet Occupation of Romania, Hungary, and Austria, 1944/​45–​1948/​
49, co-​edited with Csaba Békés and Laszlo Bochi (Budapest: Central European
University Press, 2015); The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment
in Europe. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021).
 List of Contributors    xix

SACKMANN, Reinhold—​is Professor of Sociology at the Martin-​ Luther-​

University Halle-​Wittenberg. He has held visiting professorships at the University
of Saarbrücken and the Free University of Berlin. His publications include Handbuch
Bevölkerungssozioloige, co-​edited with Yasemin Niephaus and Michaela Kreyenfeld
(Berlin: Springer, 2016); Coping with Demographic Change: A Comparative View on
Education and Local Government in Germany and Poland, (Berlin, Springer, 2015);
Lebenslaufanalyse und Biografieforschung: Eine Einführung (2nd edn, Springer, 2013).
SCHUETTEMEYER, Suzanne S.—​is Professor Emeritus of Government and Policy
Research at the Martin-​Luther-​University, Halle-​Wittenberg, editor-​in-​chief of the
Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen (ZParl) and founding director of the Institute for
Parliamentary Research (IParl) in Berlin. She is a member of the Kommission für die
Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien (KGParl) and laureate
of the Wissenschaftspreis des Deutschen Bundestages. Her publications include Der
Wert der parlamentarischen Repräsentation: Entwicklungslinien und Perspektiven
der Abgeordnetenentschädigung, co-​ edited with Edzard Schmidt-​ Jortzig (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2013); Political Representation in France and Germany: Attitudes and
Activities of Citizens and MPs, co-​edited with Oscar W. Gabriel and Eric Kerrouche
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
SCHWABE, Klaus—​is Professor Emeritus of Contemporary History at the University
of Technology (RWTH) in Aachen. He has published widely on twentieth-​century inter-
national and US history, in particular on German-​American relations and European
integration. His publications include Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany,
and Peacemaking 1918–​1919 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1985);
Weltmacht und Weltordnung. Amerikanische Außenpolitik von 1898 bis zur Gegenwart
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005); Jean Monnet. Frankreich, Deutschland und die Einigung
Europas (Baden-​Baden: Nomos, 2016); Versailles. Das Wagnis eines demokratischen
Friedens (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2019).
SCHWEIGER, Christian—​is Visiting Professor of Comparative European Governance
Systems in the Institute for Political Science at Chemnitz University of Technology
in Germany. Since 2019 he has also been a Guest Lecturer in Social Policy and Law at
the Duale Hochschule Gera-​Eisenach. His publications include Exploring the EU’s
Legitimacy Crisis: The Dark Heart of Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016); Central
and Eastern Europe in the EU: Challenges and Perspectives under Crisis Conditions, co-​
edited with Anna Visvizi (Abingdon” Routledge, 2018); ‘The Global and Financial Crisis
and the Euro Crisis as Contentious Issues in German-​American Relations’, German
Politics (2018) 27(2), pp. 214–​29.
SIEFKEN, Sven T.—​is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Parliamentary
Research (IParl) in Berlin, Visiting Professor at Colorado College in Colorado Springs,
USA, and Privatdozent at Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, Germany. He is
a member of the editorial board of the Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen and vice chair of
the Research Committee of Legislative Specialists (RC08) of the International Political
xx   List of Contributors

Science Association. His recent publications include Parliamentary Committees

in the Policy Process, edited with Hilmar Rommetvedt (London: Routledge, 2022);
Wahlkreisarbeit von Bundestagsabgeordneten. Parlamentarische Repräsentation in
der Corona-​Krise (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2021); and Parlamentarische Kontrolle im
Wandel: Theorie und Praxis des Deutschen Bundestages (Baden-​Baden: Nomos, 2018).
SPERLING, James—​is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of
Akron. He is co-​author (with Martin Smith and Mark Webber) of What’s Wrong with
NATO and How to Fix it (London: Polity Press, 2021); co-​editor (with Sonia Lucarelli
and Mark Webber) of The European Union, Security Governance and Collective
Securitisation’, a special issue of West European Politics (1999) 42(2), pp. 228–​436; and
co-​author (with Mark Webber) of ‘Trump’s Foreign Policy and NATO: Exit and Voice’,
Review of International Studies (2019) 45(3), pp. 511–​26.
STANZEL, Volker—​is Senior Distinguished Fellow at the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs (SWP) and teaches at the Hertie School, both in
Berlin. Formerly a member of the German Foreign Service, he was the German ambas-
sador to both China and Japan. His recent publications include Diplomacy and Artificial
Intelligence: Reflections on Practical Assistance for Diplomatic Negotiations (SWP
Research Paper, 2022, with Daniel Voelsen); New Realities of Foreign Affairs: Diplomacy
in the 21st Century (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019); Clueless Foreign Policy and Why It
Needs the Backing of Society (in German; Berlin: Dietz, 2019).
STARKE, Peter—​is Professor with Special Responsibilities (WSR) at the University
of Southern Denmark. Based at the Danish Centre for Welfare Studies (DaWS),
he specializes in comparative welfare state research and political economy. His
publications include Warfare and Welfare, co-​edited with Klaus Petersen and Herbert
Obinger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Radical Welfare State Retrenchment
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007); and ‘Dualization as Destiny? The Political Economy of
the German Minimum Wage Reform’, with Paul Marx (Politics & Society, 2017).
STIGLICH, Larissa R.—​is Assistant Professor of History at Young Harris College
in Young Harris, Georgia. She obtained her Ph.D. from the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill and is currently revising her manuscript about the former East
German model city, Eisenhüttenstadt for publication. It is provisionally entitled After
Socialism: Navigating German Unification in a Former Socialist Model City, 1971 to the
Present.
SZABO, Stephen F.—​is currently a Senior Fellow at the American Institute for
Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) and Adjunct Professor at the BMW Center
for German and European Studies, Georgetown University. He served as the Executive
Director of the Transatlantic Academy and Interim Dean and Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University. His publications include The
Diplomacy of German Unification (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993); Parting
Ways: The Crisis in the German-​American Relationship (Washington DC: Brookings
 List of Contributors    xxi

Institution Press, 2004); and Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geo-​Economics (London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).
THRAENHARDT, Dietrich—​is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the
Westphalian University Münster. He has published more than forty books and 250
articles. His publications include recent essays on asylum politics in Germany and its
neighbouring countries and, for instance, Integration: Begriffe—​Prozesse—​Institutionen
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2021); SelbstHilfe: Wie Migranten Netzwerke knüpfen und
soziales Kapital schaffen, with Karin Weiss (Freiburg: Lambertus Verlag, 2005);
Europe—​A New Immigration Continent: Policies and Politics in Comparative Perspective
(Münster: LIT-​Verlag, 1992/​1996).
WINKLER, Heinrich August—​is Professor Emeritus of Modern History at Humboldt
University Berlin. He has held multiple fellowships and visiting distinguished
professorships. His publications include Germany: The Long Road West. Vol. 1: 1789–​1933
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Germany: The Long Road West. Vol. 2: 1933–​
1990 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007); Wie wir wurden, was wir sind: Eine kurze
Geschichte der Deutschen (Munich, C.H. Beck, 2020).
WITTLINGER, Ruth (1961–2020)—was a Professor in the School of Government and
International Affairs at Durham University, UK, and the Lady Davis Visiting Professor
at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She published extensively on memory and
identity in post-​unification Germany and Europe and her work appeared in journals
such as West European Politics, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, German Politics and
German Politics and Society. Her publications include German National Identity in the
Twenty-​First Century: A Different Republic After All? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2010); German-​ American Relations in the 21st Century: A Fragile Friendship, co-​
edited with Klaus Larres (London/​New York: Routledge, 2019); Understanding Global
Politics: Actors and Themes in International Affairs, co-​ed. with Klaus Larres (London/​
New York: Routledge, 2020).
 I n t rodu ction

Klaus Larres, Holger Moroff, and

Ruth Wittlinger

Few countries have caused or experienced more calamities in the twentieth century
than Germany. The country emerged from the Cold War as a newly united and sover-
eign state, eventually becoming Europe’s indispensable partner for all major domestic
and foreign policy initiatives. As such it is not surprising that German Chancellor
Angela Merkel was named ‘person of the year 2015’ by Time Magazine as she played piv-
otal roles in resolving various European and global crises.
In fact the post-​war Federal Republic has been fortunate with its leaders and coali-
tion governments. The first (West) German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was rightly
praised for his successful though at first heavily criticized policy of Western integration.
Willy Brandt received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971 for his initially even more controver-
sial rapprochement with the East and the acceptance of Germany’s post-​war borders as
decided by the Second World War victors at Yalta and Potsdam. Helmut Schmidt obtained
much praise for his strategic and financial leadership and Helmut Kohl skilfully grasped
the tremendous window of opportunity to steer Germany towards unification in 1989/​90.
Gerhard Schröder was courageous enough not only to reform the country’s economic and
social policies but also to cautiously steer the united country towards a more active foreign
policy, together with his Green coalition partner, by getting involved in the wars in the
former Yugoslavia. Schröder, however, fell out seriously with the US over the invasion of
Iraq. He also provided governmental respectability to the Green party and may thus have
hastened the popular appeal and decline of his own Social-​Democratic party.
Schröder’s successor, Angela Merkel became the longest-​serving modern Chancellor
after Kohl. While her sixteen years in power have ended only comparatively recently, it
is clear that she was confronted with uniquely challenging issues and addressed them in
a way that may well prove to have a lasting impact on modern German politics. Among
the issues she had to grapple with were the sovereign debt crises of 2008–​12, which
threatened the continued existence of the Euro, and the 2014 Ukraine and Crimean
annexation crisis, which undermined the inviolability of the post-​Second World War
borders in Europe. There also was the 2015–​16 refugee crisis threatening social cohesion
2    Klaus Larres, Holger Moroff, and Ruth Wittlinger

