The African Union and Peace and Security in Central Africa

Author(s): Olumide Adetokunbo Fafore

Source: Journal of African Union Studies , Vol. 5, No. 2/3 (2016), pp. 51-66
Published by: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26893814

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 Journal of African Union Studies (JoAUS)
Volume 5, Issue 2, 2016
Pp 51-66

The African Union and Peace and Security in

Central Africa
Olumide Adetokunbo Fafore
Department of Political Science,
University of Kwazulu-Natal, Howard College Campus,
Durban, 4041, South Africa,
Email: olumide2004@hotmail.com.
Mobile: +27737177790.

Abstract
Since the formation of the African Union (AU) in 2002, peace and security has
been its central components. The African Union has sought to respond to the
many violent conflicts on the continent with African solutions to African
problems through the establishment of the African Union Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA) and its components. More than a decade however, the
African continent remains punctuated by violent conflicts, in, for example,
Central Africa, Libya, the Lake Chad Basin region and the Sahel region. This
work will assess the African Union peace and security architecture, its strength
and challenges using the Central African region as analysis and offers several
recommendations such as a coherent and mutually reinforcing cooperation
between the African Union and regional organizations in Central Africa on
regional peace and security.

Keywords: African Union, Peace and Security, Central Africa, Regional Organisations.

1. The African Union and Peace and Security in Africa

The transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the

African Union (AU) was concluded in July 2002 with 53 members and
was structured and better designed than its predecessor, the OAU to
respond to conflicts on the African continent (Kolt and Shanahan, 2005).
The African Union also sought to respond to the conflict on the
continent with ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Vines, 2013).

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 The African Union and Peace and Security …

Despite these and the establishment of the African Union Peace and
Security Architecture in 2002 provided for the following, a 15 member
Peace and Security council (PSC) with the power to intervene in cases of
egregious human rights abuses and unconstitutional changes of
government, a panel of the wise to support the Peace and Security
council objectives and to promote high level mediation efforts, an
African standby force (ASF) built around five sub-regional brigades
which are Southern, East, West, Central and North Africa, designed to
be deployed within 30 days in response to conflicts on the continent, the
Continental Early Warning system (CEWS), a military staff committee
(MSC) and a peace fund (Paterson, 2012).
Also in 2006, as a result of the establishment of the United Nations
Peace-building commission in 2005, the African Union policy framework
for post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) was
formulated (AU, 2006). Paterson (2012) argued that the African Union
policy framework for post conflict reconstruction and development
outlines a duty for the African Union to coordinate the peace building
efforts of the continent’s eight major regional economic communities,
African civil society actors, the private sector and the United Nations and
seeks to link peace, security and development and apart from emphasing
the importance of national ownership of all initiatives, one of the key
assumptions of African solutions to African problems, the framework
recognizes that transitions to peace should be informed by the political
and socio-economic circumstances of the countries concerned. Curtis et
al (2012) found out that implementation of the African Union policy
framework for post conflict reconstruction and development has been
affected as a result of its failure to clarify the necessary division of labour
and responsibilities between the African Union and the Regional
Economic Communities.
The African Union despite its challenges in peacekeeping efforts in
areas such as lack of institutional capacity to develop policy, plan and
manage peace operations and also financial constraints to devote to the
goals of its peace and security architecture have seen cooperative
peacekeeping with the United Nations and the European Union as one
of the ways to address these problems. According to (Boutellis and
Williams, 2013) the African Union have established a peace and security
coordination mechanisms since 2006, endorsing the expansion of the
United Nations support package for the African mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), in June 2012, the United Nations Security council also
endorsed an African–led regional cooperation initiative against the Lord’s

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Olumide Adetokunbo Fafore (JoAUS) Volume 5, Issue 2, 2016, pp 51-66

