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Oil Revenues, Security and
Stability in West Africa
Vandy Kanyako
Oil Revenues, Security and Stability in West Africa
Vandy Kanyako
Oil Revenues, Security

and Stability in West
Africa
Vandy Kanyako
Conflict Resolution Program
Portland State University
Portland, OR, USA
ISBN 978-3-030-37985-8 ISBN 978-3-030-37986-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37986-5
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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Acknowledgments
This book is the product of extensive research and several years of collab-
oration and dialogue with many individuals and groups to whom I owe a
debt of gratitude. It would not have been possible without the generous
funding I received from the faculty development grant at Portland State
University. The book would not have been possible without the support
and encouragement of various individuals, organizations and institutions,
both inside and outside of West Africa. My foremost thanks goes to all
those individuals and civil society organizations and grassroots community
groups that are working every day to draw attention to the core issues
covered in this book. Their support and guidance provided rich mate-
rials that helped in making this endeavor feasible. A big thank you to all
those who took time out of their busy schedule to meet with me or share
ideas via different mediums throughout the process of writing this book,
including PC David Mandu Farley Keili-Coomber of Mandu Chiefdom,
Sierra Leone, whose incisive knowledge of local laws and natural resource
owenership proved invaluable.
To my colleagues in the Conflict Resolution program at Portland
State University, Portland, Oregon, (Dr. Patricia Schechter [Interim
Director], Dr. Robert Gould, Dr. Harry Anastasiou, Dr. Barbara Tint,
Dr. Amanda Byron, Dr. Rachel Cunliffe, and Dr. Tom Hastings), I am
eternally grateful for your collegial support, Dr. Schechter’s encourage-
ment and professional guidance was particularly critical to the success of
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
this venture. I say a big thank you as well to Aislyn Matias, our hard-
working Program Coordinator who helped to weave the different strands
together!
To my family and friends, I would like to express my deepest gratitude.
It was a great comfort and relief to know that you were pushing me on
and motivating me to embark on this project. Your words of encourage-
ment kept me going till the very end. To my son Iveagh who kept asking
“Dad, Is the book done yet?” I say big thank you (with hugs) for your
patience and understanding.
To Dr. Susan Shepler of American University in Washington DC, and
my colleague at the West Africa Oil Watch, Dr. Robert Tynes, my heartfelt
thanks for your intellectual inspiration and continued support. A note
of appreciation to my research assistants for this project: Evan Way, Lisa
Serrano and Anisuz Zaman, who put in countless hours to help me meet
the deadline.
I’m eternally grateful to the various reviewers and endorsers including
Dr. Lansana Gberie, Dr. Jeffrey Colgan, and Ambassador Herman J.
Cohen. Your work on the extractive industry in particular and on sub-
Saharan Africa in general, has been a great source of inspiration for me.
Versions of Chapter 5 on community agitation has appeared in the
Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict, and I am grateful to The
Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies for letting me repro-
duce it in this book.
Finally, to the team at Palgrave Macmillan: Alina Yurova, Balaji Varad-
haraju, Rachel Moore, and countless others who made this venture a
reality my heartfelt appreciation. There are countless others that I have
not listed here, more out of the need for brevity, rather than out of negli-
gence. If your name is not listed, please understand. I appreciate all of
your efforts in helping me reach this milestone in my professional journey.
Contents
1 Introduction: Human Security, Oil Revenues, and

Conflict 1
2 The History and Geology of Petroleum in West Africa 25
3 External Stakeholders and the Geopolitics of Oil 45
4 Oil Revenues and the State 73
5 Oil and Community Agitation 109
6 Civil Society and Global Frameworks 143
7 Managing Disputes in West Africa’s Petroleum Industry 165
8 Conclusion: Implications for the Field of Conflict

Resolution 191
Epilogue: West Africa and the Pandemic of Oil 213
Index 215
vii
Abbreviations
AU African Union
BBLS Barrels
BCM Billion Cubic Meters
BOE Barrels of Oil Equivalent
BP British Petroleum
CENTAL Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia
CNOOC China National Oil Corporation
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation
CSO Civil Society Organization
CSPOG Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas
DACDF Diamond Area Community Development Fund
DFID Department for International Development
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(peace enforcement arm of ECOWAS)
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA Energy Information Administration
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ENI Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi
EPA Economic Partnership Agreements
ERA Environmental Rights Action
FNLA National Liberation Front of Angola
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ICISD International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
IEA International Energy Agency
IMF International Monetary Fund
ix
x ABBREVIATIONS
IMTD The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
IOCs International Oil Companies
IYC Ijaw Youth Council
JVC Joint Venture Contracts
LCIA London Court of International Arbitration
LDI Liberia Democratic Institute
LOGI Liberia Oil and Gas Initiative
MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MODEC Mitsui Ocean Development & Engineering Company Inc.
MOSIEN Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality
MOSOP Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MRU Mano River Union
NACE National Advocacy Coalition on Extractives
NEITI Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
NEPDG National Energy Policy Development Group
NEPG National Energy Policy Group
NEW National Elections Watch
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NMJD Network Movement for Justice and Development
NOC National Oil Company
NOCAL National Oil Company of Liberia
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PSA Production Sharing Agreement
PSC Production Sharing Contract
SANONGOL Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis
SERAP Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project
SINOPEC China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
SLEITI Sierra Leone Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
SLIMM Sierra Leone Indigenous Miners Movement
UMaT University of Mines and Technology
UN United Nations
UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNITA National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USEIA US Energy Information Administration
USGS United States Geological Survey
WACSI West Africa Civil Society Institute
WACSOF West Africa Civil Society Forum
WANEP West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WAOFCO West Africa Oil and Fuel Company
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Oil zones of West Africa: February 2010 (Credit U.S.
Geological Survey. Department of the Interior/USGS) 36
Fig. 4.1 Oil rents (% of GDP) (Source Estimates based on sources
and methods described in “The Changing Wealth of
Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in the New
Millennium” [World Bank 2011]. License: CC BY-4.0) 89
Fig. 4.2 Oil rents (% of GDP) in West Africa (Source Estimates
based on sources and methods described in “The Changing
Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in
the New Millennium” [World Bank 2011]. License: CC
BY-4.0) 90
Fig. 4.3 Military expenditure (% of GDP) (Source Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], Yearbook:
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, ID
MS.MILXPND.CN. License: Use and distribution of
these data are subject to Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute [SIPRI] terms and condition) 98
Fig. 4.4 Military expenditure (% of GDP) in 1999 (Source
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI],
Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International
Security, ID MS.MILXPND.CN. License: Use and
distribution of these data are subject to Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] terms and
condition) 99
Fig. 5.1 Civic response to oil ‘capture’ 131
xi
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Oil endowment in West Africa 37

Table 4.1 Oil wealth of West Africa (for select countries) 80
Table 4.2 Oil companies occupying oil blocks in Sierra Leone and
the estimate payout in 2013 85
Table 4.3 Types of production agreements 91
Table 4.4 National oil companies of West Africa 93
Table 4.5 Oil-fueled mega projects of West Africa 100
Table 5.1 Actors, grievances, and grievance articulation 125
Table 6.1 Global regime for enhancing the peace properties of oil 154
Table 6.2 Key concerns of international non-governmental
organizations 155
Table 7.1 Types and nature of conflicts in the oil industry 169
Table 7.2 Colonial legacy: West Africa’s border disputes 171
Table 8.1 Natural resources of West Africa 196
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Human Security, Oil Revenues,

and Conflict
The Rising Profile of West Africa’s Oil Wealth

West Africa is in the midst of an oil frenzy. The frenetic search for hydro-
carbons in what has been described as the “oiliest patch in the world”
(Black 2012; Baumüller et al. 2011) has become so intense and wide-
ranging that there is planned or ongoing oil exploration in all of the
15 countries that officially make up the regional trade bloc: the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS. Traditional oil
exporters such as Nigeria have strengthened their capacity, and new oil
economies from all over the region are emerging on the scene. With the
fourth-largest proven reserves in the world after the Middle East, North
America, and Europe, West Africa accounted for 7% of the world’s total
output in 2007. At the end of 2011 the region had an estimated 132.4
billion barrels, an increase of 154% over the 1980 figure of 53.4 billion
barrels (Palazuelos 2012). The region is projected to increase its produc-
tion from 1935.90 in 2018 to 3006.24 thousand barrels per day in 2024
(Ghazvinian 2007; Mordor Intelligence 2018). More than any other nat-
ural resource, oil has thrust the region onto the world stage in unprece-
dented ways.
The region’s ongoing economically viable oil finds have been made
possible by a host of factors, foremost among which is technological
advancement in the petroleum industry. Thanks in part to improved
technology, knowledge about the region’s geology, especially its under-
explored maritime and offshore regions, especially its offshore regions, is
© The Author(s) 2020 1

V. Kanyako, Oil Revenues, Security and Stability in West Africa,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37986-5_1
2 V. KANYAKO
improving rapidly. Most of the new reserves are deep-sea oil fields that
can now be exploited by new technology and drilling techniques includ-
ing extended reach and complex path drilling, ideal for the region’s ultra-
deep waters. Other relevant factors include the relative stability in the
region following the conclusion of its civil wars in the early 2000s. The
conclusion of the civil war in Angola in 2002 and the consolidation of
democracy in Nigeria, has also helped fuel the oil boom in the region.
Externally, the perennial instability in the traditional petroleum regions
such as the Persian Gulf, has forced governments and oil companies to
look for alternative sources for oil in places like West Africa. Continued
high prices on the global market for the “Sweet crude” variety, which hit
a record high of $164.64 in 2008 helped to make West Africa attractive
to foreign direct investment.
The intensifying oil activities have been made possible in part by for-
eign direct investment from some of the largest international oil com-
panies (IOCs) in the world. A combination of what is referred to in
oil parlance as supermajors, majors, independents, and state-owned com-
panies are snatching up exploration licenses and establishing exploration
agreements with African governments in an unprecedented manner. Since
2009, ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Texaco, three of the largest transna-
tional corporations in the world, have spent about $10 billion (all cur-
rency in US dollars except otherwise stated) annually toward West Africa’s
oil exploration (Watson 2009; Roberts 2006). According to the World
Bank (2012), between 2009 and 2011 foreign direct investment to the
region increased by 36% to $16.1 billion. Not surprisingly, a sizeable pro-
portion of this investment has been concentrated in the petroleum indus-
try. The economies of at least half of the 16 countries that make up the
region have experienced a 6% annual growth since 2002 (World Bank
2012). Buoyed by production from its enormously wealthy Jubilee Oil
Field, Ghana’s economy expanded by a whopping 13.4% between 2010,
when production started on Jubilee Oil Field, and 2011. The country
hitherto known as the gold coast, is now the fastest-growing oil economy
on the continent.
Of equal importance to the rising profile of West Africa in the global
political economy is the entry of China into the region’s oil sector. The
world’s second-largest net importer of petroleum products has intensi-
fied its involvement in Africa in general and West Africa in particular
over the last three decades. Through its three state-run companies—the
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and
1 INTRODUCTION: HUMAN SECURITY, OIL REVENUES, AND CONFLICT 3
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and the China National Oil Corpo-

ration (CNOOC)—China has signed a raft of trade deals and bilateral
agreements with various governments in the region, including Nigeria,
where CNOOC completed a $2.3 billion deal to buy a 45% interest in
an offshore oil-mining concession (Frynas and Paulo 2007, p. 231). For
example, trade between China and Nigeria, which was a mere $2 billion in
2000, had reached a whopping $18 billion by 2010 (Egbula and Zheng
2011). As China expands into the region, with new deals in Angola and
interests in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, it will create new frontiers, a
new wave of ventures and increase demands for West Africa’s oil on the
international market (Clarke 2008, p. 75).
The region has several advantages that make it appealing to global
oil companies and foreign governments nervous about their energy secu-
rity. Most of the newest and most profitable finds such as in the Jubilee
fields in Ghana are located offshore, and in the deep (5000 feet/1524
meters) and ultra-deep waters (1830–2130 meters/approximately 6000–
7000 feet) off the Atlantic Ocean. Offshore oil is of particular interest to
external investors and host governments alike largely because it is not yet
fully developed and is somewhat insulated from political turmoil on the
mainland, something that has plagued the Nigerian oil industry since its
first export in 1958.
Geography and access to some of the biggest consumer markets also
play a role in enhancing West Africa’s rising profile in the global energy
sector. West Africa is the land mass situated just west of the United States;
the reserves are just opposite the eastern seaboard of the United States.
Being closer to the US eastern seaboard than the Middle East means West
African oil can get to one of its most important markets much in a short
amount of time with relatively little hassle. For example, the shipping
distance from Sekondi/Takoradi in Ghana to Texas is about 5730 nautical
miles; from Port Harcourt to Houston, Texas, is 6790 nautical miles. In
comparison, the distance between Saudi Arabia, the world’s most prolific
oil producer, and Houston, Texas, is 7912 nautical miles.
In addition to proximity, the offshore oil in the Gulf of Guinea is
attractive to American markets and production firms in particular because
it does not have to pass through major choke points or high-risk security
areas such as the Straits of Hormuz, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Strait of
Malacca, or any other narrow canals on its way from the Gulf of Guinea
across the Atlantic Ocean to refinement companies on the southern or
eastern seaboard of the United State, where majority of US refineries are
4 V. KANYAKO
located near navigable waters to take advantage of economical waterborne

