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Executive Politics and Governance Series

Series Editors
Martin Lodge, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Kai Wegrich, Hertie School of Governance, Germany
Editorial Board
Philippe Bezes, CNRS-CERSA, Paris, France
Sharon Gilad, Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel
Nilima Gulrajani, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Will Jennings, University of Southampton, UK
David E. Lewis, Vanderbilt University, USA
Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, University of Nottingham, UK
Salvador Parrado, UNED, Madrid, Spain
Nick Sitter, Central European University, Hungary
Kutsal Yesilkagit, University of Utrecht, the Netherlands
The Executive Politics and Governance series focuses on central government, its
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Titles include:

Simon Bastow
GOVERNANCE, PERFORMANCE, AND CAPACITY STRESS
The Chronic Case of Prison Crowding
Andrea C. Bianculli, Xavier Fernández-i-Marín and Jacint Jordana
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REGULATORY GOVERNANCE
Audiences, Controls and Responsibilities in the Politics of Regulation
Maria Gustavson
AUDITING GOOD GOVERNMENT IN AFRICA
Public Sector Reform, Professional Norms and the Development Discourse
Will Jennings
OLYMPIC RISKS
Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich (editors)
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Accountability and
Regulatory Governance
Audiences, Controls and Responsibilities in
the Politics of Regulation

Edited by

Andrea C. Bianculli
Research Fellow, Institut Barcelona d’Etudis Internacionals (IBEI), Spain

Xavier Fernández-i-Marín
Senior Researcher, ESADE Business School, Spain

Jacint Jordana
Professor, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Institut Barcelona d’Estudis
Internacionals (IBEI), Spain
Selection, introduction and editorial matter © Andrea C. Bianculli,
Xavier Fernández-i-Marín and Jacint Jordana 2015
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2015
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-34957-6

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this

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First published 2015 by
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Contents

List of Tables, Figures and Maps vii

Acknowledgements x

Notes on Contributors xii

1 When Accountability Meets Regulation 1

Jacint Jordana, Andrea C. Bianculli and Xavier
Fernández-i-Marín

2 Varieties of Accountability Mechanisms in

Regulatory Agencies 23
Xavier Fernández-i-Marín, Jacint Jordana and Andrea
C. Bianculli

3 Explaining Self-Perceived Accountability of Regulatory

Agencies in Comparative Perspective: How Do Formal
Independence and De Facto Managerial Autonomy
Interact? 51
Koen Verhoest, Astrid Molenveld and Tom Willems

4 Assessing the Mandatory Accountability of

Regulatory Agencies 78
Christel Koop

5 Modelling the Relationship Between Independence and

Accountability of Regulatory Agencies 105
Mattia Guidi

6 Designing Accountability Regimes at the European Union

Level 123
Nuria Font

7 Social Accountability in the Regulatory Policy Process:

The Governance of Telecommunications in Italy
and Spain 143
Maria Stella Righettini and Selena Grimaldi

v
vi Contents

8 Accountability of the IRAs in Turkey. A Cross-Sectoral

Comparison 166
Işık Özel

9 Regulatory Capitalism, Accountability and Democracy 189

Colin Scott

10 Financial Markets and Regulatory Accountability: Between

Technocratic Autonomy and Democratic Direction 209
Nicholas Dorn

11 Accountability and Consumer Sovereignty 235

Martin Lodge

12 Some Comparative Conclusions on Regulatory

Governance and Accountability 265
Andrea C. Bianculli, Jacint Jordana and Xavier
Fernández-i-Marín

Index 278
Tables, Figures and Maps

Tables

1.1 Accountability mechanisms vs regulation costs and

benefits 10
3.1 Calibration of concepts and cases 58
3.2 The upward and downward mechanisms for
accountability under review 60
3.3 Analysis of necessary conditions for high use of
accountability mechanisms 65
3.4 Analysis of sufficient conditions for high use of
accountability mechanisms 66
3.5 Analysis of necessary conditions for high perceived
accountability 70
3.6 Analysis of sufficient conditions for high perceived
accountability 71
3.7 Support for hypotheses 72
4.1 Regulatory agencies, types of accountability and
statutory provisions 85
4.2 Annual itemized budget to government 87
4.3 Annual itemized budget to parliament 88
4.4 Annual financial reports to government 88
4.5 Annual financial reports to parliament 89
4.6 Annual financial reports to account office 89
4.7 Publication of annual itemized budget 90
4.8 Publication of annual financial report 90
4.9 Annual activity plan to government 90
4.10 Annual activity plan to parliament 91
4.11 Annual activity report to government 92
4.12 Annual activity report to parliament 92
4.13 Parliamentary hearing 93
4.14 Publication of annual activity plan 93
4.15 Publication of annual activity report 93
4.16 Publication of regulatory decisions 94
4.17 Consultation procedures 94
4.18 Dismissal of head of agency 95
4.19 Dismissal of board members 95

vii
viii List of Tables, Figures and Maps

4.20 Approval of rules of procedure 96

4.21 Judicial review 96
4.22 Ombudsman procedure 96
4.23 Publication of rules of procedure 97
4.24 Publication of register of interests 97
4.25 Accountability scores per sector 98
4.26 Accountability scores per country 99
4.27 Scores per type of accountability and sector 99
4.28 Scores per type of accountability and country 100
4A.1 List of organizations 102
6.1 Stages and mechanisms of formal accountability of 35
EU agencies 130
6.2 Formal accountability (FA) of 35 EU agencies 134
6.3 Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable 136
6.4 OLS regression. Dependent variable: formal
accountability 136
7.1 Social accountability toolbox 149
7.2 AGCOM and CMT consultations 2005–2011. Absolute
and percentage values 154
7.3 Benchmarking comparisons: AGCOM and CMT
(2005–2011) 156
8.1 Changing accountability of the IRAs, banking and
telecommunications 183
10.1 Governing financial market regulation: Technocratic
autonomy versus democratic direction, with diffuse
accountabilities being a middle category 228
11.1 Contrasting three perspectives on accountability 241
11.2 The accountability toolbox 243
11.3 Accountability toolbox and indicators 245
11.4 Cross-sectoral comparison 248
11.5 Cross-national comparison 249
11.6 Independence and consumer sovereignty 250

Figures

2.1 Percentage of regulatory agencies having particular

accountability mechanisms 31
2.2 The ‘Accountability Cube’ 32
2.3 Distribution of agencies across policy sectors 33
2.4 Distribution of upward accountability mechanisms 36
 List of Tables, Figures and Maps ix

2.5 Distribution of upward accountability mechanisms

across policy areas 38
2.6 Distribution of upward accountability mechanisms
according to administrative traditions 39
2.7 Distribution of one-sided downward accountability
mechanisms 40
2.8 Distribution of one-sided downward accountability
mechanisms by policy area 40
2.9 Distribution of one-sided downward accountability
mechanisms by administrative tradition 41
2.10 Distribution of two-sided downward accountability 42
2.11 Distribution of two-sided downward accountability
across policy areas 43
2.12 Distribution of two-sided downward accountability
across administrative traditions 45
2.13 Cluster dendrogram 46
4.1 Additive mandatory accountability index 98
5.1 Different combinations of independence and
accountability depending on different values of γ 113
5.2 Effects of accountability (towards politics and towards
social and economic actors) on policy implementation 116

Maps

2.1 Countries included in the database 28

Acknowledgements

This book brings together a selection of chapters addressing a key issue

in regulatory governance: the political and policy accountability of
the actors and institutions involved in these policy processes. It was
inspired by a series of discussions with colleagues working in the area
of regulatory governance who had an interest in the accountability and
transparency dimensions of regulatory agencies. The collaborative work
of the three editors of this volume for a research project on the glob-
alization of regulatory institutions at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis
Internacionals (IBEI) – the GlobalReg project – provided the intellectual
stimulus and the common framework for this initiative.
The process of developing these ideas and initial thoughts started
with the organization of an international workshop in July 2012 at
IBEI, and a follow-up seminar one year later in Barcelona. Both work-
shops were very lively and allowed thought-provoking conversations
about the meaning and implications of independence, accountability
and transparency while witnessing important changes and challenges
in regulatory governance processes as the financial crisis unfolded in
Europe and across the world. Since then, ideas have flowed back and
forth between the editors and the various chapter authors; we shared
readings and insights and pushed the project forward.
Thus, the book is the result of a genuinely collective endeavour.
We are grateful to all collaborators for their impressive patience and for-
bearance. We are also indebted to them for their enthusiasm for the
project and their extremely hard work on various drafts of their individ-
ual contributions. We are also thankful to the editors of the Executive
Politics and Governance Series at Palgrave Macmillan, Martin Lodge
and Kay Wegrich, in which this volume is published. They were both
supportive about this initiative since the beginning, and encouraging
about its academic potential. Andrew Baird from Palgrave Macmillan
has shown great patience as we tried to move this project towards pub-
lication, and we appreciate his suggestions and advice throughout the
process as well.
The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness facilitated
this initiative through the funding of two related research projects:
‘GlobalReg – The Spread of Regulatory Institutions. Sectorial Net-
works and National Hierarchies in a Global World (2009–2012)’

x
 Acknowledgements xi

and ‘AccountReg – The Political Economy of Regulatory Agencies:

Accountability, Transparency and Effectiveness (2013–2016)’. Addition-
ally, financial support from the Secretary for Universities and Research
of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Generalitat de
Catalunya is also acknowledged, as this was fundamental for the orga-
nization of the 2012 workshop. We also are very grateful to IBEI staff
for dealing with organizational issues during the whole process. In par-
ticular, we acknowledge the support of Carlos Sánchez Moya, Research
Coordinator at IBEI.
In all, we believe this edited volume constitutes a timely contribu-
tion for scholars, experts and practitioners in the area of regulation
and governance in the globalization context; certainly, a growing field
of research in political science, public policy, public administration
and international relations. Accountability theories and debates related
to the public sphere urgently need to meet public policy and gover-
nance issues, for both normative and analytical reasons. This volume
is intended to be a relevant contribution in the area of regulatory gov-
ernance. Finally, we think the road is ready for further enquiry as the
regulatory landscape becomes increasingly global, blurring the limits
between national, regional and global, and across the public and pri-
vate divide, all of which has an impact on regulatory outcomes and
accountability, the latter still more strictly defined in national terms.

