Process Isolation Standard

ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002
PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

INTRUSIVE MAINTENANCE
REVISION CONTROL SHEET

Revision Date Issued Comments
(YYYY/MM/DD)
0 2015-08-25 Issued for Implementation
Re-Issued for Implementation

General update to align with new Corporate Isolation Standard;
Updated Section 1.0 Introduction, 2.0 Definitions; 2.6 Blinding, 2.7
1 2017-04-18 Zero Energy, 2.9 Use of Specialty Valves, 3.4 Vessels, Section 2.8
Pressure Safety PSV’s, Section 3.9 Shutdown Valves, 3.10 Blowdown
Valves and Section 3.14 Closed Drain Systems. Added Section 2.2
Reference Documents
Document simplified for determination of isolation requirements of

operating equipment and pipelines only. References to design
requirements removed.
2 2018-08-02
Document replaces and supersedes ALL-HSE-PRC-181 – Positive
Isolation.
Incorporating review comments
Extensive review with Corporate Engineering, Montney and Surmont

Operations and Operations Engineering groups. Revision includes
updates to clarify intent and simplify requirements to remove potential
3 2019-10-18
for misinterpretation. This standard has been reviewed and confirmed
to comply with the Corporate Isolation Standard. Document replaces
and supersedes WCBU-ENG-STD-683 – Process Isolation Standard
0 2019-11-25 New document template and updated number.
Revision Number: 0 This document contains proprietary information belonging to ConocoPhillips Canada and must not be Page
Date: 2019-11-25 wholly or partially reproduced nor disclosed without written prior permission from ConocoPhillips Canada. 2 of 24
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 GENERAL ........................................................................................................................................... 4

1.1 Scope .................................................................................................................................................. 4
1.2 Definition of Terms............................................................................................................................... 5
1.3 Acronyms & Synonyms ........................................................................................................................ 8
1.4 Reference Publications ........................................................................................................................ 9
2.0 GENERAL EQUIPMENT ISOLATION PHILOSOPHY ....................................................................... 10
2.1 General.............................................................................................................................................. 10
2.2 Blinding.............................................................................................................................................. 10
2.3 Long Duration Work ........................................................................................................................... 11
2.4 Open Ended Pipework Policy ............................................................................................................ 11
2.5 Zero Energy ....................................................................................................................................... 12
2.6 Use of Specialty Valves ..................................................................................................................... 12
2.7 Pressure Safety Valves (PSVs) ......................................................................................................... 13
2.8 Other Utility Headers ......................................................................................................................... 13
2.9 Instrumentation .................................................................................................................................. 13
3.0 ISOLATION METHODS AND SCHEMES .......................................................................................... 13
3.1 Control of Isolations ........................................................................................................................... 13
3.2 Standard Isolation Methods and Schemes ......................................................................................... 14
3.3 Selection of Isolation Method and Scheme ........................................................................................ 15
3.4 Minimum Process Isolation Requirements ......................................................................................... 15
3.5 Variation Risk Assessment (VRA) ...................................................................................................... 16
APPENDIX 1: SHORT DURATION ISOLATION SUMMARY TABLE ............................................................. 18
APPENDIX 2: COMMODITY CATEGORIZATION LIST .................................................................................. 21
APPENDIX 3: ALBERTA OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY (OH&S) ISOLATION REQUIREMENTS . 23
APPENDIX 4: PROCESS ISOLATION VARIATION RISK ASSESSMENT (VRA) FORM [ALL-A0A-00-ENG-
NFR-0001] ................................................................................................................................ 24
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

1.0 GENERAL
1.1 Scope
1.1.1 This Canada Engineering Standards and Specification (CESS) only details the minimum requirements
to ensure that the proper physical barrier is selected based on the associated process risk. It is clearly
understood that there are additional requirements that shall be followed to ensure that any isolation to
contain a harmful substance and the work behind that isolation is safe and that all steps have been
taken to mitigate the risks associated with a specific isolation & its hazardous energy. These include
items such as engineering and administrative controls, competency of personnel, training, proper
personal protective equipment, physical walk down of the isolation, confirmation of zero energy, etc.
and would be part of the LOTO procedure and associated isolation certificate.
It is intended for use on all ConocoPhillips Canada (CPC) One Canada Capital Projects or Operations
related projects.
The overriding philosophy with respect to isolation is the ability to mechanically isolate and de-isolate
facilities safely to allow access for routine maintenance, repairs, inspection and general operations, as
required to cost effectively maintain the assets for safe and efficient operation. The Process Isolation
standard was developed in line with the Corporate Process Isolation Standard GESG-FAC-ES-002
and provincial jurisdictions.
The purpose of this document is to provide Operations with the tools and methodology to evaluate
and determine minimum isolation requirements for intrusive work. This BU procedure details pre-
approved isolation schemes based on engineering assessment of plant commodities, pressures and
line sizes.
This document is to be used for the process (solids, liquids and gases) isolation of piping, equipment
and instrumentation, including requirements for own trade isolation or isolation schemes used for
exclusive control.
Alberta and British Columbia OH&S state a requirement for ‘harmful substances under pressure’ to be
isolated via blanking / blinding or double block & bleed. If the required isolation cannot be met, an
employer must ensure that an alternate means of isolation that provides adequate protection to
workers certified as appropriate and safe by a Professional Engineer.
1.1.2 This CESS applies to for all sites, facilities or assets where ConocoPhillips Canada holds the principal
operational control and/or responsibility, including but not limited to Production and Pipeline
Operations, Facility Operations and Projects.
It is applicable for any systems downstream of the wellbore posing a hazard to personnel or to the
environment through the conduct of work involving opening of Process Containment.
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

