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Could artificial intelligence have consciousness? Some perspectives from

neurology and parapsychology

Article in AI & SOCIETY · December 2021

DOI: 10.1007/s00146-021-01305-x

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AI & SOCIETY
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01305-x

OPEN FORUM

Could artificial intelligence have consciousness? Some perspectives

from neurology and parapsychology
Yew‑Kwang Ng1

Received: 13 June 2021 / Accepted: 15 October 2021

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag London Ltd., part of Springer Nature 2021

Abstract
The possibility of AI consciousness depends much on the correct answer to the mind–body problem: how our materialistic
brain generates subjective consciousness? If a materialistic answer is valid, machine consciousness must be possible, at
least in principle, though the actual instantiation of consciousness may still take a very long time. If a non-materialistic one
(either mentalist or dualist) is valid, machine consciousness is much less likely, perhaps impossible, as some mental ele-
ment may also be required. Some recent advances in neurology (despite the separation of the two hemispheres, our brain as
a whole is still able to produce only one conscious agent; the negation of the absence of a free will, previously thought to
be established by the Libet experiments) and many results of parapsychology (on medium communications, memories of
past lives, near-death experiences) suggestive of survival after our biological death, strongly support the non-materialistic
position and hence the much lower likelihood of AI consciousness. Instead of being concern about AI turning conscious and
machine ethics, and trying to instantiate AI consciousness soon, we should perhaps focus more on making AI less costly
and more useful to society.

Keywords Artificial intelligence · Consciousness · Machines · Mind · Neurology · Parapsychology

With the spectacular advancement in the technology of
artificial intelligence (AI), the question of AI conscious-
ness has been widely discussed (e.g. Dehaene et al. 2017;
Robitzski 2018; Savage 2019; Numata et al. 2020).1 Indeed,
‘as far back as 2004, the UK funding body EPSRC awarded
an “Adventure Fund” grant [GR/S47946/01] of around
£500,000, to a team of “Roboteers and Psychologists” at the
Universities of Essex and Bristol, with a goal of instantiating
“machine consciousness” in a humanoid-like robot called
Cronos’ (Bishop 2018). Here, we use ‘consciousness’ in its
‘phenomenal’ sense of having subjectivity and affective feel-
ings (pains and pleasures). Just being able to beat humans
in chess is similar to (though more advanced than) a guided
missile being able to reach the target and destroy it, but with
no real consciousness. This question of AI consciousness
The author wishes to thank Prof. Karamjit Gill and two
anonymous reviewers for helping to improve this paper.
* Yew‑Kwang Ng
Kwang.ng@monash.edu
1
Emeritus Professor, Monash University, Clayton, Australia
is very important at least in the following two important
senses:
• While consciousness is not a necessary condition for con-
cerning with the possible threat of AI, turning conscious
may quantumly increase the capability of AI and hence
also increase its potential threat to us, making AI much
more of a concern.2
• Having consciousness (especially in the aspect of having
affective feelings) raises the ethical question of the proper
treatment of them, just like we should be morally con-
cerned with animal welfare and suffering, but not with
table welfare which does not exist.3
1
Consciousness is used in its commonsense sense, perhaps well
described as ‘inner qualitative, subjective states, and processes of
sentience or awareness’ (Searle 2000, p. 559).
2
Thus, ‘if that machine somehow becomes sentient, with preferences
and the drive to achieve them—or conscious, with a sense of self and
of the future, the ingredients for ambition—then it is deeply threaten-
ing to us’ (Donath 2020, p. 17). However, conscious AI may also be
less dangerous to humans by having empathy (Davies 2016).
3
On the reverse question of machine ethics (towards humans and
other machines), see Nath & Sahu (2020); on ethics guidelines for AI
regulation, see Hoffmann & Hahn (2019); on artificial morality and
human–robot interaction, see Misselhorn (2020).