Andrea C. Bianculli
Xavier Fernández-i-Marín
Jacint Jordana
Barcelona, Spain
Contributors

Andrea C. Bianculli is Research Fellow at Institut Barcelona d’Estudis

Internacionals (IBEI). She has a PhD in Political and Social Sciences
from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra. She held a post-doctoral fellow-
ship at Freie Universität Berlin, and a research position at Facultad
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO/Argentina). Her research
expertise is in the area of international and regional political economy,
global and regional governance, trade and regulation, with a special
focus on Latin America.

Nicholas Dorn is a sociologist with interests in law and politics. His

book Democracy and Diversity in Financial Market Regulation was pub-
lished in 2014 and he has also published on transnational governance,
the European Union, public and private policing and economic crime.
He is associated with the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London
(2014–15), and previously with the Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam,
the School of Social Sciences, Cardiff, and DrugScope, a UK NGO.

Xavier Fernández-i-Marín is Senior Researcher at ESADE Business

School, Barcelona. He also teaches in the Department of Political and
Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. He has been Assis-
tant Professor at Universität Konstanz and postdoctoral research fellow
at IBEI, Barcelona. His primary research interest is the methodology of
social sciences, but also public administration, public policy and inter-
national relations. He has worked in the fields of global governance, the
diffusion of policies and institutions, the processes of development of
regulatory agencies, and on Internet and e-government diffusion and
other related aspects of the public management of the Information
Society.

Nuria Font is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Universitat

Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain, where she teaches graduate and under-
graduate courses on EU politics and institutions, environmental nego-
tiation and public policy. She has participated in several European and
national research projects. Her publications include contributions on
EU institutional processes and on the Europeanization of environmental
policies.

xii
 Notes on Contributors xiii

Selena Grimaldi is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science at the Uni-

versity of Padova, Italy. Her research interests include Italian primary
elections, the accountability relations among political institutions in
advanced democracies and leadership studies. She recently published
a book on the Presidents of the Republic in comparative perspective
(I Presidenti nelle forme di governo, 2012).

Mattia Guidi is a Postdoctoral Fellow at LUISS Guido Carli, Rome.

Previously he was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Collegio Carlo Alberto
in Turin. He holds a PhD in Political and Social Sciences from the
European University Institute, Italy. His research focuses on political
economy, public policy, regulatory agencies and EU institutions. His
work investigates the impact of the type of economic system on the
independence of competition agencies, the consequences of bureau-
cratic independence for regulatory performance, and changes in the
governance of the Eurozone since the onset of the recent sovereign debt
crisis.

Jacint Jordana is Professor of Political Science and Public Adminis-

tration at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain and Director of IBEI,
Spain, an inter-university research institute devoted to international
studies. He has been visiting fellow at the Copenhagen Business
School, Australian National University, Wissenschafts Zentrum Berlin
and Konstanz University. His main research area focuses on the anal-
ysis of public policies, with special emphasis being laid on regulatory
governance and political institutions.

Christel Koop is Lecturer in Political Economy at the Department of

Political Economy, King’s College London. She is also Research Asso-
ciate at the Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation of the London
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Her research interests
include delegation theory, comparative political economy, regulation
and regulatory agencies, democratic accountability and legitimacy, and
institutional theory.

Martin Lodge is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the

LSE. He joined the Government Department in September 2002. Pre-
viously he was ESRC Senior Research Officer at the LSE’s Centre for
Analysis of Risk and Regulation and Lecturer in Public Policy at the Uni-
versity of Ulster at Jordanstown. His undergraduate and PhD degrees are
from the LSE.
xiv Notes on Contributors

Astrid Molenveld is Researcher and PhD candidate at the Public Gover-

nance Institute, KU Leuven, Belgium. Her research is focused on policy
coordination, accountability and implementation. In her thesis, she
studies how coordination mechanisms lead to ‘organizational transla-
tion’ of policy issues, that is, the extent to which organizations integrate
policy issues into their own formal and informal structures, documents
and meetings. Policy issues of particular interest in her research are aus-
terity reforms and integrated youth care. She employs multiple research
methods in her work, such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA),
Q-methodology and statistics. Astrid has a master’s degree in Interdisci-
plinary Social Science (Social Policy and Social Interventions – Utrecht
University).

Işık Özel is Associate Professor of Political Science at Sabancı University,

Istanbul. She received her PhD in Political Science from the University
of Washington, Seattle in 2006. She held a postdoctoral fellowship at
IBEI (2006–2007) and a visiting fellowship at Freie Universität Berlin.
Her research focuses on the politics of market transitions and democrati-
zation in emerging countries with a particular emphasis on institutional
change, regulatory governance and state-society interactions. Her work
has appeared in a number of outlets including the Journal of European
Public Policy, Democratization and Regulation and Governance, among
others.

Maria Stella Righettini is Associate Professor in Public Policy and Pol-

icy Evaluation at the University of Padua. Her scientific publications
and interests include comparative researches on independent regulatory
agencies and regulatory policies, and the leadership of administrative
reforms in the regional government. Her forthcoming book develops an
index of credible commitment in regulation (Indipendenza e credibilità.
Istituzioni, imprese e consumatori nella regolazione, 2014).

Colin Scott is Principal of UCD College of Human Sciences and Pro-

fessor of EU Regulation and Governance and a former Dean of Law at
University College Dublin, Ireland. Educated at the LSE and Osgoode
Hall Law School, Toronto, he has held academic positions at the Uni-
versity of Warwick, the LSE, the Australian National University and the
College of Europe, Bruges. He is a former co-editor of Law & Policy and
current co-editor of Legal Studies.

Koen Verhoest is Research Professor in Comparative Public Administra-

tion and Globalization at the Department of Political Science (Research
 Notes on Contributors xv

Group ‘Public Administration & Management’), University of Antwerp,

Belgium and is affiliated as Guest Professor to the Public Governance
Institute (KU Leuven). His main research interest is in the organiza-
tional aspects of public tasks and their governance in multi-level and
multi-actor contexts, including the autonomy, control and coordina-
tion of public organizations, the governance of liberalized markets and
regulation as well as the governance of public–private partnerships.
He has published in journals including Governance, International Review
of Administrative Sciences, Public Management Review and Organizational
Studies. Recent books include Autonomy and Control of State Agencies:
Comparing States and Agencies; Governance of Public Sector Organizations:
Autonomy, Proliferation and Performance and Multi-Level Regulation in the
Telecommunications Sector: Adaptive Regulatory Arrangements in Belgium,
Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland (2014). Since July 2012, he has
co-chaired the steering committee of the ECPR Standing Group on Reg-
ulatory Governance (http://regulation.upf.edu/) with Anne Meuwese.