1.1.3 The following is out-of-scope:
• The installation of or the de-installation of a subsurface primary pressure control barrier, e.g. the
production tree or other equipment with direct communication to the reservoir or the production
tubing.
• The installation of or the de-installation of any drilling or well intervention equipment which
provides means for well control, e.g. blow out preventer.
• Well control during drilling, completions, well workovers, or well intervention work. The Wells
Management Standard and the Well Control Manual, in addition to other Global Wells Standards,
Procedures and Practices, are to be referenced for the listed out-of-scope and other drilling or well
intervention works.
• Electrical or mechanical isolations such as positive isolation of physical stops between moving
parts or disconnection of mechanical couplings and drive shafts. Further information is contained
within CPC-ALL-HSE-PRC-167.
• The use of any specialised non-valve isolation techniques (e.g. stopples, pipeline plugs, crimping,
freezing, etc.) requires an engineering assessment to confirm the suitability of the proposed
isolation technique
1.1.4 This CESS shall be used in conjunction with applicable codes, regulations, and ordinances, as noted
below. Whenever a difference exists between this specification and the referenced codes and
specifications, the most stringent requirements shall govern.
1.1.5 Any deviation from this CESS requires a specification deviation request to be completed and
approved per the CPC Governance Standard for C-CPMS & Canada ESS Documents: ALL-A0A-00-
000-GST-0001.
1.2 Definition of Terms
ALARP ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ – A term used in the management

of risk. A point at which the cost involved in reducing the risk further is
‘grossly disproportionate’ to the benefit gained.
Blinding A physical isolation means which provide the complete isolation of

pressurized process fluid, e.g., spectacle blind, blind flange/hub, skillet,
spade, screw-threaded plug, etc.
Blind Flange A flange used to seal off and isolate the open end of a flanged pipe or
flanged fitting. It is rated to the design pressure of the piping system or
equipment being isolated.
Break of Containment The opening of a normally enclosed system housing any contained
material.
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Decommissioning Work Removal from operation. Work involving permanent isolations.
De-Isolation Removal of installed Process Isolations.
Double Block & Bleed A double block and bleed system provides a valved barrier by closing
system (DBB) two independent block valves in series and using a bleed point in
between to prove isolation point integrity.
Double Block & Bleed “Single valve with two seating surfaces that, in the closed position,
Valve (DBBV) provides a seal against pressure from both ends of the valve with a
means of venting/bleeding the cavity between the seating surfaces.
Note: This valve does not provide positive double isolation when only
one side is under pressure.”
Double Isolation & Bleed “Single valve with two seating surfaces, each of which, in the closed
Valve (DIB) position, provides a seal against pressure from a single source, with a
means of venting/bleeding the cavity between the seating surfaces.
Note: This feature can be provided in one direction or in both
directions.”
Expansible Fluid (i) a vapour or gaseous fluid, or

(ii) (ii) a liquid under pressure and at a temperature at which the
liquid changes to a gas or vapour when the pressure is reduced to
atmospheric pressure or when the temperature is increased to
ambient temperature
Flash Point The lowest temperature at which vapours above a volatile combustible
substance ignite in air when exposed to flame
Harmful Substance (from “Harmful Substance” means a substance that, because of its
OH&S Code – 2009) properties, application or presence, creates or could create a danger,
including a chemical or biological hazard, to the health and safety of a
worker exposed to it.
Intrusive Work Any activity breaking the pressure containment envelope of piping or
equipment. Some examples: separation of flanges, cutting into
isolated pipe, and opening equipment without valves”.
Note: This is non inclusive of isolation scheme (i.e. Vents, Drains)
Isolation Method A method of implementing a Process Isolation which includes Positive

Isolation/Blinding, Proven Isolation and Non-Proven Isolation.
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

Long / Short Duration Long Duration Work

Work
Period where the duration which the Process Isolation needs to be in
effect is greater than one shift, is not defined, permanent or where the
work is not progressed continuously. (i.e. where the conditions for
‘short duration’ cannot be met) once the intrusive work has
commenced.
Short Duration Work
Period where work activity does not extend beyond a one operating
shift plus overtime, or where the work is progressed continually to
completion and the worksite is not left unattended. once the intrusive
work has commenced.
Long Term Isolation Long Term Isolation, is an isolation which will require to be in place for
longer than 3 months (90 days).
Non-Proven Isolation A valved isolation with no provision to confirm the effectiveness of

valve closure prior to breaking into system.
A physical isolation where the effectiveness of the chosen Pressure
Barrier(s) is/are not verified.
Open Ended Pipe Piping or equipment that is connected to process and is isolated by
valved isolation only.
Permit to Work (PTW) A formal written system used to control certain types of work which are
hazardous.
Positive Isolation/Blinding A physical isolation means which provides the complete isolation of
pressurized process fluid, e.g. spectacle blind, blind flange/hub, skillet,
spade, screw-threaded plug, or removal of a spool, etc.
Pressure Barrier Physical means of separating higher pressure and lower pressure
systems, i.e. valve, plug or similar means.
Primary Barrier Pressure Barrier(s) acting as the first means of protection from the
Hazardous Substance/Hazardous Energy.
Process Containment The physical boundary which prevents any form of process fluid or
production additives (oil, gas, steam, water, glycol, etc.) from affecting
its surroundings.
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Process Isolation Process isolation refers to the isolation/separation of various process