transport for both import and export (Servant 2003).
Moreover, securing oil investments in the Gulf of Guinea is politically
strategic for the United States, which is very much aware of the com-
petition it faces from the growing energy needs of Asian countries such
as India, Malaysia, North Korea, South Korea, and China. Securing oil
resources in Africa represents a US response to competition from China,
whose trade with the African continent, in general, has been on an upward
trajectory (30% a year) topping $50 billion 2006 up from $39.7 billion in
2005 (McDougal 2009). China’s entry into the West African oil market is
important for several reasons as will be illustrated throughout this book.
For some years, West Africa’s offshore oil fields have been increasingly
attractive, not least because oil companies are often able to make higher
profits per barrel than from other parts of the world (Ellis 2003). Accord-
ing to the Platts Oilgram Price Report (2013), the ocean shipping rate
from Nigeria is far cheaper, at $1.45 per barrel, than shipments from,
say, the US Gulf Coast to the US Northeast refineries, which would cost
a shipper between five and six dollars per barrel. This essentially means
more profits for the oil companies when shipping crude from West Africa.
It is not just the quantity of oil that is now being drilled in West Africa
that has caught the world’s attention and interest. Its commercial oil is
of the highest grade and thus highly desirable. West Africa produces the
“Sweet crude” variety, which is among the most coveted in the world
largely because it contains low volumes of sulfur, suitable for process-
ing light refined petroleum products. The quality of Nigerian crude, for
example, is especially well adapted for use in US refineries (Ellis 2003,
p. 135), and indeed in other refineries around the world.
From the investor’s perspective, the historical circumstances of each
country in West Africa also works to the advantage of the international
oil companies. At least from the oil companies’ view the fact that West
African oil is divided up among several relatively weak countries, in dif-
ferent phases of their oil development and confronted by cultural and
language barriers (French, English, Portuguese and Spanish), they are
unlikely to coalesce into a formidable oil block to pose a major threat
in the form of an embargo or other forms of punitive measures.
In addition to the economic potential of oil and the foreign direct
investment that oil attracts, the subregion is also doing well on the demo-
cratic front. The region is experiencing a widening of the democratic
space, as evidenced in the frequent holding of national elections, some of
which have resulted in the change of unpopular governments. Since the

end of the Cold War, West Africa’s political systems have undergone both
rapid and momentous changes. A region that once accounted for more
than 70% of all military coups in Africa is now on a seemingly unstoppable
march toward pluralistic forms of governance. Without a doubt, compet-
itive general elections—often conducted under the scrutiny of the inter-
national community—have played a pivotal role in this seismic political
shift. More West African governments today have been chosen through
free and fair elections than at any other time in the region’s history. In
the region, as in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, elections are much
more than just a means of choosing public officials and changing govern-
ments. Due to the symbiotic relationship between poor governance and
instability, elections have also come to be viewed as a means of conflict
management (Kanyako 2007). Since 2002 both Sierra Leone and Liberia
have consistently conducted free and fair elections. Successive elections
in the Gambia, Senegal, Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Nigeria
and even a change of regime in Angola have since helped to boost the
democratic credentials of the region. There is no military regime in West
Africa, a fairly common type of governments in the 1970s and 1980s.
Increased democratic space means people have more avenues to express
grievances against unpopular policies such as the types often generated by
a rapacious and highly profitable business like oil.
By all indications therefore, oil, the world’s most sought after com-
modity, with its vast market opportunities and global reach, should
be a blessing to West Africa. If managed diligently the region’s natu-
ral resource-driven economies, partly hobbled by the devastating civil
wars of the 1990s, should experience a much-needed boost for estab-
lished as well as prospective first-time oil-producing countries. Even
non-producing countries in the region could stand to benefit either
directly or indirectly from the foreign investments that are flowing into
the region. In April 2019, the Gambia, one of the smallest countries
in the subregion with no known natural resources of note, signed a
contract with BP to explore for oil and gas in the country. Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, are all frantically scouring their maritime
zones for signs of oil. Like the Gambia, they hope to join the likes
of Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and the region’s oil powerhouses: Nige-
ria and Angola in harnessing their oil reserves. It is perhaps not sur-
prising, therefore, that within the oil industry and government circles
in particular, that a lot of excitement exists about the ongoing discov-
eries about the region’s energy future. The general expectation is that
6 V. KANYAKO
the discovery of oil, the world’s most dominant fuel, can help promote
socioeconomic development, as it has done in countries in the Middle
East, Russia, and the Scandinavian countries of Norway and Sweden.
In spite of these positive developments and high expectations around
new oil finds, foreign direct investment, relative stability, and high global
demands—the ongoing discoveries have renewed concerns about the
possibilities of an entrenched “oil curse,” a phenomenon in which a
petroleum-endowed nation or region fails to transform its abundant oil
wealth into sustainable growth. These fears are not unfounded. If history
is anything to go by, the experiences in the region’s most established oil
economies, shows that successive governments (military or democratic)
have not exploited their vast oil wealth to benefit their citizens, or to
achieve prosperity and their desired socioeconomic ends. Both Angola
and Nigeria epitomize this concern: their vast oil revenues have either
been squandered or the wealth has not trickled down to their general pop-
ulations. Even though it earns over $8 billion a year from crude oil sales,
Nigeria’s per capita income stands at a mere $290 per year (Ghazvinian
2007). Though Angola’s is higher, at $4980 according to recent World
Bank estimates, it is marked by a huge wealth disparity between a small
upper class and an increasingly large impoverished population.
The other concern is that the introduction of petro-capitalism into a
region that has been adversely affected by the resource-fueled civil wars
of the 1990s and other major public health emergencies such as the 2014
Ebola outbreak, is bound to have major ramifications for the tentative
peace and stability that now prevails in large parts of West Africa. The
region consists predominantly of weak states that have experienced vary-
ing degrees of challenges to their internal stability since independence in
the 1960s. Eight of the 16 countries that make up the West Africa region
have experienced various forms of political and social instability in the
last two decades. Some of these conflicts—such as the devastating wars in
Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and even Nigeria—have been attributed to
a combination of resource mismanagement, bad governance, and years
of marginalization by the ruling elites of the region’s largely youthful
population, of whom more than 64% are under the age of 24 (United
Nations Population Fund 2018). Oil and poor governance are bound to
have major implications for state and human security in West Africa.
An oil bonanza in an environment of weak institutions and poor gov-
ernance creates all manner of accountability issues as well. A government
that derives its revenue from oil, evidence from both the region and else-
where shows, is less likely to be accountable to its citizens. Flush with oil
money, or in anticipation of a continued oil boom, oil-rich governments
often embark on wasteful public projects with little benefit for the wider
population. That is already playing out in the region. In anticipation of a
continued oil boom, some of the producer governments have embarked
on major politically—driven public projects that only benefit the priv-
ileged few. For example, having come into considerable wealth in the
1980s, Nigeria embarked on building a brand-new capital in Abuja, with
the construction of the city center alone costing a whopping $3.5 bil-
lion (Deloitte 2014). President Bongo of Gabon commissioned the 650-
kilometer Transgabonais rail line to Franceville in 2005 mainly to move
manganese from the interior to the coast, at the cost of $362 million.
The end result of all of these rapacious spending is that despite intensive
oil production in both countries for more than forty years, the average
citizen is no better off than they were before the oil finds in 1955 and
1956, respectively.
Unsurprisingly, because of the seeming lack of transparency and
accountability, the continuing emergence of a West Africa-wide oil indus-
try has become a magnet for all manner of campaigners and activists,
often opposed to the rapacious effects of oil drilling on people, institu-
tions and the environment. Abuses and human rights violations in the oil
industry has become a cause celebre for many crusading organizations
(and individuals) around the world, including nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) working on human rights, social justice, gender, and
peacebuilding. The London-based Global Witness and a host of local
advocacy organizations have used a moral and ethical lens and the con-
cept of redistributive justice to draw attention to the negative impacts
of the petroleum industry in regions such as West Africa. These cam-
paigning groups argue that the redistribution of profits and the long-
term negative effects on peoples and the environment has to be factored
into any oil contracts in regions such as West Africa, a region where oil
extraction has often been associated with human rights abuses (Barrera-
Hernandez et al. 2016, p. 8; Human Rights Watch World Report 2013).
Such critics of the industry, including various domestic and international
organizations are quick to point out that in spite of the enormous oil
revenues, many citizens remain excluded from, or are at best marginal
participants in, emerging oil sectors and the ensuing resource activity.
They point out that local communities often tend to bear the risks of
losses, such as environmental degradation and health impacts. The main
8 V. KANYAKO
environmental impacts are felt in the coastal regions, whose communi-

ties often are faced with “localized costs” including abandoned pipelines
that cause spills, water, and air pollution, and land damage (Barrera-
Hernandez et al. 2016, p. 7).
As a result of growing awareness of the negative impacts of petroleum
extraction, the twin issues of transparency and accountability are gain-
ing traction around energy and resource development. There are growing
calls by nongovernmental organizations and other watchdog institutions
for corporate and regulatory actors to be answerable as well as responsive
to the needs of the communities from which the resources are extracted
(Barrera-Hernandez et al. 2016, p. 2). Local communities are now assert-
ing their rights to be involved in decisions about energy and projects that
impact their traditional ecosystem and way of life. This has energized var-
ious “bottom-up” movements and local organizations. They now call for
explicit economic and social benefits from energy project development
and resource extraction.
As a result, virtually all oil companies have now been forced to pay
attention to their operational environment. Many adopt Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) measures that are in theory designed to go beyond
purely environmental protection and management and include actions
aimed at helping address the problems of the community in which they
conduct their business. The broad and diverse set of actions includes those
at the micro level (social infrastructure such as roads and hospitals) and
macro-level (to tackle poverty, and assist the declining manufacturing and
agricultural sectors…) and, as a result, expectations are often generated
among local stakeholders with respect to their contribution to the devel-
opment of the country (García-Rodríguez et al. 2013, p. 375).
Such corporate efforts are however limited in their positive impacts
on the affected communities. In fact evidence shows it actually causes
more harm than good as it often intensifies tensions among various social
groups. At the community level, the presence of oil and the mode of
distribution of its proceeds have inflamed competition among various
social groups, who use corporate support as an endorsement of com-
munity claims over others (Watts 2003, p. 64). In the Niger Delta, a
recent European Union report found that the way the oil corporations
engaged with local communities through development projects caused
conflicts between communities participating in such projects and those
that did not directly benefit (Baumüller et al. 2011). The discovery of oil
and the encroachment into the region’s fragile and unique biodiversity
by the oil companies carry major implications for the region’s marine and
coastal ecosystem, and by extension for its coastal people’s way of life.
With two of the region’s largest economies being petro-states, the pro-
liferation of commercially viable oil finds, there are questions around
the regional implications in the area of peace and stability. As West
Africa is slowly being transformed into a petro-region, some fear that
the region might become susceptible to the resource curse phenomenon,
as evidenced in the case of Nigeria and to some extent Angola, where
entrenched corruption and patrimony has circumscribed the industry. The
general thinking is that the ongoing discoveries, if unchecked will have
major implications for the peace and stability of one of the world’s most
politically—unstable regions. If managed well however petroleum rev-
enues could harness the good potential of oil, spur growth and minimize
social conflicts, The tried and trusted methods and strategies utilized by
various official (track 1) and unofficial (track 2) methods at thwarting or
reducing oil-induced violence and harnessing the transformative powers
of oil will play a critical role in preventing such conflicts. These issues are
key to understanding the political economy of West Africa’s “oil complex”
and its potential for promoting human security, peace and stability.
Objectives and Approach

