Turkey 2023 EQ - Dam Performance

International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 102 (2024) 104284
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr
Dams in the wake-up call of the 2023 Türkiye earthquake sequence:

Insights from observed damages, risk assessment, and monitoring
Mohammad Amin Hariri-Ardebili a ,∗, Hasan Tosun b
a University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
b Mudanya University, Bursa, Turkiye
ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT
Keywords: On February 6, 2023, Türkiye experienced a significant earthquake with a magnitude of 𝑀𝑤

2023 Türkiye earthquake 7.81 , followed by four additional earthquakes throughout the day, measuring 𝑀𝑤 5.8 and
Reconnaissance above, including one with a 𝑀𝑤 7.5. As a result, over 100 dams in the region experienced
Risk analysis
low to high seismic loads. The impact of these seismic events resulted in a range of damages
Dam vulnerability
to dams, varying from light to severe. The authors participated in several post-earthquake
Damage classification
reconnaissance missions to collect perishable data regarding the damage. This paper is three-
fold: First, it explores the seismic performance and observed damage in 17 dams (majority
embankments) based on data collected from the field. During the seismic activity, embankment
dams underwent failure modes such as strength deterioration, yielding, settlement, tension
crack formation, as well as sliding along planar or circular surfaces. Second, the paper offers
an updated seismic risk analysis for ten selective damaged dams in the regions. Total risk
factors are quantified using two different methods. The results show that the majority of the
studied dams are classified as high and very high-risk dams. Third, the paper evaluates 11 other
dams in the region that were equipped with sensors for monitoring the ground motions. The
recorded acceleration at the crest and the abutment are further used to investigate the amount
of amplification based on transfer functions. These recordings will be crucial for subsequent
model calibration and system identification. Overall, the paper’s objective is to contribute to
sharing post-earthquake reconnaissance mission information and to establish the groundwork
for in-depth numerical analyses and quantitative risk assessments of dams located in seismically
vulnerable areas.
1. Introduction
Earthquakes, being formidable natural hazards, demand rigorous examination to grasp their repercussions on structures and
infrastructure. Post-earthquake reconnaissance assumes a pivotal role, involving a systematic survey and data collection to glean
insights into the aftermath of seismic events [1]. A profound understanding of the intricacies of structural damage, its categorization,
and the discernment of key influencing parameters is imperative for well-informed decision-making in the context of Earthquake
Engineering and Disaster Management. Multidisciplinary teams, comprising engineers, geologists, social scientists, and seismologists,
typically undertake post-earthquake reconnaissance. This process integrates on-site inspections, geospatial analysis, and advanced
sensing technologies [2]. The overarching objective is to amass detailed data on structural damage induced by ground shaking
effects.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: hariri@umd.edu (M.A. Hariri-Ardebili).
1 Note these values are based on initial assessment by USGS. AFAD reported differently.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2024.104284
Received 9 November 2023; Received in revised form 14 January 2024; Accepted 17 January 2024
Available online 28 January 2024
2212-4209/© 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M.A. Hariri-Ardebili and H. Tosun International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 102 (2024) 104284
Fig. 1. Geographic distribution of over 110 dams in the proximity of the February 2023 Türkiye earthquake sequence including four main shocks and aftershocks.
The circle size shows the dam size and the color illustrates the category of reservoir capacity. Note: the earthquakes moment magnitudes are based on initial
assessment by USGS and are shown as yellow circles. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
The reconnaissance mission can be tailored to a specific geographical location, where a team, leveraging diverse expertise,
assesses different types of structures. Alternatively, it may be centered on a particular type of engineering structure, such as
dams [3,4]. Subsequent missions following the initial one offer unique opportunities for a longitudinal assessment of structures,
especially the damaged ones, and enable the monitoring of their recovery process. This aligns with functional recovery efforts [5].
During post-earthquake reconnaissance efforts, teams conduct visual inspections, capture photographs, and undertake subjective
assessments to systematically categorize the observed damage. This assessment commonly entails a qualitative classification of
damage levels by comparing the observed damage with the estimated earthquake intensity. In a comprehensive classification scheme,
the data collection methods in post-earthquake reconnaissance can be delineated into multiple categories [6]: fieldwork or ground
surveys [7], omnidirectional imagery [8], terrestrial laser scanning [9], remote sensing [10], crowdsourcing platforms [11], social
media [12], and closed-circuit television videos [13].
According to data from International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), over 110 dams in the region experienced the February
2023 seismic activity. Fig. 1 displays the locations of these dams, along with their height and reservoir capacity. Dam history in
Türkiye is discussed in [14] from risk perspectives. Post-earthquake reconnaissance missions were conducted by several teams in
the aftermath of this seismic sequence. The DSI (State Hydraulic Works, Türkiye) team inspected a total of 140 dams. The Turkish
Society of Dam Safety also released a comprehensive report detailing the performance of the damaged dams [15]. The reconnaissance
efforts extended beyond dams, with thousands of buildings, bridges, and other infrastructures also undergoing inspection [16]. Both
authors actively participated in multiple missions to the site through the dam safety office and as part of the ACI 133 team.
Section 2 presents an overview of dam seismic performance, drawing insights from past earthquakes. This includes an exploration
of seismic performance criteria and a comprehensive damage classification scheme. In Section 3, we discuss the mechanics of the
February 2023 Türkiye earthquake sequence, unraveling details about fault rupture and recording stations. Section 4 engages in a
detailed discussion of regional damaged dams, providing comprehensive information on each, including estimated damage levels
and recorded seismic intensity at the nearest stations. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the damaged dams, offering insights into their
failure modes and sharing visual documentation through photos captured during reconnaissance mission. Section 7 provides the
results of a risk analysis conducted for selected dams. In Section 8, the focus shifts to dams with instrumentation in the region,
exploring recorded accelerations and investigating the role of dams in amplification of shaking. Finally, Section 9 concludes the
paper, summarizing key findings and presenting actionable recommendations.
1.1. Contributions and novelties
This paper unfolds the challenges inherent in post-earthquake reconnaissance and data collection specific to dams. It encompasses
several weeks of reconnaissance missions, systematically gathering observations on damaged dams in the aftermath of the February
2023 Türkiye earthquake sequence. This semi-qualitative effort on damage response covers approximately 17 dams, offering not
only detailed insights into observed damage but also information on the estimated seismic intensity at each dam site.
The paper then extends its scope to explore semi-quantitative risk assessment calculations with a focus on embankments. Over ten
dams are scrutinized in this section, each exhibiting varying degrees of damage. Lastly, the paper discusses instrumental monitoring
data during the February 2023 Türkiye earthquake sequence. A detailed evaluation of three dams equipped with seismographs on
both crest and abutment sheds light on the frequency amplitude changes induced by the dam structure.
Overall, this paper contributes to the 2023 Türkiye post-earthquake reconnaissance mission, assembling perishable information.
It establishes a comprehensive database of damaged and monitored dams, incorporating seismic intensity measure (IM) parameters
at dam sites and conducting semi-quantitative risk analyses on embankment dams.
2
2. Seismic performance of dams: Overview
2.1. Literature review
The seismic performance of dams has been a critical area of study in the field of civil engineering, driven by the imperative to
enhance resilience in earthquake-prone regions [17–19]. Dams, serving as vital components of water resource management, face
the daunting challenge of withstanding the dynamic forces during seismic events. Embankments, characterized by their earthen
structure, require precise evaluation of their response to seismic forces to ensure the safety of surrounding communities and the
integrity of water storage [20]. Embankments have become widely adopted globally due to their construction simplicity and the
availability of cost-effective local materials. Despite their prevalence, the historical failure of dams has resulted in catastrophic
consequence, leading to the loss of lives and substantial property damage [21]. The stability of a dam is contingent upon
ensuring that resultant forces or moments do not induce movement [22]. Embankment failures can manifest through various
specific performance issues, such as cracking, internal erosion, piping, toppling, and failures in foundations, spillways, and slopes,
particularly under dynamic loading conditions [23–25]. Existing literature highlights that overtopping and internal erosion stand
out as the most frequently cited causes of earthen dam failures [26,27]. A notable historical example is the failure of the Augusta
Dam, documented following the renowned earthquake in Charleston (South Carolina) in 1886 [28]. Comprehensive insights into
recognized failures or damages in 58 earth dams attributed to earthquakes have been compiled by Ambraseys [29].
Post-earthquake reconnaissance missions emerge as indispensable tools for gathering crucial data on the performance of
structures, including embankment dams, in the wake of seismic disturbances [30–33]. The comprehensive understanding derived
from post-earthquake reconnaissance missions plays a pivotal role in informing future design practices, retrofitting strategies, and
emergency response plans, contributing significantly to the broader goal of mitigating seismic risks in dam infrastructure [34,35].
Examples of such previous efforts can be found in Zhang et al. [36] about May 12, 2008, Wenchuan earthquake impact on high
embankment dams, Harder [37] about Loma Prieta earthquake impact on earth dams, Park and Kishida [38] about embankment
dams performance in Japan, Yousif et al. [39] about performance of a 128-m high rockfill dam under November 17, 2017
Iraq earthquake, Singh et al. [40] about 2001 Bhuj earthquake impact on earth dams. Moreover, Wen et al. [41] provided a
comprehensive statistical overview on the performance of concrete-face rockfill dams.
Concrete dams, in contrast, have a lower incidence of reported failures. Gravity dams face three potential failure modes:
