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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/08/17, SPi
Preface
In his memoirs, the French diplomat and elder statesman Jean Monnet
recalled how he had repeatedly tried and failed to achieve one of his
most cherished ambitions—that of drawing resurrected and regener-
ated Europe towards unification by endowing it with a single political
and institutional centre. From 1952 until 1955, as first president of the
newly created, six-member European Coal and Steel Community, and
then as founder and leader of the Action Committee for the United
States of Europe, he tirelessly argued for either choosing or creating a
city that would function as capital initially of the Community, and
subsequently of the European federation that he was striving to con-
struct. ‘The Community’, he wrote, ‘would probably have grown up in
a different atmosphere if the governments had been sensible enough to
found a capital city for it, isolating it from national rivalry and national
influence.’
Monnet described how, in Paris in July 1952, discussion of the issue
degenerated into haggling and recrimination. A meeting of ministers
convened in the morning on Tuesday still had not reached a decision at
midnight on Wednesday. ‘France, backed by Italy, pleaded for Strasbourg;
Belgium for Liège; the Netherlands for The Hague; Schuman [the
French foreign minister] . . . proposed Saarbrücken . . . [and] at three in
the morning of Thursday we were in both Strasbourg and Turin.’
Brussels and Paris had been proposed, but the first was rejected by the
Belgian prime minister because his electoral mandate was for Liège,
and Schuman refused to upset the mayor of Strasbourg by accepting
Paris. Weary and bleary-eyed, the ministers finally agreed to com-
promise by distributing the institutions between Strasbourg and a city
no one had even mentioned—Luxembourg. ‘Everyone was relieved,
and that is how the European Coal and Steel Community acquired its
“provisional” headquarters in a small town which became the European
crossroads.’
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vi pr e face
Six years later, after the European Coal and Steel Community had
been transformed into the European Economic Community, the wran-
gling began all over again. ‘The ministers agreed on the principle of a
single site, but disagreed about where it should be.’ Again, the outcome
was a patched-up compromise that satisfied nobody. Brussels was
selected not to replace but to supplement Strasbourg and Luxembourg.
‘From that moment’, Monnet conceded, ‘dispersion was inevitable.’
The name that is remarkable for its absence in this chronicle of
fraught negotiation and indecision is that of Rome. Not even the
Italians proposed it. Failing Turin, they would have preferred Milan—
which is where meetings of the Council of Ministers of the EEC were
held during Italy’s presidency in the 1980s. The foundation treaty of
the EEC was signed in Rome in 1957, but the enterprise of integration
had begun elsewhere and would continue elsewhere. The treaties and
agreements that defined the European Union were signed and dated
in Maastricht, Lisbon, Amsterdam, Nice, and Schengen, and the
Union’s leading institutions—Council, Commission, Court of Justice,
and Parliament—remained scattered between Brussels, Luxembourg,
and Strasbourg. Each of these was a capital city—either national or
provincial—but none had a significance even remotely comparable to
that of Rome in the history, legend, religion, art, and literature that
made up the patrimony of the Western imagination, and none was in
any way as essential as Rome to the general understanding of what
Europe, and being European, were all about.
Rome’s diminished profile is most readily explained in terms of
determination, on the part of Europe’s post-war elites, to reinvent
Europe by orphaning it from its own past—and therefore from a city
that had been implicated above all others in so much of that past that
was dark and terrible. The recent and still vividly remembered trauma
of Italian Fascism had done nothing to dispel the idea, always strong in
Protestant and agnostic Europe, that a reek of cæsaro-papal despotism
haunted Rome like a malediction, ineluctably pervading and poison-
ing institutions of authority and government. Many of the post-war
generation of European leaders had been cruelly scarred by Fascist–
Nazi tyranny. Monnet’s Action Committee included three Germans
who had been driven into exile, and Altiero Spinelli, chief architect of
the project of European Union in the 1970s and 1980s, had spent years
in a Fascist prison.Yet it could equally plausibly be argued that the sac-
rifice of Rome was in the nature of a change in perceptions of the city,
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pr e face vii
and attitudes towards it, that were part of an ongoing crisis of modern-
ity; and that the decision to rebuild Europe without Rome at its centre
was therefore not so much a decision that made history, as a decision
that history had made.
