OMV Exploration & Production GmbH

Philosophy
for
Isolation of Process Systems
Onshore

Document Number
TO-HQ-02-034-00

00 Final Issue SSS 31/5/05 JEA 31/5/05 PZ 03/6/05 MF 03/6/05

A2 Comments Incorporated AS 22/4/05 SSS 24/4/05

A1 Issued for Comment/Approval SSS 27/1/05 AS 28/105

Issue Issue or Revision Description Origin Date Chkd Date Appd Date Auth Date
Rev By By By By
 OMV Exploration & Production GmbH

Revision History
Revision Description of revision
A1 For Comment/Approval
A2 Client Comments Incorporated/ Issued for Approval
00 Final Issue

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CONTENTS

1.0 PREFACE .......................................................................................................................5

2.0 DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................................5

3.0 ABBREVIATIONS...........................................................................................................6

4.0 INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................7

5.0 APPLICABLE CODES, STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS........................................7

5.1 Codes and Standards List ........................................................................................................ 7
5.2 References ................................................................................................................................. 8

6.0 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES .................................................................................8

7.0 ISOLATION PLANNING .................................................................................................9

7.1 General ....................................................................................................................................... 9
7.2 Isolations Library..................................................................................................................... 10
7.3 Confined Space Entry ............................................................................................................. 11

8.0 ISOLATION STANDARDS ...........................................................................................11

9.0 ISOLATION METHODS AND PRACTICES .................................................................16

9.1 General ..................................................................................................................................... 16
9.2 Isolation Block Valve Selection.............................................................................................. 16
9.3 Other Isolation Devices........................................................................................................... 17
9.4 Valve Integrity Testing ............................................................................................................ 17
9.5 Bleed Valves............................................................................................................................. 18
9.6 Implementing Standard 1........................................................................................................ 20
9.7 Implementing Isolation Standard 2 ........................................................................................ 20
9.8 Implementing Isolation Standard 3 ........................................................................................ 23
9.9 De-Isolation of Plant / Equipment .......................................................................................... 23
9.10 Isolation Security..................................................................................................................... 24
9.11 Personal Mechanical Isolations ............................................................................................. 24
9.12 Specific Hazards Associated with Mechanical Machinery................................................... 25

10.0 ISOLATION RISK ASSESSMENT................................................................................25

11.0 TRAINING OF MECHANICAL ISOLATING AUTHORITIES ........................................26

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12.0 AUDITING, MONITORING AND REVIEW....................................................................27

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1.0 PREFACE

This Philosophy defines the OMV Exploration & Production GmbH corporate
policy on the design of the Isolation of Process Systems for onshore
hydrocarbon production and processing facilities. The document specifies
basic requirements and criteria, defines the appropriate codes and
standards, and assists in the standardisation of facilities’ design across all
onshore operations.

The design process needs to consider project specific factors such as the
location, production composition, production rates and pressures, the
process selected and the size of the plant. This philosophy aims to address
a wide range of the above variables, however it is recognised that not all
circumstances can be covered. In situations where project specific
considerations may justify deviation from this philosophy, a document
supporting the request for deviation shall be submitted to OMV E&P for
approval.

Reference should be made to the parent of this philosophy, document

number TO-HQ-02-001 for information on deviation procedures and
Technical Authorities, general requirements and definitions and
abbreviations not specific to this document.

2.0 DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are relevant to this document.

Blank Flange A suitably rated circular metal plate fitted to seal the
open ends of system isolations using bolts and
gaskets. Blank Flanges should clearly marked with
their size, material and rating.
Bleed Valve Used to drain liquids or vent gas from a pressurised
system
Block Valve Valve to provide tight shut-off for isolation purposes.
Confined Any place, including any chamber, tank, vat, silo, pit,
Space trench, pipe, sewer, flue, well or other similar space in
which, by virtue of its enclosed nature, there arises a
reasonably foreseeable risk.
Isolation A facility on each site where all agreed Isolation
Library Schemes and Isolation Risk Assessments are held by
the Issuing Authority.
Isolation The arrangements required to achieve the full
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Scheme Mechanical Isolation of the plant to be worked on.

