The Implications of Emerging

Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic

Space: Views from the Younger
Generation Leaders Network Julia
Berghofer
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-implications-of-emerging-technologies-in-the-euro
-atlantic-space-views-from-the-younger-generation-leaders-network-julia-berghofer/
The Implications of
Emerging Technologies
in the Euro-Atlantic
Space
Views from the Younger
Generation Leaders Network

Edited by
Julia Berghofer · Andrew Futter ·
Clemens Häusler · Maximilian Hoell ·
Juraj Nosál
The Implications of Emerging Technologies
in the Euro-Atlantic Space
 Julia Berghofer · Andrew Futter ·
Clemens Häusler · Maximilian Hoell ·
Juraj Nosál
Editors

The Implications
of Emerging
Technologies
in the Euro-Atlantic
Space
Views from the Younger Generation Leaders
Network
Editors
Julia Berghofer Andrew Futter
Berlin, Germany Leicester, UK

Clemens Häusler Maximilian Hoell

Munich, Germany London, UK

Juraj Nosál
Vienna, Austria

ISBN 978-3-031-24672-2 ISBN 978-3-031-24673-9 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
For Bob Berls
 Introduction

This book is a joint project by members of the Younger Genera-

tion Leaders Network on Euro-Atlantic Security (YGLN), a network of
emerging leaders which draws its membership from the Euro-Atlantic
space. Rather than just presenting a compilation of different viewpoints
on emerging technologies and their immediate and longer-term impli-
cations for societies, security and economies in the region, the book
presents a broad range of perspectives. It includes a collection of ideas,
analyses and perspectives from a geographically diverse group of next
generation thinkers from Europe, Russia and North America, who have
collaboratively worked on their chapters.
24 February 2022 marked a sharp break in the relationship between
Russia and the West, and an even sharper break in the relationship
between Russians and Ukrainians—be it in the cultural, civil society, or
academic sphere. The work on this book, however, continued with a
remarkable spirit of collaboration between the contributors from east
and west. Even in the present circumstances, the YGLN brings together
experts from all sides. The YGLN is a place where Russians and Belaru-
sians talk to Ukrainians, Armenians talk to Azeris and where North Amer-
icans talk to their European colleagues on security matters, economic,
political and technological trends as well as threats to humanity like
climate change and nuclear war.
The Network started thinking about this book in late 2020, at a time
when relations between east and west were already strained but did not

vii
viii INTRODUCTION

yet appear as bleak as today. Following the publication of a first book co-
authored by YGLN members in 2020—Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security:
Views from the Younger Generation Leaders Network—the participants in
the Network shared a feeling that there would be value in joining forces
once again for another academic, cross-regional project. The book we
present here was also greatly motivated by the conviction that by collabo-
rating on academic work, the YGLN creates and protects a safe space for
scholars and professionals to meet and exchange ideas.
At the same time, the book aims to spread fresh, next generation
thinking across the academic, think tank and policy communities. We
sense that the implications of emerging technologies for our collective
future would be a timely and important topic for a Network as the YGLN
to address. Henceforth, the collection that we brought together mirrors
different trends in the wide field of emerging and disruptive technologies
and puts them in the context of various social, political and economic
settings, from military applications, export controls, the struggle between
liberal and illiberal forces on the Internet, to new trends that can help to
tackle climate change—to name but a few.
The YGLN as a next-generation project is a natural hub for nourishing
new ideas and for offering its members platforms to share them with a
wider public. Since 2014, when the Network was launched in the wake
of the emerging Ukraine crisis, it has provided a forum for exchange for
the younger voices of emerging leaders across Europe, Russia and North
America. Leaders come from a broad variety of professional and cultural
backgrounds.
While the YGLN has doubled its membership since the establishment
of the Network to more than 100, the tradition of strong interper-
sonal links, formal and informal meetings between members, intimate
discussions in-person and online, as well as frank and open exchange,
has persisted. Those members who have risen to influential positions
and consider themselves alumni of the YGLN—working for instance at
NATO, the U.S. State Department, as advisors for the United Nations
or pursuing political careers—are role models for existing members and
remain part of the YGLN family to support their peers.
Against this background, the book is to be understood as a project
realised by colleagues who are closely collaborating with each other and
who assist each other in developing their thinking—across cultural and
political barriers.
 INTRODUCTION ix

Finally, the YGLN would not be as powerful as it is today without

the tremendous support of senior leaders and experts from across North
America, Russia and Europe. The Network continues to be extremely
grateful for their help and advice. Amongst them, the co-editors would
like to particularly thank Lord Des Browne, Ambassador (ret.) Jim
Collins and Sir Adam Thomson for their passion for the network and
their continued steadfast commitment to support the next generation of
leaders. Above all, Robert E. Berls Jr. who was, until his passing in 2021,
the staunchest supporter of the YGLN and a good friend and colleague
to its members, deserves our highest gratitude.
 Contents

Part I Politics and Geopolitics

1 Digital Illiberalism and the Erosion of the Liberal
International Order 3
Pavel Kanevskiy
2 The Emergence of E-participation Tools:
Strengthening Democracy Through Inclusive Debates 23
Julia Berghofer
3 The US–China 5G Race in Europe’s Western Balkans 43
Gent Salihu
4 The Role of Export Controls in Managing Emerging
Technology 57
Maria Shagina
5 The Geopolitics of Energy Transition: New Resources
and Technologies 73
Marco Siddi

Part II Strategic Stability and Military Affairs

6 Technological Uncertainty and Strategic Stability 89
Igor Istomin

xi
xii CONTENTS

7 Emerging Technologies and “Green-Friendly”

Military Conflict? 109
Lucia Gavenčiaková
8 Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Command, Control,
and Communications: Implications for the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty 123
Maximilian Hoell and Sylvia Mishra
9 Contemporary Cybersecurity Challenges 143
Pavel Sharikov
10 Autonomous Weapons Systems in Armed Conflicts:
New Challenges for International Law 159
Verena Jackson

Part II Economy and Society

11 Crime in the Digital Age: A New Frontier 177
Juraj Nosál
12 Emerging Technologies as an Opportunity
for a Sustainable and Carbon-Neutral Future 195
Ivana Vuchkova
13 Cyber Sovereignty: Should Cyber Borders Replicate
Territorial Borders? 209
Tinatin Japaridze
14 Tracing Accountability: Product Sourcing Technology
and Implications for Conservation and Human
Rights Initiatives 227
Carolyn Forstein

Index 241
 Notes on Contributors

Julia Berghofer is a Policy Fellow with the European Leadership

Network where she focuses on nuclear arms control and deterrence in the
Euro-Atlantic space. Her position also includes coordinating the activities
of the Younger Generation Leaders Network on Euro-Atlantic Security
(YGLN). Prior to joining the ELN, Julia was a Research Assistant with the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin
and a Project Assistant in the organisational team of the Munich Security
Conference (M.SC.).
Julia holds a Bachelor in Political and Communication Sciences from
the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich and the University of
Vienna, and completed her Master in Political Science at the University
of Hamburg.
Carolyn Forstein is an Attorney practising trial and appellate litigation
at a U.S. law firm. She previously clerked for U.S. District Court Judge
Timothy Burgess and Justice Edwin Cameron of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa. Carolyn has worked on a range of international law and
rule of law issues, including projects based in Ukraine, Bangladesh and
Peru. Before law school, Carolyn researched rule of law development as a
Fulbright fellow in Ukraine and studied in Russia on an academic schol-
arship. Carolyn holds a J.D. from Columbia Law School and a B.A. in
International Relations from Stanford University.

xiii
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Lucia Gavenčiaková is a Policy Assistant at Globsec, and a Master’s

degree student in Security and Strategic Studies in the Czech Republic.
She became interested in the field of climate security as a high school
student and developed her passion for the topic into the main focus of her
studies. She was an active contributor to Czecho-Slovak security portal,
where she has published several analyses on climate security and military
decarbonisation. She currently focuses on the challenge of climate security
among the leaders and citizens of the Slovak Republic.
Maximilian Hoell is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Leadership
Network in London, where he works on issues pertaining to nuclear arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation as well as transatlantic secu-
rity. He earned a Ph.D. in International Relations from University College
London. He also studied at the Universities of Oxford, Yale and Montpel-
lier, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) as
well as the London School of Economics and Political Science. Max has
held academic appointments at Université Paris Dauphine—PSL, London
campus as well as Northeastern University—London.
Igor Istomin is an Acting Chair at the Department of Applied Inter-
national Political Analysis and a Leading Research Fellow at the Center
for Advanced American Studies, at Moscow State Institute of Interna-
tional Relations. He holds Ph.D. and M.A. degrees from MGIMO as
well as undergraduate degree from St. Petersburg State University. In
2020–2021, Igor was a Senior Fellow at the Davis Center for Russian
and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University.
Verena Jackson is a Researcher and Lecturer at the Center for Intelli-
gence and Security Studies (CSIS) at the University of the Armed Forces
of Germany in Munich (UniBW). Prior to that, she worked for interna-
tional law firms and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen Germany. She is a fully qualified lawyer
in Germany holding a degree with specialisation in International Law.
Her research focuses on Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and National
Security Law. In particular, on the challenges that emerging technologies
pose to the law. She also focuses on the transatlantic comparison of law.
Tinatin Japaridze is the Vice President of Business Development at The
Critical Mass and Special Advisor on Eurasian security at Eurasia Group.
She previously worked for the City of New York and the United Nations
as Bureau Chief for Eastern European media. In 2019, she became a
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xv

Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs Ambassador on Cyber

Ethics and Digital Leadership. Tinatin served as a “Go Big” Officer at
ELN focusing on the New START Treaty extension, and later became a
member of the YGLN. Her book Stalin’s Millennials was published to
critical acclaim by Rowman & Littlefield in 2022.
Pavel Kanevskiy is an Associate Professor of political science and inter-
national relations at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Since 2014
he has been a member of the Younger Generation Leaders Network on
Euro-Atlantic Security (YGLN), being chair of the YGLN in 2018–2022.
In 2015–2016 he was an EASI Hurford Next Generation Fellow at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is an expert at the
Russian International Affairs Council, focusing on Russia–West relations.
He regularly writes for academic journals and think tanks on Russian and
American politics, international relations and comparative politics.
Juraj Nosál works at the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna where he is currently an Associate Project
Officer for combating cybercrime in the Transnational Threats Depart-
ment. Prior to that, he served in the OSCE Secretariat’s Conflict Preven-
tion Centre (2020–2022), Transnational Threats Department (2017–
2020) and the Office of the Secretary General (2014–2017) where
he supported various projects on the topics such as security sector
governance and reform, intelligence-led policing, cybercrime and pan-
European security dialogue. He holds a Master’s degree in Terrorism
and Political Violence from University of St Andrews and in International
Relations from Masaryk University.
Gent Salihu is a J.D. Candidate and Allen and Erika Lo Endowed Tech-
nology Law Scholar at Georgetown Law. Previously, Salihu worked on
justice reforms through USAID Kosovo programming, including util-
ising technology to improve access to justice and streamline services.
Gent taught public policy at the Rochester Institute of Technology in
Kosovo, and served as an Advisor to the President of Kosovo and Minister
of Justice. Salihu graduated A.B., magna cum laude, in Philosophy and
Government from Dartmouth College, and as a recipient of Weidenfeld
and Chevening scholarships, he holds a Master of Public Policy from the
University of Oxford.
Dr. Maria Shagina is a Diamond-Brown Research Fellow for Economic
Sanctions, Standards and Strategy at the International Institute for
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Strategic Studies (IISS). Her research interests cover economic statecraft,

international sanctions and energy politics, with a particular focus on the
post-Soviet states.
Pavel Sharikov is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Europe,
Russian Academy of Sciences, and Associate professor at Lomonosov
Moscow State University. In 2019–2020 Pavel worked at the Center for
International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. In 2015
he authored the book Information security in a multipolar world. Pavel
has published over 100 articles in Russian and English, and regularly
appears in Russian media with commentaries on American politics and
Russian-West relations.
Marco Siddi is a Montalcini Assistant Professor at the University of
Cagliari (Italy) and a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute
of International Affairs. He focuses primarily on EU–Russia relations,
European energy and climate policy and European identity and memory
politics. He has published in some of the most renowned peer-reviewed
journals in his research field. Previously, he was a Marie Curie fellow at the
University of Edinburgh and a DAAD fellow at the Institute of European
Politics (IEP) in Berlin. He has a Ph.D. in Politics from the Universities
of Edinburgh and Cologne.
Ivana Vuchkova is a Program Coordinator at the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung Office in Skopje, where she leads the portfolio of activities in
the field of economy, energy and sustainable development. Ivana holds
a Master’s degree in Economic Governance and Development from the
OSCE Academy, and is an author and co-author of number of papers and
publications in the mentioned fields, including the first Manual of Argu-
ments for a Fair and Ecological Society. As part of her professional and
personal development, she is committed to promoting just economic and
energy policies that are in harmony with the planetary boundaries and
social needs.
 PART I