This book investigates the origins and nature of those long-term
changes. It is therefore what the Victorian historian James Anthony
Froude would have called a short study of a great subject—for the sub-
ject is indeed great: how, why, and with what consequences the Western
world moved from cherishing Rome as the keystone of modern think-
ing and feeling, to ignoring it as peripheral, and even detrimental, to
the revival and redemption of Europe. It argues, controversially per-
haps, that the charisma and kudos of Rome in modern times had been
less a destructive than a constructive influence, and that the tribula-
tions of Europe and the West began rather than ended with the loss of
this emblematic and fabled city. If this interpretation is sound, then it
follows that the failure of the new Europe to generate any perceptible
sense of supranational loyalty or patriotism is in some measure a pen-
alty incurred for the replacement of Rome, and the common heritage
of identity and purpose that it shaped and nurtured, by aspirations
altogether less appealing to the imagination. Never was the time riper,
perhaps, for Burke’s famous lament: ‘The age of chivalry is gone; that
of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded; and the glory
of Europe is extinguished for ever.’
My subject is Old Rome, the Rome of the sovereign popes, and
New Rome, the capital of the kings and presidents of Italy. These have
been much less written about than ancient, or classical, Rome but
I cannot claim to have made any momentous new discoveries, or to
deal in any other than the common currency of modern historians and
critics. What I have hoped to do is give a common habitation and a
name to a theme, a story, that has hitherto been less than fully apparent
because it has been fragmented and buried, like the ruins of ancient
Rome in the architecture of the popes, in other themes and stories.
I hope, too, that what I have put together will be useful to readers who
are not academic specialists and might appreciate some clarification of
the meaning and significance of ‘modernity’, and who wish to deepen
their understanding of what Rome now is by measuring it against
what it recently was.
Because I have had in mind an audience wider than that generally
reached by collective research, I make no apology for undertaking
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viii pr e face
single handed the sort of project that these days is more usually shared
by a team of experts; but I do thank all the more gratefully the scholars
and specialists who have tolerated and encouraged my efforts. I fear
I shall now try their patience even more sorely, for having written
about ‘the modern mind’. In justification I plead that in using the term
I have taken a necessary rather than a reckless risk. For narrative pur-
poses I needed a concept, a hypothetical common denominator, that
would suggest those ways of thinking and understanding that educated
minds were identifying as ‘modern’ from the end of the seventeenth
century. ‘The modern mind’ is both a convenient and an innocent fic-
tion. It may never have existed in any discrete and specific sense, but it
does no violence to historical truth to allow it notional reality.
First among the claimants to my thanks are Andrew Hopkins and
Gavin Stamp, who first set me thinking about Rome, modernity, and
the meaning of Europe by inviting me to contribute to their confer-
ence on ‘Lutyens Abroad’ at the British School at Rome in 1999. I am
also deeply indebted to the University of Bristol for the Senior
Research Fellowship that has enabled me to continue researching and
writing in a scholarly and supportive environment during retirement.
My obligation to the anonymous publisher’s readers who assessed the
first draft of my text is great; their perceptive and constructive sugges-
tions showed me the way to clarification and improvement. The scru-
pulous and erudite attention the text has received from the editorial
staff at Oxford University Press has been, as always, exemplary. I thank
my copy editor Chris Bessant for his sensitive and highly professional
handling of the text, and I am profoundly grateful to Di Steeds, who
brought back into operation all her considerable editorial experience
and skills when I was confined to a hospital bed. Her help as amanu-
ensis was invaluable and kept production running smoothly and on
schedule at a difficult time. For blunders and blemishes that remain,
I alone am responsible.
French, Italian, and German works are quoted from published
translations when so indicated in the notes; otherwise translation is
my own.
j. p.
