Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Borderland Battles Violence Crime and Governance at The Edges of Colombias War 2019 Annette Idler Full Chapter
Borderland Battles Violence Crime and Governance at The Edges of Colombias War 2019 Annette Idler Full Chapter
ANNETTE IDLER
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
vii
viii Contents
Tables
2.1 Non-State Order and Citizen Security 56
7.1 Border Effect on Violent Non-State Group Interactions and Citizen
Security 252
A.1 Spread of Observations across Clusters and Sites 340
A.2 Spread of Selected Observations across Cases 341
A.3 Spread of Interviews across Stakeholders and Sites 347
B.1 Observations of Violent Non-state Group Interactions 352
Figures
2.1 The continuum of clusters of violent non-state group interactions 40
2.2 Citizen security 52
3.1 Homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants in the Colombian-Ecuadorian
and Colombian-Venezuelan borderlands 72
3.2 Percentage of coca cultivation in Colombian border departments,
2016 81
3.3 Plaza of Mocoa, Colombia, 2011 87
3.4 Border river between Colombian Putumayo and Ecuadorian
Sucumbíos, 2012 88
3.5 Road between Pasto and Mocoa, Colombia, 2011 90
3.6 Border bridge San Miguel between Putumayo (Colombia) and
Sucumbíos (Ecuador), 2012 92
3.7 Informal border crossing between Tufiño (Ecuador) and Mayasquer
(Colombia), 2012 96
ix
x Table s, Figur e s, and Maps
Maps
3.1 Border crossings along the Colombia-Ecuador border 76
3.2 Border crossings along the Colombia-Venezuela border 77
3.3 Regional coca cultivation stability in Colombia, 2007–2015 82
3.4 Main global cocaine flows 84
3.5 Violent non-state group interactions along the Colombia-Ecuador
border (2011–2013) 86
3.6 Trafficking flows along the Colombia-Ecuador border 99
3.7 Violent non-state group interactions along the Colombia-Venezuela
border (2011–2013) 105
3.8 Trafficking routes through Puerto Santander, Colombia 113
5.1 Drug trafficking routes that start in Llorente, Nariño,
Colombia 165
5.2 Gasoline price in USD per container (21 liters) at the Colombia-
Venezuela border in 2011 170
5.3 Strategic location of Ocaña (Colombia) for drug trafficking
routes 205
7.1 Tracks of supposed cocaine flights in 2010 265
7.2 Persistence of coca cultivation along the Colombia-Ecuador border,
2007–2015 281
7.3 Displacements in Nariño (Colombia) in 2010 291
7.4 Confinement in Nariño (Colombia) in 2010 and 2011 291
C.1 Fieldwork itinerary in Nariño and Putumayo (Colombia) and Carchi
(Ecuador) 358
C.2 Fieldwork itinerary in Nariño and Putumayo (Colombia) and
Esmeraldas, Carchi, and Sucumbíos (Ecuador) 359
C.3 Fieldwork itinerary in Norte de Santander (Colombia) and Táchira
(Venezuela) 360
C.4 Fieldwork Itinerary in Norte de Santander (Colombia) 361
C.5 Fieldwork itinerary in Arauca (Colombia) and Apure
(Venezuela) 362
C.6 Fieldwork itinerary in Cesar and La Guajira (Colombia) and Zulia
(Venezuela) 363
C.7 Fieldwork itinerary in La Guajira (Colombia) 364
C.8 Fieldwork itinerary in Putumayo (Colombia) 365
C.9 Fieldwork itinerary in Norte de Santander, Cesar, and La Guajira
(Colombia) and Táchira (Venezuela) 366
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book would not exist without the hundreds of people across the Colombian-
Ecuadorian and Colombian-Venezuelan borderlands, and in Bogotá, Caracas,
and Quito, who shared their time, knowledge, and experiences with me. I am
grateful to them, and especially to the families who welcomed me to their homes
and with whom I developed meaningful friendships over the years. Their hos-
pitality and generosity had no limits. They showed me what the social fabric of
borderlanders can look like.