and solidarity in the European Union (EU) as well as the UK leaving the EU in January
2020. And from 2020 to 2022 the Covid-​19 pandemic caused the greatest post-​war re-
cession and global health crisis so far.
These external shocks and the responses they triggered from policy-​makers within
the EU and elsewhere were complemented by forward-​looking and sometimes vi-
sionary policy initiatives coming from Germany itself. For instance, the country
abandoned atomic power in an attempt to decouple economic growth from nuclear and
fossil-​fuel consumption, and emphasized data and privacy protection in the face of un-
precedented spying and surveillance revelations. The German Chancellor also became
a target of pervasive disapproval by US President Trump, who attempted to turn Merkel
into the butt of constant ridicule and criticism. He represented the opposite of her in
political style and value-​based policy content. For much of the world, however, Merkel
became the stalwart defender of liberal Western values and democratic convictions.
This was both recognized and commemorated when Trump’s successor President Joe
Biden invited the outgoing Chancellor to a state visit to the White House a couple of
months before her voluntary retirement in December 2021. Her Finance Minister, the
Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, succeeded her, leading a “traffic-​light-​coalition” with the
Green Party and the Free Democrats. The new governments foreign policy resolve and
acumen was immediately tested by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demand to halt
any further expansion of NATO and Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February
2022. As in 1998, it is a Green Party foreign minister that will have to help lead Germany
in cooperation with its transatlantic allies into uncharted territory of security and mili-
tary challenges in Europe in the aftermath of Russia’s ruthless war in Ukraine.
Still, all of Scholz’s and his predecessors’ policies have come at a price to German
consumers and taxpayers. That they seem able and willing to pay it has as much to do
with Germany’s history as with more recent economic and political dynamics. To name
just a few issues, Germany kept Europe’s common currency viable during protracted
sovereign debt crises, helped to deescalate the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in
2014/15, and invented a new ‘welcoming culture’ in Europe’s refugee crisis, in the process
wielding it like a weapon. Two World Wars and various transformations of its welfare
state, party system, citizenship, and immigration laws, and of its export driven economy
have informed Germany’s domestic democratic culture and the country’s thoroughly
multilateral foreign policy as well as its reluctant leadership in global affairs and inter-
national organizations. This self-​assertion through self-​restriction also applies to the
role of politics in society at large. The experience of both fascist and communist versions
of totalitarianism instilled a large degree of both scepticism of autocracy and demo-
cratic convictions in the German people.

This Oxford Handbook of German Politics provides a comprehensive overview of

some of the major issues of German domestic politics, economics, foreign policy,
and culture by leading experts in their respective fields. This book serves primarily
as a reference work on Germany for scholars and an interested public, but through
this broader lens it also provides a magnifying glass on global developments, which
 Introduction   3

are challenging and transforming the modern state. The growing importance of
Germany as a political actor and economic and security-military partner makes this
endeavour all the more timely and pertinent from both a German and European but
also from a global perspective.
This Handbook has assembled a large number of eminent scholars and outstanding
younger experts on Germany. They are based in Germany, on the European continent
and Scandinavia, the UK, as well as North America and have explored and analysed
developments in German politics from 1945 to the present, with a particular focus on
the years since 1990. Within the thirty-​seven chapters of this book the contributors and
the three editors have done their best to look at Germany from both the outside and
from within, providing a well-​balanced picture of the most crucial developments in
German politics over the last few decades.
This book starts with four eminent scholars’ divergent historical interpretations of
the developments in Germany in the post-​1945 world, reflecting upon a great number
of important aspects that have influenced wider European and global views of modern
societies at large.
The second part of the book focuses on Cold War Germany. The authors analyse
West and East Germany’s domestic, economic, social, and external relations during the
Cold War and Germany’s embeddedness in both the Atlantic and the European policy
structures. The final chapter of this part of the book deals with the domestic and external
dimensions of German unification as well as with the economic and social legacies of
this momentous event.
Part III of the Handbook is dedicated to Germany since 1990—​the domestic dimen-
sion. The first section considers Germany’s formal and informal political institutions,
focusing on its parliamentary democracy and federal structure. The subsequent section
explores how the policy-​making process has shaped its welfare state as well as its energy,
environmental, immigration, and gender policies. The following section deals with the
role of culture and society while the final section looks at the structure of Germany’s
political economy with a special emphasis on its model of a coordinated social market
and export-​driven economy.
The fourth part of the book focuses on the external dimension of German politics
since 1990. The first section deals with Germany’s role in the EU. It explores monetary
relations and the Euro crisis, Justice and Home affairs, as well as Germany’s import-
ance in the EU’s common foreign and defence policy. The subsequent section deals
with Germany’s role in global affairs since unification. The respective authors analyse
Germany’s relationships with some of the major powers such as the US, China, and
Russia.
The fifth and final part of the handbook consists of two chapters. The authors reflect
on the lasting importance of the Merkel era and analyse the development of German
politics in the post-​Merkel era. While in the US, President Joe Biden has returned to
a more traditional Western policy, in China and Russia, the other two global powers
of great importance to Germany, the autocratic leaderships of Xi Jinping and Vladimir
Putin are continuing. With the end of the Merkel era and Olaf Scholz’s transformational
4    Klaus Larres, Holger Moroff, and Ruth Wittlinger

chancellorship, an important turning point has occurred in German politics with mo-
mentous consequences for German domestic, economic/​environmental, and external
affairs.
This handbook is dedicated to our co-​editor Professor Ruth Wittlinger of the
University of Durham in the UK. After a grave illness Ruth passed away much too early
and was unable to see the completion of this book. We are immensely grateful for her
hard work and dedication to this Handbook and to the study of German politics, his-
tory, and culture in general. Ruth was a wonderful person with a very pleasant and
unique personality and a great sense of humour. We miss her tremendously as do all her
many friends and family.
We also would like to thank all our many contributors for their hard work, dedication,
and patience, and of course for their insightful and well-​written essays. All this is greatly
appreciated. Oxford University Press senior editor, Dominic Byatt, accompanied this
book from the beginning with much helpful advice and guidance for which we are also
most grateful.
Chapel Hill, NC, February 2022
Klaus Larres and Holger Moroff
 PA RT I

L E A DI N G S C HOL A R S
AND THEIR
I N T E R P R E TAT ION S
OF G E R M A N H I STORY
F ROM WOR L D WA R I I
TO T H E P R E SE N T
 CHAPTER 1

ENC OUNTERS W I T H
MODERN I T Y
The German Search for Alternatives in
the Twentieth Century

Konrad H. Jarausch

In March 1915 the sociologist Torstein Veblen published a treatise that attributed
German bellicosity in the First World War to a deficit in political modernity. Like
other critics, he was struck by the contradiction between the rapid development of
industrialization and the tenacious survival of an authoritarian dynastic state. ‘This
united German community, at the same time, took over from their (industrially) more
advanced neighbors the latest and highly efficient state of the industrial arts’, allowing
the Second Empire ‘to grow to formidable dimensions’. But simultaneously ‘Germany
carried over from a recent and retarded past a state of the dynastic order, with a scheme
of detail institutions and a popular habit of mind suitable to a coercive, centralized and
irresponsible control and to the pursuit of dynastic dominion’ (Veblen, 1915). In contrast
to Great Britain which had pioneered both industrialization and parliamentary govern-
ment, Germany, he argued, excelled at the former without embracing the latter.
In contrast, the novelist Thomas Mann at the end of the war published a massive
volume in defence of Germany’s special cultural achievements. Rejecting his older
brother Heinrich’s cosmopolitan call for democracy as deeply un-​German, he insisted
on his country’s middle position between Western individualism and Eastern autocracy,
which he brilliantly explicated in The Magic Mountain a few years later. ‘The difference
between spirit and politics contains [a distinction] between culture and civilization,
soul and society, freedom and right to vote, art and literature.’ For Mann, ‘Germanness
meant culture, soul, freedom, art and not civilization, society, right to vote, literature’.
Provoked by the universalism of the post-​Enlightenment claims of democracy, the
writer defended the German ‘authoritarian state’, since ‘his heart belonged to Germany’
(Mann, 1918, p. xxxiii). Instead of considering the Prusso-​German system as backward,
8   Konrad H. Jarausch

Mann defended its distinctive combination of economic prowess and political authori-
tarianism as culturally superior.
After the Third Reich, self-​critical West German historians returned to this Sonderweg
thesis as a negative deviation from Western development. From a macro-​sociological
perspective, it seemed indeed that Germany had chosen a historical path that differed
from the Anglo-​American model, enshrined in the textbook notion of Western civiliza-
tion. This viewpoint inverted Thomas Mann’s claim of cultural superiority and revived
Veblen’s approach of using Great Britain as the yardstick by which Germany failed in
disastrous ways. Led by the theoretically minded and fiercely partisan Hans-​Ulrich
Wehler, scholars clustered around the new university of Bielefeld elevated this inter-
pretation to a general thesis of ‘partial’ or ‘defensive’ modernization from above that
would explain German responsibility for the World Wars and the Holocaust (Wehler,
1975; Wehler, 1973; Wehler, 1987; Nolte, 2015). However, hermeneutic traditionalists
such as Thomas Nipperdey attacked such conclusions as overly generalized, while leftist
historians such as Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn disputed the suitability of Britain as
a positive model. Moreover, Michael Geyer and I questioned the appropriateness of the
national master narrative in general (Jarausch and Geyer, 2003, pp. 1–​33).
Though the ‘special path’ interpretation has lost much of its explanatory power, it
posed the central question of Germany’s relation to modernity. That elusive concept,
defined variously as a description of a historical period, a claim to constant progress, and
a projection screen for blueprints of the future came into general use around the turn
of the twentieth century. Initially sociologists employed a simplistic normative under-
standing of modernization, based on Anglo-​American experiences (Gerschenkron,
1943; Moore, 1966), but more recently the theoretical discussion has moved towards a
plural conception of competing modernities. Based on my interpretation of twentieth-​
century European history in Out of Ashes, I argue that the German story no longer needs
to be read as incomplete Westernization but rather as a set of failed attempts at creating
alternate authoritarian, organic, or socialist forms of modernity, different from the
Western liberal-​democratic pattern (Eisenstadt, 2000, pp. 1–​29; Jarausch 2018a, pp. 21–​
38). The following remarks attempt to sketch out some of the implications of such a more
nuanced understanding.