overstressing, sliding along cracked surfaces, and sliding accompanied by rotation in the downstream direction [42]. An example
includes the Koyna Dam, which experienced horizontal cracks on both faces during the 1967 Koyna earthquake in India, specifically
at the downstream change of slope elevation. Remarkably, despite the damage, the dam did not fail. Buttress dams, on the other
hand, are susceptible to seismic forces in the cross-valley earthquake direction. Notably, Hsinfengkiang in China and Sefidrud in
Iran, both buttress dams designed with some level of seismic provisions, encountered significant earthquake damage. As for arch
dams, potential failure modes encompass: excessive contraction joint opening combined with cantilever tensile cracking, movements
of abutment rock wedges formed by rock discontinuities, and in certain cases, sliding along the gently sloped dam-abutment
interface. Nuss et al. [43] compiled a list of 20 concrete dams that sustained damage but did not fail despite severe earthquakes. A
subsequent semi-quantitative risk assessment for the same group of dams has been elaborated by [44]. The United States Society of
Dams (USSD) has produced three reports focused on seismic performance and documented case histories of dams [45–47]. These
reports serve as primary sources for potential failure mode analysis and risk assessment.
2.2. Performance criteria
As per the guidelines outlined by ICOLD [48], the criteria governing the seismic performance of dam structures can be categorized
into two groups. (1) Dam Body under Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE): No structural damage, such as cracks, deformations, or
leakage, affecting the dam’s operation and reservoir is permissible. Minor, reparable damage is acceptable. (2) Dam Body under
Safety Evaluation Earthquake (SEE): Structural damage, including cracks, deformations, or leakage, is accepted as long as the dam’s
stability is maintained, and there is no uncontrolled release of large water quantities causing downstream flooding.
The performance criteria may be intricately linked to the definition of SEE. For instance, regions with high seismicity might
have more stringent requirements, surpassing those specified by ICOLD [48]. In Germany, a sliding stability safety factor of slopes
greater than 1.0 is mandated for an SEE with a return period of 2500 years, and in China, water stops in concrete dams must remain
undamaged during an SEE with a return period of 5000 years [49].
Safety-relevant components and equipment encompass bottom outlets, spillways, and associated gear (especially gates), control
panels, power supply systems, software, etc. It is imperative that these components enable the regulation and lowering of the
reservoir after an SEE. Considering the time needed for dam repairs post-earthquake, the ability to safely release a moderate
flood with a return period of approximately 200 years is crucial. For embankment dams, specific safety criteria under SEE
include preventing overtopping (i.e., maintaining reservoir level below the top of the impervious core), preserving internal erosion
safeguards, and ensuring a sliding safety factor for slopes greater than 1 post-earthquake. In cases of earth core rockfill dams located
on fault lines, additional conservative designs are recommended for optimal safety.
Pells and Fell [50] proposed a damage classification system, focusing on the maximum crack width (in any longitudinal cracking)
and maximum relative crest settlement (expressed as a ratio of the structural dam height), See Table 1. This approach considers
both damage metrics, as settlement alone is less likely to cause failure. The damage class is determined by selecting the worst case
among the mentioned criteria. They also devised graphs to establish the relationship between damage and seismic intensity – both
magnitude and peak ground accelerations (PGA) – (refer to Fig. 2) for various types of earthfill dams, including zoned earthfill,
homogeneous earthfill, and earthfill with a filter or rock toe, as well as for earth and rockfill dams separately.
3
Fig. 2. Contours of damage class as a function of earthquake magnitude and PGA.
Table 1
Damage classification system proposed by Pells and Fell [50].
Class Description Max longitudinal crack width [mm] Max relative crest settlement [%]
C0 No <10 <0.03
C1 Minor 10–30 0.03–0.20
C2 Moderate 30–80 0.20–0.50
C3 Major 80–150 0.50–1.50
C4 Severe 150–500 1.50–5.00
C5 Collapse >500 >5.00
Fig. 3. Location of the plate boundaries and active faults in Türkiye. The background contour plot presents the PGA in [g] for the scenario with 10% probability
of exceedance in 50 years (i.e., 475 years return period). Source: Data collected and altered from https://tadas.afad.gov.tr.
3. Mechanism of February, 2023 earthquake sequence in Türkiye
Türkiye, strategically positioned at the convergence of the Anatolian plate and bordered by the Arabian, African, and Eurasian
plates, finds itself in one of the most seismically active regions globally. Tectonic dynamics in this area are predominantly influenced
by two major active faults-the East Anatolian Fault (EAF) and the North Anatolian Fault (NAF), with the former gaining prominence
due to its north-east trending left-lateral strike-slip fault system, spanning about 450 km.
On the northern periphery, the Anatolian block undergoes westward movement at an approximate speed of 25 mm/yr relative
to Eurasia. Between 1939 and 1999, a series of devastating 𝑀𝑤 7.0 or larger strike-slip earthquakes propagated westward along the
NAF system. Simultaneously, the southeastern edge of the Anatolian block experiences southwestward movement at approximately
15 mm/yr relative to the Arabian plate. While the EAF did not witness 𝑀𝑤 7.0 or larger earthquakes in the century preceding 2023,
it remained seismically active, as evident from the January 24, 2020, 𝑀𝑤 6.7 earthquake [51]. Fig. 3 illustrates the location of the
plate boundaries and active faults in Türkiye.
Throughout the 20th century, Türkiye experienced 21 𝑀𝑤 7.0 or larger earthquakes. Among these, eleven occurred on or near the
NAF, five within the extensional regime of western Türkiye, three in the easternmost region of the country, and the two significant
earthquakes in 2023, measuring 𝑀𝑤 7.8 and 𝑀𝑤 7.5, unfolded on the southernmost section of the EAF.
At 04:17 a.m. local time on February 6, 2023, a seismic event of moment magnitude 7.82 shook the EAF zone at Pazarcık
(N37.288◦ , E37.043◦ ), situated about 40 km northwest of Gaziantep and 33 km southeast of Kahramanmaraş. The earthquake
occurred at a focal depth of 8.6 km. Approximately 10 min later, a significant aftershock measuring 𝑀𝑤 6.7 took place at Nurdağı
2 Note these values are based on initial assessment by USGS. AFAD reported 𝑀𝑤 of 7.7.
4
Fig. 4. Recorded total horizontal PGA at different stations (specified with triangular) from three main earthquakes, as well as location of studied dams (specified
with blue circles). Color bar presents the PGA in [g]. Source: Data collected from https://tadas.afad.gov.tr. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
(N37.304◦ , E36.92◦ ). Subsequently, approximately 9 h later, Elbistan (N38.089◦ , E37.239◦ ) experienced an 𝑀𝑤 7.53 earthquake
with a focal depth of 7.0 km. Another noteworthy seismic event, registering 𝑀𝑤 6.3,4 struck Hatay on February 20 (N36.037◦ ,
E36.021◦ ) with a focal depth of 21.73 km.
The initial significant seismic event, registering a magnitude of 7.8 (Pazarcık earthquake), initiated along the Narlı Segment
situated at the northern end of the left-lateral strike-slip Dead Sea Fault Zone. Subsequently, the second major earthquake, with
a magnitude of 7.5 (Elbistan earthquake), unfolded in proximity to the Çardak Fault, distinct from the EAF. The location of the
Pazarcık earthquake, with a magnitude of 7.8, is approximately 9.1 km from the Narlı segment of the DSFZ and 6.6 km from the
Sakçağöz segment of the same fault zone to the south. The epicenter lies 14.1 km west of the Amanos segment of the EAF zone
and 18.6 km northwest and north of the Pazarcık segment of the EAF zone. This seismic event resulted in the rupture of a segment
spanning about 300 km (125 km of Amanos Segments, 90 km of Pazarcık fault, 60 km of Erkenek fault, and 25 km of Narlı fault)
between Çelikhan, located in the Adıyaman district, and Hatay-Ovakent. The left-lateral fault exhibited a slip exceeding 6.0 m,
with the largest vertical offset measured at 1.2 m. Some studies have suggested left-lateral slips reaching up to 8.5 m between the
Amanos fault, covering 125 km of surface rupture, and the Pazarcık fault, encompassing 90 km of surface rupture with 3.5 m lateral
slip [15].
The earthquake, measuring 7.5 in magnitude and centered in Elbistan (Ekinözü), occupies a complex seismo-tectonic position.
Its epicenter, located in close proximity (7.6 km) to the Çardak fault to the south, stands 26.0 km away from the Sürgü fault, which
emerges as an eastward extension of the Çardak fault. Furthermore, it maintains an average distance of 49.6 km and 76.2 km,
respectively, from the Beyyuda and Gurun faults, representing the continuation of the Savrun fault to the west. The Doğanşehir
fault, recognized as one of the most active discontinuities in the region, is positioned 33.1 km from the earthquake base. Field
observations confirm the epicenter’s energy source, revealing a lateral separation exceeding 2.0 m in the relevant area. The road
exhibits elevation changes, and rock units display splitting towards the northeast in higher elevations.
The seismic activity originating from the northern end of the Narlı segment of DSFZ triggered faults both to the south and north
(up to Çelikhan), including the Antakya fault, resulting in a substantial energy release in the northern region. The additional energy
accumulation, induced by the initial earthquake in the southern region, was partially mitigated by the subsequent Nurdağı (𝑀𝑤
6.7) and İslahiye (𝑀𝑤 6.5) earthquakes. At this stage, energy was further transferred to certain segments in the south, such as the
İskenderun Fault Zone. The pronounced damage observed in Syria resulted from the ground movement triggered by the activation of
other faults in this region. The second earthquake (Elbistan 𝑀𝑤 7.5 earthquake), occurring with accumulated energy on the Çardak
fault, the weakest zone in the region, triggered the Sürgü fault. Effectively, the energy release just north of the Çardak fault set
off a chain reaction, impacting all the faults in the region (Çardak, Sürgü, Doğanşehir, Malatya-Akçadağ, and Göksun), leading to
significant damage in the area. Further details about this earthquake sequence and its mechanism can be found in [52–55].
All main shocks and aftershocks have been recorded by hundreds of accelerographs at various stations. Fig. 4 presents the
recorded PGA at different stations during three main earthquakes—two on February 6 and one on February 20. Most accelerographs
capture acceleration time histories in three orthogonal directions: N-S, E-W, and UP. Due to the varying location of stations relative to
the earthquake epicenter, the two horizontal components of acceleration may differ due to station rotation with respect to epicenter.
To address this, an SRSS method is employed to calculate the total horizontal PGA, assuming peak horizontal accelerations occur
simultaneously. For more consistent station comparison, PGA values are categorized into seven groups. Fig. 4 indicates that the
𝑀𝑤 7.8 earthquake induced high PGA values at numerous stations along the EAF. Conversely, the 𝑀𝑤 7.5 and 𝑀𝑤 6.3 shocks
predominantly resulted in localized elevated PGA values. The circles on the figure denote the locations of damaged dams (refer to
Table 2 for details).
3 AFAD reported 𝑀𝑤 of 7.6.