Bristol, March 2017
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Contents
List of Plates xi
Publisher’s Acknowledgements xiii
Notes 139
Picture Acknowledgements 153
Index 155
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List of Plates
Publisher’s Acknowledgements
12. The Laocoön, after the removal of restoration and restitution of a frag-
ment of the original right arm.
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14. The Protestant Cemetery at Porta San Paolo, late nineteenth century.
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Prologue
Two poets and three Romes
I n 1821 Shelley wrote his elegy Adonais. The occasion was the death
of Keats; the subject was the consolation of Rome, the city where
Keats had died and is buried. ‘Go thou to Rome,’ Shelley urged the
poet’s mourners, and
From the world’s bitter wind
Seek shelter in the shadow of the tomb.
Rome was a refuge because it proclaimed that flux, fragmentation, and
mortality are illusion; that reality is enduring unity outside time:
Death is dead, not he;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The One remains, the many change and pass;
Heaven’s light forever shines, Earth’s shadows fly;
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity,
Until Death tramples it to fragments.
Shelley’s summons and numinous vision were part of a tradition. Rome
had long featured in Western thinking as the threshold of a transfigured
existence. Poets had been going there since 1341, when Petrarch trav-
elled from Avignon to be immortalized by being crowned laureate on
the Capitol, and an unending procession of painters, sculptors, archi-
tects, composers, philosophers, historians, antiquarians, connoisseurs,
and sentimental tourists had followed, lured by the poetic promise
of apotheosis. By the early seventeenth century, no education was
deemed complete that had not encompassed Rome, the central shrine
and academy of civilization, and an assurance of rebirth both historical
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mother and head of my moral world surely, and central enough even today:
balmy also, humanly habitable at all seasons, full of ancient and modern and
even recent beauties, and inhabited by a people that more than any other
resembles the civilised ancients. I could not be more at home anywhere, while
preserving my essential character of stranger and traveller.1
A sensitive ear heard always in the music of Rome the same theme in
different keys.
Livy, Ovid, and Virgil had written of Roma aeterna, and by the Middle
Ages the notion had been absorbed into folklore. This coupling of
eternity with an earthly city was blasphemous to the Christian patri-
archs, so medieval theological and liturgical texts avoided it; but in the
more secular climate of the sixteenth century, intellectual reservations
relaxed and Rome as the Eternal City became a part of Renaissance
thinking. ‘All that totters does not fall’, wrote Montaigne. ‘The fabric
of so great a body holds together by more than a single nail. There is
no place here below that heaven has endowed with such favourable
influence and such constancy.’ The axiom of humanism became a
cliché of Romanticism; the cliché of Romanticism became a dogma of
Fascism; and finally, during the last decade of Santayana’s life, even the
pope, Pius XII, was making public references to the supernal perman-
ence of Rome.3
The legend had resurfaced again and again throughout the literature
on the three Romes. In the sixteenth century the French poet Joachim
du Bellay described how Rome was always and ever more divinely
recreating itself by quarrying the fabric of its own buried past:
De jour en jour
Rome fouillant son antique séjour
Se rebâtit de tant d’œuvres divines.4
Three centuries later Anglo-Saxon visitors were claiming that since
Rome had always lived by devouring its own past, it was never more
truly itself than in these years of ruthless demolition and reconstruction.
‘The transformation of Rome during the past twenty years’, wrote the
American journalist William Stillman in 1898,
is unique in the history of civilisation . . . But Rome survives it, as it has sur-
vived the wrecking of the Goths, the Vandals, the Constable de Bourbon . . .
Details disappear, but the eternal city looms above them . . . and will do so when
the present system is in ruins and ivy grows over the new quarter . . . Rome
will again be what it has always been from its republican days, even though
the new republic comes and the papacy departs, a centre of attraction to
a spiritual, cosmopolitan population. He owns it who feels its spiritual
(not ecclesiastical) attraction. To him there is no city on earth which can
content him after it. He may live in New York, or London,Venice or Naples,
but will always be more or less a stranger there, and be ready to go back
to Rome.5
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The inferential changes in Rome’s estate were even more drastic than
the physical ones. At this time ‘improvement’ and ‘development’ were
affecting all the old cities of Europe, and although the degree of Rome’s
transformation was much greater than that elsewhere, in kind it was
much the same. Consequently it was more and more difficult to sustain
not only the idea of immutability, but the idea of pre-eminence too.