13
Vol.:(0123456789)

This paper combines parapsychological studies with
some recent neurological advances to throw lights on the
mind–body problem, in a way strongly suggesting that AI
consciousness may well neigh be impossible, at least much
less likely and much more difficult to instantiate than many
imagine. However, as very complicated issues are involved,
this paper does not definitely rule out AI consciousness
absolutely.
While many researchers may hesitate to accept parapsy-
chological studies, these studies have been found to be of
‘generally extreme rigor of their experimental approach’
and fulfil ‘most of the scientific methodological criteria that
characterize “real” sciences’ (Mousseau 2003, p. 280; see
also De Foe 2016, p. 110 for further support). While there
have been forceful critics (e.g. Randi 1982/2011, Martin
and Augustine 2015), there are also convincing replies and
defenses (e.g. Kelly et al. 2007, 2015; McLuhan 2010; Presti
2021).
Section 1 below discusses the relationship between
AI consciousness and the philosophical mind-brain or
mind–body problem.4 Section 2 discusses recent neuro-
logical advances that help to reject (or at least seriously
qualify) decades-old evidences supportive of a materialistic
answer to the mind–body problem. Section 3 summarizes
some parapsychological studies supportive of the position
beyond simple materialism. Section 4 offers some conclud-
ing remarks on the implications for AI and society.
1 AI consciousness and the mind–body
problem
Most people accept the compelling Darwin’s theory of
evolution.5 The evolution of non-living into living things
is also largely answered by the discovery of the double-
helix structure of DNA by Watson and Crick (1953; see a
description by Watson 1968). When complex organic mol-
ecules evolve into the double helix structure as discovered,
they may reproduce themselves. This is by definition life.
However, how could matter, including living things (and
their brains) without consciousness, evolve into something
4
On the relevance of the mind–body problem and the importance of
consciousness for AI issues, see Andreotta (2020). In particular, ‘AI
rights is disanalogous from animal rights in an important respect: ani-
mal rights can proceed without a solution to the ‘Hard Problem’ of
consciousness. Not so with AI rights’ (Abstract).
5
The present author, originally a hard-core materialist, still largely
believes in evolution after conversion to non-materialism after
acquaintance to the wealth of evidence against simple materialism.
However, he doubts the possibility of the emergence of mind after
just 14 billion years since the Big Bang if that occurred naturally. For
further discussions, see Ng (2019, 2021).
13
AI & SOCIETY
with subjective consciousness? How could the brain cre-
ate or generate the mind? This is the hard problem called
by philosophers as the ‘world knot’ (Chalmers 1995). This
paper does not pretend to be able to untie this knot. Rather,
it focuses on the point that the possibility of AI or machine
consciousness depends much on the type of answer to this
hard problem.
There are numerous attempts to answer this hard problem.
For simplicity and for our specific purpose, we focus only
on two main groups: the materialist and the non-materialist.
The materialist or physicalist answer to the mind–body prob-
lem is also called the reductionist. This is the belief that
everything mental could be reduced to matter (defined to be
inclusive of energy) or its functioning. The mental or spir-
itualistic aspects are just some characteristics or functions of
matter (in its complicated form of our brain). If this answer
is correct, then AI consciousness must be possible at least
in principle. If consciousness is just some characteristic of
some complex enough matter, in principle, if we put the mat-
ter in such a complex form, it will give rise to consciousness.
For the non-materialist, we focus mainly on the idealis-
tic/mentalist and the dualist answers. Both these answers
regard the mental as not just reducible to the materialistic,
but as independent of the materialistic. The former treats the
mental as more fundamental than the materialistic, if mat-
ter exists at all. The latter (dualist) treats the two at parity;
both the mental and the materialistic have an independent
existence.
Even if the materialist answer is correct, and machine
consciousness is in principle possible, this possibility will
still likely not be realized for a very long time. This is so
because the materialist answer is just an in-principle view
to the hard problem; it does not provide an explanation as
to how the mental may arise from matter, or in our material
brain.
Encouraged by important advances in neuro-science,
Ramachandran (2011, p. 247) confidently stated that,
“Sometime in the twenty-first century, science will confront
one of its last great mysteries: the nature of the self.” In the
context of that whole book, this likely means the solution to
the hard problem, untying the world knot. This is unlikely
in the next ten centuries. If we cannot understand how con-
sciousness can arise in our own brain, it seems very difficult
to build machine to generate consciousness.
Francis Bacon (1620) wrote that ‘human knowledge and
human power meet in one, for where the cause is not known
the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded
must be obeyed’ (cited from Spolaore 2020, p. 778). It is
true that we may not be able to rule out the possibility of AI
consciousness definitely even if the non-materialist answer
to the hard problem is true, but the probability certainly
becomes much smaller. We may not have to understand the
why and how but may still be able to do certain things. For
AI & SOCIETY
example, we may just duplicate our own brain. If we build a
machine virtually the same as our brain, it should generate
consciousness, if materialism is true. However, no current
and foreseeable AI is built using this method. Thus, our posi-
tion that even if materialism is true, AI consciousness will
not be realized for a very long time, is very secure.
It is also possible that discoveries and inventions may
come about by accident without our full understanding of the
mechanisms involved. However, our failure to understand
even vaguely the mechanisms involved suggests that they are
rather complex and difficult to comprehend. While this does
not rule out accidental inventions completely, it does reduce
their probabilities drastically, to close to zero.
However, the main point of this paper is that, if non-
materialism is true, AI consciousness may not be possible
even just in principle, at least the possibility becomes much
more remote. If matter, even in the very complex form of our
brain, cannot in itself give rise to the mental, then machine
consciousness may be impossible; we may need something
extra, something from the mental or spiritual side. We
should not be too absolute; it is imaginable that if a suitable
material body is made either by biological conception or by
artificial manufacturing, a soul will just jump in (or sent by
God) to drive the body, just like a shell-fish going to live in
an empty shell. However, such possibilities must be regarded
as rather remote. Nevertheless, many if not most scientists
are sympathetic to materialism, even though they cannot
explain how. Advances in neural sciences in the past centu-
ries also give materialism much support. However, over the
last decade or so, there are two new advances that weaken
if not reverse this support, as discussed in the next section.
Before that, we discuss a common observation that seems
difficult to explain under simple materialism.
Materialism is comfortable with the effects of matter/
body on mind. However, the mind also affects the body.
Apart from the issue of free will discussed in the next sec-
tion, a common observation most people accept is that our
mental conditions also affect our body. It is well accepted
that sadness and worries may cause stomach ulcers; long-
term happiness contributes to health; the placebo effect; etc.
If mental conditions are just characteristics of the material
body (including the brain) and have no independent exist-
ence, it is difficult to imagine that they can affect the mate-
rial body in turn. (For further discussion of cases of mind on
body, see Beauregard 2007, Kelly 2007 and Matlock 2016a
and references therein; for arguments that such cases do not
negate materialism, see Augustine 2016.)
The materialists (e.g. Wang Chong 王充; 27–97)
believe that the mind as to the body is like sharpness as to
the knife; it is impossible for the sharpness of a knife to
exist if the knife itself is destroyed. Hence, as so believed
by Wang Chong, the mind cannot continue to exist as a
soul after our biological death. If this were so, how could
the sharpness of the knife affect the knife itself? We may
use another diamond knife to cut this steel knife. However,
this is the effect of the diamond knife on the steel knife,
not the effect of the sharpness of the steel knife on the steel
knife itself. On the other hand, if dualism is correct, both
the material body and the mental consciousness have an
independent existence. Then, obviously, they could affect
each other. If so, ‘mind is to body’ is not like ‘sharpness as
to knife’; rather, it is more like ‘driver as to the car’. The
driver may affect the car and its driving; the car may also
affect driving results and the driver. The two independent
things may affect each other. This is obvious.
Consider a materialist argument: ‘If minds can func-
tion completely independently of brains, brain states
should not be able to fix or determine our mental states
so completely (e.g., when PCP [phencyclidine or phenyl-
cyclohexyl piperidine] alters one’s moral compass). The
data that are most inconvenient for the [mind-brain] inde-
pendence thesis are those that show that one’s supposedly
independent mind is so thoroughly at the mercy of the
condition of one’s brain.’ (Augustine 2016, p. 215). If the
driver-car analogy of the mind–body relationship is valid,
the non-materialist may reply this way. If we are confined
to the performance of the car, the driver is also thoroughly
at the mercy of the condition of the car. If it is out of order
or out of power, it cannot be driven; if it is damaged in a
certain way, it drives badly in a certain way; etc. Similarly,
if we ignore such cases as out-of-body experience (OBE),
near-death experience (NDE), past-life memories, etc., and
confine ourselves to our normal life experience when we
are stuck with our brain/body, it is not surprising that we
are similarly at the mercy of the conditions of our brain/
body, even if we have independent souls. Thus, it seems
that the debates between the materialists/reductionists and
the non-materialists in general, and that between Augus-
tine (2016) and Matlock (2016a) in particular, are largely
indecisive at the theoretical level; at the conceptual level,
either the sharpness-knife or the driver-car analogy may
be valid. The trump card rests on whether such parapsy-
chological evidence for survival like NDE, reincarnation,
and medium communication supposedly from the deceased
(surveyed in Sect. 3 below), are acceptable.
2 Some recent neurological findings
Advances in science and technology generally result
in increasing support for a materialistic answer to the
mind–body problem. In particular, two neurological find-
ings in the 1970’s appeared to provide definite knock-out
blows to non-materialism (until reversed in recent studies,
as discussed below).
13