The book maps the correlation between oil extraction and state and
human security in West Africa. More specifically, it analyzes oil revenue
flows and the role of the various stakeholders (both domestic and inter-
national) in West Africa. To do so the book contextualizes the nature of
conflicts and human security challenges in oil-producing regions in West
Africa as well as identify possible solutions for addressing cases of conflict
and human rights violations associated with oil extraction in the region.
Theories on human needs as propounded by Burton (1990), civil society,
and global governance have been utilized to foster a deeper understand-
ing of the conflict and peace “properties” of oil in a region such as West
Africa. The relationship between unmet basic human needs and natural
resource agitation and grievances described by Murshed (2002, p. 389)
as “motivations based on a sense of injustice in the way a social group is
treated.” is nothing new in West Africa. This book expands on that argu-
ment as it traces the history and evolution of such grievances in the oil
industry. How oil and grievances intersect forms a core element in this
analysis in this book.
10 V. KANYAKO
Challenges
The oil industry is notoriously difficult to study. Politics, the economy,
geography, and the actors involved all add to the complexity and chal-
lenges. It has often been described by critics as a secretive industry. While
official data on reserve estimates are found in different places, there
is really no comprehensive state-of-the-art measure of the volumes of
proven, probable and possible reserves (Clarke 2008, p. 382). To com-
pound the problem further, oil contracts are treated as state secrets, often
managed by the executive branch of government, with details of deals and
contracts known only to a closed circle of top government insiders. Fur-
thermore, the field is highly technical and littered with jargon that might
pose challenges to an “outsider” researcher with a passing interest in the
topic. A typical oil contract is of varied types (production sharing con-
tracts and joint ventures); has many parts and phases (exploration, pro-
duction, and development) and involves a multitude of powerful stake-
holders (both domestic and international) with vested interests ranging
from profits to the environment.
In spite of the secrecy and difficulties in penetrating a rather reclusive
industry, what is often easy to discern is the effects (especially the nega-
tive impacts) of oil extraction on a society. The book draws on a review
of the relevant documents (including company and newspaper reports)
and from interviews and focus-group sessions with representatives of civil
society and communities from across the region conducted between 2013
and 2015. It has been further enriched by insights gained from extensive
field-based engagements in the region over the last two decades, including
fieldwork in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, the twin cities of Sekondi/Takoradi in
Ghana’s western region, and in southern and western Sierra Leone and on
the coastal and border regions of Liberia. Researching for this book has
involved directly organizing or participating in trainings, workshops, and
other formal and informal engagements around the extractive industry
with civil society thought leaders and community members from countries
as diverse as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Togo, Cameroon, Guinea,
Angola, the Gambia, and Senegal. Interactions with experts and indus-
try watchers both within and outside the region have also contributed
immensely to broadening my horizons and interests in the subject mat-
ter. In the summer of 2015 the author traversed London, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and the Nordic countries of Norway, Sweden, and Finland
in a bid to gain firsthand insight into the transformative influence of oil as
a critical natural resource and as a global product. To address adequately

the strategic challenges that petro-capitalism poses for West Africa’s
regional stability and human security, one must understand the transfor-
mative powers of petroleum revenue vis-à-vis the complex realities of the
region’s changing geopolitical landscape and its linkages to the outside
world.
Oil industry demarcation is at best an imperfect science, made difficult
by the fact that oil flow does not follow the contours of official political
boundaries. The countries that compose West Africa include Nigeria and
several non-OPEC countries. The latter group includes seven important
producers, three small producers, and many nonproducers. The impor-
tant producers are Angola (defines the southern limit of West Africa),
Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast,
and Mauritania (defining the northern limit of West Africa). The small to
medium producers are Benin, Ghana, and Senegal. The nonproducers
include Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe,
Sierra Leone, and Togo. This book properly contextualizes world-wide
oil industry’s operations in West Africa, a strategic enclave in the global
political economy. The challenge is that some countries that are econom-
ically in West Africa, especially in oil terms, such as Angola and Gabon,
are politically not considered West African as they are not members of the
Economic Community of West African States.
This book breaks new ground in how it approaches the study of natu-
ral resources in West Africa. First, it utilizes a West Africa–specific regional
approach, with emphasis on countries that are in the two main geological
oil zones of the Senegal Basin and the Gulf of Guinea respectively. The
regional approach is useful for understanding patterns and trends across a
wider geographical area with mostly consistent socioeconomic and politi-
cal features. A regional study of petroleum industry is the most productive
approach to understanding patterns, dynamics, and the modus operandi
of a rather reclusive industry. That is mainly because country-specific or
firm-specific studies, though important, are not always ideal for capturing
larger trends and the complexities of a large and powerful industry.
There are other reasons for adopting a regional approach. This is
the first time in the history of West Africa that the discovery of oil
has taken a regional dimension, with more countries set to become
“first-time producers.” Also, the impact of oil on a community and
its ancillary effects (oil spills, armed groups, environmental degrada-
tion, and piracy, to name a few) are both transnational and regional in
scope and are critical to understanding the region’s human security chal-
lenges. For example, the coastal communities, which are the frontline
12 V. KANYAKO
stakeholders in the region’s emerging offshore oil industry, share simi-

lar riverine-based socioeconomic activities (farming, fishing, and trading)
and are thus heavily dependent on the coastal terrain for their sustenance.
With the oil finds located largely offshore, a threat to their way of life
often triggers various forms of social unrest whose impact could be felt
across borders.
Country-specific or firm-specific studies, though important, tend to
utilize a pro-business approach that fails to capture the larger trends and
complexities. In Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea, Soares de Oliveira
(2007, p. 163) argues that a singular country or company focus would fail
to capture other external powerful forces or the wider ramifications in oil
investment decisions. As such a regional study of the petroleum industry,
as adopted in this book, is the most productive approach to understanding
patterns, dynamics, and the modus operandi of a rather reclusive industry.
The Urgency of Oil

This is the first time in the history of West Africa that one natural resource
has become the common political and economic denominator in the
majority of the countries in the same geological zone. More than 12
countries in the region are either oil producers (Nigeria, Ghana, Angola,
Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea) or have discovered or are on the verge
of discovering oil in commercial quantity (Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Sierra
Leone, and Liberia). As more countries continue to explore for oil, there
is a need for a deeper understanding of the oil industry in the region,
including knowledge of the businesses and cultures involved, along with
West Africa’s unique socioeconomic and political context within which an
oil economy is taking shape. African hydrocarbons could prove decisive in
long-term economic relations, as it a strategic resource base for the mod-
ern, industrial, energy-importing world. As such, what happens in (West)
Africa’s oil (and gas) will have profound ramifications for both the pro-
ducer countries and indeed for the global economy. As Clarke (2008)
correctly points out, governments may stand or fall on the management
of this crucial industry (p. 72).
The diverse and competing foreign interests and investments in this
part of the world are not understood in depth, largely because their oper-
ations often evade scrutiny. As already alluded to at the beginning of this
chapter, a theme that will be explored in-depth in subsequent chapters,
the leading multinational oil companies are heavily invested in the region.
This book provides an insight into the motivations and modus operandi
of some of the most powerful and wealthiest transnational corporations
in the world. Royal Dutch Shell, BP, and ExxonMobil are the world’s
second-, third- and fourth-largest transnational companies, respectively
(Economist 2012). In spite of their power and influence, not much is
known in terms of the details of their contracts or specifics on their gen-
eral operations. This is not surprising, given that the oil industry is one of
the most secretive in the world. Most of the easily available information
is put out by the oil companies themselves or through groups that they
sponsor, either directly or indirectly. While these pro-industry reports are
important contributions in their own right, they do not provide the full
picture of what is, needless to say, a very complex, opaque, tenacious, and
constantly evolving industry.
The key international oil companies (IOCs) that operate in the coun-
tries along the Gulf of Guinea and the Senegal Basin share similar charac-
teristics either through multicountry ownerships of oil concessions in the
region or as subsidiaries of one another. For example, in addition to the
big IOCs such as Shell and ExxonMobil, other lesser-known names, such
as African Petroleum and Anadarko have major stakes in several countries
in the region. A regional approach helps us better understand their inter-
ests and alliances. In very specific terms, therefore, the study provides an
opportunity to evaluate the commitments (known in the business world
as corporate social responsibility) of profit-seeking companies that operate
in a regulatory vacuum with lax laws and weak implementation.
The book also provides an alternative argument for curtailing the
resource curse. While the linkages between natural resources and conflicts
have received immense attention from both scholars and analysts of all
sorts (Sachs and Warner 1995; Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1999,
Klare 2002), there is very little focus on the varied nuances of the impact
of oil on societies or regions emerging from conflict. The book focuses on
the more multifaceted ways in which oil’s impacts are felt at various lay-
ers of societies and communities. Among other themes this book explores
the “Peace properties” of oil. The argument put forward here is that oil
by itself is not a “cursed” resource. In other parts of the world, includ-
ing the Scandinavian countries, it has been used to propel development,
peace, and stability. In West Africa it has the potential to foster com-
munication and dialogue among the various stakeholders. The stakes and
investments in oil are often so high that it requires cooperation among
14 V. KANYAKO
various stakeholders to make it economically viable. In short, where man-

aged diligently, oil can promote peace and sound development in a region
that is desperately short of these markers of progress.
Perhaps the most significant relevance of the study is its focus on the
perspectives of domestic actors in the region’s petroleum industry. The
book advances a theory of local agency in the oil industry by arguing
that diverse voices, including from “below” are critical to mitigating the
oil curse. Thus the perspectives of local communities, including women’s
groups, youth associations, and traditional and religious leaders as well
as representatives of oil communities form a centerpiece in this book.
The impact of oil on a community and its ancillary effects (oil spills,
armed groups, and piracy) are both transnational and regional in scope
and are thus important for understanding the region’s human security
challenges. In the end, it is these aggregate efforts of countless individu-
als and groups that make social change happens (p. 98). The key point,
which Ugor (2013, p. 85) gestures toward, is that oil communities, often
the ones that bear the brunt of the negative effects of oil are not pas-
sive but rather active agents of change. This book contributes to our
understanding of the agency of community groups in the political econ-
omy of West Africa by outlining their perspectives, actions, and counter-
actions. If nothing else the multicausal, multidimensional, and intercon-
nected nature of the issues surrounding oil in the region requires such a
bottom-up understanding of the rationale for the evolution of community
groups into what Ikelegbe (2005) refers to as a “mobilizational and agita-
tional force… involving ingenuity, vision, and resilience to get their voices
heard in a space dominated by oil-producing governments and powerful
international oil companies”.
Book Structure
To properly contextualize the complex relationship between a strategic
natural resource such as oil and its “conflict properties” in the context of
West Africa, I have divided the book into three main parts. The first part
(the centrality of oil) provides an analytical background to the growing
influence of hydrocarbons in the region’s two main geological oil zones:
the Senegal Basin and the Gulf of Guinea. The first section is mainly con-
cerned with the historiography as well as the geological and topographical
mapping of West Africa’s emerging oil economy. Here the book provides
a general historical overview of West Africa’s oil industry and outline the
relevant theoretical framework for understanding the “oil complex” phe-

nomenon. I focus on theories in the realm of the political economy of
conflict, especially around human needs, the paradox of plenty, resource
capture and the rentier state phenomena respectively.
In Part II (the stakeholders and core issues), which is made up of
Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I focus on the various external and internal stake-
holders in the West African oil industry. There I analyze the region’s polit-
ical economy and its linkages to the global petro-economy. This part also
deals with the varied forms of state and human security issues and chal-
lenges posed by the rapid incursion of petro-capitalism into West Africa.
The role of the producer governments in the region and their national oil
companies are also the subject of analysis in this section. The third and
final part (oil and peace) is made up of Chapters 6, 7, and 8 provides an
analytical assessment of the effectiveness of varied strategies to make West
Africa’s “big oil” more accountable to the needs and aspirations of its
people. The section outlines in very specific terms the possible outcomes
of an entrenched petro-capitalism as well as various multilayered efforts
by national, regional, and international third parties to manage oil-related
conflicts. It deals with the management and resolution of various types of
conflicts in the oil sector, as well as attempts made by various conflict
resolution mechanisms to prevent and resolve disagreements and disputes
in the industry. This section also contains the conclusion, which weaves
together all of the core elements relating to oil revenues and human secu-
rity. The core argument posited here is that the oil industry will shape
West Africa, and will in turn be shaped by other critical centrifugal forces
both within and outside the region.
This is how the rest of the chapters are broken down, starting with the
historical context, then moving on to the stakeholders and their modus
operandi; the fiscal dimensions of oil, its impact; agency of local commu-
nities, and ending with its implications for the conflict resolution.
Chapter 2: The History and Geology of Petroleum in West Africa

Commercial oil exploration and drilling in West Africa goes back nearly
a century. The region has experienced varied commercial oil exploration
phases that spans more than a hundred years. This chapter traces the his-
toriography and phases of the oil industry pointing out that the region’s
search for oil has been in fits and starts with exploration halted and
resumed often based on major events—some domestic, others global. The
16 V. KANYAKO
chapter also points out that West Africa’s oil finds are widely dispersed
and unevenly distributed, with the resource found in commercial quan-
tity in its onshore, offshore, deep waters, and ultra-deep waters. There
are primary producers, such as Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea;
and there are secondary producers. The chapter outlines the various ways
the geography, geology, and history has positioned West Africa as a key
player in the global political economy of oil. It ends with a discussion of
the role of technology on the development of the region’s oil industry.
Chapter 3: External Stakeholders and the Geopolitics of Oil