4 AFAD reported 𝑀𝑤 of 6.4.
5
Table 2
A compilation of dams affected during the February 2023 Türkiye earthquake sequence [15,16,56]. Note: the list may not be exhaustive and covers only the
dams studied in this paper. Height is measured from the foundation. I: Irrigation, DW: Domestic Water.
Dam City Basin Height Crest Function Dam Body Construction Reservoir Irrigated Damage Latitude Longitude Nearest Distance
[m] length type volume period capacity area status station from nearest
[m] [Mm3 ] [Year] [hm3 ] [ha] code (TK) station [km]
Arıklıkaş Osmaniye Ceyhan 33 355 I Earthfill 0.62 1994–1998 2.2 268 Severe 37.156 36.514 ‘8002‘ 5.8
Kalecik Osmaniye Ceyhan 80 194 I Concrete faced 0.84 1978–1985 32.8 4890 Moderate 37.148 36.459 ‘8002’ 10.3
rockfill
Aslantaş Osmaniye Ceyhan 95 566 I+E+F Zoned earthfill 8.49 −1984 1928 Light 37.273 36.272 ‘8004’ 19.5
Kartalkaya Kahramanmaraş Ceyhan 57 205 I+DW Zoned earthfill 1.45 1965–1972 195 22 810 Severe 37.467 37.239 ‘4614’ 5.6
Kılavuzlu Kahramanmaraş Ceyhan 61 556 E Earth core 3.8 −2014 74 Moderate 37.626 36.802 ‘4617’ 5.2
sand gravel
Çat Adıyaman Euraphates 78 267 I Rockfill 2.5 1985–1996 240 22 091 Moderate 38.068 38.313 ‘0214’ 8.8
Çetintepe Adıyaman Euraphates 116 780 I Earth core 12.7 −2022 460 Moderate 37.840 37.666 ‘0208’ 6.0
rockfill
Sürgü Malatya Euraphates 55 736 I+DW Earth core 1.22 1965–1969 70.9 10 090 Moderate 38.035 37.879 ‘4408’ 6.8
rockfill
Sultansuyu Malatya Euraphates 60 721 I Earth core 3.2 1986–1992 53.3 17 614 Severe 38.319 38.052 ‘4406’ 7.3
sand gravel
Büyükkaraçay Hatay Rebel 105 415 DW Concrete faced 2.5 2009–2019 53.7 3736 Light 36.188 35.988 ‘3140’ 12.3
rockfill
Hassa-Demrek Hatay Rebel 30 503 I Earthfill 0.36 1997–2006 2 276 Moderate 36.666 36.447 ‘3145’ 4.2
Islahiye- Gaziantep Rebel 41 233 I Earth Core 0.69 2015–2017 2.8 612 Light 37.031 36.771 ‘2718’ 13.1
Bayraktepe sand gravel
Kırıkhan- Hatay Rebel 40 419 I Earth Core 0.36 2007–2017 0.75 92 Moderate 36.485 36.320 ‘3142’ 4.4
Kutlusoğuksu rockfill
Nurdağı- Gaziantep Rebel 29 182 I Earth Core 0.15 2015–2018 1.9 274 Severe 37.100 36.893 ‘2712’ 17.0
Hamidiye rockfill
Reyhanlı Hatay Rebel 30 9271 I Earthfill 20.73 2010–2020 480 58 460 Moderate 36.349 36.562 ‘3133’ 11.8
Samandağı- Hatay Rebel 26 406 I Earthfill 0.36 2001–2005 2 222 Moderate 36.169 36.033 ‘3129’ 9.4
Karamanlı
Yarseli Hatay Rebel 45 960 I Earth core 3 1985–1992 5 8343 Severe 36.194 36.327 ‘3136’ 11.2
sand gravel
4. An overview of regional dams
The repercussions of the February 2023 earthquake sequence have left a profound impact on the stability of numerous dams in
Türkiye, raising considerable concerns. Official reports indicate the presence of approximately 140 small and large dam structures
in the region [56]. Fifteen dams, constructed between 1956 and 2015 within the borders of Adana province, include Seyhan (1956),
Kesiksuyu (1970), Kozan (1972), Nergizlik (1996), Çatalan (1996), Yüreğir Kılıçlı (2010), Yedigöze (2010), Sarıçam-Baklalı (2015),
Pozantı Yağlı taş (2015), KozanPostkabasakal (2015), Kozan Bağtepe (2016), Kozan Zerdali (2016), Karaisalı Demirüt (2016), Aladağ
Dölekli (2016), Kozan Meletmez (2020). The commissioning dates for these dams are detailed in the other publication.
Seven dams (Tahtaköprü-1976, Yarseli-1992, Yayladağı-2000, İskenderun-Pirinçcik-2015, Samandağ Çökek-2015, Kırıkhan
Kutlusoğuksu-2017, and Büyük Karaçay-2019) commissioned between 1992 and 2019 lie within the borders of Hatay province.
Notably, Yarseli dam, one of these storage water structures, underwent elevation in 2006. Osmaniye houses four dams (Memetli-
1973, Aslantaş-1985, Kalecik-1987, Düziçi Karacaören-2016) according to official records, with the Mehmetli dam being raised in
2013. Seven dams (Berdan-1984, Merkez Aslanköy-2006, Alaköprü-2015, Toroslar Gözne-2017, Silifke Kıca-2019, Merkez Cemilli
Çevlik-2019, and Merkez Değirmendere-2020) in the region are potentially at risk.
Official records also reveal eight dams (Kartalkaya-1970, Sır-1991, Menzelet-1992, Ayvalı-2007, Çağlayancerit Merk-2009,
Çağlayancerit Zorkun-2012, and Adatepe-2013) within the borders of Kahramanmaraş province. Gaziantep province, part of the
basin, has five dams (Hancagiz-1992, Kayacık-2006, Ardil-2016, Nurdağı Kuzdık-2017, and İslâhiye Bayraktepe-2017) operational
between 1992 and 2017. Two dams (Çamgazi-1998 and Kahta Menzil-2011) in Adıyaman province and one dam (Seve-2005) in
Kilis province complete the landscape.
Table 2 offers a comprehensive breakdown of damages, classifying them into levels of light, moderate, and severe. The table
provides detailed information about each dam, including its location, height, crest length, body volume, construction material,
reservoir capacity, and the observed damage level. For a visual representation of these dams, including the locations of the four
main shocks and aftershocks, refer to Fig. 5. It is noteworthy that the majority of observed damage is attributed to the earthquake
sequence on February 06, while the influence of the February 20 events may be more localized to nearby dams.
Table 2 predominantly features embankments, underscoring the general vulnerability of this type of infrastructure. Notably,
concrete dams, absent from this list, exhibit a contrasting resilience. Among the 17 dams listed, three show light damages, five exhibit
severe damages, while the remainder display moderate damage. These dams fall within the category of large dams as defined by
ICOLD, with heights ranging from 26 m to 116 m and crest lengths spanning 182 m to 960 m. Fig. 6 presents cross-sectional details
for select dams from Table 2, wherever accessible. The figure displays the material and filter types, along with their configurations,
influencing the damage behavior of embankment dams. This visual aid can be effectively utilized in conjunction with photographs
captured from the damaged dams discussed in Sections 5 and 6 for a comprehensive interpretation of the failure modes.
The seismic intensity at dam sites significantly influences the damage levels observed. None of the damaged dams had an installed
station at the dam or its abutments, necessitating the estimation of PGA from surrounding stations. Two main approaches are
6
Fig. 5. The location of the dams (circles) studied in this paper, along with the four main events (asterisk) from the February 2023, Türkiye earthquake sequence.
Note: only the damaged dams are illustrated, and the color bar indicates their respective damage statuses. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 6. Cross-sectional details of select dams from Table 2 for qualitative comparison. While a relative scale and color variation are applicable within a single
plot, there is no scale for comparison between two dams. Additionally, color variation may differ between dams. Each plot highlights only the most crucial
details. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
7
Fig. 7. Estimated total horizontal PGA at the dam site obtained from the nearest station for three main shocks. Data collected from https://tadas.afad.gov.tr.
The ⊙ signifies the absence of recorded data for the specific event at the nearest target station. Note: the color bar presents the PGA and the circle size inversely
correlates with the distance from the nearest recording station. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)
Fig. 8. Normalized crest settlement (NCS) of embankment dams during earthquake. Note: 𝛥: settlement, DH: dam height, AT: alluvium thickness. 𝑁𝐶𝑆 =
𝛥
𝐷𝐻+𝐴𝑇
× 100. For dams in Türkiye, the AT is not available and is therefore ignored.
commonly employed for this purpose: (1) Physics-based estimation: This involves creating a Kriging model for the entire region,
leveraging known PGA values at existing stations. The model combines meta-modeling concepts with ground motion prediction
models to adjust PGA values based on site-specific conditions, such as shear wave velocity. For example, the Semi-variogram models,
as detailed by EERI and GEER [57] (in Chapter 3: Ground motions) characterize spatial correlation and provide ground motion
estimates for sites without recordings. (2) Voronoi-based nearest stations: This approach identifies the closest station to the site and
utilizes information solely from this station (or the average of two nearest stations if equally close) to estimate ground motion. The
estimation can be enhanced by incorporating information from ground motion prediction models.
The first approach may produce more accurate results by leveraging information from multiple stations to estimate data at
missing sites. Nevertheless, its accuracy is contingent upon the precision of the developed Kriging model. On the contrary, the
second approach is straightforward and simple but provides deterministic estimates. Given that this paper does not require exact
ground motion estimates for quantitative simulations, the second approach is adopted for simplicity. Table 2 includes the ID code
of the nearest station to each dam (e.g., station TK8002 is the closest to Arıklıkaş Dam, located 5.8 km away). Most stations are
within 10 km of the studied dams, with distances ranging from 4.2 km to 19.5 km. Fig. 7 illustrates the estimated total horizontal
PGA at the site of all 17 dams resulting from three main shocks. The contour plot depicts PGA values, and the size of the circles
inversely correlates with the distance from the nearest recording station–larger circles indicating closer proximity and more reliable
ground motion estimates.
Alongside the qualitative damage status assigned in Table 2 to different dams, various empirical relations have been proposed
to classify embankment damage based on seismic performance. Regression models, grounded in empirical data, are commonly em-
ployed for preliminary deformation estimates, providing a basis for comparison with more detailed analyses. For instance, Swaisgood
[19,58] conducted studies compiling seismic response data for over 80 dams of different types (earth core rockfill, earthfill, concrete-
faced rockfill, and hydraulic fill). Fig. 8(a) illustrates the correlation between normalized crest settlement and PGA, categorizing
