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P. K. Mohapatra
An Applied
Perspective on
Indian Ethics
An Applied Perspective on Indian Ethics
P. K. Mohapatra
An Applied Perspective
on Indian Ethics
P. K. Mohapatra
Former Professor of Philosophy, Utkal University
Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India
ISBN 978-981-13-7502-6 ISBN 978-981-13-7503-3 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7503-3
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

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The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
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Singapore
Dedicated to
Professor Rajendra Prasad
In grateful appreciation
of his inspiring contributions
of innovative and critical thinking,
which have
helped in enriching philosophical analysis
in contemporary India.
Preface and Acknowledgement
The purpose of ethics is to provide guidance for practical life. Buddha emphatically
highlighted this in his life and teachings. Any theory that has no practical bearing on
human life was of no value for him. Other Indian thinkers like Sankara (Vedanta
Sutra III. ii) even insisted that ethical values must be realized before being counted
as values. Indian philosophers have always believed that ethical theories are practi-
cally applicable, for these are the principles we ought to follow, and if something
(some principle, theory or standard) is impossible to be followed or achieved, then
one ought not to try to follow or achieve it; because ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and there-
fore, conversely, ‘cannot’ means ‘ought not’. However, the fact remains that, more
often than not, many of our celebrated ethical theories seem to be inapplicable or
difficult to apply in actual life situations. This apparent contradiction between ethics
and its application has an inevitable effect of threatening the use and even the rele-
vance of ethics and moral principles in the lives of people. This is a general problem
about ethical theories, and Indian ethical theories are no exceptions to this. But I
consider Indian ethical theories to be of special significance to the problem at issue,
because they have in them rich potentials for applicability as much as many of them
typify inapplicable abstract theories of morals.
What is needed is an enquiry into the source(s) of the problem of this apparent
inapplicability of ethical theories which exposes a disturbing incompatibility
between the very purpose of ethics and its practical significance. While addressing
to this, the present work also aims at offering some methodological explanations for
effective application of ethical theories in practical life and thus proposing a rational
solution to the problem at issue. As a part of this endeavour, the present book under-
takes the analysis of some prominent theories of Indian ethics, especially the theory
of dharma which is a paradigm Indian moral theory meant for guiding man’s life
and conducts and which also illustrates the apparently inapplicable abstract features
in its various conventional aspects and interpretations. Some other Indian moral
theories, like those of karma, purusarthas and moksa, are also taken up for analysis
and interpretation in this light so as to be reconstructed and augmented to over-
come some of their standard limitations.
vii
viii Preface and Acknowledgement
But prior to that, the project aims at analysing ethical theories in general and
evincing their rational features insofar as their spirits and purposes are concerned.
To this purpose, analysis and interpretation is done of the supposed objectivity and
universalisability required as preconditions of ethical theories: it is enquired if these
conditions do indeed require ethical theories to be applied unconditionally, as it
generally seems to have been assumed by conventional moralists. A methodological
explanation has been essayed for what I call rational morality as I suspect that
ethical theories become apparently vulnerable – and this is true of several important
Indian theories – because of our proneness for abstraction and absolutism and for,
what may be called, generalism. This also seems to be the result of what I call
‘literalism’, the tendency for taking the theories in their literal sense, even at the
expense of their very spirit and purpose. This proneness and tendency lead to the
theories being misconstrued; they also make their use and applicability being
seriously questioned.