substances (solids, liquids and gases) from piping and equipment to
allow intrusive work, confined space entry and various other works.
A means of preventing the flow of process fluid from one location to
another, implemented by Isolation Methods and Isolation Schemes.
Note: This is in contrast with mechanical isolation which is the
prevention of movement between equipment parts in the work area.
Mechanical isolation typically, for example, requires the disconnection
of mechanical couplings and drive shafts or the fitting of physical stops
between moving parts to prevent inadvertent movement.
Proven Isolation A valved isolation where the effectiveness of the isolation can be
confirmed via vent/bleed points before breaking into system.
A physical isolation by valves, plugs or other barrier(s) with verification
that the barriers are functioning appropriately.
Reinstatement The process of returning an isolated system back to service.
Routine Maintenance Routine maintenance is classed as planned work (normally

preventative maintenance) that is completed repetitively on the same
device or equipment on an agreed frequency.
Secondary Barrier Pressure Barrier(s) acting as the second means of protection from the
Hazardous Substance/Hazardous Energy.
Single Block & Bleed An isolation method consisting of a single block valve with a bleed
(SBB) valve on the work side to prove isolation point integrity.
Variation Risk Assessment A situation where circumstances require the use of an isolation of a
(VRA) standard lower than the baseline isolation standard (as identified in
Appendix 13 of this document). Use of a variation is acceptable only
when it is supported by an engineering approved situation-specific risk
assessment. Variations must be appropriately authorised and fully
recorded (by use of the VRA Form found in Appendix 4).
1.3 Acronyms & Synonyms

• HSE Health Safety & Environment
• P&ID Piping & Instrumentation Diagram
• PPE Personal Protective Equipment
• Spade = Paddle Blind = Slip Blind = Slip Plate = Blind Skillet = Blank
• Spacer = Paddle Spacer
• Bleed Ring = Drip Ring = Vent Ring
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1.4 Reference Publications

References to be used in conjunction with this document are the dated or latest revisions of the
following:
DOCUMENT NO. TITLE

Corporate
GESG-FAC-ES-002 Process Isolation Standard
ConocoPhillips Canada Standards & Procedures
ALL-A0A-GE-00-HST-0005 Emergency Isolation Valves
ALL-A0A-GE-00-LST-0004 Utility Station Details drawing
ALL-A0A-GE-00-HST-0002 Piping for Pressure Relieving Systems
First Break of Hazardous/Sour lines and Respiratory Protection
SUR-A0A-00-HSE-HPR-0001
Procedure
Bypassing Safety Shutdown Devices and Safety Critical
ALL-A0A-GE-OPM-OPR-0013
Equipment
ALL-A0A-GE-OPM-OPR-0003 Integrated Safe System of Work
ALL-HSE-PRC-179 Lockout / Tagout
ALL-A0A-GE-OPM-OPR-0006 Surmont Lockout and Tagout Procedure
ALL-HSE-PRC-165 ConocoPhillips Canada Confined Space Entry Document
ALL-A0A-GE-00-LST-0010 Piping Materials
ALL-A0A-GE-00-IST-0012 Instrumentation Design
Other
UK Health and Safety Executive – The Safe Isolation of Plant &
HSG253
Equipment - 2006
Occupational Health & Safety Code AR 87/2009 – Part 15
Alberta
Managing the Control of Hazardous Energy
WorkSafe BC OHS Regulation Part 10 De-Energization and Lockout
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2.0 GENERAL EQUIPMENT ISOLATION PHILOSOPHY
2.1 General
Where isolation is required, the type of isolation is defined in the Isolation Summary table shown in
Appendix 1. These isolations have been authorized for use by the ConocoPhillips Facility Engineering
Management for the specific criteria indicated. Any new commodities or criteria ranges not referenced
within this table shall be brought to the attention of Facility Engineering for evaluation.
Isolation should not compromise the ability to safely de-pressure sections of the plant in an
emergency.
During maintenance work, it shall be possible to isolate equipment with the appropriate isolation type,
or sections of equipment, to ensure a safe working environment for personnel. If a safe working
environment cannot be achieved, then work cannot proceed.
The location of any isolation shall take into consideration maintenance and inspection requirements,
extent of shutdown, the hazardous nature of the contained fluids, and temperature and pressure
rating of the piping system. Risk analysis should be used where appropriate to support the isolation
philosophy. When considering base isolation requirements normal operating pressure is considered
not system design pressure.
The isolation device shall provide the means to safely reinstate the equipment or system following a
successful maintenance or inspection/testing and repair operation.
This standard represents the minimum isolation requirements to work safely. Where practicable the
best isolation possible shall be used. (i.e. in the event of a PSV removal for bench testing that is
planned to be returned in the same day the open end should be blanked for the duration that the PSV
is absent).
2.2 Blinding
Positive isolation (by the addition of a blind / spade) is required regardless of fluid type or system
pressure in the following circumstances:
• All confined space entry with the following exceptions:

o Entering Fired Heaters on the combustion side for internal inspections and refractory repairs
will require blinding of the fuel gas system, but not the water / steam side.
o Sump Entry will require individual assessment of feed / discharge lines to determine blinding
requirements on a case by case basis
Pressure rated blinds shall always be used and torqued to the required specification.
When installing blinds / blanks, follow first break procedure and ensure a proving point is available for
deblinding. Where vents or drains are not available this may be achieved by utilising vented blanks /
blinds or bleed rings.
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Valved isolation as detailed in Appendix 1, (i.e. single proven or double block and bleed), is required
and is considered to be adequate isolation for the duration of installation of positive isolation (blinds).
2.3 Long Duration Work