From figuring in global history as Caput Mundi, ‘wonder of the world’,
and ‘sovereign mistress of the imagination’, Rome was becoming just
more data in urban history: no longer incomparable, but comparable,
in the problems it faced and the solutions it adopted, to many other
famous towns with historic monuments.
This reduction was compounded by other influences. Changes
occurring not only in Rome, but in the world at large, were dragging
Rome from its pre-eminence. For as long as Europe had seen itself as
the centre of the world—first because it knew of no world beyond
itself, then because it conceived itself as exemplar and agent of civiliza-
tion—Rome had been regarded as the centre of Europe. It was ‘the
Centre of the Centre’, in Goethe’s words. ‘The entire history of the
world’, he wrote, ‘is linked up with this city;. . . here . . . all history is
encamped about us, and all history sets forth again from us.’9 Focus of
universal attention and shrine of universal pilgrimage, it was the site of
age-old rituals of veneration, emulation, commemoration, and dese-
cration. It was celebrated, revered, and reviled as only the fabulous
cities of religion and legend have been. Subsuming the world, it moved
the world to passion, submission, and rebellion. Proverbially all roads
led to Rome, and the roads from Hellas and Jerusalem led there most
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directly. The Renaissance revealed how much ancient Rome had owed
to Greece. Subsequently it also became clear how far holy Jerusalem
had been prefigured in classical paganism, and the idea of a great his-
torical hiatus became defunct. A premonition of the New Testament
was recognized in classical literature; and the temples of ancient Rome
were perceived as piles of stone providentially prepared for reconstruc-
tion as Christian churches.10 Three histories thus coalesced into one:
Greece, pagan Rome, and Christian Rome were phases of a divinely
ordered continuity and mutuality, and the site of Rome featured on
the map of what had come to be called ‘the modern era’, or ‘modernity’,
as the point of convergence and fusion of the two arterial currents
of civilization.
But from the later years of the nineteenth century this map was
rapidly becoming obsolete. Modernity was in crisis because the Western
mind was in turmoil, doubting what it had taken for granted and
knowing only that certainty was illusion. The Cartesian–Newtonian
universe, with its fixed laws and absolute values, its generic grammar
of reason, and its secular evangelists (Hegel, Marx, Comte, Spencer)
propounding magisterial master-narratives of progress, was dissolving
into a random, unpredictable universe of chance and relativity. The
generic grammar of reason was overridden by the irrational individual
subconscious, and the grand master-narratives were condemned as
fictions serving a will to power.The heliocentric heavenly cosmos and
the Romano-centric terrestrial order had been constructed together,
and now together they were falling apart.
There was no sudden and complete transition. During half a century
the two world-views jostled for predominance, and there were times
of overlap and relapse. Fascism and Nazism were ruthless rappels à
l’ordre in the midst of modernity’s crisis. But by the early decades
of the twentieth century leading writers, academics, painters, sculp-
tors, and composers were aware of a vertiginous and irreversible
acceleration of intellectual change, and urgently looking for ways
to express it in literature, music, and art. In 1919 Yeats wrote his
apocalyptic poem ‘The Second Coming’, with its often-quoted
opening lines:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world . . .