To substantiate the above hypothesis regarding the sources of the problem, a
method of philosophizing is adopted in this work which is both analytic and recon-
structive. The analysis of the concept of ethics (and of the family concepts like ethi-
cal, moral, and morality, etc.) has inevitably proceeded to enquire into the meaning
as well as the purpose of ethics and ethical theories far beyond the barriers of ety-
mology and definitions, for it is demonstrated that taking the ethical theories in their
literal sense often conflicts with their applicability. And to cope with this, some
amount of rethinking about and reconstruction of the nature and purpose of these
theories have become necessary. For example, the requirement of ethical theories
being objective and ethical standards being absolute and inviolable has been reinter-
preted, because application of general theories and laws to particular cases is always
mediated by suitable interpretations, either in a particular case or in general laws or
both. This has been demonstrated with the help of moral laws. Interpretations and
reconstructions have been done in keeping with the spirit of such principles and the
demand of situations; in fact, a reasoned balance between these two has been
pleaded as the key to applied ethics and to a rational interpretation and understand-
ing of ethics and morality. Blind literal adherence to ethical theories, it has been
argued and demonstrated, would lead to a theory being inapplicable or, if applied,
to consequences that may be morally disastrous.
The appropriateness of a moral value cannot be thought apart from social
realities. Aristotle (Ethics) and Kant (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals)
held that it would be problematic if fixed models of virtues and values were held as
constant and invariant in a changing world like ours. Strange as it may appear, the
imputed properties of a supposed independent world are as much subject to histor-
ized career of human society as are the presumptions of moral invariance. And eth-
ics is meant to work within the ambits of society and social reality and aims at
promoting values common and conducive to effective and desirable social life.
Moral values, for example, like truth telling for example, need to be pursued accord-
ingly. A useful lie under a demanding situation would be morally preferable to a
dangerous revelation of truth. Several Indian scriptures have demonstrated this trait
of ethics and morality. The present work therefore pleads that, depending on the
Preface and Acknowledgement ix
gravity of the situation, a conventional moral theory may need to be toned down,
even violated, to prevent an otherwise disastrous consequence. But this has to be
done strictly in keeping with the spirit of ethics and ethical principles, which is to
promote the good life. A violation in this perspective, pleads this work, would be
justified violation in the interest of ethics and morality. There are eminent scriptural
supports for such justified violations: apad dharma has been prescribed to cope
with dharma sankat, and apriyam satyam has been proscribed to prevent morally
disastrous consequences. The present work therefore argues to the effect that it is
not always rational to follow the dictates of conventional morality nor is it always
irrational to act to the contrary. Bhishma’s advice to Yudhishtira that not all the do’s
are ethical and not all dont’s are unethical is virtually the injunction not to insist on
the literal sense of our supposedly objective moral maxims.
Our analysis and interpretation of these concepts has revealed that moral values
are objective but defeasible: they instantiate those important kinds of principles and
relations which hold necessarily but are defeasible in overriding situations, where
another competing value deserves preference in the interest of morality. These justi-
fied exceptions, however, do not point to ethical relativism and would never turn the
particular defeated virtue into a vice; for despite such exceptions, the values and
virtues in question continue to be objective and normally inviolable. All this help
showing that my argument from defeasibility and justified violation, can bridge the
gap between ethics and its application.
Our proneness for absolutism and generalism, besides creating the problem of
application, has had the effect of obscuring correct understanding of some Indian
theories of morals and making them appear logically flawed. I have taken the doc-
trine of karma as an example. This doctrine and its operation bring to focus the
pre-eminently moral nature of Indian value system. Its supposed forte is the prin-
ciple of retributive justice – a principle of allocating to each his/her own desert. But
insistence on absolute inexorability of the law of karma makes it binding that a
person must experience the result of all his actions – if not in this life then certainly
in a later life or later lives. Thereby, the doctrine is made logically bound up with the
theory of (belief in) rebirth, which I expose to be illogical by arguing that, in the
absence of physical continuity between the dead person and the one allegedly
reborn, there would be no guarantee that the two persons are the same and the latter
person will reap as he had sowed. It has, however, been argued in this work that one
need not reap the consequences of all one’s actions, though it is morally desirable
that one ought to; we further argue that the latter does not imply the former. This
much of gap between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ is surely admissible, and it is not detrimental
to the oughtness of values, for if ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, then the possibility that one
can or may reap the results of one’s actions in this life should be enough incentive
for one’s being moral. The craving for absolutism, we argue, not only unduly neces-
sitates the belief in the otherwise illogical theory of rebirth and after-life, but it also
tells upon retributivism that is so much crucial to the karma doctrine. If, to make the
law unfailingly operational (another fallout of absolutism), God is brought in as the
all-powerful dispenser of justice, that would affect the all important moral nature of
the law of karma, since the person then would cease to be fully responsible for his
x Preface and Acknowledgement
actions as, ex hypothesi, God would be the all-controlling agent and the virtual
cause of the doings of men. It is for this reason, we point out, that not only the het-
erodox schools, like Buddhism and Jainism, but also some orthodox ones, like
Samkhya and Mimamsa, have disallowed the role of God in the operation of the law
of karma.