Politics and Geopolitics

 CHAPTER 1

Digital Illiberalism and the Erosion

of the Liberal International Order

Pavel Kanevskiy

Introduction
The Internet was one of the most important technological innovations
of the twentieth century, originating at the core of liberal international
order (LIO). Three decades ago, the Internet was presumed to become
a technology that would strengthen global liberalism because open infor-
mation flows were seen as a natural continuation of freedom, supporting
basic liberal and democratic principles. The creation of the Internet
should be seen as a logical continuation of technological progress that
is deeply interconnected with the spread of liberalism. But the liberal-
ising promise of the Internet was put at risk by political authorities inside
both authoritarian and democratic countries, as well as by “Big Tech”
and populist, illiberal groups of different kinds. This chapter provides
an overview of the underlying reasons that have led to the emergence
of both digital liberalism and digital illiberalism, what implications these

P. Kanevskiy (B)
Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: pskanevskiy@gmail.com

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Switzerland AG 2023
J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies
in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_1
4 P. KANEVSKIY

processes have on the liberal international order, and proposes policy

recommendations for how to reverse illiberal tendencies in the digital
sphere.

Technological Progress and the Emergence

of Liberal Internationalism
Technological progress and the evolution of liberalism can be seen as
naturally interdependent. Liberties and liberal institutions deriving from
the era of the Enlightenment established conditions for human creativity,
social and political progress. Liberalism created the premises for innova-
tion and inventions that provided people with new means to do things,
increased benefits and lowered costs. Innovation became the driving force
of the industrial revolution in the West and laid the foundations of
modern economies.
The strong link between liberalism and technological progress was the
key factor behind the evolution of liberal democracies and the liberal
international order. From the liberal colonial empires of the nineteenth
century to the post-Cold War order, the technological superiority of
the Western countries was the foundation of their central role in global
politics and the global economy. Technological progress had steadily
increased monetary and political returns for industrialised and liberal
states and created preconditions for stronger connectivity inside the liberal
core. Globalisation, the internationalisation of the chains of production,
and improved links between capitalist hubs across the world technologi-
cally drove the liberal order in the second half of the twentieth century.
Hence, technologies were shaping and strengthening liberalism both
domestically and globally. The interconnection between globalisation and
technological progress also explains the remarkable stability of the post-
WWII Western order and its ultimate technological superiority by the end
of the millennium. It facilitated economic growth, encouraged the flow
of knowledge and technology and drew states together.1 The spread of
liberalism resulted in the emergence of the truly integrated global system

1 G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?”, International Affairs,

94:1 (2018), p. 17.
 1 DIGITAL ILLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION … 5

in the nineteenth century even though not all members of this system
were fully open and democratic societies.2
At the same time, members of the liberal order had to adjust to a
growing technological complexity. A grand debate on who controls tech-
nologies and, in whose interest, dates back to the early stages of industrial
capitalism, although it was not until the twentieth century that widely
accepted regulatory frameworks were created by states.3 Had the modern
regulatory state not developed, the negative effects of industrialism would
likely have overshadowed its positive ones. However, the exact balance
between regulation and freedom has changed over time. Technological
progress has had both benefits and drawbacks for liberal societies because
of its strong impact on labour markets, distribution of resources and social
inequality.
Waves of industrial progress strengthened the link between liber-
alism, technological progress and capitalism. One of the key reasons why
technological development became highly interconnected with liberalism
was the adoption of experimental methods within liberal communities.
But whereas in most parts of the world science and innovation existed
without much practical application, in early liberal societies, primarily
in Great Britain, it became an element of industrial production when
business people understood the benefits of relying on experiments and
scientific research. As Jack Goldstone argues, England in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries was the first country in which a combina-
tion of “educated workforce, freedom of ideas, technological innovation,
and the application of scientific engineering to industry” created a new
model of economic growth and set an example for other nations to
follow.4 States that managed to build strong institutional and cultural
ties between liberty, creativity, innovations, inventions and the market
economy benefitted the most. They became more developed economically
and technologically which in turn amplified their power and capabilities

2 Ronald Findlay & Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World
Economy in the Second Millennium, (Princeton University Press: 2007) pp. 395–414.
3 Larry Neal & Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds.), The Cambridge History of Capitalism
(Cambridge University Press: 2014), pp. 82–126.
4 Jack Goldstone, Why Europe? The Rise of the West in the World History, 1500–1850
(George Mason University: 2009), p. 172.
6 P. KANEVSKIY

globally. These processes also fostered the emergence and strength-

ening of more inclusive institutions that made societies more open and
promoted the culture of innovation.5
The deep interconnection between liberalism, technological progress
and the economy was one of the centrepieces of Modernisation Theory of
the twentieth century.6 This theory was criticised multiple times, mainly
from a Marxist and Dependence Theory viewpoint.7 Doubts have also
been raised about whether capitalism and technological innovation can
survive without liberalism.8 The major weakness of such criticism is that
although it poses many deep questions on the nature of capitalism,
democracy and societal development, it doesn’t really break the logical
tie between liberalism and technological progress.
For example, Germany was economically and technologically backward
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but had managed to reach
high levels of scientific and industrial development in the second half of
the nineteenth century while remaining a predominantly authoritarian
state. As noted by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Germany’s
economic institutions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
became more inclusive even as its polity remained largely authoritarian.9
To understand the German phenomena, it is worth remembering that
although not being a part of the liberal order in the strict sense of
the word, Germany was not completely illiberal. Centres of economic
and technological progress in the Western parts of Germany had long-
standing traditions of decentralised governance, trade and science. Civil
codes like Prussia’s Allgemeines Landrecht had protected private prop-
erty since at least the late eighteenth century, and in the early nineteenth
century the Code Napoleon with its ideas of constitutionalism and the
rule of law were becoming particularly visible in places like Rhineland

5 Trygve R. Tholfsen, “The Transition to Democracy in Victorian England”, Interna-

tional Review of Social History, 6:2 (1961), pp. 226–248.
6 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, (Cambridge University Press: 1960).
7 Herbert Marcuse, One-dimensional man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial
Society, (Beacon Press: 1991), p. 260; Andre Gunder Frank, Barry K. Gills, The World
System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? (Routledge: 1996), p. 344.
8 Branko Milanovic, Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World
(Harvard University Press: 2019), p. 304.
9 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty, (Crown Business: 2012), p. 546.
 1 DIGITAL ILLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION … 7

and Westphalia.10 Furthermore, the pre-WWI autocratic regimes with

their growing middle classes and fast urbanisation had to integrate and
accept elements of freedom and plurality without which it would’ve been
impossible to sustain the necessary levels of scientific knowledge and
entrepreneurship. The same logic is applicable to a certain degree to Japan
or Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Centralised illiberal states of the twentieth century like Nazi Germany
and the Soviet Union made a new series of attempts to build compet-
itive technological infrastructures in the twentieth century. They were
successful in the military domain and in using technologies for mass
mobilisation and total state control. For totalitarian regimes, technologies
were used largely for the coercive needs of the state and became multi-
pliers of their power at home and abroad. Innovations were allowed to the
extent that they contributed to regime survival. This level of technological
progress was enough to compete with the Euro-Atlantic liberal powers
on the global stage but had limited potential for societal and economic
development at home.
The Communist system was the longest-standing illiberal and undemo-
cratic alternative to the liberal order. Soviet science was able to produce
ground-breaking success in space technologies, nuclear physics and chem-
istry. However, despite high levels of education, scientific breakthroughs
and a stable if modest quality of life, innovation and technology never
became drivers of societal and economic change under Communism. As
Chi Ling Chan rightfully argues, that was mainly because of the “exten-
sive military-industrial black hole exhausting the Soviets of key resources”
as well as “the ideological capture of science… and structural disincen-
tives against innovation.”11 The domination of a top-down approach and
the absence of markets never allowed for the creation of a proper link
between science, innovation and the economy. Loren Graham suggests
that this is because the Soviet Union (as well as contemporary Russia to a
certain degree) never “fully adopted the modern view that making money
from technological innovation is an honorable, decent, and admirable
thing to do.”12 The Soviet Union was able to compete with the West

10 Ewald Grothe, “Model or Myth? The Constitution of Westphalia of 1807 and Early
German Constitutionalism”, German Studies Review, 28:1 (2005), pp. 1–19.
11 Chi Ling Chan, “Fallen Behind: Science, Technology, and Soviet Statism”, Intersect,
8:3 (2015), p. 1.
12 Loren Graham, Lonely Ideas: Can Russia Compete? (The MIT Press: 2013), p. 103.
8 P. KANEVSKIY

primarily because it created modern weaponry, but it never became a true

competitor in the global economy. Gaps in key areas such as microchips
and mechanical engineering only accelerated Soviet technological and
economic decay. The Soviet example demonstrates that while innovations
and technologies may serve the narrow purposes of the autocracy, the
inability to link innovations and technologies with societal and economic
progress inevitably weakens illiberal regimes from the inside.
Contemporary China represents the latest example of the predom-
inantly authoritarian system that managed to build a strong economy
and to be able to compete with the West in many technological areas.
According to Global Innovation Index, in 2021 China ranked 12th
among the 132 economies, up 22 positions from ten years earlier.13 China
heavily invests in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, semi-
conductors and the space industry, although it is still far from being a
leader in any of these areas.14 China is just another example of when
modernisation, economic and technological progress become possible
after a series of semi-liberal reforms. The new thinking of Deng Xiaoping
as well as favourable geopolitical, trade and demographic conditions of
the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s resulted in significant economic growth and
boosted China’s technological potential. However, just like the Soviet
Union before China faces serious challenges in building a truly competi-
tive technological economy in a situation when Xi Jinping and the ruling
elite appear unwilling to reform the system further.15

The Rise of Digital Liberalism

With the rise of the Internet and digital technologies championed by the
West, the structural leadership of liberal democracies in the global system
became ever more evident. The Internet surfaced as the game-changing