There are four women I would like to thank in particular—they know that
I mean them. They accompanied me on different parts of my fieldwork journey.
Their strength, courage, and leadership do not cease to inspire me. I am confi-
dent that with people like them—people who continue to make a difference in
their communities, despite the risks that this entails—there is hope for a better,
more secure tomorrow in the borderlands. It is my heartfelt desire that one day
I will be able to openly thank them and others by name for all they did, and all
they continue to do.
The support of many local and international organizations was invalu-
able for my fieldwork. They made traveling along and across the border so
much safer and insightful. I would like to highlight the support by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Mission Colombia,
the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the
Organization of American States, the German Development Cooperation GIZ,
the Norwegian Refugee Council, CARITAS, the Jesuit Refugee Service, the
Colombian National Peace Observatory, the Ecuadorian Border Network for
Peace (Red Fronteriza de Paz), and the Venezuelan Fe y Alegría. I also would like
to thank Universidad de los Andes Bogotá, FLACSO Quito, and Universidad
Central de Caracas for their academic support in Colombia, Ecuador, and
xiii
xiv Acknowledgments
and several grants and awards at the University of Oxford, including the Oxford
Department of International Development and St. Antony’s College.
My friends and family accompanied me throughout this process. I cannot
thank enough Marthe Achtnich, Chloé Lewis, and Ina Zharkevich for their sup-
port. My brother Stefan with Sandra and Mathilda were incredible sources of
energy. I am most grateful to my parents, Manuela and Thomas, for their love,
patience, and support from the inception to the end of this journey. This book is
dedicated to them.
A B B R E V I AT I O N S
xvii
xviii Abbreviations
This book is the result of a decade of research in and about the shared borderlands
of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. It presents an alternative narrative of the
recent history of the modern world’s longest internal armed conflict and its
embeddedness in a region where violent crime is entrenched—a history of inse-
curity witnessed from the margins.1
This decade starts on 1 March 2008, when the Colombian armed forces
bombed a camp of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo—FARC).
The bombing took place, however, in Angostura, 1.8 kilometer into Ecuadorian
territory. Killing the FARC’s number two in command, Raúl Reyes, the skir-
mish marked a turning point in Colombia’s internal armed conflict. From the
country’s center, it was seen as an iron-fisted message of strength from Bogotá
to the FARC. Yet the message to Bogotá was a different one; furious about the
violation of their territorial sovereignty through what they considered an unan-
nounced military incursion, Ecuador cut diplomatic relations with its neighbor.
Venezuela did so too, and stationed tanks and troops at its border. At that mo-
ment, I decided to carry out field research to explore the spillover potential of
Colombia’s war to its neighbors in the aftermath of Angostura. I focused my
work on the Ecuadorian northern border zone, which was at that time becoming
increasingly militarized, securitized, and stigmatized as a result of the attack.2
I then decided to widen my lens of analysis to explore all four sides of the
Colombian- Ecuadorian and Colombian- Venezuelan borderlands. This way,
I was able to witness the developments in Colombia’s war from the margins, lit-
erally and figuratively. Between 2011 and 2013, my research took me not only
to Bogotá, Caracas, and Quito but also to numerous towns, villages, indige-
nous settlements, and lone farms in the Colombian departments of Nariño and
xix
xx Prologue
August, I was in a meeting with the commander of the Colombian army when
he received a call from Cuba where the peace talks were underway; after more
than fifty years of armed conflict and four years of negotiations, the Colombian
government and the FARC had reached a final peace agreement. Yet while it
sparked enthusiasm internationally, within the country skepticism was rife. As
a taxi driver in Bogotá put it to me on the morning after the announcement of
the deal: how could Colombians be sure that ex-FARC combatants would be
able to reintegrate into civilian life after decades in the jungle? Would they not
use the demobilization as a pretext to continue life as criminals, fueling insecu-
rity in urban areas? These and other concerns that demonstrated people’s mis-
trust toward peace would go on to contribute to a vote that, while a surprise
to many outsiders, was to a certain degree predictable to some of those who
were following events closely. Even though on September 26, President Santos
and FARC leader Timochenko signed the peace deal, it was rejected in a pleb-
iscite on October 2, 2016. Still, Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
on October 7, 2016, perhaps the Nobel Peace Prize Committee’s vote of con-
fidence to the Colombian president.10 In any case, the results of the plebiscite
were telling: having suffered most from continued violence, almost all border
areas voted in favor of peace, while in less marginalized regions the “no” vote
prevailed.11
On November 24, 2016, headlines in Bogotá’s newspapers praised Santos
and Timochenko for finally signing a revised peace deal, ending more than five
decades of armed conflict—this time, supposedly, for real.12 This revised deal
was approved by Congress shortly afterward, paving the way for a new era of
peace. The situation on the ground in Colombia’s margins, however, did not
reflect a straightforward transition from war to peace. At that time, I was back
in Tumaco. Locals expressed unease amid uncertainty over who would fill the
power vacuums left by the FARC, should they indeed demobilize. They were
also worried because of the most recent killings of that month, supposedly trig-
gered by the assassination of a FARC dissident, as I discuss later in the book.