Resistance Army (LRA), in December 2012, the United Nations Security

council also authorized an Africa-led international support mission in
Mali (AFISMA). Earlier in July 2007, the African Union and the United
Nations established an hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur
(UNAMID), with the United Nations providing back-stopping,
command and control structures (UN, 2007).
Alfredo (2013) argued that cooperative peacekeeping between the
African Union and the United Nations despite its advantages is facing
the following challenges such as: Financial and logistical constraints and
weak bureaucratic capabilities especially on the part of the African
Union; Ambiquity of the nature of regional arrangements in maintaining
peace and security as called for in chapter VII of the United Nations
charter as it does not distinguish between regional and sub-regional
arrangements; Different peacekeeping doctrine and approaches between
the African Union and the United Nations. United Nations peacekeeping
operates in three core principles, namely, consent of the parties,
impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of
the mandate (UN, 2008). This has been critiqued by several African
countries who believe that peacekeeping on the continent requires a
different response generating divergence with respect to purpose,
configuration and force requirements for peacekeeping especially in
situations where there is no peace to keep; Intra-AU dynamics
complicates the cooperative peacekeeping. This according to (Alfredo,
2013) was evident in the crisis in Libya, Mali and Cote d’ Ivoire. The
African Union approach to Libya in 2011 and Mali in 2012 was
inconsistent and contradictory to that of sub-regional initiatives of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). That while African
member states with seats in the United Nations Security Council were
unanimous in support of Resolution 1973 regarding Libya, the African
Union opposed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
intervention in Libya.
Apart from the United Nations, individual members of the United
Nations Security Council have helped with the development of the
African Union peace and security architecture through various
mechanisms such as the G8++ Global peace operations initiative
(GPOI) and the European Union’s (EU) African peace facility
established in 2004 (Boutellis and Williams, 2013). According to
(Bakwegegha, 2003), the African Union peace and security architecture is
more comprehensive than that of the Organization of African Unity but

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 The African Union and Peace and Security …

many of the new structures provided by its constitutive act still need to
be fully operational. Okumu and Jaye (2010) argued that the African
Union peace and security architecture is evolving in a new environment
with dramatic challenges and if Africa is to live up to its motto of solving
its own problems, it should find solutions to its limited resources and
lack of trained manpower. Neethling (2006) argued that while the African
Union may have normatively and theoretically successes in developing a
comprehensive peace and security framework revolving around peace
and security council (PSC), there nevertheless remains a pivotal
divergence between aspiration and actual implementation and that
indeed, at the conceptual level, the African Union has undoubtedly made
great progress in moving towards an African peace support operations
capability, significant challenges and even problems remain in translating
political statements and ideals into reality.
With regards to the African Standby Force, a major component of
the African Union peace and security architecture, Ramsbotham, Bah
and Calder (2005) argued that the significant stumbling block hampering
its development is the continued absence of a memorandum of
understanding between the African Union and Regional Economic
Communities in Africa and the resultant lack of coordination between
the African Union and Regional Standby Brigades and that regions such
as North Africa appear to be practically disengaged from the entire
process and that the African Union is currently lacking the organizational
structures to deploy integrated missions or to substantially implement
long-term oriented peace-building programmes such as those envisioned
for the African Standby Force.
This study argued in support of the aforementioned argument of
(Ramsbotham, Bah and Calder, 2005) by using the conflict in Mali in
2012 to support its argument. The African-led International Support
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) from inception was faulted due to slow
deployment of troops as a result of logistical difficulties and coordination
challenges faced by the countries providing troops. Apart from rivalry
and tension between the African Union and the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) over ownership of AFISMA,
AFISMA lacked the size, logistics and finances to be effective in Mali
due to lack of commitment from African Union members states (APA,
2014). However, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) from
2004-2007, represented a bold step by the African Union to intervene in
Sudan and Darfur. Kobbie (2009) however argued that the African
Union Mission in Sudan demonstrated that the African Union have not

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Olumide Adetokunbo Fafore (JoAUS) Volume 5, Issue 2, 2016, pp 51-66