2.1 Recent challenges to the implications
of the split‑brain study
First, there was the split-brain study (Gazzaniga and Sperry
1967; Gazzaniga 1970; Gazzaniga and Ledoux 1978). Our
brain consists of two hemispheres connected by corpus cal-
losum. For the treatment of certain epileptic patients, the
corpus callosum is sometimes transected, cutting off com-
munication between the two hemispheres. The left hemi-
sphere, which controls the right side of the body, has bet-
ter verbal abilities; the right hemisphere is better in spatial
visualization but cannot speak, though it has some under-
standing of language. If a subject with a transected brain is
given a small object such as a spoon in her left hand (which
signals to the right hemisphere) and asked what she is hold-
ing, she may answer ‘nothing’ or ‘I don't know’, since the
speaking left hemisphere receives no message from the
left hand and the right hemisphere cannot speak. However,
if she is shown a picture of many objects, the right hemi-
sphere readily directs the left hand to point to the one this
left hand had examined. When the right brain of a young
woman was shown the picture of a naked woman, she gig-
gled and showed embarrassment. But when asked why she
giggled, she said, ‘That's a funny machine.’ Presumably, the
giggling was made by the right brain and the verbal answer
was given by the speaking left brain which tried to provide
some explanation of her giggling the real reason for which
it did not know.
The split-brain evidence seems to suggest that we have
two, not just one, minds, at least when the two hemispheres
are separated. Eccles (1973), a distinguished neurophysiolo-
gist, believes that only the left brain has consciousness and
that the right brain is just an automaton. But it is difficult to
imagine that an automaton giggles, shows embarrassment,
and answers questions by pointing at the right objects. More
damaging to Eccles' position is the evidence that the right
hemisphere seems to possess self-consciousness. When the
question ‘Who are you?’ was posed to the right brain of
a subject, he was able to select letters from a scrabble set
and spell his name correctly. Since consciousness is a pre-
condition for self-consciousness, how could an unconscious
automaton possess self-consciousness? It appears difficult
to deny that both hemispheres, at least when separated, are
distinct sites of consciousness and selfhood.6
If the mind, which seems quite integrated into our normal
condition, can be separated into two distinct minds simply
by blocking the communication of the two hemispheres of
6
Nearly two centuries ago, Wigan (1844) believed that even nor-
mal persons without brain-splitting have two separate spheres of
consciousness. Schechter (2018) believes that each of the two minds
under split-brain subjects is still ‘one of us’.
13
AI & SOCIETY
the brain, it seems most likely that the mind is just a prop-
erty of the material brain. This is so since the creation of
an additional (two instead of one) mind just by splitting the
brain strongly support the materialist belief that the mind
is just the function of the material brain. The non-material
mind is usually believed to be unified. (On other neurosci-
entific evidence for materialism, see Honderich 1988, Ch.
5; Ramachandran 2011).
However, this strong result was recently seriously chal-
lenged. Pinto et al. (2017) show that, ‘although the two
hemispheres are completely insulated from each other, the
brain as a whole is still able to produce only one conscious
agent. This directly contradicts current orthodoxy and high-
lights the complexity of unified consciousness.’ (Science
News: https://​www.​scien​cedai​ly.​com/​relea​ses/​2017/​01/​
17012​50938​23.​htm) Split-brain subjects claim to feel no
different after the surgery and are undistinguishable in eve-
ryday life. Their experiments ‘show that whilst perceptual
information is localized to a given hemisphere during the
split-brain experiment, cognitive access is not localized to a
given hemisphere’ (Downey 2019, p. 802).7
Reviewing the split-brain literature over the last few dec-
ades, de Haan et al. (2020) also note the erosion of the old
view ‘over time’, and that ‘the mind may remain unified
when the brain is split’. However, the evidence is compli-
cated and further studies are called for. Other studies show
that people born with very tiny brains do not seem to be
deficient in their mental capability; those with a whole-brain
hemisphere removed can still function properly (Kliemann
et al. 2019). To say the least, the unity of consciousness
and the non-materialist position cannot be definitely rejected
despite the split-brain experiments.
2.2 Recent challenges to the experimental negation
of free will
The second finding supportive of materialism was some neu-
rological experiments challenging the existence of a free
will. Deecke et al. (1976) asked subjects to flex their index
fingers suddenly at times of their own choice. Electrodes
recorded brain activities (EEG; electroencephalograph) and
the precise instances of muscle actions. It was found that
activities in the brain began to rise markedly as much as a
full second before the supposedly deliberate action was con-
sciously undertaken. Libet et al. (1979) showed that it takes
a full half-second before a subject consciously perceives a
skin stimulation, though it takes only a few hundredths of a
second for the stimulus to reach the cerebral cortex. How-
ever, if the subject is told beforehand to push a button as
7
Downey also argues that split-brain subjects unify their perceptual
field by using external factors including cueing.
AI & SOCIETY
soon as he feels the skin stimulus, he may react in about 1/10
of a second, i.e. well before conscious perception. (This is
similar to the reflex action of withdrawing one's hand upon