Like all ethical theories, the law of karma is not absolutely inviolable and its not
being so, we argue, would not affect its essentially moral nature as a theory of retrib-
utive morality. Drawing support from scriptural sources again, it has been shown that
the law of karma is not inviolable and karma phala is avoidable. There are scriptural
evidences that strong enough endeavour (purusakara) can overwhelm the impact of
karma and subsequent virtuous conducts and reciting the vedas can efface the
adverse effects of one’s prarabdha and prevent one’s sanchitas from being fructi-
fied. Freed thus from its absolutistic preconceptions, the karma doctrine would more
relevantly apply to and provide guidance for human motivations and actions equally
effectively, as has been argued herein. Analysis and interpretation of niskama karma
has also been done in similar vein. In addition to the proneness for absolutism, there
has also been a tendency in classical Indian thinking to mix up ethics with metaphys-
ics and theology, which has had the effect not only of undermining the importance
of ethics in Indian philosophy but also of leading to a general misconception among
some western writers that there was no ethics and no ethical theory in Indian phi-
losophy; even some recognized Indian scholars (e.g. P.S. Sivaswamy Iyer) are found
to have been constrained to concede(?) that scientific study of ethics has received
very little attention in India. The present book therefore tries to present – by way of
analysis and interpretation – Indian ethical theories as ethical theories with adequate
potentials for application to life. This has been substantiated by highlighting the
Indian thinkers’ characteristic respect for the down-to-earth aspect of our ethical
concerns, which is why Indian ethicists prefer to theorize in contextual, particularis-
tic manner. It had been shown that they indeed theorized about practice, which is so
much vital for moral reasoning. The theory for them is an abstraction from practices.
This way of ethical theorizing, as has been argued herein, is as good as and on a par
with theorizing purportedly to raise general theories of moral values, obligations,
etc. that was the only model of western ethical theorizing. This makes the point –
contrary to what several western thinkers have opined – that Indian ethicists did in
fact theorize, albeit in a significantly different manner.
With a view to uncover the typically ethical character of Indian theories of mor-
als, this book has undertaken comprehensive analysis and reconstruction, wherever
necessary, of the major theories of morals, e.g. dharma, karma and purusarthas.
While artha, kama and dharma are clearly shown to be social and hence moral val-
ues, moksa, despite it being pre-eminently a spiritual and metaphysical value, has
been shown nevertheless as the highest moral value involving, as it inevitably does,
impeccable moral life as an essential prerequisite. Applicability and world-
orientedness of all these theories have been demonstrated and complemented by
analysing and interpreting the general nature of ethics and ethical theories as
objective but defeasible so as to cope with the demanding situations of ethical
decision-making.
Preface and Acknowledgement xi
Besides conceptual clarification about the nature and spirit of ethics, the result of
this study will, I hope, have healing effects on contemporary social and moral life,
riddled as it is with crisis of values and declining moral sensibility. The gap between
ethics and its application to actual life situations will not be felt as a real problem,
and effective application of moral principles will help in coping with the current
concern over declining values in the society. Instead of the usual stereotyped picture
of ethics, it will, hopefully, provide scope for an open-ended, objective and, what I
would like to call, secular approach to the moral issues and for effective application
of ethics to solve moral problems that are encountered in practical and professional
life. What is in fact more important, it will present a fresh approach to Indian ethics
and help dispel misconceptions among several western writers that there was no
ethical theorizing in India and even that there was no ethics in Indian philosophy.
