Case History of Geosynthetic

Reinforced Segmental Retaining Wall

Failure

MD Sahadat Hossain, Ph.D., P.E.

Assistant Professor, Department of Civil Engineering,

Box 19308, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX 76019
email: hossain@uta.edu

Victor Omelchenko, P.E.

Principal, Schnabel Engineering North, 656 Quince Orchard Road,

Suite 700, Gaithersburg, MD 20878
email: vomelchenko@schnabel-eng.com.

Tahsina Mahmood

Graduate Student, Department of Civil Engineering,

The University of Texas at Arlington , Arlington, TX-76010
e-mail: tahsina.mahmood@mavs.uta.edu

ABSTRACT
Segmental Retaining Walls (SRW) have been increasingly used in many federal, state and private
projects over the last 20 years. SRW‟s are reliable, constructible, and cost effective. However, failure
of SRW‟s has become a problem for all agencies using them. This paper presents the case history of a
SRW located in Rockville, MD, which collapsed. The SRW wall was up to 15 ft high and was
constructed using geosynthetic reinforcement. Soils in the reinforced zone generally consisted of on-
site silty sand and sandy silts residual soils. The top of wall moved about 12 inches to 18 inches, prior
to collapse of the wall. This paper presents the results of the forensic investigations to determine the
causes of failure. An extensive geotechnical investigation program was undertaken to investigate the
wall collapse. A total of 9 (nine) soil test borings were drilled in November 2003, after the wall
collapsed. The test boring data indicated the presence of brown and reddish brown, tan and dark silty
sand and sandy silt. Two test pits were excavated to check the soil and geogrid conditions after failure
occurred. Voids were discovered below the geogrid reinforcement and the geogrid were not horizontal.
Compaction testing in the test pits indicated soils were not adequately compacted within the reinforced
zone. Also, observations in the test pits revealed that inadequate internal damage was provided within
the wall. Stability analyses of SRW were performed using Finite Element Program PLAXIS. Based on
site investigation, test pit results and stability analyses, it was concluded that the wall failure was
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 2
caused by a combination of factors: improper geogrid installations, inadequate compaction of soils
within reinforced zone, and inadequate internal drainage of backfill soils.

KEYWORDS: SRW, Backfill soils, Failure Analyses, Drainage, Numerical Modeling

INTRODUCTION
The first commercial proprietary mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) wall system was introduced in
the U.S. in the 1960‟s. It utilized metallic strips to reinforce the soil and precast concrete panels that retain
the soil at the face of the wall. Its use worldwide has increased dramatically since the 1970‟s, mainly due
to its economics and aesthetics. Competitive wall systems using welded wire grids were introduced in the
mid 1970‟s. Geosynthetic reinforced walls were introduced in the 1980‟s. In the 1990‟s, the use of
geosynthetic reinforced walls increased dramatically by the introduction of segmental retaining wall
(SRW) units (Leshchinsky and Han, 2004).

More recently, reinforcement materials such as metallic strips, geotextiles, or geogrids are being used
to reinforce the backfill of retaining walls, which are generally referred to as mechanically stabilized
Earth (MSE) walls. MSE walls are typically constructed using three structural components: 1) geogrid
reinforcement 2) block facing 3) backfill soil. As the backfill is placed, additional courses of block facing
are laid. The geogrid reinforcement is placed horizontally at predetermined elevation as the backfill is
placed in the reinforced zone of the wall. Some common causes of MSE wall failure are small offset
distance, higher height of MSE Wall, low quality fill soil and insufficient reinforcement length. A sudden
draw down of water may also greatly decrease the overall stability of wall. Bearing or deep seated failure
could control the failure if, the foundation soil is weak (Leshchinsky and Han, 2004)Yoo and Jung (2006)
presented the MSE wall failure case in Korea and concluded that poor quality backfill soil may have
contributed to the failure. Scarborough (2005) presented the MSE wall failure due to poor quality backfill
soil, which contributed to water pressure build up against the wall face. The overwhelming causes for
these cases of poor performance were related to: (1) backfilling with improperly draining fine-grained
soil; and (2) contractors deficiencies that could have been avoided with proper quality control and
inspection (Koerner and Soong 2001)