Lockout Box A security device used to control the fitting and removal
of isolations using keys and padlocks.
Mechanical Is the separation of an area of plant and identified
Isolation equipment from every source of energy (mechanical
and pressure) in such a way that the separation is
secure. This may be achieved by closing valves,
inserting suitably rated Spades, or Spectacle Blinds, or
by the Physical Disconnection of a section of pipework
and the fitting of suitably rated Blank Flanges.
Permit to Work A formal written scheme used to control certain types
of work which are deemed hazardous
Physical A method of isolation whereby a complete separation
Disconnection between the energy source and the plant is achieved.
Pressure A system comprising pressure vessels of rigid
System construction, including pumps, compressors or other
equipment, any piping or pipeline and protective
devices.
Spade (Slip A suitably rated circular metal plate fitted between
Plate) flange faces using bolts and gaskets to secure a
Mechanical Isolation.
Spectacle A suitably rated combined Spade and line spacer,
Blind permanently installed between pipe flanges, and
rotated into the open or closed position as required.

3.0 ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are relevant to this document.

AA Area Authority
EIA Electrical Isolation Authority
IA Issuing Authority
MIA Mechanical Isolation Authority
RS Removable spool
SP Slip Plate

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4.0 INTRODUCTION

The scope of this document is to provide guidelines for safe isolation of

process systems applicable to onshore plant.
The philosophy also provides guidance on the application and management
of isolation standards on operating plant.
In general OMV facilities are designed with a high plant availability that will
require duty standby arrangements for key equipment. In order to reduce
dependence on planned maintenance the facilities will be designed so that
spared equipment and parallel process trains can be isolated without the
need for a full plant or system shutdown.
The principles outlined in this document shall be applied to ensure that
appropriate equipment isolation standards are selected during the design
stage to meet the overall plant maintenance and availability requirements.
The selection of the correct Isolation Scheme is fundamental to the
economic operation of the process plant as it can have a significant impact
on the percentage of time the facilities can be expected to remain in
operation.
It is recommended that this philosophy should be used in conjunction with the
OMV design philosophies listed in Section 5.2 that cover other key design
features of an overall process system.

5.0 APPLICABLE CODES, STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS

Codes, standards and regulations referred to in this philosophy shall be of the

latest edition and shall be applied in the following order of precedence: -
• Local Regulations,
• The provision of this document,
• International standards (e.g. ISO, IEC etc),
• National standards.
Design of the safety system shall comply with the standards listed within this
philosophy, however, for instances where local standards are more onerous local
standards shall apply.

5.1 Codes and Standards List

The Safe Isolation of Oil Industry Advisory Committee (OIAC)
Plant and Equipment
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5.2 References
TO-HQ-02-001 Develop Process Engineering Guidelines and
Design Philosophies Overview
TO-HQ-02-063 Philosophy for Maintenance Onshore

6.0 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Site Manager: Has overall responsibility for the implementation of this

philosophy and is responsible for:
- Ensuring the operation of this procedure is subject to monitoring and
the close out of all subsequent actions raised.
- Appointing Mechanical and Electrical Isolation Authorities after review
and approval of their individual competence.
Issuing Authority (IA): An authorised and competent person appointed by
the Site Manager responsible for:
- The overall control and administration of the Permit to Work System.
- Co-ordination of all isolation activities and maintaining the Isolation
Library.
Area Authority (AA): An authorised and competent person appointed by
the Site Manager and responsible for:
- Identifying and controlling the application and removal of all Mechanical
Isolations within their area of responsibility.
Mechanical Isolation Authority (MIA): An authorised and competent
person, typically a process operator, appointed by the Site Manager and
responsible for:
- Ensuring the correct specification, isolation, de-isolation and
documentation of Mechanical Isolations required in support of
individual Work Permits
Electrical Isolation Authority (EIA): An authorised and competent person,
typically an electrical technician, appointed by the Site Manager and
responsible for:
- Ensuring the correct specification, isolation, de-isolation and
documentation of Electrical Isolations required in support of individual
Work Permits.

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7.0 ISOLATION PLANNING

7.1 General

For new plant, Isolation Schemes based on this philosophy, as described in

Section 8, shall be developed during the design stage.
An Isolation Scheme consists of:
• Marked-up P&IDs and sketches
• Mechanical Isolation Certificate and Isolation Labels
• Isolation List
• Isolation Risk Assessment

For operational plant, OMV policy is to use approved Isolation Schemes

documented in the Isolations Library at each site wherever practicable. In the
event that the required Isolation Standards cannot be achieved, then an
alternative method of isolation must be developed and an Isolation Risk
Assessment carried out (see Section 10 - Isolation Risk Assessment).