13 Global Innovation Index 2021. China, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/

wipo_pub_gii_2021/cn.pdf (Accessed 10 August 2022).
14 Dennis Normile, “A Beijing Think Tank Offered a Frank Review of China’s
Technological Weaknesses. Then the Report Disappeared”, Science (8 February
2022), https://www.science.org/content/article/beijing-think-tank-offered-frank-review-
china-s-technological-weaknesses-then-report (Accessed 10 August 2022).
15 Hal Brands, “The Dangers of China’s Decline”, Foreign Policy (14 April 2022),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/china-decline-dangers/ (Accessed 10 August
2022).
 1 DIGITAL ILLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION … 9

technology at the turn of the millennium. When Tim Berners-Lee

invented the World Wide Web in 1989 for the purpose of information
exchange between scientists and institutions, few could have imagined
the revolutionary impact it would soon have on communication and the
global economy. The Internet played a crucial role in the expansion of
the liberal international order not only through increased returns, but it
also created a new communication infrastructure that allowed the LIO to
strengthen and expand in the post-Cold War era.
According to Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, the post-1945
international liberal order was comprised of several key elements: secu-
rity and economic co-binding; the consensual, cooperative and integrative
nature of the American hegemony; the availability of mutual gains
through the expansion of capitalism and free trade; the role of the Western
liberal civic identity; the presence of semi-sovereign powers like Germany
and Japan that reinforced the liberal order rather than the balance of
power.16 It is through these elements that the liberal international order
became the foundation for solidarity, cohesion and cooperation between
states.
The Internet successfully supported these elements in a number of
ways, especially during the “golden era” of globalisation and liberalisa-
tion of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Foremost, it became a crucial
tool for democratisation, and the expansion of liberal views and ideas.
For the United States an open and free Internet was crucial for ensuring
peace and prosperity at home and abroad as it helped to sustain Amer-
ican economic and political hegemony. The Internet was part of the
“end of history” zeitgeist because it was considered as a natural continu-
ation of the Western ideological, economic and technological superiority.
Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman point out that the United States had
managed to restructure the LIO with the use of the Internet, believing
that “open communication would become self-reinforcing over time,
strengthening democracy within liberal states and spreading democracy
and liberal values to autocratic regimes.”17

16 Daniel Deudney & G. John Ikenberry, “The Nature and Sources of Liberal
International Order”, Review of International Studies, 25 (1999), pp. 179–196.
17 Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, “The Janus Face of the Liberal International
Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining?”, International
Organization, 75 (2021), p. 337.
10 P. KANEVSKIY

According to Larry Diamond, the Internet had great advantages

compared to earlier technologies. Its decentralised character and ability
to reach large segments of the population were well-suited to grass-
roots movements. The Internet’s capability to empower citizens in their
desire to play a bigger role in politics and combat authoritarian regimes
made it a perfect “liberation technology.”18 Indeed, this new commu-
nication infrastructure became one of the pillars of the Euro-Atlantic
security model based on a combination of military force, economic
and technological power and attractiveness of the Western model of
development.
The principles of open access and the unrestricted flow of information
were crucial in supporting the growth of interconnected global liberal
networks. It created a platform for improved communication within the
global civic and capitalist communities. It was the driving force behind the
strengthening of what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye called “complex
interdependence:”19 that the unwinding informational revolution funda-
mentally changes the world in which force matters less and countries are
increasingly interconnected.20 The neoliberal approach towards global
networks was based on the assumption that their existence resulted in
reciprocal dependence that made coercive behaviour less effective, while
stimulating mutually beneficial cooperation between states, corporations
and civic groups. A network-based liberal order led to the creation of
multiple information and communication hubs which made it harder for
separate states to control them.21 This, in turn, fostered decentralisation,
more freedom in international agenda-setting and hence strengthened
the key principles of the LIO. Liberal networks existed long before the
Internet, but digital liberalism reinforced their strength and efficacy while
creating new communication channels for them. This is especially relevant
in regard to international businesses and non-governmental organisations
that received a new tool for communicating and advocating their agendas
in the transnational and supranational space.

18 Larry Diamond, “Liberation technology”, Journal of Democracy, 21:3 (2010),

pp. 69–83.
19 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence (Longman:
2001).
20 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the
Information Age”, Foreign Affairs, 77:5 (1998), p. 83.
21 Ibid.
 1 DIGITAL ILLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION … 11

The deep connection between online technologies and networks of

interdependence challenges the opinions of some authors claiming that
digital liberalism did not fulfil its main objective—that of increased inter-
national liberalisation.22 New communication spaces allowed major civic
and capitalist forces around the world to better coordinate their activities,
strengthened business ties and played a huge role in the development of
international civil society. That of course didn’t mean that the Internet
was able to change the structure of world politics. After all, as Keohane
and Nye rightfully observed, “information does not flow in a vacuum but
in political space that is already occupied.”23 Hence, the Internet was just
an additional layer of the complex interdependence that made communi-
cation and transnational flows easier but didn’t become fully independent
of politics. This also posed a dilemma—largely unsolved to this day—of
whether the Internet is a technology of freedom or it is a technology of
control.24
Consequently, one of the biggest challenges for many Western and
especially American experts and policymakers since the 1990s was to make
sure that the Internet and its underlying communication system stayed
within the liberal agenda. This challenge shaped the American approach
towards Internet governance. At the core of that thinking was the idea
that the Internet—with all the benefits it creates for the liberal order—
must not include any barriers or strict norms. In other words, it should be
left as a largely unregulated technology because that was the only way for
it to support the LIO naturally; to remain as a tool of the invisible hand
of democratisation and liberalisation; and on top of that to let the United
States strengthen its role as the key stakeholder in LIO. This goal was
meant to be reached under two main conditions: the open and unregu-
lated nature of the Internet, and American “smart supervision” designed
to guarantee that no other state had the capacity to shape the virtual space
according to their views and national interests. Greater multilateralism
in governance of the Internet was traditionally perceived by American
decision-makers as a threat to its democratic and liberal nature.

22 Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, “The Janus Face of the Liberal International
Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining?”, International
Organization, 75 (2021), p. 342.
23 Keohane & Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age”, p. 84.
24 Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, “Liberation vs. Control: The Future of
Cyberspace”, Journal of Democracy, 21:4 (2010), p. 44.
12 P. KANEVSKIY

These ideas were behind the logic of US President Bill Clinton’s deci-
sion in 1998 to shift governance of the Internet from multilateral bodies
such as the UN-affiliated International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
a California-based private company.25 As the American domain name
market was the largest in the world, and the United States controlled the
root server system that sits on top of the Domain Name System (DNS).
This decision allowed the United States to shape Internet governance to
their political and economic advantage as well as to multiply American
hegemony within the liberal order.
ICANN is not a formal regulatory institution, it is a private supervising
body whose main function is to maintain the unregulated, open and inter-
connected character of the Internet. This approach coincided perfectly
with the dynamic of the American-led liberal order because it restricted
possibilities for states to shape the norms and rules of the virtual space
and left it within the self-regulatory framework. The Internet was, hence,
a double-edged technology that rested on principles of deregulation but
was never meant to be fully neutral, because its main purpose was seen
in supporting a certain set of ideas and multiplying American political
and business influence globally. This situation created a paradox when a
key new technology deriving from within the liberal system with tremen-
dous potential to influence economies, civil societies and security was
left outside of the normative and institutional structure. Such a paradox
predetermined the anarchic nature of the Internet, which soon became
a double-edged sword for digital liberalism and the liberal order it was
supposed to support.

Virtual Anarchy and Digital Illiberalism

The liberalising function of the Internet focussed attention away from
its darker illiberal side. But how and why, in a matter of just two
decades, did this alternate world become so powerful that it began to
contest the original image? There is no single answer: power misbalances
created by the unipolar system, the impact of democratic interventions,
the economic crisis of 2008 and its aftershocks, accelerating migration
flows, cultural clashes, rising populism, nativism and anti-globalisation

25 David Bach, “Varieties of Cooperation: The Domestic Institutional Roots of Global

Governance”, Review of International Studies, 36:3 (2010), pp. 578–579.
 1 DIGITAL ILLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION … 13

sentiments provoked a perfect storm for liberal internationalism in the

twenty-first century. The political, economic, value and communicative
foundations upon which the LIO was grounded were put into doubt
by many non-Western polities as well as different groups at the heart
of the liberal community. Together with structural problems, such as
the unequal distribution of resources and the disproportional role of the
corporate sector, these factors created new challenges for the liberal order.
The Internet, which was a major communication platform within the
liberal order, became crucial in the rise of illiberalism. There were several
fundamental shifts in world politics that strengthened the illiberal side
of the Internet. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 led to an era
of surveillance systems penetrating all aspects of life. Together with the
growing power of big technological corporations this resulted in an inva-
sion of personal privacy and the evolution of surveillance capitalism based
on micro-targeting of the audience and marketing and advertising busi-
ness.26 Another important reason behind the rise of digital illiberalism
was the gradual rise of autocratic regimes and autocratic tendencies both
outside and inside the Euro-Atlantic community. It took time for these
actors to accommodate to the new information technologies used by
pro-democratic forces, but mobilisation against it accelerated during the
second decade of the twenty-first century. Finally, the culture of polit-
ical activism itself started to change with growing anti-elitist and populist
sentiments gaining ground globally.
Hence, digital liberalism was facing rising pressure from three different
but deeply interconnected sides: the state (from both liberal and illib-
eral camps), “Big Tech,” and a new type of grassroots political activism.
The combination of these pressures led to a number of disruptions in the
relationship between the Internet and the liberal order.
One thing that could have hardly been predicted in the early days of
digital liberalisation was that online technologies would reinforce rather
than undermine the domestic and global influence of the illiberal regimes.
The role of illiberal states in controlling the virtual agenda had indeed
long been relatively low. In the 1990s and early 2000s, they lacked the
motivation and means to influence the evolution of the Internet and to
compete with the United States as well as global networks that promoted
digital liberalism. Tectonic shifts in political cultures and new waves of

26 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future
at the New Frontier of Power (Profile Books: 2019), p. 704.
14 P. KANEVSKIY

civic activism at the beginning of the twenty-first century resulted in a

political tremor, legitimacy crises and colour revolutions in developing
regions, from the post-Soviet space to the Islamic world and the Asia–
Pacific. The Internet played a crucial role in this wave of democratisation.
As Philip Howard argued in 2010, the Internet played a key role in
nearly all democratic transitions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries.27 The World Web became a basis for civic coordination and was
able to successfully compete with the state media in agenda-setting.
However, new protests and legitimacy crises pushed many ruling elites
into defensive positions. Liberalism and extensive freedoms were quickly
blamed as universal causes of all misfortunes by illiberal politicians and
autocrats. The Internet was at the centre of the new battleground for
human minds. Its open nature and strong connection to the liberal world
were perceived as a threat to national interests in the eyes of many illiberal
political elites. Hence some states started pushing harder to contest and
ideally control the virtual agenda. The example of Belarus vividly demon-
strates how the regime’s response to pro-democratic Internet activism
evolved in the first decade of the twenty-first century.28
Attacks on digital liberalism by authoritarian regimes became more
solidified and concentrated in the 2010s as a response to such events
as the Arab Spring and new civil unrest in the post-Soviet space. More-
over, as authoritarian regimes started to view digital liberalism as a threat
to their legitimacy and survival, they decided to shift those tactics used
against dissent at home to fighting digital liberalism globally by mobilising
illiberal forces of all kinds and undermining democratic institutions. Those
tactics that worked at home turned out to be applicable in the global anar-
chic and unregulated virtual space. Fake news and the creation of illiberal
networks based on social media had become unexpectedly strong tools
that were able to compete with liberal agendas and discourses, influence
public opinion and sow social and political mistrust. Digital illiberalism
became a compensatory strategy for those political forces who saw the
US-led LIO as the source of all troubles, from an unfair distribution
of power to the existential threat to the illiberal regimes themselves. A