touching something hot.) Nevertheless, the subject is con-
vinced, after his conscious perception of the stimulus, that
he pressed the button consciously in response to the stimu-
lus. The delayed consciousness is referred back to the instant
the stimulus occurred or reached the cortex. But how could
something (conscious perception) that happens later be the
cause of something (pressing a button) earlier? It seemed
that what we believe to be undertaken by our mental self
freely is just determined by our material brain.
However, the above experimental negation of free will has
been challenged later. It has been shown that the rise in brain
activities half a second before actual action is just noise,
not the brewing intention of the brain at all, but something
random. Rather, ‘the neural decision to move coincides in
time with average subjective estimates of the time of aware-
ness of the intention to move’ (Schurger et al. 2012, p. 7).
Though this does not establish a free will, it negates Libet’s
conclusion against free will, and suggests that the problem
of free will is much more complicated. Also, ‘Multiple rep-
etition of the experiment showed that subjects did not always
complete the action for which the readiness potential had
started to form in the brain and which was predicted by the
experimenter. … that scientists’ experiments do not demon-
strate the absence of free will’ (Razeev 2019, p. 616, p. 618).
Other experimental results negating the simple rejec-
tion of free will or at least supporting the complexity of the
issue include: ‘Freely selected movements were found to be
associated with a higher RP [readiness potential] amplitude
than pre-determined repetitive movements in the fixed mode’
(Praamstra et al. 1995; Touge et al. 1995; following similar
result in the activity of the supplementary motor area by
Deiber et al. 1991); this is confirmed in Dirnberger et al.
(1998) who also show that the novelty of the movements
also contribute to the effect; Takashima et al. (2020) fur-
ther concludde that ‘the enhanced expression of readiness
potential related to the so-called “free mode” of movement
selection can not be ascribed to the endogenous selection
of movements per se, but is probably related to volitional
processes’. Volition is ‘defined as the individuals’ subjec-
tive experience of acting deliberately or according to their
own will’.
Recently, the John Templeton Foundation and the Fetzer
Institute sponsored a large multidisciplinary study involving
neurology and philosophy on free will, headed by Uri Maoz
(Gholipour 2019). Though some useful results may follow,
we can hardly expect a conclusive answer soon.
While the issue of free will (and the mind–body one) is
complicated, one point seems worth emphasizing. Material-
istic determinism in general and the negation of free will in
particular, eliminate the causal role of consciousness. If free
will does not exist or is just an illusion, as believed by deter-
minists (e.g. Caruso 2013, especially p. 4), and that all our
actions and choices are just the results of physical (including
neural) processes beyond the person’s control, what is the
‘person’ for? Such a position or that consciousness is just
an epiphenomenon is contrary to Darwinian evolution. As a
function of our brain, consciousness must require energy. If
consciousness does not have the free will to affect our behav-
iour to increase our fitness, it cannot survive the competition
of mutants that dispense with consciousness. Natural selec-
tion would have eliminated such consciousness (Ng 1995;
see also: James 1890). Moreover, while materialistic deter-
minism may be consistent with Newtonian physics, it seems
inconsistent with quantum physics; see Stapp (2011, 2017),
Laskey (2019). (On the effectiveness of free conscious inten-
tions and related complications, see Mele 2010.)
The absence of free will tends to support the non-exist-
ence of the soul. A common argument against free will is
the point that we cannot show how a non-physical substance
can casually interact with a physical one (e.g. Caruso 2013,
p. 35). However, not knowing how does not imply false-
hood. We also absolutely do not know how the material
brain could give rise to subjective consciousness. However,
this does not mean that consciousness does not exist or that
it has nothing to do with our brain. Whether we call it the
‘effort of attention’ of James (1890), ‘intellectual inner life
of the individual’ (von Neumann 1955), or ‘reducing agent’
of Stapp-Laskey (Laskey 2019, p. 83 & p. 87), the non-
technical term is ‘mind’ (the ‘I’ that everyone feels as her
‘self’) which is the ‘soul’ if it survives death, as supported
by evidence partially discussed in Sect. 3.
Thus, the following argument seems quite unjustified:
‘let’s take for granted, as Matlock does, that souls are real
and that they survive death and are reborn in new bodies
over and over. The question then becomes, how do souls do
this? What is the mechanism? Here Matlock is missing a
scientific theory entirely, but in any serious scientific inquiry
one has to deal with the how question, and the answer has
to be an actual mechanism, not just more speculation. Thus,
even if the no-evidence-for-the-soul problem were over-
come, the proponent of reincarnation still has the how prob-
lem to deal with before the skeptic can be fully satisfied.’
(Augustine 2016, p. 234). True, after tentatively establishing
the existence, we may wish to go further to investigate the
how question. However, blanket denial of the conceptual
possibility irrespective of evidence is not going to help.
3 Results of parapsychological studies
Some people may regard paranormal phenomena as defi-
nitely non-existent and hence parapsychology as not wor-
thy of consideration at all. However, we should not be too
13