West Africa has become a magnet for oil companies from all over the
globe. More than 500 oil (and gas) expatriate firms are participating vig-
orously in the region’s upstream and downstream energy sector. These
external stakeholders consist of states, investment and equity firms, multi-
lateral agencies, and an eclectic mix of well-established oil companies and
various Africa-specialist upstart companies. They are engaged in funding,
exploring, drilling, monitoring, and setting the policy agenda that shapes
the region’s oil commercial activities. Their collective investment portfo-
lios, commercial activities, and policy strategies have turned West Africa
into not just one of the most promising oil zones but also one of the most
heavily contested hydrocarbon provinces in the world. This chapter deals
with the expatriate business history of West Africa’s oil ventures, tracing
its cartel-like beginnings at the turn of the twentieth century, through the
colonial period, into the independence and postindependence era. The
key finding here is that because of their depth of technological experi-
ence, influence, wealth, and global reach, the role of external actors is key
to understanding West Africa’s modern resource extraction environment.
The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the wider implications
of expatriate business activities for the subregions status in the global oil
industry.
Chapter 4: Oil Revenues and the State

Oil revenues are becoming increasingly crucial to the political economy
of West Africa. Both oil-rich and oil-scarce countries in the subregion are
generating funds from the intense oil exploration and drilling activities
taking place right across the West African coastline. In some countries in
the subregion, as much as 85% of export earnings are derived from oil.
The ensuing revenue streams, which come in various forms—bonuses,

taxes, rents, and production sharing or joint-venture contracts—should
in theory enable West Africa’s governments to address sorely neglected
developmental problems. Though in theory the increased oil revenues
enable producer countries to allocate additional resources for infrastruc-
ture and social services including construction of roads, hospitals, schools,
in practice the monies are often used to fund megaprojects and strengthen
state security at the expense of human security. This chapter outlines the
different oil revenue streams, their allocation, and the varied ways they
impact state and human security, exploring the political economy of oil:
in particular, the social, economic, and political ramifications of oil rev-
enue flows in the subregion. It posits that governments’ spending habits
as well as foreign and domestic and foreign policies, including investment
in public infrastructure and social services, often directly correlate with
the price of oil on the global market. All of this in turn carries major
implications for both foreign and domestic policy.
Chapter 5: Oil and Community Agitation

The incursion of petro-capitalism into West Africa has activated grievances
among the region’s oil host communities in unprecedented ways. From
Pujehun District in southern Sierra Leone to Takoradi in Western Ghana,
from Bomahun in southeastern Liberia to the well-publicized Niger Delta
in southern Nigeria, the ancillary effects of oil and the mode of distribu-
tion of its proceeds have inflamed passions among populations that are
often exposed to enormous negative externalities with few tangible ben-
efits. This chapter focuses on the symbiotic relationship between oil and
grievances at the community level in West Africa. It explores the eclectic
nature of these grievances and the wide array of actions adopted by oil-
producing communities in seeking redress for perceived injustices ema-
nating from the region’s emerging petroleum industry. The chapter also
focuses on the creative strategies used by various local communities to
gain concessions from the international oil companies and the host or
producer governments. The chapter concludes that the failure of West
Africa’s petroleum industry to translate oil wealth into human-centered
development, as outlined by the UNDP (2013), that meets the socioeco-
nomic aspirations of the oil host communities in particular and the coun-
tries in the region as a whole has the potential to undermine the region’s
shaky peace and stability.
18 V. KANYAKO
Chapter 6: Civil Society and Global Frameworks

The ongoing discovery of oil across large swaths of West Africa and its
negative impacts on people and the ecosystem has attracted a plethora
of critics from the nongovernmental sector. This chapter explores the
intersections between existing global frameworks and those of local civil
society agencies as they promote transparency and accountability in West
Africa’s petroleum industry. Unofficial efforts by nongovernmental orga-
nizations in articulating the needs and demands of various affected com-
munities across the region are discussed and analyzed. Through their mul-
tistakeholder and watchdog initiatives at all levels of society, an eclectic
mix of nongovernmental and civil society organizations have continued
to exert pressure on producer governments and oil companies for the
transparent use of proceeds from the region’s emerging oil wealth. Using
a combination of judicial measures, research, and documentation of vio-
lations, reports, and in some cases direct nonviolent action, civil society
has become a factor in crystalizing the growing influence and impact of
petro-capitalism in West Africa. Varied multi-track efforts are critical to
ensuring that West Africa’s oil riches become a catalyst for development
and sustainable growth rather than a curse that hinders and stunts the
region’s socioeconomic growth and undermines its stability.
Chapter 7: Managing Disputes in West Africa’s Petroleum Industry

The oil industry is one of the most conflict-prone natural resource extrac-
tion environments in the world. The sheer scale of the investment,
the complexities and protracted nature of the various agreements, the
plethora of stakeholders and the bewildering number of interests both
domestic and international all coalesce to make disagreements and dis-
putes of all sorts inevitable in the oil industry. This chapter explores the
nature and types of conflicts and the mechanisms used to produce success-
ful mutually beneficial agreements in the region’s nascent oil industry. It
critically assesses the role of national, regional, and international actors
engaged in resolving or preempting the various oil-driven conflicts across
the subregion. A combination of track 1 (state level and formal diplo-
matic) and track 2 diplomacy (informal and nonstate level) have been
applied to quell or reduce oil-induced and other natural resource-based
conflicts. This chapter also explores the joints policy efforts designed to
help countries manage their differences through various conflict resolu-

tion mechanisms.
Chapter 8: Conclusion: Implications for Conflict Resolution

In the brief concluding chapter, the issues of oil, peace, and conflict are
revisited. The chapter looks at the wide-ranging ramifications (real and
perceived) of the expanding oil industry on various facets of life in West
Africa: human security, community relations, securitization of the state,
military–civil relations, maritime and riverine activities, and international
conflicts. It explores the implications of these phenomena for the field of
conflict resolution, which emphasizes the amicable resolution of disputes
and the fostering of dialogue and communications among the various
stakeholders.
Core Themes of the Book

On the surface, this is a book about oil. It is about how a natural resource
that was at best marginal to the global economy a mere 150 years ago, has
now become one of its most critical and most sought after, leading nations
who perceive a threat to their energy security to go to war over it. But the
book is much more than that just an extractive resource project. It deals
with several interconnected and overlapping themes ranging from politics
to the economy to protracted social issues in a small but strategic corner
of the world. Oil is about profits and state security as it is about people,
communities, the environment, and the institutions that shape and are in
turn affected by the network of interactions between and among some-
times diametrically opposed forces, both small and gargantuan, domestic
and global.
Another core theme that runs throughout the book is the relationship
of oil, a strategically critical resource, to conflict and peace. Jeff Colgan
(2013) considers oil’s relationship to international conflict as “central to
understanding contemporary world politics.” Using empirical data from
several case studies he showed that petro-states-defined as states that have
at least 10% of GDP derived from oil exports-are twice as prone to inter-
national conflict as non-petro-states. In Petro-Aggression, When Oil Causes
War (2013, p. 11) the author argues quite convincingly that the propen-
sity of petro-states to engage in conflict comes about when leaders, espe-
cially revolutionary ones, converts large proceeds from oil into “military
20 V. KANYAKO
and political assets in support of aggressive foreign policy.” In what he

termed as “petro-aggression,” he points out that “oil income enables
aggressive leaders to eliminate political constraints, reduce accountabil-
ity, and take their countries to war.” Using the case studies of Sudan,
Libya, and Iraq, Colgan argued that at the domestic level, oil facilitates
risky behavior on the part of petro-state leaders. This argument builds
on one posited earlier by Klare (2002) who pointed out that oil inten-
sifies competition between states more than any other natural resource.
Some of these, the author points out, are due to historical factors such
as the poor delineation of national borders or by attempts of big pow-
ers to shore up allies in resource-concentrated but turbulent regions. It
is for these reasons, he argues, that the United States in particular has
either signed defense pacts with several countries in the region, or has
sold huge quantities of sophisticated weapons to these countries. Klare’s
analysis also posits that international conflict resolution will come under
a lot of strain as nations and nonstate actors engage in a free for all fight
to protect “national security” in the case of governments, or to access the
oil wealth through the use of force. Klare contends that power struggles
over petroleum, among others, will be the engine driving international
politics in the near future. As such, the foreign policies of most west-
ern governments will be shaped by the desire to control access to these
resources. Such policy will be based on military power projection, partly
because these resources are often located in the most volatile regions of
the world. This point had been taken up a year earlier by the National
Energy Policy Development Group in a May 2001 paper when it argued
that as natural resources become scarce and depleted, they will lead to
more friction between people both within and across borders, and subse-
quently wars. Signs of these predictions are already coming to pass in West
Africa. Oil-fueled border disputes, have intermittently flared up between
Nigeria and her neighbors, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon. In the case
of Cameroon the two have engaged in several armed skirmishes over the
potentially oil-rich Bakassi peninsula which was awarded to Cameroon by
the International Court of Justice in November 2007.
In spite of these potential negative impacts, there is also empirical evi-
dence (at least in West Africa) to suggest that oil could help various stake-
holders including states and communities better manage their differences
in a more peaceful manner. Where oil finds are located near common
borders states have realized it is in their best interests to negotiate and
amicably resolve their differences to ensure that everyone benefits. They
are increasingly utilizing various multi-track diplomatic efforts to harness

the full potential of oil proceeds and oil-related foreign direct investment
for socioeconomic development and the peaceful resolution of conflicts
between and within states, as well as at the community levels. The regional
lens adopted in this work explores the wide range of creative methods
and techniques used at the domestic, national, regional, and global levels,
ranging from formal peacemaking to grassroots human rights advocates,
to address the region’s intractable conflicts. Harnessing the “Peace prop-
erties” of oil is key to making West Africa, home to 5% of the world’s
population, strong, secure, viable and a dependable member of the global
economy.
Summary
West Africa is in the midst of an oil frenzy. The region is projected to
provide around 7–10% of the world’s total output in the next decade.
A constellation of factors has coalesced to turn the region into an “in-
creasingly attractive prize both by major energy-importing states and by
transnational energy corporations” (Raphael and Stokes 2011, p. 22).
These factors included technological advances in the way petroleum is
explored and drilled; high global demand; seemingly endless upheaval in
the Persian Gulf and North Africa, where the world’s largest oil reserves
are found; the phenomenal rise and growing energy needs of China; and
the consistently high prices that oil fetches in the international market.
The region’s oil is generally of the highest quality (commonly called sweet
crude, in petroleum parlance) and thus highly desirable: it is less costly to
process into the refined product. Also, West Africa’s proximity to Europe
and the United States means its oil can get to some of the largest and
most important global markets much faster and cheaper as opposed to oil
from places like the Middle East. From the oil companies’ perspective,
the fact that most of the oil finds in West Africa are located offshore is
a major incentive to source there. This is because such exploration and
drilling make it largely immune to onshore instability and community-
level conflicts. Furthermore, the West Africa region itself has a very small
local consumption market, meaning that the vast majority of whatever is
produced will be headed mainly for the international market. This book
explores the reasons for the region’s rise in profile, the modus operandi
of the varied stakeholders, including the responses of the grassroots com-
munities often affected by the negative consequences of oil drilling and
22 V. KANYAKO
the efforts at peacemaking. What happens in West Africa’s oil industry has
major implications for the rest of the world.
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CHAPTER 2
The History and Geology of Petroleum

in West Africa
The History and Evolution of West Africa’s Oil

West Africa was one of the first subregions to make contact with the Euro-
pean world in what eventually became known as the Atlantic interconti-
nental trading system. Beginning with the Portuguese contact in 1444,
the Dutch, French, English, and Scandinavians soon followed. Between
the 1580s and 1670s, various European ships landed on West Africa’s
shores, including Cape Verde, Senegambia, the Gulf of Guinea, and West
Central Africa, which includes Angola. They engaged in commerce with
the natives and eventually established trading posts all along the coast to
guarantee military protection for their commerce. They exchanged Euro-
pean goods such as cutlery, china, guns, and gunpowder for ivory, red-
dyed woods, beads, gold, and eventually slaves (De Golyer 1965, p. 169).
These early transactional encounters marked the beginnings of West
Africa’s interaction and engagement with global commerce. That the
region was rich in natural resources was not in doubt. The area was vari-
ously known to the Europeans during this period as the Grain Coast, the
Gold Coast, the Ivory Coast, and around the eighteenth century the Seep
Coast. The Atlantic intercontinental trade marked a major turning point
both for intra–West African trade and for the more sinister commerce: the
Transatlantic Slave Trade.
The region’s early commerce with the outside world was built largely
on the exploitation of its natural resources. Three institutional practices
established during these early encounters laid the foundation for the
© The Author(s) 2020 25

