Problems of democratic transition

By Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais - November 17, 2014

The big vacuum of credibility, trust, genuineness, true representation, and

clean image, helps the military run the country with the political horses it
can choose at will, discard and replace when they are found too weak to
pull the political cart

Since the October 1999 coup, every party in the opposition, regional, ethnic,
Islamic or mainstream has been threatening to dislodge General Musharraf
and his political associates through street agitation. Some have spewed more
rhetoric, shown more enthusiasm and have been more active in fashioning
up a coalition of groups, individuals and parties to achieve this end; others
have been relatively more circumspect. On the ground, however, there are no
visible signs of any agitation yet.

The examples of some of the states that have made the transition to
democracy from military regimes show that pressure from below through
mobilising the masses at the popular level, civil society and professional
groups works in making the hard military regimes amenable to the idea
of democratic change. The present regime has been in power now for more
than seven years, and from the way it is preparing for the general elections
next year, it is not likely to give up its hold on power anytime soon. The
man on the top and his core of political allies, though not under great
pressure, may simply change alignments among the groups eager to seek
cooptation with them.

Why has the opposition failed in stirring any big political trouble so far, and
why is it unlikely to produce any storm in the near future? Three factors,
among others, stand out. Consider.

The first is the embarrassing political reality that a big section of Pakistan’s
political elites have been more than willing to join the military
governments. Ayub Khan achieved remarkable success in putting together a
coalition of elites from the landed aristocracy, new industrial/business
classes, and the civilian bureaucracy. This good lesson was never lost to
successive military rulers, including the present one. Successive generations
of the political elites, coming from socially dominant groups, have continued
to join the military regimes without any scruple. The only exceptions are
the Pashtun and Baloch nationalist groups.

The pattern of military-political elites, the latter in subordinate position,

ruling together demonstrates two important points about Pakistani politics.
First, we have a sort of elite consociationalism, with a nebulous consensus
on controlled democracy. Second, for our political elites, power comes before
principles or a commitment to democratic norms. There are also structural
and social reasons for the willingness of the elites to seek collaboration
with the military, but space does not permit a discussion of them here.

The second important factor for the failure of the opposition to mobilise
society in the cause for democracy is its inability to engage the fledging
civil society. The civil society, a product of economic development and
modernisation, doesn’t trust the present class of political elites, whether they
are with the government or in the two mainstream political parties, the
Muslim League (Nawaz) and the Pakistan People’s Party. Their political
incompetence, nepotism and corruption and their politics of polarisation and
confrontation disappointed the civil society groups.

Most of the civil society seems to be committed to the basic principles of

democratic governance. But it is not clear about what role it can and should
play for helping the country transition to democracy. Civil society groups do
a lot of advocacy for gender equality, rule of law, respect for human rights
and freedoms, but they don’t want to organise or lead the movement for the
restoration of democracy. Once there is a credible leadership with an agenda
of change, some of the civil society groups may join as a supportive
element rather than be in the vanguard. In democratic transition from
mobilising masses to post-regime change reconstruction, civil society groups
in the third-wave democratisation have played a vital role. The reason these
groups may not play that role in Pakistan is that they are not entirely
convinced about the democratic credentials of the opposition parties.

Third, and perhaps the most important factor disabling the political
opposition is the structure of their parties and the social hierarchies of their
leadership. The old political parties of Pakistan are closed political outfits,
kind of family businesses in which the leaders at the top have acquired a
divine right of sorts to run them, most often in an autocratic way, and
frequently to safeguard interest of the dynasties. They are oblivious to the
social and economic changes that have taken place during the past twenty
years, notably the emergence of very large rural and urban middle classes.

Since the founding of the Pakistan People’s Party, for instance, and the
mass mobilisation by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, there has been remarkable growth
of urbanisation and a manifold increase in the social and economic mobility
of various sectors of Pakistani society. None of the old parties, including
old-fashioned ethnic nationalists is open or democratic enough to give
representation to the rising middle class of Pakistan. And the parties have
no system or process to gauge the aspirations, changing values, opinions,
likes and dislikes of different layers of society today.

Since democracy within the parties would have made the dynastic leaders
vulnerable to leadership change, they never encouraged, allowed or even
tolerated it. It was a design to control the party machines, not neglect. They
have substituted efforts to build a support base through populism or by
doing exactly what the military regimes have been doing: assembling an
alternative coalition of political elites that have relatively secure political
constituencies on account of their dominant social position. The label of a
few parties, PPP being one such, makes a marginal difference in the final
outcome of balloting. But the traditional base, first of the Muslim League
and then of the PPP, has gradually withered away.

The two main opposition parties and the military regime know their
weaknesses too well. This is why the leaders in Dubai and London are
eager to explore back channels to strike a bargain, collaborate, and if the
price is right, jump on the bandwagon and push the present crowd out.
Unfortunately, our struggle for democracy will remain a struggle for power
among the rival coalitions of elites, until new leaders with a new vision
and a new programme emerge on our political horizon. But the emergence
of such leaders may have to meet two preconditions: free and fair elections
and, second, active involvement of genuine civil society groups (associations
of lawyers, teachers, labour unions, students, teachers, farmers, and
professional groups) in the struggle for democracy.

Neither of the two conditions is likely to materialise in the near future. The
dominant elites, contrary to their public claims, have rigged elections when
in power. They will not mind if the elections are rigged to make them win.
Second, the civil society is middle class in ethos, values and aspirations and
is not willing to throw its weight behind the traditional mainstream party
leaders or the mullahs. The big vacuum of credibility, trust, genuineness,
true representation, and clean image, helps the military run the country
with the political horses it can choose at will, discard and replace when
they are found too weak to pull the political cart.

The author is a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of

Management Sciences.