yet overcome the political weakness inherent in the Organisation of

African Unity because of its fixation on the principle of sovereignty and
resulting indifference to the grave humanitarian and human rights
situations in the country.
Pham (2007) argued contrary to the above by arguing that while the
African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the African Mission in Sudan
(AMIS) represent milestones for the African Union in terms of peace
and security in Africa, they also provided lessons for the African Union
on how to better fulfill its roles and readiness in peacekeeping
operations. This study argued that the African Mission in Burundi
(AMIS) can be credited with stabilizing Burundi and made a positive
difference despite financial, logistical and planning difficulties and that
the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) can provide the African Union
useful lessons in issues relating to peace and security in Africa conclude
that with political will the African Union Peace and Security Architecture
will restore peace to conflict zones across Africa.
On funding of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture,
Deconing (2010) argued that the effectiveness of the African Union
Peace and Security Architecture will depend on how they are financed.
Using Nigeria’s role with ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone (1990)
and South Africa’s support to AMIB in Burundi (2003) as case studies of
the only fully funded peacekeeping operations by African Union member
states in Africa, Deconing (2010) argued that the African Union remains
dependent on voluntary contributions to finance its peace operations
which denies the African Union the freedom to take independent
decisions on strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of its peace
operation. Making Feldman (2008) to recommend that the African
Union should develop a source of dedicated funding, such as through
taxes, tariffs and or fees to support its peace and security mechanisms.
While the African Union remains the central organization responsible
for peace and security in Africa, this study argued that it must empower
the Regional Economic Communities in Africa to address conflict and
allow regional hegemonies such as South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and
Ethiopia to play a more practical role on peace and security on the
continent and that coordination between the African Union and the
Regional Economic Communities such as SADC playing a very
important role in peace and security in Southern Africa with its
mediation in Lesotho and other volatile parts of that region, IGAD and
ECOWAS should be based on comparative advantage and circumstances
of the conflict.

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 The African Union and Peace and Security …

2. The Crisis in Central Africa

Central Africa comprises of countries such as Burundi, the Central

African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Rwanda, called Middle Africa by the United Nations, with the inclusion
of Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon
and Sao Tome and Principle (UN, 2013). The eleven countries constitute
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The
major occupation of the people of Central Africa are farming, cattle
rearing and fishing from the Lake Chad basin although according to
(Fedotov, 2011), it is a region with vast resources and potential
overshadowed by a tragic past that influences the present. The Central
Africa is one of Africa’s most resource-endowed regions and ironically, it
is made up of the poorest and least developed countries on the
continent. According to (Meyer, 2011), Central Africa’s significant wealth
in minerals, oil and timber, together with government failure to access
and effectively manage resources, represents a substantial conflict factor,
and weak, limited or non-existent state control over mines and resources
makes these resources a potential income source for criminal groups and
rebel movements.
Debos (2008) argued that among the 11 Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS) member states, only a few have escaped
serious internal crisis and violent conflict during the last two decades and
the porosity of national borders and between the different zones of
conflict and the proliferation of illegal arms and weapons increase the
risk of spill-over from conflicts in neighboring states. Meyer (2011)
argued that weak political legitimacy leading to fragile social cohesion
threatens the stability of political structures and challenges the capacities
of Central African States institutions.
Although conflicts have declined in Central Africa except in
countries such as the Central African Republic and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Political instability in the Central African
Republic, an ongoing armed conflict in Eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo and activities of organized crime such as illicit gold and diamond
exports, trafficking in cannabis, firearms, illicit timber and elephant ivory,
child trafficking and exploitation of its vast natural resources continue to
undermine peace and security in the region, leading to increasing
instability, lawlessness and violence particularly in the Central African
Republic and the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Armed groups

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Olumide Adetokunbo Fafore (JoAUS) Volume 5, Issue 2, 2016, pp 51-66

such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) with its origin in Uganda
continue to kill, rape, kidnap and mutilate across Central Africa.
According to the United Nations Group Experts on the DRC in
2010, the exploitation of natural resources and illicit diamond trade by
armed groups is an important cause of insecurity and conflict in Eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo and the region and also, Central Africa at
the end of 2009 accounted for 16% of the world’s refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs). Apart from its richness in biologic resources,
Central Africa is home to one of the largest rainforests in the world after
the Amazon and most of these environmental wealth that can be a
source of livelihood to millions across the region are controlled by the
various armed groups across the region (Greenpeace, 2010). Another
factor influencing conflict within the region is the illicit flow of firearms,
according to (Fedotov, 2011), firearms have flowed into the region over
the years from the two Congolese wars, the genocide in Rwanda, the
conflict in Burundi and external sources. (Meyer, 2015) argued that the
Central Africa region is one Africa’s most fragile and vulnerable regions
with several military coups, crisis and conflicts. According to (Meyer,
2015) current security issues in Central Africa are, cross-border crimes,
terrorism due to the increasing criminal activities and expansion of Boko
Haram, a direct security threat to Chad and Cameroon, maritime security,
electoral violence and the crisis in the Central African Republic.
Meyer (2015) argued that border porosity, limited territorial control
and weak state authority in remote zones in virtually all Central Africa
states coupled with increasing activities of centrifugal movements, rebels
and armed groups outside the reach of state control have increased
transnational insecurity in Central Africa. (Meyer, 2015) argued that many
of the continent’s longest-serving heads of state are in Central Africa
such as the President of Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Republic
of the Congo and Chad and as a result Central Africa is a growing
security risk in pre-elections tensions due to causes such as constitutional
changes to allow incumbent presidents to run for another term, a
controversial candidacy as evident in the April 2015 elections in Burundi,
postponement of elections or opposition parties anticipation of electoral
fraud and in a situation where several countries in Central Africa are in
election process (2015/2016), violent electoral contests in one country
may also result in imitation effects in others.
The Central African Republic (CAR) is ranked fifteen (15) most
violent country in the world according to the January 2015 Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) with over 2000