V. Kanyako, Oil Revenues, Security and Stability in West Africa,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37986-5_2
26 V. KANYAKO
brand of petro-capitalism that emerged a few centuries later. The first

is that most of this early trade was carried out by private traders and
businessmen, with some on the payroll of various trading companies, the
precursors to today’s multinational corporations. The second is that the
companies that were eventually set up were largely state-sponsored or in
some cases state-owned. Such was the case for the West India Company,
a chartered company set up by the State General’s Office in the Nether-
lands in 1621. Even where they were considered private, the companies
still depended to a large extent on “home country” protection, and occa-
sionally financial support, to keep them afloat. The third point is that
these companies were granted monopoly rights over the natural resources,
especially to the minerals that were found in abundance in this part of
the world. For example, the Dutch granted the West India Company a
monopoly over all Atlantic commerce. The British, Spanish, and French
all utilized the same practices of favoring their national or home com-
panies over others. All of these practices shaped the extractive industry
that emerged in West Africa in the eighteenth century and well into the
twentieth century.
The West African region has experienced varied commercial oil explo-
ration phases that spans more than a hundred years. Oil was known to
exist in West Africa as far back as the eighteenth century, when the Por-
tuguese noticed seeps and slicks in present-day Angola. In spite of this
however our knowledge of history and growth of oil in the subregion is
rather uneven. For example, not much is known about pre-1950s com-
mercial oil exploration and production. During the colonial era (between
1857 and 1947), Ghana was known to the British (and French) colonial
authorities who administered the region as the Seep Coast—on account
of the number of tarballs and other evidence of oil that were found along
the coast. (New African 2012). Between the eighteenth century, when
knowledge of the existence of oil became known, to the dawn of the
twentieth century, when the British discovered oil in commercial quantity
in the Niger Delta, major powers—including Britain, France, Germany,
the USA, Portugal, Spain, and international oil companies such as Shell
and Exxon, to name just two—vied for control of the continent’s vast
natural resources and engaged in frenetic prospecting for commercial oil.
In spite of the overwhelming evidence of the availability of oil in the
region, it was not until the turn of the twentieth century, when the British
discovered commercial oil in Nigeria’s Niger Delta in the early 1930s,
2 THE HISTORY AND GEOLOGY OF PETROLEUM IN WEST AFRICA 27
that most of the world started paying attention to West Africa’s oil via-
bility. The reasons for the delay in harnessing West Africa’s oil potential
are manifold, ranging from financial, logistical, political, economic, and
technological challenges. The most important of the reasons for the delay
lies elsewhere, in other parts of the world, where the technology and the
capital to extract oil first started.
The Drake Well oil creek drilling in Pennsylvania in 1859 is generally
considered to be the genesis of modern oil drilling. Edwin L. Drake, a
conductor for the New York and New Haven Railroad, who had no prior
knowledge of the oil business, is known as the “father of the petroleum
industry” because he devised a technology and technique of driving a
pipe down to protect the integrity of the well bore that revolutionized
how crude oil was produced and launched the industry on a large scale
(American Oil and Gas Historical Society 2019).
Prior to Drake’s revolutionary techniques, early oil exploration and
drilling was unsophisticated. Primitive methods of locating oil were largely
through trial and error, known in the industry as “wildcatting,” often
undertaken by enthusiastic prospectors with no scientific background or
knowledge and who largely depended on guesswork. But what these early
oil moguls lacked in scientific method they more than made up for in
enthusiasm and tenacity. De Golyer (1965, p. 120) described it best:
“Most of the world’s early production was found by men who knew no
more of origin or occurrence of oil than they did of the inner workings
of a slot machine. They drilled. They pulled the lever and hoped for the
jackpot.” As one could imagine, such a rudimentary search for what was
soon to become the world’s most sought after resource, was highly ineffi-
cient and expensive too. De Golyer gave the example of the United States,
where in 1948 “out of the 6,182 wildcat wells that were drilled (at the
cost of about a billion dollars each) seven out of eight were dry” (1965,
p. 120).
Following Drake’s remarkable discovery, the nascent oil industry began
to register modest progress in the next four decades. Thanks largely to
his contributions to the industry, the great age of oil discovery started
in earnest in the twentieth century when the first great oil strike was
recorded on January 13, 1901, at Spindletop in eastern Texas, near the
Louisiana border (De Golyer 1965, p. 117). This was the first-recorded
large-scale commercial oil well.
Shortly after these technological breakthroughs of drilling for oil, mod-
ern techniques of harvesting oil in commercial quantities (including the
28 V. KANYAKO
dry rotary auger method; rotary drill; and the mechanical percussion
drill method) all began to spread to other parts of the world, including
Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and subsequently sub-Saharan Africa. At
the time of Drake’s discovery, in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
Russia, with one of the world’s known oil reserves began to modernize its
oil production in the highly lucrative Baku region by replacing its unso-
phisticated manual-labor techniques, where locals reportedly used “rags
and buckets” to scoop up oil sleeks, with modern and more sophisticated
borehole techniques (Goldman 2008, p. 18). The Middle East, which is
today the world’s largest-known deposit, did not hit oil until the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, with the discovery of oil in Iran in 1907,
followed by Saudi Arabia in 1938 by the ARAMCO Consortium (Gold-
man 2008, p. 21).
Why did West Africa lag behind? To start with, oil is a very difficult
and complicated natural resource to harness. Prospecting for it efficiently
requires a deep knowledge of geology as well as huge financial resources.
It is one of the most capital-intensive industries in the world. Locating oil,
especially in the early days when oil-drilling technology was in its infancy
was incredibly difficult, made all the more difficult by the fact that those
initial efforts were not backed by science. As Golyer reminds us, it wasn’t
until the twentieth century that the field of geology truly gained recog-
nition in the oil industry. Prior to that, the industry depended largely
on digging holes and hoping for the best. Even though they knew of its
commercial worth, the colonial authorities in West Africa had a hard time
locating oil and an even harder time drilling for it.
With the entry of geologists who used scientific methods to locate oil,
most of the guesswork in oil exploration was eliminated. Geology and
other scientific methods helped determine with more certainty the avail-
ability (or not) of oil, the quantity of the find, as well as help determine
whether it is technically feasible to extract and the overall commercial
viability of the enterprise. The combustible nature of the material makes
extracting oil, processing it, and making it available to the end user even
more complicated. The field of geology helped make the industry safer
and more efficient.
With the scant information about the genesis and modus operandi of
the oil actors before 1950, scholarly and public analyzes do not bother
to interrogate the nature and forms of horizontal and vertical relation-
ships, often hugely disadvantageous to the West African countries, that
evolved among the stakeholders, both local and international. The role of
the colonial state and the pioneer oil explorers, many of whom were wild-
catters, is key to understanding the nature of the industry that emerged in
the late nineteenth century in what became the oil-producing countries
of Angola and Nigeria. Potential for economically viable oil has been rec-
ognized since at least the nineteenth century, when sustained exploration
for oil in most countries commenced (Clarke 2008, p. 3). The region’s oil
exploration and development occurred over four main time periods (colo-
nial/preindependence; postindependence; post–Cold War, and the glob-
alized twenty-first century). Each historical time period registered slow
but steady progress toward prospecting, exploring, and developing com-
mercial oil in the region.
Colonial Period/Preindependence (Exploration and Discovery)

The growing demand for oil, partly fueled by the invention and wide
use of the internal-combustion engine created a huge demand for and
an acute shortage of petroleum. At the turn of the twentieth century,
oil production was heavily concentrated in a handful of countries. For
example, in the whole of the British Empire, commercial oil was produced
only in Burma and Canada by 1900.
Though the oil shortage was marginally offset (3.8%) by commer-
cial production in countries such as India, Canada, Trinidad, Egypt, and
Brunei, it did not adequately address the limited availability problem
(Steyn 2006, p. 251). By 1918, at the end of the First World War, the
frenetic search for reliable oil supply forced the European powers to look
elsewhere for alternative sources of fuel, a commodity that had proven
decisive in the just-concluded war. West Africa was a natural choice, as it
was already known at that point that pieces of bitumen and oil seepages
were noticeable over a wide geographical area in the zone now known
as the Gulf of Guinea. The various European powers made more funds
available, both as loans and grants, to various oil prospectors from their
home countries or friendly governments. For example between 1945 and
1958 the French government quadrupled its tropical Africa investments
with special focus on “countries bordering the ocean” (Twomey 2001,
pp. 80, 81).
It was during this post-World War era period that the economic struc-
tures, policies, and political relations that have had a lasting impact on the
subregion were created. These had an enduring legacy on the way and
manner in which the industry evolved. From about the 1850s and 1940s,
most of sub-Saharan Africa was under the direct or indirect control of
30 V. KANYAKO
seven European powers: Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium,

Spain, and Portugal. West Africa, which was dominated by the French
and British, was central as it had vast natural resources and trade goods,
including palm oil, cotton, palm kernel, rubber, gold, and groundnut,
that the colonialists desperately needed. The control for these resources
set in motion both a political and economic battle for supremacy, between
especially Great Britain and France that was to have a major impact on the
region and indeed the rest of the world.
The colonial era established beyond all reasonable doubt that the
region had oil. Around the mid-eighteenth century, the Portuguese dis-
covered oil in what is now Angola. Oil and gas exploration in Ghana
(which was then known as the Seep Coast) got underway in 1896 when
the West Africa Oil and Fuel Company (WAOFCO) commenced explo-
ration in an area known as Half-Asini. In 1909 the French company, the
Société Française de Petrole, followed suit with their own commercial
prospecting and drilling (Openoil 2012). Soon after this surface indi-
cation of petroleum, which included mainly onshore oil seeps, was also
established in at least seven countries in and along the Gulf of Guinea,
including Gabon, Cameroon, and Nigeria. In 1926 petroleum explo-
ration was initiated in Gabon by the French company Elf, with drilling
commencing in earnest in 1934 (Clarke 2008, pp. 158, 181).
With petroleum exploration underway during the colonial period,
the ultimate goal for Britain and France in particular, was to exploit
the critical resource for commercial purposes. The colonial authorities
also centralized the process of commercial exploitation by encourag-
ing the joint public-private enterprises. Not surprisingly, most of the
international companies during this era, including those focused on oil,
were either partly or wholly government—owned. Such an arrange-
ment meant for example that the security and safety of the compa-
nies’ overseas staff were the ultimate responsibility of the home gov-
ernments. As part of the centralization process during this era, all poli-
cies on extraction were decided in major cities like London and Paris,
and with the sole aim of benefiting the home country and not the
local economies, as was the case with most of the region’s extractive
industry. For example, as soon as oil was discovered in Nigeria, the
British government passed an ordinance in 1914 making any oil and
mineral under Nigerian soil legal property of the British Crown. The
colonial governments gave special concessions to their home country
oil companies. On the eve of the Second World War, in 1938, the
British government granted Shell (then known as Shell D’Arcy) sole
rights over the exploitation of “all minerals and petroleum throughout

the entire colony” (Steyn 2006).
Thanks in large part to the devastating effects of the Second World
War, the 1950s were particularly active in the exploitation of the region’s
oil industry. The colonial governments made a desperate attempt to com-
mercially exploit West Africa’s oil. With their respective economies in
ruins following the conclusion of the war, both Great Britain and France
started vigorously drilling for oil in their respective colonies. They opened
up the industry to more companies which in turn led to the proliferation
of oil prospecting in the region.
Though these initial attempts were short-lived, it was a success as the
investment paid off as they opened up the industry to more investments
and eventual commercial discoveries which began to “yield dividends by
the 1950s with the commencement of commercial drilling in Nigeria,
Gabon and Angola” (Clarke 2008, p. 181). Angola’s first onshore oil was
produced in the 1950s, and the first offshore was produced in Cabindan
waters in 1968. Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon were to follow shortly in 1953
and 1956, respectively. In the Gambia, modern oil exploration got under-
way in 1956. Four years later, in 1960, British Petroleum (BP) drilled
two onshore wells, followed by the purchase of acreage by Chevron. Oil
was discovered in Nigeria in 1956 at Oloibiri in the Niger Delta after
a half century of exploration through largely to the pioneering efforts
of the Nigerian Bitumen Company and British Colonial Petroleum com-
panies, respectively, which by 1908 had succeeded in drilling for oil in
an area known as Okitipupa, in present-day Ondo state. Oil exploration
in Cameroon started some 70 years ago (Clarke 2008, p. 175; NNPC
2019). It was also during this era that the first commercial oil from the
region was exported from Nigeria in 1958. This intensified the search for
commercial oil in the region, which has not abated since.
The struggle for independence upped the stakes and altered the politi-
cal and economic landscape for both West Africa and the colonial powers
in profound ways. Given the unpredictable and sometimes violent nature
of independence, especially following Guinea’s turbulent separation from
French colonial rule in October 1958, it became a race against time for
the European colonial powers to either exploit as much of the region’s
natural resources as possible or to design new arrangements with the
soon-to-be independent countries that will enable former colonial mas-
ters to continue to hold sway over the region’s economic independence.
They did both. Home governments and the oil companies redoubled their
32 V. KANYAKO
efforts, knowing fully well that independence for the region and continent
as a whole, was just a matter of time. West African countries were soon to
gain their independence from the European powers in the 1960s, only to
realize that political independence did not equate to economic indepen-
dence.
Because of the critical nature of oil and its strategic importance to
nations even in its early phase of its widespread use, even political inde-
pendence did not necessarily lead to the severance of African nation’s
economic ties with the former European colonizers. If anything, the busi-
ness and economic ties were strengthened further, to the extent that
the same companies that were visible and active during the colonial era
remained the dominant players in the extractive industry in the region
even after independence. Political independence from colonial rule did
not amount to economic independence. The newly independent African
leader’s hands were tied. Their countries lacked the financial means and
the technical know-how to drill for oil on their own. For companies such
as Shell and Exxon, it was business (and profits) as usual. The preferred
strategy of the African leaders, therefore, was to seek some kind of an
accommodation with the various foreign powers, mainly those from which
they had just gained independence, to continue to extract and sell their
natural resources, including oil (Twomey 2001, p. 81).
Postindependence and the Cold War (Drilling and Exportation)