Authoritarian Modernization

Surprisingly enough, a group of distinguished American visitors during the pre-​First

World War years ‘studied the Wilhelmine empire as a fellow—​statist—​pioneer of mod-
ernity’. For instance, the writer Samuel Clemens, aka Mark Twain, was impressed by the
bustling capital of Berlin: ‘It is a new city: It is the newest I have ever seen.’ As a dynamic
country, united only in 1871, Imperial Germany attracted such distinguished observers
as Theodore Dreiser or William Jennings Bryan as well as Booker T. Washington who
commented on their positive impressions in their writings. Ignoring the medieval
 ENCOUNTERS WITH MODERNITY    9

castles and patrician townhouses, these travellers were impressed by the speed and in-
tensity of the transformation of what had been a sleepy set of dynastic territories. What
fascinated them most was ‘this work of modern improvement, especially in public
appointments’ led by the government, which was a product of ‘the scientific spirit and
method’ (Krause, 2017, pp. 25–​52). For many observers, the Reich was not backward but
rather a paragon of progress.
One particular area that stood out was the excellence of science and technology,
since in the late nineteenth century German universities were considered the best in
the world. Out of neo-​humanist philology, these institutions had developed a ‘research
imperative’ as a secular calling of scholarship which centred on the production of new
knowledge rather than on the transmission of received truths. This innovative ethos
attracted more than 10,000 American students who brought the new spirit as well as
institutional arrangements such as the doctoral degree, the seminar, and the research in-
stitute to the US on their return. The renown of scientific discoveries in fields like medi-
cine is evident in the disproportionate number of Nobel Prizes which German scholars
gathered during the first decades of the twentieth century. Equally prominent were the
technical institutions which turned theoretical innovations in chemistry or physics into
practical applications that produced entire new branches of industry (McClelland, 2017;
Jarausch, 1988, pp. 181–​206).
Another area that struck foreign visitors was the rapid industrialization of Imperial
Germany which transformed the country into an industrial powerhouse. On the eve of
the Great War, the Wilhelmine Empire was catching up to British leadership in areas like
coal and steel production, also increasing its share of international trade at great speed.
In contrast to the Anglo-​American model of laissez-​faire, much of this dynamism was
due to state intervention, shielding infant industries with tariffs and supporting the
development of businesses such as the Krupp steelworks with subsidies. Especially in
technology-​based areas typical of the second phase of the industrial revolution, such as
chemistry and electricity, the public support of research made it possible to carry innov-
ation over into production companies such as Bayer, BASF, Siemens, or AEG. The style
of this modernization has sometimes been called ‘organized capitalism’ in order to stress
the cooperation between government, academe, and monopolistic industry (Lee, 2017;
Winkler, 1974).
A final aspect of Imperial Germany that impressed many observers as a sign of pro-
gress was systematic state intervention to foster modernity. In contrast to the corruption
of some American officials, the Prussian bureaucracy seemed to be a model of incor-
ruptibility and efficiency in the solution of problems. Also the development of a trans-
portation infrastructure of roads, canals, and railroads appeared to be better organized
than the market-​driven expansion in the US. Progressives especially travelled to
Germany in order to study its pathbreaking efforts at urban reform by fostering public
health through water and sewer-​line construction, building of streetcars and subways,
moving away from tenements to housing with green spaces, the provision of allotment
garden plots (Schrebergärten), and the like. Finally, foreigners were fascinated by
Bismarck’s insurance scheme for pension, disability, and accident that was designed to
10   Konrad H. Jarausch

wean the workers away from socialism by offering an incipient welfare state (Rodgers,
2000; Mauch and Patel, 2010).
In the iron test of the First World War, the German version of authoritarian mod-
ernity nonetheless failed disastrously, since the democracies were better able to sustain
its strains. Already before the conflict many commentators had wondered about the
persistence of the Kaiser’s ‘personal rule’ and the lack of parliamentary control in spite
of universal male suffrage in the Reichstag. Moreover, the rapid growth of the labour
movement with its powerful trade unions and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as the
largest party indicated an unresolved conflict. During the war, the power of the military,
represented by the quasi-​dictatorship of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, seemed to guar-
antee efficient decision-​making by suppressing dissent. But in the long run the suspen-
sion of politics in the Burgfrieden failed to resolve such vital problems as the rationing
of food (Jarausch, 1973; Leonhard, 2014). In the competition of different versions of pro-
gress, the particularism of the German Kultur proved unable to compete with the uni-
versalism of Western democracy.

Weimar Modernism

The ill-​fated Weimar Republic was in many ways an effort to rejoin Western civiliza-
tion by establishing a German variant of liberal-​democratic modernity. The Supreme
Command’s defeat in battle and collapse of nerve discredited the prestige of the military,
while the grassroots revolution of the sailors and soldiers in November 1918 overthrew
the Kaiser’s authoritarian rule by forcing William II to abdicate and flee to Holland. This
double rupture offered a chance to end the discrepancy between socio-​economic mod-
ernity and political backwardness by changing the political system from the Empire to
a Republic. As a result, some historians like Detlev Peukert have labelled the Weimar
Republic as apogee of ‘classical modernity’ which inspired innovation in many areas
of society and culture (Peukert, 1993; Machtan, 2018). But the very radicalism of these
departures prohibited a stable synthesis, inaugurating instead a massive backlash that
denounced modernism as a ‘crisis’ that had to be remedied by a neo-​conservative return
to older traditions.
Among the three major ideological blueprints for modernity that issued from the
First World War, the Weimar Republic represented the Wilsonian, liberal-​democratic
version. The Fourteen Points proposed by the American president seemed to offer a
less onerous peace treaty than the vindictive demands of the Anglo-​French statesmen.
Moreover, the transfer of government responsibility to the largest Reichstag party, the
SPD, offered a gradual transition that facilitated the drafting of a Republican constitu-
tion. The compromise between the trade unions, led by Carl Legien, and the employers’
associations, represented by Hugo Stinnes, created a chance for orderly bargaining for
wage increases. And the deal struck between President Friedrich Ebert and war minister,
 ENCOUNTERS WITH MODERNITY    11

Wilhelm Groener signified that the Reichswehr would at least tolerate the Republic.
In the chaos of defeat and revolution, these agreements represented an evolutionary
attempt to fashion a truly democratic form of political modernity (Winkler, 1993).
The calling of a constitutional convention also meant that the new government would
reject the Soviet example of modernization that was based upon grassroots councils.
During the Revolution numerous workers and soldiers had spontaneously elected such
Räte which understood themselves as carriers of revolutionary legitimacy, demanding
the end of the war, the creation of a socialist Republic, and the socialization of in-
dustry. In Berlin members of the socialist Left wing, called Spartacists, in January 1919
staged a general strike and rose up in order to seize power. The moderate SPD leader
Gustav Noske thereupon used Free Corps, made up of veterans and students, to put
down such rebellions in Berlin and other cities. The radical Right killed the leaders
of the revolt, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, irretrievably splitting the labour
movement (Schütrumpf, 2018). The victory of the moderates stabilized the Republic
and inaugurated a whole series of modernizing reforms such as green-​belt housing for
the working class.
In cultural terms, Weimar proved to be a hothouse of modernist innovation and ex-
perimentation, since the institutional supports of tradition had broken down. An ex-
plosion of creativity by avant-​garde groups like DADA sought to provoke the staid
burgers of the middle class. A flood of new visual styles, ranging from expressionism
to cubism rejected the traditional standards of representation, while twelve-​tone music
began to reflect the dissonances of urban life. At the same time radio and film opened
up popular worlds of mass entertainment, often geared to the lowest common denom-
inator. Advertisements for the ‘new woman’, with slim shifts and bobbed hair threatened
conventions of maternalism with androgynous sexuality. In building and design, daring
Bauhaus architects attempted to marry form with function, irrespective of cultural
baggage from the past. Challenging traditional ways in virtually all avenues of human
endeavour, Weimar culture exuded a hothouse atmosphere of excitement, daring, and
conflict (Gay, 1970; Weitz, 2007).
This shock of rapid modernization created an angry backlash against cultural mod-
ernism which inspired the formation of a new, neo-​conservative Right. Many religious
leaders denounced the abandonment of bourgeois conventions of morality as decadent
and sinful; nationalist commentators criticized the cosmopolitanism of the innovators,
many of which hailed from outside of Germany; a fanatical band of biological racists also
accused the Jews of destroying the core of culture; and many elitists blamed the lowering
of standards on ‘the rise of the masses’ and their entertainment by popular culture.
Like Moeller van den Bruck, this motley group of neo-​conservatives did not want to go
back to the Second Empire but rather longed for the foundation of a new, anti-​modern
Third Reich that would lead Germany to a national rebirth. Unfortunately, many leftist
intellectuals, such as Kurt Tucholsky, found the Republic too mundane or capitalist and
therefore failed to rally to the defense of its democratic modernity (Peukert, 1993, p. 281;
Weitz, 2007, p. 330; Woods, 1996).
12   Konrad H. Jarausch