Isolations planning should take account of the following:

ƒ If a safe method of working cannot be achieved either by compliance
with the Isolation Standards, or from the findings of the Risk
Assessment, then consideration must be given to shutting down plant,
or a complete system shut down, to enable the work to be carried out
safely.
ƒ Plant and equipment isolation requirements should be identified early in
the work planning cycle so that adequate time can be made available
for an Isolation Risk Assessment should it be necessary.
ƒ The hazards to be controlled within the Pressure System must be
clearly identified and a Risk Assessment carried out to maintain a safe
system of work. Specific hazards such as H2S, pyrophoric iron scale,
radioactivity, LSA scale, toxic and flammable substances, static
electricity etc. are to be given special consideration.
ƒ Isolations should be as close to the vessel or work site as possible to
assist with security and ease of monitoring.
ƒ The hazards of fluid migration from adjacent activities on adjoining plant
or systems shall be considered during issue of Permit to Work.
ƒ All necessary tools, equipment and materials should be available at the
work site at the start of the job.

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ƒ Operations personnel should be in attendance when flanges are broken

ƒ Where Electrical Isolation is required in addition to Mechanical Isolation,
the Area Authority must co-ordinate with the Electrical Isolation
Authority to establish an overall Isolation Scheme and ensure isolations
are put in place in the correct sequence.
ƒ All isolation activities are carried out as part of the Permit to Work
System and the site procedures for defining, implementing and
checking a safe and effective Isolation Scheme.
ƒ Consideration should be given to contingency planning in the event of
leakage or locked-in pressure between Block Valves. This should
involve breaking joints carefully, and if leakage occurs, boxing up and
reviewing the situation. Other contingency arrangements to be
considered are:
ƒ Identifying and knowing the location of local Emergency Shutdown
facilities and the location of the next upstream Block Valve etc.
Permits to Work that require Mechanical Isolations will only be issued after all
applicable Isolations have been agreed, authorised and implemented by the
Mechanical Isolation Authority responsible and confirmed by the Area
Authority. A separate Permit to Work will be required to implement Positive
Isolations.
When isolating sections of pipeline, the hazard from thermal expansion of
liquid trapped between isolation valves should be considered as this could
result in line rupture.
7.2 Isolations Library
The Isolations Library contains approved Isolation Schemes. These consist of
marked-up P&IDs and sketches, Isolation Lists (with system line
specifications), Mechanical Isolation Certificates, Isolation Risk Assessments
and any other relevant documentation.
Isolation Schemes in the Library may be used, subject to review by the Area
Authority, when the system to be isolated and the environmental / physical
parameters remain the same. A review for suitability, together with a work site
check, is mandatory to confirm these parameters before existing Isolation
Schemes are implemented.
The Library is normally located in the Permit Office and is administered by the
Issuing Authority. The Area Authority has overall responsibility for ensuring
the information is updated where changes in plant, equipment and system
configurations have been identified.

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7.3 Confined Space Entry

For any task involving entry into a vessel or Confined Space, positive isolation
must be effected on all lines going to or from that vessel or space. Spool
removal is the preferred method although Spade isolation may be used where
it is not possible to remove pipe work sections. The Mechanical Isolating
Authority must witness the insertion of Spades. Physical breaks (e.g. spool
removal) should be as close to the vessel as possible.
It may not be reasonably practicable to comply with the above requirement
when making entry into mud tanks, pump pits, ballast tanks or other utility
systems. In these cases, an Isolation Risk Assessment must be carried out
and approved by the Site Manager, or his appointed deputy, before entry is
permitted under the control of a Work Permit.
Vessel nozzles should normally be left open to assist with free ventilation. Air
movers or ducted fans may also be used to create a flow of clean air through
the vessel. If there is the likelihood of fumes, water or other contaminants
entering the vessel from sources other than the isolated pipe work, then the
need to blank off any affected nozzles must be considered. Blanks used for
this purpose do not need to be pressure-rated. However, they must be clearly
identified by a label, painted circumference or other marking. (In tanks with
‘swan-necks’, mechanical plugs may be an option to prevent ingress of fumes
etc.).

