Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Post-pandemic Governance in the Indo-Pacific Adapting USAID’s Strategy in the Face of

Covid-19
Author(s): Dan Runde, Conor Savoy and Shannon McKeown
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2020)
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 CSIS BRIEFS
Post-pandemic Governance in the Indo-Pacif ic
Adapting USAID’s Strategy in the Face of Covid-19

By Dan Runde, Conor Savoy, and Shannon McKeown SEPTEMBER 2020

THE ISSUE
■  In recent years, democracy has been under siege as its global appeal has waned, and authoritarian coercion and
pressure have risen.
■  The Covid-19 global pandemic will become yet another vehicle for great power competitors, such as China, to further
exacerbate existing democratic backsliding, corruption, and disinformation.
■  The Indo-Pacific region is important to U.S. interests and has been the subject of a number of U.S. government
approaches—specifically USAID’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, which outlines governance, security, and economic objectives
for the region. The effects of Covid-19 present additional challenges to the existing governance issues in the Indo-
Pacific and have implications for democracies in the region and abroad.

and stoke potential for spill-over effects to occur in other

INTRODUCTION
In the Indo-Pacific region, democracy is strongly established
in several countries and is taking root in others.1 Some of the
region’s democracies—Australia, Japan, Indonesia, Taiwan,
and New Zealand— have shown great resilience and progress
in combating Covid-19. The successful response to Covid-19
by established democracies in the Indo-Pacific provides a
powerful counterpoint to those who argue authoritarian
countries alone can manage this kind of external shock. This
should come as no surprise as the Indo-Pacific is the only
region that has seen recent overall improvements in freedom,
even as the last decade has seen global declines. The region’s
democracies have made significant progress in advancing
democratic values, even as they may differ in meaning, and
have even produced broad programming to support good
governance practices. An increasingly aggressive and assertive
China and the Covid-19 pandemic threaten to destabilize
these governance gains, which would disrupt weaker states
Indo-Pacific countries.
The Indo-Pacific region is an increasingly contested
geopolitical theater between China and the United States.
China’s efforts to undermine trust in democratic institutions
and promote an alternative form of government—
authoritarian capitalism—is a stark contrast to U.S.
democratic and free-market values. The U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) has developed a
multisectoral approach for the region under the Indo-Pacific
Strategy (IPS); however, the economic fallout and frustration
from Covid-19 threatens to disrupt several of the governance
objectives as part of the agency’s strategy. As a result,
USAID must adapt its strategy to better address the unique
challenges that the pandemic has created, including further
democratic backsliding, human rights abuses, corruption,
and malign foreign influence and disinformation. This brief
focuses on the role that USAID can play in promoting the

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governance pillar of the IPS, particularly in the wake of the
Covid-19 pandemic.
PRE-PANDEMIC U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD
THE INDO-PACIFIC
The United States has long been a leading power in the
Indo-Pacific region. Since the end of World War II, the
United States formalized its position through a series
of treaty relationships with South Korea, Japan, the
Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. The U.S. security
relationship with these countries is bolstered by its
deep and extensive economic relationships. China’s rise
as a global superpower and economic powerhouse has
prompted the United States to reemphasize the strategic
importance of the Indo-Pacific region, with Beijing seeking
to counter U.S. influence and undermine U.S. partner
relationships in the region. The Obama administration
laid the groundwork for the U.S. rebalance in Asia and the
Pacific by seeking to strengthen traditional alliances as
well as preexisting trade and economic ties.2 The Trump
administration has continued this shift in Indo-Pacific
priorities as it also views China’s geopolitical rise as a
direct threat to U.S. leadership in the region.
As China evolves into a globally driven, authoritarian
power, democracies in the region—both weak and
strong—face severe threats. China offers an alternative to
democratic, free-market principles by providing state-to-

Figure 1: Covid-19 Cases in the Indo-Pacific Region

Covid-19 Cases in Select Indo-Pacific Countries

(as of 08/28/2020)

Vietnam 1,038
Taiwan 487
Thailand 3,410
South Korea 19,077
Singapore 56,666
The Philippines 209,544
Papua New Guinea 453
Palau 0
New Zealand 1,714
Myanmar 628
Marshall Islands 0
Country

Maldives 7,329
Malaysia 9,306
Laos 22
Japan 66,499
Indonesia 165,877
India 3,387,500
Fiji 28
Federated States of Micronesia 0
China 89,814
Cambodia 273
Brunei 144
Bangladesh 306,794
Australia 25,448
0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 4,000,000

Cases
Non-democracy Democracy

Source: Ensheng Dong, Hongru Du, and Lauren Gardner, “An interactive web-based dashboard to track COVID-19 in real time,” The Lancet 20, no. 5 (May 1, 2020): 533–534,
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30120-1.
Source: Ensheng Dong, Hongru Du, and Lauren Gardner, “An interactive web-based dashboard to track COVID-19 in real time,” project on prosperity
The Lancet 20, no. 5 (May 1, 2020): 533–534, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30120-1. and development