In bringing out my thoughts in the above form, I am indebted to many scholars
and colleagues across disciplines in the IITs of Mumbai and Kanpur, in the universi-
ties of Calcutta and Hyderabad and in ICPR Academic Centre at Lucknow, where I
had the opportunity of presenting my ideas in the form of lectures and was immensely
benefited from the discussions and feedbacks. I am also indebted to several scholars
of repute whose exceptionally original ideas have been the major sources of my
contention and critical analysis presented herein. All these have been duly acknowl-
edged in the form of notes and references. Above all, I express my gratitude to the
ICPR for considering me fit for offering the National Fellowship under which this
study has been prepared. Without this patronage, the present book, An Applied
Perspective on Indian Ethics, would not be seeing the light of the day; I thank the
Chairman and the Member-Secretary for all this. Springer Nature has been graceful
enough in taking up the publication of this book. The author humbly records
his sincere gratitudes to them. It has been wonderful interacting with the whole
production team that consists of impressively decent and helpful ladies. I am
thankful and grateful to all of them for their help and guidance.
Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India P. K. Mohapatra

Contents
1 Introduction: Justification of Morality�� 1

Rationality and Moral Personhood�� 2
Spirituality and Moral Personhood�� 4
References�� 7
2 Ethics, Applied Ethics and Indian Theories of Morals�� 9
Absolute Standards Account for Inapplicability�� 14
Logical Consistency and Applicability�� 16
Dharmas, Conflicts and Defeasibility�� 17
Critique of Swadharma as Swabhavaja�� 20
References�� 23
3 Morality and Objectivity�� 25
Objectivity and Moral Scepticism�� 25
Moral Realism and Objectivity�� 27
Understanding Mackie �� 28
Objectivity and Independence�� 31
Objective Tolerance: The Secondary
Quality Model of Value Awareness�� 33
Craving for Absolute Objectivity: Sources and Solution�� 34
Applicability and Objectivity�� 38
References�� 40
4 Universalisability and Objectivity�� 43
References�� 48
5 Ethical Theorizing in Indian Philosophy �� 49
On Indian Philosophy Being Practical�� 50
Theorizing About Practice �� 53
Ethics Presupposes a Real World�� 55
‘No-Ethics’ Charge Refuted�� 57
References�� 63
xiii
xiv Contents
6 Dharma as Moral Duty�� 65

Dharma, Its Varieties and the Internal Contradictions �� 69
Moral Duty: Kant and the Gita�� 70
Dharma as the Sustainer�� 72
References�� 74
7 Karma as a Theory of Retributive Morality�� 75
References�� 82
8 Niskama Karma: A Critical Assessment�� 83
References�� 92
9 Purusarthas: A General Theory of Values �� 93
What It Means�� 93
From Actuality to Normativity�� 95
Synthetic Nature of the Purusarthas�� 98
On the Typology of the Purusarthas�� 100
References�� 105
10 Moksa and Morality�� 107
Morality as Precondition of Moksa�� 110
References�� 114
Bibliography �� 115
Index�� 119
About the Author
P. K. Mohapatra Former Professor of Philosophy at

Utkal University, was the National Fellow of the Indian
Council of Philosophical Research during October
2013 to September 2015. Earlier, he has been an
Emeritus Fellow of the University Grants Commission
and also a Senior Fellow of the Indian Council of
Philosophical Research.
Professor Mohapatra obtained the Degree of Ph.D.
from the University of Keele, England, where he
worked as a Commonwealth Scholar during 1974 to
1977. He was a Fulbright Visiting Professor in the
United States in 1989. During this visit, he lectured in
the universities of Western Michigan, Philadelphia
(Temple University), Wittenberg and Iowa. Later on, he
was Visiting Professor in Brock University, Ontario,
Canada, in 1993 and in 1995 and also in Ohio State
University, USA, in 1999.