The period following the end of colonialism (1960s–1990s) was by far
one of the most important and active phases in the oil exploration and
development in West Africa, as it witnessed drilling and commercial
exploitation. For the first time, control of the region’s natural resources
came under the direct governance and control of Africa’s postindepen-
dence leaders, who were desperate for funds to undertake their various
national development projects. In a bid to gain economic independence,
the continent’s new political masters embarked on various capital accu-
mulation projects, chief among which was the commercial exploitation of
their natural resources, including oil. They wasted no time in exploring
for oil, whose world demands had risen considerably. For example, less
than a year after Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961, its govern-
ment granted oil exploration rights to the little-known Tennessee Sierra
Leone Inc., an affiliate of the Tennessee Gas Transmission Company of
Houston, Texas (New York Times, March 24, 1962). Around this time,
in the first half of the twentieth century, shallow drilling for prospectivity
was conducted by Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Gabon, with sur-
face indication of oil and gas recorded in all geological littoral areas at this
time (Clarke 2008, p. 73).
The situation in Ghana exemplifies the methods, approach, and dilem-
mas faced by newly independent African countries who for their survival
looked both to the West and also to each other through various bilat-
eral and multilateral arrangements. The country was known not just for
gold but had signs of oil by the time it gained independence in 1958
from Great Britain. In 1963, AGIP an Italian oil company was awarded a
contract to construct an oil refinery at the port of Tema, Bight of Benin
to process imported crude oil from neighboring Nigeria. In its heyday in
the mid-1970s, the plant had a processing capacity of 43,000 barrels a day
(McCaskie 2008, p. 322). While importing oil from its neighbor, Ghana
embarked on aggressive oil prospecting as a way to reduce dependency on
outsiders, a stated objective of its independence leader, Kwame Nkrumah.
Through his efforts and initiatives, including nationalizing TOR in 1975,
Ghana became a modest oil producer in 1978 (Clarke 2008, p. 181).
By the late 1960s—a few years after independence for most African
countries—oil exploration, which had until that point largely been con-
fined onshore, started moving offshore. International oil companies
shifted their focus to offshore exploration again, partly influenced by
global developments thousands of miles away. On September 10, 1964,
the United Nations ratified what became known as the Geneva Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Article 1 of the
32-article document states categorically that “the sovereignty of a State
extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea
adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea” (Clarke 2008, p. 73;
United Nations 1964, p. 2). This provided West Africa’s littoral states
with the legal instruments to extend their reach beyond the territorial
borders to maritime borders with full access to all the natural resources
contained therein.
By the 1970s, the focus on the offshore terrain progressed steadily,
with some spectacular results. Initial wells were drilled on the shelf and
shallow water, followed by drilling in deeper waters, especially in countries
like Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria, paid off with series of discoveries (Horn
2018).
34 V. KANYAKO
Post–Cold War (Expansion and Consolidation)

The Cold War had a major impact on oil exploration in the region. Many
countries were hobbled by the constraints imposed by the division of the
world into two main spheres of influence: communism versus capitalism.
Both Nigeria (1967–1970) and Angola, two of the region’s leading pro-
ducers, were embroiled in major civil wars that claimed the lives of mil-
lions of their citizens. Things changed quickly in the industry, however
as oil exploration and development progressed rapidly in the aftermath of
the Cold War with search for commercial oil moving into the deep water,
off the Atlantic Coast where 40% of new oil fields, yielding more than
500 million barrels have been found (McCaskie 2008, p. 318).
Twenty-First Century and Beyond (Commercial Export)

By the dawn of the twenty-first century, West Africa had gained recog-
nition as a growing oil province, one to be reckoned with in the
global petroleum industry. It had witnessed a series of new ventures,
which includes the expansion of the oil search from traditional and well-
established countries to new prospects. Another focus involves moving the
prospecting for oil from onshore (with all its attendant consequences) to
deep and ultra-deep waters. Angola has already set the pace where two-
thirds of its newest and most profitable finds are in ultra-deep waters off
the coast of the Atlantic Ocean (Clarke 2008, p. 73). Advances in tech-
nology, trade liberalization, and increases in foreign direct investment (the
theme of Chapter 3) all helped to open up the subregion’s oil industry
for further exploration. The end result was spectacular oil finds, which
attracted more investors. Now West Africa is firmly established as an oil
province and a key member of the international petroleum industry.
The region’s search for oil has been in fits and starts. Serious explo-
ration was halted and resumed often based on major events—some
domestic, others global—much larger in scope, such as the First and
Second World Wars and the fight for independence and indeed available
technology. Because of the technologically—intensive nature of oil explo-
ration and extraction, the hydrocarbon sector, as important as its always
been to the region’s political economy, developed relatively late, com-
pared to less financial, and technology intensive extractive industry such
as diamond, timber, or gold. Only 20 years ago neither Equatorial Guinea
nor Ghana was known for oil (Clarke 2008, p. 262). That has changed
with oil exploration in all countries of the region.
Once the region gained independence, the new leaders were faced with
challenges in exploiting their oil potential. They lacked the resources and
technical know-how to harness oil—a notoriously technology-heavy and
large investment industry. It was a catch-22 situation: severing political
ties while as a matter of expediency relying on the Europeans for eco-
nomic development. Africa’s new leaders quickly found out that political
independence did not mean economic freedom. To be able to make the
best out of their natural resources they still needed to rely on overseas
partners, often their former oppressors, to help them harness the resource.
After years of difficulty Africa is positioned for improved exploration
and development, with West Africa as the main source of oil, accounting
for well over half of total production of the continent’s oil. The region’s
crude output has been rapidly improving and will continue to do. What
is new is the scale of the finds and the growing number of actors, both
domestic and international. By 1980 only Nigeria was producing oil on
a commercial basis. By 2000, 12 of the 16 countries in the region had
commercially—viable oil finds and productions. Due to rising competition
in the global energy market, the nature and character of the industry has
witnessed a dramatic shift over the last three decades.
West Africa’s Geologic Oil Provinces

Where the region known as West Africa starts or ends is a matter of
intense debate. According to the United Nations Statistics Division, West-
ern Africa comprises 17 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte
D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Maurita-
nia, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Oth-
ers agree- to some extent. The Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), the African Union, and even the African Development
Bank Group (2005) have different geographic subcategorizations. Mem-
ber countries making up ECOWAS do not include St. Helena or Maurita-
nia (which left in 2002). The highly regarded Oil and Gas Journal adds
Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), and Mauritania to the count of coun-
tries that make up West Africa. According to the African Development
Bank (2013) the region consists of 15 countries, eight of which are from
the CFA zones while Nigeria, Ghana, Cape Verde, Guinea, The Gambia,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone are non CFA members. With the exception of
Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire all member countries of the region are net oil
importers.
Another random document with
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“One of our troubles is with smuggled liquor. We try especially to
keep it from the Indians, but nevertheless it gets in. In one instance
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dressed hogs. In another a woman contrived a rubber sleeve, which
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arm a hard squeeze.”
I asked how it was that the Mounted Police are so feared by bad
characters that this whole territory can be controlled by a handful of
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own bad men, but also of those who come across from Alaska. They
may be dangerous on the other side of the border, but they are
always gentle enough when they get here.
“The big thing that helps us,” concluded the head of the police,
“is that the government supports us up to the limit. For example, it
cost us two hundred thousand dollars to convict in one famous
murder case, but it was done and the guilty man hanged. Ottawa
always tells us that it is prepared to spend any amount of money
rather than have a murderer go unpunished. It is that policy that
enables us to keep order here.”
THE END
SEEING THE WORLD
WITH
Frank G. Carpenter
Doubleday, Page & Company, in response to the demand from
Carpenter readers, are now publishing the complete story of
CARPENTER’S WORLD TRAVELS, of which this book is the tenth
in the series. Those now available are:
1. “The Holy Land and Syria”

2. “From Tangier to Tripoli”
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3. “Alaska, Our Northern Wonderland”
4. “The Tail of the Hemisphere”
Chile and Argentina
5. “From Cairo to Kisumu”
Egypt, the Sudan,
and Kenya Colony
6. “Java and the East Indies”
Java, Sumatra,
the Moluccas, New Guinea,
Borneo, and the Malay Peninsula
7. “France to Scandinavia”
France, Belgium,
Holland, Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden
8. “Mexico”
9. “Australia, New Zealand, and Some Islands of the South
Seas”
Australia, New Zealand,
New Guinea, the Samoas,
the Fijis, and the Tongas
10. “Canada”
and Newfoundland
Millions of Americans have already found Carpenter their ideal

fellow traveller, and have enjoyed visiting with him all the corners of
the globe. He tells his readers what they want to know, shows them
what they want to see, and makes them feel that they are there.
CARPENTER’S WORLD TRAVELS are the only works of their
kind. These books are familiar talks about the countries and peoples
of the earth, with the author on the spot and the reader in his home.
No other one man has visited so much of the globe and written on
the ground, in plain and simple language, the story of what he has
found. CARPENTER’S WORLD TRAVELS are not the casual record
of incidents of the journey, but the painstaking study of a trained
observer, devoting his life to the task of international reporting. Each
book is complete in itself; together they form the most vivid,
interesting, and understandable picture of our modern world ever
published. They are the fruit of more than thirty years of unparalleled
success in writing for the American people, and the capstone of
distinguished services to the teaching of geography in our public
schools, which have used some four million copies of the Carpenter
Geographical Readers.
INDEX
Abitibi, large production of news-print at, 92.

Agriculture, in Newfoundland, 11;
in Quebec, 47, 48;
possibilities of Manitoba, 154.
Air plant, a polar orchid along the Yukon Trail, 236.
Airplanes, fail in attempt to reach Fort Norman, 205.
Alberta, coal deposits estimated to be one seventh of the world’s
total, 200;
extent of pure bred cattle and dairy industries, 208.
Alberta Railway and Irrigation Company, pioneer in Alberta
irrigationwork, 207.
Alfalfa, largely produced in southwestern Saskatchewan, 176.
American “branch plants” in Canada, 104.
American capital and investments in Canada, 105.
American owned pulp-mills and timber tracts in Canada, 96.
Americans, number of, in Canada, 2, 193.
Anderson, Charlie, his lucky strike in the Klondike, 275.
Annapolis Valley, Nova Scotia’s apple-growing district, 34.
Anyox, British Columbia, copper mines at, 223.
Apples, largely grown in Annapolis Valley, Nova Scotia, 34;
in the Okanagan Valley, 223.
Asbestos, most of world’s supply produced in Thetford district,
Quebec, 47.
Astrophysical Observatory at Victoria, British Columbia, 225.
“Athabaska Trail,” poem by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 205.
Automobiles, American, in Canada, 104.
Banff, finest mountain resort of Canada, 215.
Bank of Montreal, one of the world’s great banks, 73.
Banks and the banking system of Canada, 69, et seq.
Banting, Dr. F. G., discoverer of Insulin, 99.
Barley, production in the Winnipeg district, 149;
large crops at Edmonton, 200;
in Peace River Valley, 202.
Baseball, popular in Nova Scotia, 35;
in Toronto, 101.
Bassano, great irrigation dam at, 206.
Battleford, Saskatchewan, noted for its fur trade and lumber mills,
179.
Beach, Rex, in the Klondike, 278.
Bears, abundant in the Yukon, 234.
Beatty, E. W., first Canadian-born president of the Canadian Pacific,
165.
Beaver, the first fur exported by the Hudson’s Bay Company, 169;
abundant in the Yukon, 234.
Beck, Sir Adam, at the head of Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission,
110.
Bell Island, visit to the Wabana iron mines on, 26.
Belle Isle, Strait of, 4.
Big game of the Yukon region, 253.
Black, George, demonstrates to Ottawa Parliament possibility of
winter automobile travel in the Yukon, 239.
Bonsecours Market, at Montreal, 66.
Boyle, Joseph W., successful gold-dredging operations in the Yukon,
271;
the story of his career, 281.
Branch plants, American, in Canada, 104.
Bras d’Or Lake, an inland sea, 39.
Bright “Dickie,” a character of old-time Calgary, 211.
British American Nickel Company, operators of mines at Sudbury,
130.
British Columbia, timber resources of, 90;
production of silver in, 124;
agricultural and mineral resources, 220 et seq.
Buffalo, last wild herd reported to be near Fort Vermilion, 202;
largest herd in America at Wainwright Park, Alberta, 217.
Cabbage, as raised at Dawson, Yukon, 265.