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state lending, largely focused on infrastructure projects
that are desperately needed in developing countries, often
at record scale and speed. The nation has taken an indirect
approach to establish its “community of shared destiny”
through extensive peripheral diplomacy and infrastructure
development projects throughout the region, such as the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Expenditures for the BRI,
launched in 2013, are estimated to reach $1.2–$1.3 trillion
by 2027, mostly concentrated in Asia and the Pacific.3 The
BRI spans over 70 countries and has been likened to a
modern-day Silk Road.
Since the ascent of President Xi Jinping in 2013, China has
increased its diplomatic, military, and economic aggression
in the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing’s competitive economic
advantage targets developing countries, many of which are
weak or nascent democracies, and offers a “new option”
for countries looking to expedite economic development.
The Chinese government may not explicitly transform
democracies into autocracies; however, China frequently
works with autocratic leaders when it serves its interests.
President Xi has a particularly strong relationship with
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, and in June 2020,
he secured a statement of support from President Rodrigo
Duterte of the Philippines—both of whom are leaders that
have overseen democratic backsliding and increases in
autocratic measures in their own countries.4, 5 These close
relations also help solidify authoritarian leaders’ control, as
China often provides multipurpose technology, including
surveillance technology.
To respond to Chinese assertiveness, the U.S. government
has developed a new strategy for the region, which
stretches from India to the Pacific Islands and from
Northeast Asia to New Zealand.6 In November 2017,
President Trump outlined a “vision for a free and open
Indo-Pacific.”7 The 2017 National Security Strategy
identified the Indo-Pacific as a scene of “geopolitical
competition between free and repressive visions of
world order.”8 The United States Departments of State
and Defense, with contributions from USAID, have
since released their own strategy documents focused
on the Indo-Pacific, identifying three pillars to the
U.S. approach.9, 10 The governance pillar focuses on
transparency, respect for human rights, and democracy.
The economic pillar emphasizes the importance of
free trade and the role of governments in enabling
free-market enterprise. The security pillar seeks to
build a network of U.S. partners in the region to deter
adversaries, counter transnational crime, protect freedom
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of navigation, and preserve the environment. Partners
in the region have followed the United States’ lead with
their own concepts and policies for the region. Japan’s
Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, India’s Act East
Policy, Australia’s Indo-Pacific concept, the Republic
of Korea’s New Southern Policy, and Taiwan’s New
Southbound Policy are among the most prominent,
reaffirming regional support for U.S. principles.11
While China’s new ambitions and influence in the region
have taken grip in some countries, such as Cambodia, the
interagency Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative (IPTI),
announced by Vice President Michael Pence in 2018, seeks
to combat the rising pressure on the region’s democracies.
The IPTI seeks to “promote civil society, the rule of law,
and transparent and accountable governance in the Indo-
Pacific region.”12 The United States has established over 200
programs, totaling approximately $210 million annually in
IPTI programming. Some of the regional achievements of
USAID through this initiative include: increasing legal aid for
people from marginalized communities by more than tenfold
in Indonesia; supporting the authorization of nine laws to
improve the integrity of the electoral process in Nepal and;
launching a national plan to combat corruption and bribery
in Sri Lanka.
The work of USAID and other U.S. government agencies
under the Indo-Pacific Strategy focuses on strengthening
institutional and fiscal integrity, political and electoral
system integrity, and informational integrity, as well as
strengthening human rights and promoting social attitudes
that reinforce democratic systems. However, given the
Covid-19 pandemic, there is unprecedented pressure on
democratic systems globally and a disproportionate impact
on the most vulnerable and marginalized populations,
which makes the governance challenges in the Indo-Pacific
uniquely difficult.
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES FOR THE
INDO-PACIFIC IN THE FACE OF COVID-19
In early 2020, Covid-19 began to spread around the Indo-
Pacific region from its origin in China. While the primary
effects of the novel coronavirus have targeted health care
systems and economies, the pandemic has also exacerbated
existing governance challenges, such as democratic
backsliding, human rights abuses, pervasive corruption,
and malign foreign influence. Covid-19 has helped facilitate
authoritarianism by giving governments an excuse to impose
draconian measures that restrict movement and expression,
disempower local governments, limit public protests, increase
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invasive surveillance through contract tracing and mobile
apps, and delay elections. These measures have occurred
under the guise of public health concerns and have the
potential to erode civil society and public trust in the region
and beyond.
Many authoritarian governments lack the necessary
preconditions to establish an effective response to
Covid-19. Authoritarian powers often lack integrated
governance capable of imposing a consistent response on
all levels from the top to local levels. Covid-19 threatens
the legitimacy of authoritarian powers, as they have been
unable to send a message of strength, with some even
evading acknowledgment of the virus at all.13 As Covid-19
has threatened the trust, legitimacy, and power of
authoritarian regimes, many have responded to reinstate
this lost power, leveraging the crisis to double down on
suppressive restrictions that ultimately threaten the long-
term security and stability of their regime.
The increase in authoritarian norms and modes of governance
in the last decade is a growing global phenomenon and
a threat to U.S. national interests. While the Indo-Pacific
region’s established democracies are demonstrating
resilience, its newest and weakest democracies have seen
regression in civil liberties and political rights, particularly
from rising trends of autocracy, disinformation, political
coercion, human rights violations, and corruption.
The trends in the Indo-Pacific, along with China’s growing