Organic Modernity

Ever since the establishment of the Third Reich, commentators have debated the
paradoxical relationship between National Socialism and modernity. Though con-
temporary leftists denounced the NSDAP as a reactionary movement, some later
analysts have stressed its unwitting modernizing effects. But trying to reaffirm the
Enlightenment tradition of liberty and equality, most progressive scholars have
vigorously denounced the racist repression of the Third Reich as nefarious and
backward-​looking. Unconvinced, some other, more moderate social historians have
pointed to modern features of the Nazi system in its embrace of technology, efforts
at biological social engineering, and the like. According to Peter Fritzsche, ‘the
Nazis were modernists because they made the acknowledgement of the radical in-
stability of twentieth century life the premise of relentless experimentation’. Seeking
to reconcile such contradictions, Jeffrey Herf has coined a concept that addressed
both dimensions by calling it ‘reactionary modernism’ (Fritzsche, 1996, pp. 1–​22;
Herf, 1984).
Many aspects of Nazi ideology and practice that rejected modernity suggest that
the Third Reich was, indeed, a reactionary system. On the negative side, Hitler and his
followers hated the experiments of Weimar modernism, railing against ‘degenerate
art’; they promoted a racial anti-​Semitism, denouncing Jews both as capitalists and
socialists; and they vigorously fought against the revolutionary egalitarianism of com-
munism, accusing it of cosmopolitan treason to the nation. On the positive side, the
Nazis embraced a romantic agrarianism, praising the healthy farm life of ‘blood and
soil’; they similarly promoted Nordic mythology as an invigorating martial creed, su-
perior to pacifist Christianity; and they fostered a medieval belief in a strong leader, the
charismatic Führer who would restore the country to greatness (Jäckel, 1981; Link, 2014).
Though much of the iconography was also reactionary, the Nazis were less interested
in the real past than in an imagined earlier age that would solve all the problems of the
present.
Numerous other indicators, however, imply that National Socialism was itself an out-
growth of the very modernity it claimed to combat. Holding a permanent pass to the
Deutsche Museum in Munich, Hitler was not alone in his infatuation with technology
such as driving in fast cars, flying in airplanes, and the like. The sophisticated propa-
ganda apparatus of Joseph Goebbels also used modern devices from loudspeakers to
radio receivers, from newsreels to feature films. Moreover, the Wehrmacht drew on in-
novative engineering to develop the first jet-​fighter planes and the infamous V-​2 rockets.
On a more general level, the Third Reich was a mass dictatorship that differed from trad-
itional authoritarian regimes in the radicalism of its methods and ideology. To Aryan
citizens the regime offered attractive incentives such as the subsidized vacations of the
Kraft durch Freude (strength through joy, KdF) and the ‘people’s cars’ of Volkswagen
(VW), but towards its opponents the Gestapo and SS used ruthless repression (Prinz
 ENCOUNTERS WITH MODERNITY    13

and Zitelmann, 1994; Allen, 1996). In spite of its neo-​conservative claims, the mass mo-
bilization of the Third Reich was a quite modern form of dictatorship.
Thoroughly modern too was the gigantic Nazi project of social engineering in
order to strengthen the body of the nation for Darwinist competition. The positive
measures of such a eugenics programme consisted of efforts to reverse the decline of
the birthrate, which had been dropping due to the population transition, by fostering
motherhood and improving children’s health. The negative sides of this racial
approach to public health involved the prohibition of reproduction with Jews so as
to prevent the ‘pollution of Aryan blood’ as well as the weeding out of the hereditary
ill through sterilization or even euthanasia. Part of this biopolitical crusade was also
the reaffirmation of traditional gender distinctions between a ‘martial masculinity’,
ready to defend the fatherland against external enemies, and a ‘volkish femininity’,
providing children for the perpetuation of the Aryan race. This partly supportive
and partly murderous effort to remake the Volkskörper speaks of an astounding
ambition that can only be called modern (Dickinson, 2004, pp. 1–​48; Burleigh and
Wippermann, 1991).
The Nazi project of creating an alternate ‘organic modernity’, however, failed
even more disastrously than the earlier authoritarian effort. While the Third Reich’s
rhetoric stressed the inclusive character of building a true people’s community, the
exclusions of political enemies and ‘racial inferiors’ turned the NS-​Volksgemeinschaft
into a licence for mass murder. The attempt to seize ‘living space’ in the East triggered
an orgy of violence during the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the mostly Slavic inhabitants
of these territories. The anti-​Semitic project of eliminating an entire people such
as the Jews unleashed a systematic genocide of unprecedented proportions in the
Holocaust. As long as the ‘lightning warfare’ of the Wehrmacht produced victories,
the Aryan majority was willing to support Hitler’s aims, but when the radio
announced one defeat after another, it began to understand that the war would come
to Germany itself. In spite of their ideological differences the Grand Alliance powers
ultimately combined to defeat the National Socialist challenger (Jarausch, 2018b,
pp. 33–​46; Jarausch, 2015, p. 393).

Conservative Modernization

The second, even more total defeat discredited the fascist alternative and offered a
choice between the liberal-​democratic and the Soviet-​communist versions of mod-
ernity, represented by the US and the USSR. The allied occupation ended German
sovereignty in June 1945 and dissolved the military, putting all power into the Allied
Control Council meetings in Berlin. Opinions clashed as to whether the Germans
were such ingrained militarists that they ought to be suppressed with force or whether
Nazism had merely been a disease which could be cured with the right policies. The
14   Konrad H. Jarausch

compromise, agreed upon at Potsdam, stipulated ‘demilitarization, denazification, and

decartelization’ in order to prevent a Third World War (Hönicke-​Moore, 2014; Jarausch,
2006). Only after the Wehrmacht had been dissolved, the Nazi members dismissed, and
the cartels broken up would there be a chance for democratic rehabilitation. But since
the four victorious powers interpreted these principles differently, the occupation zones
gradually drifted apart, dividing the remnant of the country in the Cold War.
In Western Germany, the popular desire for a return to ‘normality’ inspired a para-
doxical form of conservative modernization. Symbolized by the first chancellor, Konrad
Adenauer, a septuagenarian affectionally called ‘the old one’, many people longed
for a return to the ‘good old days’ of the Empire before the catastrophes of the World
Wars. The quest for reestablishing public order created a restoration climate in which
individuals and groups sought to salvage traditions from the rubble of the Third Reich
which might still be viable for the future. In the search for spiritual values the pews of the
churches began to fill again, even if many pastors and priests had collaborated with the
Nazi regime. In personal life, the traditional bourgeois standards of hard work, thrift,
discipline, punctuality, and cleanliness made a surprising recovery as the foundation for
social civility. Most apolitical people who had survived the fighting, bombardment, or
flight, just wanted to get on with their private lives, find a job, start a family, and the like
(Schildt and Sywottek, 1998; Jarausch, 2018c).
At the same time many inhabitants of the three Western zones came to embrace
the liberal and capitalist modernity of the West. With lectures, films, and magazines,
America Houses propagated an alluring image of peace and progress that was reinforced
by positive experiences of hundreds of exchange students and business travellers. As
the dominant Western power, the US came to symbolize innovation and prosperity,
represented by its huge automobiles and comfortable homes with all sorts of domestic
technology such as refrigerators and washing machines. As a government system,
parliamentary democracy wooed the sceptics by allowing space for rebuilding per-
sonal lives and the free expression of individual opinions. Konrad Adenauer’s strategy
of Westbindung, tying the nascent Federal Republic to the Western camp, therefore
proved more attractive than Kurt Schumacher’s neutralist nationalism (Schwarz, 1995;
Doering-​Manteuffel, 1999). And finally, the establishment of a communist dictatorship
in the East validated the turn to the West.
By creating a consumer democracy, the so-​called ‘economic miracle’ gave modernity a
positive connotation during the post-​war era. The surprising success of Ludwig Erhard’s
gamble of returning to market competition through the ‘currency reform’ in 1948 ended
the state control that had resulted in stagnation. After a slow start, the West German
economy grew an average of between 5 and 10 per cent annually until the mid-​1970s,
only interrupted by a small recession in 1966. Once the shopwindows filled again and
the Deutschmark (DM) could actually buy something worthwhile, consumers started
a shopping spree by acquiring household implements, home entertainment gadgets,
automobiles, and the like. Commentators talk about consumption ‘waves’ of indulging
in food and alcohol, followed by buying new clothing, furniture, and travel, with cul-
ture coming in last. Since trade unions succeeded in raising wages, shortening working
 ENCOUNTERS WITH MODERNITY    15

hours, and lengthening vacations, many of these technological advances became avail-
able to ordinary people (König, 2000; Carter, 1997).
Although some traditionalists remained sceptical, the majority of the West Germans
accepted modernity as a benign development during the post-​war era. No doubt the
proliferation of rock ’n’ roll music and shallow Hollywood movies seemed to members
of the elite as a loss of cultural standards. But when efforts to save youths from such
American influences generally failed, Cold War conservatives learned to live with the
arrival of popular culture as a passing phase in the process of growing up that did not
fundamentally threaten Western civilization. Similarly, many traditionalists who found
Western styles strange were never completely sure of the reliability of NATO or the
advantages of integration in the Common Market. But during the various Cold War
crises in 1948, 1953, 1958, 1961, 1968, and so forth, it was clear that the Federal Republic
needed the American nuclear umbrella in order to retain its independence (Poiger,
2000; Granieri, 2003). Since the liberal version of modernity was associated with posi-
tive experiences, it finally carried the day.