27 Philip N. Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information

Technology and Political Islam (Oxford University Press: 2010), pp. 3–4.
28 Volodymyr V. Lysenko & Kevin C. Desouza, “The Use of Information and Commu-
nication Technologies by Protesters and the Authorities in the Attempts at Colour
Revolutions in Belarus 2001–2010”, Europe-Asia Studies, 67:4 (2015), p. 639.
 1 DIGITAL ILLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION … 15

new kind of illiberal counter-propaganda produced plentiful outputs at a

minimum cost, and allowed for illiberal sentiments to be spread both at
home and abroad.
Illiberal states also introduced an array of methods to put the Internet
under stricter governmental control. Simple solutions to this day include
blocking or slowing down of the Internet supported by legislative actions
best seen in China, Russia and Iran. Longer-ranging visions suggest it
is possible to disconnect from the global network and create a sepa-
rate state-controlled root system. Russia and China have made the first
steps in this direction in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Russia went ahead
by enacting a law that would someday allow it to create a “sovereign
Internet,”29 whereas China started experimenting with independent DNS
root servers.30 Today it is possible to imagine a world where the Internet
is divided into different regulatory segments.31 The spread of content-
filtering from both illiberal and liberal states violates the very philosophy
of the Internet as an open space.
But it is not only illiberal states that are witnessing the erosion of
digital liberalism. Democratic states, either through governmental agen-
cies or private entities, are collecting enormous amounts of metadata
to be used for national security reasons. Political parties and politicians
of different kinds use private companies to collect and analyse private
data without a strict judicial oversight. This raises a question about the
moral limits of personal data management and the purposes it can be
used for. The notorious example of Cambridge Analytica, a firm that was
involved in multiple political campaigns in the United Kingdom and the
United States, including the support of Donald Trump and pro-Brexit

29 Roman Goncharenko, “Russia Moves Toward Creation of an Independent Inter-

net”, DW (17 January 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/russia-moves-toward-creation-
of-an-independent-internet/a-42172902 (Accessed 25 January 2022).
30 “China Greenlights Establishment of Root Server”, Xinhua (8 December
2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/08/c_138613999.htm (Accessed
25 January 2022).
31 Ronald J. Deibert, “The Geopolitics of Internet Control: Censorship, Sovereignty,
and Cyberspace”, in: Andrew Chadwick/Philip N. Howard (eds.), Routledge Handbook of
Internet Politics (Routledge: 2009), p. 334.
16 P. KANEVSKIY

organisations. But this is just a drop in the ocean of unregulated data

gathering.32
Illiberal civic activism is another dilemma for digital liberalism. The
anarchic nature of the Internet created natural premises for a wide variety
of opinions that were not necessarily liberal. The liberalising effect of
the Internet was most evident among globalised elites, well-educated,
rational, cosmopolite citizens, and those aspiring to liberal values in the
developing world. However, as a mass technology available to every
citizen in the world with access to a computer or a smartphone, the virtual
world can also be shaped by very different actors.
As Larry Diamond noted a decade ago, “even in the freest environ-
ments, the new digital means of information and communication have
important limits and costs… The proliferation of online media has not
uniformly improved the quality of public deliberation, but rather has
given rise to an “echo chamber” of the ideologically like-minded egging
each other on.”33 Radical, populist, illiberal voices on both sides of the
political spectrum, with little chance of setting agendas through tradi-
tional representation, have found the Internet a perfect ideological tool.
While mainstream politicians and political parties were slow in exploring
the possibilities of online communication, illiberal movements were early
adopters. The emergence of illiberal movements has rational explanations
but it is doubtful whether they would have had such an impact on the
wider public without the Internet. Examples of both Trump and pro-
Brexit campaigners demonstrate the malicious side of online media and
its potential to empower illiberal movements.
Major tech corporations have often been blamed for the rise of digital
illiberalism. After all, they created the infrastructure through which states
gather data and illiberal regimes and movements spread hatred and fake
news. Considering the Internet is largely unregulated, Big Tech was free
to set the rules and norms to their advantage with minimal public control.
The evolution of regulatory regimes across the world, with the noticeable
example of the EU and its General Data Protection Regulations (GDRP)
implemented in 2018, have made some difference but haven’t stopped
illiberal forces from exploiting the open nature of the Internet.

32 Billy Perigo, “The Capabilities Are Still There. Why Cambridge Analytica Whistle-
blower Christopher Wylie Is Still Worried”, Time (8 October 2019), https://time.com/
5695252/christopher-wylie-cambridge-analytica-book/ (Accessed 10 August 2022).
33 Diamond, “Liberation Technology”, p. 80.
 1 DIGITAL ILLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION … 17

Big Tech didn’t have all these political dilemmas in mind when it
evolved into the digital universe. The main goal of these companies was
and remains profit. Facebook and Twitter were not created for propa-
ganda and the spread of fake news. As David Runciman argues; “The
architects of the system are stumbling across the pitfalls with the rest of
us… It is just a side effect of being in the advertising business.”34 In
the end, the corporations were handmaids in shaping both digital liber-
alism and digital illiberalism. According to Francis Fukuyama “network
economies guarantee that the power to distribute or supress information
becomes concentrated in the hands of just two or three gigantic internet
platforms.”35 This shows once again that institutions designed to enhance
market efficiency and reduce transaction costs can be used for coercive
needs.36
All this leads to the broader question of why the Internet and
social media have made liberal democracies more vulnerable rather than
strengthening them. Traditional media in liberal societies has to a certain
degree been subject to the public interest, regulations and ethical codes.
By contrast, the anarchic virtual world is a perfect breeding ground for
a cacophony of voices, competing narratives and partisanship. As Anne
Applebaum notes, “the social media algorithms themselves encourage
false perceptions of the world.”37 Algorithms have the ability to radi-
calise those who use them and favour primitive emotions like anger and
fear because emotions keep people online. Recent revelations by Face-
book whistle blower Frances Haugan show that the corporation knew its
algorithms were fuelling polarisation, hate speech and misinformation.38
Still, the underlying problem of digital illiberalism is not Big Tech,
populist politicians or illiberal movements per se. Rather it is the changing
nature of democracy and the way that politics is made in the digital era.

34 David Runciman, How Democracy Ends (Profile Books: 2019), p. 158.

35 Francis Fukuayama, Liberalism and Its Discontents (Profile Books: 2022), p. 104.
36 Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global
Networks Shape State Coercion”, International Security, 44:1 (2019), pp. 46–47.
37 Anne Applebaum, Twilight of Democracy. The Failure of Politics and the Parting of
Friends (Allen Lane: 2020), p. 113.
38 Loveday Morris, Elizabeth Dwoskin & Hamza Shaban, “Whistleblower Testimony
and Facebook Papers Trigger Lawmaker Calls for Regulation”, The Washington Post (25
October 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/25/facebook-
papers-live-updates/ (Accessed 25 January 2022).
18 P. KANEVSKIY

Whereas traditional representative democracy was meant to work through

discussion and compromise, democracy in the digital era is built on the
short-term desires, fears and biases of the electorate. The Internet with
its data-harvesting machines, online advertising and social media algo-
rithms, is a perfect environment for quick decisions and what people see
as quick solutions. Brexit was based on the idea of a quick solution to a
range of complicated challenges, just like the election of Donald Trump.
Populists and illiberal politicians build their agendas on short-lived occa-
sions rather than long-term visions. This tendency is also spreading to
mainstream centrists. Digital democracy is not necessarily equal to digital
liberalism, because participation and political perceptions work differently
in the virtual universe, not always in the name of reason, respect of norms
and basic liberal values.

What Is to Be Done?
There is no simple solution to the problem of digital illiberalism. It
will require a lot of work from political elites as well as a politically
conscious public. The core task is to harness digital technologies again
for democratisation. One example is a wave of deliberative democracy,
a form of democracy that is based on public consultation with citi-
zens, that continues to gain momentum across the globe. One of the
leading researchers in this area, Hélène Landemore, argues that citi-
zens’ assemblies and juries have become vivid examples of how the direct
participation of citizens can make policies more informed, efficient and
legitimate.39 Today’s political deliberation extensively relies on online
technologies with the trend becoming particularly evident in the wake
of the COVID-19 pandemic.40 Citizens’ assemblies have great potential
to channel public activity into meaningful decision-making and connect
it to representative democracy. Apart from that, online voting spreading
from Canada to Estonia is used to help politicians decide on key issues
of local communities. Big data and machine learning can also be used to
scan social problems and improve feedback loops rather than be exploited
solely for the sake of successful political campaigns.

39 Hélène Landemore, Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First
Century (Princeton University Press: 2020), p. 272.
40 Claudia Chwalisz, “The Pandemic Has Pushed Citizen Panels Online”, Nature, 589
(2021), p. 171.
 1 DIGITAL ILLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION … 19

Changing the nature of social media requires more sophisticated

responses. Combating fake news and fact checking are good starting
points that are already high on the agenda. The problem is that they
haven’t prevented polarisation and cognitive biases. The example of the
United States shows that citizens tend to interpret political issues through
a partisan perspective and use the term “fake news” when “referring to
information uncongenial to one’s own beliefs.”41 As Francis Fukuyama
argued “the Internet has allowed people to mistake speech acts for acts
that affect outcomes in the real world… This is not to say that social
media cannot lead to meliorative outcomes in the real world. Most
people, however, are satisfied with the simulacrum of reality that they
get through their online interactions.”42 To change such attitudes would
mean changing the way people see the Internet as a tool of responsible
political actions based on norms of civil society, verification of information
as well as respect for private opinions and zones of privacy. Recalibrating
corporate algorithms is another vector but that would require a lot of
work from lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic as well as public discus-
sion on forms and limits of regulation. GDPR is a great example of data
protection, however, it is necessary to watch carefully that GDPR’s safe-
guards do not compromise freedom of speech that is already endangered
in such EU countries as Hungary or Poland.43
In illiberal countries the situation is more one-dimensional. Digital
illiberalism is rooted in the nature of such political regimes. Bureaucracies
and special services tend to interfere much deeper into the digital space
seeing it as a potential threat to the stability of the state. In countries like
China and Russia governments control what their citizens can and cannot
see online and shrink and destroy the space for independent thought on
the Internet.44 “Sovereign Internet” approaches won’t reverse to a more

41 Chau Tong, Hyungjin Gill, Jianing Li, Sebastián Valenzuela & Hernando Rojas,
“Fake News Is Anything They Say!”—Conceptualization and Weaponization of Fake News
Among the American Public”, Mass Communication and Society, 23:5 (2020), p. 760.
42 Fukuayama, Liberalism and Its Discontents, pp. 112–113.
43 Nani Jansen Reventlow, “Can the GDPR and Freedom of Expression Coexist?”,
AJIL Unbound, 114 (2020), p. 34.
44 Yaqiu Wang, “In China, the ‘Great Firewall’ Is Changing a Generation”, Politico.com
(9 January 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/01/china-great-
firewall-generation-405385 (Accessed 10 August 2022); John Thornhill, “Russia’s Digital
Iron Curtain Will Fail”, Financial Times (10 March 2022), https://www.ft.com/con
tent/26e88a2b-c7ba-46c7-8191-490188f4757b (Accessed 10 August 2022).
20 P. KANEVSKIY

open digital political culture unless pushed by political transformations

from the inside.
The underlying issue is how the Internet could be governed to remain
part of the liberal order and to reduce the risks of descending into greater
illiberalism. The biggest dilemma is that Internet governance has two
faces; one of a democratic nature and another of a coercive and manipu-
lative one. Both digital liberalism and illiberalism are rooted in the global
web’s open nature. The absence of clear rules and norms has created a
vacuum that was filled by radical populists of all kinds, private corporate
interests and illiberal regimes, and it allowed governments and political
parties to exploit unregulated flows of big data.
That leads to the next question: Who should be responsible for
creating a more structured, understandable and legitimate set of rules?
Illiberal states would obviously want a more multilateral approach like
the revival of the ITU mandate, but that would most likely legalise and
legitimise the partition of the Internet along geopolitical and ideological
lines. One possible answer is that the current deregulated regime with
ICANN at its core should be reformed. Internet governance should be a
multi-stakeholder process with international civil society having more of a
voice within the regulatory mechanism. That also requires a more robust
action from politicians, lawmakers and civil societies across the world
who should acknowledge the risks of the Internet remaining an informal
and therefore highly politicised space. That requires a lot of balancing
because giving too much regulative power to national governments will
only further depreciate its original liberal nature. Whether through the
comprehensive reform of ICANN or the creation of new institutions, we
need to make sure that any new attempt to regulate the Internet and the
way information is spread online doesn’t undermine basic freedoms and
is used for the benefit of liberal democracy.