regional influence, inhibit democratic consolidation and
threaten to undermine the great progress the United States
has made to promote the sovereignty and independence
of the region’s democracies. Democratic backsliding in the
region was a preexisting condition that will only worsen
because of the Covid-19 pandemic. In weak democracies,
opportunities for corruption will create the impression
that democratic governments and institutions are unable
to cope with the pressures created by the pandemic. This
will be further exacerbated by malign actors like China,
who will seek to spread disinformation through digital and
social media.
In response to the present reality, the U.S. government
must work with its partners in the region to prevent
further backsliding by emerging democracies. This
will require greater support for programs that build
transparency and accountability through strengthening
existing government institutions and mechanisms, greater
engagement with civil society, and a renewed emphasis on
upholding human rights and civil liberties.
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DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING
The Covid-19 pandemic is testing the resiliency of
democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Several government
leaders in the region have expanded their executive
authority, jailed political opponents, restricted freedom
of expression, delayed elections, and increased the role of
the military, which could have far-reaching (and possibly
long-term) consequences for the future of democracy in
the Indo-Pacific. The uncertain and chaotic nature of a
pandemic lends an easy justification to leaders who want
to centralize power. Suspending elections is easier to
explain when health and safety are at stake, and political
leaders can justify the need for military on the streets in
terms of preserving public health.
There are already plenty of examples of Covid-related
democratic backsliding in the region.14 In Sri Lanka, newly
elected President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a former army
officer, has appointed military officers to key posts in
government and has assigned them the role of enforcing
quarantines and overseeing Covid-19 contact tracing.15
President Rajapaska’s political party scored a parliamentary
majority victory on August 5, which could further
empower the government to crackdown on journalists and
expressions of freedom through its arrest of government
critics. According to Human Rights Watch, over 66,000
people have been arrested in Sri Lanka for allegedly
violating Covid-19 curfew requirements.16
In Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand, leaders have also
cracked down on political opponents and online critics.17
In the Philippines—a de facto democracy—journalists
operate in an already hostile environment and face potential
imprisonment for criticism of the government. The
suppression of press freedom and expression of dissent are
continuations of pre-Covid democratic backsliding. President
Rodrigo Duterte, in particular, has granted himself “special
temporary power.”18 The Philippines has imposed one of
the longest and most restrictive lockdowns in the region
after Duterte placed the entire country under “enhanced
community quarantine.”19 Reports estimate that over
30,000 people were arrested for violating quarantine in the
first month of the lockdown alone. In addition, the recent
conviction of journalist Maria Ressa for cyber libel, despite
a lack of evidence to support the charges and the closure of
ABS-CBN, the country’s largest broadcast network, illustrate
a continuation of the decline in media freedom since Duterte
took power in the Philippines.20
There is a chance that Covid-19 will punish ineffective
governments and reward those that have responded strongly
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to the virus. In the Indo-Pacific, democracies such as South
Korea, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia have
handled the pandemic well, but so has the one-party
state of Singapore and the one-party authoritarian regime
in Vietnam.21 Meanwhile, emerging democracies such
as the Philippines and Indonesia have mismanaged the
pandemic, and China’s handling of the virus remains mired
in controversy.22 The stark contrast of how democracies
in the region have successfully contained and responded
to Covid-19 compared to China, discredits China’s
propaganda that more centralized, authoritarian forms of
government are more adept to handling crises.
Despite its mishandling and attempted cover-up of
Covid-19 at the onset of the outbreak, China continues
to claim that it has dealt with the crisis more effectively
than other wealthy, developed democracies in the region.
China’s propaganda campaign praises the government
and its citizens’ response to Covid-19, with no mention
of bureaucratic troubles or efforts to initially hide the
virus outbreak.23 In claiming a triumph in its response to
Covid-19, China is positioning its authoritarian model of
governance in direct opposition to the response of Taiwan
and South Korea that have been praised for their efficient
responses to the pandemic. China’s propaganda about its
handling of Covid-19 also serves to reinforce the perceived
success of other authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states
in the region, such as Vietnam.
VIETNAM’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19
Vietnam has been recognized as one of the few early
Covid-19 success cases due to its preparedness and
early targeted prevention and containment strategy.
While its prior experiences with SARS and avian
influenza prepared and informed its response, even
prior to its first reported cases of Covid-19, Vietnam
took preventative measures such as imposing
travel restrictions. The Vietnamese government
also provided clear public health messaging that
emphasized the dangers and seriousness of the
virus rather than downplaying or even ignoring
it, as many other governments did.24 Vietnam
quickly established detection and containment
measures such as government-run quarantine
centers (based on possible exposure rather than just
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symptoms), disinformation fines, contact tracing
apps, community-level lockdowns, and nationwide
testing centers to identify clusters before their
spread and performed more tests than cases than
any other country.25 Overall, Vietnam’s transparent,
responsible, effective, and early response encouraged
citizen trust and compliance and thus enabled its
extensive success.
CORRUPTION
Covid-19 has increased opportunities for corruption in the
Indo-Pacific, as governments hastily respond to economic
shocks and pass emergency measures. Corruption was
already a pervasive problem in the Indo-Pacific, but given
the larger role of government in distributing services,