Socialist Modernity

In East Germany it was the communist version of modernity, represented by the Soviet
Union, that ultimately seized control. Many intellectuals proudly believed that they were
carrying on the Enlightenment project of creating a more equal society according to ra-
tional standards. Moreover, apparatchiks could claim that they finally had a chance to
implement the progressive reforms long advocated by the labour movement in order to
free workers and peasants from want. Drawing a positive lesson from the Nazi debacle,
many activists also greeted the merger between the Social Democratic and Communist
parties in the Socialist Unity Party (SED) during the spring of 1946 as an overdue
step that would finally give the proletariat the majority in elections. At the same time
Communist party members were able to draw on the prestige of having been the only
consistent anti-​fascists in the resistance against the Third Reich. With this moral cap-
ital the Eastern leaders could claim to be building a better and more modern Germany
(Ross, 2002; Hillaker, 2020).
In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Soviet Union provided the positive
blueprint according to which a new socialist society ought to be built. The smashing
victory of the Red Army over the Nazi Wehrmacht showed even to bourgeois sceptics
who resented the accompanying atrocities that Russia must have done something right.
Moreover, the revolutionary transformation of a still somewhat backward country
into one of the superpowers, equipped with nuclear weapons and sending satellites
into space, also impressed many Germans. Since the GDR lacked heavy industry, the
strategy of labour-​intensive ‘smokestack industrialization’ appeared plausible, even if it
came at the expense of providing consumer goods. One of the clichés regarding ‘the
friends’ was therefore ‘to learn from the Soviet Union is to learn how to be victorious’.
16   Konrad H. Jarausch

But unfortunately Soviet collectivization and industrialization proved only moder-

ately attractive, since in many areas the GDR was already further developed than its big
brother (Schroeder, 2013; Fulbrook, 2005).
The politics of the East German ‘people’s democracy’ established a modern ‘welfare
dictatorship’, forcing the population to become communist for its own good. Initially,
the revived political parties agreed on the priority of erasing the traces of National
Socialism and therefore cooperated in a ‘national bloc’. But when the SED was trounced
in Berlin and failed to win elections in the provinces, the distribution of seats was agreed
upon beforehand, assuring the dominance of the ‘leading party’. At the same time the
establishment of the Stasi, the state security service, systematically persecuted church-
going Christians, pro-​Western politicians, and dissident intellectuals. Eventually the
SED shifted more to incentives, using the trade unions and other mass organizations
to offer privileges and rewards to conformist citizens. But in the tradition of Rousseau,
the GDR was a Stalinist dictatorship for the people rather than a government by them.
As Ulbricht quipped: ‘It must look democratic, but we have to control everything’
(Klessmann, 2007; Jarausch, 1999).
In spite of its social services, socialist modernity lost out to the capitalist form of con-
sumer society in the East-​West competition. A key reason was the planned economy
which eliminated the vagaries of the competitive market by setting bureaucratic targets
for production. The fixed but unrealistic price system failed to allocate resources
according to their actual costs, thereby ignoring what it took to produce a given item. In
East Germany the free education and medical care as well as the subsidies for basic food,
housing, and transportation made it possible to get by with a modest salary. But the
planning system also led to low productivity because workers were not paid by how they
performed but rather by other socio-​political priorities. As a result, the GDR economy
was also unresponsive to consumer demands, making bathing suits when it rained and
umbrellas when the sun shone (Steiner, 2010; Wolle, 1998). Compared with their pros-
perous Western relatives, East Germans often felt disadvantaged and resented coming
in second best.
The ‘peaceful revolution’ of 1989 was therefore a repudiation of socialist modernity
and a vote for liberal-​democratic modernization. The construction of the Berlin
Wall in 1961 signified that the SED had to use force to keep its populace in, leading
to an unstoppable demand for travel and emigration. Moreover, the mass protests in
Leipzig and other East German cities called for the actual practice of those human
rights which were promised in the 1973 constitution. Confronted with such demands
from its own citizens, the party lost its credibility as representative of workers and
peasants. The last-​ditch effort of the Round Table to democratize but retain the GDR
by pursuing a Third Way failed to convince the majority of citizens who voted for
accession to the Federal Republic as the quickest way to gain political freedom and
material prosperity. Because ‘real existing socialism’ had failed to live up to its own
billing, the magnetic attraction of the larger, freer, and wealthier West had proven ir-
resistible (Jarausch, 1994; Maier 1997).
 ENCOUNTERS WITH MODERNITY    17

The European Model

With the overthrow of communism in the East, the Berlin Republic finally arrived in
the West, defined as liberal-​democratic modernity. According to many criteria united
Germany had become a fairly ‘normal’ nation-​state like most of its neighbours: In con-
trast to Weimar’s crises, it was a parliamentary democracy whose government proved
to be an anchor of stability in Europe. Its export-​oriented economy was the largest on
the continent, making the Euro, the European common currency introduced in 1999,
a coveted currency and racking up large foreign trade surpluses. Though somewhat
pruned by the Schroeder government’s Agenda 2010, its welfare state was still one of
the most elaborate, offering ample benefits. Its intellectual life no longer sought to dis-
tinguish itself from Western civilization, but rather embraced its fashions with a ven-
geance. And finally, its foreign policy was peaceful and multilateral, embedded in the
European Union (EU) and NATO. Only in memory culture did Germans still carry the
double burden of the Nazi (NS) and SED dictatorships (Winkler, 2006; Jarausch, 2013).
Ironically, just when it seemed that Germany had given up its special path, this rec-
onciliation was threatened from an unlikely quarter—​the Right-​wing turn of the US.
From the ‘Reagan Revolution’ onwards, many Republican politicians had veered in a
neo-​conservative direction that reinterpreted the common values of liberal modernity
in light of American exceptionalism. In the economy this shift meant the ascendancy
of neo-​liberalism, trying to throw off regulatory restraints on competition and other
economic constraints and liberating the market for the sake of private gain. In foreign
policy this turn signified an embrace of unilateralism and neo-​imperialism, especially
after the 9/​11 terrorist attacks. In military affairs this attitude sponsored two wars in Iraq
and an invasion of Afghanistan, both of which were successful on the battlefield but
failed in subsequent peace-​making. In a whole host of issues like welfare support or gun
control, an increasing gap opened up between the unbridled individualism of the US
and the preference for solidarity and collectivism on the European continent (Kurthen
et al., 2006; Ther, 2016).
Somewhat unwittingly, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) found itself in the
thankless role of defending the European model of modernity against this neo-​liberal
American variant. In practice that meant holding onto the compromise of the ‘social
market economy’ that tried to combine competition with solidarity. In the transatlantic
debate about a reform of the welfare state, Germany was only willing to accept modest
cut-​backs coupled with an effort to retrain rather than to coddle the unemployed.
Regarding environmental protection it dared to shut down nuclear power-​plants and
shift over to renewable energies such as wind or solar power. And in the highly charged
migration question, Berlin was willing to open its gates at least temporarily. Only in the
sovereign debt crisis did Germany insist on austerity in order to restore the global com-
petitiveness of the heavily indebted southern European PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy,
Ireland, Greece, Spain) that were clamouring for soft money (Ash, 2004; Jarausch, 2021,
18   Konrad H. Jarausch

pp. 3–​5, 271–​82). After a century of failed searches for alternatives, the Germans had now
become a key defender of the embattled European way.
Due to these different interpretations of modernity, maintaining a liberal world order
against a nationalist US has become a difficult challenge for Germany. Because of its
historic burden and limited military, the FRG had developed a foreign policy ‘culture
of restraint’, preferring soft power to armed force. Pushed by the international commu-
nity, Berlin had gradually accepted more international responsibility, even allowing the
Bundeswehr to participate in combat missions justified as peace-​keeping in the Kosovo
and Afghanistan. But the Kohl and the Schroeder governments refused to participate
in the Iraq wars, the former because of concurrent reunification, the latter because it
condemned the invasion as a preemptive war. The Federal Republic is therefore faced
with a fundamental foreign policy dilemma: On the one hand, Berlin wants to maintain
its friendship with the US for reasons of defence and trade, but on the other it feels more
and more compelled to assert its own and European interests (Sommer, 2018).
The victory of liberal modernity in the ideological competition of the past century
has had the unexpected consequence of splitting it into an American and a European
variant. As the ‘seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century’, the First World War had
produced three competing blueprints of modernity: the Bolshevik social revolution of
the Soviet Union; the Wilsonian promise of capitalist democracy; and the fascist attempt
at a radical nationalism, first enunciated by Mussolini and then adopted by Hitler. In the
bloody competition between these modernizing visions, the unlikely alliance between
democracy and communism first defeated National Socialism, while Cold War com-
petition then vanquished ‘real existing socialism’ as well. But instead of ushering in a
post-​historical age of liberal capitalism, the victorious democratic ideology has begun
to fracture into American and European variants, confronted by a post-​communist
Chinese challenge. Surprisingly enough, it was a chastened Germany which became
the chief champion of the continental model (Jarausch, 2015). One can only hope that
with the reforms of the Biden administration, the transatlantic gap will start to narrow
once again