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Five years later Virginia Woolf, in her essay ‘Mr Bennett and Mrs
Brown’, described how inherited literary conventions had become
unusable, and how serious writers were now so intent on discarding
the lumber and contriving something new that they were forgetting
their literary manners. ‘We hear all round us,’ she wrote, ‘in poems and
novels and biographies, the sound of breaking and falling, crashing and
destruction . . . the feeble are tempted to outrage, and the strong are
tempted to destroy the very foundations of literary society.’11 This
‘season of failures and fragments’, of ‘grammar violated’ and ‘syntax
disintegrated’, has been labelled ‘modernism’ by Anglo-American and
French literary critics, art historians, and musicologists. Marcel Proust,
for example, wrote of ‘ces manifestations modernistes de la littérature
et de l’art’.12 The terms were well chosen, in that they signified con-
tinuity as well as change. Modernism was dissent rather than heresy; it
was always referencing the modern grammar and syntax it resisted. But
the term ‘postmodern’, which came into vogue after the Second World
War, allowed for no such links and derivations. Postmodernity was—or
proclaimed itself to be—an uncompromising declaration of heresy and
hiatus. The postmoderns were university intellectuals and public sages
who diagnosed their mood of anger, insecurity, and iconoclasm as a
rejection and invalidation of all things modern and modernist—not
just art and literature, but the fundamentals of language, thought, and
morality as well.
When Santayana died, in 1952, Old Rome no longer existed and
much of Europe was rubble and ashes. Modernity, endlessly and fretfully
unstable, had cherished Old Rome in order to destroy it. But in the
postmodern view Old Rome was not a victim, it was a culprit. It had
been the centre of the modern world, and it had been modernity’s
accomplice and example in its cosmic intellectual enterprise—an
enterprise that postmoderns incriminated as the author of Europe’s
catastrophe. The Romano-centric world, with its mantras of reason,
progress, and syntax, with its absolute values and its universal truths,
had, they argued, provided an endorsement for intolerance and a
template for tyranny.
Then, towards the end of the twentieth century, their verdict was in
its turn being challenged, and a reversal of roles and reputations was
bringing the story of Old Rome full circle. The accusers were now
themselves accused—of deluding themselves that they had escaped
from modernity, of falsifying history, of conducting an intolerant,
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1
Paradise, Grave, City, Wilderness
14 pa r a dise, gr av e, ci t y, w i lde r n e ss
Page 108
Page 113
Chapter V
Some Aboriginal Tribes in Kweichow
Kweichow is
supposed to be the
original home of the
Miao stock. The
mountainous
character of the
province with its
rugged fastnesses
and deep valleys is
admirably suited to
be the refuge for the
many tribes who
have continually
been driven back
throughout the
centuries by their
enemies, the
Chinese. Many have
taken refuge in the
neighbouring
province of Yünnan
and even in French
territory south of the
MIAO WOMAN. Red River. The
hostility of the
Chinese to them is
due to three causes, as far as I can gather: (i) to the low morality of
the tribes, (ii) to their illiteracy, and (iii) to their dissimilarity of
character to the Chinese. The first two points are very vital to the
Chinese: they are at the root of all their civilization, for no ancient
race has laid greater stress on the necessity of morality and learning.
Their contempt for the Miao is unbounded and out of all proportion.
Our interpreter was astonished to find how different they were from
all that he had ever heard, and decided that he must enlighten
Peking on the subject when he returned home!
The character of the people is in striking contrast to that of the
Chinese. They are warlike, frank, lawless, primitive, open-hearted,
opposed to trading and city life: some are great riders, but we never
saw one on horseback. This was due to their poverty, and we heard
of no rich ones: no doubt the headmen have a certain relative
wealth. In the north of Yünnan we heard of their having curious
horse-races, when the course would be strewn with feathers. The
men wore capes, which gave them a weird look of being birds of
prey, as they swept along the course with outstretched arms in
clouds of dust and feathers. It is like the Caucas Race in Alice in
Wonderland: nobody wins.
The Miao are all agriculturists. They cultivate everything they
require for food and clothing except salt, which is a Chinese
Government monopoly: they only enjoy this luxury about twice a
year, we were told at Ta-ting.
In self-defence they live in villages, many of which are almost
inaccessible to the outside world and are only penetrated by
missionaries. One of our friends describes her descent from one
such village, with a man on each side holding her on to the saddle,
while a third held on to the pony’s tail to prevent him going down
headlong! The Miao huts are small and dark, and their love of colour
is entirely confined to personal adornment. Red, white and blue are
the dominant colours in their dress, and the material is hempen, the
hemp for which is grown, spun, woven and dyed by themselves. The
dyes are vegetable, and are of vivid colour. The different tribes have
various designs, but, roughly speaking, all the women wear short full
kilts and jackets.