incentives for corrupt officials to demand bribes and
kickbacks have increased.26 In addition, while international
partners rush to disburse aid packages, they are less likely
to include key corruption controls. With a lack of oversight
over public finances, corruption in public spending is likely
to increase, which ultimately deteriorates governments’
responses to the pandemic.
While the extent of corruption during the pandemic has
yet to be fully documented, several instances in the Indo-
Pacific have been reported. In the Philippines, a video in
which a municipal official revealed that he was distributing
only half of Covid-related aid funds to the intended
beneficiaries generated public outrage and a national
investigation.27 It is too early to estimate how much
Covid-related aid will be diverted to corruption. However,
previous aid packages, such as the funds following the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, demonstrate that corruption
is avoidable when stakeholders view corruption “not as
a nuisance or unfortunate side effect of the recovery, but
as a core threat to the reconstruction effort as a whole.”28
Donors and local partners will need to take appropriate
action to ensure that corruption does not reinforce existing
corrosive trends that would further undermine good
governance and public oversight.
MALIGN FOREIGN INFLUENCE
AND DISINFORMATION
In efforts to reestablish its global position of power and
redirect its global narrative as the Covid-19 epicenter,
China has deployed numerous disinformation campaigns
and vaccine propaganda. The Covid-19 pandemic presents
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China with several avenues to project its influence. First,
Beijing has ramped up a campaign of “mask diplomacy,”
shipping personal protective equipment (PPE) to foreign
countries to gain sympathy.29 Second, Chinese leaders
have selectively released information to portray their
response to Covid-19, and by extension, their system
of government in a positive light.30 Third, as countries
look to monitor their citizens for contact tracing and
quarantines, China has an opportunity to export their
tools for digital surveillance.31
China has manufactured and spread disinformation
about the Covid-19 crisis in a myriad number of ways.
In the most prominent case, in March 2020, Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian retweeted a
conspiracy theory that the Covid-19 virus had been
created in a U.S. laboratory.32 Disinformation has
also been more subtle, however. The Oxford Internet
Institute analyzed disinformation published by state-
backed outlets from China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey,
finding that their content published in European
languages often had higher average engagement per
article than publications such as Le Monde, Der Speigel,
and El País.33 China also amplified fake text messages
and social media posts that said that President Trump
was declaring a national lockdown.34 Social media
platforms such as Twitter have swiftly responded to
the Chinese disinformation efforts, classifying 23,750
accounts as “spreading geopolitical narratives favorable
to the Communist Party of China (CCP).”35
In promoting false narratives surrounding Covid-19
on social media, China is hoping to depict itself as a
reasonable stakeholder in the international community to
increase its global reach.
In Taiwan, there have been numerous examples of Chinese
influence to use disinformation surrounding Covid-19 to
question science and institutions, and thereby fragment
Taiwanese society. For example, the Chinese launched
a coordinated social media campaign, citing unnamed
members of the Taiwanese parliament about a massive
cover up in terms of infections and deaths. The objective
of the campaign was to sow distrust in Taiwanese health
institutions. A digital intelligence lab based in California
traced back this claim to a coordinated disinformation
campaign with origins in China that was sent out over the
Chinese app, Weibo.36 The Chinese government, therefore,
has the capacity and willingness to employ disinformation
tactics against democratic societies by leveraging the
opportunities presented by Covid-19.
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CHINA’S VACCINE PROMISES AND
PROPAGANDA
As one of the world’s largest producers of vaccines,
it is no surprise that China is one of the leaders
in global efforts to create a vaccine. Three of the
six vaccines in the final stages of human testing
originate from China, thus giving Beijing a new
diplomatic tool.37 Beijing has promised vaccines to
many countries of strategic interest such as Brazil,
Indonesia, and Pakistan, with priority access to
the Philippines.38 Xi has made a strategic promise
to make the vaccine “a global public good, which
will be China’s contribution to ensuring vaccine
accessibility and affordability in developing
countries,” to reverse the damages to its geopolitical
standing prior to the outbreak.39 Official agreements
reached with these countries demonstrate a blur
between collective and self-interest on the part of
China as they seek opportunities out of chaos with
promises such as territorial claims and security in
the South China Sea.40
China’s vaccine propaganda, including its promise
to have a vaccine ready before the end of the
year, has brought it to the forefront of the global
vaccine race and has made tremendous progress
in reversing, or at least mitigating, its detrimental
reputation from the outbreak. These attempts
portray China’s strength and firm control over the
situation by globally publicizing its efforts and
progress, but often put forth distorted and false
narratives. In doing so, China’s rush to create
a successful vaccine has ignored international
standards and regulations, such as bypassing
clinical trials, which makes reports of successful
experimental vaccine trials extremely dubious.
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
Since the Covid-19 outbreak began, human rights have
been under attack in various countries throughout
the Indo-Pacific. Covid-19 allows governments an
excuse to enact emergency and crisis-related laws that
can undermine freedom—such as arbitrary arrest and
detention, the right to privacy, the freedom of movement,
and the freedom of information. The Chinese government,
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for example, took advantage of the pandemic by imposing
a new security law in Hong Kong, permitting the central
government to try residents in Hong Kong for certain
crimes on the mainland.41 Beijing has also increased
surveillance, suppressed information related to the virus,
and escalated an existing crackdown on virtual private
networks (VPNs), which allow users to access content
that has been censored by the central government.42, 43
Meanwhile, in Myanmar, the government has prioritized