damage into four levels: none, slight (minor in the original paper), moderate, and severe (serious in the original paper). The figure
implicitly reflects the influence of earthquake magnitude, with higher magnitudes corresponding to greater settlements. Additionally,
8
Fig. 9. Observed damage in Kartalkaya Dam.
the circle size in the figure, representing dam height, indirectly aids in establishing a connection between dam size and damage
level.
Using field-collected data and available literature, we computed the normalized settlement for selected dams in Türkiye. The
settlement data includes estimations, and normalization considers dam height while disregarding alluvium thickness. PGA values
represent the maximum recorded values from all main shocks and aftershocks at the nearest stations (as illustrated in Fig. 7) and are
not exact estimates at the dam location. With these assumptions and simplifications, Fig. 8(b) presents the preliminary relationship
between normalized settlement and PGA for these dams in Türkiye. The overall trend aligns with global dam data.
5. Shaken and damaged dams: Ceyhan and Euraphates basin
This section provides a condensed overview of the observed damage in various dams, detailed in Table 2 which are located
in either Ceyhan and Euraphates Basin. The primary data source is the authors’ comprehensive post-earthquake reconnaissance
mission, documented, including photographs, in a detailed report [15]. Although the majority of the information is derived from
this mission, updates and additional insights from other reconnaissance teams are incorporated in this paper.
5.1. Kartalkaya Dam
Kartalkaya Dam, situated in Kahramanmaraş province along the Aksu River, serves the dual purpose of supplying drinking and
irrigation water. Standing at a height of 56 m from the river level, the dam is constructed as a zoned rock-fill type. The recorded
PGA (from 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event) at the nearest station (TK-4614), located approximately 5.5 km away, measured 2.05 g and 2.07 g in
the N-S and E-W directions, respectively. Check Fig. 7 for detailed PGA values at the nearest stations. Other sources have reported
different PGA estimates: 1.16 g [57] and 0.45 g [59].
Following the February earthquake sequence, severe damage occurred in the earth-rock fill of the dam. The reservoir was already
at a low pool due to ongoing drought. Immediate aftermath photographs revealed significant damage, including large cracks in the
dam body, slips on the upstream left bank, and settlement approximately 1.0 m to the left [15]. The security cabin on the crest was
completely destroyed. Notably, vertical ground movement in the bedrock on the upstream right bank caused damage to the rock
fill’s right bank, accompanied by large rock falls obstructing roads and impeding timely aid delivery. During reconnaissance, the
research team found the embankment crest covered with material, obscuring key technical evidence. Hasty operations led to the
deposition of a layer exceeding 60 cm in thickness on the crest, erasing collapse patterns and slip principles. Fig. 9 illustrates the
observed damage at the dam site including the longitudinal cracks along the crest, and large vertical movements.
Variances in reported numbers exist; according to [59], crest cracks ranged from 15 to 80 cm in width and 20–90 cm in depth,
while Çetin and Ilgaç [56] reported 20–30 cm crest cracks. The EERI and GEER [57] report notes moderate damage with crack widths
between 15–35 cm along the crest, attributed to seismic compression of the earthfill. No damage was observed on the upstream
or downstream faces. No leakage occurred at the downstream toe, and the rocky nature of native materials prevented liquefaction
traces. The dam’s outlet structure remained unchanged, with superficial damage to the wingwalls at the water inlet through the
gates. The right side of the spillway wing wall shifted towards the dam.
9
Fig. 10. Observed damage in Sultansuyu Dam. Sources: ∙ is adopted from https://adiyamannews.com. ∙∙ is adopted from [57].
5.2. Sultansuyu Dam
Situated within the Akçadağ district of Malatya province, Sultansuyu Dam is an earthfill type designed for irrigation purposes,
with a height of 52 m from the river basin. The foundation comprises claystone-sandstone. The recorded PGA (from 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event) at
the nearest station (TK-4406), approximately 7.3 km away, measured 0.11 g and 0.14 g in the N-S and E-W directions, respectively
(Refer to Fig. 7). However, the same closest station recorded two horizontal PGAs of 0.58 g and 0.65 g at the first aftershock 𝑀𝑤 6.7.
Other sources have reported varying PGA estimates: 0.19 g [57] and 0.44 g5 [59]. The shear wave velocity range in the foundation
was reported to be 385–616 m/s, while it is 369–467 m/s in the fill material in the dam itself. During the seismic events, the
maximum water level in the reservoir was recorded as 10 m below the embankment crest level.
After the earthquakes, large cracks emerged in the embankment, leading to controlled discharge of water from the reservoir.
Initial photographs revealed cracks around 0.8–1.0 m at most (See Fig. 10). The depth of these cracks reached 4.0 m ten days
later. Lateral separation in the form of slides was observed, including general slips in the protective rock fill layer on the upstream
slope and tension cracks in the middle height of the fill, around 1.0 m in depth and 1.2 m in width. The dam experienced lateral
movement towards the upstream direction during the earthquake, with reporting a maximum settlement of 80 cm [59]. Differential
movements were observed in several locations due to multiple separation areas and slope changes. However, no transverse cracks
were found in the dam. While Kula [59] reported no liquefaction in the dam or foundation, EERI and GEER [57] reported evidence
of liquefaction in the form of sand boils, destabilizing the upstream face of the earth dam, leading to slope instability and crest
cracking. Fig. 10 reports the general view, cracks at the crest and upstream (US) slope, lateral separating, and the potential sand
boils (as reported in [57]) at the skirts of the right abutment.
5.3. Reyhanlı Dam
Located in the Reyhanlı district of Hatay province, Reyhanlı Dam is an earthfill type structure designed for irrigation and flood
protection, situated just 4 km away from the Syrian border. It is composed of two different sections, i.e., homogeneous and clay
core earth dams. Positioned between the Amanos Segment of the East Anatolian Fault Zone and the Yesemek Segment of the Death
Sea Fault Zone, the dam has a height of 28.2 m from the foundation. The recorded PGA from 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the nearest station
(TK-3133), approximately 11.7 km away, was 0.23 g (in either directions). However, the recorded PGA from 𝑀𝑤 6.3 event in
February 20 at the same station measured 0.57 g and 0.60 g in the N-S and E-W directions, respectively (Refer to Fig. 7).
Substantial damages were identified on the dam crest and both the upstream and downstream slopes of the embankment. While
the dam axis predominantly extends in the north-south direction, exceptions exist at the beginning and end of the embankment.
5 The station used in this study seems to be incorrect.
10
Fig. 11. Observed damage in Reyhanlı Dam. Damage classification scheme is shown in green, orange and red colors. (For interpretation of the references to
color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Damage varied across different regions, prompting the use of a color-coded damage classification in [57]: green (no damage), orange
(crack width around 30 cm and settlement of 5–10 cm), and red zones (crack width over 1.0 m and crest settlement of 15–80 cm).
Our observations from the first orange-colored zone (900–2000 m) revealed lateral separations exceeding 1.0 m in this section,
with variable crack depths in the crest, reaching up to 1.2 m. In the red and second orange zones (6000–9272 m), lateral separations
reached 1.5 m, and crack depths reached 3.5 m. Additionally, settlements approaching 50 cm in the upstream–downstream direction
were observed in these sections. The damages were attributed to proceeding circular slip surfaces formed in the upstream and
downstream directions. Notably, these damages were concentrated in specific regions. While no soil liquefaction or leakage was
observed, the authors cannot rule out the possibility of liquefaction in the red zone. In Fig. 11, three damage zones are illustrated,
showcasing examples of lateral deformation and settlement in the red zone, as well as cracking and tilted bolts in the orange zone.
5.4. Yarseli Dam
The Yarseli Dam, situated in Hatay’s Antakya district, stands at a height of 45 m and serves irrigation purposes as an earthfill
structure on Beyazçay. Positioned amidst seismic zones – the Antakya Fault Zone and the Hacıpaşa Segment of the Death Sea Fault
Zone – the dam is founded on alluvium overlying claystone and sandstone. The dam features a (relatively long) upstream blanket
(with the same material of core zone) designed to enhance seepage distance. The recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the
nearest station (TK-3136), about 11.2 km away, were 0.54 g and 0.41 g in the N-S and E-W directions. Additionally, the 𝑀𝑤 6.3
event in February 20 registered PGAs of 0.62 g and 0.43 g at the same station (Refer to Fig. 7).
On-site investigations unveiled significant damages on the dam crest and embankment upstream face. Tensile cracks, formed
by the slippage of fill materials under seismic compression, exhibited widths ranging from 5 to 30 cm and depths up to 55 cm
in certain locations (the crack depth of 60–125 cm was reported in [56]). Remarkably, no cracking was noted on the spillway or
outlet structures. According to [59], negligible movement was observed on the upstream and downstream faces. Sand boils and soil
liquefaction were observed near the downstream toe; however, no leakage was detected. Fig. 12 shows the deep longitudinal cracks