The isolation requirements detailed in Appendix 1 are minimum isolation requirements for ‘short
duration’ work.
For ‘long duration’ work there are two separate risks to consider:
• Worker risk exposure

• Potential for leak from unattended isolations
For equipment or system outages which require intrusive maintenance for ‘long duration work’ a
positive isolation boundary will be required.
Maintenance blanks will be fitted by maintenance department for open ends created by equipment
removals which take greater than 12 hours.
For irreversible work, i.e. line cutting which will leave the process open for greater than 12 hours
without the ability to affix maintenance blanks to open ends, blinds should be fitted prior to work
commencing, or work progressed continuously until system can be ‘closed up.’ Blinds will not be
required for work which proceeds over 12 hours, i.e. permit is re-issued the next day and the work
location does not leave open ended pipework.
If the tube bundle(s) on exchangers are to be removed for multiple days, a cover plate or process
blinds are to be utilized on all process flows. This practice is in alignment with the corporate isolation
standard requirements.
If it is known at the planning stage that intrusive work will take greater than 12 hours, this work should
be planned to be completed behind positive isolation (blinds). In the event of changes of scope once
the work has started, the work needs to be stopped and the work and the required isolations need to
be reassessed.
In the event that the required isolation standard can be met, but the existing valve(s) are passing, then
a VRA is required or the isolation envelope is required to be extended before the work can proceed.
(For further details of VRA requirements please see Section 4.5)
2.4 Open Ended Pipework Policy

No open ends should be left unattended on process piping with only valved isolation.
a) Pressure containing cover plates must be fitted to pump bowls where removable cartridges or pull
out elements have been removed and will be left unattended at the end of the day.
b) Suitably rated blank flanges or slip plates are to be fitted to plant / equipment open ends which
may otherwise be left open to atmosphere and unattended beyond the end of the working day.
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

c) Open ends within boundary blinds are acceptable (i.e. train shutdown - if within a process train
with boundary isolation blinds, individual equipment may be left open ended).
d) Open ends are permitted for fluids that are both non-flammable and non-toxic such as Water,
Steam, and Pneumatic Air System within CPF boundaries only. For these three listed
commodities blinding should be achieved where possible, however, when blinding is difficult to
accommodate such as welded systems with RTJ flanges or large bore (8+ inch) piping no VRA is
required.
e) Bleed locations will not be considered as ‘open ended pipework’ and will remain in the secured
open position for the duration of the isolation with the following exceptions:
i. If proven isolation is required to fit a blind, once the blind is fitted, the bleed should be
closed. Note: Well Pad Well Workover work, bleeds will be left open, even though line is
blinded due to segregation of heat tracing circuits.
ii. Bleed locations which could lead to escalation from an unattended open bleed (flammable
hydrocarbons / H2S) should not be left unattended in the open position (i.e. fuel gas).
iii. For fuel gas systems installation of plugs on locked open bleed valves is not acceptable.
2.5 Zero Energy

When isolating equipment, both maintenance and operations staff shall verify that there is no pressure
(zero energy) in the isolated piping or equipment. This practice applies to both the maintenance and
construction activities that impact ConocoPhillips Canada assets. New system designs should include
adequate drains and vents to facilitate verification of zero energy.
2.6 Use of Specialty Valves

Actuated valves that are fail closed may be used for isolation provided they are of a tight shutoff
(Class 4 or better) for the fluid and conditions being isolated. To be used within an isolation, actuated
valves shall be driven to their fail-safe position and isolated from their source. Check valves and relief
valves are not suitable for isolation and therefore are prohibited. However, as applicable consideration
to be given to pressure that can be ‘trapped’ on the downstream side of check valves.
If a single bodied integral dual isolation valve is to be used for double block and bleed system to
protect personnel from harmful substance/hazardous energy then it must be a double isolation and
bleed (DIB) valve designed with bidirectional seats for bi-directional service certified to API 6D H12
testing requirements.
For future designs, butterfly, pinch, check and choke valves are not an acceptable isolation approach
unless the deviation to this standard is approved by an authorized CPC representative.
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

2.7 Pressure Safety Valves (PSVs)

If a PSV discharges to atmosphere no downstream isolation is required provide there are no other
PSV routed to the same discharge piping. If the PSV discharge is manifolded with other PSV’s and is
open to atmosphere, then a single isolation valve is required. This single isolation also applies to other
pressure relief devices.
All spared PSVs require provision for upstream and downstream isolation. PSVs that discharge to a
flare require single isolation and a bleed.
Blinding is not required for a PSV if it is immediately swapped with a spare PSV.
2.8 Other Utility Headers

Isolation shall be provided in accordance with this standard to isolate individual off-takes from utility
headers.
2.9 Instrumentation
In general, maintenance work around instrumentation would be considered short duration Own Trade
Isolations or Exclusive Control and as such shall follow isolation requirements in accordance with the
appropriate Isolation Summary table in Appendix 1. For example, this includes pressure taps for
services such as pressure gauges and transmitters.
For situations where double block and bleed is required the following sequenced isolation will be
considered to comply with this requirement:
1. Isolate root valve
2. Bleed at calibration port
3. Isolate at instrument block to provide double isolation
3.0 ISOLATION METHODS AND SCHEMES
3.1 Control of Isolations