8.0 ISOLATION STANDARDS

OMV classifies Mechanical Isolations into the following three basic standards:
ISOLATION STANDARD 1 Physical Disconnection (Figure 1)
ISOLATION STANDARD 2 Double Block and Bleed (Figure 2)
ISOLATION STANDARD 3 Single Valve Isolation (Figure 3)

The required Isolation Standard will depend on the following factors:

• the nature of the task to be undertaken
• the length of time the isolations will be in place
• the type of fluid
• the pressure of the system
Table 1 shows the minimum standards to be adopted under various
conditions.

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1 When defining a suitable Isolation Scheme, the Area Authority, Issuing

Authority, Mechanical Isolating Authority, Requestor and Performing
Authority, as appropriate, refer to the Isolation Standards.
2 Where the required standard cannot be achieved (e.g. insufficient
isolation points or, the points available do not provide effective
isolation), then an Isolations Risk Assessment must be carried out to
assess a suitable alternative method.
3 When considering a Positive Isolation, consideration must be given to
the exposure duration required to implement the isolation against the
duration required to carry out the intrusive task. For example, where
an intrusive task has an expected duration of, say 30 minutes, and it
would take several hours to complete a Standard 1 Isolation, then it
may be safer to carry out the intrusive task without implementing the
Positive Isolation and utilising a Standard 2 isolation. This should form
part of the pre-job Risk Assessment as required by the Permit to Work
System.
4 Only certified Spades, Spectacle Blinds and Blank Flanges must be
used in Isolation Schemes. To ensure the correct selection, all
certified Spades, Spectacle Blinds and Blank Flanges are stamped to
identify their pressure rating and materials of construction.

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Table 1 - Application of Isolation Standards

System
Pressure < 10 Barg 10 - 55 Barg > 55 Barg
Fluid Type
Confined Space Entry Standard 1 Standard 1 Standard 1
Process Sour Standard 2 Standard 2 Standard 2
Process Sweet Standard 3 Standard 2 Standard 2
Hazardous Utilities Standard 3 Standard 2 Standard 2
Non Hazardous Utilities Standard 3 Standard 3 Standard 2

Notes:
1 These are the minimum recommended standards.
2 If the minimum recommended standard cannot be achieved, an isolation
Risk Assessment must be carried out. Under these conditions, all jobs
extending past a 12-hour duration must be treated as Standard 1 (i.e.
Positive) Isolation.
3 The above table indicates the valving required to implement Positive
Isolation.
4 Pipe work of ¾” n.b. and smaller shall be treated as for pressures less
than 10 barg.
5 The selection criteria should not disregard the need for sound technical
judgement by competent personnel.
Figure 1 - Isolation Standard 1

Positive Isolation – Scheme 1

LC LC

Live Isolated
Bleed
RS

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Positive Isolation – Scheme 2

SP

LC LC

Live Isolated
Bleed

Notes

1. Isolation Standard 1 or Positive Isolation is:

• Regarded as the most secure method of isolation
• Mandatory for work involving entry into Confined Spaces
• Required also for process and utility systems containing
flammable, toxic fluids or gas inventory where:
- isolations will be in place for more than 12 hours
- equipment is temporarily out of service
- equipment is decommissioned
2. Valve Isolations are implemented ahead of Positive Isolations
to ensure that the Isolations can be effected safely.

Figure 2 - Isolation Standard 2

Double Block and Bleed – Scheme 1

LC LC

Live Isolated
Bleed

Double Block and Bleed – Scheme 2

Single Valve Body

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Live Isolated
LC

Notes Bleed

1 Isolation Standard 2, or Double Block and Bleed, is the most

secure form of Valve Isolation if the valves can provide a reliable
seal under the particular conditions of service.
2 Emergency Shutdown Valves (or ESD valves) may be used as
part of a Double Block and Bleed but only if they can be readily
immobilised.
3 The isolation must be effected in such a way that the integrity of
each valve is proven during the isolation.
4 Single valves of a type that provide a double seal in a single
body, with a bleed between the seals and where the seats are
energised by means of a spring, are acceptable as a Double
Block and Bleed.
5 Where a Standard 2 isolation is left unattended, the integrity of
the isolation must be monitored on a regular basis to ensure
there is no pressure build-up between isolation valves.

Figure 3 - Isolation Standard 3

Single Valve – Scheme 1

LC

Live Isolated
Bleed

Notes

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1 Single valve isolation involves closing a single valve.