absolute. Many things considered as impossible have since
occurred and accepted as routine; for example,
• Meteorites were considered impossible before the nine-
teenth century: ‘How could rocks fall from the sky?’
• Aeroplanes were long regarded as impossible. When
the Wright brothers successfully tested flying in Ohio
in 1904, despite being witnessed by hundreds of people,
the local press did not report that, regarding it as impos-
sible. Two years after the flight, Scientific American still
refused to accept it, saying, if there was anything in it,
why did the local newspapers not report it (Mantel 2008;
Pearson 2014, p. 69).
• Most if not all economists regarded only real interest
rates (after deducting the rate of price inflation) could
be negative, but not the nominal rates. However, since
2012, negative nominal rates have become quite common
in the Euro area, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and
Japan (Ulate 2021, pp. 1–2).
• Most people are sure that the prices of goods cannot be
negative. However, on 20 April 2020, the May 2020 price
of crude oil fell from about US$18 by more than 300% to
minus $37.63 a barrel.
• Many people still find the effects of speed and space cur-
vature on time and length as dictated by the theory of
relativity incredible, not to mention the ‘spooky action
at a distance’ of quantum physics that even Einstein dis-
believed.
So let us be more open-minded and look at the evidence
of parapsychology. Instead of refusing to look through Gal-
ilio’s telescope, we should follow Stapp (2009, p.2) in perus-
ing ‘certain documentations of such claims’ of survival of
bodily death, in spite of initial skepticism. Most confirmed
skeptics (including the present writer until recent years) have
not really looked at the relevant evidence carefully. Taken
widely, parapsychology includes many areas. For reasons of
space, we will just focus on the following three fields closely
related to post-mortem survival. (For other areas, see, e.g.
Kelly et al. 2007, 2015.)
3.1 Evidence from medium communication
While not yet known as parapsychology at the time, the
systematic study of paranormal and psychic phenomena
started at least from the establishment of the Society for
Psychical Research (SPR) in England in 1882. The initial
studies focused on the purported communication from the
death through the trance mediums. Recent studies show that
mediums are not sick but healthy psychologically and physi-
cally, with big differences from those with mental problems
(Bastos et al. 2020). However, many frauds were known to
be involved in mediumship. But frauds could be committed
13
AI & SOCIETY
by the subconscious of the mediums while in trance, as
openly admitted by the famous medium Eusapia Palladino
(Kean 2017, p. 7 of Ch.22). In addition, the widespread
existence of frauds does not preclude that some mediumis-
tic communications may be genuine. As a very prominent
American scholar William James (1842–1910) mentioned,
to show that not all crows are black, we only have to show
the existence of one white crow. James’ white crow was Mrs.
Leonora Piper (1857–1950; see: http://​www.​guten​berg.​org/​
files/​19376/​19376-h/​19376-h.​htm). To investigate her, SPR
brought her from America to England, taking great care to
preclude frauds, including hiring detectives to follow her to
preclude illicit information.
After prolonged study of Mrs. Piper, James wrote in
1890: ‘…taking everything that I know of Mrs. Piper into
account, the result is to make me feel as absolutely certain
as I am of any personal fact in the world that she knows
things in her trances which she cannot possibly have heard
in her waking state, and that the definite philosophy of her
trances is yet to be found’ (see: http://​skepd​ic.​com/h.​html;
Also, for a critical examination of Mrs. Piper’s mediumship,
see Gauld 1982, pp. 32–44.)
Intensive studies of the mediumship of Mrs. Piper con-
vinced not only James, but many other prominent celebrities
including William Barrett (1913–1992), Richard Hodgson
(1855–1905), James Hyslop (1854–1920), and Oliver Lodge
(1851–1940), not only of the genuineness of Piper’s medi-
umship but also the reality of post-mortem survival. This
was so despite the awareness that genuineness in the mediu-
mistic communication may not have implied survival, as
the super-psi hypothesis, that existing living persons includ-
ing the mediums and the sitters may possess very powerful
extra-sensory perception (ESP) to cause the apparent com-
munication from the dead. Nevertheless, in numerous cases,
the communicators from the other side were so similar to
the dead persons in accent, manner of speech, and other
specific characteristics that even the originally very skeptic
investigators were converted (Sidgwick 1915). In the con-
siderate assessment of Braude (2003, p. 306), the super-psi
hypothesis faces ‘crippling complexity’ of the evidence. In
addition, since there are so many areas of anomalies, the
principle of Occam’s Razor also favors the survival hypoth-
esis. Moreover, from the viewpoint of simple materialism,
the super-psi hypothesis does not seem more palatable than
the survival hypothesis.
Another convincing evidence was the ‘cross-correspond-
ences’. This took place between 1901 and 1936 with five
different mediums in England, America, and India, through
automatic writing under trance. It started soon after the
death of an eminent scholar of classical study, Federic W.H.
Myers (1843–1901) in January 1901. Myers spent much
time studying medium communications, and converted
from a skeptic to a believer in post-mortem survival. Before
AI & SOCIETY
his death, he mentioned that he would try to prove survival
after his own passing away. Pieces of communications in