Conclusion
The connection between digital liberalism and illiberalism is ambiguous
because the Internet itself is both a liberation technology and technology
of control. Realistically it is hard to disconnect one from another. The
biggest challenge in dealing with digital illiberalism is the open and dereg-
ulated nature of the Internet. The Internet is different from information
technologies of the past because it potentially gives every citizen and
social group the power to shape public opinion and influence political
 1 DIGITAL ILLIBERALISM AND THE EROSION … 21

actions. Platforms of digital communication allow the spread of any kind

of information and disinformation, but their strengths are easily turned
into weaknesses; they are vulnerable to excessive control and manipula-
tion. Reversing digital illiberalism will require a new approach to Internet
governance, to the ways social media algorithms are organised, and to the
Internet’s function in a modern democracy. At the same time digital illib-
eralism is not the cause but the effect of the larger illiberal wave in the
Euro-Atlantic community and beyond that has deep roots in economic,
demographic, political and cultural shifts across the globe. If and when the
liberal international liberal order is fixed and the next global wave of liber-
alisation arrives digital illiberalism will not fade away completely but it can
at least lose its current impact. The power of the Internet lies in its ability
to open the way to critical thinking, to accelerate economic and social
development, to build cultural, economic and political ties among groups
and nations, to break stereotypes, and to foster the spread of democratic
ideas. This is why any attempt to introduce more regulation in the digital
sphere requires careful treatment. An overregulated Internet will not solve
the problems of the liberal order but likely make things worse.
 CHAPTER 2

The Emergence of E-participation Tools:

Strengthening Democracy Through Inclusive
Debates

Julia Berghofer

Introduction
Direct democracy is not part of the political process in most countries,
which is one reason why participation in the public political discourse
for citizens who are not part of the political establishment is traditionally
limited. This can lead to discontent with citizens who do not have access
to these debates. Likewise, the bureaucratic process around some available
tools is complex and may lead to lesser engagement. However, leaders in
countries like Germany have started to understand that broader and more
inclusive participation by citizens can contribute to strengthen demo-
cratic structures and the legitimacy of the decision-making processes.
E-participation, whose “tools and approaches are constantly evolving

J. Berghofer (B)
European Leadership Network (ELN), London, UK
e-mail: juliab@europeanleadershipnetwork.org
Younger Generation Leaders Network (YGLN), Berlin, Germany

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 23

Switzerland AG 2023
J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies
in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_2
24 J. BERGHOFER

parallel to new technologies and the digitalization of various services”1 is

an effective way to increase the inclusivity of participation. Thanks to the
availability and widespread reach of digital technologies—the use of social
media platforms, videoconferencing, etc.—in most parts of the world it
offers an opportunity for engaging a larger part of the citizenship in policy
processes.
Given the limitations of this contribution it is not possible to provide
a holistic assessment of e-participation tools. Therefore, an assessment
of the strengths and weaknesses of three specific initiatives—the Dialog
Endlagersicherheit, the Bürgerrat—Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt, and
the Bundestag’s (public) e-petition platform—is used to exemplify the
opportunities and challenges linked to e-participation tools from the view-
point of their reach, their contribution to the decision-making process
and user-friendliness. These initiatives have been selected because of their
popularity and relevance. They have certain aspects in common and other
aspects in which they differ. Their commonality is the timeliness of their
respective focal area; the concreteness of their output; a combination of
online and offline activities. The aspects where they partly differ are the
scope of participation and inclusiveness; the level of provision of informa-
tion; the ability of participants to take part in consultations; possibilities
for active participation; the accessibility of the tools provided by the
conveners; their timeline; and concrete outcomes.
The chapter begins by providing information on the concept of e-
participation as a tool to support e-government and enhance digital
democracy. Subsequently, it will look at Germany’s overall performance
in e-participation and e-government, before examining the three initia-
tives mentioned above and their respective approach. In the final section,
the chapter will provide some thoughts on the effectiveness of these
approaches based on principles laid down by the research services of the
United Nations (UN) and the European Parliament (EP).

1 Lita Akmentina, “E-participation and Engagement in Urban Planning: Experiences

from the Baltic Cities”, Urban Research & Practice (2022). https://doi.org/10.1080/
17535069.2022.2068965.
 2 THE EMERGENCE OF E-PARTICIPATION TOOLS: … 25

E-participation: Definition
and the Situation in Germany
The 2020 E-Government Survey, published by the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA),2 defines e-
participation as both a subfield of participation and part of e-government,
the latter being one component of the broader framework of digital
democracy. More precisely, the UN study, describing itself as the “only
global report that assesses the e-government development status of all
United Nations Member States”,3 refers to e-participation as a concept
that “revolves around the use of information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) to engage people in public decision-making, administration
and service delivery”. Alongside pointing out the “intrinsic and instru-
mental value” of this specific form of participation, the publication also
highlights the importance of e-participation for the implementation of the
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In particular, target 16.74
of the UN SDGs calls for ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory, and
representative decision-making at all levels.5
The intrinsic value, the report further explains, “is based on the idea
that participation (…) is a desirable goal because it contributes to inclu-
sive societies”, while the instrumental value lies in “the role it can play
in increasing government accountability, making public services more
responsive to people’s needs, and improving the quality of policies and

2 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government

Survey 2020”, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Docume
nts/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Report).pdf
(accessed 27 July 2022).
3 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey
2020”, see section “About this Survey”.https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Por
tals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%
20(Full%20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
4 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government
Survey 2020”, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Docume
nts/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Report).pdf
(accessed 27 July 2022).
5 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, SDG Indicators, https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?Text=&Goal=16&
Target=16.7 (accessed 27 July 2022).
26 J. BERGHOFER

legislation”.6 According to the concept laid out by the E-Government

Survey, the core elements of e-participation as an intersection of partici-
pation and e-government are: provision of information, consultation, and
decision-making.7
This approach cannot be seen as a general definition. In a 2016 study
on the “Potential and Challenges of E-Participation in the European
Union”, the European Parliament states that the term e-participation
“suffers from a lack of an all-inclusive definition, as it comprises a
wide range of initiatives”.8 According to this paper, there is neverthe-
less a “general consensus” that it comprises the following interactions
between governments and citizens: e-information, e-consultation, and e-
decision-making.9 Macintosh/Whyte (2008) are using a similar “working
definition” when describing e-participation along the lines of provision of
information, the engagement of citizens through government-led initia-
tives (“top-down”), as well as efforts to empower citizens and civil society
to reach out to their elected representatives (“ground-up”).10 For the
purpose of this chapter—which is not aimed at finding a new defini-
tion—the working definitions provided by the EP and the UN, which also
align with the Macintosh/Whyte definition, will be used. In this sense, e-
participation can be broadly defined as a combination of three aspects: (i)
the provision of information, (ii) consultation of citizens, and (iii) engage-
ment of citizens in the decision-making process through digital means
(which does not exclude a combination of digital and offline tools as will
be shown later in this chapter).

6 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey

2020”, see Chapter 5 “E-Participation”, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/
Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20S
urvey%20(Full%20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
7 Ibid.
8 European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, “Potential and Chal-
lenges of E-Participation in the European Union”, (2016), https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556949/IPOL_STU(2016)556949_EN.pdf (accessed
27 July 2022).
9 Ibid.
10 Ann Macintosh and Whyte, Angus, “Towards an Evaluation Framework for ePar-
ticipation.” Transforming Government People Process and Policy, 2:1 (2008). https://doi.
org/10.1108/17506160810862928.
 2 THE EMERGENCE OF E-PARTICIPATION TOOLS: … 27

Besides the lack of clear definition of the term “e-participation”,

there are also no clear benchmarks as to what defines “successful” e-
participation tools. Taking the UN and EP publications as a basis,
responsiveness of governments to the needs of their citizens, account-
ability, inclusiveness/accessibility, and effectiveness appear to be dominant
aspects when it comes to assessing the success of e-participation initiatives.
The UN Survey ranks countries according to an E-Participation Index
(EPI) based on the features of national e-government portals. A summary
of these features provided by the study includes 14 points, starting with
the “[a]vailability of online information (on policies and budgets) in the
areas of education, health, social protection, employment, environment
and justice” and ending with “[e]vidence of Government’s publication of
outcomes of policy consultations online”.11 The countries assessed in the
UN publication have been allocated to four distinct EPI levels since 2016,
ranging from “low” to “middle”, “high”, and “very high” EPI values. In
2020, Germany ranks among the countries with a very high EPI level
according to the study,12 which indicates that most of the e-participation
features identified by the UN are present in Germany. Compared by
its E-Government Development Index (EGDI)—a measurement that
includes the Online Service Index (OSI), Telecommunications Infrastruc-
ture Index (TII), and Human Capital Index (HCI)—Germany is ranked
25, thus falling behind, inter alia, the Nordic countries, Estonia, the
UK, France, and the Netherlands. Compared to 42 other countries in
Europe that were assessed by the authors of the study, Germany’s perfor-
mance is therefore only moderately satisfactory. Although Germany still
holds a very high EDGI value (rating class V3—which equals 15 out
of 16 possible ranks), the survey states that “focusing on improvements
in online services provision could greatly accelerate progress in overall
e-government development”.
With regard to citizens’ preparedness to engage politically via online
tools, there have been only a few German-speaking studies published in

11 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey

2020”, see p. 118, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Doc
uments/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Repo
rt).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
12 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey
2020”, see p. 119, Table 5.1, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/ego
vkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%
20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
28 J. BERGHOFER

recent times. One insightful study on e-democracy has been conducted by

Germany’s digital association Bitkom.13 It was presented in September
2021, ahead of the general elections. The study investigates to what
extent citizens consume information about political topics online, whether
they appreciate online dialogue opportunities with politicians, and
whether there is appetite for more e-participation tools. According to
the study, while the younger generation is most likely to gather polit-
ical information online, there is a huge interest among almost half of
the respondents across all age groups to engage in an online dialogue
with politicians, thus implying a greater desire for active involvement.
Also, more than a third of the respondents have already tried out e-
participation tools, be it in a regional, federal, or European context. More
than half of the respondents would like to do so in the future. The
study also flags divergencies regarding the approval for e-participation in
different contexts: while 33% of the respondents have already engaged
in e-participation on a federal level, and 31% indicated an interest to do
so in the future, actual participation and interest is considerably lower
regarding the EU level (9% and 22%, respectively). The authors of the
study add that the higher engagement rate and interest with regard to
the federal level might be due to the availability of several existing tools,
for instance e-petitions.