SRW‟s are typically constructed using three structural components: 1) geogrid reinforcement 2) block
facing 3) backfill soil. Backfill soils within SRW‟s are constructed in soil lifts of approximately 8 to 12
inches in height. As the backfill soil is placed, additional courses of block facing are laid. The geogrid
reinforcement is placed horizontally at predetermined embedment lengths and at predetermined elevations
as the backfill soil is placed in the reinforced zone of the wall. The backfill soil is compacted using
mechanical compaction equipment to at least 95 percent of the maximum dry density per ASTM D-698.
This process typically continues until the planned top of wall is achieved.

A maximum 15 ft high SRW constructed along the eastern boundary of the Tower Oaks residential
development in Rockville, Maryland. A typical cross-section for a SRW is presented in Figure 1. The
wall was about 760 feet long and was constructed in the late summer and fall of 1996. Large gaps and
separations in the wall facing blocks were observed during late 2002 and the wall collapsed in 2003. In an
attempt to identify possible causes of the collapse, an extensive geotechnical investigation program was
undertaken to investigate the wall collapse. A total of 9 (nine) soil test borings were drilled in November
2003, after the wall collapsed. Two test pits were excavated to check the soil and geogrid conditions after
failure occurred. Stability analyses of SRW were performed using Finite Element Program PLAXIS.
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 3
The objectives of the paper are to present the extensive site investigation results and to summarize the
causes of SRW failure.

Figure 1: A Typical Segmental Retaining Wall

SITE CONDITIONS AND WALL COLLAPSE

A maximum 15 ft high SRW was constructed in the late summer and fall of 1996 along the eastern
boundary of the Tower Oaks residential development, in Rockville, Maryland. Large gaps and
separations in the wall facing blocks were observed during late 2002. Various leaning and bulging of the
retaining wall were also observed. The greatest leaning and bulging occurred where the wall height was
highest. Surveying of the wall indicated that wall movements were as large as about 12 to 18 inches.
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 4
Gaps and separations continued to increase until wall collapse occurred in 2003. Horizontal gaps up to
about 1 inch wide were visible as presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2: View of Separation of Facing Units before Wall Collapse

Scarp-like failures were visible at several locations along the slope at the top of the wall prior to
failure. The scarps were generally located at a distance of about 16 to 17 feet behind the wall face as
shown in Figure 3. The townhouses were located about 36 feet behind the face of the wall. Corrugated
black plastic drainage conduit was attached to the downspouts of the townhouse units. The individual
conduits extend to a common conduit that conducts rainwater over the top of the retaining wall in an
attempt to reduce infiltration into the reinforced zone (Figure 4) The SRW collapsed in June 2003.

FAILURE ANALYSES APPROACH

An extensive geotechnical investigation program was undertaken to investigate the cause of wall
collapse. A total of 9 (nine) soil test borings were drilled in November 2003, after wall collapsed. Two
test pits were excavated to check the soil and geogrid conditions after failure occurred. Voids were
discovered below the geogrid reinforcement and the geogrid were not horizontal. Compaction testing was
performed in the test pits, which indicated soils were not adequately compacted within the reinforced
zone.
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 5
In recent years, numerical methods have been increasingly used for analysis of slope stability and
other geotechnical engineering problems. Budge et al. (2006) used FEM program PLAXIS to simulate the
MSE wall behavior and found that the simulation results matches quite well with the field data. Han and
Leshchinsky ( 2004) had used limit equilibrium and continuum mechanics-based difference program
FLAC to investigate the stability of MSE walls. San et al. (1994) presented the comparisons of potential
failure surface and the maximum tensile force developed in the geosynthetic reinforcement layers
between finite element (FE) method and limit equilibrium (LE) method. Dawson et al. (1999) used finite
different program FLAC to determine the stability of un-reinforced slopes. In the current paper, FEM
Program PLAXIS was used for stability analyses of SRW.