at the crest, as well as the observed sand boil at the downstream.
5.5. Arıklıkaş Dam
Situated in Osmaniye province on the Buğdaycık stream, a Ceyhan River tributary, the Arıklıkaş Dam stands at a height of 32.5 m
(25.0 m above the river basin). Built as a homogeneous earth fill structure, it is founded on low-plasticity clay. Bedrock consists of a
sedimentary rock, including layers of claystone, siltstone, sandstone, marl, and limestone. The dam site is in close proximity to the
earthquake-affected Bahçe district of Osmaniye. The seismic activity is influenced by the Düziçi-İskenderun Fault Zone, positioned
between the Düziçi Segment and the East Anatolian Fault Zone Amanos Segment. Recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the
nearest station (TK-8002), approximately 5.7 km away, were 0.25 g and 0.21 g in the N-S and E-W directions. Additionally, the 𝑀𝑤
6.7 aftershock (10 min later) registered PGAs of 0.31 g and 0.33 g at the same station (Refer to Fig. 7).
During on-site investigations, significant damages were evident on the dam crest and upstream face of the fill. Arıklıkaş Dam
endured substantial damage in this earthquake sequence, with lateral displacements exceeding 5.0 m in the dam embankment due
to sliding movements. Fig. 13 illustrates different cracks types, their openings, and the lateral separation. Tensile cracks reaching up
to 4.0 m were observed, and horizontal movement in the upstream direction recorded a maximum of 1.2 m. The dam’s abutments
exhibited no significant cracking, and both the spillway and outlet structures remained undamaged. Sand boils towards the toe were
also observed. According to local observers, the dam sustained damage in the initial 𝑀𝑤 7.8 earthquake in Pazarcık, with further
damages occurring in the Nurdağı and İslahiye aftershocks (𝑀𝑤 6+). The Elbistan earthquake of 𝑀𝑤 7.5 on the same day caused
extra damages. Reconnaissance revealed widened separations in the fill crest and deeper cracks compared to previous assessments
by other institutions.
11
Fig. 12. Observed damage in Yarseli Dam. Source: ∙ is adopted from [57].
Fig. 13. Observed damage in Arıklıkaş Dam. Source: ∙ is adopted from [57].
5.6. Sürgü Dam
The dam, located in Malatya province on Sürgü stream, a tributary of the Euphrates River, serves irrigation purposes. With an
earth-fill type design, it stands 55.0 m high from the river level. Situated south of the heavily affected Doğanşehir settlement, Sürgü
Dam features a thin impermeability zone and a clay core zoned earth-fill structure inclined upstream (with transition section of
sand and gravel). The initial construction of the embankment was completed in 1969, but it was later heightened. Consequently,
the side slopes of the main embankment increase as one ascends towards the crest. The downstream fill is comprised of large-sized
crushed rocks. Before initiating the construction of the main embankment, the alluvium on the riverbed was removed. The dam
suffered damage during the 𝑀𝑤 5.8, 1985 Doğanşehir earthquake.
Recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the nearest station (TK-4408), approximately 6.8 km away, were 0.10 g and 0.14 g
in the N-S and E-W directions. While the location of this dam is closer to the 𝑀𝑤 7.5 event (nine hours later), TK-4408 station did
not provide recording (Refer to Fig. 7).
After the February 2023 earthquake, systematic cracks formed on the fill, and local sliding occurred in the upstream direction.
Multiple cracks and local collapses appeared in various parts of the embankment, as shown in Fig. 14. Particularly in the upstream
direction of the fill, a crack formed along the crest, with lateral openings reaching up to 30 cm. The cracks deepened in some areas,
reaching depths of 80 cm with a crack mouth opening of 30–40 cm. Cracks were also observed in the downstream direction of the
embankment crest, but in the form of superficial cracks with 1–2 cm openings.
12
Fig. 14. Observed damage in Sürgü Dam.
Fig. 15. Observed damage in Çat Dam.
5.7. Çat Dam
Situated in Adıyaman province along Abdülharap stream, a tributary of the Euphrates River, Çat Dam is a rockfill structure faced
significant challenges after recent earthquake sequence. The side slopes of the main embankment are designed at a ratio of 3H:1V for
the upstream side and 2.5H:1V for the downstream side, where H represents horizontal distance and V represents vertical distance.
The cross-section includes a central impervious core made of compacted low-plasticity clay. A transition section comprising sand,
gravel, and small-sized crushed rock has been incorporated between the core and the rockfill materials for the downstream part. The
downstream shells consist of large-sized crushed rocks. Before commencing the construction of the main embankment, the alluvium
on the riverbed, consisting of mixtures of fine to large-sized grains, was removed.
The earthquake’s aftermath led to the destruction of plant-based peat islands floating in the reservoir, which adhered to the
upstream surface of the dam fill due to wave effects. Recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the nearest station (TK-0214),
approximately 8.7 km away, were 0.06 g in both the N-S and E-W directions (Refer to Fig. 7).
The seismic activity resulted in cracks within the soil-rock fill, separations in building joints, and the development of slip planes
in various areas. Rockfalls were observed in the spillway area, accompanied by cracks in the dam body in both upstream and
downstream directions. Tension cracks at the embankment crest exhibited separations up to 25–30 cm. Sliding along rotational slip
planes occurred in parts of the embankment, generating surface cracks in the middle of the fill. Circular slip development, as a
surface separation, is depicted in Fig. 15.
The earthquake-induced effects included separations at the dam fill and spillway concrete junction, with observed differential
settlements. Notably, different settlements up to 40 cm were identified in the spillway structure-embankment junction near the
downstream slope. Following the earthquake, rockfalls and rockflows were noted on the left bank of the embankment. Particularly,
slipping and flowing events on the left side of the spillway caused partial damage to the walls of the spillway structure, which were
already constructed with poor-quality concrete.
13
Fig. 16. Observed damage in Kalecik Dam.
5.8. Kalecik Dam
The dam is within the borders of Osmaniye province and is located on Kalecik stream, a tributary of the Ceyhan River. The
dam’s height from the river basin is 80 m, and it is a central clay core rock-fill type dam. There are three layers of sand filter zone
(2.5 m thickness), gravel filter zone (2.5 m thickness), and rock crush (5.0 m thickness) next to the central clay core. The entire
dam is built on weathered diabase bed rock (an igneous rock, exhibits a variety of Gabbro, primarily composed of feldspar, augite,
magnetite, and olivine. Its grain size is smaller when compared to gabbro and basalt.).
The Düziçi-İskenderun Fault Zone affects seismic activity in the region, with the embankment situated between Düziçi Segment
and East Anatolian Fault Zone Amanos segment. Recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the nearest station (TK-8002),
approximately 5.7 km away, were 0.25 g and 0.21 g in the N-S and E-W directions. Additionally, the 𝑀𝑤 6.7 aftershock (10 min
later) registered PGAs of 0.31 g and 0.33 g at the same station (Refer to Fig. 7).
During on-site investigations, major damages were found on the dam crest and the upstream face of the fill. The measured crack
width ranged from 40–50 cm with depths of 30–150 cm. Crest settlement of up to 40 cm was observed [59]. Deformation on the
upstream face of the fill, measured up to 50 cm, is evident in Fig. 16. This figure also illustrates the deviation of vertical elements
on the fill.
5.9. Aslantaş Dam
The dam is within the borders of Osmaniye province and is located on a tributary of the Ceyhan River. It is a 95 m high zoned
earthfill dam. Recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the nearest station (TK-8004), approximately 19.4 km away, were 0.17 g
and 0.18 g in the N-S and E-W directions. Additionally, the 𝑀𝑤 6.7 aftershock (10 min later) registered PGAs of 0.39 g and 0.35 g at
the same station (Refer to Fig. 7). Minor crest cracks, with a width of up to 10 cm and a depth of 40–45 cm, have been reported [56].
6. Shaken and damaged dams: Rebel basin
This section provides a condensed overview of the reported damage in various dams, detailed in Table 2 which are located in
Rebel Basin. Most of the dams in this section have not been visited by the authors and therefore, only a general information are
provided about them.
6.1. Büyükkaraçay Dam
The dam is within the borders of Hatay province and is located on a tributary of the Rebel River. It is a 105 m high concrete-
faced rock-fill dam. The ultrabasic rocks constituting the dam foundation are identified as high-strength, moderately jointed, and
impermeable based on test results and field investigations. The pressuremeter test results classify the dam foundation as a good
rock [60]. Recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 6.3 event (on February 20) at the nearest station (TK-3041), approximately 12.3 km away,
were 0.25 g and 0.21 g in the N-S and E-W directions. Additionally, the 𝑀𝑤 6.7 aftershock (10 min later) registered PGAs of 0.31 g
and 0.33 g at the same station (Refer to Fig. 7). Minor crest cracks, with a width of 2–6 cm and a depth of 14–32 cm, have been
reported [56], including some rockfalls, as shown in Fig. 17.
14
Fig. 17. Observed damage in Büyükkaraçay Dam.
Fig. 18. Observed damage in Kırıkhan-Kutlusoğuksu Dam.
6.2. Hassa Demrek Dam
The dam is within the borders of Hatay province and is located on a tributary of the Rebel River. It is a 30 m high earthfill dam.
Recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the nearest station (TK-3145), approximately 4.2 km away, were 0.6 g and 0.7 g in the