Tom Willems held a PhD fellowship at the Research Foundation

Flanders (FWO) and works currently as postdoc in the Department of
Politics at the University of Antwerp, Belgium. He is a member of the
research group ‘Public Administration & Management’. His research
focuses on the issue of democratic accountability in complex forms
of public governance like public–private partnerships. In May 2014, he
publicly defended his PhD research project. Recent publications include
‘Democratic Accountability in Public–Private Partnerships: The Curious
Case of Flemish School Infrastructure’ in Public Administration (2014)
and ‘PPP for Schools in Flanders: A Complex Governance Structure for
a Complex Context’ in Public Money & Management (2014), co-authored
with Kit Van Gestel, Koen Verhoest, Joris Voets and Steven Van Garsse.
1
When Accountability
Meets Regulation
Jacint Jordana, Andrea C. Bianculli and
Xavier Fernández-i-Marín

This volume aims to contribute to the study of regulatory governance,

today a growing area of research in public policy and public admin-
istration. The study of regulatory governance analyses the politics of
regulation in the context of globalization, in which different levels are
often entrenched in policy processes while multiple actors, public and
private, play an increasing role in decision-making, thus having an
impact on regulatory outcomes. The various chapters in this volume
address a key issue in this area: the challenges of political accountability
for the actors and institutions involved in regulatory governance.
Although analysis of how actors and institutions worldwide become
involved in dense regulatory activities in the public space has expanded
significantly, scholarly discussion of their accountability has been lim-
ited. Often, there is no clear understanding of the particular problems
that emerge when policies and institutions in the regulatory sectors
attempt to become increasingly accountable. Moreover, obstacles to pre-
vent actors from becoming more accountable in these policy areas are
related to institutional design issues, irrespective of the contents of the
politics of regulation. Improving our understanding of the problems
associated with accountability in regulatory governance, as this volume
intends to do, is of interest not only to scholars working in this area but
to professionals and practitioners as well, because it is fundamental to
their successful performance, and more generally to the consolidation
of any regulatory institution.
By focusing on accountability as a key dimension of regulatory
governance, this book will also deepen our understanding of the insti-
tutional model of regulatory agencies, which has been enthroned as
the most popular institutional form of regulatory governance (Levi-Faur
2011). To the extent that delegation and agency independence are

1
2 When Accountability Meets Regulation

rather common features in these policy domains, accountability issues

have become particularly important in terms of policy legitimacy.
As traditional administrative structures erode and regulatory agen-
cies of an autonomous nature proliferate, adequate and effective
accountability mechanisms are highly relevant for assessing regula-
tory decision-making processes and responsibilities. Thus, apart from
conventional – yet innovative – accountability mechanisms within
the political system, such as reporting towards the legislative or the
judiciary, regulatory agencies have often implemented more specific
accountability mechanisms, for example through the development of
particular tools to communicate with their diverse audiences in a more
direct manner.
This volume systematically explores the diverse avenues of account-
ability in regulatory governance. First, several chapters measure the
actual dimensions of accountability instruments in place within regu-
latory agencies, exploring thus the logic of existing variations. Moving
beyond normative frameworks, they empirically analyse the current
status and the potential of regulatory agencies for political accountabil-
ity. A second group of chapters focuses on the diverse problems actors
and institutions face in regulatory governance contexts to make their
activities and procedures more accountable to their constituencies and
to society as a whole, including when regulation turns transnational.
Finally, several contributions in this volume explore the accountabil-
ity challenges posed to the politics of regulation, while discussing how
accountability, regulatory governance and democracy are related.
In order to provide a useful road map to the edited volume, this
introductory chapter offers a conceptual guideline for accountability
and regulatory governance. After providing a review of the relevant
literature, it develops a contextual perspective to assess accountability
arrangements in the regulatory domain, identifying some basic prob-
lems accountability confronts in dealing with regulatory governance,
and providing thus a common terminology for the development of the
theoretical and empirical analyses presented in the various chapters in
the volume. Additionally, and building on the various definitions and
approaches the literature has discussed, this chapter suggests an analyti-
cal framework for the study of accountability in regulatory governance,
which is resumed and discussed in the conclusions.

The concept of accountability

The concept of accountability is rather elusive. The term accountability

was widely used in public administration literature for decades, focusing
 Jacint Jordana, Andrea C. Bianculli and Xavier Fernández-i-Marín 3

on the organizational sphere and its political linkages. The concern

over accountability in modern public administration was also associ-
ated with the debate over the administrative reforms put in place in
OECD countries starting in the 1980s and the need to keep the admin-
istration responsible to those having political legitimacy (Hood 1991;
Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Today, however, accountability is portrayed
as a complex and multifaceted concept. The notion has expanded over
the last 20 years as it has moved from the more straightforward notion
of accountability within organizations in the public sphere to that of
public accountability. Furthermore, discussions on different dimensions
of accountability have resonated continuously in the literature (Bevir
2010; Considine and Afzal 2012).
Whereas broad conceptualizations distinguish between accountability
as a mechanism and accountability as a virtue (Akpannuko and Asogwa
2011), the latter makes it very difficult to establish empirically whether
an official or organization has accountability virtues (Bovens 2007;
Bovens et al. 2008). In fact, this is related to the multiple ways in which
professionals are accountable for their practices and activities, which
raises the broad issue of their relations with society in general – certainly
beyond the scope of our analysis. Therefore, a narrower definition of this
concept based on the idea of accountability as a mechanism is required.
Building on these insights, we take as a departure point Bovens’s narrow
definition of accountability as any ‘relationship between an actor and a
forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his
or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and
the actor may face consequences’ (Bovens 2007: p. 450).
Thus understood, accountability describes a relationship between
power-holders and those affected by their actions. It comprises two
key elements: ‘answerability’ – making power-holders explain and jus-
tify their actions – and ‘enforceability’, allowing the participants in the
forum to judge and punish poor or criminal performance (Schedler
1999). Translated to democratic practices, this means that the whole
citizenship is the ultimate forum, that each public officer and public
institution remains in dialogue with their particular forum, and they
should expect to face some specific consequences if they fail to produce
particular results. Concerning the regulatory state in a democratic soci-
ety, accountability does not mean that the publicity principle is to be
introduced in all cases, but rather that it requires a legitimate association
to the forum (Luban 2002).
The scope and meaning of accountability for public organizations
has been extended in a number of directions beyond its core sense of
‘being called to account for one’s actions’ through a social exchange
4 When Accountability Meets Regulation

by external bodies or groups having some rights over one. This ‘exten-
sion’ of accountability refers also to the creation of new accountability
instruments, which include tools to report not only to parliament or the
corresponding ministry, but also to direct stakeholders and the public.
Authors have emphasized particular accountability mechanisms over
others, namely, citizens’ oversight (Graham 1997) and output-based
mechanisms (Majone 1999). Thus, the literature often introduces sev-
eral distinctions to classify such diverse mechanisms according to the
characteristics of accountability obligations, or to the features of the
relations of those who are to be accountable towards particular actors
within the forum.
As to accountability obligations, there are different categorizations.
Mandatory vs voluntary accountability identifies whether there is or not
a legal basis for accountability mechanisms (Koop 2013). Differentiation
between formal and informal accountability mechanisms represents a
similar division, depending on how accurately the notion of informal
mechanism could be formulated. Distinguishing between ex ante sys-
tems of control and ex post, results-oriented systems of control refers
to the prospective or retrospective nature of the activity the agent is
to account for. This distinction, however, has been problematized on
the basis that accountability should only focus on the actor’s obliga-
tion to answer for past actions (Mulgan 2011). In fact, three steps have
been identified to constitute a complete accountability relation, namely,
information, discussion and consequences (for example, Mulgan 2003).
The first one involves explaining conduct, aims or rationales, while the
second one entails establishing interactions between the specific forum
actors and the subject, and the last one refers to the judgements actors in
the forum make and communicate – and which can eventually involve
sanctions (Brandsma and Schillemans 2013).
In respect to the characteristics of the accountability relation, tra-
ditional discussions on accountability have remained largely focused
on institutional mechanisms, especially on the importance of input
and parliamentary channels (Lodge 2004). However, the literature has
further distinguished between upward and downward relations (for
example, Verschuere et al. 2006). While upward mechanisms concern
those involving hierarchical relations based on the principal–agent
logic, downward accountability implies non-hierarchical mechanisms,
namely rendered to relations with citizens, users and stakeholders
in particular. Nevertheless, the division between upward and down-
ward accountability cannot be related to horizontal accountability, as
far as we understand horizontal relations as those occurring between
 Jacint Jordana, Andrea C. Bianculli and Xavier Fernández-i-Marín 5

agents or institutions of similar status and where only under par-

ticular circumstances may a hierarchical relation apply. To solve this
inconsistency, and building on Scott (2000: p. 42), we adopt a more
precise distinction that implies three directions: upwards, horizontal
and downwards. More generally, this is what Mulgan characterized as
a ‘360-degree’ view of accountability (2011: p. 4).
To better clarify these distinctions, upward accountability can be iden-
tified with relations between citizens and representatives, or elected
politicians vis-à-vis bureaucrats; whereas downward accountability is
related to delivery organizations vis-à-vis consumers, or regulatory
agencies vis-à-vis interests groups. Finally, horizontal accountability in
the public domain can be understood basically as inter-institutional
accountability. As Pasquino details, ‘it occurs when the various insti-
tutions in different ways are in a position to control the activities of
another specific institution’ (2011: p. 17). Typical cases include relations
between the executive and the legislative or between the judiciary and
other independent authorities. In each case, mechanisms of account-
ability can be either two-sided or one-sided, involving strong sanctions
or not. Still, all cases are subject to a specific set of rules defining the
conditions under which these mechanisms will be activated.
Beyond these classifications, and in an attempt to categorize theoret-
ical approaches on public accountability, Bovens et al. (2008) identified
three perspectives on accountability mechanisms, based on different
assessment criteria: democratic, constitutional and learning. Democratic
accountability refers to the goal of providing mechanisms to make the
executive and its agencies explain and debate their actions in a demo-
cratic regime. Clearly, upward accountability mechanisms predominate
here. According to this, the main objective is to keep active and vital
the ‘democratic chain of delegation’ from citizens – the audiences
they serve – to the executive. The second perspective – constitutional
accountability – focuses on the prevention of governmental abuses,
and its corresponding assessment criteria aim to control government
activities and prevent the exercise of potential privileges. In this case,
horizontal mechanisms prevail given that inter-institutional account-
ability is the main procedure to assure constitutional stability. Finally,
the third perspective expects accountability to trigger the learning capa-
bility of governments, whereas the criteria are whether this process
induces the executive to achieve the most desired societal goals. Down-
ward mechanisms are dominant within this perspective given that
they involve often continuous interactions and dialogue with multiple
stakeholders.
6 When Accountability Meets Regulation