Figure 3: Drainage conduits over the wall

Figure 4: Scrap failures behind the front face of the wall before wall collapse
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 6
Based on the site investigations and test pit results the engineering characteristics of backfill soil and
geogrid reinforcement conditions are presented first. Then, the finite element analyses and results are
discussed.

SITE INVESTIGATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF

BACKFILL SOILS
Subsurface investigations have been performed several times during the failure analyses. Two soil
test borings were drilled by Schnabel Engineering in May 2002. Nine additional soil test borings were
drilled in November 2003 after the collapse. The test borings are located along the wall to investigate the
characteristics of backfill soils. The soil samples were collected at every foot for first five feet and then
five feet intervals up to the maximum depths of drilling, which was typically 20 ft.

Figure 5: Grain Size Distribution curve for Backfill Soils

The test boring data indicated the presence of brown and reddish brown, tan and dark silty sand and
sandy silt. Fill soils, which were underlain by residual natural soils, which generally consisted of sandy
silt (ML) and Silty Sand (SM)The fill soils were placed during construction of the SRW. The thickness of
fill soils varied from 10 to 20 ft. The soils were generally soft and contain some wood, topsoil and root
material.

Soil samples recovered from the borings were tested in a soil laboratory to evaluate natural moisture
contents, natural in-place density, and to classify soils. Tests on the upper soils indicated SM, GM and
ML classification per ASTM D-2487, although the majority of the soils were classified as ML and SM.
The grain size analyses showed that the soils had 22.2 to 73 percent fines passing the No. 200 sieve, as
presented in Figure 5. The backfill soil did not conform to the FHWA recommendations. FHWA (1995)
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 7
guideline recommends that the soil passing sieve no. 200 should be less that 15 percent to be considered
as backfill soil. Based on the experimental data, natural moisture content of backfill soils varied from 7.1
to 29.5 percent. However, during the wall construction in 1996, the natural moisture content test revealed
that the moisture content of the soils were between 10 and 15 percent. There was significant increase in
moisture content of backfill soils over the years. Atterberg limit testing indicated liquid limits of about 29
and 37 and plasticity indices of about three and eight. This data indicated that the backfill soils used in
the SRW were generally fine grained materials with low permeability.

Figure 6: The Geogrid Drop or Downward Bend at the Block Facing Connections

Ground water was encountered at a depth of about 9 to 15 feet below the existing grades during soil
test boring. Ground water seepage through the wall was continuously observed to occur at a height of 3 to
8 feet above the base of the wall, even during periods when precipitation had not occurred in a number of
weeks.

TEST PIT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF GEOSYNTHETIC

REINFORCEMENTS
Test pits were excavated on November 02, 2004. Test pits were excavated at a location where
movement of the SRW was less than other locations of the wall. It was believed that at the test pit
locations, soil and geogrid should be in a condition which would be representative of the conditions prior
to wall collapse. The test pit observation results are discussed in this section.

The first layer of geogrid was observed at a depth of about 12 inches below the top of the wall. The
geogrid had a drop or downward bend where it connected to the block facing. The geogrid was also not
placed horizontally, as required, but tended to slope downward as presented in Figure 6. Also, a two to
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 8
three inches void space was observed where there was no soil beneath the geogrid at the wall face as
result of bend in the geogrid. The second layer of geogrid was about 16 inches below the first layer of
geogrid. Similar conditions were observed at the second geogrid layer. The geogrid had about a 45
degree bend where it connected to the block facing. A smaller void space below the geogrid was observed
as a result of the bend in geogrid. Cross-sections of geogrid in the test pit 2 are presented in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Cross-sections of Geogrids in Test Pit 2

Field compaction testing was performed on soils within the reinforced zone in the test pits.
Compaction test results indicated that compaction was about 81 percent, although a minimum of 95
percent compaction was required for the project. Observations in the test pits indicated that a vertical
drainage layer directly behind the block facing had not been installed. Also a drainage blanket of the base
of the wall and a chimney drain at the rear of the reinforced soil zone had not been installed.
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 9