Cabot, Sebastian, reported that fish obstructed navigation on
Newfoundland coast, 13.
Cabot Tower, commemorating discovery of Newfoundland, 6.
Calgary, Alberta, huge irrigation works of the Canadian Pacific
Railway at, 206, 207;
the city and its industries, 209.
Camping and hunting in Ontario province, 139.
Canadian Bank of Commerce, established in the Klondike, 280.
Canadian Banking Act, provisions of, 72.
Canadian Banking Association, of semi-official status, 73.
Canadian Klondike Mining Company, established by Joe Boyle, 284.
Canadian National Railways, eastern terminus at Halifax, 31;
extent of, 158;
work abroad to induce immigration, 190;
transcontinental route from Prince Rupert to Halifax, 229.
Canadian Northern Railway, growth of, 162.
Canadian Pacific Railway, eastern terminus at St. John, N. B., 41;
extent of its railroad and steamship service, 158, 160;
work abroad to induce immigration, 190;
begins huge irrigation project near Calgary, 206, 207;
leads in exploiting Canada’s scenic wonders, 218.
Canadian relations with the United States, 85.
Canso, Strait of, railroad trains ferried across, 39.
Cantilever bridge, world’s longest at Quebec, 45.
Cape Breton Island, port of province of Nova Scotia, 38.
Cape Race, chief signal station of the North Atlantic, 3.
Cape Spear, most easterly point of North America, 6.
“Card money,” circulation of, 74.
Caribou, abundant in Newfoundland, 11;
in northern Ontario, 140;
in the Yukon, 234, 253;
meat sold at butcher shops in Dawson, 253.
Carmack, George, discoverer of gold in the Klondike, 274.
Carrots, a successful crop at Dawson, Yukon, 261.
Cartier, Jacques, early explorations of, 45.
Catholicism, Quebec the American capital of French, 57.
Cattalo, cross between buffalo and cattle, raised in large numbers at
Wainwright Park, 218.
Cattle, pure bred, in Alberta, 208;
transportation of, on the Yukon River, 242.
Cattle ranches being supplanted by farms in Alberta, 206.
Château Laurier, government railroad hotel at Ottawa, 81.
Chaudière Falls, source of power for Ottawa manufactures, 80.
Chicken Billy and his ten-thousand-dollar potato patch, 259.
Chinese labourers, not admitted to Canada, 190.
Chippewa, immense hydro-electric development at, 113.
Chisana, abandoned town on the Yukon River, 244.
“Circle tour,” the Canadian Rockies, Yellowstone Park, and Grand
Canyon motor route, 215.
Clay Belt, the Great, agricultural possibilities in, 139.
Clergue steel plant, at Sault Ste. Marie, 135.
Climate, at Edmonton, 200;
at Prince Rupert, British Columbia, 228;
at Dawson, Yukon, 256.
Coaker, Sir William, organizer of Newfoundland Fishermen’s
Protective Union, 21.
Coal, great importance of the Sydney mines, 39;
amount saved by development of Canada’s water-power, 108;
Alberta’s deposits, the greatest in the Dominion, 200;
immense deposits, near Crow’s Nest Pass, 221.
Cobalt, Ontario, world’s richest silver deposits at, 119.
Cobalt, immense production of the mineral at Cobalt, Ontario, 125.
Cochrane, “Billy,” breeder of “wild” cattle at Calgary, 210.
Cochrane, Senator, owner of large cattle ranch in Alberta, 207.
Cod fisheries, of Newfoundland, 13;
of Nova Scotia, 36.
Coffee, George T., lucky miner in the Yukon, 266.
Coke ovens, at the coal deposits near Crow’s Nest Pass, 221.
Columbia River, source of, in the Kootenays, 220.
Conservation of forests in Canada, 89.
Copper, rich deposits in Newfoundland, 12;
in the Kootenay country, 221, 222.
Copper sulphate, by-product of Sudbury mines, 130.
Cornwallis, Lord, city of Halifax, founded by, 32.
“Country banks” of coal, the settler’s recourse, 201.
Creighton Nickel Mine, largest producer in the world, 127.
“Cremation of Sam McGee,” poem by Robert Service, 257.
Crow’s Nest Pass, railway line through, 217, 220;
immense coal deposits near, 221.
Cucumbers, a hot-house crop, at Dawson, Yukon, 261.
Curling, a popular game in Canada, 68.
Dairy cattle and products of Alberta, 208.

Dawson, the capital of the Yukon, 250 et seq.
Deer, plentiful in Nova Scotia, 57.
Divorce, no laws for, in Newfoundland, 9.
Domestic servants, scarcity of, 192.
Dominion Agricultural Department, originates improved wheat
varieties, 183.
Douglas fir, principal timber of British Columbia, 91.
Doukhobors, fanatical colonists from Russia, 194.
Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan, poem, “The Athabasca Trail,” 205.
Dredging for gold in the Yukon, 267, 269.
Dunsmore, Lord, as a pioneer names town of Moose Jaw, 179.
Edmonton, Alberta, the gateway to the northwest, 197 et seq.

Electric current, low cost of in southern Ontario, 106, 108, 111.
Electrically heated water for winter mining in the Klondike, 285.
Elevators, how conducted in the Canadian wheat belt, 186.
Farm labour, how obtained for the Canadian wheat fields, 184.
Farmers, American, movement to the Canadian wheat belt, 193.
Farmhouses, well built in Nova Scotia, 38.
Farming, on the edge of the Arctic, Fisheries, of Newfoundland, 13;
of Nova Scotia, 36.
Fisheries of British Columbia, extent of, 230.
Fishermen, Newfoundland, their hard lives and small incomes, 20.
Fishermen’s Protective Union, activities of, 21.
Flax seed, production in the Winnipeg district, 149.
Fleming, Peter, plans harbour development of Montreal, 62.
Floating dry dock, at Prince Rupert, 229.
Flour industry, location of principal mills, 186.
Football, popular in Toronto, 101.
Forest fires and protective measures, 89.
Forest reserves, set aside by government of Ontario, 139.
Forests, denudation of Canadian, 88.
Fort Garry, present site of Winnipeg, 151.
Fort McMurray, on the route to the new oil fields, 203.
Fort Norman, trading post for the new oil region, 203.
Fort Smith, capital of the Northwest Territories, 203.
Fort Vermillion, last herd of wild wood buffalo reported near, 202.
Fort William, the great wheat centre, 135, 141.
Fox, Black, price of fur declining since advent of fur farming, 173.
Fox farms on Prince Edward Island, 40;
near Indian Lorette, Quebec, 44.
Fraser River, gold discoveries on, the first in British Columbia, 223.
Freighters, Lake Superior, 146.
French, dispute British claims to Newfoundland fisheries, 14;
attempts to hold Nova Scotia, 15;
driven from Cape Breton Island, 39.
French, the language of Quebec, 49.
French Canada—Quebec, 42.
French Catholicism, Quebec the American capital of, 57.
Fruit growing in the Okanagan Valley, British Columbia, 224.
Fundy, Bay of, the forty-foot tides of, 38.
Fur, and the great organizations concerned in its marketing, 166 et
seq.
Gas, natural, at Swift Current, Saskatchewan, 180;

at Medicine Hat and near Edmonton, 201.
Gates, Swift-Water Bill, his great strike in the Klondike, 277;
partnership with Jack London, 278;
partnership with Joe Boyle, 282.
Glace Bay, first transatlantic cable landed at, 39.
Gold, but little found in Labrador, 11;
production of, in the Porcupine district, 125;
in the Kootenay country, 221;
first discovery in British Columbia, on the Fraser River, 223;
supply being exhausted in the Klondike, 250;
the wonders of the Yukon, 266.
Gouin reservoir, immense water-power development in Quebec, 47.
Government ownership of railroads, how brought about, 162.
Governor-General, the, his position in the Canadian government, 84.
Grain-carrying ships, of the Great Lakes, 146.
Grain elevators, at Port Arthur and Fort William, 141 et seq.
Grain sacks, manufacture of, a leading industry of Montreal, 63.
Granby Company, miners and smelters of copper in British
Columbia, 222.
Grand Banks, the cod fishing grounds, 4, 19.
Grand Forks, British Columbia, smelter closed down after a record
production, 222.
Grand Trunk railway, growth of, in Canada, 162.
Grande Prairie, largest town in the Peace River Valley, 202.
Great Divide, crossing the, 213.
Great Slave Lake, on the route to the new oil fields, 204.
Grenfell, Dr., sailors’ mission of, at St. John’s, 8.
Gulf Stream, its influence on Newfoundland, 4, 5.
Halibut, large production of the British Columbia fisheries, 230.

Halifax, chief city and capital of Nova Scotia, 31.
Halifax explosion, one of the greatest ever known, 33.
Hamilton, Ontario, prosperity due to cheap electric power from
Niagara, 117.
Hayward, Edward, his murder near Lesser Slave Lake, and the
running down of his murderer, 295.
Hematite ore, in the Kootenay country, 221.
Hidden Creek copper mines, largest in British Columbia, 223.
Hill, James J., prediction of Canada’s future population, 189.
Hockey, the great game of Canada, 68.
Hogs, raised at Dawson, Yukon, 260, 262.
Hollinger Mine, largest gold mine in North America, 125.
Holt, Renfrew and Company, great furriers at Quebec, 171.
Homesteads in the Yukon, 265.
Horse raising, in Alberta, 209.
Hot-houses for cucumbers and tomatoes at Dawson, Yukon, 261.
Hudson Bay, railways projected to, 155.
Hudson’s Bay Company, history of, 166 et seq.
Hudson Strait, chief difficulty in navigation of Hudson Bay Route,
156.
Hull, wet suburb of dry Ottawa, 80.
Hunting, in Newfoundland, 11.
Hunting and camping in Ontario province, 139.
Hydraulic mining, in the Yukon, 267.
Hydro-electric Commission, work of, in Ontario, 102, 103, 106, 107.
Hydro-electric development in Quebec, 46;
of Niagara Falls, 106;
of Welland River at Niagara Falls, 113;
at Sault St. Marie, 134.
Hydro-electric development and the paper and pulp industry, 96.
Hydro-electric plant, supplying St. John’s, 15.
Hydro-electric project at Ogdensburg proposed for furnishing power
to United States and Canada, 100.
Ibex Range, as seen from the Yukon trail, 236.

Ice Palace, formerly erected each winter at Montreal, 68.
Icelanders, a colony of, near Winnipeg, 152.
Immigration, Canada’s desire for, 188 et seq.
Indian Head, government forestry experiments at, 178.
Insulin, specific for treatment of diabetes, discovered at University of
Toronto, 99.
International Joint Commission, approves project for improvement of
St. Lawrence waterway, 100.
International Nickel Company of Canada, Ltd., owners of rich
Sudbury mines, 127.
Iron, one of the world’s largest deposits in Newfoundland, 12;
the wonderful Wabana mines, 24;
in the Kootenay country, 221.
Irrigation in Alberta, 206;
in the Okanagan Valley, 224.
Japanese labourers, not admitted to Canada, 190.

Jasper Park, greatest of Canada’s western game and forest reserve,
217.
Keeley Mine, rich silver veins of, at Cobalt, 124.
Keno Hill, new silver district in the Yukon, 124.
Kicking Horse Pass, where the railway crosses the Great Divide,
216.
King, Charles, his capture and conviction of murder by the Mounted
Police, 295.
King Solomon’s Dome, in the centre of the Klondike gold region,
274.
Kirkland Lake gold district, production of, 125.
Klondike, the supply of gold being exhausted, 250;
romances of the, 274.
Kootenay country, resources of, 220, 221.
Kootenay Lake, steamer trip through, 221.
Labrador, cod fisheries of, 19.

Labour, how obtained for the Canadian wheat fields, 184.
Lac Beauvert, a mountain resort of the Canadian National Railways,
217.
La Chine Rapids, so-named by Cartier, 61.
Lachine Canal, near Montreal, 64.
Lacrosse, one of the most popular Canadian games, 67.
Lake of the Woods, a beautiful camping and hunting district, 139.
La Rose, discoverer of silver at Cobalt, 122.
Land grants to the Canadian Pacific Railway, 190.
Laurentian Mountains, oldest rock formation of the continent, 48.
Le Roi Copper Mine at Rossland, British Columbia, 222.
Leacock, Stephen, at McGill University, Montreal, 63.
Lead, in the Kootenay country, 221.
Left-hand driving, the custom in Newfoundland, 25.
Life insurance, amount held by Canadians, 78.
Lignite coal, in Saskatchewan, 180.
Live stock, transportation of on the Yukon River, 242.
Live stock production in Newfoundland, 11.
London, Jack, in the Klondike, 278.
London, Ontario, greatly increased consumption of electricity due to
low price, 112.
Louise, Lake, in the Canadian Rockies, 216.
Lumber, production at Sault Ste. Marie, 135;
production of the Saskatchewan province, 176, 179;
immense quantities shipped from Vancouver, 225.
Lumber industry of Canada, the, 88 et seq.
Manitoba, extent of the province, its topography and resources, 154.