German Transformations

The German encounters with modernity in the twentieth century were therefore tor-
tuous affairs, full of contradictions and dead ends. In many areas, such as science and
technology or urbanization and economic growth, the inhabitants of Central Europe
were at the forefront, due to government support for their innovations. But in other
more affective domains such as identity, values, and mores, their intellectuals often
clung to a bygone era of seemingly stable rural or small town life which was slipping
away. The authoritarian modernity of the Second Empire was therefore an ingenious
effort to combine rapid development with political tradition which failed due to a self-​
centred focus on Kultur that lacked a universal appeal. The second, more radical project
 ENCOUNTERS WITH MODERNITY    19

of the Third Reich, to fashion an ‘organic modernity’, was another attempt to reconcile
cutting-​edge advances with a protective ‘peoples’ community’. But by excluding other
peoples and ideologies, the Volksgemeinschaft deteriorated into ethnic cleansing and
hegemonic genocide (Herbert, 2014; Jarausch, 2018a, p. 21).
Though starting with the bonus of anti-​fascist resistance, the socialist version of mod-
ernization was not any more successful either. To be true, it could appeal to the Marxist
heritage of the labour movement, which sought to create a more equal and just society,
inspiring radicals from Bebel to Luxemburg. But it was established on the bayonets
of the Red Army that had shed too much blood during the Nazi defeat in order to be
accepted by the ‘liberated’ populace. Even after the fusion of the Social Democratic and
Communist parties, the project of social revolution by forced industrialization and col-
lectivization appealed only to a minority of the East German populace, compelling the
party to establish a Leftist dictatorship. While the effort to create ‘a better Germany’ ini-
tially appealed to intellectuals like Berthold Brecht or Victor Klemperer, in the long run
even socialist idealists were disenchanted with ‘real existing socialism’ (Jarausch and
Sabrow, 1999; Fulbrook, 1995). The GDR experiment therefore failed for multiple eco-
nomic, cultural, and political reasons.
Yet it took two attempts in order for the majority of Germans to accept the liberal-​
democratic and capitalist form of modernity associated with the West. Born in defeat
and revolution, the Weimar Republic, supported by democratic, Catholic, and social-​
democratic parties, sought to replace the discredited authoritarianism of Imperial
Germany. But its pathbreaking constitution, social reforms, and vibrant culture were
denigrated by anti-​democratic forces of the Left and the Right (Hett, 2018). In contrast,
the ‘donated democracy’ after the second, even more complete defeat, gained more
popular support, since all the other alternatives had proven even less attractive. No
doubt, the Cold War confrontation with the dictatorial East and the material success of
the economic miracle made democracy look better by comparison. Nonetheless, it took
at least an entire generation until the majority of the West Germans internalized demo-
cratic norms sufficiently in order to be sure that ‘Bonn [was] not Weimar’ (Strote, 2018;
Wolfrum, 2006).
The history of twentieth-​century Germany can therefore be read as a search for
convincing answers to the mounting pressures of modernization. The sociologist
Thorstein Veblen had already identified the underlying problem of a discrepancy be-
tween technical or economic advances and obstacles to political development. Thomas
Mann’s defence of the philosophical depth and musical creativity of German Kultur
therefore failed to persuade critics like his brother Heinrich. It took the collapse of
the Empire to make the former a ‘Republican by reason’ whose tepid support of the
Weimar Republic was insufficient to prevent the Nazi takeover. Only during the second
murderous war would Mann commit fully to the defence of democracy in his radio
addresses from exile. As the human rights engagement of later intellectuals like Jürgen
Habermas shows, Germany has become a stable, Western-​oriented country in the
end. But this century-​long learning process has come at a terrible cost in broken lives
(Jarausch, 2018c).
20   Konrad H. Jarausch

Further Reading
Herbert, Ulrich, Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014).
Jarausch, Konrad H., Out of Ashes: A New History of Europe in the Twentieth Century
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).
Kershaw, Ian, To Hell and Back, 1914–​1950 and Rollercoaster Europe, 1950–​2017 (London: Allen
Lane, 2016, 2018).
Walser Smith, Helmut, Germany: A Nation in its Time, 1500–​2000 (New York: Norton, 2020).
Wolfrum, Edgar, Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepubik Deutschland von
ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Klett-​Cotta, 2006).