WALL STABILITY ANALYSES

Wall stability analysis was performed at the location of failure. Stability analyses of SRW were
performed using Finite Element Program PLAXIS. Six layers of geogrid reinforcement were modeled in
the analysis as used in the actual design. The geogrid reinforcement used in the wall was Strata Systems
Stratagrid 200 and Stratagrid 500. Stratagrid 200 and 500 have Long Term Design Strengths (LTDS‟s) of
1,395 pounds/foot and 2,360 pounds/foot, respectively, in the primary strength direction. Plans indicate
that the geogrid embedment length measured 5 to10 feet from the face of the retaining wall. The details
finite element analyses are presented here:

Mesh Generation and Boundary Conditions

The two-dimensional finite element program PLAXIS was used to simulate the SRW failure. Plain
strain model was used for the analyses. The 15 nodded triangle elements were used in the modeling.
Based on PLAXIS version 8.0, a robust triangulation procedure was used to form „unstructured meshes‟.
These meshes are considered to be numerically efficient when compared to regular „structured meshes‟.
The powerful 15- node element provides an accurate calculation of stresses and failure loads. The two
vertical boundaries were free to move vertically and were considered to be fixed in the horizontal
boundary direction. The foundation soil was considered to be stiff soil and its stability is not considered in
this analysis. Therefore, the bottom boundary has been modeled as fixed boundary. The generated mesh is
presented in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Generated Mesh for Finite Element Modeling

Soil Properties
Mohr-coulomb model was used for the considered for the analyses. This elastic perfectly-plastic
model requires five basic input parameters (Young‟s modulus, E, Poisson‟s ratio, ν, cohesion, c, friction
angle, φ, and dilatancy angle, ψ)The soil properties are presented in Table 1.
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 10
Table 1: Soil Parameters

Soil Fill Natural

γunsat [lb/ft³] 130 120
γsat [lb/ft³] 130 120
kx [ft/day] 3.28 0.003
ky [ft/day] 3.28 0.003
Eref [lb/ft²] 48000 84000
ν [-] 0.3 0.35
cref [lb/ft²] 1 1
φ [°] 24 32
ψ [°] 0 2
Rinter. [-] 0.67 1

MSE FACING WALL AND GEOGRIDS

The vertical component of the SRW facing units were modeled using “plate” (beam) elements
possessing x-translation, y-translation and a rotational degree of freedom at each node, and able to sustain
axial forces. A footing was also simulated at the base of the facing wall by using “plate” element.
Geogrids are slender structures with a normal stiffness but with no bending stiffness. Geogrids can only
sustain tensile forces and no compression. Geogrids were modeled using “geogrid” elements possessing
only one (axial) degree of freedom at each node, and an inability to sustain compressive forces. Material
and geometrical properties used for modeling the geogrid. Interface elements were provided to simulate
the soil and geogrid interaction behavior. Each interface was assigned a „virtual thickness‟ which is an
imaginary dimension used to define the material properties of the interface. The interaction between soil
and geogrid was modeled by choosing a suitable value for the strength reduction factor in the interface
(Rinter)For the present analysis, a typical value of Rinter, which is 0.67 is used for the fill soil. The factor
relates the interface strength (wall friction and adhesion) to the soil strength (friction angle and cohesion).

Analysis Types and Cases

To determine the causes of wall failure two different conditions were analyzed:

(1) When the water table was at the bottom of the wall. The designed backfill soils for the SRW are
granular soils so that the pore water pressure will not develop during the lifetime of SRW‟s.

(2) However, many times during the design, instead of free draining materials, soils with the
presence of SILT or CLAY are used as backfill soils. Koerner and Soong (2001) presented that
backfilling with improperly draining fine-grained soil are prevalent cause of SRW wall failure.
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 11
Therefore, the second case will be analyzed assuming the backfill soils were not free draining
soils and water table was at the middle of wall.