Besides a number of publications in reputed journals
of philosophy, Professor Mohapatra has authored
5 other books and edited 12 books published under the
‘Utkal Studies in Philosophy’ series of publications, of
which he was the General Editor from 1996 to 2002.
A specialist in Philosophy of Mind and Practical
Ethics, Professor Mohapatra is passionately concerned
over promotion of human values in the society.
xv
Chapter 1
Introduction: Justification of Morality
As a forerunner to a treatise on Indian ethics, two questions that inevitably call for
deliberation are why need we be moral? and why and how ethics can be applied in
life? The second question which is asked within ethics and presupposes the ethical
point of view may be answered by appealing to the nature and spirit of ethics. If
ethics is meant to provide guidance for successful practical life, then it must be pos-
sible to apply the ethical principles in actual life situations. ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’,
which means ‘cannot’ means ‘ought not’. Ethical theories are the ones we ought to
follow, and therefore, it must be possible for us to follow them in practical life; for
no one can be excepted to follow a rule or principle if it is not possible for anyone
to follow it. Application of ethics is therefore inevitable. How ethical theories are
to be applied will be dealt with in details in the next chapter, which deals with
the nature of ethics and its applications. In the present chapter, I will focus on the
more crucial question, the first one mentioned above, the question ‘why should one
be moral?’
As distinctively different from the (above-mentioned) second question, this one
is a question about ethics, thus belonging to a different level altogether. At this level,
we question the need, if at all, for the ethical point of view; we ask for justification
of ethics, the rationale of being moral. This question is often considered perplex-
ing; because in a very important sense, it is a question about something that is nor-
mally presupposed. One reason why ethics and the ethical point of view is normally
presupposed is that men by nature and inclination are moral beings. Man being
moral can be said to follow jointly from his nature as a rational being as well as a
spiritual being. As a first step towards showing this, I shall try to show that to be
moral and to tend to act morally is as much natural for men as it is for them to be
rational. (I shall use ‘men’ to mean the same thing as ‘persons’, very much in the
sense in which Aristotle defined man as a rational animal). For unless otherwise
constrained, every man has the natural propensity to act morally and do things
which are considered morally good.
This theory of moral personhood is based on the fact that morality supervenes on
personhood in as much as the reality of value is supervening on the reality of
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 1

P. K. Mohapatra, An Applied Perspective on Indian Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7503-3_1
2 1 Introduction: Justification of Morality
consciousness. This is because consciousness inevitably has two prominent

aspects – rationality and spirituality – which virtually define personhood. Because
of rationality, man is capable of reason and reflection, and human consciousness
necessarily contains what may be called reciprocal personal stance that is adopted
by one person towards others who, in turn, are capable of reciprocating this stance.
This is implied when Strawson famously said that to be a person is to treat others,
who are not oneself but are like oneself as persons (Strawson 1962): ‘It is a neces-
sary condition of one’s ascribing states of consciousness, experiences, to oneself’,
said Strawson, ‘…that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them,
to others, who are not oneself’ (Strawson 1962, p. 99). Rationality makes us recog-
nize not only the distinction between oneself and others but also their inevitable
interrelations; it accounts for this reciprocal personal stance that necessarily charac-
terizes us, persons. And because of spirituality, the second important aspect of
human consciousness, we the persons are capable of reflective self-transcendence,
the capacity to go beyond one’s own interests and recognize value in others. Moral
personhood is thus a necessary outcome of the two aspects of human conscious-
ness – rationality and spirituality. It is because of this that acting morally, or being
moral, is congenial to human nature and the few occasions when one refrains from
morality or acts in ways contrary to moral expectations, one finds that alien to one’s
nature and inclinations. This is evident from the familiar fact that normal human
mind is prone to perform actions that are considered good and virtuous and to get
along well with things and systems of thought that are right rather than wrong or
condemnable. Human mind has a ‘natural partiality for truth’, says an ancient
Buddhist verse, ‘…which, we all believe, will ultimately triumph over error and
ignorance’. As a matter of fact, a man is not only a rational being capable of know-
ing and appreciating moral values, but given his freedom without constraint of any
sort, he would identify with what is morally valuable and alienate from what is
immoral and morally proscribed.