During recent decades various literatures have increasingly used

these notions of accountability, both from national and international
perspectives. From the domestic perspective, the concept of account-
ability has come a long way, starting with the introduction of the
New Public Management (NPM) approaches. The NPM doctrines that
confronted the traditional public administration paradigm (see mainly
Hood 1991; Pollitt 1993; Christensen and Lægreid 2006) challenged
hierarchical controls by representative institutions and, in consequence,
made it necessary to promote a more diversified understanding of
accountability for new public managers (Dunleavy and Hood 1994;
Peters and Wright 1996; Olsen 2003). In fact, some of the major pre-
scriptions for administrative reform, such as the autonomy of public
managers, empowerment of front line workers and market-like compe-
tition to create incentives, were perceived as a challenge to traditional
public administration theories (Deleon 1998). However, the NPM con-
centrated on expanding the control perspective in hierarchical contexts,
without considering the other theoretical perspectives identified by
Bovens et al. (2008); namely, the learning potential of accountability
or the design of mechanisms to enhance democratic accountability in
autonomous institutions.
The international relations literature, namely debates on ‘governing
without government’, has focused on the accountability deficit of insti-
tutions of global governance, either from the perspective of democratic
deficit, the lack of control, or the need to increase dialogue and learning
(Rosenau 2000; Keohane and Nye 2003; Grant and Keohane 2005; Philp
2009). In a similar vein, a growing literature has analysed the democratic
accountability deficit at the European Union (EU) level and the EU reg-
ulatory state (Majone 1994; Majone 1996; Thatcher 2002; Géradin et al.
2005; Christensen and Lægreid 2006).
The increasing fragmentation and autonomy of the public realm
within and across levels has been accompanied by the rise of rather
sophisticated forms of accountability, eventually also including a
transnational dimension as well. Consequently, concerns over demo-
cratic quality have also fostered more interest in a variety of innovative
accountability mechanisms (Verschuere et al. 2006).

The politics of regulation and accountability

When discussing public accountability and its mechanisms in differ-

ent political regimes, it is our understanding that we should take
into account the particular policy sector and national configurations,
 Jacint Jordana, Andrea C. Bianculli and Xavier Fernández-i-Marín 7

given that public accountability arrangements cannot be disentangled

from discussions about appropriate levels of democratic governance and
transparency. In regulatory policies, the predominant type of account-
ability is not about how resources have been spent or how programs
have been managed. Rather, it focuses on why particular regulations
were established and their consequences. Furthermore, not all account-
ability mechanisms may work for those sectors in which regulation
is involved: some mechanisms will be more adequate than others in
addressing accountability needs in a particular sector. Departing from
Lowi’s classical typology of policy sectors (1972), we know that regu-
latory politics involve a particular type of policy process different from
other areas of public policy. In fact, regulatory policy is affected by direct
coercion of individual conduct, being the likelihood of coercion imme-
diate (1972: p. 300). It is worth noting that Lowi mainly referred to
command and control regulation, and not to regulation based on infor-
mation, market incentives or other instruments that have become more
popular in recent times. Still, in any case, most of these new regula-
tory instruments affect individual conduct, and coercion often plays a
role in non-command and control instruments. Such particularities are
relevant for the analysis of accountability in the domain of regulatory
governance given that regulation directly limits individuals’ (or firms’)
conduct – what they can and cannot do in markets and society – and
these actions require precise information to justify the establishment
of certain limitations or restrictions to citizens’ – and firms’ – freedom
to act. Providing detailed information about the effects of regulation
on individual freedom, due to the impact of coercion, entails partic-
ular requirements for accountability mechanisms to work effectively in
any policy sector populated with regulatory instruments. These account-
ability mechanisms should help manage and interpret a large amount
of information and data to be able thus to justify the introduction of
regulations and particular regulatory decisions (ex ante) and to judge
their impact once introduced (ex post). The underlying objective of
these mechanisms is that ‘coerced’ individuals and groups understand
and respect the rationale behind regulations, and commit themselves
to limit and reduce their freedom to obtain some type of individual or
collective benefits in the end.
The underlying assumption is that the social relations established
between the actor and the forums in regulatory governance are based
on information, dialogue and justification, being all-essential in the
accountability relation. This can be based either on upward account-
ability mechanisms that actualize the democratic chain of delegation,
8 When Accountability Meets Regulation

on horizontal mechanisms establishing patterns of interaction with

different public institutions, or on downward mechanisms promoting
feedback among the audiences involved in the policymaking process.
To be meaningful and legitimate, because most regulation has a direct
impact on the forum actors, those mechanisms must go beyond sheer
information and include debate, namely the possibility of posing ques-
tions by the respective accountability forum and providing responses by
the responsible actors, eventually leading to judgement by the forum.
More precisely, upward and horizontal accountability mechanisms
based on controls to prevent abuses of power remain embedded in
the institutional constellation of checks and balances in which regu-
latory governance operates. Downward mechanisms, meanwhile, are
more malleable, and we expect the accountability forum involved
in regulatory governance to be subject also to a learning process
through these interaction and dialogue mechanisms. While downward
accountability arrangements confront public regulators with informa-
tion about their own performance and force them to reflect on the
successes and failures of their past policies and decisions, various politi-
cal obstacles or pressures may hinder the adoption or implementation of
improvements.
The design of accountability mechanisms involves the alteration of
individual and institutional incentives to assure their compatibility with
other policy objectives. However, and precisely because of this, it is
important to take into account the specific problems that may arise
within each particular regulatory governance configuration. Account-
ability mechanisms require both persistence and flexibility: as public
devices, they need to establish stable links between different individuals
holding diverse preferences, with the final aim of increasing interper-
sonal trust on the one hand, and trust in the policy process itself, irre-
spective of the final output, on the other. Accountability mechanisms of
any type may often play as ‘institutional irritants’ (Goodin 1996) since
they introduce explicit civic values that are embedded in their design
and are to be employed as social correctors of the policy process when
tensions and outcome uncertainty increase. The design of accountabil-
ity mechanisms constitutes a central question in the study of regulatory
governance, having both positive and normative implications. This
endeavour would require, however, further theoretical and conceptual
elaborations on the one hand, and the precise examination and assess-
ment of different accountability practices on the other. It is a key aspect
discussed or considered in most of the chapters included in this volume,
based on empirical findings or through more conceptual lenses, and we
 Jacint Jordana, Andrea C. Bianculli and Xavier Fernández-i-Marín 9

do not provide a detailed answer here. Nevertheless, having identified a

major attribute of accountability mechanisms in regulatory governance,
we propose a more specific perspective to identify a particular variation.
Our analysis builds on Wilson’s (1980) matrix of the politics of reg-
ulation, where he identifies different options based on the degree of
concentration of costs and benefits of regulation. These various configu-
rations of concentrated and dispersed costs and benefits define relevant
differences in regulatory politics and, consequently, the extent to which
they require the introduction of particular accountability mechanisms
in each case – or at least of what intensity. This should help address
potential democratic pitfalls and compensate risks related to informa-
tion asymmetries among those assuming most of the regulatory costs.
Under Wilson’s characterization, we suggest that accountability prob-
lems may emerge particularly in client politics, when the costs of
regulation are dispersed but the benefits are concentrated. Here, incen-
tives to collective action and downward accountability mechanisms are
very weak, except for those special clienteles who may benefit from reg-
ulation (Olson 1971). Thus, the need for strong upward accountability
mechanisms to readjust this structural configuration in the policy areas
where differences in costs and benefits are more pronounced is partic-
ularly important, because downward mechanisms may suffer numerous
shortcomings and thus be incapable of understanding effectively the
exchanges involved.
The case of interest group politics, where both costs and benefits are
concentrated, also involves potentially problematic and opaque situa-
tions as it frequently occurs in the politics involved in zero-sum games.
Here, horizontal accountability mechanisms should contribute to keep
democratic principles active, as far as upward mechanisms cannot be
capable of identifying the relevant political game. The other two cases,
majoritarian politics and entrepreneurial politics, are less problematic,
even if they show particular accountability dynamics. These two are
cases in which downward mechanisms may create better options to
stimulate policy learning, while other mechanisms should keep demo-
cratic legitimacy active though relaxing their political legitimacy is
guaranteed by means of a combination of mechanisms.
According to the problems posed by the configurations detailed
above, Table 1.1 identifies potential difficulties accountability mech-
anisms may confront in each configuration. More specifically, the
table presents these difficulties according to the various theoretical
perspectives on accountability depicted by Bovens et al. (2008) referred
to earlier. Thus, the democratic perspective aims to understand the