2 Any valve used for Single Valve Isolation must provide a reliable
seal.
3 Closing more than one valve in series can provide additional
security. This is still classified as Single Valve Isolation if no
bleed or vent is available between the valves.
4 The use of double Block Valves without a bleed, or a single
Block Valve with a downstream bleed, is not equivalent
standard to Double Block and Bleed.

9.0 ISOLATION METHODS AND PRACTICES

9.1 General
Isolation Standards can only be implemented securely by using the correct
equipment and following the correct procedures.
Correctly rated items of equipment such as valves, gaskets, blind flanges,
Spades and pressure gauges are selected by referring to P&IDs, engineering
specifications, joint tables and system inventory details.
All valves used in Isolation Schemes must have suitable immobilising or
locking devices fitted to provide Mechanical Isolation point security.
Isolation Labels must be attached to each isolation point and be cross-
referenced to a Mechanical Isolation Certificate.
The Isolation Scheme should be demonstrated to the Performing Authority and
form part of the pre-job toolbox talk to all permit users.
9.2 Isolation Block Valve Selection
Manually operated ball, plug and gate valves are the preferred valves for use
in isolations. Control valves or butterfly valves may not provide an effective
Isolation and should only be used following an Isolation Risk Assessment.
Actuated shutdown (fail closed) valves are suitable for inclusion in an Isolation
Scheme only where the instrument air supply is isolated and disconnected.
Electrically or hydraulically operated valves must have the power supply
positively isolated and any hand-jack must be manually locked. If the valve
cannot be physically immobilised, it should not be used for isolation purposes.
Single valves of a type, which provide a double seal in a single body, with a
cavity, Bleed Valve between the seals, are acceptable as a Double Block and
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Bleed. Examples of such valves are suitably specified double wedge gate,
parallel expanding gate, and double-seating ball valves where the seats are
energised by a means of a spring. (Note that double-seating ball valves where
the seats are energised by pressure are not acceptable).
9.3 Other Isolation Devices

It is recognised that other isolation devices are available for use in

circumstances where the Isolation Standards cannot be implemented or are
inappropriate. These devices include:
• Pipe Freezing
• Expandable Mechanical Plugs
• Inflatable Stopple Bags
Note: Use of these devices must be controlled through plant change control
procedures. The application must be properly engineered and an Isolation
Risk Assessment carried out as a minimum.

Where proprietary equipment is used, it must be operated strictly in

accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.

9.4 Valve Integrity Testing

In Pressure Systems that have liquid inventories only, use an open Bleed
Valve to monitor for any visual leakage in the section of piping between the
closed Block Valves to test Block Valve integrity. Valves operating as shut-
off valves should not allow any visual seepage of liquids across their seats
over a suitable monitoring period (typically 30 minutes).
Where liquid inventories have the potential to release hydrocarbons, the Bleed
Valve shall only be cracked open to check for visual seepage under direct
operator control. The operator shall be in attendance and shall monitor the
operations during the monitoring period.
In Pressure Systems containing gas, use a pressure gauge fitted to the Bleed
Valve to monitor pressure build-up or fall-off to show Block Valve integrity.
The Block Valves should not allow gas to leak at a rate where a pressure
build-up can develop in the downstream piping. (Note: Hydrates can cause
blockages in valves and pipe work under certain conditions of temperature and
pressure. This could provide misleading information during testing).
If any pressure build-up is observed using pressure gauges with ranges as
specified in Table 2 below, the valve does not have sufficient integrity to meet
the requirements of the Isolation standard.

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An integrity test over 30 minutes should be carried out. Any increase on the
pressure gauge range indicates an unacceptable integrity test.
Each valve should be proved to the highest pressure that can be expected
within the system for the duration of the work activity.