N-S and E-W directions. Additionally, the 𝑀𝑤 6.7 aftershock (10 min later) registered PGAs of 0.62 g and 0.78 g at the same station
(Refer to Fig. 7). Minor crest cracks, with a width of 6–8 cm and a depth of 40–60 cm, have been reported [56]. Cracks, 5–10 cm
wide and 60–70 cm deep, were observed at a distance of 0.9–1.3 m from the downstream slope [59].
6.3. Islahiye-Bayraktepe Dam
The dam is within the borders of Gaziantep province and is located on a tributary of the Rebel River. It is a 41 m high earth
core sand gravel dam. Recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the nearest station (TK-2718), approximately 13.0 km away, were
0.67 g and 0.64 g in the N-S and E-W directions. Additionally, the 𝑀𝑤 7.5 event registered PGAs of 0.62 g and 0.78 g at the same
station (Refer to Fig. 7). Minor crest cracks, with a width of 3–5 cm and a depth of 15–20 cm, have been reported [56].
6.4. Kırıkhan-Kutlusoğuksu Dam
The dam is within the borders of Hatay province and is located on a tributary of the Rebel River. The foundation is composed
of an ophiolitic complex, characterized by a diverse assemblage of rocks, including ultramafic, mafic, and associated formations.
It is a 40 m high earth core rockfill dam. Recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the nearest station (TK-3142), approximately
4.4 km away, were 0.66 g and 0.75 g in the N-S and E-W directions. Additionally, the 𝑀𝑤 6.3 event registered PGAs of 0.37 g and
0.30 g at the same station (Refer to Fig. 7). As shown in Fig. 18, significant crest cracks, ranging from 10–120 cm in width, were
observed with depths reaching up to 2.8 m [56].
15
Fig. 19. Observed damage in Nurdağı Dam.
Table 3
Summary of the deterministic and probabilistic seismic hazard analyses, and the results of total risk analyses for the selective dams considered in the study.
Notes, EF: Earthfill dam, RF: Rockfill dam, 𝑀𝑚𝑎𝑥 : Maximum earthquake magnitude in 𝑀𝑤 ; 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 : Minimum distance to fault segment; PGA50% : Mean PGA at
the 50th percentile; PGA84% : Mean PGA at the 84th percentile; OBE: Operational Based Earthquake; MDE: Maximum Design Earthquake; SEE: Safety Evaluation
Earthquake.
Dam Arıklıkaş Kalecik Kartalkaya Çat Polat Sürgü Sultansuyu Reyhanlı Tahtaköprü Yarseli
Dam City Osmaniye Osmaniye K.maraş Adıyaman Malatya Malatya Malatya Hatay Hatay Hatay
information Height (m) 33 85 57 78 56 57 60 30 47 45
Type EF RF EF RF EF RF EF EF EF EF
Body volume (Mm3 ) 0.62 0.84 1.45 2.5 2.1 1.2 3.2 20.8 2 3
Reservoir capacity (hm3 ) 2.2 32.8 195 240 11.5 70.9 53.3 480 200 5
𝑀𝑚𝑎𝑥 7 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.6 7.4 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.1
Deterministic 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 (km) 7.6 5.7 7.5 2.8 3.4 1.2 8.5 3.2 0.8 3.4
method PGA50% (g) 0.311 0.363 0.354 0.471 0.47 0.463 0.351 0.453 0.503 0.397
PGA84% (g) 0.505 0.591 0.569 0.762 0.761 0.761 0.563 0.733 0.81 0.643
Probabilistic OBE (g) 0.304 0.379 0.228 0.322 0.408 0.369 0.162 0.31 0.445 0.342
method MDE (g) 0.407 0.525 0.331 0.434 0.548 0.52 0.239 0.423 0.599 0.462
SEE (g) 0.562 0.591 0.497 0.607 0.754 0.766 0.37 0.597 0.834 0.643
Hazard Class IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
analysis Hazard ratio Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high
Total Risk factor 28 34 34 36 34 34 34 32 36 32
risk Risk class IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
ICOLD [64] Risk ratio Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high
Total Risk factor 189 173.6 176.2 238.7 228.9 244.5 225.5 230.2 236.7 165.5
Risk Risk class III III III III III III III III III III
Bureau [61] Risk ratio High High High High High High High High High High
6.5. Nurdağı Dam
The dam is within the borders of Gaziantep province and is located on a tributary of the Rebel River. It is a 29 m high earth core
rockfill dam. Recorded PGAs from the 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event at the nearest station (TK-2712), approximately 17.0 km away, were 0.57 g
and 0.61 g in the N-S and E-W directions. Additionally, the 𝑀𝑤 6.7 aftershock event registered PGAs of 0.8 g and 0.63 g at the
same station (Refer to Fig. 7). Cracks with 15–20 cm width have been developed in the crest as seen in Fig. 19.
7. Semi-quantitative risk analysis
The semi-quantitative risk analysis framework used in this paper is a simplified method that is described in Bureau [61], where
the total risk is determined by two main factors: the seismic hazard rating of the dam site, and the risk rating of the dam and
appurtenant structures. The risk rating of the dam is based on reservoir capacity, dam height, evacuation requirements, and potential
downstream damages. The downstream damage depends on the human population at risk, value of private, commercial, industrial,
or governmental property in the potential flood path, and also the potential downtime. A summary of this framework can be found
in Tosun and Hariri-Ardebili [62], and thus, is not presented in this paper.
In this paper, the semi-quantitative risk analysis framework is utilized on ten selective dams. Eight of them are from those already
listed in Table 2 and damaged in different levels. Two other dams are also included that were close to the epicenter of the February
2023 earthquake sequence and experienced large shaking but sustained no damage. These to are Polat Dam in Malatya (which is
very close to Sürgü Dam in Fig. 5), and Tahtaköprü Dam in Hatay (which is located in middle of Islahiye Dam and Hassa Demrek
Dam in Fig. 5).
For the seismic hazard analyses of dam sites across three water basins (Ceyhan, Euphrates, and Rebel), an exhaustive study was
conducted, leveraging the macro seismo-tectonic model of Türkiye. While the initial map was provided by the National Disaster
Organization and other Institutes for general use, a refined version tailored for dam projects was developed at the Earthquake
Research Center in Osmangazi University. This program, utilized by the authors in previous studies [34,63] has proven effective.
16
Fig. 20. Location of the dams with stations (solid circle) and all damaged dams without stations (white circle) studied in this paper, as well as four main shocks
and aftershocks from the February 2023, Türkiye earthquake sequence. In the individual dam photos, the red triangles present the location of recording station
and its ID.
Incorporating local geological features and seismic history, the seismic activity rates within the basins were quantified.
Subsequently, the seismic stability of dams under consideration underwent a re-analysis, aligning with the new seismic zonation map
and updated national regulations on seismic design. The summary results of the seismic hazard analyses are presented in Table 3.
The seismic hazard analyses conducted through two distinct methods reveal a considerable variation in PGA values across dam
sites. Deterministic seismic hazard analysis indicates that the PGA values for the 50th percentile range from 0.311 g to 0.503 g,
while those for the 84th percentile fall between 0.505 g and 0.810 g. Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis shows that PGA changes
widely across all earthquake levels, depending mainly on the dam sites’ positions and the nature of predictive relationships. In this
study, six separate relationships were considered for determining horizontal PGA.
It is crucial to highlight that all dams are impacted by a nearby energy source, with distances less than 10.0 km from fault line
(Table 3). The results of total risk analyses are presented in Table 3. The hazard ratio identifies a risk class of IV with high risk for
all dams, aligning with ICOLD [64] specifications. According to this study, Total Risk Factor (𝑅𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ) values range between 173.6
and 244.5, signifying a high-risk potential for downstream life and structures.
8. Instrumented and shaken without damage
In addition to the damaged dams (in various degrees) discussed in Sections 5 and 6, there are another group of dams that are
of interest: those with instrumented devices to record the ground accelerations. These dams include one to three accelerometer and
all of them have at least one recording from four main shocks or aftershocks shown in Fig. 20. This figure shows the locations of
eleven such dams in the region equipped with accelerometers. These dams, owned or operated privately, often lack detailed data
accessibility. This section exclusively examines publicly available information. As no public records or reports indicate damage in
these eleven dams, they are assumed to be intact.
17
Fig. 21. Comparison of PGA ratio from dam to abutment in different multi-sensor dams under 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event.
Fig. 22. Views from the crest of Tahtaköprü Dam (left) and fill materials in downstream slope (right).
Among the eleven dams, three are situated along the main East Anatolian Fault, close to those discussed in Fig. 5, while the
remaining eight are west of this fault. Most of these dams feature at least two accelerometers-one on the dam and another on
the abutment or downstream rock. AceBox sensors, known for their high performance, are commonly used. AceBox, an advanced
accelerograph, employs three Force Balance Accelerometers to record seismic signals with high resolution (up to 100 Hz frequency),
storing the data on embedded USB memory. The recorded accelerations offer valuable insights into various dam characteristics, such
as its fundamental period.
The primary examination involves comparing the acceleration recorded at the crest to another point on the abutment. The ratio of
crest to abutment PGA indicates the degree of acceleration amplification by the dam. Typically greater than one, this ratio illustrates
the dam’s flexibility relative to its foundation. In Fig. 21, this ratio is depicted for eight dams equipped with two sensors, computed
from the main 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event (excluding one dam lacking recording from this event). With the exception of Sincik Dam, the others