Buddhists, the ethnic majority, for Covid-19 treatment and
broken its own ceasefire against separatists.44, 45 Cambodia
has placed restrictions on social, political, and press
activities; in fact, Cambodia’s parliament passed a state
of emergency law, which states that the King can declare
a state of emergency in a barrage of situations, including
pandemics. This law allows the government to control the
national security, public order, the digital surveillance of
its citizens, and seek retribution against those who do not
follow orders.46
In Sri Lanka, India, and Cambodia, discrimination against
Muslims has increased as unfounded claims/allegations
blaming them for spreading the virus have become
widespread. There are some reports that businesses have
been boycotted or Muslims have been denied medical care.
In Sri Lanka, Muslim families have reported their deceased
loved ones have been forced to have cremations, which
go against Islamic practice.47 India’s Muslim minority had
already been facing increasing discrimination and threats
before Covid-19, as violence broke out earlier this year
between Hindus and Muslims in the Indian capital city
of New Delhi. Social media outlets such as Facebook and
Twitter have been platforms for anti-Muslim rhetoric as
slurs and hashtags falsely accusing Muslims of spreading
Covid-19 have been circulated.48
In Thailand—a country that has experienced 12 military
coups since 1932—pro-democracy protestors demanded
Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha’s resignation and
constitutional changes. Failed promises to restore
democracy and the repression of civil rights have fueled
the anti-government protests and led to calls for reforms to
the monarchy. Covid-19 has provided fodder for the largest
pro-democracy movement since Prayuth took power in
a coup in 2014 and has galvanized urban demonstrators
in historical numbers.49 The pandemic is worsening the
treatment of ethnic minorities and furthering scapegoating
and xenophobic attitudes that empower the ruling
majority—undermining social order and potentially fueling
massive social unrest if left unresolved.
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR USAID INVOLVE-
MENT IN THE POST-PANDEMIC RECOVERY
Covid-19 has disrupted current USAID programming
and has shifted priorities in the short-term toward
strengthening health care institutions, emergency
responses, and governance issues to prevent development
backsliding.50 While funds have been diverted to mitigate
the short-term effects of Covid-19, USAID must also
consider that the increase in governance challenges in
the Indo-Pacific will continue after the pandemic and will
require additional future programming and consideration.
This will require prioritizing several challenges to preserve
the important work USAID has done to assist countries
in actualizing their self-reliance and strengthening their
democratic institutions:
1. PROMOTE GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY,
OVERSIGHT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES
Corruption was a pervasive issue pre-pandemic and has
become more rampant as public funds with little oversight
are quickly disseminated for emergency responses.
Combatting corruption requires greater public engagement
on issues of transparency and government accountability,
as well as controlling corruption when it occurs. USAID
must continue this work in its partner countries (i.e.,
Indonesia and Bangladesh), while recognizing Covid-19
has allowed for opportunities for corruption. USAID should
be prioritizing its open and accountable governance metric
as part of its ongoing Journey to Self-Reliance program,
with special attention to public procurement, health care
supplies, and emergency aid packages.
USAID should establish more programming that
strengthens oversight and ensures a higher degree of
accountability and restores confidence in public and
national institutions. Public financial management, as
well as transparency and accountability principles, could
be implemented into the USAID health and education
programming. Furthermore, bolstering country capacity
to investigate, prosecute, and sanction Covid-19-related
corruption—including strengthening anti-corruption and
anti-money laundering frameworks—will allow countries
to respond to corruption more effectively in the future.
USAID’s work should go beyond ensuring that Covid-19
emergency funding is being spent for its intended
purposes by modifying its programs to place more
reform and transparency measures in the countries that
are most susceptible to Chinese influence in the Indo-
Pacific region. Globally, pro-democratic movements are
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 7
already demanding accountability and transparency to
explain the origins of Covid-19 and why it has had worse
effects in certain locations than others. USAID and local
organizations can channel that impulse against corruption,
explaining to the public that corrupt institutions are more
likely to hire incompetent, but well-connected bureaucrats
and remove funds from the areas where they are needed
most. Local partner and group relationships will become
increasingly important as they can garner public trust
and knowledge. Additionally, U.S. Foreign Service Officers
located in-country should develop strong relationships
with people in the civil service who are willing to identify,
publicize, and punish corrupt acts, gradually pushing their
institutions toward greater transparency.
2. WORK WITH GLOBAL DEMOCRACIES TO MAKE A
RENEWED CASE FOR DEMOCRACY
To strengthen the coalition of democratic countries in the
Indo-Pacific, USAID should help highlight how democratic
responses to Covid-19 in the region have often been more
effective than non-democratic responses. This could be
done by sponsoring a regional event on the topic, bringing
together the experiences of South Korea, Japan, New
Zealand, Taiwan, and Australia. The purpose of the event
would be to share best practices amongst democracies in
the Indo-Pacific that could be translated more broadly to
the international democracy community and produce new
opportunities for multinational coordination. This would
act as a powerful counternarrative to China and solidify
U.S. support for democratic values abroad.
Democratic institutions have been undermined due to
Covid-19 and are at risk of further degradation. Free
and fair elections—one of the cornerstones of a healthy
democracy—are another area where USAID can provide
assistance to local partners or electoral commission boards.
USAID should consider expanding its work with non-
profits that have extensive election observation expertise.
With over 100 elections in 61 countries postponed from
Covid-19, USAID should support local partners to monitor
upcoming and rescheduled elections to ensure the voting
processes are transparent and free from manipulation.