Table 2 – Pressure Gauge Selection

Pipe Nominal
Bore Distance between Block Flanges / m
(ALL UNITS IN Barg)

Inch mm 1.5 to 9 to 12
0 to 1.5 3 to 5 5 to 7 7 to 9 >18
3 12 to18
1 25 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 1.6
2 50 6.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 2.5 1.6

4 100 6.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.6

6 150 6.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.0
8 200 6.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.0 1.0
10 250 6.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.4
12 300 6.0 4.0 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.0 0.4 0.4
16 400 4.0 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.4 0.25
20 500 4.0 2.5 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.4 0.25 0.25

Note : All pressure gauges used for integrity testing must be:-
a) fitted with an over-range protection device
b) calibrated to prove their accuracy
c) removed and replaced prior to re-instatement of the system

9.5 Bleed Valves

1. Bleed Valves, forming part of a Double Block and Bleed isolation, should
be left in the open position while intrusive work is being carried out on an
isolated Pressure System i.e. during:
- work required to install positive isolations as part of a Standard 1
Isolation and,
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- short duration maintenance work (i.e. less than 12 hours) using a

Standard 2 (Double Block and Bleed) Isolation.
2. Bleed Valves should be closed, and a suitably rated pressure gauge
installed to monitor pressure build-up, in the following instances:
- during Valve Integrity Testing
- following installation of positive isolations and the system integrity
being re-instated
3. The status of the Bleed Valves must be recorded and controlled using the
Sanction to Test section of the Mechanical Isolation Certificate
4. During de-isolation, the same rules apply
5. Temporary hoses and fittings attached to Bleed Valves that are used for
draining and venting operations, must be
- suitable for service
- routed to a safe location
- suitably supported, identified and protected
- monitored regularly.
Note: Vents used for draining or venting which are connected to systems
that may become pressurised, such as closed drains or flares, must be
closed afterwards and securely immobilised to maintain the isolation
envelope as per the Isolation Standards detailed in this procedure.

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9.6 Implementing Standard 1

Positive Isolation – Scheme 1

Valve 1 Valve 2

Live LC LC
Isolated
RS

Positive Isolation – Scheme 2

Valve 1 Valve 2 SP

Live LC LC
Isolated

Notes

Before breaking containment to insert a Spade, swing a Spectacle

Blind or remove a spool piece, ensure that:
1 Adequate valve isolations are in place (refer to Table 1).
2 The Bleed Valve(s) are open while the positive isolation is
being installed or removed (see Section 9.5)
3 Successful integrity tests have been carried out on all Block
Valves in the Isolation Scheme.
4 The piping has been proven to be de-pressured and free from
hazardous fluids on both sides of the flange to be broken.
5 Valves are locked closed or securely immobilised.
6 The Bleed Valve(s) are closed when the positive isolations are
in place.
9.7 Implementing Isolation Standard 2
Double Block and Bleed – Scheme 1

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Live
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Isolated
Valve 1 Valve 2

LC LC Valve
Valve 4A
Notes 3A
Valve 3B Valve 4B
1 Close valve 2. Vent/ drain the inventory to atmospheric
pressure through Bleed Valves 4A and 4B.
2 In Pressure Systems with liquid inventories only, open valves
4A and 4B and monitor for any visual leakage.
3 In Pressure Systems containing gas, attach a pressure gauge,
with a range as indicated in Table 2, to bleed point 4 and
monitor pressure build-up. Final confirmation of zero pressure
should be by checking through Valve 4B.
4 No rise in pressure means valve 2 is providing an effective
single valve Isolation. Continuously monitor the isolations for
pressure build-up. Vent / drain any minor increases in pressure
to a suitable and safe area.
5 Close valve 1. Vent/ drain the inventory to atmospheric
pressure between valves 1 and 2 through Bleed Valves 3A/3 B
6 Attach a pressure gauge, with a range as indicated in Table 2,
to bleed point 3 and monitor pressure build-up. If there is no
rise in pressure, valve 1 is providing an effective single valve
Isolation, and the Double Block and Bleed has been proven.
Confirm zero pressure through Bleed Valve 3B.
7 While the equipment downstream of valve 2 is being worked
on, the gauge at point 3 provides information on valve 1
isolation and should be monitored on a regular frequency.
Should the gauge pressure increase, the integrity of the DB&B
no longer exists. Inform the AA and MIA immediately.
8 The isolation Block Valves must be securely immobilised prior
to work commencing on the isolated Pressure System and the
Bleed Valve(s) must be operated as described in Section 9.5.
Double Block and Bleed – Scheme 2 Single Valve Body
with Double Seals
Seat 1 Seat 2 & Cavity Bleed
Valve 1