Maritime Provinces, of Canada, the, 31.
Marquette, Father, establishes first Jesuit mission in the new world at
Sault Ste. Marie, 135.
Marquis, valuable variety of wheat originated by Dominion
Agricultural Department, 183.
Matches, manufacture of, at Ottawa, 80, 88.
Medicine Hat, natural gas wells at, 201.
Mennonites, at Winnipeg, 153;
colonies of, from Russia, 194, 195.
McGill University, Montreal, 63.
Miller, Joaquin, in the Klondike, 278.
Mine props, cut in Newfoundland for use in English and Welsh
mines, 11.
Mining wonders of the far North, 266.
Mond Nickel Company, operators of mines at Sudbury, 130.
Monel metal, how produced, 129.
Montreal, Canada’s largest city and financial centre, 60 et seq.
Moose, plentiful in Nova Scotia, 37;
in Ontario province, 140;
in the Yukon, 234, 253;
meat sold at butcher shops at Dawson, 253.
Moose Jaw, an important commercial centre of Saskatchewan, 179.
Mosses, along the Yukon trail, 236.
Mother’s pension, in Ontario, 103.
Motor tourists, welcomed in Quebec, 50.
Mountain goats, abundant in the Yukon, 253.
Mountain sheep, abundant in the Yukon, 253.
Mount Robson, highest peak in Canada, 217.
Mount Royal, from which Montreal is named, 61.
Municipal ownership in Port Arthur and Fort William, 143.
Muskrat, a valuable fur when dyed and prepared, 172.
Names, fanciful, in Newfoundland geography, 12.

National debt of Canada, greatly increased during the World War,
188.
Natural gas, at Swift Current, Saskatchewan, 180;
at Medicine Hat, and near Edmonton, 201.
Nelson, British Columbia, in the heart of the mining country, 221.
New Brunswick, its resources and industries, 40.
New Caledonia, nickel production of, 127.
Newfoundland, size and strategic importance, 4;
population, 7;
education and church activities, 7;
political relation to British Empire, 8;
system of government, 9.
Newspapers in the early Klondike days, 280.
News-print, production of the Sault Ste. Marie mills, 134.
Niagara Falls, hydro-electric development of, 106, 113.
Niagara Falls Railway Arch Bridge, cost of lighting American half
more than double Canadian, 108.
Nickel, largest production in the world at Sudbury, Ontario, 127;
the different uses of the metal, 131.
Nickel-steel, the many uses of, 131.
Nipissing silver mine at Cobalt, 122.
Northcliffe, Lord, built plant in Newfoundland for supply of pulp wood
paper, 11.
Northwest Company, opponent of the Hudson’s Bay Company, finally
absorbed, 170.
Notre Dame, Church of, at Montreal, 65.
Nova Scotia, travels, in, 31 et seq.
Oats, production in the Winnipeg district, 149;

large crops at Edmonton, 200;
in Peace River Valley, 202.
Oats hay, a farm crop at Dawson, Yukon, 261.
Ogdensburg, N. Y., site of proposed hydro-electric plant for supplying
Canada and the United States, 100.
Oil fields, the new operations along the MacKenzie, 203 et seq.
Okanagan Valley, famous as fruit-growing region, 223.
Ontario, Province of, richest in mineral and agricultural wealth and
industrial development, 103;
the frontier of the province, 137.
Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission, work of, in Ontario, 102, 103,
106, 107.
Ottawa, capital of the Dominion, 79 et seq.
Paper, Quebec leading producer of, 46;

greatly increased production of, in Canada, 92;
process of manufacture, 93.
Paper mills, at Ottawa, 80, 88.
Parliament buildings, at Ottawa, 82.
Peace River, the town of, 202.
Peace River Valley, agricultural possibilities in, 202.
Petroleum, in Alberta, 201;
the new field along the Mackenzie, 203.
Petty Harbour, typical Newfoundland “outport,” 16.
Phoenix, British Columbia, copper mines at, 222.
Pilgrimages to Ste. Anne de Beaupré, 52.
Porcupine gold district, production of, 125.
Port Arthur, the great wheat centre, 135, 141.
Port Nelson, projected terminus of the Hudson Bay Route, and port
for wheat shipment, 155.
Portage la Prairie, a prosperous farming section, 175.
Potatoes, success with in Dawson, Yukon, 259.
Poultry raising in the Arctic, 260.
Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, noted for its fur trade and lumber mills,
179.
Prince Edward Island, smallest but richest province in the Dominion,
40.
Prince Rupert, northern terminus of Canadian National Railways and
nearest port to the Orient, 226 et seq.
Public ownership, in Toronto, 101 et seq.;
success of the Ontario Hydro-Electric Commission, 107.
Pulp wood, chief product of forests in Newfoundland, 11;
great production of Quebec, 46;
Canada’s resources in, of great importance to the United States,
91, 96.
Pulp mills, at Ottawa, 88;
great increase in numbers of, in Canada, 92;
at Sault Ste. Marie, 134.
Quebec, and its history, 42;

population, 46.
Queenston Chippewa hydro-electric plant below Niagara Falls, 113.
Radio, fisheries of Nova Scotia controlled by, 36.

Rabbits, destruction of trees by, 234.
Railways, in Newfoundland, 10;
transcontinental, of Canada, 157;
government-owned in Canada, 162.
Rainfall, excessive, at Prince Rupert, British Columbia, 229.
Regina, the capital of Saskatchewan, 177.
Religious denominations in Newfoundland, 7.
Remittance men, in Calgary, 210.
Revillon Frères, chief competitor to the Hudson’s Bay Company, 170.
Rideau Canal, at Ottawa, 80, 81.
Rideau Hall, residence of the Governor-General, at Ottawa, 84.
Rockies, Canadian, beauty of the, 213.
Rocky Mountain Park, finest mountain resort of Canada, 215.
Royal Bank of Canada, connections abroad, 77.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, training camp at Regina, 177;
district headquarters at Dawson, 251;
the story of the service, 288 et seq.
Russian church, at Winnipeg, 153.
Rye, production in the Winnipeg district, 149.
St. Boniface, old French-Canadian settlement near Winnipeg, 152.

St. Helene Island, once owned by Champlain, 64.
St. James, Cathedral of, at Montreal, 65.
St. John, chief city of New Brunswick, 41.
St. John’s, capital and chief port of Newfoundland, 3, 5;
around about the city, 8.
St. Lawrence River, International plans for improvement of, 99.
St. Mary’s River, hydro-electric development of, 134.
St. Paul’s Church, Halifax, first English house of worship in Canada,
35.
St. Pierre Island, headquarters of bootleggers, 15.
Sainte Anne de Beaupré, the Shrine and its miraculous cures, 52.
Salmon fishing, in Newfoundland, 11.
Salmon fisheries of British Columbia, 231.
Sanderson, John, first homesteader at Portage la Prairie, 175.
Saskatchewan, greatest wheat province of the Dominion, 175 et
seq., 181 et seq.
Saskatoon, second largest city of Saskatchewan, 179.
Sault Ste. Marie, hydro-electric development of, 134;
one of the oldest settlements in Canada, 135.
Sealing industry, of Newfoundland, 21.
Selkirk, Lord, his colony in Manitoba the first wheat farmers, 182.
Service, Robert, the poet of the Yukon, 249, 257, 279.
Settlers, Canada’s inducements to, 191.
Shawinigan Falls, hydro-electric development of, 46.
Shaughnessy, Lord, an American boy who became president of the
Canadian Pacific, 165.
Sheep, in southern Alberta, 208.
Silver in the Kootenay country, 221.
Silver mines of northern Ontario, 119.
Slavin, Frank, in the Klondike, 278;
partnership with Joe Boyle, 282.
“Soo” Canal, the waterway and its traffic, 136.
Sports, Canadian, 67;
outdoor games promoted by municipal athletic commission at
Toronto, 101.
Spruce, predominant standing timber of Canada, 91.
Steam thawing of the ground in Yukon mining, 266, 271.
Steel industries developed in Sydney district, Nova Scotia, 39.
Stock raising in southwestern Saskatchewan, 176.
Sudbury, rich nickel deposits at, 126, 127.
Sunlight, hours of, at Dawson, Yukon, 264.
Superior, Lake, the grain-carrying trade through, 141 et seq.
Swift Current, an important commercial centre of Saskatchewan,
179.
Sydney coal mines, of immense importance, 39.
Tahkeena River, crossing of, on the Yukon trail, 235.

The Pas, an undeveloped mineral region, 154.
Thomas, C. A., demonstrates possibility of winter automobile travel
in the Yukon, 239.
Thornton, Sir Henry, in charge of the Canadian national railways,
164.
Three Rivers, Quebec, largest production of paper in the world, at,
47, 92.
Threshing, methods in the Canadian wheat belt, 185.
Tides, forty feet high in Bay of Fundy, 38.
Timber, valuable tracts in Newfoundland, 11.
Timothy hay, large crops at Edmonton, 200.
Tomatoes, a hot-house crop at Dawson, Yukon, 261.
Toronto, the city of public ownership, 97 et seq.
Toronto University, largest in the British Empire, 98.
Transcontinental railway systems of Canada, 157.
Trappists, at Winnipeg, 153.
Truro, Nova Scotia, 38.
Turnips, as a crop, at Dawson, Yukon, 264.
University of Saskatchewan, efforts in behalf of agriculture and

ceramics, 179.
Valley of the Ten Peaks, in the Canadian Rockies, 216.

Vancouver, chief city of British Columbia and Canada’s most
important Pacific port, 224.
Vancouver Island, copper workings on, 223.
Van Horne, Wm., strenuous railroad builder, 165.
Veneer, manufacture of, at Sault Ste. Marie, 135.
Victoria, capital of British Columbia, 225.
Wabana iron mines rich under-sea deposits, 24.

Wainwright Park, Alberta, containing largest herd of buffalo extant,
217.
Waterfalls that work for the people, 106 et seq.
Water-power, great developments in Quebec, 46;
its relation to the paper and pulp industry, 96.
Welland Canal, building of deeper and larger locks, 99.

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Oil Revenues, Security and Stability in

West Africa 1st ed. Edition Vandy

Oil Revenues, Security

ISBN 978-3-030-37985-8 ISBN 978-3-030-37986-5 (eBook)

1 Introduction: Human Security, Oil Revenues, and

2 The History and Geology of Petroleum in West Africa 25

3 External Stakeholders and the Geopolitics of Oil 45

4 Oil Revenues and the State 73

5 Oil and Community Agitation 109

6 Civil Society and Global Frameworks 143

7 Managing Disputes in West Africa’s Petroleum Industry 165

8 Conclusion: Implications for the Field of Conflict

Epilogue: West Africa and the Pandemic of Oil 213

IMTD The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

Table 2.1 Oil endowment in West Africa 37

Introduction: Human Security, Oil Revenues,

The Rising Profile of West Africa’s Oil Wealth

© The Author(s) 2020 1

Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and the China National Oil Corpo-

located near navigable waters to take advantage of economical waterborne

which have resulted in the change of unpopular governments. Since the

environmental impacts are felt in the coastal regions, whose communi-

Objectives and Approach

a critical natural resource and as a global product. To address adequately

stakeholders in the region’s emerging offshore oil industry, share simi-

The Urgency of Oil

various stakeholders to make it economically viable. In short, where man-

relevant theoretical framework for understanding the “oil complex” phe-

Chapter 2: The History and Geology of Petroleum in West Africa

Chapter 3: External Stakeholders and the Geopolitics of Oil

Chapter 4: Oil Revenues and the State

The ensuing revenue streams, which come in various forms—bonuses,

Chapter 5: Oil and Community Agitation

Chapter 6: Civil Society and Global Frameworks

Chapter 7: Managing Disputes in West Africa’s Petroleum Industry

help countries manage their differences through various conflict resolu-

Chapter 8: Conclusion: Implications for Conflict Resolution

Core Themes of the Book

and political assets in support of aggressive foreign policy.” In what he

are increasingly utilizing various multi-track diplomatic efforts to harness

The History and Geology of Petroleum

The History and Evolution of West Africa’s Oil

© The Author(s) 2020 25

brand of petro-capitalism that emerged a few centuries later. The first

Colonial Period/Preindependence (Exploration and Discovery)

seven European powers: Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium,

rights over the exploitation of “all minerals and petroleum throughout

Postindependence and the Cold War (Drilling and Exportation)

Post–Cold War (Expansion and Consolidation)

Twenty-First Century and Beyond (Commercial Export)

West Africa’s Geologic Oil Provinces

1. “The Holy Land and Syria”

Millions of Americans have already found Carpenter their ideal

Abitibi, large production of news-print at, 92.

Cabbage, as raised at Dawson, Yukon, 265.

Dairy cattle and products of Alberta, 208.

Edmonton, Alberta, the gateway to the northwest, 197 et seq.

Gas, natural, at Swift Current, Saskatchewan, 180;

Halibut, large production of the British Columbia fisheries, 230.

Ibex Range, as seen from the Yukon trail, 236.

Japanese labourers, not admitted to Canada, 190.

Labrador, cod fisheries of, 19.

Manitoba, extent of the province, its topography and resources, 154.