Through targeted messaging, USAID could highlight the
success of the South Korean election during the Covid-19
pandemic to demonstrate the value of voting without the
need for military or police presence. Election assistance
and monitoring in the context of a pandemic will be
essential to ensuring a peaceful transition of power and
maintaining the integrity of democratic institutions.
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3. BOLSTERING SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY
Civil society is paramount in holding government leaders
accountable and preventing corruption. Covid-19 presents
an opportunity for USAID to create and deploy technology
that helps empower citizens and civic society. USAID
should increase measures to support civil society, given
that civic groups are playing a valuable role in many
countries’ pandemic responses. This new vitality of civil
society may help civil society re-legitimate itself and
further the momentum post-Covid. USAID can also make
sure that new aid packages for Covid-19 relief include
provisions that ensure civil society will be given a role in
helping implement and monitor relief packages.
USAID can continue to partner with local organizations
to strengthen the ability for civil society to become a
trusted source of information and resource hub. Working
in Nepal with civil society organizations, USAID was
instrumental in developing many policies and holding
public forums that enabled legislators to garner input on
draft legislation that eventually helped strengthen the
electoral process. USAID may also consider membership-
based organizations, which are common across South Asia,
as partners, in addition to more traditional NGOs. The
United States can connect civil society organizations across
countries to share best practices in the face of Covid-19,
and they might even contemplate sharing aid agreements
directly with civil society organizations if governments are
insufficiently democratic.
4. EFFECTIVELY COUNTER CHINESE DISINFORMATION
AND PROMOTE FACT-CHECKING MECHANISMS
Digital authoritarianism threatens to undermine
democratic institutions and trusted sources of information.
Covid-19 has created new opportunities for disinformation
as science and public health advice are distorted. In
particular, China’s efforts to promote a false narrative of an
effective response to Covid-19 are indicative of its broader
anti-democratic messaging.
USAID, in partnership with civil society organizations and
NGOs, should continue to invest in the digital influence
of local partners. In doing so, USAID funding will go
toward increasing awareness and skepticism of China’s
actions in partner countries and bolster the capacity to
respond to misinformation. USAID should continue to
help countries develop capabilities to process, analyze,
and mobilize information. In doing so, USAID can invest
and mobilize countries on their journey to self-reliance,
but also respond to the disinformation vestiges of the
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 8
pandemic and empower society, institutions, and the
private sector to address the sources of disinformation
and effectively respond.
USAID could partner with civil society organizations
that possess the resources to fact check information
and quickly correct fake news stories that are promoted
by China or likeminded actors. The private sector
can help in many cases; social media companies, for
example, can flag content that is unreliable or that
fails an independent fact check, as Twitter has recently
done. As media independence is further eroded, USAID
should increase funding for capacity building for local,
trusted, and independent newspapers. Government
institutions also need to be much better equipped and
able to rapidly respond and reach a large number of
people with responses and clarifications on the news
and public health information. To further decrease the
power that disinformation has, USAID should consider
additional funding for media literacy programs and news
cooperatives, like in 2018, when the United States and
Taiwan cohosted an International Workshop on Defending
Democracy through Media Literacy.51 These programs
can help foster strategic leadership that understands
how to interpret and apply metrics for disinformation.
Equipping citizens with the skills to recognize and analyze
disinformation will make them less susceptible to Chinese
disinformation efforts.
CONCLUSION
The Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing
governance challenges and has created new opportunities
for authoritarianism. Democracy and the U.S.-led liberal
international order are being questioned by malign actors
and governments. A major global disruptor, Covid-19 has
given governments an excuse to enact sweeping measures
that restrict freedom of movement and expression, as
well as undermine universal human rights. Distrust in
government leaders, scapegoating, and xenophobic attitudes
toward certain groups and communities have increased.
Meanwhile, countries and communities are more
vulnerable to disinformation and the weaponization of
crucial public health statistics. While some of these trends
existed before the pandemic, Covid-19 has emboldened
strongman leaders, which has fed the flames of pro-
democracy protest movements.” There is an opportunity
now to build back better democratic institutions and
governance structures that include civil society, fact-
checking mechanisms, independent judiciaries, and
greater government oversight and accountability.
To counter growing threats to democracy, the United States
and its allies must band together to share lessons and craft
a pro-democratic approach to the Covid-19 pandemic,
one that champions accountability, transparency, and the
protection of human rights. Foreign assistance spending
and programming such as the IPTI are more important
than ever. China’s promotion of disinformation and
propaganda threatens established democracies in the
Indo-Pacific and globally, undermining U.S. interests and
democratic values. The United States must lead by example
to other democracies globally, reassure allies in the Indo-
Pacific that it is a reliable and trusted partner, and project
confidence in its own democratic institutions.
Daniel F. Runde is a senior vice president, director of the
Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William
A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Conor
Savoy is a non-resident senior associate at the Project on
Prosperity and Development at CSIS. Shannon McKeown
is a program coordinator for the Project on Prosperity and
Development (PPD) and Project on U.S. Leadership in
Development (USLD) at CSIS.
Support for this brief was provided by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). The views expressed here
do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID.