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 The African Union and Peace and Security …

recorded events of political violence between January 1997 and

September 2014. According to a survey by the Armed Conflict Location
and Event Data Project carried out in January 2015, violence against
civilians a significant characteristics of the conflict in the Central African
Republic (CAR) far exceeds the African Continental average of 35%, and
is higher than other African states experiencing ongoing civil conflict
surpassing even that of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Also,
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) since 2008 has been operating in
Central Africa and LRA attacks on rural communities have displaced
hundreds of thousands of people in the Central African Republic and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The Crisis in the Central African Republic is having a huge impact on
regional stability and if not adequately resolved can undermine stability in
Central Africa states like Burundi and Rwanda with limited capacity to
respond to conflict. To date, influx of refugees from the Central African
Republic and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is weighing on
scarce local resources while cross border trade has been hindered by
increasing insecurity.

3. The African Union Intervention in Central Africa

With the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council
(PSC) in December 2003, Africa’s regional peace and security
mechanisms became the pillars of the Africa Peace and Security
Architecture with the signing in 2008 a memorandum of understanding
between the African Union and Regional Economic Communities based
on institutionalization and the strengthening of partnership and
cooperation for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in
Africa (AU, 2008). In the Central Africa sub-region, there are three
Regional Economic Communities which are the Economic Community
of Central African States (ECCAS) established in 1983 with an original
mandate for regional economic cooperation later broadened to include
promotion of peace, security and stability in the sub-region and has been
involved in peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic
through the Mission De Consolidation De La Paix en Republic Centra-
Fricaine (MICOPAX) since July 2008.
There is also the Economic and Monetary Community of Central
Africa (CEMAC) an offshoot of the Central African Customs Union
(UDEAC) established in 1966. CEMAC from 2002 to 2008 deployed a
peacekeeping operation, the Force Multinationale en Centra-Frique

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Olumide Adetokunbo Fafore (JoAUS) Volume 5, Issue 2, 2016, pp 51-66

(FOMUC) to the Central African Republic. There is also the Economic

Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) which according to
(Meyer, 2015) has been constrained by the conflicts that have adversely
affected relations between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
Rwanda and Burundi. With Regards to the African Union, in April 2003,
the African Union in response to the crisis in Burundi deployed the
African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) with troops from South Africa,
Ethiopia and Mozambique to monitor the peace process and provide
security (Murithi, 2005). According to (Murithi, 2005), AMIB was the
first peacekeeping operation fully initiated, planned and executed by the
African Union, and AMIB represents a milestone for the African Union
in terms of self-reliance in operationalising and implementing peace-
building. The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) succeeded in
establishing relative peace to most provinces in Burundi, de-escalated a
potential volatile situation and laid the foundations for reconciliation and
reconstruction.
In the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where over 700,000
people since April 2012 has been displaced, a complex conflict according
to a February 2013 report by Action Aid that resulted in untold numbers
of rapes, killings, and other human rights violations, the South African
Development Community (SADC) has been active in mediation and
reconciliation efforts under the aegis of the African Union. According to
(Hendricks, 2015), South Africa was and remains a key factor in conflict
management in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and since
1999 has been involved in peacekeeping operations in the DRC and since
March 2013, together with Tanzania and Malawi as part of the Force
Intervention Brigade (FIB) has been relatively successful at disarming the
M23 (Hendricks, 2015). In the Central African Republic the African
Union suspended the Central African Republic from its membership in
March 2013 (Dixon, 2013) and also the deployment of the African-led
Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA).
Cing-Mars (2015) argued that MISCA effectiveness in the Central
African Republic was hindered by lack of capacity and insufficient troops
and as a result were unable to effectively protect civilians throughout
2013. Also the cooperation between the African Union and the
Economic Community of Central African States on peacekeeping
operations in the Central African Republic was fraught with toxic politics
and complicated by financial concerns and according to (Cing-Mars,
2015), there was not a sufficient presence of peacekeepers on ground to
adequately protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes. The African