Live of Process Systems

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Notes Valve
LC Valve
3A
2A
1 Ensure VALVE 1 is closed and secured. Vent / drain the
Valve 2B
inventory in the downstream side to atValve
mosphe3B
ric pressure
through Bleed Valves 3A and 3B.
2 Check the integrity of Seat 2 through Valves 2A and 2B by
pressurising the double seated valve annulus to live upstream
pressure using an appropriate medium e.g. water, nitrogen.
3 In Pressure Systems with liquid inventories only, monitor the
pressure at point 2 for any decrease in pressure in addition to
monitoring for any visual leakage through Valves 3A and 3B.
4 In Pressure Systems containing gas, attach a pressure gauge,
with a range as indicated in Table 2, to bleed point 3 and
monitor pressure build-up.
5 No decrease in pressure at point 2, and no increase in pressure
at point 3 means that Seat 2 is providing an effective seal. Final
confirmation of zero pressure should be by checking at Valve
3B.
6 De-pressurise VALVE 1 annulus through Bleed Valves 2A
and2B.
7 Attach a pressure gauge with a range as indicated Table 2 to
bleed point 2 and monitor pressure build-up. If there is no
increase in pressure, Seat 1 is providing an effective seal and
the Double Block and Bleed isolation has been proven.
8 While the equipment downstream of the double seated valve is
being worked on, the pressure gauge at point 2 provides
information on Seat 1 isolation and should be monitored on a
regular frequency. If the gauge pressure increases, the integrity
of the Double Block and Bleed isolation no longer exists. Inform
the AA and MIA immediately.
9 The double seated valve must be securely immobilised prior to
work commencing on the isolated Pressure System.

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9.8 Implementing Isolation Standard 3

Single Valve – Scheme 1

LC

Live Valve 1 Isolated

Bleed

Notes

1 To implement the Isolation, de-pressure and drain the Isolated

section. This enables any pressure build-up to be measured
and prove the integrity of the single Block Valve.
2 Carry out valve integrity test as described for Double Block and
Bleed Isolation.
3 Single Valve Isolations must not be left unattended when open
to the atmosphere.
4 The Mechanical Isolating Authority must be present for the
breaking of containment and demonstration of isolation integrity
to the Performing Authority. The single isolation valve must be
securely immobilised.

9.9 De-Isolation of Plant / Equipment

Prior to de-spading, the pressure build-up in the section of line between the
Isolation valve and Blank Flange (or Spade), where fitted, should be checked
using a test port or pressure gauge. Where there is pressure build-up
observed, vent / drain the inventory and re-test after 30 minutes. Final
confirmation of zero pressure before opening the line, should be checked
through an open vent or Bleed Valve.
Ensure that de-isolation activities are carried out in the correct sequence.
Where electrical isolation is involved as well as Mechanical Isolation, the
overall Isolation Scheme must be co-ordinated by the Area Authority and the

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respective Isolating Authorities to ensure that de-isolation activities are carried

out in the correct sequence.
De-isolation consists of removing all locking / immobilising devices and
Isolation Labels. However, drain, bleed or vent valves should be closed to
maintain the integrity of the system and plugged or capped as appropriate.
9.10 Isolation Security

The Isolation of Plant, Equipment or Systems must be carried out in such a

manner that accidental interference / inadvertent removal or inadvertent
operation of valves cannot occur, thereby ensuring that the correct
authorisation for removal must be obtained

Isolation valves on hydrocarbon and high-pressure systems (e.g. water

injection etc.) must be secured using padlocks and chains/pro-lock wires,
and the padlock keys retained in lockout boxes

Where valves are required to be securely immobilised (Open or Closed) as

part of an Isolation Scheme on other systems, the following methods are
acceptable:
• Secure metal tie wraps or locking tag and wire
• Proprietary lockable valve hand-wheel covers
9.11 Personal Mechanical Isolations

Personal Mechanical Isolations are intended for short duration tasks of

relatively low risk e.g. replacing pressure gauges, filters or small valves, or
such tasks where the completion of a Mechanical Isolation Certificate adds
no significant value in terms of risk reduction.