Isolation of process plant and equipment for maintenance will be completed utilizing the Facility LOTO
and Permit to Work Process.
As needed a written plan may be generated that addresses the installation and the de-installation of
the process isolation, identifies all isolation points, and addresses interfaces and communication. The
plan must be reviewed and understood by all parties.
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3.2 Standard Isolation Methods and Schemes

Table 1 Standard Isolation Methods and Schemes (GESG-FAC-ES-002)
Isolation
Guidance Isolation Schemes Illustration/Example
Methods
I Complete Blinding, supported by

Blinding / Separation from Proven Isolation
Positive Hazardous Fluid.
Isolation
Blinding, supported by
Non-Proven Isolation
Blinding, supported by
Non-valve Isolation
II Use of verified Double Pressure Barrier

Proven Pressure and bleed
Isolation Barriers.
Single Pressure Barrier

and bleed
Non-valve Proven Isolation
III Use of Pressure Double Pressure Barrier

Non-Proven Barrier(s) which Isolation
Isolation is/are not verified
prior to Break of
Containment Single Pressure Barrier
Isolation
Non-valve Non-Proven
Isolation
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3.3 Selection of Isolation Method and Scheme

The selection of an appropriate Isolation Method and Scheme needs to be evaluated based on
exposure risk. A standard method of evaluation is used based on reference to HSG253. Base
requirements are summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Overview of use of selection tool to select final isolation method (HSG253)
Refer to Appendix 2 for Substances (Commodities) and Appendix 1 for Pressure, Line Size and
Isolation Results contained in summary tables specific to Montney and Surmont.
3.4 Minimum Process Isolation Requirements

The following minimum Process Isolation requirements apply:
1. Proven Isolations require a physical isolation by valves, with verification that the barriers are
functioning appropriately.
2. Blinding/Positive Isolation is required for:
• Confined space entry with the following exceptions:
o Entering Fired Heaters’ on the combustion side for internal inspections and refractory
repairs will require blinding of the fuel gas system, but not the process fluid side.
o Sump Entry will require individual assessment of feed / discharge lines to determine
blinding requirements on a case by case basis.
o Heat medium coils do not require positive isolation (such as in air-preheaters or tank
heating coils).
• Wherever equipment/piping integrity is of concern appropriate blinding is required for confined
space to mitigate potential personnel exposure.
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3. No blinding is required for both services on exchanger cleaning. For example, if heads to be
removed for tube inspection/cleaning, and the water tubes are blinded it is acceptable to use
proven valved isolation on the shell glycol non-intrusive side. If equipment integrity is of concern,
for example suspected potential tube damage, blinding is required on both sides.
4. Single Pressure Barrier Isolation Schemes are only permitted for Short Duration Isolations where
potential leaks can be tolerated and managed safely.
5. The disturbing of RTJ (Ring Type Joint) flanges (900# or greater systems) will be completed
against a double block & bleed isolation as a minimum (i.e. no single proven isolations).
6. Short duration pigging operations and pig trap routine maintenance will be completed under
single proven isolations.
3.5 Variation Risk Assessment (VRA)

Where the baseline isolation standard (BU specific) cannot be achieved and it is not reasonably
practicable to extend the isolation envelope or defer until a shutdown a Variation Risk Assessment
(VRA) must be carried out. VRAs are not used to look at execution risks associated with job tasks.
The drive to use a VRA is to keep risk as low as reasonably practicable, not for convenience. If the
risk cannot be brought to ALARP then the isolation envelope must be extended or the work deferred
until equipment can be shutdown.
A VRA requires to state the following:
• The part of the isolation standard which cannot be achieved.

• Why it cannot be achieved?
• Can the work be extended until the shutdown or the isolation envelope extended?
• Explain why we don’t want to extend or defer.
• What is proposed alternative?
• What is the safety impact and details of any controls implemented to minimize risk?
All potential deviations from this standard (i.e. all VRA requests) require Engineering assessment and
Approval (Facilities Technical & A&OI Manager or Production Operations Manager) prior to
completion.
A VRA will be approved for use and will be recorded every time it is used. Repetitively used VRA’s will
be subject to periodic review with consideration given to modifying the plant to prevent the
requirement for the VRA.
Control valves shall not be used for isolation. However, a variance could be granted if all the following
points are achieved:
• If the control valve is considered in good sealing condition (to be based on the process, specifically
the class of shutoff of the valve should be evaluated against the criticality of the process).
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• Is used as a second isolation point as part of the overall isolation scheme only after approval via a
VRA.
• Approved by Engineering.
Acceptable Criteria for VRA consideration:
• Leak rates of passing block valves.
• Circumstances where expanding or achieving the isolation increases risk to workers safety more
than the deviation. This includes extending a proven isolation permitted for a short duration task
where blinding operations would pose greater hazard than completing the task.
• Authorizing non-proven isolations on atmospheric or near atmospheric systems for low hazardous
non-expansible commodities.
• Non-standard isolation such as Squeeze Off, Foam Bagging, Pipe Plugs, Inflatable Bag, Ice
Plugging, Stopples, Crimping, etc.
• A blind cannot be fitted on the system.
Hot bolting or torqueing is not considered intrusive work and does not require an isolation VRA to
proceed.
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