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 The African Union and Peace and Security …

Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States

(ECCAS) competed over responsibility for and visibility with MISCA
and there were also divergent views over ownership, command and
control of the peacekeeping operation. Cing-Mars (2015) argued that
there were disagreements over which countries would contribute and
that Chad which was the largest troop contributor to MICOPAX and
was the Chair and Secretary-General of ECCAS in 2013, sought to
maintain influence over the AU-led operation.
According to (Cocodia, 2015), another challenge MISCA faced was
the cultural blend of its forces, that a mission’s composition in terms of
cultural beliefs and ethnic affiliations matter especially in religious or
ethnically charged mission areas and sometimes intervening troops share
in the constructed identities of the mission areas, and this can seriously
hinder effectiveness. In CAR, French forces were accused of siding with
anti-Balaka, while Chadian soldiers were accused of showing solidarity
with Muslim Seleka, which undermined the credibility of the
peacekeeping operation in CAR (Cocodia, 2015). Cocidia (2015) argued
that the African Union should consider the local histories of mission
areas and the sociocultural affiliations of peacekeeping contingents
before, during, and after deployment.
This bring us to one of the argument of this study that the African
Union should cooperate with regional economic communities on sub-
regional peace and security but such cooperation and relationship must
be properly defined to avoid such conflict over ownership as evident
with ECCAS in the Central African Republic with MISCA and in the
crisis in Mali in 2012 with AFISMA. According to (Welz and Meyer,
2014), the delayed transformation from MICOPAX into MISCA not
only reflected the strained relationship among the various actors, but also
impeded an effective international response to the crisis with fatal results
for Central African Republic citizens. The deteriorating situation in the
Central African Republic highlighted some of the failures of the African
Union Peace and Security Architecture and send a clear message to the
African Union that the time for the African Standby Force to become
operational is long overdrew.
The Challenges faced by MISCA in the Central African Republic also
highlighted the shortcomings of the African Union Peace and Security
Council (PSC) and its time the African Union find lasting solution to its
Financial, Logistical and personnel constraints as suggested by several
scholars as well as an implementation of the Olusegun Obasanjo report
of 2015 on the African Union funding of its Peace and Security

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Olumide Adetokunbo Fafore (JoAUS) Volume 5, Issue 2, 2016, pp 51-66

mechanisms. Cing-Mars (2015) argued that the response to the Central

African Republic crisis also underscored the crucial importance of
effective cooperation between sub-regional, regional and international
organizations as competition between the African Union, the Economic
Community of Central African States and the United Nations hampered
the international response during a crucial period of the crisis and
undermined the ability of the international community to effectively
protect civilians in the Central African Republic.
With regards to the activities of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in
Central Africa, the African Union summit of Heads of State and
Government in July 2010, requested the AU commission to consult
countries affected by the LRA with a view to facilitating a coordinated
regional action to mitigate the threat (AU, 2010) and in October 2010, a
ministerial meeting was held in Bangui to review and consider how to
strengthen measures taken against the LRA. At the second regional
ministerial meeting held in Addis Ababa from 6-8 June 2011, the African
Union agreed to launch an AU authorized mission and a well
coordinated unified regional political process to defeat the LRA. The
agreement in collaboration with Uganda, the DRC and CAR include the
following: Establishment of a Regional Task Force (RTF) to eliminate
the LRA; Appoint a special envoy to provide overall political and
strategic coordination of operations to counter the LRA; Establish a joint
operations centre (JOC) at RTF headquarters in Yambio (Uganda),
Dungu (DRC), Obo (CAR) and Nzara (South Sudan).
The above were approved by the July 2011 African Union summit in
Malabo, Equatorial Guinea (AU, 2011). According to Maphosa (2013),
the African Union initiative against the LRA is a flexible and original
mechanism to promote collective security by pooling the resources and
capabilities of the countries of the sub-region to address the LRA
problem. The regional cooperative initiative for the elimination of the
LRA (RCI-LRA) a comprehensive regional policy mechanism of the
African Union was authorized by the African Union Peace and Security
Council in November 2011 and launched in March 2012 in Juba, South
Sudan. The African Union is cooperating with affected member states,
the United Nations, the United States and the European Union to help
mitigate and eradicate the LRA problem in Central Africa through the
following strategic objectives: Implementation of the AU-led RCI-LRA;
Enhancement of efforts to promote the protection of civilians;
Expansion of current disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
resettlement and reintegration activities to cover all LRA affected areas;