generally adhere to the expected trend (or at least maintain a ratio of one). Yamanli Dam exhibits an amplification of up to five
times, while the others typically range between 1–2.
In the following sections, two dams are discussed more in detail.
8.1. Tahtaköprü Dam
A specific focus is given to the Tahtaköprü Dam, notable for its resilience despite its proximity to a segment of the DSFZ in the
region. This is a 47 m height earthfill dam with 200 hm3 reservoir capacity which was completed in 1975. Tahtaköprü Dam showed
no damage during February 2023 earthquake sequence.
According to deterministic seismic hazard analysis, PGA50% and PGA84% are 0.503 g and 0.810 g, respectively. Moreover, PSHA
yields to OBE = 0.445 g, MDE = 0.599 g and SEE = 0.834 g for this dam site. These PGA values are highest among all dams
considered in semi-quantitative risk analysis (See Table 3). Minimal capillary cracks were discerned as the sole visible impact.
Situated proximately to the center and villages of Hatay province’s Hassa district, most affected by recent earthquakes, the dam
occupies a location between the Amanos Segment of the East Anatolian Fault Zone and the Yesemek Segment of the Dead Sea Fault
Zone—regions instrumental in shaping seismic activity in the area. Fig. 22 showcases images captured during the reconnaissance
mission at Tahtaköprü dam. Furthermore, the presence of recently poured and laid material on the fill crest suggests a need for
further investigation.
Tahtaköprü dam is equipped with three accelerometers—one in the crest and two installed in the left and right abutments. This
configuration allows for the evaluation of the actual acceleration experienced by the dam during the earthquake sequence. Fig. 23
presents the recorded acceleration time histories at the Tahtaköprü Dam location during the first event (𝑀𝑤 7.8). Notably, a PGA
of approximately 0.25 g is observed in both the E-W and N-S directions at the crest, while the vertical acceleration reaches 0.2 g.
A significant spike in the displacement time history of both horizontal components occurs around𝑡 = 40 s, reaching about 0.8 m
18
Fig. 23. Recorded acceleration time histories at Tahtaköprü Dam stations from 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event.
Fig. 24. Recorded acceleration time histories at Feke II Dam stations from 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event.
(plots are not shown for brevity). This figure reveals that the recorded acceleration comprises two distinct strong motion phases,
one around 10 s and the other around 40 s.
Unexpectedly, the recorded acceleration in the right abutment exhibits higher acceleration, potentially attributed to noise in
recording. Removal of spikes in the acceleration time history reduces the PGA in the horizontal direction to about 0.20 g and 0.17 g
in the vertical direction. The displacement time history of the vertical component at the right station (not shown in the plot) displays
a remarkably large displacement cycle and residual value. In the left abutment, a horizontal PGA of 0.16 g is observed with a vertical
PGA of 0.11 g.
8.2. Feke II dam
This 70 m RCC dam is equipped with two sensors—one installed at the dam crest (TK0133) and the other on the abutment
rock (TK0134). Utilizing information sourced from the AFAD website, we retrieved four primary recordings from the February 2023
earthquake sequence for both TK0133 and TK0134 stations at the Feke II Dam site. Each recording encompasses three components
in the N-S, E-W, and Up directions. Fig. 24 present the acceleration time histories from 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event only. Upon comparing the E-W
and N-S components, a noticeable trend emerges: for TK0133 recordings at the dam crest, the E-W component typically induces a
higher PGA compared to the N-S component. Conversely, for TK0134 station, the PGA from the N-S component is typically higher
than that from the E-W component.
Next, the amplitude spectrum of seismic records from two locations – dam crest (TK0133) and abutment rock (TK0134) – is
examined. The time domain signals are transformed into the frequency domain using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) techniques,
allowing a comprehensive exploration of the frequency content. The resulting spectra highlight the amplitude variations across
different frequencies, providing insights into the dynamic response of the dam under seismic events. The spectral analysis also
involves the calculation of the amplitude ratio between the dam crest and abutment rock, showing the differential response at
these key locations. Fig. 25 represents the Fourier amplitude, 𝑆𝑖 , ratios across various frequency components and can interpreted
𝑆
as a transfer function (TF), i.e., 𝑇 𝐹2⏐1 = 𝑆2 . The location of spikes in this figure highlights frequencies where the amplitude
1
response at the dam crest significantly differs from that at the abutment rock. These variations in amplitude ratio spikes could be
associated with resonance or amplification effects at specific frequencies, showcasing the dam’s unique vibrational characteristics.
This figure also illustrates the cross power spectral density (CPSD) function (defines the distribution of power per unit frequency),
2
i.e., 𝐶𝑃 𝑆𝐷2⏐1 = 𝑆2 .𝑆1 , and coherency (Coh) function, i.e., 𝐶2⏐1 = |𝐶𝑃 𝑆𝐷2⏐12 |∕(𝐶𝑃 𝑆𝐷
2⏐2 .𝐶𝑃 𝑆𝐷1⏐1 ). A coherence function varies
between 0 and 1, and indicates how well two acceleration time histories correspond to each other at each frequency.
19
Fig. 25. Transfer function (TF), cross-spectral (CPSD) and coherence function (Coh) between the acceleration time histories recorded at the crest and rock in
Feke II Dam location from 𝑀𝑤 7.8 event.
9. Conclusions
In the aftermath of the seismic events that shook Türkiye on February 6, 2023, this comprehensive study delves into three
key aspects: the observed damages in various dams, the risk analysis conducted for selective dams in the region, and the role
of instrumentation in monitoring and understanding seismic impact. The reconnaissance missions conducted on numerous dams,
including Akçadağ-Sultansuyu, Doğanşehir-Sürgü, and Reyhanlı-Reyhanlı, provided crucial insights into the diverse failure modes
experienced, such as strength deterioration, settlement, and tension crack formation. Notably, embankment dams faced seismic
challenges, and the extensive damage to structures like Arıklıkaş Dam emphasized the need for robust seismic resilience.
The risk analysis conducted for selective dams, incorporating both deterministic and probabilistic approaches, painted a
concerning picture, categorizing the majority as high and very high-risk structures. This underscores the urgent necessity for
thorough safety evaluations and the implementation of risk mitigation strategies. The study also identified seismic hazard zones,
providing valuable information for future risk assessments and preparedness measures in the region.
In parallel, the evaluation of dams with instrumentation, notably exemplified by the Tahtaköprü dam, demonstrated the pivotal
role of monitoring in understanding the true impact of earthquakes. While certain dams faced high PGA values, the absence
of observed damage in Tahtaköprü highlighted the proper design and construction. As we conclude, this study reinforces the
interconnectedness of seismic performance assessment, risk analysis, and instrumentation for enhancing the safety and resilience
of dams in earthquake-prone regions. The lessons learned from the February 2023 Türkiye events lay a foundation for informed
decision-making and proactive measures to safeguard dam infrastructure in the face of seismic challenges. This work not only
contributes to the empirical understanding of dam behavior in seismically active regions but also serves as a reference for future
endeavors in enhancing dam resilience and risk mitigation strategies.
As part of future research, it is recommended to conduct a comprehensive numerical analysis focusing on some of the dams that
experienced damage. The numerical models should aim to replicate the observed level of damage and failure modes outlined in this
study. Given the absence of direct recording of shaking intensity at the specific sites (abutment and crest) for most damaged dams,
this presents a challenge. Alternatively, numerical simulations can be carried out on undamaged dams equipped with sensors at the
abutment to assess the analyst’s ability to capture the recorded acceleration at the dam itself. This endeavor may contribute to the
ongoing efforts in model validation, verification, and uncertainty quantification studies.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Mohammad Amin Hariri-Ardebili: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Resources, Validation,
Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Hasan Tosun: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Investigation,
Methodology, Resources, Validation, Writing – original draft.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared
to influence the work reported in this paper.
Data availability
Data will be made available on request.
20
Acknowledgments
The first author participated in a reconnaissance mission as part of the ACI 133 team and expresses gratitude to the team members
for their invaluable support. The second author would like to convey appreciation to the local authorities of DSI and extends thanks
to the members of the Turkish Society on Dam Safety residing in the earthquake region.
Disclaimer
Certain commercial equipment, instruments, or materials (or suppliers, or software, . . . ) are identified in this paper to foster
understanding. Such identification does not imply recommendation or endorsement by the authors, nor does it imply that the
materials or equipment identified are necessarily the best available for the purpose.
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the official stance or endorsement
of any organization, university, or institution.
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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 102 (2024) 104284