APPENDIX 1: SHORT DURATION ISOLATION SUMMARY TABLE
The following section contains ‘pre-approved’ minimum isolation schemes for fluids.
This represents the minimum isolation requirements to work safely. Where practicable we should
strive to achieve the best isolation possible as a best practice. (i.e. In the event of a PSV removal for
bench testing to be returned in the same day we should blank or plug the open end for the duration
that the PSV is absent)
Positive isolation is required Confined Space Entry. (All sources of energy will be blinded unless
stated as an exemption under 3.4.2.)
No open ends should be left unattended on process plant with only valved isolation. Suitably rated
blank flanges or slip plates are to be fitted to plant / equipment open ends which may otherwise be left
open to atmosphere and unattended beyond the end of the working day.
The level of isolation required is dependent on the line size which is being opened to atmosphere / the
workface exposure and not the size of the largest isolation valve being isolated as part of the isolation
envelope.
The level of isolation required is dependent upon the actual commodity contained in the pipe not the
stated commodity on the line list.
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Table 2 Surmont Isolation Table

Operating Pressure Line Size
Types Fluids Short Duration Isolation Method
(kPag) (Inch NPS)
Argon 3447 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Coagulant 1500 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Demulsifier (EB) 4300 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Filming Agent (Filming Amine) 11232 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Fire Fighting Foam 1000 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed
Flocculant 690 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
H2S Scavenger 1150 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed
Hydrated Lime/Lime Slurry 1200 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed
Hydrochloric Acid 1550 or less Less than 10 Single block and bleed with a blind*
Chemical Hypochlorite/Chlorine 690 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Magnesium Oxide (MagOx) 460 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed
Mercaptan (Gas Odourant) 1935 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Methanol 9930 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
O2 Scavenger 700 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Polymer (De-Oiling/De-Watering) 700 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Reverse Demulsifier (REB) 4300 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Scale Inhibitor 5102 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Soda Ash/Soda Ash Slurry 400 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Sodium Hydroxide (Caustic Soda) 1550 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed with a blind*
Blanket Gas 1000 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Calibration Gas (BTU Analyzer) 13790 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Diesel 350 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Diluent - SCO/Naptha 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Fuel Gas 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Flare Header 1200 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Lube Oil 8301 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed
Natural Gas 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Produced Emulsion (<100°C) 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Produced Emulsion (>100°C) 1000 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Hydrocarbon
Produced Emulsion (>100°C) 1001 - 4300 12 or less Single block and bleed with a blind*
Produced Emulsion (>100°C) 1001 - 4300 Greater than 12 Double block and bleed
Produced Emulsion (>100°C) Greater than 4301 ALL Double block and bleed
Produced Gas (Surmont) 1000 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Produced Gas (Surmont) Greater than 1000 ALL Double block and bleed
Produced Gas (Treated) 1150 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Recyle Slop Oil 1000 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Propane 2068 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Sales Oil 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Varsol 1000 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Blowdown (<100°C) 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Blowdown (>100°C) 1000 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Blowdown (>100°C) Greater than 1000 ALL Double block and bleed
Boiler Feed Water (<100°C) 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Boiler Feed Water (>100°C) 1000 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Boiler Feed Water (>100°C) 1001 - 4600 12 or less Single block and bleed with a blind*
Boiler Feed Water (>100°C) 1001 - 4600 Greater than 12 Double block and bleed
Boiler Feed Water (>100°C) Greater than 4600 ALL Double block and bleed
Fire Water 1379 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Potable Water 700 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Produced Water (<100°C) 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Produced Water (>100°C) 1000 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Water & Steam
Raw Water 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Saline Water 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Sludge Slurry 1200 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Steam 1000 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Steam 1001 - 4000 6 or less Single block and bleed with a blind*
Steam 1001 - 4000 Greater than 6 Double block and bleed
Steam Greater than 4000 ALL Double block and bleed
Steam Condensate 1000 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Steam Condensate Greater than 1000 ALL Double block and bleed
Treated Water 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Utility Water 1235 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Waste Water (Sewage) 690 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Glycol 2765 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Instrument Air 1034 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Utilities
Nitrogen (N2) 1034 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Utility Air 1034 or less ALL Single block and bleed
* Double block and bleed can be used for commodities where blinding is identified for short duration work, unless it is for confined space entry. For the commodities as
identified by the asterisk, the only work that can occur behind a single proven isolation is the installation of a blind flange.
Revision Number: 0 This document contains proprietary information belonging to ConocoPhillips Canada and must not be wholly or partially reproduced nor disclosed without Page
Date: 2019-11-25 written prior permission from ConocoPhillips Canada. 19 of 24
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