Table 1.1 Accountability mechanisms vs regulation costs and benefits
Difficulties for accountability Regulation Costs
mechanisms
Regulation benefits Concentrated
Concentrated Interest Group Politics
Barriers to democratic chain
Difficulties to control
Concentrated dialogues
Dispersed Entrepreneurial Politics
Active democratic chain
Superficial control
Concentrated dialogues
Source: Own elaboration based on Wilson (1980).
10
Dispersed
Client Politics
Barriers to democratic chain
Difficulties to control
Dispersed dialogues
Majoritarian Politics
Active democratic chains
Superficial control
Dispersed dialogues
 Jacint Jordana, Andrea C. Bianculli and Xavier Fernández-i-Marín 11

challenges posed in terms of the democratic chain of delegation in each

case, while expecting it to be more restricted when regulation benefits
are concentrated – given that these cases create strong structural induce-
ments for non-optimal social outputs. The constitutional perspective
focuses on the prevention of power abuse that emerges when benefits
are concentrated, because of the difficulty of controlling opaque situ-
ations. Finally, the learning perspective identifies the problems facing
the emergence of constructive dialogues among the audiences involved
in the regulatory policy process, either due to the existence of concen-
trated regulatory costs that create restricted forums established by the
main stockholders, or because costs are too dispersed and dialogues are
also excessively dispersed within general audiences.

Democracy, regulatory institutions and accountability

The typical image of the liberal democratic state as a coherent struc-

ture that relies on clearly defined upward and horizontal institutional
accountability mechanisms is under significant strain. While demo-
cratic legitimacy has been traditionally entwined with accountability,
the complex patterns of governance today make it increasingly diffi-
cult to determine who is responsible for what and how to hold them
accountable. Accountability has thus become a far-reaching concern
for institutions, especially for new institutions with a certain level of
political and organizational delegation from political principals. Debates
about the emergence of the regulatory state (Loughlin and Scott 1997;
Majone 1997; Lodge 2001; Moran 2002) have also led to an interest in
accountability. The fragmentation of the public sector associated with
the emergence of the regulatory state in democracies involves the trans-
formation of institutional structures and the appearance of new actors
operating out of ministerial hierarchies (Bouckaert et al. 2010). More-
over, delegation of important policymaking powers to non-majoritarian
institutions raises novel problems of democratic legitimacy (Majone
1999).
Based on autonomy, independence and expertise as fundamental ele-
ments to the improvement of policy outcomes and economic efficiency,
numerous regulatory agencies have been established since the 1990s to
regulate both economic and social issues. While ‘the diffusion of the
regulatory agency model has challenged the structure of power in many
countries, often reducing centralization in the governance of many
sectors’ (Jordana and Sancho 2004: p. 307), questions of legitimacy
and accountability have been raised (Flinders and Smith 1999; Scott
12 When Accountability Meets Regulation

2000; Schmitter and Trechsel 2004). On the one hand, extensive del-
egation of policymaking competencies to agencies has been portrayed
as promoting greater policy continuity and consistency and as a way
of compensating for the credibility problems of democratic politicians
(Majone 1999). On the other hand, the main criticism is that vital state
functions are being delegated to agencies operating at arm’s length from
government, to the extent that ‘the real work of running democracies
is now carried out by the unelected’ (Vibert 2007: p. 186). Moreover,
this type of state bureaucracy has been seen as a contradiction of the
parliamentary model of most European governments (Döhler 2011).
A main concern in regard to upward accountability is the emer-
gence and diffusion of autonomous regulatory agencies in different
policy areas, at both the national and sub-national level (Scott 2000;
Flinders 2004; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005). The regulatory agencies
are one of the most prominent forms of new institutional structures
characteristic of the regulatory state. Often established as independent
authorities, these agencies operate outside ministerial hierarchies and,
in consequence, are not subject to traditional hierarchical control and
accountability mechanisms (Verhoest et al. 2004). The political isola-
tion that these institutions enjoy, as well as the considerable autonomy
they benefit from in the performance of their duties, has raised con-
cerns regarding their accountability (Weir 1995; Flinders and Smith
1999; Scott 2000; Schmitter and Trechsel 2004). However, this is not a
new problem. As early as the 1950s, critics in the United States – the reg-
ulatory state avant la lettre – first questioned the lack of political (upward)
accountability of independent regulatory commissions created in prior
decades (Majone 1996).
The shift to the regulatory state has created concerns about the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the new regulatory authorities. Thus, scholars have
long discussed how these structures differ from the traditional account-
ability mechanisms of bureaucracies, and whether or not new forms of
accountability have emerged or have eventually been reinforced. In fact,
decision-making processes within regulatory institutions often involve
politically sensitive choices, such as balancing economic efficiency with
social or environmental objectives (Baldwin and Cave 1999). The deci-
sions of regulatory organizations are not merely technocratic, but are
often based on values-based choices (Lodge 2004: p. 124). In this regard
the creation of autonomous agencies was expected to improve regula-
tory performance and efficiency, while having no negative side effects
on other values, namely accountability (Self 2000; Pollitt et al. 2004).
However, analysts have also underscored the accountability deficit of
 Jacint Jordana, Andrea C. Bianculli and Xavier Fernández-i-Marín 13

these new institutions (Baldwin et al. 1998). Clearly, the diagnosis of

accountability problems of regulatory agencies will differ depending on
the particular theoretical accountability perspective adopted.
Some authors argue that although agencies may not always be
controlled by traditional bureaucratic procedures, they can be held
accountable through alternative means (Kickert 2001; Koppell 2003;
Christensen and Lægreid 2004). Agencies are constrained by procedu-
ral and substantive rules that guide their discretion. Autonomy from
direct political control does not mean immunity from other direc-
tions of accountability, in particular inter-institutional accountability
(Majone 1999). Therefore, weaker upward accountability mechanisms
towards the executive may be compensated with stronger downward
accountability mechanisms towards consumers and citizens (Flinders
2004; Verhoest et al. 2005). In other words, responsiveness to users
and clients might become a complement or a partial substitute for
upward accountability of autonomous agencies (Bouckaert and Peters
2004). Accountability should be framed within a wider context that
includes institutional checks and balances, consumer sovereignty and
the empowerment of citizens (Lodge 2004). In this sense, scholars point
out that the emergence of the regulatory state may imply a change in the
quality of citizenship (Lodge 2004). When compared to the conception
of citizenship in the era of the welfare state, the regulatory state is
portrayed as bringing a more reduced version of citizenship, one that
moves from a political conception to an economic consumer-like one,
also relying on less effective (downward) accountability mechanisms.
This criticism has led to claims of deterioration in the quality of citi-
zenship standards (Haque 2001), and consequently a decline in overall
accountability has been suggested (Falconer and Ross 1999).
Second, and from another perspective, the principal-agent (PA) liter-
ature has pointed to a wider discussion of accountability instruments
given its concern with information asymmetries and incomplete con-
tracting (for an overview, see Huber and Shipan 2000). Because of their
isolation, agencies might have more opportunities to shirk, misuse and
abuse political power than ministerial departments have (Koop 2011).
To account for this, the PA perspective analyses whether the weak-
ness of upward accountability mechanisms facilitates possibilities for
drift due to limited control in a context of incomplete information
(see McCubbins et al. 1987; Horn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).
However, autonomous regulatory agencies also face de facto incentives
to remain accountable. At any given moment, principals might find
that the discretion allowed to the agency has produced agency losses
Another random document with
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Der Geist der
Gotik
 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
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eBook.

Title: Der Geist der Gotik

Author: Karl Scheffler

Release date: September 9, 2023 [eBook #71602]

Language: German

Original publication: Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917

Credits: The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at

https://www.pgdp.net

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DER GEIST

DER GOTIK ***
 Anmerkungen zur Transkription
Der vorliegende Text wurde anhand der Buchausgabe von 1917 so weit wie möglich
originalgetreu wiedergegeben. Typographische Fehler wurden stillschweigend korrigiert.
Ungewöhnliche und heute nicht mehr verwendete Schreibweisen bleiben gegenüber dem
Original unverändert; fremdsprachliche Ausdrücke wurden nicht korrigiert.
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serifenlos als auch gesperrt erscheinen.
Der Geist der Gotik
Von