Personal Isolations may be used under the following conditions:

• Applied by a competent, authorised Performing Authority
• Personal Mechanical Isolation Labels must be attached to the
isolation points.
• Appropriate locking or immobilising devices must be used to achieve
isolation point security
• Personal Isolations may not last beyond the Performing Authority’s
own shift period
• The same Isolation Standards apply to Personal Isolations with the
exception of the completion of a Mechanical Isolation Certificate

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9.12 Specific Hazards Associated with Mechanical Machinery

Hydraulic, pneumatic and process powered machinery need to be isolated by
utilising the appropriate isolation valves.
Supply and return pipes should then be disconnected or otherwise made safe
to prevent any possibility of movement.
Engine-driven machinery should be isolated by shutting off the engine fuel
supply and isolating all starting systems. Electrically-driven machinery should
be made safe by switching off the power supply to the motor and isolating all
electrical supplies.
Any residual mechanical, electrical or pressure energy should be safely
released as follows:
- mechanical: high and low speed rotating elements to be run down
and springs released
- electrical: capacitors should be discharged and batteries isolated
- hydraulic: accumulators and pressurised pipework should be
depressurised
- pneumatic: air from the system to be depressurised
- services: steam, gas or fuel may need to be vented, purged or
drained
After machinery power devices have been disconnected or engines/motors
prevented from starting, there may still be a foreseeable risk to people working
on the machinery if it were to move. A properly engineered chocking device
should be used to lock the machinery in a safe position.

10.0 ISOLATION RISK ASSESSMENT

Where an Isolation Standard cannot be achieved, an alternative method of

isolation is considered. This alternative Isolation Scheme must be
subjected to an Isolation Risk Assessment.
This process uses the principles inherent in the Risk Assessment Procedure
and concentrates primarily on the primary hazard – loss of containment.
The Area Authority selects a team of at least two personnel, including the
Mechanical Isolating Authority, with the necessary experience of the system
involved to undertake the Isolation Risk Assessment.
The Isolation Risk Assessment must identify the likely hazard effect should
inventory containment fail. It should also identify the specific control
measures to reduce the risk of this occurring.

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The team must agree that the proposed alternative Isolation Scheme, with
its associated control measures, presents a low risk. The Site Manager
must review and approve all Isolation Risk Assessments.
If problems arise while the Isolation Scheme is being implemented, then
work must cease and the work site made safe and secure. The Mechanical
Isolating Authority must inform the Area Authority and Issuing Authority
immediately. Where necessary, a further Isolation Risk Assessment must
be carried out.
Where a number of activities are being carried out within an Isolation
Scheme, the Isolation Risk Assessment may apply to these other activities
providing they have been addressed as part of the risk assessment.
Where problems are repeatedly experienced in meeting the minimum
Isolation Standard for specific plant, the data gathered may highlight the
necessity for an engineering change.
The Issuing Authority should file the completed Isolation Risk Assessment in
the Isolation Library.
Where an Isolation Risk Assessment has been carried out, a copy must be
attached to the Mechanical Isolation Certificate as part of the Work Permit
application.

11.0 TRAINING OF MECHANICAL ISOLATING AUTHORITIES

Mechanical Isolating Authorities shall, as a minimum, be deemed competent

in, and demonstrate the necessary knowledge and experience of the following:
• Process operations
• The Specific Plant
• Permit to Work Procedure
• Other related site specific procedures (e.g. Breaking Containment
Procedure, Confined Space Entry Procedure, Gas Testing Procedure)
Formal training in the OMV Mechanical Isolations Procedure shall be carried
out for all MIAs.

Candidates for the Mechanical Isolating Authority role must be able to

demonstrate competence in all of the above. In addition, they must be
assessed on their knowledge and understanding of the Mechanical Isolations
Procedure through practical demonstration of:

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• Designing an Isolation Scheme using Mechanical Isolation certificates,

marked-up P&IDs etc.
• Selection and application of the Isolation Standards (this philosophy)
• Participation in an Isolation Risk Assessment

12.0 AUDITING, MONITORING AND REVIEW

The primary method of control and monitoring is through line supervision

(Line Compliance Monitoring). Compliance monitoring of isolations is to be
carried out by Production Operations Personnel on a weekly basis. The
relevant Area Authority will review the findings from the monitoring process
and ensure that any deficiencies recorded are rectified or other appropriate
action taken.
Compliance Monitoring records shall be filed by the Issuing Authority in the
Permit Office.
To ensure that Compliance Monitoring is carried out to the required high
standard the relevant Area Authority will undertake an audit of the
Compliance Monitoring records for isolations in his area every three
months. This audit is to ensure that all actions arising from the check
sheets have been addressed and any trends or recurrent problems are
identified. The Area Authority will report his findings to the Site Manager.
OMV HSE Department will undertake an annual independent audit of
isolation methods and procedures.

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