Table 3 Montney Isolation Table

Operating Pressure Line Size
Types Fluids Short Duration Isolation Method
(kPag) (Inch NPS)
Acid Gas 1000 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed with a blind*
Biocide 1965 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Coagulant 1500 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Flocculant 690 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Hydrogen Peroxide 1000 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed with a blind*
Chemical Lean Amine 5653 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed
Methanol 9930 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Rich Amine 5653 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed with a blind*
Reverse Demulsifier (REB) 4300 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Sodium Hydroxide (Caustic Soda) 1550 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed with a blind*
Sodium Hypochlorite/Chlorine 690 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Diesel 350 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Fuel Gas 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Fuel Gas Greater than 9930 ALL Double block and bleed
Flare Header 1200 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Light Oil (<100°C) 4964 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Light Oil (100-200°C) 4964 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Light Oil (100-200°C) 4964 or less Greater than 2 Single block and bleed with a blind*
Light Oil (>200°C) 2400 or less ALL Double block and bleed
Lube Oil 8301 or less Less than 8 Single block and bleed
Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Hydrocarbon Process Condensate (<100°C) 4964 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Process Condensate (100-200°C) 4964 or less 2 or less Single block and bleed
Process Condensate (100-200°C) 4964 or less Greater than 2 Single block and bleed with a blind*
Process Condensate (>200°C) 2400 or less ALL Double block and bleed
Produced Gas (Montney) 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Produced Gas (Montney) Greater than 9930 2 or less Single block and bleed with a blind*
Produced Gas (Montney) Greater than 9930 Greater than 2 Double block and bleed
Propane 2068 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Well Effluent 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Well Effluent Greater than 9930 2 or less Single block and bleed with a blind*
Well Effluent Greater than 9930 Greater than 2 Double block and bleed
Deaerated Water 1965 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Fresh water (River) 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Potable Water 700 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Water & Steam
Produced Water (<100°C) 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Treated Water 9930 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Utility Water 1235 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Glycol 2765 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Heat Medium 2413 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Utilities Instrument Air 1034 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Nitrogen (N2) 1034 or less ALL Single block and bleed
Utility Air 1034 or less ALL Single block and bleed
* Double block and bleed can be used for commodities where blinding is identified for short duration work, unless it is for confined space entry. For the commodities as
identified by the asterisk, the only work that can occur behind a single proven isolation is the installation of a blind flange.
Revision Number: 0 This document contains proprietary information belonging to ConocoPhillips Canada and must not be wholly or partially reproduced nor disclosed without Page
Date: 2019-11-25 written prior permission from ConocoPhillips Canada. 20 of 24
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

APPENDIX 2: COMMODITY CATEGORIZATION LIST
Description (CHIP
ConocoPhillips Canada
Category Classifications, where Remarks
Commodity Categorization
appropriate)
1 Very Toxic (T+) Acid Gas
Toxic
H2S Scavenger
Carcinogenic
Mutagenic Mercaptan (Gas Odorant)
Toxic for reproduction Produced Gas Potential H2S concentration > 3000 PPM
Sensitizing (S1 & upstream of H2S
scavenger S2)
O2 Scavenger
Scale Inhibitor Suspected carcinogenic
2 Extremely flammable (F +) Amine
Highly Flammable
Blanket gas
Flammable gases
Flammable liquids (unless Blowdown (>100 C)
included in Category 4) Boiler Feed Water (>100 C)
Petroleum products (unless
included in category 4) Calibration Gas (BTU Analyzers)
Oxidizing Demulsifier (EB)
Explosive
Steam Diluent - SCO/Naphtha
Pressurized gases >25000 KPa Filming Agent (Filming Amine)
Flashing fluids
Flare Header Flammable and contains H2S
Asphyxiants
Fuel Gas
HP Boiler Feed Water
Methanol
Nitrogen (N2)
Natural Gas
Natural Gas Liquids (NGL)
Peroxide
Process Condensate Rated a 2 due to its low flash point
Produced Emulsion
Produced Gas
(Downstream of H2S Scavenger
S2)
Produced Oil Flammable and contains H2S
Produced Water (>100 C)
Propane
Recycle Slop Oil Potentially flammable and contains H2S
Sales Oil Rated a 2 due to its low flash point
Steam
Steam Condensate
Wax Inhibitor Toxic and flammable but stored below flash point
Well Effluent
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

Description (CHIP
ConocoPhillips Canada
Category Classifications, where Remarks
Commodity Categorization
appropriate)
3 Corrosive Blowdown (<100 C) Rated a 3 due to temperature, >60 C
Harmful Coagulant
Irritant
Flocculant
Hydrated Lime/ Lime Slurry
Hydrochloric Acid
Hypochlorite / Chlorine
Boiler Feed Water (<100 C)
Magnesium Oxide (MagOx)
Polymer (De-Oiling / De-
Watering)
Produced Water Rated a 3 due to temperature, >60 C and may
contain H2S
Reverse Demulsifier (REB)
Sludge Slurry
Soda Ash / Soda Ash Slurry
Sodium Hydroxide (Caustic
Soda)
4 Flammable liquids stored below Diesel
flashpoint and below flashpoint
Glycol Rated a 4, highly toxic but only if swallowed
following release (R10)
Hot (Thermal) Oil
Lube Oil
Varsol Rated a 4, highly toxic but only if swallowed
5 Non-classified and not stored in a De-ionized water
potentially harmful state
Fire Water
Fresh Water (River)
Instrument Air Pressurized gas
Potable Water
Raw Water
Saline Water
Source Water
Treated Water
Utility Air Pressurized gas
Utility Water
Wastewater (Sewage)
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

APPENDIX 3: ALBERTA OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY (OH&S) ISOLATION