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 The African Union and Peace and Security …

Promotion of a coordinated humanitarian and child protection response;

Provision of support to affected member states in peace building, human
rights, rule of law and development, to enable them to establish whole
state authority (Maphosa, 2013).
According to Maphosa (2013) the RCI-LRA is a peace support
model that highlights the multifarious presence of collaboration and
regional cooperation which necessitates a shared understanding and
assessments of the deep-seated causes of the problem, shared
understanding of how to address the problem with shared planning and
unambiguous mandates of operation, with clear coordination of military
and non-military utilities. This study therefore argued that the African
Union RCI-LRA model is a good model for future interventions against
armed groups in Africa and can be repeated in the Lake Chad Basin
region against Boko Haram insurgency, in the Sahel region against the
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and against Al Shabab in the
horn of Africa.

Conclusion and Recommendations

For future effective intervention in Central Africa and across Africa by

the African Union and for the concept ‘African Solutions to African
Problems’ on peace and security to be achievable, the following
recommendations are as follows:

• The African Standby Force with its regional standby brigades

answerable to the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC)
has to become operational. Other components such as the Early
Warning System (CEWs) of the African Peace and Security
Architecture must be fully operationalised. The formation of the
African Standby Force is a matter of urgency including its rapid
deployment capabilities as a result of the new challenges to peace and
security in Central Africa and the entire continent such as terrorism,
cross-border crimes and activities of transnational organized crimes.
• Funding of peace and security in Africa is very vital. As seen with
MISCA in the Central African Republic, the African Union Peace
and Security Architecture is hindered due to lack of adequate
funding, the Africa Union’s Peace Fund is under-resourced and limits
the effectiveness of African centered solutions on peace and security
in Africa. The African Union must find alternative sources of
funding and be less dependent on its foreign partners; the African

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Olumide Adetokunbo Fafore (JoAUS) Volume 5, Issue 2, 2016, pp 51-66

Union must find avenues through which progress towards self-

sustainability can be made.
• Effective collaboration between the African Union and Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa is very important;
however, such collaboration on peace and security in Africa should
be based on comparative advantages and on different synergies, and
what such collaboration on peace and security represents should be
properly determined. Although the African Union is the major
organization apart from the United Nations primarily responsible for
peace and security in Africa, with the emerging threats to continental
peace and security in Central Africa and the rest of the continent,
peace and security should no longer be the sole priority of the
African Union. Local sensibilities must be respected by the African
Union and in situations such as in the crisis in the Central African
Republic where rivalry and competition over ownership of the
peacekeeping operations between the African Union and the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and
limited the effectiveness of MISCA and in the crisis in Mali in 2012
with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
over AFRISMA.
• Poor governance and political instability is one of the root causes of
the various conflicts in Central Africa, apart from having some of the
longest serving presidents in Africa, most countries within the sub-
region are characterized by political violence such as in the 2015
elections in Burundi, the Rwanda genocide of 1994, the Democratic
Republic of Congo where political instability since the death of
Mobutu Sese Seko has worsen one of Africa’s longest conflict and
the Central African Republic characterized by oppression,
dictatorship since the days of Emperor Bokassa. Therefore the
African Union through its developmental arm, the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) with emphasis on good
governance and economic development must be fully utilized. The
central Africa sub-region has abundant deposits of minerals and
biological wealth controlled illegally by armed groups which with
good governance could turn around the region positively. The
African Union must put in place mechanisms to ensure that the
African Peer review Mechanism (APRM) mandate which is to ensure
that policies and practices of participatory countries confirm to the
agreed values in the following key focus areas which are Democracy
and Good Political Governance, Economic Governance and

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 The African Union and Peace and Security …

Management, Corporate Governance and Socio-Economic

Development. This is another major area of collaboration between
the African Union and Regional Economic Communities such as
ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC among others. The purpose
of the APRM is to put Africa on the road to good governance which
is also one of the core objectives of NEPAD. NEPAD strongly
affirm the necessity for Africa to become masters of its own fate and
occupy a key position in global politics and economy. Good
Governance in Central Africa will rest to sustainable development
which is vital for the sub-region’s and Africa’s aspirations for growth
and continental development.

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