Dialog Endlagersicherheit
The topic of Endlagersicherheit (repository safety) is one of the most
controversial themes in post-War Germany, as it is linked to another
contentious issue, nuclear energy. While there was some optimism in the
early days of nuclear energy, huge demonstrations in the 1970s and the
Chernobyl incident in 1986 have stirred more criticism among the popu-
lation.14 The Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats continued to
reassure the German public of the safety of nuclear power plants, while
in sharp contrast, the Green Party established itself as a key opponent of

13 Bitkom, “Bitkom stellt Studie zu E-Democracy vor”, (9 September 2021), https://

www.bitkom.org/Presse/Presseinformation/Bitkom-stellt-Studie-zu-E-Democracy-vor
(accessed 27 July 2022).
14 BUND, “AKW in Deutschland”, https://www.bund.net/themen/atomkraft/akw-in-
deutschland/ (accessed 27 July 2022).
 2 THE EMERGENCE OF E-PARTICIPATION TOOLS: … 29

atomic energy, and the Social Democrats slowly embarked on a similar

route.15
After more than a decade of hard struggle among opposing political
forces about a possible nuclear phase-out, the tragic reactor incident in
Fukushima in 2011 led to a rethinking among nuclear energy propo-
nents. The German government eventually decided to gradually eradicate
atomic energy. Chancellor Merkel, once known as “enthusiastic supporter
of nuclear energy”,16 made a remarkable “180-degree turn”17 when she
announced only four days after the incident plans for Germany to phase
out until 2022, adding in a public statement that “the world has changed
through Fukushima”.18 Her decision was backed by a broad majority in
the Bundestag. The incident also strengthened public mistrust against the
continued reliance on nuclear energy.19
However, identifying a final repository for spent nuclear fuel proved
a difficult issue to solve. Indeed, Germany has been struggling with the
problem of finding a final storage since the late 1970s. While the small
municipality of Gorleben in Lower Saxony has been treated as possible
long-term storage site, public resistance and protest marches have led to
a growing awareness among politicians that a top-down approach would
not be feasible and that an involvement of citizens might lead to increased

15 SWR2, “Bundestagsdebatte zu Tschernobyl und Atomkraft” (25 April 2022),

https://www.ardaudiothek.de/episode/archivradio-geschichte-in-originaltoenen/bundes
tagsdebatte-zu-tschernobyl-und-atomkraft/swr2/88310820/ (accessed 27 July 2022).
16 “Out of Control: Merkel Credibility with Nuclear U-Turn”, Der Spiegel (21
March 2011), https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/out-of-control-merkel-gam
bles-credibility-with-nuclear-u-turn-a-752163.html (accessed 27 July 2022).
17 NTV, “Merkel verteidigt 180-Grad-Wende in Atompolitik Schwarz-Gelb wirbt um
rot-grüne Zustimmung”, (15 March 2011), https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Schwarz-Gelb-
wirbt-um-rot-gruene-Zustimmung-article2850061.html (accessed 27 July 2022).
18 WDR, “15. März 2011 - Merkel verkündet Abkehr von Atomenergie”, (15
March 2021), https://www1.wdr.de/stichtag/stichtag-fukushima-merkel-abschaltung-
akw-atommoratorium-100.html (accessed 27 July 2022).
19 Deutschlandfunk, Endstation Fukushima, (25 November 2011), https://www.deu
tschlandfunk.de/endstation-fukushima-100.html (accessed 27 July 2022); for a more
detailed assessment of the loss of trust in atomic energy in Germany against the back-
ground of media framing, see Wolling, Jens (Ed.); Arlt, Dorothee (Ed.), “Fukushima
und die Folgen - Medienberichterstattung, Öffentliche Meinung, Politische Konse-
quenzen”, (2014), https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/49390/
49390_1.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 27 July 2022).
30 J. BERGHOFER

acceptance among the population.20 Gorleben today is no longer an

option, and the government is now planning to identify an alternative
by 2031.
Against this background, the Federal Ministry for Environment,
Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety, and Consumer Protection (BMUV)
ran the Dialog Endlagersicherheit from July to November 2019. The aim
was to comprehensively involve citizens as laid down in the Repository
Site Selection Act (Standortauswahlgesetz—StandAG)21 which entered
into force in 2017.22 The StandAG regulates the search for a suitable
repository site for highly radioactive waste in Germany. The first step
in the process consisted of further strengthening the security require-
ments of the StandAG through a new regulation.23 The BMUV involved
experts, relevant stakeholders as well as interested citizens without expert
knowledge in the in-person and virtual discussions about the new regula-
tion.
The website of the BMUV further explains the various steps of
the dialogue, starting in July 2019. The steps include, inter alia, an
online dialogue in August 2019 which preceded a public symposium in
September and the amendment of the StandAG in May 2020.24 In sum,
the entire dialogue process can be described as a combination of three
elements: (i) provision of information on the website (www.dialog-end
lagersicherheit.de): explanatory videos, information about relevant legis-
lation and other publications, and a specific youth module; (ii) virtual
consultation and active participation online: opportunity to comment
the regulation, virtual dialogue, submission of written statements, and;

20 DW, “Der lange Weg zum Atommüll-Endlager”, (28 September 2020), https://
www.dw.com/de/der-lange-weg-zum-atommüll-endlager/a-55080914 (accessed 27 July
2022).
21 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbrauch-
erschutz, “Dialog Endlagersicherheit”, https://www.bmuv.de/themen/bildung-beteil
igung/beteiligung/dialog-endlagersicherheit (accessed 27 July 2022).
22 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbraucher-
schutz “Endlagersicherheit: Der Weg zum sicheren Einschluss”, (August 2019), https://
www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Endlagerprojekte/endlagersich
erheit_bf.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
23 Ibid.
24 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbrauch-
erschutz, “Dialog Endlagersicherheit”, https://www.bmuv.de/themen/bildung-beteil
igung/beteiligung/dialog-endlagersicherheit (accessed 27 July 2022).
 2 THE EMERGENCE OF E-PARTICIPATION TOOLS: … 31

(iii) in-person consultation: symposium over two days in Berlin. The

final report25 of the BMUV published in the aftermath revealed some
interesting data: The website counts 5,530 visitors and 116 comments
to Articles 1 and 2 of the draft regulation that were under considera-
tion. Furthermore, the ministry reports almost 19,000 page views for the
online platform, alongside more than 1,600 downloaded materials, which
appears to be a high number.
From a technical perspective, the online platform seems to have been
easily accessible as the final report shows. The participants were able to
insert their comments directly into a text box next to the draft regulation
on the website. In addition, they were able to submit more comprehen-
sive written reactions via email, which happened in 24 cases. The process
was open to everyone and is described on the BMUV’s website as “low-
threshold”. However, the final report reveals that only 40 persons made
use of the opportunity to comment the regulation. The numbers are even
lower for the online dialogue which counted only four contributions.
After the Dialog ended, the BMUV collated the comments and reac-
tions submitted by the participants providing them for evaluation by
experts. Based on these evaluations, there have been some changes
to the draft regulation (Verordnung über Sicherheitsanforderungen und
vorläufige Sicherheitsuntersuchungen für die Endlagerung hochradioaktiver
Abfälle).26

Bürgerrat Demokratie
Unlike the Dialog Endlagersicherheit, which was designed to combine in-
person elements with e-participation tools, the second round of the Bürg-
errat —Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt (Citizens’ Assembly—Germany’s

25 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbrauch-

erschutz, “Schlussbericht: Dialog Endlagersicherheit”, (July 2020), https://www.bmuv.
de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Pools/Forschungsdatenbank/fkz_4718E03290_schlussber
icht_bf.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
26 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbrauch-
erschutz, “Verordnung des Bundesministeriums für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare
Sicherheit”, (6 April 2020), https://www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_
PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/19._Lp/endlsianf_verordnung/Entwurf/endlsianf_vo_refe_vero
rdnung_bf.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).
32 J. BERGHOFER

Role in the World)27 was moved into the virtual space as a response to the
pandemic. Initially, it was designed as a format in which participants meet
and discuss physically. Hence, the first round of the Bürgerrat took place
in the form of in-person gatherings. The project has been realised by the
initiative Mehr Demokratie e.V., which describes itself on its website as the
largest NGO for direct democracy globally, as well as “non-partisan and
charitable”, comprising 10,000 members and “informing 200,000”.28
Moving into the virtual space, the conveners of the discussion plat-
form brought together a group of 160 randomly selected citizens from
different socioeconomic and professional backgrounds via an online
platform. Over the course of ten meetings, the organisers provided partic-
ipants with detailed information on topics such as trade and EU, with
inputs by renowned experts like Timothy Garton Ash and Nicole Deit-
elhoff. Likewise, participants had the opportunity to actively engage and
debate during the video sessions.
The Bürgerrat started with a first “preparation” phase in the Autumn
of 2020. This phase was dedicated to drafting a working programme,
including a selection of topics, implementing institutes, parliamentary
groups of the Bundestag, and civil society organisations.29 This initial
process was accompanied by online discussion rounds with randomly
selected participants. The initiative came up with five focal areas: sustain-
able development, economy and trade, peace and security, democracy
and the rule of law, and the European Union. During the second of the
process,30 ten virtual meetings took place between January and February
2021, both in the form of plenary as well as working group sessions.
The discussions were supported by professional moderators and experts
who provided their insights as “living libraries”. During these meetings, of
which some have been live streamed, the participants worked on concrete
proposals in the five fields.

27 Bürgerrat, “Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt”, https://deutschlands-rolle.buergerra

t.de (accessed 27 July 2022).
28 Mehr Demokratie, “Profil von Mehr Demokratie e.V”, https://www.mehr-demokr
atie.de/ueber-uns/profil (accessed 27 July 2022).
29 Bürgerrat, “Phase 1: Preparation”, (Autumn 2020), https://deutschlands-rolle.bue
rgerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/preparation/ (accessed 27 July 2022).
30 Bürgerrat, “Phase 2: Meetings”, (January/February 2021), https://deutschlands-
rolle.buergerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/meetings/ (accessed 27 July 2022).
 2 THE EMERGENCE OF E-PARTICIPATION TOOLS: … 33

The third phase31 in March 2021 involved presenting the proposals

which were then published in a “Citizens’ Report”. The report has been
handed over to the President of the Bundestag and to parliamentary
groups. The final phase32 began in March 2021 and was dedicated to
“civil society monitoring” by which the organisers mean the process of
evaluating the implementation of the report’s recommendations through
continued discussions with parliamentarians. The list of the meetings is
long and reveals a high level of ambition: In April, the Bürgerrat has
presented its report to then-foreign minister Heiko Maas; in July, there
has been a discussion with the Bundestag Committee on Economic Coop-
eration and Development; in August, the group convened for workshops
at the Federal Academy for Security Policy and the Chancellor’s Office,
to name but a few.
The Bürgerrat initiative is characterised by a high level of profession-
alism, a creative website, and a coherent agenda. The access, however, was
restricted since the project was only open to 160 selected participants.
Since the agenda of the Bürgerrat was much broader than the Dialog
Endlagersicherheit, it offered a wider scope for deliberation, consultation,
and exchange of ideas between participants in an online format. While the
aim of the Dialog was to work on a very specific regulation with a narrow
focus, the Bürgerrat was more about developing visions and a larger set
of recommendations on Germany’s future role in the world. At the same
time, both processes can be described as result oriented.