Karl Scheffler

Mit 107 Abbildungen

Im Insel-Verlag zu Leipzig
1917
 Vorwort

Die Gedanken, die auf den folgenden Seiten ausgesprochen

sind, haben mich zwei Jahrzehnte lang beschäftigt. In vielen meiner
Arbeiten sind sie schon erörtert worden, ja, wer sich die Mühe gibt,
danach zu suchen, findet sie in meiner ganzen Kunstauffassung. Ich
habe mich entschlossen, sie mehr systematisch nun
zusammenzufassen, weil die Zeit dafür günstig scheint. In den
letzten Jahren haben einige unserer besten Kunsttheoretiker
verwandte Anschauungen vertreten und sie — jeder in seiner Weise
— zu Werkzeugen der Forschung gemacht. Und es mehren sich die
Anzeichen, daß in der Kunstbetrachtung überhaupt ein
grundsätzlicher Wandel vor sich geht. Wenn mehrere gute Köpfe
gleichzeitig auf dieselbe Idee verfallen, so ist damit bewiesen, daß
es sich nicht um subjektive Spekulationen handelt, sondern um eine
objektive Erkenntnis. Es mag darum nützlich sein, das Problem
einmal in seinem ganzen Umfang wenigstens anzudeuten.
Zu der Wichtigkeit, die ich dem Gedanken von der Polarität der
Kunst beimesse, steht das Volumen dieses Buches freilich in keinem
Verhältnis. Ich benutze die Gelegenheit, das Bekenntnis abzulegen,
daß ich dieser Arbeit über den „Geist der Gotik“ gern viele Jahre
meines Lebens gewidmet hätte, daß ich sie am liebsten erweitern
möchte zu einem umfangreichen, auf genauen Spezialforschungen
und vielen Reiseerlebnissen beruhenden, von einem reichen
wissenschaftlichen Abbildungsmaterial erläuterten Werk. Die
Erfüllung dieses Wunsches ist mir dauernd versagt. Notgedrungen
begnüge ich mich, das schöne Problem aphoristisch zu behandeln
und intuitiv gewonnene Resultate vorzulegen, ohne sie im einzelnen
auch empirisch zu beweisen. Ich bin mir bewußt, daß dieses nicht
eigentlich ein Buch ist, sondern nur etwas wie eine Einleitung zu
dem Werk, das mir vorschwebt. Es ist nur eine Disposition; jeder
kleine Abschnitt könnte zu einem ausführlichen Band erweitert
werden.
Die Abbildungen sollen dem allgemein Gesagten als einige
konkrete Beispiele zur Seite stehen. Manches hätte
charakteristischer gewählt werden können, wenn alle gewünschten
photographischen Vorlagen in der Kriegszeit hätten beschafft
werden können. Um so dankbarer bin ich denen, die mir geholfen
haben, dieses Resultat wenigstens zu erzielen. Für einige schwer
erreichbare Vorlagen bin ich vor allem zu Dank verpflichtet den
Herren Otto Bartning, Professor Peter Behrens, Reg.-Baumeister
Ernst Boerschmann, Prof. Dr. Heinr. Bulle, Dr. Curt Glaser,
Geheimrat Dr. Peter Jessen, Karl Robert Langewiesche, Hans von
Müller, Stadtbaurat Prof. Hans Poelzig, Dr. Emil Waldmann, Frau
Hedwig Fechheimer und den Verlagen Bruno Cassirer, Georg Hirth,
Julius Hoffmann, Wilhelm Meyer-Ilschen und E. A. Seemann.
 I. Die Lehre vom Ideal