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the Twentieth Century: Competition and Convergence (Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Iron bridge, the first: 15.
Iron boats:
Wilkinson builds the first, 14;
Symington, 14, 82;
Brunel, 32;
Onions & Sons, 14;
Jervons, 14;
at Horsley Works, 14;
“Great Eastern” and “Great Western,” 32;
Fairbairn, 73-74.
Jefferson, Thomas:
on interchangeable system in France, 129-131;
on Whitney, 135.
Jenks, Alfred:
textile machinery, 123, 246-247.
Jenks, Alvin:
cotton machinery, 124-125.
Jenks, Barton H.: 247.
Jenks, Eleazer:
spinning machinery, 123.
Jenks, Joseph: 115-116, 125.
Jenks, Joseph, Jr.:
founder of Pawtucket, 118.
Jenks, Joseph, 3d:
governor of Rhode Island Colony, 118.
Jenks, Capt. Stephen:
guns, 117;
nuts and screws, 124;
Jenks & Sons, 125.
Jennings gun:
origin of, 292-294.
Jerome, Chauncey:
brass clocks, 144, 171-172, 233.
Jervons:
iron boat, 14.
Jewelry industry in Providence: 126-127.
Johnson, Charles: 237.
Johnson, Iver: 226.
Johnson, Judge:
decision, Whitney vs. Fort, 155-157.
Jones & Lamson Machine Co.: 191, 193, 194, 197;
flat-turret lathe, 198-199;
Fay automatic lathe, 200.
Kaestner:
gearing, 64.
Kearney & Trecker: 276.
Kempsmith, Frank: 264-265, 271.
Kempsmith Manufacturing Co.: 271, 276.
Kendall, N., & Co.: 186, 189.
Key-seater: 61.
Lamson, Goodnow & Yale: 192, 193.
Lamson Machine Co.: 198.
Landis Tool Co.: 259-260.
Lane & Bodley: 267.
Lapointe, J. N.:
broaching machine, 183.
Lathes:
pole, 3, 41;
engine, 4;
in 18th century, 3, 4;
automatic, 5, 176;
French rose engine, 6;
screw-cutting, 19, 35, 40, 119-120;
tool-room, 182;
Lo-swing, 200;
Bramah and Maudslay, 17;
Ramsden, 38;
Bentham, 38;
Maudslay, 40-42, 46;
Wilkinson, 119-120;
Blanchard, 140, 142-143;
Spencer’s turret lathe, 176;
 Fay automatic, 200;
Sellers, 250.
Lathe, Morse & Co.: 222.
Lawrence, Richard S.: 188-189, 195;
profiling machine, 143;
master armorer, Sharps Works, 170, 194;
lubricated bullet, 194;
miller, 191, 194;
split pulley, 194;
turret lathe, 197;
autobiography, 281-291.
Lawrence, Mass.: 127.
Lawrence Machine Shop: 219.
Lead screw: 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43.
Le Blanc:
interchangeable gun manufacture in France, 130.
Le Blond, R. K.: 271.
Lee-Metford rifle: 105.
Leland, Henry M.: 214;
on J. R. Brown, 215.
Leonards: 116.
Libbey, C. L.:
turret lathes, 275.
Limit gauges:
developed in America, 5.
Lincoln, Levi: 165, 171.
Lincoln Co., The: 165.
Lincoln, Charles L., & Co.: 165.
Lincoln, George S., & Co.: 137, 165.
Lincoln miller: 137, 165-166, 208.
Linear dividing engines: 206.
Lingren, W. F., & Co.: 274.
Locomotives:
early inventions, 56;
Sharp, Roberts & Co., 61-62;
Nasmyth, 93.
Lodge, William E.: 268-271.
Lodge & Davis:
policy of, 270-271.
Lodge & Shipley Machine Tool Co.: 270.
Lowell, Mass.: 127;
machine shops of, 218.
Lowell Machine Shop: 217, 218, 253.
Lucas Machine Tool Co.: 265.
McFarlan, Thomas: 268.
Macaulay, Lord:
on Eli Whitney, 161.
Machine tools:
effect of modern, 1;
crudity in 18th century, 3, 4;
developments of, 4, 5, 63, 107;
Fairbairn on, 10;
Bramah and Maudslay, 34;
Whitworth, 99;
Greek or Gothic style, 63;
developed by cotton industry, 120.
Machine Tool Works: 255.
Machinist Tool Co.: 222.
Madison, Wis.: 276.
Manchester, N. H.: 123, 127;
founding of, 217.
Manchester Locomotive Works: 217.
Manchester pitch: 70 note 66, 80.
Manville, E. J.: 237.
Map of tool building industry: Fig. 56.
Marshall, Elijah D.: 254.
Marvel, C. M., & Co.: 219.
Mason, William: 170, 173-174.
Massachusetts Arms Co.: 162.
Maudslay, Henry: 7, 8, Chapter IV;
estimates of, 9, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 88;
taps and dies, 10, 42, 88;
Portsmouth block machinery, 8, 29, 35;
 screw thread practice, 10, 40, 42, 88, 101;
cup-leather packing, 18, 34;
the slide-rest, 6, 35, 36, 38, 40, 43, 49, 143;
screw-cutting lathe, 35, 40, 41, 42, 50, 120;
engine improvements, 43;
work on plane surfaces, 44, 45, 99, 100.
Maudslay & Field: 8, 19, 35, 58, 98;
influence on English tool builders, 46;
Moon’s description of shop, 46-48.
Maynard Rifle Co.: 161.
Mechanics Machine Co.: 274.
Merrick, S. V.:
introduces steam hammer into United States, 96, 257.
Merrimac Valley:
textile works, 124, 127;
shops of, 216-219.
Michigan Twist Drill & Machine Co.: 266.
Midvale Steel Co.: 250.
Miles, Frederick B.:
steam hammer, 255.
Mill, Anton: 272.
Miller, Patrick: 82.
Miller, Phineas:
partner of Eli Whitney, 148-149, 153, 154.
Miller & Whitney: 149, 152.
Miller, universal:
origin of, 5, 138 note 163, 208-209.
Milling cutter, formed: 206-207, 208.
Milling machine:
Whitney, 142;
first in Hartford, 170, 194;
Lawrence, 191;
Lincoln, 137, 165-166, 208.
Millwork: Chapter VI;
Nasmyth on, 71.
Milwaukee, Wis.:
tool builders in, 276-277.
Milwaukee Machine Tool Co.: 277.
Moen, Philip L.: 225.
Montanus, Philip: 271.
Moody, Paul:
expert in cotton machinery, 218.
Moore & Colby: 252.
Morris, I. P., & Co.: 257, 258.
Mueller, Oscar: 271.
Murdock: 55;
D-slide valves, 51.
Murray, Matthew: 7, 54-57, 107;
planer, 50, 51, 55, 57;
D-slide valve, 55;
steam heating, 56;
locomotives, 56;
influence on flax industry, 56.
Nashua Manufacturing Co.: 124.
Nasmyth, Alexander: 81, 82, 83.
Nasmyth, James: 7, 8, Chapter VIII;
with Maudslay, 46, 48, 87, 88;
millwork, 71, 88;
steam road carriage, 86;
milling machine, 89;
shaper, 92;
method of invention, 92;
steam hammer and other inventions, 93-96;
study of the moon, 97;
on interchangeable system of manufacture, 140-141.
Nasmyth & Gaskell: 92.
National Acme Manufacturing Co.:
multi-spindle automatic lathe, 183, 265.
Naugatuck Valley: Chapter XVIII;
brass industry in, 231-238;
pin machinery, 233.
New Britain, Conn.:
hardware manufacture in, 171.
Newell, Stanford:
Franklin Machine Co.: 125.
New England industries:
early development of, 109-110;
cotton, 114;
iron, 116, 117, 118.
New England Screw Co.: 126.
Newton & Cox: 266.
Newton Machine Tool Works: 266.
New York:
early steamboat trade, 127.
Niles, James and Jonathan: 251.
Niles & Co.: 267, 273.
Niles-Bement-Pond Co.: 179, 222, 255, 259, 273.
Niles Tool Works: 267, 273.
Norris, Henry M.: 272.
North Chelmsford Machine & Supply Co.: 124.
North, Henry: 165.
North, Selah: filing jig, 142.
North, Simeon: 161-163;
gun contracts, 131, 133, 134, 135, 137, 162, 163;
interchangeable system, 133-134, 136, 142, 145, 162.
Norton, Charles H.:
precision grinding, 214, 224, 225.
Norton, F. B.: 224, 225.
Norton Company, The: 224, 225.
Norton Emery Wheel Co.: 224.
Norton Grinding Co.: 224, 225.
Norwalk Iron Works Co.: 184.
Oesterlien Machine Co.: 268.
Ohio Machine Tool Co.: 269.
Orr, Hugh:
early mechanic, 116-117.
Orr, Robert:
master armorer at Springfield, 117.
Otting & Lauder: 268.
Owen, William: 271.
Palmer, Courtland C.: 190.
Palmer, Jean Laurent:
screw caliper, 212, 213.
Palmer & Capron: 127.
Parallel motion: 3 note 6.
Parkhurst, E. G.: 182.
Parks, Edward H.:
automatic gear cutters, 214.
Pawtucket, R. I.:
manufacturing center, 118, 127;
Dr. Dwight on, 121;
manufactures of, 118-125.
Peck:
lifter for drop hammer, 143.
Pedrick & Ayer: planer, 53.
Phelps & Bickford: 222.
Phœnix Iron Works: 165.
Philadelphia, Pa.:
tool builders in, Chapter XIX;
early textile machinery, 246.
Pin machinery: 233.
Pitcher, Larned:
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.: 123;
Pitcher & Brown, 124.
Pitkin, Henry and James F.:
American lever watches, 164.
Pitkin, Col. Joseph:
pioneer iron worker, 164.
Planer:
in 18th century, 4;
developed in England, 4;
Bramah, 18;
Clement, 19, 52;
inventors of the, Chapter V;
early French, 50;
 Roberts, 51;
Murray, 57;
Bodmer, 75, 76;
Sellers, 248.
Plane surfaces, scraping of:
Maudslay, 44, 45;
Whitworth, 44, 98-101.
Plume & Atwood: 234.
Plumier: French writer, 50.
Pond Machine Tool Co.: 222, 259.
Pope Manufacturing Co.: 170.
Portsmouth block machinery:
influence on general manufacturing, 5;
work of Bentham and Brunel, 8, 9, 22, 26, 27, 28;
Maudslay’s contribution to, 29, 35;
description of, 29, 30, 31;
Roberts, 60;
Maudslay and Bentham, 89;
approaches interchangeable system, 131.
Potter & Johnson: 183.
Pratt, Francis A.: 137, 170, 177;
Lincoln miller, 165, 191.
Pratt & Whitney: 137, 178-183;
Interchangeable system, 179;
gun machinery and manufacture, 179-180, 182;
screw threads, 180-182;
tool-room lathe, 182;
thread-milling, 183;
workmen, 183;
turret screw machines, 207.
Precision gear cutter: 206.
Prentice, A. F.: 224.
Prentiss, F. F.: 266.
Priority in invention: 5.
Pritchard, Benjamin: 216.
Profiling machine: inventors of, 143.
Providence, R. I.:
 early cannon manufacture, 117;
trading center, 118;
textile industry, 123;
manufactures in, 118-126;
jewelry industry of, 126-127.
Providence Forge & Nut Co.: 125.
Providence Tool Co.: 125;
turret screw machine built for, 207;
universal miller built for, 209.
Providence & Worcester Canal: 219-220.
Punching machine, Maudslay’s: 43.
Putnam, John: 227-228.
Putnam, Salmon W.: 227-228.
Putnam Machine Co. Works: 200, 227-228.
Ramsden, Jesse: lathe, 38.
Randolph & Clowes: 236.
Reed, F. E.: 224.
Reed & Prentice Co.: 222.
Remington Arms Co.: 161.
Remington, E., & Sons: 175.
Rennie, George: 54;
planer, 50, 51.
Rennie, Sir John: 54.
Rennie, John: millwright, 54.
Rhode Island Tool Co.: 125.
Richards, Charles B.: 173.
Richards, John: on Bodmer, 79.
Robbins & Lawrence: Chapter XV;
interchangeable system, 138;
turret lathe, 143, 197;
miller, 165, 191;
government contracts, 190;
Enfield rifle and gun machinery, 191-192;
cause of failure, 192;
successive owners of plant, 192-194, 200.
Robbins, Kendall & Lawrence: 189-190.
Roberts, Richard: 7, 9, 59-60, 62, 107;
with Maudslay, 46, 60;
planer, 50, 51, 60;
locomotives, 61-62;
Sharp, Roberts & Co.: 61, 62.
Robinson, Anthony:
screw thread, 39.
Rockford, Ill.:
tool builders in, 274-275.
Rockford Drilling Machine Co.: 274.
Rockford Iron Works: 274.
Rockford Lathe & Tool Co.: 274.
Rockford Machine Tool Co.: 274.
Rockford Milling Machine Co.: 274.
Roemer: epicyclic curve, 63.
Rogers, William A.:
Rogers-Bond comparator, 180-182.
Root, Elisha K.: 168-169, 170;
influence on die forging, 137;
profiling machine, 143;
drop hammer, 143, 169;
Colt Armory, 169;
machinery invented by, 169;
horizontal turret principle, 197.
Roper Repeating Arms Co.: 175.
St. Joseph Iron Co.: 253.
Savage Fire Arms Co.: 161.
Saxton: gear teeth, 66-67.
Schneider, M., and Nasmyth’s steam hammer: 95-96.
Scituate, R. I.: Hope Furnace, 117.
Scovill Manufacturing Co.: 232.
Screw machines, multi-spindle automatic: 265.
Screw-thread practice:
Maudslay and Clement, 10, 19, 42, 58-59, 88;
Whitworth standardizes, 10, 101;
early methods of screw cutting, 38-40;
 Pratt & Whitney, 180-182;
history of Sellers’ or U. S. Standard, 249.
Sellers, Dr. Coleman: 251-252;
design of railway tools, 251;
screw thread, U. S. Standard, 249.
Sellers, William: 247-251, 255;
inventions, 247-248;
planer, 248;
system of screw threads, 248-249;
bridge building machinery, 250;
great lathe, Washington Navy Yard, 250.
Sellers, William, & Co.: 251, 252.
Sentinel Gas Appliance Co.: 160.
Shapers:
developed in England, 4;
Brunel’s, 27;
Nasmyth’s “Steel Arm,” 92.
Sharp, Roberts & Co.: 61, 62.
Sharpe, Lucian: 202;
American wire gauge, 205.
Sharps, Christian:
breech loading rifle, 170, 192.
Sharps Rifle Works: 192, 194, 195.
Shaw, A. J.: 214.
Shepard, Lathe & Co.: 222.
Shipley, Murray: 270.
Slater, Samuel: 114, 119, 121;
Arkwright cotton machinery, 120, 121;
textile industry, 122;
Amoskeag Co., 216-217.
Slide-rest:
in 18th century, 4;
inventors of, 6;
early forms of, 6, 36;
Bramah and Maudslay, 17;
Maudslay, 35, 36, 38, 40, 43, 49.
Sloan, Thomas J.:
 screw machine, 126.
Slocomb, J. T.: 214.
Slotter: 61.
Smeaton, John: 2, 3;
boring machine, 2, 13;
cast iron gears, 64.
Smith, George: 214.
Smith & Mills: 270.
Smith & Phelps: 234.
Smith & Silk: 271.
Smith & Wesson: 138.
Snyder, J. E., & Son: 22.
Southwark Foundry & Machine Co.: 173, 256-257.
Spencer, Christopher M.: 170, 175-177;
turret lathe, 143, 176;
board drop, 143;
silk-winding machine, 175;
repeating rifle, 175.
Spencer Arms Co.: 177.
Spring: planer, 50, 53.
Springfield, Mass.: 230.
Springfield Armory: 103, 136, 138, 143, 163;
Blanchard’s lathes, 142-143.
Springfield Machine Tool Co.: 271.
Standard Tool Co.: 266.
Stannard, Monroe:
with Pratt & Whitney, 178.
Steam boats:
early, 82;
Wilkinson’s, 119.
Steam engine, Watt’s:
new element in industry, 1;
problems in building, 1-3;
first built at Soho, 12;
Maudslay’s improvements, 43.
Steam hammer: 4;
Nasmyth’s invention of, 93-96.
Steam heating apparatus:
Murray, 56.
Steinle Turret Machine Co.: 277.
Stephenson, George: 6, 32, 56, 150.
Steptoe, John: 267-268.
Steptoe Co., The John:
shapers and milling machines, 268.
Stone, Henry D.: 192, 193, 196;
turret lathe, 143, 197.
Swasey, Ambrose: 183, 262, 263;
dividing engine, 264.
Syme, Johnie: Nasmyth on, 84.
Symington, William: iron boat, 14, 82.
Taps and dies:
developed in England, 4;
Maudslay’s, 10, 42;
Clement’s, 59.
Taylor, Frederick W.:
high-speed tool steels, 250, 277.
Taylor & Fenn Co.: 165.
Terry, Eli: clocks, 144, 171, 172.
Textile industries:
Arkwright and Strutt, 53;
influence of Whitney’s cotton gin, 114;
in New England, 114, 120, 123, 127;
Slater’s influence on, 122.
Textile machinery:
Robert’s spinning mule, etc., 61;
Bodmer, 77;
in New England, 114, 120-121;
Wilkinson, 122;
Alfred Jenks, 123.
Thomas, Seth: clocks, 144.
Thomaston, Conn.:
clock manufacture, 171.
Thurber, Isaac:
 Franklin Machine Co., 125.
Thurston, Horace: 214.
Tool builders:
general estimate of early, 107;
in Central New England, Chapter XVII;
Western, Chapter XX.
Tool building centers: 127;
map of, Fig. 56.
Torry, Archie:
Nasmyth’s foreman, 91.
Towne, Henry R.: 257, 258.
Towne, John Henry: 256-257, 258;
screw thread, U. S. Standard, 249.
Traveling crane, first: 77, 80.
Trevithick:
steam road engine, 56.
Turret lathes: 140;
early producers of, 143;
Spencer, 176;
Howe and Lawrence, 197;
Hartness’ flat-turret, 198;
Warner & Swasey, 262.
Turret screw machine, improvements on: 207.
Union Steel Screw Works: 198, 265, 266.
Universal Radial Drill Co.: 273.
Wadsworth, Capt. Decius:
on Whitney’s interchangeable system, 134-135.
Waldo, Daniel:
Hope Furnace, 117.
Wallace, William: 237.
Wallace & Sons: 234.
Waltham Watch Works, see American Watch Co.
Warner, Worcester R.: 183, 262, 263.
Warner & Swasey Co.: 261-265;
building of astronomical instruments, 263-264.
Washburn, Ichabod: American Steel & Wire Co., 225, 226.
Washburn & Moen Co.: 225.
Waterbury Brass Co.: 234, 237.
Waterbury Button Co.: 234.
Waterbury Clock & Watch Co.: 234.
Waters, Asa: 226.
Waston, William: Nasmyth on, 84.
Watt, James: 3, 6, 82, 83, 150, 161;
invention of steam engine, 1, 2, 145;
parallel motion, 3 note 6;
dependence on Wilkinson’s boring machine, 3;
opposed by Bramah, 18.
Weed Sewing Machine Co.: 170, 174, 175.
Weeden, W. N.: 237.
Wheeler, William A.: 221.
Wheeler & Wilson: 192.
Whipple, Cullen: 126.
Whitcomb, Carter, Co.: 222.
Whitcomb-Blaisdell Machine Tool Co.: 222.
White, Zebulon: J. S. White & Co., 122.
White Sewing Machine Co.: 193, 266.
Whitman-Barnes Co.: 266.
Whitney, Amos: 137, 170, 177, 219.
Whitney, Baxter D.: 177, 230.
Whitney, Eli: 6, 146-147, 161, 177;
interchangeable system, 76, 132-133, 134-135, 136, 145,
146, 158-159;
cotton gin, 114, 131, 145, 148-158;
U. S. contract of 1798, 131-132, 158, 159;
Whitneyville plant, 132, 162, 158, 160;
method of manufacture, 158-159;
milling machine, 142;
Miller & Whitney, 149.
Whitney, Eli, Jr.:
contract for “Harper’s Ferry” rifle, 160;
steel-barreled muskets, 160, 162.
Whitney Arms Co.: 160-161;
first Colt revolvers made by, 167.
Whitworth, Joseph: 7, 8, 9, 93; Chapter IX;
screw-thread practice, 10, 59, 101, 102 note 105;
manufacture of plane surfaces, 44, 45, 98-101;
with Maudslay, 46, 98;
shaper and improvements in machine tools, 99;
improved methods of measurement, 101;
ordnance and armor, 104-105;
on American automatic machinery, 102-104;
William Armstrong, 105.
Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Machines: 208, 210, 213.
Wilkinson, Abraham: 119.
Wilkinson, Daniel: 119, 122.
Wilkinson, David: 123, 124, 125;
patent on slide-rest, 6;
steamboat, 119;
slide lathe, 119-120;
textile machinery, 122;
nail manufacture, 122.
Wilkinson, Isaac: 119, 125.
Wilkinson, John: 2, 8, 11, 15;
boring machine, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 60;
first iron boat, 14;
first iron bridge, 15;
relations with Boulton & Watt, 12, 13.
Wilkinson, Ozeal: 118-119, 121, 122.
Wilkinson, William: 119, 121.
Willimantic Linen Co.: 175, 178.
Willis, Robert: 69 note 64;
gear teeth, 63, 64, 69-70.
Wilmot, S. R.:
micrometer, 212.
Winchendon, Mass.:
woodworking machinery, 230.
Winchester Repeating Arms Co.: 160, 174.
Windsor, Vt.: 127, 186.
Windsor Machine Co.:
Gridley automatic lathes, 194, 200.
Windsor Manufacturing Co.: 193.
Wolcott, Oliver: 132.
Wolcottville Brass Co.: 233-234.
Wood, Light & Co.: 222.
Woodruff & Beach: 165.
Woodward & Powell Planer Co.: 224.
Woodworking machinery:
Bramah, 18, 19, 24;
Bentham, 24, 25;
Brunel, 31;
in Massachusetts, 229.
Worcester, Mass.: 127;
tool builders in, 219-226;
early textile shops of, 220;
gun makers in, 226.
Worm-geared tilting pouring-ladle, Nasmyth’s: 91-92.
Worsley, S. L.:
automatic screw machine, 208.
Wright, Sylvester: 200, 228.
Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.: 258.
 Transcriber’s Notes