(Public) E-Petitions
The UN E-Government Survey 2020 notes that while the use of e-
participation tools continues to spread over more countries, there is
also “a trend towards multi-function participation platforms”,33 which

31 Bürgerrat, “Phase 3: Handover to the Bundestag”, (March 2021), https://deu

tschlands-rolle.buergerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/handover-to-the-bundestag/ (accessed
27 July 2022).
32 Bürgerrat, “Phase 4: Implementation Phase”, from March 2021 on, https://deutsc
hlands-rolle.buergerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/implementation-phase/ (accessed 27 July
2022).
33 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey
2020”, see Executive summary, p. xxx, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Por
tals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%
20(Full%20Report).pdf, (accessed 27 July 2022).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of A little gipsy lass
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.

Title: A little gipsy lass

A story of moorland and wild

Author: Gordon Stables

Illustrator: W. Rainey

Release date: September 29, 2023 [eBook #71755]

Language: English

Original publication: Edinburgh: W. & R. Chambers, Limited, 1907

Credits: Al Haines, Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LITTLE

GIPSY LASS ***
The girl simply lifted the latch and entered without ceremony.
LASS. Page 20.

A Little Gipsy Lass

A STORY OF MOORLAND AND WILD

By

GORDON-STABLES, M.D., C.M., R.N.

Author of
'Peggy M'Queen,' 'The Rover Caravan,' &c.

WITH SIX ILLUSTRATIONS

by

William Rainey

LONDON: 47 Paternoster Row

W. & R. CHAMBERS, LIMITED
EDINBURGH: 47 Paternoster Row
1907

Edinburgh:
Printed by W. & R. Chambers, Limited.
 CONTENTS.
CHAPTER PAGE
I. LOTTY LEE 1
II. HOW ANTONY HAPPENED TO BE THERE 11
III. IN GIPSY CAMP AND CARAVAN 18
IV. 'EVER BEEN AN INFANT PRODIGY?' SAID LOTTY 34
V. THE QUEEREST SHOW.—A DAY IN THE WILDS 47
'THERE IS THAT IN YOUR EYE WHICH CRONA
VI. LOVES' 59
VII. POOR ANTONY WAS DROWNING! 69
VIII. THE MYSTERY OF THE MERMAN 79
IX. 'THE NEW JENNY WREN' 90
X. A LETTER AND A PROPOSAL 99
XI. BLOWN OUT TO SEA 111
XII. 'OUT YONDER, ON THE LEE BOW, SIR' 121
XIII. ON BOARD THE 'NOR'LAN' STAR' 132
XIV. A LITTLE STRANGER COMES ON BOARD 142
XV. 'I WANT TO DREAM THAT DREAM AGAIN' 154
XVI. SAFELY BACK TO ENGLAND 163
XVII. LIFE ON THE ROAD IN THE 'GIPSY QUEEN' 172
XVIII. SNOW-BOUND IN A MOUNTAIN-LAND 182
XIX. SPORTING-TIME IN WOODS AND WILDS 193
XX. IN THE DARK O' THE NEAP 204
XXI. THE WRECK OF THE 'CUMBERLAND' 214
XXII. THE AMBITIONS OF CHOPS JUNIOR 226
XXIII. 'WELL, CHOPS, TO RUN AWAY' 236
XXIV. 'I SAVED IT UP FOR A RAINY DAY' 248
XXV. 'WE'VE GOT A LITTLE STOWAWAY HERE, GUARD' 260
XXVI. THAT CROOKED SIXPENCE 272
XXVII. 'GAZE ON THOSE SUMMER WOODS' 283
XXVIII. 'HO, HO, HO! SET HIM UP' 290
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE
The girl simply lifted the latch and entered without ceremony Frontispiece.
Then that huge brown bear began to dance 50
He found himself in the water next moment ... with the Jenny
Wren on her side 71
And they had special tit-bits which they took from her hands 92
Presently the black hull of the bark was looming within fifty
yards over her 129
'Father, father,' she cried, 'I cannot, will not do this' 224
 BOOKS FOR GIRLS

By May Baldwin.

MYSIE: A Highland Lassie 5/-

With Eight Illustrations by A. S. Boyd.
PEG'S ADVENTURES IN PARIS 5/-
With Eight Illustrations by W. Rainey.
THE SUNSET ROCK 5/-
With Eight Illustrations by Harold Copping.
DORA: A High School Girl 3/6
With Six Illustrations by Mabel L. Attwell.
THE GIRLS OF ST GABRIEL'S 3/6
With Six Illustrations by Percy Tarrant.
THAT AWFUL LITTLE BROTHER 3/6
With Six Illustrations by Chas. Pears.
SIBYL; or, Old School Friends 3/6
With Six Illustrations by W. Rainey.
A PLUCKY GIRL; or, The Adventures of 'Miss Nell.' 3/6
With Six Illustrations by Jessie Macgregor.
A POPULAR GIRL; or, Boarding School Days 3/6
With Six Illustrations by Jessie Wilson.
THAT LITTLE LIMB 2/-
With Four Illustrations by Mabel L. Attwell.

W. & R. Chambers, Limited, London and Edinburgh.

A Little Gipsy Lass.

 CHAPTER I.

LOTTY LEE.

T HE young man stood on the deserted platform of the small, north-

country station, just where the train had left him, on that bright August
evening. Yonder she was speeding east-wards against the breeze.
Against the breeze, and along towards the cliffs that o'erhung the wild,
wide sea, the end of the last carriage gilded with the rays of the setting sun,
the smoke streaming backwards and losing itself over the brown-green
woods that stretched away and away till lost in a haze at the foot of the
hills.
He hailed a solitary porter.
'This isn't a very inviting station of yours, Tom, is it?'
'An awful good guess at my name, sir,' said the man, saluting.
'Your name is Tom, then?'
'No, sir—George,' he smiled. 'But any name does; and as for the station,
weel, it's good enough in its way. We only tak' up or pit doon by signal. But
you'll be English, sir?'
'That's it, George; that's just it. I'm only English. But, so far, I am in luck;
because I understand your talk, and I thought everybody here ran about raw,
with kilts on and speaking in Scotch.'
'So they do, sir, mostly; but I've been far south myself. No, sir, no left-
luggage room here; but if you're going to the inn I'll carry your
portmanteau, though ye'll no' find much accommodation there for a
gentleman like yourself. Besides, it's the nicht of the fair, and they'll be
dancin' and singin' in the road till midnicht.'
'But,' said the stranger, 'I'm bound for Loggiemouth, if I can only find the
way. I'm going to a gipsy encampment there—Nat Lee's or Biffins'. You
know Nat Lee?'
'Well, and curly-headed Lotty too. But, man, you'll have ill findin' your
road over the moor the nicht. It's three good Scotch miles, and your
portmanteau's no' a small weight—a hundred and twenty pounds if an
ounce.'
 This young man, with the sunny hair, square shoulders, and bravely
chiselled English face, seized the bag with his left hand and held it high
above his head, much to the admiration of the honest porter.
'You're a fine lad, sir,' said the latter. 'An English athlete, no doubt. Weel,
we all love strength hereabouts, and Loggiemouth itself can boast of bonny
men.'
'Here!' cried the stranger abruptly, as he looked to the west and the sun
that was sinking like a great blood-orange in the purple mist of the
woodlands, 'take that portmanteau, George, in your own charge. I suppose
you live somewhere?'
'I'll lock it up in the lamp-room, sir. It'll be safe enough there.'
'Well, thanks; and to-morrow I'll either stride over for it myself or send
some one. Now, you'll direct me to the camp, won't you?'
'Ay, ay, sir, and you've a good stick and a stout heart, so nothing can
come o'er ye. But what way did nobody meet you, sir?'
'Nat Lee said he would send some one, but—hallo! who is this?'
She ran along the platform hurriedly but smiling—a little nervously
perhaps, blinking somewhat moreover, for the sun's last beams lit up her
face and eke her yellow hair. Her colour seemed to rise as she advanced.
Blushing? No. Lotty Lee was barely twelve.
'Oh, please, sir, are you Mr Blake?'
'I am. And you?'
'Me? I'm only Lotty Lee, and that's nobody. But father sent me to meet
you, and lead you home to our pitch across the Whinny Moor. You couldn't
find the way by yourself, never, never, never!'
'Good-night, sir.—Good-night, Miss Lotty,' cried the porter, throwing the
portmanteau on his shoulder and marching off with it.
'Well,' said the young fellow, 'I have a sweet little guide anyhow; but are
you sure that even you can find the way yourself, Lotty?'
'Oh yes, Mr Blake, please.'
Hers was a light, musical, almost bird-like laugh.
She tossed back her head a little, and all those impossible little crumply
curls caught by the evening breeze went dancing round her brow and ears.
'If you have any—any big thing, I will carry it for you, sir.'
 It was his turn to laugh now. 'Why, Lotty,' he said, 'I shouldn't wonder if
I had to carry you before we get to camp.'
'Come,' she answered, with an uneasy glance at the west. She took his
hand as if he'd been a blind man. 'Father said I was to lead you, sir.'
'But I don't think he meant it in so literal a sense, Lotty. I think I can see
for quite half an hour yet.'
He kept that warm hand in his, nevertheless. So on they went, chatting
together gaily enough now, for she did not seem a bit afraid of her tall
companion.
'I would have been here much sooner, you know, but Wallace followed
me. Wallace is a very naughty boy sometimes, and father doesn't like him to
be out of camp at nights.'
'And where is the young gentleman now?'
'Oh, I had to take him back, and that is what kept me.'
It was getting early dark to-night, and one great star was already out in
the east. Whinny Moor was beginning to look eerisome enough. The
patches of furze that everywhere hugged the ground were like moving
shapes of strange and uncanny antediluvian monsters, and here and there
stood up the dark spectre of a stunted hawthorn-tree waving black arms in
the wind as if to forbid their approach.
Sometimes they had to creep quite sideways through the bushes of
sturdy whins and bramble; sometimes the moor was more open, and here
and there were little lakes or sedgy ponds of silver sheen, where black
things swam or glided in and out among the rustling rushes. Flitter-mice
darted over their heads or even between them, and from the forest now and
then came the doleful cry of the great barn-owl.
'On the whole,' said young Blake, 'I'm glad you came, Lotty. I doubt if
ever I could have made my way across this moor.'
'Nor through the forest yonder. Ah! the forest is much worse, Mr Blake.'
'Dark and dismal, I suppose?'
'It is dark; I don't know about dismal, Mr Blake. But I know all the road
through this moor; because when things come to the station father often
sends me for them.'
'At night?'
 'Oh yes, often at night. Only, there is a little winding path through among
the pine-trees, and one day Chops went in daylight and marked all the trees
in white paint for me. But father thrashed him for it, because white paint is
one of the show properties, and we mustn't waste the properties. But I cried
for Chops.'
'And who is Chops, Lotty?'
'Oh, Chops is the fat boy; he is a property himself, but nobody could
waste him.'
'No?'
'No; and Chops is fifteen, you know, and so good and so fond of me; but
he is so fat that he can't look at you, only just blinks over his cheeks. But
Chops is so kind to me—quite loves me. And so does Wallace. But I love
Wallace better than anybody else, and everybody else loves Wallace.'
'And Wallace and everybody love Lotty, I'm sure of that.'
'Oh, Wallace loves me, and would die for me any day. But, of course,
everybody doesn't. I'm only just a property, you know.'
'But your father and mother?'
Frank Antony Blake felt the small, soft hand tremble in his.
'There is no mother, sir. Never was a mother in my time. But father'——
The child was crying—yes, and sobbing—as if her heart would break.
Then, though Frank Antony was tall and strong for his eighteen years, he
didn't really know what to do with a girl who burst into tears at night on a
lonesome moor. He could remember no precedent. It mightn't be correct, he
thought, to take her in his arms and kiss her and try to soothe her, so he
merely said, 'Never mind, Lotty; never mind. It is sure to come all right
somehow.'
For the life of him, however, he couldn't have told you what was wrong
or what there was to come right. In the fast-waning light Lotty looked up at
him ever so sadly, and he could not help noticing now what he had not
noticed before—Lotty was really a beautiful child.
'You talked to me so kindly like,' she said, 'and hardly anybody does that,
and—and that was it. Don't talk to me kindly again, sir, ever, ever, ever!'
He patted her hand.
 'That's worse,' said Lotty, feeling she wanted to cry again, and she drew
the hand away. 'You'll have me crying again. Speak gruff to me, as others
do, and call me "Lot!"'
But at that moment Antony had a happy inspiration. He remembered that
in his big coat-pocket he had a large box of assorted chocolates, and here
close by on a bare part of the moor was a big white stone.
'Come,' he cried, 'there is no great hurry, and I'm going to have some
chocolates. Won't you, Lot?'
Down he sat on the big white stone, and Lotty stood timidly in front of
him. But Antony would not have this arrangement, so he lifted her bodily
up—'how strong he is!' she thought—and seated her beside him, then threw
a big handful of the delicious sweets into her lap.
She was smiling now. She was happy again. It was not the chocolates
that worked the change; but the chance companionship of this youth of
gentle blood, so high above her, seemed to have wakened a chord long, long
untouched in that little harp of a heart of hers.
Was it but a dream, or had there been once a time, long—ever so long—
ago, when voices quite as pleasant and musical and refined as Antony's
were not strange to her? And had she not, when young—she was twelve
now, and that is so old—lived in a real house, with bright cushions on real
sofas, and lamps and mirrors and flowers everywhere? No, that must have
been a dream; but it was one she often dreamt while she swung by night in
her cot, as the winds rocked the caravan and lulled her to sleep.
The autumn evening was very beautiful now; bright stars were shining
so closely overhead that it seemed as if one could almost touch them with a
fishing-rod. Besides, a big, nearly round moon had managed to scramble up
behind the bank of blue clouds in the east—a big, fat face of a moon that
appeared to be bursting with half-concealed merriment as it blinked across
the moor.
It wasn't the lollies that had enabled Lotty to regain her good spirits; but
she felt quietly happy sitting here on the stone beside this newly found
friend. Oh yes, he was going to be a friend; she felt certain of that already.
Young though Lottie was, she had a woman's instinct. Perhaps she
possessed a woman's pride as well, though only in embryo; for she felt half-
ashamed of her awkward, bare brown legs that ended not in shoes but rough
sandals, and of the pretty necklace of crimson hips and haws that she had
strung for herself only yesterday.
They had been sitting in silence for some time, both thinking, I suppose,
when Lotty's keen ear caught the weary call of some benighted plover.
'They'll soon be away now!' she sighed, more to herself than to her
companion.
'What will soon be away, Lotty?'
'Oh, the plovers and the swallows and the greenfinches, and nearly all
my pretty pets of springtime, and we'll have only just the rooks and the
gulls left.'
Antony laid his hand on hers.
'Lotty loves the wild birds, then?'
'I—I suppose so. Doesn't everybody? I wish I could go south with the
birds in autumn, to lands where the flowers are always blooming.'
'Who knows what is before you, child!'
The child interested him.
'Look, Lotty, look!' cried Antony next moment; 'what on earth can that
be?'
He was genuinely startled. About two hundred yards from the place
where they sat a great ball of crimson-yellow fire, as big as a gipsy pot, rose
slowly, waveringly, into the air. It was followed by five others, each one
smaller than the one above it. They switched themselves towards the forest,
and one by one they went out.
'It is only will-o'-the-wisps,' said Lotty, 'and they always bring good
luck. Aren't you glad?'
'Very,' said Antony.
Then, hand in hand, as if very old acquaintances indeed, they resumed
their journey. And, as they got nearer and nearer to the forest, the tall pine-
trees, with brown, pillar-like limbs, grew higher and higher, and finally
swallowed them up.
 CHAPTER II.

