India emerged as a free and democratic country in 1947, and entered into the nuclear

age in 1948 by establishing the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), with Homi Bhabha
as the chairman. Later on the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was created under
the Office of the Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru. Initially the AEC and DAE received
international cooperation, and by 1963 India had two research reactors and four nuclear
power reactors. In spite of the humiliating defeat in the border war by China in 1962 and
China's nuclear testing in 1964, India continued to adhere to the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. On May 18, 1974 India performed a 15 kt Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
(PNE). The western powers considered it nuclear weapons proliferation and cut off all
financial and technical help, even for the production of nuclear power. However, India
used existing infrastructure to build nuclear power reactors and exploded both fission
and fusion devices on May 11 and 13, 1998. The international community viewed the
later activity as a serious road block for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; both deemed essential to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons. India considers these treaties favoring nuclear states and is prepared to sign
if genuine nuclear disarmament is included as an integral part of these treaties.

India possesses both nuclear weapons and extensive nuclear fuel cycle
capabilities. India tested its first nuclear device in May 1974, and remains
outside both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, India has
a facility-specific safeguards agreement in place with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
allowing it to participate in global civilian nuclear technology commerce. India
has a sizable and growing nuclear arsenal, primarily due to decades of conflict
with its nuclear-armed neighbor Pakistan.

According to the 2019 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian arsenal includes 130 to 140
warheads. 1 The ranges of such estimates are generally dependent on
analyses of India’s stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium, which is estimated
at 0.58 ± 0.15 tons. 2 India has also stockpiled roughly 4.0 ± 1.4 tons of highly
enriched uranium (HEU), some of which is intended for use in nuclear
submarines and research reactors. 3

The plutonium for India’s nuclear arsenal is obtained from the 100 MWt
research reactor, Dhruva, which began operations in 1988. 4 Another 40 MWt
CIRUSreactor produced about 4 to 7 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually
until it was decommissioned in 2010 under the separation plan of the
U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. 5 Irradiated fuel from the reactors
is reprocessed at the Plutonium Reprocessing Plant in Trombay, which has a
capacity of roughly 50 tons of spent nuclear fuel per year. 6 A 500MW
prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam in the South Indian state
of Tamil Nadu was expected to reach criticality by 2019 to increase India’s
plutonium production capacity, but has not yet reached this goal. Starting in
2021, India plans to construct six more PFBR-type reactors. 7 8

Assessments of the yield and reliability of India’s nuclear devices vary

considerably. When India tested its first fission device in May 1974, Indian
scientists claimed the device had a yield of about 12 kilotons (kt), while other
independent analysts estimated a much lower yield. 9 Similar disputes
surrounded India’s May 1998 tests. After its first of round of tests on 11 May,
India announced that it had simultaneously tested three nuclear devices: a
thermonuclear device, a fission device, and a sub-kiloton device with a
combined yield of around 65 kt. 10 However, analysts and scientists outside of
India – citing evidence from geologic and seismic data – concluded that the
cumulative yield of the Indian tests was lower. 11 12 Some scientists in India
seem to agree with this analysis and argue that India should therefore refrain
from signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and conduct
further tests. 13 14 15 However, former leaders of the Atomic Energy
Commission of India who oversaw these tests dispute such claims,
maintaining that their original estimates were correct and that further testing is
unnecessary. 16 17 18

1947 to 1974: Developing a Peaceful Nuclear Program

India’s nuclear program was mainly conceived by Homi Bhabha, an influential

scientist who persuaded political leaders to invest resources in the nuclear
sector. 19 The first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, launched an
ambitious nuclear program to boost the country’s prestige and self-reliance in
energy with primary focus on producing inexpensive electricity. However, the
decision to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle also gave India the
technical capability to pursue nuclear weapons. 20

In the years that followed, the internal debate over whether India should
develop a nuclear explosive device continued. On one hand, the scientific
establishment wanted to prove that it was technically capable of detonating a
nuclear device, whereas hawks within the security establishment pointed to
security developments in China and elsewhere as necessitating a nuclear
deterrent. 21Many politicians opposed nuclear weapons both for economic and
moral reasons, arguing that nuclear weapons would not make India safer, and
that the solution to nuclear proliferation was comprehensive global nuclear
disarmament. 22 As a result, a consensus emerged on both sides that India
should not sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
when it was opened for signature in 1968 unless the nuclear weapon states
agreed to a clear plan for nuclear disarmament. 23

Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri authorized theoretical work on the

Subterranean Nuclear Explosion for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP) project in
November 1964. 24 In the late 1960s nuclear scientists continued to develop
the technical capacity for a nuclear explosion, although the political decision
had not yet been made to carry out the test. 25 Ultimately, on 18 May 1974,
under orders from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India tested a fission device
which it described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE). 26