some technical terms of classical studies were received soon
after his death from the five mediums, most of whom knew
nothing about classical studies. How did they manage to
communicate using such technical terms? Many of the com-
munications had no meaning on their own. Only when the
various pieces from the five mediums were put together that
something meaningful could be seen. This is why they were
called cross-correspondences. Who was the mastermind
behind the mosaic formed by the various pieces over differ-
ent continents? Who else apart from Myers himself who was
already dead? This seems to be quite impossible to explain
in terms of simple materialism. The materialists could try
to explain the cross-correspondences by the super-psi of
the mediums and/or sitters. However, as already noted in a
couple of paragraphs above, the super-psi hypothesis faces
‘crippling complexity’ of the evidence and is less parsimoni-
ous than accepting survival (Braude 2003, p. 306; Cf. Lund
2009, p. 172; Kean 2017, Ch. 24).
Through the cross-correspondences, Myers mentioned
that, from their side, to communicate with us was like being
separated by a class with fog, difficult to see and hear, mak-
ing communication difficult. Despite this, Myers apparently
managed to complete the cross-correspondences over 2.5
decades. His persistence in trying to prove post-mortem
survival is admirable. On a more recent incidence of cross-
correspondence from the beyond, see Kean (2017, Ch. 19).
Could communications from the other side and things like
apparitions/ghosts be purely psychological, without objec-
tive existence? As shown by Auerbach (2017), objectivity
is established for those cases ‘that are seen by multiple wit-
nesses at the same time or by several witnesses at different
times. Apparitions can directly affect the environment and
are not solely visual; they also create sounds or smells, and
sometimes pets or other animals demonstrate awareness of
them’ (Abstract). When the apparition named the Blue Lady
walked through the body of Auerbach, this was observed
by three mediums. Auerbach then ‘asked them each, sepa-
rately and independently, to note whom they’d seen, what
she was wearing, her hairstyle, and what she was doing.
Their descriptions not only agreed with one another’s, but
also with the mental image I’d received’ (Auerbach 2017,
the third last page of chapter).
An even more incredible but evidential phenomenon
associated with mediumship is ectoplasm, the apparently
material stuff coming out of the body of entranced mediums.
While the materialization of a complete person may be sus-
picious of cheating by a life person, that of a hand or two
(which gradually formed) and capable of playing musical
instruments in the air seem impossible to be from cheating.
Two hands once materialized during some seance. Research-
ers prepared in advance and had the two hands molded. With
the ten fingers crossing one another or interlocking (i.e. the
two hands crabbing together) and submerged into paraffin to
form gloves of wax. After formation, the hands dematerial-
ized, leaving the glove of wax seamless and intact. This is
not possible with actual human hands (which presumably
do not dematerialize). The actual gloves are stored in Insti-
tut Metapsychique International, Paris. Dozens of photos of
them were published in Geley (1927); some are re-published
in Kean (2017, after Ch. 20). This is very evidential. As
Geley (1927, p. 220) emphasized, ‘We were able to obtain
objective and formal proofs, absolutely incontrovertible, of
the reality of the materializations to secure absolute certainty
of the supernormal origin of the moulds’. Moreover, some
of such incredible materializations were achieved under the
strict conditions ensured by a skeptical professional magi-
cian Albert Fletcher-Desborough (Kean 2017, Ch. 24).
3.2 Near‑death experience
Another type of evidence supportive of post-mortem sur-
vival is from the studies of near-death experience (NDE).
Pioneered by Moody (1975), many more cases have been
reported more recently with medical advances in rescuing
those with heart attacks or the like. About one in every five
or six near-death survivals (11–23% in different studies; van
Lommel 2017, p. 43) reports paranormal experience during
the periods considered dead. Greyson (2021b, pp. 216–7)
estimates that about 10–20% of those experiencing close to
death, or 5% of the total population, have had paranormal
NDEs. Thus, this phenomenon is rather widespread.
A typical near-death experience is leaving one’s own
body, sometimes through a tunnel, and seeing bright light
of love (usually interpreted by experiencers as God), and
relatives already dead. They often see themselves as float-
ing up to the ceiling and looking down, seeing their physical
body on the bed under emergency rescue. Most regard the
experience as more real than normal reality perceived in
normal waking time (e.g. Alexander 2012, p. 40). After hav-
ing NDE they also believe firmly in post-mortem survival
and the existence of the spiritual world. Typically, they then
have a more positive outlook in life and are no longer afraid
of death.
One interpretation of NDE is that, while the brain is in
trouble, it may trigger the sub-conscious memory of the pro-
cess of one’s own birth, giving rise to the tunnel experience.
(However, the tunnel experience is equally common among
persons born by Caesarean section and those born by normal
vaginal delivery; see Greyson et al. 2009.) Another is that
NDEs are hallucinations created by mal-functioning brains
or the stimulation of temposroparietal junction of the brain
(e.g. Blanke et al. 2002; Sacks 2012; Jalal 2018). While this
may be so for some cases of mistaken beliefs about leaving
the body, it is not applicable to true cases of NDEs (Greyson
13