HOW ANTONY HAPPENED TO BE THERE.

A NTONY BLAKE—or Frank Antony Blake, to give him the benefit of

his full tally—was the only son and heir-apparent of Squire Blake of
Manby Hall, a fine old mansion away down in Devonshire; thousands
of acres of land—no one seemed to know how many—rolling fields of
meadow-lands divided by hedgerows and waving grain, woods and wolds,
lakes and streams, and an upland of heath and fern that lost itself far away
on the nor'-western horizon.
The mansion itself, situated on a green eminence in the midst of the
well-treed old park, was one of the stately homes of England; and though
antique enough to be almost grim—as if holding in its dark interior the
secrets of a gloomy or mayhap tragic past—it was cheerful enough in
summer or winter; and from its big lodge-gates, all along its gravelled
avenues, the wheel-marks bore evidence that Manby Hall was by no means
deserted nor the squire very much of a recluse.
The gardens of this mansion were large enough to lose one's self in,
silent save for the song of birds, with broad green walks, with bush and tree
and flower, and fountains playing in the centre of ponds only and solely for
the sake of the waterfowl or the gold and silver fish that hid themselves
from the sunshine beneath the green, shimmering leaves of lordly floating
lilies, orange and white.
A rural paradise was Manby Hall. Acres of glass too, a regiment of semi-
silent gardeners, and a mileage of strong old walls around that were gay in
springtime and summer with creeping, climbing, trailing flowers of every
shape and shade.
If there was a single grim room in all this abode it was the library, where
from tawny, leather-bound shelves the mighty tomes of authors long dead
and gone frowned down on one, as one entered through the heavily draped
doorways.
Whisper it! But Antony was really irreverent enough to say one day to a
friend of his that this solemn and classic library was a jolly good billiard-
room spoiled.
 Anyhow, it was in this room that Frank Antony found himself one
morning. He had been summoned hither by his father.
The squire was verging on fifty, healthy and hard in face, handsome
rather, with hair fast ripening into gray.
'Ha, Frank, my boy! come forward. You may be seated.'
'Rather stand, dad. Guess it's nothing too pleasant.'
'Well, I sent for you, Frank'——
'And I'm here, dad.'
'Let me see now. You're eighteen, aren't you?'
'I suppose so, sir; but—you ought to know,' replied Antony archly.
'I? What on earth have I to do with it? At least, I am too busy a man to
remember the ages of all my children. Your mother, now, might; but then
your mother is a woman—a woman, Frank.'
'I could have guessed as much, dad. But as for "all" your children, father,
why, there are only Aggie and I. That comprises the whole lot of us; not
very tiresome to count, I reckon.'
'There! don't be quizzical, boy. I sent for you—er—I sent for you to—
to'——
'Yes, father, sent for me to—to'——
'I wish you to choose a career, you young dog. Don't stand there and to—
to at me, else I'll—I don't know what I mightn't do. But stand down, sir—I
mean, sit down—and you won't look so precious like a poacher.'
Antony obeyed.
'You see, lad, I have your interest at my heart. It is all very well being an
athlete. You're a handsome young fellow too—just like me when I was a
young fellow. Might marry into any county family. But cricket and football
and rowing stroke aren't everything, Frank, and it is high time you were
looking ahead—choosing your career. Well, well,' continued the squire
impatiently, 'have you nothing to say?'
'Oh yes,' cried Frank Antony, beaming now. 'I put that filly at a fence to-
day, father, and'——
'Hang the filly! I want you to choose a career; do you hear?'
'Yes, father.'
 'Well, I'm here to help you all I can. Let us see! You're well educated; too
much so for the Church, perhaps.'
'Not good enough anyhow, dad, to wear a hassock. Whew! I mean a
cassock.'
'Well, there are the civil and the diplomatic services.'
Antony shook an impatient head.
'And you're too old for the army. But—now listen, Frank. I expect your
eyes to gleam, lad, when I mention the term: a parliamentary career! Think
of it, lad; think of it. Just think of the long vista of splendid possibilities that
these two words can conjure up before a young man with the blood of a
Blake in his veins.'
Frank Antony did not seem at all impressed; not even a little bit.
'I'm afraid, father, I'm a lazy rascal,' he said, almost pitying the
enthusiasm which he himself could not appreciate. 'I'm not so clever as my
dear old dad, and I fear the House would bore me. Never could make a
speech either, so'——
'Speech!' roared the squire, 'why, you'll never be asked to. They wouldn't
let you. They'd cough you down, groan you down, laugh you down.
Besides, clever men don't make speeches nowadays—only the fools.'
Young Antony suppressed a yawn.
'Very good, my boy, very good!'—his dad was shaking hands with him
—'and I honour you for your choice. And I'm of precisely the same opinion.
There's nothing like a seat in the House.'
'Rather have one on the hillside though, daddy, all among the grouse.'
His father didn't hear him.
'And now, Frank, I'm not an ordinary father, you know; and, before
entering the House, I don't see in the least why you shouldn't have your
fling for a year or two. I maintain that all young fellows should have their
fling. A hundred years or so agone I had my fling. Look at me now. Am I
any the worse? Well, I've just put a bit in the bank for you, lad, so go and do
your best.'
Frank was laughing merrily.
He put his hand in what he called his rabbit-pocket and handed out a
book: The Gamekeeper at Home. 'That is my lay, dad,' he said. 'I only want
to potter around and fish and shoot, or hunt in season. Don't like London.
Hate Paris. Not at home in so-called society. I'll just have my fling in my
own humdrum fashion, daddy, thank you all the same. I'll have my fling,
depend upon it.'
The young man was smiling to himself at some recollection.
'What is it, Frank?'
'Only this, dad. The black keeper—Tim, you know—weighs two
hundred and twenty pounds. The other day he was stronger than I. I threw
him last eve—Cumberland. This morning I lifted him with my left and
landed him on the west side of the picket-fence. How's that for a fling,
daddy?'
'Go on, you young rogue. Listen, I hear Aggie calling you!'
'Oh, but you listen to me, father. I really don't see enough life down
here.'
'Well, there's London, my lad. London for life!'
'No, no! For the next few months, with your permission, I'm going to
live a life as free as a swallow's. I'm going on the road in my own house-
upon-wheels. I'll see and mingle with all sorts of society, high and low, rich
and poor. I'll be happy in spirit, healthy in body, and by the time I come
back my mind will be quite a storehouse of knowledge that will better fit
me for Parliament than all the lore in this great library, father.'
'You're going to take up with gipsies, Frank?'
'Be a sort of gip myself, daddy.'
'Bother me, boy, if there isn't something really good in the idea. But how
are you going to set about it? Build a caravan for yourself?'
'Not build one, father. Nat Biffins Lee—a scion of the old, old gipsy Lee,
you know—owns a real white elephant'——
'Bless my soul! is the lad going mad? You don't mean seriously to travel
the country with a real white elephant, eh?'
'You don't understand, daddy. This Nat Lee has a splendid house-upon-
wheels which belonged to the Duchess of X—— She went abroad, and Lee
has bought it. But as it needs three powerful horses to rattle it along, it is
quite a white elephant to Nat. So I'm going up north to Loggiemouth in
Nairnshire, and if I like it I'll buy it. Is it all right?'
'Right as rain in March, boy. Go when you like.'