Inconsistencies in spelling, hyphenation, etc. have

been retained, in particular in quoted material.
Minie rifles and Minié rifles both occur in the text.
Depending in the hard- and software used to read
this text and their settings, not all elements may
display as intended.
Page 20, Group portrait Eminent Men of Science:
there are 50 people in the portrait, but only 48 are
identified in the accompanying list.
Page 217, ... he and his brother, Ziba Gay, ...: also
referred to as Zeba Gay in this text.
Page 223, Figure 45: The source document does
not show any links to or from the entry A. F.
Prentice.
Page 235, F. J. Kingsbery, Sr. and F. J. Kingsbury,
Jr.: as printed in the source document; either one
may be an error or misprint.
Index: sorting errors have not been rectified.
Changes made
Footnotes, illustrations and charts have been moved
out of text paragraphs; footnotes have been
renumbered consecutively throughout the book
(and footnote references have been adjusted
where necessary).
Some obvious minor typographical and punctuation
errors have been corrected silently.
Text in
dashed boxes
 have been transcribed from the accompanying
charts, and give a (very) approximate indication of
the relative positions of chart elements.
List of names after page 20: Patrick Millar changed
to Patrick Miller.
Index: the inconsistent lay-out has been
standardised; some entries (mainly proper names)
have been changed to conform to the spelling
used in the text.