Planning my travels for the following day to Catatumbo in the border depart-
ment of Norte de Santander, I reviewed social media and was sent photos of
roads blocked by explosives, an attack by ELN rebels against a police station,
EPL pamphlets announcing the continuation of the armed struggle, a burned
ambulance marked with EPL graffiti, and farmers fleeing their homes, scared of
being caught in the crossfire.
For the international community, the peace deal ended the FARC’s armed
struggle against a democratically elected government. Yet for many marginalized
community members, it also ended their informal protection by the FARC
from other armed groups: paramilitary successor groups, Venezuelan gangs,
Mexican drug cartels, and ELN rebels. The EPL was another source of fear,
Prologue xxiii
as it gained more territory and numbers than the FARC had held in Norte de
Santander.13
In early 2017, the FARC began to demobilize in designated transition zones
across Colombia, and the ELN formally entered peace talks with the Colombian
government in Quito. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s crisis worsened, producing an
overwhelming influx of Venezuelans across the border to Colombia. In Ecuador,
former president Rafael Correa’s party secured its legacy by winning the presi-
dential elections held in April 2017. By the time I went to some of the demo-
bilization camps in March and April 2017, where FARC members were laying
down their weapons, the Colombian president, ministers, and the international
press had already visited, reinforcing the narrative of the peace deal’s success
to the world. Remarkably, the FARC did complete the process and became a
formal political party on September 1, 2017.14 The country’s pathway toward
peace seemed to be irreversible now, and gained additional momentum with the
ceasefire between the ELN and the government, announced shortly afterward
in Quito.
Yet while Bogotá heralded the beginning of a new, more peaceful era, in the
borderlands there is still no clear line between war and peace. At the Colombia-
Venezuela border, violence continues to be fueled by a brutal war between the
ELN and the EPL, the operations of FARC dissidents, and criminals taking ad-
vantage of Venezuela’s crisis. At the Colombia-Ecuador border, the murders of
three Ecuadorian journalists by dissident rebels, Quito’s decision to revive mili-
tarization of the zone, and the stalling of the ELN talks in Quito (then moved to
Havana) also present a sobering critique of the narrative of a “peace era.” Across
both borders, cocaine production and other illicit businesses are thriving.
Witnessed from the margins, and against the historical backdrop of decades
of conflict and crime in the Andean region, perhaps just another decade of inse-
curity passed by. Yet a perspective from the margins also highlights something
else. While the centers have continuously focused their attention on large-scale
attacks, as the one with which I started this decade, they have ignored how local
communities have been maneuvering multiple kinds of insecurities along and
across the border. Listening to their voices and understanding their experiences
may not only serve to comprehend why insecurity in the margins has persisted
throughout this decade, from 2008 to 2018. Perhaps it can also help change
views from the centers, so that in the next decade, peace and security will indeed
extend to and across the margins.