1974 to 1998: The Slow Path Toward Weaponization

India’s 1974 nuclear test was condemned by many countries as a violation of

the peaceful-use agreements underlying U.S. and Canadian-supplied nuclear
technology and material transfers, and was a major contributing factor to the
formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 27 However, due to
international alarm about the military implications of its nuclear explosion,
India did not follow the 1974 test with subsequent tests, nor did it immediately
weaponize the device design that it had tested. 28 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
authorized weaponization of India’s nuclear capability in late 1980s as a
response to oblique nuclear threats issued by Pakistan in the wake of the
1986 to 1987 Brasstacks crisis. 29 30 At the same time, India continued to
support efforts for nuclear disarmament. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
submitted an Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World
Order to the United Nations General Assembly. 31

As negotiations on the CTBT rapidly progressed in the early 1990s, India

came to regard the CTBT as an instrument of nonproliferation that sought to
freeze countries’ nuclear capabilities. This, along with the indefinite extension
of the NPT, reignited domestic political pressure to conduct further tests. 32 In
1995, the Narasimha Rao government considered an accelerated program of
nuclear tests but test preparations were detected by U.S. intelligence
agencies, and the resultant U.S. diplomatic pressure convinced the Rao
government to postpone the tests. 33 When Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee came to power in 1998, his government authorized two rounds of
nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998, after which India formally declared itself
to be a nuclear-weapon state. 34 Almost no one outside of India foresaw the
test; however, geospatial analysis by Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian had
identified a likely site and timeframe for the test. 35

1998 to 2009: India as an Emerging Nuclear Power

India’s nuclear tests were followed within a month by a similar set of tests by
Pakistan, resulting in fears in the international community of an arms race or
an escalation of conflict between the two openly declared nuclear powers in
South Asia. 36 The 1999 Kargil War and the 2001 to 2002 Twin Peaks Crisis
heightened tensions between the two countries, although these conventional
conflicts did not escalate to the nuclear level. 37 38 The US government
imposed sanctions on both India and Pakistan in response to their 1998
nuclear tests. 39

After the 1998 tests the Indian government established a National Security
Advisory Board, which issued a Draft Report on Indian Nuclear Doctrine in
1999 that broadly outlined India’s nuclear no-first-use policy and defensive
posture of “credible minimum nuclear deterrence.” 40 In January 2003, a
Ministry of External Affairs press release maintained adherence to
no-first-use, although with the condition that nuclear weapons could also be
used in retaliation for a biological or chemical attack, or to protect Indian
forces operating in Pakistan. 41In line with this posture, India does not keep its
nuclear force at a heightened state of alert. The country’s nuclear weapons
remain under the control of the civilian Nuclear Command Authority (NCA),
comprising of a Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, and an
Executive Council, led by the National Security Advisor. 42

A turning point in U.S.-India relations occurred when plans for negotiating a

U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement were unveiled in July 2005 under
the George W. Bush administration. This agreement, and the subsequent
endorsement of India’s case by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), enabled
India to engage in international nuclear trade. In return, India agreed to allow
safeguards on a select number of its nuclear facilities that are classified as
“civilian” in purpose. The remaining “military” facilities remained off-limits to
international inspectors. The U.S. Congress passed the Hyde Act in January
2006 to exempt nuclear cooperation with India from provisions of the U.S.
Atomic Energy Act, allowing for the adoption of a bilateral 123 nuclear
cooperation agreement in August 2007. 43 In September 2008, the NSG
approved an exemption allowing the members of this export control regime to
conduct nuclear trade with India. 44 Finally, a safeguards agreement for select
civilian nuclear facilities was concluded between India and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in February 2009, after approval by the IAEA
Board of Governors the previous year. 45

2009 to Present: India as an Established Nuclear

Power
In October 2009, India submitted a separation plan to put its civilian nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards by 2014. 46 In late July 2010, India and the
United States signed a bilateral agreement allowing India to reprocess
U.S.-obligated nuclear material at two new reprocessing facilities, to be
constructed and placed under IAEA safeguards. 47 However, the nuclear
power industry did not grow as expected because India’s liability laws
regulating civilian nuclear power plants far exceeded the international
standards for nuclear liability and held suppliers legally liable for any damages
resulting from accidents. To address these concerns and give impetus to
nuclear power industry, India ratified the IAEA Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 2016. 48

By 2019, India had put total of 26 reactors under IAEA safeguards. 49 Enabled
by the NSG waiver granted to it in 2008, India has signed nuclear cooperation
agreements with Russia, United States, France, United Kingdom, South
Korea, Canada, Argentina, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Australia, Sri Lanka,
Japan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Czech Republic and Namibia. 50 Additionally,
India continues to participate in international nuclear trade and has signed
agreements with Canada, Kazakhstan and Australia to supply uranium to fuel
its civilian nuclear reactors. Negotiations are currently underway for
concluding negotiations to construct six reactors in the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh by Westinghouse. 51

Recent Developments and Current

Status
India was recently accepted as a member of three of the four major export
control regimes. It was admitted as a member into the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) in 2016, Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017 and
Australia Group in 2018. 52 53 54