The Ta Wha Miao (Great Flowery Tribe) are the gayest in colour
that we saw: their designs are bold and effective, the colours used
are scarlet and dark blue on a whitish ground, and very exact in line.
The design consists of simple geometrical outlines, but these are
often filled in with colour, and use is made of a roughly-stencilled
pattern which is tacked on the material and worked over in coarse
thread. I succeeded in purchasing a partly-worked piece of
embroidery from one of the men of this tribe, his wife being away
from home, though he evinced some anxiety as to what she would
say on finding out that he had done so when she returned. The
women seem very strong and independent, do most of the work in
the fields, and I can fancy she might have a heavy hand! Also they
are thoroughly feminine in their love of clothes. Many of them make
quite an elaborate wardrobe, and when a girl is going to a festival of
any sort she will take as much as forty pounds weight of clothes,
which her young swain will carry for her, so as to have a variety of
costume! One kilt I possess weighs nearly four pounds, and some
kilts will have as many as thirty-one breadths of material in them.
They swing their kilts with all the jauntiness of a Harry Lauder.
Although the men are only about five feet in height and the women
about half an inch less and very sturdy, their erect carriage lends
them a certain attractive dignity. The women cling tenaciously to their
national dress, but not infrequently the men discard their loose-
flowing clothes for Chinese trousers, and many of them speak the
local Chinese dialects.
Formerly these people had no distinctive names and kept no count
of their age. Probably it is due to Western influence that they now
have adopted them. Sometimes the Chinese would take the women
as wives and settle down among them, but no Miao was allowed to
marry a Chinese wife. One of them told this to my interpreter.
As a rule they wear nothing on their feet; but some of those who
could afford it wear sandals, and the wealthier Miao (if so they can
be called) had prettily embroidered ones for special occasions, with
an embroidered band along the outer side of the foot, and fastened
across the instep with a scarlet thread. The Miaos of both sexes
wear stout puttees wound round and round their legs till they look
like pillars; or a piece of felt tied with a white band. They are
generally dyed a dark blue colour. Sometimes the girls’ unprotected
feet get the skin cracked or cut with the stones on their rough
mountain paths. They think nothing of sewing them up with needle
and thread, as if they were stockings.
The style of hairdressing among the Great Flowery Miao is quite
different from those of other Miao tribes. Their coarse black hair is
very abundant; as long as they are unmarried girls they wear it in two
plaits, hanging from close behind the ears to well below the waist.
When a girl marries she coils her hair into a long horn, which stands
out just above, and in a line with the shoulder. When she becomes a
proud mother her horn is exalted into a lofty pyramid, rising straight
upwards from the crown of her head.
The men wear the same kind of embroideries as the women,
placed like a shawl across their shoulders, and a sort of long
hempen garment falling below the knees and girded in at the waist.
Their upper garment has loose sleeves, looped up about the elbow
with ornamental braid, which they make on primitive little looms.
Round their heads they wind cloth turbanwise, or else wear nothing.
They live on the simplest diet, nothing but flour cooked before
grinding, which they mix with water into a kind of porridge and eat
twice a day: this, with some vegetables or herbs, is their staple food.
They are addicted to drinking and fed no shame in it; both sexes
have drinking bouts. No Chinese woman is ever seen drunk, and it is
a most unusual vice among them: but if she should be drunk, she
would be far too proud to be seen out of doors in such a condition.
Morally the Ta Wha Miao seem to be at the bottom of the scale, and
the Heh (black) Miao at the top.
Considering their extreme poverty we were much touched by
these people asking Mr. Slichter to express to us their regret at not
being able, on that account, to offer us hospitality. This was in reply
to a message he had given them from us, expressing our pleasure at
being with them and regret at not being able to visit their various
villages, or talk to them in their own language.
Little Flowery Miao Coat.
Page 120