Case 1 Water Table at the Bottom of Wall

Based on the finite element analyses, it was determined that the maximum wall movement at the top
of the wall is about 0.85 ft. The actual field investigations results showed that the wall moved around 1 ft
to 1.5 ft before collapse. Therefore the numerical modeling results indicate that the water table may not
have been at the bottom of the wall during failure. Also, during site visit, visible sign of water at the mid
level of the wall was observed. The numerical modeling results are presented Figure 9.

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

Figure 9: FEM Results for Water Table at Base of Wall (a) Deformed Mesh, (b) Contour Lines of
Total Displacement, (c) Contour Line of Stress, and (d) Plastic Points
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 12
Figure 9a present graphical view of deformed SRW. The highest displacement was at the top of the
wall and gradually decreased with depth of the wall. Figure 9c presents the increase in stress below the
SRW foundation soils. The pattern of change in effective stresses is quite logical and seems to reflect the
actual field condition properly. The plastic points are the stress points in a plastic state, displayed in a plot
of the deformed geometry. The plastic stress points (Figure 9d) indicate that the stresses lie on the surface
of the Coulomb failure envelope.

Case 2 Water Table at the Mid Height of Wall

Based on the finite element analyses, it was determined that the maximum wall movement at the top
of the wall is about 1.27 ft (Figure 10), when the water table is at mid height of SRW. The actual field
investigations results showed that the wall moved around 1 ft to 1.5 ft before collapse. Therefore, the
numerical modeling results indicate that the water table may have been at the mid height of the wall
during failure. During site visit, visible sign of water at the mid level of the wall was observed. Based on

Figure 10: FEM Results for Water Table at Mid Height of Wall (a) Deformed Mesh, (b) Contour Lines
of Total Displacement, (c) Contour Line of Stress, and (d) Plastic Points
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 13
the laboratory investigations of backfill soil was classified as SM, ML, with 22.2 to 73 percent fines
passing the No. 200 sieve. The permeability of these soils is expected to be very low, compared to free
draining backfill soils. Therefore, it is quite possible that part of the backfill soil may have been saturated
and contributed to the wall failure. The numerical modeling findings conform to the actual finding in the
field. The results from the numerical modeling are presented in Figure 10. The effective stress is highest
at the bottom of SRW foundation and the plastics points are clearly beyond the reinforced area, which
lead to eventual SRW failure.

PROBABLE CAUSES OF FAILURE

The backfill soils in SRW should be free draining granular soils, or SRW‟s should have adequate
internal drainage to prevent hydrostatic pressure from developing within the SRW‟s. Based on the
geotechnical investigations, laboratory experimental results, and test pit results, it was found that the
backfill soils consisted of soft silty (ML) soils. The permeability of ML soils is expected to be low and
these soils will not act as a free draining backfill soil. Therefore, water entering the SRW would remain
within the wall for sometime before draining out of the wall. The design of a SRW typically does not
account for hydrostatic pressure, but assumes a fully drained condition. During the site visits, it was noted
that portions of the wall face were visibly wet, even though some of the visits took place after extended
periods of relatively dry weather. This indicated that water was draining out of the wall very slowly. It is
believed that inadequate internal drainage within the wall was a major reason for wall collapse.

The numerical modeling results also present insight into the causes of failure. When the water table
was at the base of wall, the stress was developing at the foundation level and the top of wall moved about
0.85 ft. However, when partially saturated condition was analyzed, the top of SRW moved about 1.27 ft,
which is close to the movement observed at the field, before failure. The plastics pints for the partially
saturated conditions went far beyond the reinforced soil zone. Therefore, the poor draining materials or
inadequate internal drainage may have contributed to the failure.