et al. 2006; Alexander 2017). Sensations induced by tem-
poral lobe stimulation differ in several important ways from
spontaneous out-of-body experiences including those in
NDEs (Holden et al. 2006). Hallucinations ‘caused by brain
malfunction generally produce confusion, irritability, fear,
and idiosyncratic, bizarre visions. These hallucinations are
not at all like the exceptionally clear thinking, peacefulness,
calmness, and consistent visions generally seen in NDEs’
(Greyson 2021a, p. 28).
For those close to death, the oxygen supply in the brain
is higher for those with paranormal experiences than those
not having such experiences; the former also have less drugs.
Thus, NDEs cannot be explained by the lack of oxygen or
the effects of drugs (Velmans 2019, p. 269). ‘Almost all of
the people who have had NDEs report that, during the expe-
rience, their thinking was clearer, faster, and more logical
than ever before … 80% describe their thinking as clearer
than usual or at least as clear … 74% described their think-
ing as faster … 65% described their thinking as more logi-
cal’ (Greyson 2021a, p. 31 and p. 34). These ‘reports are dif-
ficult to reconcile with a brain that is not functioning well’.
Moreover, materialistic explanations of NDEs are incon-
sistent with:
1. Many NDEs occurred not to mal-functioning, but non-
functioning brains; clinically dead with flat, zero EEG.
If consciousness is just brain function, there should be
a complete absence of any consciousness, memory, or
any experience, not to mention the realer-than-real NDE
experienced by many. Many NDEs are reported when
the brain is completely not functioning. Yet, after the
person recovered, she was able to report the NDE during
that period, with observations possible only during that
period of zero EEG and verified true later by doctors/
nurses. Such experiences cannot be the results of the
brain. Some materialists suspect that such experiences
were perceived before or after the period without brain
functioning. However, this is not the case at least for
many more remarkable cases with independent verifica-
tion (e.g. Alexander 2012, Greyson 2021b, Ch. 8).
2. In some cases, the experiencers find themselves float-
ing up to the ceiling or even outside the hospital, and
can see things they cannot see from their hospital beds.
After the incidence, the observed items were confirmed
as real with fitting details. The case of Maria is remark-
able. During NDE, she saw a single tennis shoe sitting
on the window ledge of the hospital, a position not only
not observable from the hospital bed, but anywhere else,
except from the air outside the hospital (Sharp 2017).
3. Some experiencers were originally blind. However, dur-
ing NDE, they have a paranormal vision of 360 degrees,
in contrast to the normal 180 degrees (Long 2017, pp.
60–61). This is inconsistent with the orthodox materi-
13
AI & SOCIETY
alistic view but is consistent with that of James that the
brain, instead of creating consciousness, actually filters
consciousness. Upon death, the filtering function stops
or weakens, allowing more to be perceived.
4. In some cases, the apparitions of the NDE’ers were seen
by living persons at the locations where the experiencers
felt there were travelling out of their bodies. (Rivas et al.
2016, Chapter 7 alone reported seven such cases.)
5. In some cases, the experiencers are children of only a
few years old. For example, the case of a 3–4 years old
Colton Burpo described by Cattoi and Moreman (2015,
Ch.8) is impressive. This case was written into a book
(Burpo and Vincent 2010) and made into a film, both
called Heaven is for Real. A remarkable point is that
the image of Jesus described by Colton is different from
the traditional conception, but similar to that of Jesus
drawn by another child NDE experiencer Akiane Kra-
marik (Dubaj 2017, p. 211).
Also, some NDEs are experienced by prominent neuro
scientists or surgeons, including Alexander who reports,
‘But while I was in coma my brain hadn’t been working
improperly. It hadn’t been working at all.’ [Alexander
2012, p. 129; italics original], supporting point 1 above.
He also believes that, ‘Not only do we continue to exist
after bodily death, but our awareness functions at a much
higher level once it is free from the physical limitations
of the brain. At the core of our existence is a love for us
far grander than we can ever imagine: the infinite, uncon-
ditional love of a Divine Creator. That love offers us the
power to heal ourselves, our species, our planet and our
entire existence.’ [last sentences of ‘A Conversation with
Eben Alexander, M.D.’ printed in the book (Alexander
2012) after the Index, without page numbers.
A sceptic interprets Alexander’s NDE as hallucination.
However, the following shows that he is obviously very
biased. ‘When I first read that Alexander’s heaven includes
“a beautiful girl with high cheekbones and deep blue eyes”
who offered him unconditional love, I thought, “Yeah,
sure, dude. I’ve had that fantasy, too.” (Shermer 2013, p.
86). In his whole article, Shermer did not explain to read-
ers that the beautiful girl was not Alexander’s dream girl,
but his blood sister, nor did he give a convincingly argu-
ment for dismissing Alexander. Despite that Alexander
was adopted from birth and never saw his sister in life, he
saw his sister accompanying him during his NDE. Only
afterward, after seeing a photograph did he realize that she
was his blood sister (Alexander 2012, p. 40; Rivas et al.
2016, p. 297). Thus, Shermer twisted something likely
paranormal into something laughable.
AI & SOCIETY
3.3 Reincarnation: memories of previous lives
Another type of evidence supportive of non-materialism
is the memories of numerous children (typically around
3–12 years old, but some memories may persist to adult-
hood) of their previous lives. The systematic study of rein-
carnation was pioneered by Ian P. Stevenson (1918–2007).
Nearly half a century of study of over 2500 cases (1400 of
which have the actual existence of the previous lives con-
firmed) led numerous researchers to the firm conclusion that
reincarnation is real (Stevenson 1974, 1997, 2003; Haralds-
son and Matlock 2017; Kean 2017; Tucker 2021). Remark-
able facts include:
• Cases exist across different countries, religions and cul-
tures, including those discouraging the idea of reincarna-
tion.
• Memories spoken include many specific details that the
children could not know of, but confirmed to be cor-
rect, when the previous lives were discovered for those
‘solved’ cases.
• When the child was brought to the home of the previous
life, she shows uncanny familiarity with the location and
personalities there, such as finding some money hidden
in the previous life.
• When the language of the previous life is different from
that of the present one, even if the child never has expo-
sure to that previous language, she can fluently speak that
language.
• A very high proportion of past-life memories involve
cases of abnormal death. Many of such children have
natural birth marks at the precise places of the previous
fatal wounds. For cases of death from being shot, the
birth marks are consistent with the smaller wound at the
bullet entrance than the exit place.
• The children involved typically have preferences, behav-
ioural patterns, and even facial appearance similar to the
person in the previous life.
• Many children have phobias suggestive of the cause of
death in the previous life, e.g. if the previous person died
from drowning, the child is very scared of water, with no
explanation of this in the present life.
The case of James Leininger (described by his father
in Kean 2017, Ch. 1; Cf. Presti 2021, pp. 57–60) is very
convincing. At the age of around two, when his mother
mentioned to him that a toy plane has a bomb under it, he
corrected his mother, saying that it is not a bomb but a drop-
tank (for getting rid of excess petrol in an emergency), a
fact not known by most adults. James’ previous life was a
fighter plane pilot killed when his plane was shot down by
the Japanese. This caused many nightmares for James. His
remembered former life was subsequently identified to be
James Huston, whose details including the circumstances
of his death fitting the description of James.
One remarkable detail is that James often signed his name
as James 3. But his parent believed that he is the first James
in the family, not the third. It turned out that it was his for-
mer life as James Huston who is James Huston Jr., making
James Leininger James the third including his previous life.
Another notable point is this. James got two G.I. Joe dolls
for his third birthday. He liked them very much and named
the brunette one Billy and the blonde one Leon. James got
another G.I. Joe doll on his 4th birthday which he named
Walter. His parents were very surprised, as no one in the
family was named either Leon or Walter. His father asked
James why he chose these names. James answered that these
were the three who came to meet him as he [presumably in
his previous life] went to heaven. Subsequently, from the
war records, James’ father Bruce found out that in the same
squadron of James Huston, there were three soldiers named
Billie Peeler, Leon Conner, and Walter Devlin. Moreover,
all these three died during the year before James Huston was
shot down. Thus, when James Huston went up to heaven,
these three persons/souls could be there to greet him. In
addition, Bruce found out from the family members of these
three persons that their hair colors in fact match those of the
three dolls as named by James. How could James know these
details? (For additional compelling cases, see e.g. Stevenson
1997; Haraldsson and Matlock 2017; Tucker 2021).
3.4 Some additional considerations
Some people may regard survival after death as completely
impossible (the Bayesian prior being zero), and hence regard
the apparently compelling evidence as unworthy of belief.
I was sympathetic to this position. However, this position
seems to be incompatible with the following considerations.
• If our universe were as described by Newtonian phys-
ics, the simple materialistic position seems to be more
acceptable. However, even in accordance with modern
hard physics of relativity and quantum mechanics, our
world is as weird or as spooky as ghosts, reincarnation,
communication from the dead, etc. This makes a Bayes-
ian prior of zero probability for such things not really
rational.
• Things incredible in the simple materialist perspec-
tive like the piercing of cheeks with big metal rods at
religious celebrations without leaving scares could be
seen repeatedly. Being witnessed at a close distance
from 360%, this could not be compared to those done
by ‘magic’ (tricks) on stage. This is also collaborated by
Western researchers (e.g. Schwartz 2011, pp. 105–6; p.
321).
13