Nach einem Ausspruch Goethes deutet alles Theoretisieren auf

ein Stocken oder Nachlassen der schöpferischen Kräfte. Dieses
Wort hat die Kraft eines Lehrsatzes und gilt ebensowohl für die
Völker wie für die Individuen. Aus ihm allein könnte man schon
schließen, wenn nicht andere Anzeichen noch in Fülle vorhanden
wären, daß es kritische Jahre für die schöpferischen Kräfte der
Kunst gewesen sein müssen, als jene groß gedachten Theorien
aufkamen, die nun schon einhundertundfünfzig Jahre lang das
geistige Leben Europas beherrschen und deren Schöpfer in
Deutschland so große Geister wie Winckelmann, Lessing und
Goethe gewesen sind. Die Theorien sind in dem Augenblick
aufgetreten, als in den Künsten mit den Formen des Barock und
Rokoko die ursprüngliche Gestaltungskraft abklang und als mit dem
Klassizismus eine kritisch abgeleitete Kunst, eine Bildungskunst,
heraufkam. Auch jetzt war die Theorie, wie edel die Gedanken und
Forderungen, wie genial die Vertreter immer sein mochten, ein
Notprodukt; ihre Verkünder standen im Dienste einer
Kultursehnsucht, sie fühlten sich — selbst schöpferische Geister —
unbefriedigt von der Zeit und wollten eine allgemeine
Vollkommenheit erzwingen. Wer die Kunsttheorien von Männern wie
Lessing oder Goethe kritisiert, muß betonen, daß sie und viele ihrer
Genossen als Persönlichkeiten und Begabungen viel mehr waren als
Theoretiker — selbst dann noch, wenn man von ihren poetischen
Arbeiten absieht. So strittig ihre Kunstlehren sind, so groß stehen
ihre kunsttheoretischen Schriften doch da als Denkmale eines
klassischen Schreibstils und einer vorbildlichen Methode,
Gedankenfolgen mit architektonischer Klarheit zu entwickeln. Diese
Männer werden nicht kleiner, weil sie in einem Punkte geirrt haben,
denn ihr Irrtum war der einer ganzen Zeit, er war eine notwendige
Folge des „Stockens oder Nachlassens der schöpferischen Kräfte“ in
den bildenden Künsten. Heute, wo diese Kräfte sich wieder regen,
würden so lebendige Geister ganz woanders stehen. Lessing hätte
in unsern Tagen wahrscheinlich mit seiner zielsicheren Logik einen
Anti-Laokoon geschrieben und würde orthodoxe Anhänger der
Laokoonlehre mit eben jenem heiteren Witz verfolgen, der seinerzeit
die Herren Lange und Goeze getroffen hat. Und Goethe würde
vielleicht den herrlichen Instinkten seiner Jugend glauben, würde
mehr seiner eingeborenen gotischen Natur folgen, die den „Faust“
hervorgebracht hat, und nicht einem abgeleiteten klassizistischen
Bildungsideal so unbedingt vertrauen.
Die Gefahr der von unsern Klassikern meisterhaft formulierten
Kunsttheorien, die den Deutschen noch jetzt heilig sind, besteht
darin, daß diese Lehren nur die Hälfte der menschlichen Kunstkraft
gelten lassen. Die Kunst ist von diesen großen Begriffsreinigern
nicht als eine Ganzheit mit zwei Polen erfaßt und dargestellt worden.
Sie lebten auf der einen Hemisphäre der Kunst und vergnügten sich
dort an ihren Spekulationen; die andere Halbkugel blieb für sie im
Dämmer, und sie sprachen davon mit einem gewissen Schauder.
Keiner glaubte, daß auch diese andere Welt einmal im Mittagslicht
daliegen könne. Und doch war unter den Gesetzgebern wenigstens
einer, der vor allen andern berufen gewesen wäre, eine neue Lehre
von dem Zusammenhang aller bildenden Kräfte zu geben: Goethe.
Während auf ihn mehr oder weniger alle Lehren zurückweisen, die
die Natur als ein unzerstörbares Ganzes nehmen, während er in der
Natur an Polarität und Stetigkeit, an Metamorphosen und an feste
Gesetze des Formwerdens glaubte, hat er die Kunst — die doch
eine zweite Natur, eine Natur auf dem Wege über den menschlichen
Willen und die menschliche Erkenntniskraft ist — nicht so umfassend
gesehen. Vielleicht weil er Künstler war und sich als solcher für ein
bestimmtes Klima entscheiden mußte. An die Formen der Kunst ist
er kritisch, ausscheidend herangetreten, hat sich für eine bestimmte
Formenwelt begeistert und eine andere verurteilt. Überzeugt,
durchaus objektiv vorzugehen, hat er — und mit ihm seine ganze
Zeit — tendenzvoll gewertet. Und so ist der Begriff zur Herrschaft
gelangt. Es war das Unglück jener Zeit, daß die Theorie nicht einer
lebendigen Kunst folgte, sondern eine neue Kunst schaffen wollte,
daß sie sich über den Künstler stellte, anstatt neben und unter ihn.
Auch waren die großen Werke der Vergangenheit, die den
Theoretikern als Muster galten, nur unvollkommen aus Kopien und
Nachahmungen bekannt; die bedeutendsten Beispiele waren noch
nicht gefunden. Es war fast unmöglich, von konkreten Vorbildern aus
ein wünschenswertes Ganzes zu denken. Im Gegenteil: von einem
für wünschenswert gehaltenen Ganzen aus wurden Forderungen für
alles einzelne festgestellt. Und dieses eben ist der Weg des
Begriffes. Nichts ist dem Denken über Kunst gefährlicher als Mangel
an Anschauungsstoff und Herrschaft des Begriffs. Denn jeder
Begriff, so grenzenlos er scheinen mag, ist hart begrenzt und stößt
immer irgendwo mißtönend mit der Unendlichkeit des Lebens
zusammen. Wogegen in jeder sinnlich geborenen Empfindung
immer das ganze Lebensgefühl enthalten ist, etwa so, wie in jedem
Naturausschnitt die ganze Natur zu sein scheint. Dieses ist das
große Geheimnis des reinen Gefühls: daß im Augenblick das Ewige,
im Beschränkten das Unbegrenzte, im Zufälligen das Gesetzmäßige
aufglänzen. Nur wer die Kunst aus der Erfahrung der sinnlichen
Empfindungen denkt, hat sie in ihrer Totalität; wer sie begrifflich
meistern will, besitzt sie immer nur in Teilen. Darum haben die
schaffenden Künstler, in all ihrer Einseitigkeit, ein so fruchtbares
Verhältnis zur Kunst. Sie wählen, gruppieren und werten aus dem
Instinkt, ihre Gedanken werden von der leidenschaftlichen Liebe
geboren, während sich beim Theoretiker nicht selten die Liebe erst
am Gedanken entzündet.
Als Kind eines genialisch gesteigerten Denkens über die Kunst
ist nun vor anderthalb Jahrhunderten eine Idee hervorgetreten, die
freilich etwas Blendendes hat und die darum auch heute noch fast
unumschränkt herrscht. Sie spricht sich aus in dem Lehrsatz, der
Endzweck der Künste sei „das Schöne“, und die Wirkung der Künste
auf das menschliche Gemüt müsse ein Vergnügen sein. Lessing
sagt im „Laokoon“, daß bei den Alten die Schönheit das höchste
Gesetz der bildenden Künste gewesen wäre, und daß darum alles
andere, auch von uns, der Schönheit untergeordnet werden müsse.
Diesem Lehrsatz ist die Frage entgegenzustellen: Was ist
Schönheit? Ist Schönheit etwas ein für allemal Feststehendes? Fragt
man die Kunstgeschichte um Rat, so zeigt es sich bald, daß die
Schönheit, wie unsere Klassiker sie verstanden, nicht das Endziel
der Künste sein kann, sondern daß sie eine Begleiterscheinung ist,
ähnlich etwa wie die Wohlgestalt des menschlichen Körpers nicht
der Zweck, sondern eine von selbst sich ergebende Eigenschaft der
organisierenden Natur ist.
Gäbe es eine absolute Schönheit in der Kunst und dürfte
folgerichtig nur sie gelten, so wäre alles andere neben ihr niederen
Grades. Das haben unsere Theoretiker ja auch behauptet. Man ist
sogar so weit gegangen, zu sagen, diese Schönheit wäre nur einmal
einem auserwählten kleinen Volke, den Griechen, gelungen, und die
Nachgeborenen könnten nichts Besseres tun, als sich nach ihnen
richten. Das kommt aber einer Bankerotterklärung der Menschheit
gleich. Es ist unmöglich, das Wesen der Kunst von der Schönheit
aus zu bestimmen. Der junge Goethe war dem Zentrum des
Problems näher, als er, hingerissen von einem Erlebnis des Auges,
vor dem Straßburger Münster stand und das Wort fand: „Die Kunst
ist lange bildend, ehe sie schön ist, und doch so wahre, große Kunst
ja oft wahrer und größer, als die schöne selbst.“ Mit diesem Wort ist
das Wesen der Kunst wie mit einer einzigen Linie umschrieben. Der
Wille der Kunst ist es, bildend zu sein und ein Inneres so
auszudrücken, daß es ein Äußeres wird. Der Ausdruck eines inneren
Zustandes, das ist das Entscheidende. Die Schönheit umfaßt nur die
Hälfte, sie zielt auf den Genuß, sie befriedigt
Glückseligkeitsbedürfnisse und das Verlangen nach ruhiger, heiterer
Harmonie. Das Glück aber ist in der Kunst ebensowenig das
Höchste wie im Leben. Um ein Wort Lessings zu variieren: auch in
der Kunst ist das Streben nach Glück und Schönheit mehr als der
Besitz von beiden. Der Welt des Kunstgefühls gehören ebensowohl
die Empfindungen des Schreckens, die Dissonanzen des
Charakteristischen, die Monumentalität des Erhabenen an. Auch die
Formen des Willens, die das Groteske erzeugen, gehören zur Kunst;
denn die Kunst ist vor allem ein Akt des Willens und darum ihrer
Natur nach elementar. Auch sie setzt vor die Form das Chaos, vor
die Harmonie das Übermaß und die Urkraft vor die Schönheit. Die
Kunst entsteht im kleinen nicht anders, wie die Welt im großen
entstanden ist. Wie die uns heute umgebende Landschaft kaum
etwas gemein hat mit der von der menschlichen Hand noch
unberührten Landschaft, wie die kultivierte, in soziale Rhythmen
gebrachte Landschaft etwas anderes ist als die vorgeschichtliche,
aus Gottes Hand hervorgegangene, und wie die Schönheit der
vermenschlichten Landschaft nicht höher gewertet werden darf als
die Gewalt der ursprünglichen, so darf auch eine klassizistisch
geglättete und veredelte, so darf auch die „schöne“ Kunst nicht
absichtsvoll der ursprünglichen Kunst als etwas Höheres
entgegengestellt werden. Es darf nicht heißen: dieses ist richtig und
jenes ist falsch, sondern es muß heißen: die Kunst geht lebendig in
Metamorphosen durch die Zeiten dahin, sie kennt nicht „Ziele“, sie
kennt nur Bewegung, und auch für sie ist der Weg das Ziel. Wie kein
einzelner Sterblicher die ganze Wahrheit hat, wie die Wahrheit
vielmehr unter alle ausgeteilt ist, so ist auch die Kunst als Ganzes
nie im Besitz eines einzelnen Volkes oder einer bestimmten Zeit. Alle
Stile zusammen erst sind die Kunst.
Aus der Lehre, das Endziel der Kunst sei die Schönheit, hat sich
folgerichtig die Verkündigung eines Ideals ergeben. Nun hat aber
jedes Ideal etwas Autokratisches, etwas Ausschließendes. Es duldet
nicht seinesgleichen neben sich, es kann seinesgleichen gar nicht
geben, wie die Pyramide nur eine Spitze haben kann. Daneben ist in
jedem Ideal etwas Einschmeichelndes und Betörendes. Es pflegt
den Wahn, es gäbe im Leben und in der Kunst etwas Absolutes, wo
doch alles Sterbliche und von Sterblichen Geschaffene irgendwie