CSIS BRIEFS are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution
focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific
policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to
be solely those of the author(s). © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
Cover Photo: Jack Taylor/AFP via Getty Images

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ENDNOTES
1 The Indo-Pacific region, according to the U.S. Department of State,
encompasses the following states; Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Brunei, Cambodia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, India, Indo-
nesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, The Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Van-
uatu, and Vietnam.
2 U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebal-
ance to Asia and the Pacific,” The White House, November 16, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/
fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific.
3 Morgan Stanley, “Inside China’s Plan to Create a Modern Silk Road,”
Morgan Stanley, March 14, 2018, https://www.morganstanley.com/
ideas/china-belt-and-road.
4 Tsukasa Hadano and Tomoya Onishi, “‘A Friend in Need is a Friend
Indeed,’ Xi Tells Visiting Hun Sen,” Nikkei Asian Review, Feb. 6, 2020,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/A-friend-in-
need-is-a-friend-indeed-Xi-tells-visiting-Hun-Sen.
5 Kinling Lo and Kunal Purohit, “China and Philippines Pledge Mutual
Support after Rodrigo Duterte’s U-Turn on Scrapping US Alliance,”
South China Morning Post, June 12, 2020, https://www.inkl.com/
news/china-and-philippines-pledge-mutual-support-after-rodrigo-
duterte-s-u-turn-on-scrapping-us-alliance.
6 “USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Com-
mand, https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPA-
COM-Area-of-Responsibility/#:~:text=U.S.%20Indo%2DPacific%20
Command%20%3E%20About%20USINDOPACOM%20%3E%20
USPACOM%20Area%20of%20Responsibility&text=United%20
States%20Indo%2DPacific%20Command,Unified%20Command%20
Plan%20(UCP).
7 “Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit | Da Nang,
Vietnam,” The White House, November 10, 2017, https://www.white-
house.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-
summit-da-nang-vietnam/.
8 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, (Washington, DC: The White House, December 18, 2017),
45, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/
NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
9 U.S. Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a
Shared Vision (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, November
4, 2019), 30, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/
Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.
10 U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Prepared-
ness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region (Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 1, 2019), https://media.de-
fense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DE-
FENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.
11 Melissa Conley Tyler, “The Indo-Pacific is the New Asia,” The Inter-
preter, June 28, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/
indo-pacific-new-asia.
12 “Forging Just and Accountable Governance in the Indo-Pacific
Region,” USAID, June 19, 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/1861/USAID_and_the_Indo-Pacific_Transparen-
cy_Initiative_-_Fact_Sheet_June_19_2019.pdf.
13 Thomas Carothers and David Wong, “Authoritarian Weaknesses and
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the Pandemic,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August
11, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/11/authoritari-
an-weaknesses-and-pandemic-pub-82452.
14 Brian Harding, “Is Coronavirus Making Southeast Asia More Authori-
tarian?” U.S. Institute for Peace, June 18, 2020, https://www.usip.org/
publications/2020/06/coronavirus-making-southeast-asia-more-au-
thoritarian.
15 “Sri Lanka’s New President is Putting Soldiers in Charge of Every-
thing,” The Economist, May 14, 2020, https://www.economist.com/
asia/2020/05/14/sri-lankas-new-president-is-putting-soldiers-in-
charge-of-everything.
16 “Sri Lanka: Increasing Suppression of Dissent,” Human Rights Watch,
August 8, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/08/sri-lanka-in-
creasing-suppression-dissent.
17 Harding, “Is Coronavirus Making Southeast Asia More Authoritari-
an?”
18 Ibid.
19 Eimor Santos, “Nearly 30,000 Quarantine Violators Arrested Nation-
wide in a Month,” CNN Philippines, April 18, 2020, https://www.
cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/18/quarantine-violators-arrest-
ed-coronavirus-lockdowns.html.
20 Rebecca, Ratcliffe, “Journalist Maria Ressa Found Guilty of “cyber-
libel” in Philippines,” The Guardian, June 15, 2020, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/15/maria-ressa-rappler-editor-
found-guilty-of-cyber-libel-charges-in-philippines.
21 Harding, “Is Coronavirus Making Southeast Asia More Authoritari-
an?”
22 Elizabeth Economy, “The Coronavirus Is a Stress Test for Xi Jinping:
Can China Control an Epidemic from the Top Down?” Foreign
Affairs, February 10, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
china/2020-02-10/coronavirus-stress-test-xi-jinping.
23 Keith, Bradsher. 2020. “China Hails Its Virus Triumphs, and Glosses
Over Its Mistakes.” New York Times, June 7, 2020. https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/06/07/world/asia/china-coronavirus.html.
24 Exemplars in Global Health, “Emerging COVID-19 Success Story:
Vietnam’s Commitment to Containment,” Our World in Data, June
30, 2020, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-vietnam.
25 Ibid.
26 Vitor Gaspar, Martin Mühleisen, and Rhoda Weeks-Brown, “Cor-
ruption and COVID-19,” IMFBlog, July 28, 2020, https://blogs.imf.
org/2020/07/28/corruption-and-covid-19/.
27 “DILG to PNP: Probe and Arrest Corrupt Local Officials in SAP
Distribution,” Republic of the Philippines Department of the Interior
and Local Government, May 5, 2020, https://dilg.gov.ph/news/DILG-
to-PNP-Probe-and-arrest-corrupt-local-officials-in-SAP-distribution/
NC-2020-1134?fbclid=IwAR1bnkZ52NHK5_5zJR0wjvPY53_1XENBU-
pW-y6ReAdZBTTTc0mt2iblr15U.
28 Patrick Worsnip, “Tsunami Aid Often Bypassed Conflict Victims:
Report,” Reuters, April 24, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-un-tsunami/tsunami-aid-often-bypassed-conflict-victims-re-
port-idUSTRE53N77H20090425.
29 Alicia Chen and Vanessa Molter, “Mask Diplomacy: Chinese Narra-
tives in the COVID Era,” Stanford Cyber Policy Center: Freeman Spog-
li Institute for International Studies, June 16, 2020, https://cyber.fsi.
stanford.edu/news/covid-mask-diplomacy.
CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 10
30 Javier C. Hernández, “China Spins Coronavirus Crisis, Hailing Itself
as a Global Leader,” New York Times, March 3, 2020, https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/02/28/world/asia/china-coronavirus-response-pro-
paganda.html.
31 Nicholas Wright, “Coronavirus and the Future of Surveillance,”
Foreign Affairs, April 6, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/arti-
cles/2020-04-06/coronavirus-and-future-surveillance.
32 Robert Boxwell, “The Blame Game: The Origins of Covid-19 and the
Anatomy of a Fake News Story,” South China Morning Post, April 4,
2020, https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/
article/3078417/how-chinas-fake-news-machine-rewriting-history.
33 Katarina Rebello et al., “Covid-19 News and Information from State-
Backed Outlets Targeting French, German, and Spanish-Speaking
Social Media Users,” The Computational Propaganda Project: Oxford
Internet Institute, June 2020, https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/
covid19-french-german-spanish/.
34 Edward Wong, Matthew Rosenberg, and Julian E. Barnes, “Chinese
Agents Helped Spread Messages That Sowed Virus Panic in U.S.,
Officials Say,” New York Times, April 23, 2020, https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/04/22/us/politics/coronavirus-china-disinformation.html.
47 “Sri Lanka: Muslim COVID-19 Victims Cremated against Families’
Wishes,” Amnesty International UK, April 3, 2020, https://www.
amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/sri-lanka-muslim-covid-19-victims-
cremated-against-families-wishes.
48 Joanna Slater and Niha Masih, “As the World Looks for Coronavirus
Scapegoats, Muslims Are Blamed in India.” Washington Post, April
23, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-
world-looks-for-coronavirus-scapegoats-india-pins-blame-on-mus-
lims/2020/04/22/3cb43430-7f3f-11ea-84c2-0792d8591911_story.
html.
49 Helen Regan and Kocha Olarn, “Thailand’s Monarchy Was Long
Considered God-like. But Protestors Say It’s Time for Change,” CNN,
August 17, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/17/asia/thai-
land-democracy-protests-monarchy-intl-hnk/index.html.
50 U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment, Report to the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
on the Use of Covered Funds (Washington DC: U.S. Department of
State and U.S. Agency for International Development, August 18,
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sponse-accountability-committee-use-covered-funds.