Segmental retaining walls behave as gravity structures and rely on their self weight to resist
destabilizing forces. Geogrids provide the reinforcing to allow the soil mass to behave as a gravity
structure. Geogrids need to be tensioned properly to reinforce the soils and to allow the wall to act as a
large mass. Drops or bends and associated slack within geogrids will not allow proper tensioning of the
geogrid and will not allow the soil mass to behave as gravity structure. Observations within test pits
indicated bends and slack within the geogrids, contrary to horizontal placement of geogrids i.e.
perpendicular to the wall facing, which is a standard design requirement and common industry practice.
The geogrid needed to be staked and stretched to take the slack out of the geogrid prior to placement of
fill soil over the geogrid. Therefore, the bends and slack within the geogrid are suspected to be the
contributing factors for the SRW failure.

Based on field density test results in test pits, it appeared that the backfill soils were not properly
compacted. Compaction test results indicated that compaction was about 81.0 percent. Low compaction
of backfill soils may cause problems for several reasons including allowing additional surface water to
infiltrate the soil, settlement of retained soil, and poor soil to geogrid interaction, thus allowing for
slippage and wall movement at the geogrid locations. Poor compaction of backfill within the reinforced
soil zone is also believed to have contributed to the failure of SRW.
 Vol. 14, Bund. C 14

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper presented the case history of a failed SRW located in Rockville, Maryland. The SRW was
up to 15 ft high and was constructed using geosynthetic reinforcement. An extensive geotechnical
investigation program was undertaken to investigate the SRW failure. Stability analyses of SRW were
performed using Finite Element Program PLAXIS. Also, soils borings were drilled and two test pits were
excavated to check the backfill soil and geogrid conditions. The results of the forensic investigations to
determine the causes of failure and possible remedial measures are presented in this paper. In conclusion,
the wall failure and collapse was caused by a combination of the following factors:
 Improper installation of geogrid was performed, which allowed slacks and bends within the
geogrids. These bends and slack did not allow adequate tensioning of geogrids.
 Soils were inadequately compacted within the reinforced soil zone.

 Backfills soils were silty soils (ML), which are not free draining soils and have low
permeability. Inadequate internal drainage was provided within the wall, which allowed
hydrostatic pressure to develop at the wall face and/or at the end of reinforced soil zone where
soil “scraps” or depressions occurred.

REFERENCES
1. Budge, A.S., Bay, J.A., and Anderson, L. R. (2006) “Calibrating Vertical Deformations in a
Finite Element Model of an MSE Wall”, GeoCongress 2006 , Feruary 26 – March 1, 2006,
Atlanta, ASCE-2006.
2. Dawson, E.M., Roth, W.H., AND Drescher, A. (1999) “Slope Stability analysis by Strength
Reduction.” Geotechnique, 49(60, 835-840.
3. FHWA Publication (1995) “Geosynthetic Design and Construction Guideline". FHWA
Publication Number: FHWA-HI-95-038, Publication Year: 1995.
4. Koerner, R. M., and Soong, T. Y. (2001) “Geosynthetic reinforced segmental retaining walls.”
Geotext. Geomembr., 19(6), 359–386.
5. Leshchinsky, D. and Han, J. (2004) “Geosynthetic Reinforced Multitiered Walls”, Journal of
Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering, Vol. 130, No 12, ASCE-December 2004.
6. Yoo, C, and Jung, H.Y. (2006) “Case Histories of Geosynthetic Reinforced Segmental Retaining
Wall Failure” Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmnetal Engineering, Vol. 132, No. 12,
December 1, 2006.
7. Han, J., and Leshchinsky, D. “Limit Equilibrium & Continum Mechanics Based Numerical
Methods for Analyzing Stability of MSE Walls” Geotechnical Special Publications GSP 140,
Slopes and Retaining Structures under Seismic and Static Conditions, Geo-Frontiers 2005,
January 24-26, 2005 in Austin, Texas, ASCE-2005.
Vol. 14, Bund. C 15
8. San, K. C., Leshchinsky, D. and Matsui, T. (1994) “Geosynthetic Reinforced Slopes: Limit
Equilibrium & Finite Element Analysis”, Soils and Foundations, Vol. 34, No. 2, 79-85, June
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