REQUIREMENTS
ConocoPhillips Canada Process Isolation Standard meets Alberta Occupational Health & Safety
(OH&S) code revised in July 2009. Section 215.4 Isolating Piping states:
“215.4(1): To isolate piping or a pipeline containing harmful substances under pressure, an
employer may use
(a) A system of blanking or blinding, or
(b) A double block and bleed isolation system providing
(i) Two blocking seals on either side of the isolation point, and
(ii) An operable bleed‐off between the two seals.”
“215.4(2): An employer must ensure that piping that is blanked or blinded is clearly marked to
indicate that a blank or blind is installed.”
215.4(3): An employer must ensure that, if valves or similar blocking seals with a bleed‐off valve
between them are used to isolate piping, the bleed‐off valve is secured in the “OPEN” position and
the valves or similar blocking seals in the flow lines are functional and secured in the “CLOSED”
position.”
“215.4(4): An employer must ensure that the device used to secure the valves or seals described in
subsection (3) is:
(a) A positive mechanical means of keeping the valves or seals in the required position, and
(b) Strong enough and designed to withstand inadvertent opening without the use of excessive
force, unusual measures or destructive techniques.”
“215.4(5): If it is not reasonably practical to provide blanking, blinding or double block and bleed
isolation, an employer must ensure that an alternate means of isolation that provides adequate
protection to workers certified as appropriate and safe by a professional engineer, is implemented.”
This Isolation Standard is an engineering document that uses accepted practice to consider the
hazard and duration to define isolation requirements; effectively this “pre-certifies” many low hazard
isolations.
All potential isolations have been subject to review by engineering and isolations which are
considered as “appropriate and safe” are summarized in Appendix 1.
Potential isolation schemes of a lower integrity than specified in Appendix 1 will be managed by
exception through Engineering review via the VRA process.
ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

APPENDIX 4: PROCESS ISOLATION VARIATION RISK ASSESSMENT (VRA) FORM [ALL-A0A-

00-ENG-NFR-0001]
This form is to be completed when the minimum isolation requirements as detailed in ‘Process
Isolation Standard for Equipment and Piping for Intrusive Maintenance’ – ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002
cannot be met:
Associated Isolation Certificate No: IC##########
1.0 Why is a Variation being requested?
(please detail why the minimum isolation standard cannot be achieved)
Enter Text Here
2.0 Can the work be deferred until a planned shutdown or the isolation envelope extended?
(Please explain the driver for completing the work now rather than deferring to a shutdown or extending
the isolation envelope)
Enter Text Here
3.0 Duration of Isolation
(For how long will the isolation be required? How secure is the isolation? Can the required time period be
reduced?)
Enter Text Here
4.0 Potential Consequences
(What are the hazards of the substance in the pipe / vessel? Are there occupational exposure limits for the
substance? What is the pressure behind the isolation? What is the size of the pipe? What is the inventory that
could be released and how fast, in the event of an isolation failure?)
Enter Text Here
5.0 Controls implemented to minimize risk
(Please provide a summary of all actions taken to minimize risk during isolation – i.e. Do we need to minimize
the people in the vicinity of the work for the work duration? Is special PPE required? What are the means of
access and escape? Are emergency arrangements needed e.g. to evacuate / rescue people and / or protect the
environment?)
Enter Text Here
6.0 Frequency
(Is this a one-off isolation or will it be repeated? If so, how often? If not a one-off isolation, is it possible to modify
plant hardware or change plant operations to allow a standard isolation? Potential to raise an MOC to address?)
Enter Text Here
Requestor
Print Name
Approver
Print Name Signature Date

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ALL-A0A-00-000-NST-0002

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

REVISION CONTROL SHEET

0 2015-08-25 Issued for Implementation

Re-Issued for Implementation

Document simplified for determination of isolation requirements of

Extensive review with Corporate Engineering, Montney and Surmont

0 2019-11-25 New document template and updated number.

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

1.0 GENERAL ........................................................................................................................................... 4

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

1.1.3 The following is out-of-scope:

1.2 Definition of Terms

ALARP ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ – A term used in the management

Blinding A physical isolation means which provide the complete isolation of

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

Decommissioning Work Removal from operation. Work involving permanent isolations.

De-Isolation Removal of installed Process Isolations.

Expansible Fluid (i) a vapour or gaseous fluid, or

Isolation Method A method of implementing a Process Isolation which includes Positive

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

Long / Short Duration Long Duration Work

Non-Proven Isolation A valved isolation with no provision to confirm the effectiveness of

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

Process Isolation Process isolation refers to the isolation/separation of various process

Reinstatement The process of returning an isolated system back to service.

Routine Maintenance Routine maintenance is classed as planned work (normally

1.3 Acronyms & Synonyms

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

1.4 Reference Publications

DOCUMENT NO. TITLE

WorkSafe BC OHS Regulation Part 10 De-Energization and Lockout

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

2.0 GENERAL EQUIPMENT ISOLATION PHILOSOPHY

• All confined space entry with the following exceptions:

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

2.3 Long Duration Work

• Worker risk exposure

2.4 Open Ended Pipework Policy

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

2.5 Zero Energy

2.6 Use of Specialty Valves

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

2.7 Pressure Safety Valves (PSVs)

2.8 Other Utility Headers

3.0 ISOLATION METHODS AND SCHEMES

3.1 Control of Isolations

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

3.2 Standard Isolation Methods and Schemes

I Complete Blinding, supported by

II Use of verified Double Pressure Barrier

Single Pressure Barrier

Non-valve Proven Isolation

III Use of Pressure Double Pressure Barrier

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

3.3 Selection of Isolation Method and Scheme

3.4 Minimum Process Isolation Requirements

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

3.5 Variation Risk Assessment (VRA)

• The part of the isolation standard which cannot be achieved.

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR

PROCESS ISOLATION STANDARD FOR