bedingt sein muß. Und indem es angeblich zum Streben nach dem
Höchsten auffordert, lähmt es von vornherein die Flugkraft, weil es
den Strebenden immer mehr oder weniger zur Nachahmung
verdammt und ihn unselbständig macht. Nur unproduktive Menschen
und Zeiten konstruieren das Ideal, sie geben sich mit seiner Hilfe
eine Wichtigkeit, die sie nicht haben; naive Menschen,
willenskräftige Völker tragen ihre Ziele im Instinkt, niemals aber
drücken sie sie begriffsmäßig mit Idealforderungen aus. Wie es denn
auch bezeichnend ist, daß unsere großen Dichter wohl
Idealforderungen für die bildende Kunst aufgestellt haben, nicht aber
für die Kunst, worin sie selbst Meister waren, für die Poesie. In
unserm Falle hat die Idee vom absoluten Ideal in der Kunst unser
Volk, ja, unsere Rasse lange Zeit hindurch blind gemacht für das
eigentlich Bildende der Kunst. Besonders die Deutschen haben
schwer gelitten unter der Idealisierungstheorie, weil sie alle geistigen
Dinge immer bis zur letzten Konsequenz verfolgen und gründlich
sind bis zur Selbstvernichtung. Noch heute ist dem Deutschen das
Wort „Idealismus“ etwas Heiliges, vor dem die Kritik anhält; das Wort
bezeichnet etwas Sittliches. Und doch lehrt die Erfahrung, daß dem
unbedingten Idealismus zumeist der Jüngling verfällt, der Werdende,
der noch nicht mit sich selbst einig Gewordene, der Sehnsüchtige, ja
Unzufriedene. Wendet man diese Erfahrung auf das Ganze an, so
zeigt es sich, daß der deutsche Idealismus, der uns in unseren
Augen über die anderen Völker erhebt und uns zu dem
auserwählten Volke zu machen scheint, auch ein Produkt der Not ist,
ein Mittel, um über eine gewisse Unfertigkeit und Unbegabtheit
hinwegzukommen, und ein Zeichen dafür, daß das Wollen noch
bedenklich größer ist als das Können. Der deutsche Idealismus ist
das Werkzeug einer Schwäche, die Kraft werden möchte. In der
Kunst hat gerade das Ideal die Deutschen seit anderthalb
Jahrhunderten verhindert, das Nächste zu tun, hat ihre Blicke nach
Wolkenkuckucksheim schweifen lassen, wo es besser gewesen
wäre, einfach, vernünftig und besonnen vom Handwerk auszugehen.
Der Idealglaube hat die Tradition verdorben. Er macht das deutsche
Volk ehrwürdig, aber er hat es auch problematisch gemacht; er
verleiht uns — vielleicht — „Wichtigkeit vor Gott“, aber er verhindert
den Einfluß auf die Menschen. Er macht im Inneren unsicher und —
in der Folge — begriffsüchtig, lehrhaft und hochmütig nach außen.
So fruchtbar ein lebendiger Idealismus sein kann, wenn er still und
unbewußt in der Brust des Individuums glüht und alle Taten adelt, so
gefährlich ist er, wenn er als Begriff zum Bewußtsein erwacht und
sich Herrschaft anmaßt. Geht man die Geschichte der deutschen
Kunst in den letzten hundertundfünfzig Jahren durch, so zeigt es
sich, daß das griechische Vollkommenheitsideal zwar eine Kunst aus
dritter und vierter Hand nachhaltig gefördert hat, ja daß es sogar
allgemein eine gewisse edle Afterkultur zu schaffen fähig gewesen
ist; zugleich aber hat es die eigentlich schöpferischen Kräfte, die
naiven Talente bedroht und sie gezwungen, sich abseits zu
entwickeln, es hat die geniale Begabung einsam gemacht und in die
Verbannung getrieben. Und so ist eine tiefe Kluft entstanden, die
quer durch unsere Kultur geht. Dieser stolze Idealismus erweist sich
als ein Danaergeschenk; er macht oft blind für die Grenzlinie, die
Wahrheit von Lüge scheidet und echte Empfindung von
Schwärmerei; er peitscht auf und verhindert doch zugleich das
Schöpferische, er predigt das Absolute und läßt nur das Bedingte
entstehen. Während die Zeit ganz unharmonisch war, ja eben weil
sie es war, hat dieser Idealismus die Harmonie gepredigt. Da aus
sich selber aber niemand imstande war, harmonisch zu werden, so
wurde als Muster in der Kunst der griechische Stil aufgestellt.
Ein Stil! Es ist das Eigentümliche des begrifflichen Idealismus,
daß er lieber von einem Stil redet, als von bestimmten Kunstwerken.
Oder er macht das einzelne Kunstwerk zu einem Stilsymbol. In
Deutschland sind zum Beispiel die einflußreichsten Theorien an ein
Kunstwerk geknüpft worden — an die Laokoongruppe —, das
keineswegs zu den guten griechischen Arbeiten gehört, in dem die
spezifischen Eigenschaften des griechischen Formwillens nur sehr
bedingt enthalten sind, ja das recht eigentlich dem Formenkreis des
griechischen Barock angehört und dessen Lobpreisung von seiten
Lessings, Goethes und ihrer Geistesverwandten beweist, wie sehr
dieses Geschlecht, das so viel von der „edlen Einfalt und stillen
Größe“ der Antike sprach, im Instinkte noch den
Barockempfindungen des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts unterworfen
war. Es ist damals der grundsätzliche Fehler gemacht worden, Stil
und Qualität miteinander zu verwechseln; man meinte, ein
Kunstwerk sei schon wegen seiner Zugehörigkeit zu einem
bestimmten Stil — zum griechischen Stil — gut und besser als jedes
andere. Darin liegt eine folgenschwere Verwechslung der Art mit
dem Grad. Die Art kann überhaupt nicht kritisiert werden, weil sie gar
nicht vom Willen abhängig ist, sie kann nur konstatiert werden,
kritisieren kann man allein den Grad. Kunststile lassen sich
ebensowenig kritisch vergleichen, wie man die Buche mit der Tanne
qualitativ vergleichen darf. Man sagt ja auch nicht, der Granit sei
besser als der Sandstein, man sagt nur, er sei härter. Der Stil eines
Volkes ist der Abdruck seines Willens, seiner ganzen Eigenart, wie
sie im Wind und Wetter der Geschichte geworden ist; auch der Stil
ist ein Naturprodukt, er kann nicht anders sein als er ist und muß
darum hingenommen werden wie ein Schicksal. Er kann nur
naturgeschichtlich beurteilt werden. Es geht ebensowenig an, zu
sagen, der eine Stil sei richtig und der andere sei falsch, wie man
eine Sprache richtig oder falsch nennen darf. Es gibt begünstigte
Kunststile, die sich in einer, viele Hemmungen beseitigenden Umwelt
entwickeln, und es gibt andere, die sich mühsam durchringen
müssen und die dabei eine mehr knorrige Formenwelt
hervorgebracht haben — wie es vokalreiche und konsonantenreiche,
harte und weiche, mehr wohllautende und mehr charakteristische
Sprachen gibt. Man mag so weit gehen, zu sagen, daß es talentvolle
und weniger begabte Völker gibt und daß dieses Mehr oder Weniger
sich deutlich in den Kunststilen ausdrückt. Selbst damit aber hat das
von einem begabten Stil getragene Kunstwerk nichts
Entscheidendes gewonnen; das Entscheidende bleibt immer die
schöpferische Persönlichkeit. Auch eine Sprache kann den Dichter
fördern oder hemmen, sie kann für ihn bis zu gewissen Graden
„dichten und denken“; aber sie kann nicht den Dichter machen. Ein
Stil kann mit seinen Regeln bestenfalls das Schlechte verhindern,
Kunstwerke aber kann er nicht spontan hervorbringen. Kurz: die
Qualität des Kunstwerks ist in den wesentlichen Punkten vom Stil
unabhängig, ja sie beginnt erst jenseits der Stilform. In dieser
Hinsicht ist es von tiefer Bedeutung, daß die großen Kunstwerke
aller Zeiten und Länder einander verwandt erscheinen. Homer ist
dem Dichter des Nibelungenliedes, Sophokles ist Shakespeare
näher verwandt, als Schiller es einem seiner mittelmäßigen
Epigonen ist. Damit ist nicht gesagt, der Stil sei unwesentlich, denn
er ist ja das Formenklima, in dem der Künstler heranwächst; nur darf
die Zugehörigkeit zu bestimmten Stilformen nicht zum Kriterium des
Wertes oder Unwertes gemacht werden. Und das eben ist in
Deutschland, in Europa im letzten Jahrhundert geschehen. Dieser
Vorgang ist um so unnatürlicher, als es eine fremde, in einer
südlichen Kultur einst gewordene Formenwelt gewesen ist, der die
Deutschen sich zugewandt, die sie als Vollkommenheitsideal
verkündet haben. Soll schon ein Stilideal aufgestellt werden, so liegt
es doch am nächsten, die im eigenen Lande organisch
gewachsenen Kunstformen als vorbildlich zu bezeichnen. Der auf
germanische Initiative zurückzuführende gotische Stil aber ist von
den Gesetzgebern unserer Ästhetik geradezu verfemt worden. Als
unsere Literatur auf ihrer Höhe stand, wurde den bildenden Künsten
von den Schöpfern einer klassischen deutschen Schriftsprache eine
fremde Formensprache gezeigt, mit der Forderung, diese müsse das
den Deutschen eigentümliche Idiom werden. So war es, wie gesagt,
in ganz Europa. Aber die anderen Nationen haben verstanden, das
Griechische mehr zu französieren, zu anglisieren, zu italienisieren;
wir allein sind so „objektiv“ gewesen, daß wir nur schüchtern eine
Verdeutschung des Griechischen gewagt haben. Wir haben
geglaubt, glauben es wohl noch heute, es gäbe einen Normalstil.
Wohin diese Meinung geführt hat, das liegt vor aller Augen: sie
hat eine Epigonenkunst gezeugt. Eine Epigonenkunst, die als
Bildungsresultat bewundernswürdig ist, die bei alledem aber wie ein
Laboratoriumserzeugnis erscheint. Aus den Theorien ist eine Kunst
hervorgegangen, die lehr- und lernbar ist, eine gelehrte Kunst, kurz:
die Akademie. Das Streben nach der absoluten Schönheit hat zu
einem trüben Eklektizismus geführt. Und hat zu gleicher Zeit einen
temperamentlosen Naturalismus aufkommen lassen. Denn beides,
Stileklektizismus und Naturalismus, sind einander keineswegs
entgegengesetzt, sie sind miteinander verwandt. In Zeiten, wo aus
den Meisterwerken der Vergangenheit und der Fremde Einzelformen
losgelöst und in anderem Zusammenhang, zu anderen Endzielen
verwandt werden, wo die einst genial gebildeten Formen der Alten
mit gelehrtem Wissen nachgeahmt werden, macht sich der Künstler
auch von der Natur in subalterner Weise abhängig. Das griechische
Ideal konnte nicht eine neue Klassik heraufbeschwören, denn diese
fließt allein aus dem elementaren Willen, es hat nur den
klassizistischen Stil geschaffen. Und das große Naturgefühl der
Alten hat nicht das moderne Naturgefühl selbständig gemacht,
sondern unfrei. Das neunzehnte Jahrhundert ist eine Epoche der
stückweisen Kunst- und Naturnachahmung, der Formflauheit, der
sentimentalischen Ideologie gewesen. Es haben in ihm die Künstler
der mittleren Linie geherrscht, während die wahrhaft Selbständigen
verfolgt und vernachlässigt worden sind. Wir haben uns gewöhnt,
inmitten einer abgeleiteten Bildungskultur zu leben, als sei dieser
Zustand normal. Das heute lebende Geschlecht weilt, vom ersten
Tage seines Daseins ab, in einer unerfreulichen klassizistisch-
naturalistischen Umwelt, entstanden aus dem Kompromiß, den der