India has been actively pursuing membership into the NSG and has received
explicit support for its membership from many current NSG members
including the United States, Russia, Switzerland and Japan. 55 56 57 58 In
arguing for NSG membership, India has portrayed itself as a responsible
nuclear power, pointing to its positive record on nonproliferation and
consistent support for complete nuclear disarmament. 59 However, China
does not support an explicit membership in the NSG for India but instead
proposes a two-step approach: first would be to reach consensus on a
non-discriminatory resolution that would apply to all non-NPT countries alike
and then discuss individual membership applications by non-NPT countries. 60
India argues that its membership should be considered under current rules
because NSG is an export-control mechanism and not a nonproliferation one
so question of linking NSG membership to the NPT membership does not
arise. 61 Furthermore, India argues that there is a precedent for
non-signatories of NPT joining the NSG when France became a founding
member of the NSG in 1974 but did not accede to the NPT until 1992. 62

India’s declared nuclear posture is of credible minimum deterrence and has

successfully developed a strategic triad of nuclear delivery systems. 63 64
India has not signed the CTBT, but maintains a unilateral moratorium on
nuclear testing and supports negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT)that is “universal, non-discriminatory, and internationally verifiable.” 65
The Indian mission to the United Nations has also submitted several draft
recommendations on “reducing nuclear danger,” which include “steps to
reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons,
including through de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons.” 66 At the
same time, India has remained firmly outside of the NPT, arguing that “nuclear
weapons are an integral part of our national security and will remain so
pending the global elimination of all nuclear weapons.” 67 India maintains its
official commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. However, during
prepared remarks at the Pokhran nuclear test site in August 2019, Indian
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh implied that India’s no first use policy would
not be continued indefinitely. 68
History of India’s
Nuclear Program
Why in news?
The nuclear ‘chain reaction’ and neighbourhood challenges led India to
acquire nuclear weapons.

● Dual intent strategy - It was followed by then Prime Minister of India

Jawaharlal Nehru.
● He made it clear in 1950 that while he was against the atom bomb, the
call for a nuclear-free world must come from a position of strength, not
weakness.

Homi Jehangir Bhabha was called as the father of India’s nuclear program
and he is the founder of Tata Institute of Fundamental Research.

● Nuclear program- Homi Bhabha was tasked to develop the capability

to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but to retain the capacity
to develop a weapon if the need arose.
● Indo-China War 1962- India’s external environment became more
challenging after the defeat to China in 1962.
● In 1960’s almost all the permanent members in United Nations Security
Council had tested nuclear weapons.
● Smiling Buddha- India’s first nuclear test in 1974 where it
demonstrated its capability to produce nuclear weapons.
● Nuclear Suppliers Group- It was founded in 1974 as response to
India’s nuclear test.
● It aims to control the export of materials, equipment and technology that
can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.
 ● Operation Shakthi- It is India’s second nuclear test in 1998 which
marked the beginning of the rise of a strong and self-confident India.

What is India’s Nuclear Doctrine?

● India’s official nuclear doctrine is codified in a 2003 document, which
takes cues from the 1999 draft doctrine.
● Since 2003, India’s nuclear doctrine has had three primary components.
○ No First Use
○ Massive Retaliation
○ Credible Minimum Deterrence
● No First Use - India will only use nuclear weapons in response to a
nuclear attack on Indian Territory or Indian forces.
● Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
● A warning is made about their possible use in response to a chemical or
biological attack.
● Massive Retaliation - India’s response to a first strike will be massive,
to cause ‘unacceptable damage’.
● While the doctrine does not explicitly espouse a counter-value strategy
(civilian targets), the wording implies the same.
● Credible Minimum Deterrence - The number and capabilities of India’s
nuclear weapons and delivery systems should merely be sufficient to
ensure intolerable retaliation.
● This should also keep in mind first-strike survival of its relatively meagre
arsenal.
● India’s strategic nuclear command was formally established in 2003.
● Nuclear Command Authority

Council Head Function

Political Prime It is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear
council Minister weapons
Executive National It provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear
council Security Command Authority and executes the directives given to
Advisor it by the Political Council

What is India’s nuclear triad?

● It refers to the delivery of nuclear weapons via land, sea and air i.e.
○ Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
○ Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and
○ Strategic bombers.
● Purpose - To reduce the possibility that an enemy could destroy all of a
nation's nuclear forces in a first-strike attack.
● It ensures a credible threat of a second strike, and thus increases a
nation's nuclear deterrence.
What are the nuclear organisations
present globally?
● Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) – It prohibits any nuclear
weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion anywhere in the
world.
● The treaty was opened for signature in 1996, and has been signed by
186 nations and ratified by 176.
● The treaty cannot formally enter into force until it is ratified by 44
specific nations, 8 of which have yet to do so: China, India, Pakistan,
North Korea, Israel, Iran, Egypt, and the United States.
● International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – Also known as the
world’s Atoms for Peace and Development organization within the
United Nations.
● It is the international centre for cooperation in the nuclear field to
promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies.

India is a member of the Multilateral Export Control Regime (All 3

groupings)except the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
References

1. Indian Express- Nuclear weapons and India

2. PIB- Nuclear doctrine