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

Dams in the wake-up call of the 2023 Türkiye earthquake sequence:

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: On February 6, 2023, Türkiye experienced a significant earthquake with a magnitude of 𝑀𝑤

1.1. Contributions and novelties

2. Seismic performance of dams: Overview

2.1. Literature review

2.2. Performance criteria

Fig. 2. Contours of damage class as a function of earthquake magnitude and PGA.

3. Mechanism of February, 2023 earthquake sequence in Türkiye

3 AFAD reported 𝑀𝑤 of 7.6.

4. An overview of regional dams

Fig. 9. Observed damage in Kartalkaya Dam.

5. Shaken and damaged dams: Ceyhan and Euraphates basin

5.1. Kartalkaya Dam

5.2. Sultansuyu Dam

5.3. Reyhanlı Dam

5 The station used in this study seems to be incorrect.

5.4. Yarseli Dam

5.5. Arıklıkaş Dam

5.6. Sürgü Dam

Fig. 14. Observed damage in Sürgü Dam.

Fig. 15. Observed damage in Çat Dam.

5.7. Çat Dam

Fig. 16. Observed damage in Kalecik Dam.

5.8. Kalecik Dam

5.9. Aslantaş Dam

6. Shaken and damaged dams: Rebel basin

6.1. Büyükkaraçay Dam

Fig. 17. Observed damage in Büyükkaraçay Dam.

Fig. 18. Observed damage in Kırıkhan-Kutlusoğuksu Dam.

6.2. Hassa Demrek Dam

6.3. Islahiye-Bayraktepe Dam

6.4. Kırıkhan-Kutlusoğuksu Dam

Fig. 19. Observed damage in Nurdağı Dam.

6.5. Nurdağı Dam

7. Semi-quantitative risk analysis

8. Instrumented and shaken without damage

8.1. Tahtaköprü Dam

8.2. Feke II dam

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Declaration of competing interest

Data will be made available on request.

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