• Many prominent authors have openly professed having
paranormal experiences personally, e.g. the neurosurgeon
Alexander who had a NDE discussed in Sect. 3.2 and
the various contacts from his deceased brother by the
journalist Kean (2017, Ch. 19).
• ‘The most significant philosophical treatments of the
survival issue in recent years have been those of Griffin
(1997) and Braude (2003), both of whom end up con-
cluding that the data point toward the reality of postmor-
tem survival. They have been joined by several others
(e.g. Almeder 1992; Lund 2009; Weiss 2012) who have
been impressed by the evidence for reincarnation above
all.’ (Matlock 2016b, p. 107). If there is nothing worth
pursuing, these well-established researchers must all be
blind!
• According to recent surveys (World Values Survey, Euro-
pean Values Survey), even in Europe, there are slightly
more people believing in survival than not. In answer to
the question: Do you believe in life after death?, there
are 44.3% believers compared to 41.2% non-believers,
with 14.5% unknown (Haraldsson and Matlock 2017, Ch.
8). Non-Europeans typically have higher proportions of
believers. Though majority believers could be mistaken,
we should at least think twice before dismissing them
completely.
4 Concluding remarks: implications
for the possibility of conscious AI
While the few categories in the last section are far from
being exhaustive of evidence in favor of the non-material-
ism, they are yet compelling, especially in combination.8 If
souls exist and may survive our biological death, it is highly
likely that consciousness is not just the function of a mate-
rial brain; something extra, the mental or spiritual, may be
required. Then, non-materialism seems to be valid. While
not widely openly accepted in the scientific cycles, many
prominent scholars hold such a belief. Apart from those
mentioned above, we may include a quote from Sir John
C. Eccles (1903–1997), a Nobel laureate (in Physiology or
Medicine 1963):
‘I maintain that the human mystery is incredibly
demeaned by scientific reductionism, with its claim in
promissory materialism to account eventually for all of the
spiritual world in terms of patterns of neuronal activity.
This belief must be classed as a superstition. … we have to
8
The non-materialist position is also consistent with the fact that
all five main features of consciousness (qualitativeness, subjectivity,
unity, intentionality, intentional causation) are unexplained (Searle
2013).
13
AI & SOCIETY
recognize that we are spiritual beings with souls existing in
a spiritual world as well as material beings with bodies and
brains existing in a material world.’ (Eccles 1989, p. 241).9
Sections 2 and 3 show that some recent advances in neu-
rology and results of parapsychological studies provide not
only strong supports for non-materialism, but also suggest
that souls likely exist and may survive our biological death.
Section 1 argues that, given the truth of this non-material-
istic position, AI consciousness may not be (at least much
less likely) possible even just in principle. Then, we do not
have to worry much about robots turning conscious and evil
and become very harmful to humans. True, non-conscious
robots may also be dangerous. However, such problems are
more manageable as a matter of avoiding undesirable side
effects, such as reducing traffic accidents now. In addition,
we also do not have to worry about our ethics towards AIs
as they cannot suffer and enjoy; nor do we have to discuss
the ethics of machines themselves, as non-conscious things
cannot have moral sentiments. Lastly, we may want to think
twice before committing big sums of money trying to instan-
tiate AI consciousness. Instead, we may focus on making
robots less costly and more useful to society. However, this
does not preclude the possible usefulness of research in AI
consciousness.
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