35 Arjun Kharpal, “Twitter Takes down China-Linked Accounts 51 “Taiwan and US Co-Host International Workshop on Defending
Spreading Disinformation on Hong Kong and Coronavirus,” June 12, Democracy through Media Literacy under Global Cooperation and
2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/12/twitter-takes-down-chi- Training Framework,” Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 17,
na-linked-accounts-spreading-disinformation.html. 2018, https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1EAD-
DCFD4C6EC567&sms=5B9044CF1188EE23&s=11FF191323AC26AE.
36 Nick Monaco, “No Rest for the Sick: Coronavirus Disinformation
from Chinese Users Targets Taiwan,” Medium, March 5, 2020,
https://medium.com/digintel/china-coronavirus-disinfo-targets-tai-
wan-2490d99ce6a9.
37 Chao Deng, “China Seeks to Use Access to Covid-19 Vaccines for
Diplomacy.” Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2020, https://www.wsj.
com/articles/china-seeks-to-use-access-to-covid-19-vaccines-for-di-
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38 Ibid.
39 Corinne Gretler, “Xi Vows China Will Share Vaccine and Gives WHO
Full Backing.” Bloomberg, May 18, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2020-05-18/china-s-virus-vaccine-will-be-global-
public-good-xi-says.
40 Deng, “China Seeks to Use Access to Covid-19 Vaccines for Diploma-
cy.”
41 Grace Tsoi and Lam Cho Wai, “Hong Kong Security Law: What Is It
and Is It Worrying?” BBC News, June 30, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-china-52765838.
42 Lily Kuo, “More Surveillance, Tighter Controls: China’s Coronavirus
Crackdown,” The Guardian, February 3, 2020, https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2020/feb/03/more-surveillance-tighter-controls-chi-
nas-coronavirus-crackdown.
43 Grady McGregor, “China Deploys a Favorite Weapon in the Coro-
navirus Crisis: A Crackdown on VPNs,” Fortune, February 25, 2020,
https://fortune.com/2020/02/25/coronavirus-china-vpn/.
44 Harding, “Is Coronavirus Making Southeast Asia More Authoritari-
an?”
45 Andrew Nachemson, “In Myanmar, the Coronavirus Gives National-
ists an Opening,” Foreign Policy, May 1, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2020/05/01/myanmar-coronavirus-pandemic-gives-national-
ists-opening-ethnic-minorities-risk/.
46 Michael A. Weber et al., “Global Democracy and Human Rights
Impacts of COVID-19: In Brief,” Congressional Research Service, June
26, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46430.pdf.

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