BORDERLAND MAPS
Map 0.1 The shared borderlands of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Map created by
Author.
xxv
Map 0.2 The Colombian-Ecuadorian borderlands. Map created by Author.
Map 0.3 The Colombian-Venezuelan borderlands. Map created by Author.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
constructed one which possesses the true shape of a phallus. The
stone is about three feet long and stands in a vertical position in the
ground commanding a ceremonial cirque as if intended to watch
over the proceedings which are instituted there.
On the shores of Cambridge Gulf, a grotesque dance is performed
by the men, during which a flat, wooden phallus is used, shaped
almost like a tjuringa, about seventeen inches long and three inches
wide at the middle. It is painted in alternate bands of red and black,
running transversely across the two flat surfaces, which are, in
addition, decorated with the carved representations of the male
organ of generation. The dance takes place at night and is too
intricate to describe in detail. It is introduced by the following chant:
The verse is repeated three times, and then the performers stamp
the ground with their feet, about ten times in quick succession, the
action suggesting running without making headway. Presently, and
with one accord, the whole party falls upon the knees. The phallus is
seized with both hands and held against the pubes in an erect
position, and so the party slides over the ground from left to right,
and again from right to left. An unmistakably suggestive act follows,
when the men jerk their shoulders and lean forward to a semi-prone
position, after the fashion generally adopted by the aborigines. Still
upon their knees, the men lay the phallus upon the ground and
shuffle sideways, hither and thither, but always facing the object in
front of them. After several repetitions of this interact, the performers
raise their hands, in which they are now carrying small tufts of grass
or twigs, and flourish them above their heads, while their bodies
remain prone. Then follow some very lithe, but at the same time very
significant, movements of the hips. When, presently, they rise to their
feet again, the phallus are once more reclaimed and held with one of
the pointed ends against the pubes in an erect position. A wild dance
concludes the ceremony, during which the men become intensely
agitated and emotional; very often, indeed, their excitement, verging
on hysterical sensibility, evokes an orgasm.
PLATE XXXVI
1. An ordinary performer in the Ladjia or yam ceremony, wearing the “tdela” head-
gear.
Among them we observe: Two turtles (Figs. 1 and 2), the one of
which (Fig. 1) being shown in a dorsal aspect, the other (Fig. 2)
apparently in a ventral; two large fish (Figs. 3 and 4) resembling the
Port Jackson type; a lizard track (Fig. 5), showing the trail of the tail
in the centre; a human foot-print (Fig. 7), with an emu track above it;
a large stingray (Fig. 8), with protruding eyes and long tail standing
erect; a shark’s liver (Fig. 9), at any rate, it was described as such by
a native; a stingray’s liver (Fig. 10); an emu track (Fig. 11); a lizard
(Fig. 12); shields (Figs. 16, 18, 19, 21, 30), variously decorated;
boomerangs (Figs. 14, 15, 20, 27, 28, 32), variously decorated;
spear-throwers (Figs. 22 and 31); a corrobboree plume (Fig. 33),
such as is worn in the hair or stuck in the armlets during many of the
ceremonial dances; pubic tassels (Figs. 34, 35, 36), used as a
covering, suspended from a hair belt; a “circle-within-circle” design
(Fig. 39), often figuring conspicuously among emblematic and
ceremonial patterns; a human foot-print (Fig. 37); a dog track (Fig.
38); a lizard (Fig. 41); a group of figures (Fig. 40), consisting of a
spiral, of similar significance as Fig. 39, a chain of turkey tracks on
the right, and three paired tracks of a bounding wallaby on the left.
One or two of the remaining smaller figures are of doubtful meaning,
the most remarkable being Fig. 25, which for an aboriginal ideograph
is extraordinarily complex and symmetrical.
PLATE XXXVIII
PLATE XXXIX
“This area, mostly oval or circular in shape, remains a strict taboo to all beyond its
confines, and is believed to disenchant any morbid influence the evil spirit may
bring to bear upon it.”