Rationality and Moral Personhood
Now what is involved in man being rational, and how does it bear upon morality and
moral personhood? Rationality is so much an essential characterization of man,
indeed a defining feature of man, that anyone trying to question this by asking a
question like ‘why should I be rational?’ would be asking a very improper question,
because in trying to answer this question, he would be giving reasons for his being
(or even not being) rational. That means we would be presupposing rationality in
attempting to justify our being rational. The resulting justifications would therefore
be inevitably circular, and so it would be pointless to ask for justification for man to
be rational. What this shows is ‘not that rationality lacks justification but that it
needs no justification because it cannot intelligibly be questioned unless it is already
presupposed’ (Singer 2011). All this goes to vindicate the definition of man as a
rational being. The fact that many people are irrational or sometimes behave
Rationality and Moral Personhood 3
irrationally is irrelevant to this definition. For what is meant here is that men are
capable of rationality, that is, capable of being fully rational, though at times, they
may not be acting rationally because of factors alien to their human nature. To be
rational, very much like to know, is a capacity concept (Courtesy: Gilbert Ryle), and
hence, a rational being need not always exercise the faculty of reasons but can do so
on appropriate occasions. The fact that some of us behave irrationally some of the
times, or even most of the times, should be unworrying. To such deviant pointers,
eminently raised by Bertrand Russell, Antony Flew had replied by saying that ‘…
to be rational in the sense of [being] capable of rationality, is not merely not incon-
sistent with, but is a precondition of, being irrational…’, very much in the same way
as ‘only a moral being, a being capable of morality and immorality, can be truly
said to be actually immoral’ (Flew 1978). [emphasis added]. We would not say of a
systematically trained chimpanzee, or of a powerfully programed robot endowed
with what now is fashionably described as artificial intelligence, that it is behaving
irrationally, for it is in principle incapable of behaving rationally or irrationally in
the strict sense of the terms. Just as only the people with the sense of logic can be
properly said to be illogical and be reprimanded or criticized for being so, i.e. for
not being logical of which they are capable, so also only rational beings with a sense
of discrimination between what is rational and what is not can be said to behave
irrationally and be held accountable for that. Actions of beasts, babblers and insane
adults, though may happen to be good or bad, useful or harmful, can never be
termed as rational or irrational – much less as moral or immoral, since moral respon-
sibility cannot be ascribed to them. Freedom and morality are semantically inalien-
able, and in the obvious lack of freedom in these cases, attribution of moral
responsibility will be gratuitous. Thus, rationality being a necessary presupposition
of human consciousness, reasoning is a distinctively human activity. By virtue of
rationality, we are capable of judging what is good and what is right and what is bad
and what is wrong. Further, our actions that are governed by reason are responses to
our desires, and, as Aristotle made us aware, one can respond too much or too little
to one’s desires. He therefore gave us the doctrine of the golden mean, as per which
the correct response would lie somewhere between the two extremes. This is a meta-
ethical doctrine which holds that to every virtue, there are (can be) two vices, two
extreme responses to one’s desires, and that reason helps in locating the virtue by
steering clear between the two. The distinction between the two extreme responses,
on the one hand, and the right response, on the other, is the distinction between the
desired and the desirable, between what is called the preya and the shreya in Indian
ethics. The desirable is what one values, or what one would value, under all normal
conditions. In a moral predicament, where one passionately pursues a desire that is
not desirable, the rational struggle to get over it would result in attaining an ideal
consistency between what one values and what one desires, and that is the mark of
moral personhood. In pursuing what one passionately desires, disregarding the fact
that it is not desirable, one might appear to be free to pursue what one desires to
pursue; but this would expose not only an irrational pursuit but also a puerile view
of freedom, since far from being free, one would be really impeded from being the
person one wants to be – one would be pursuing a desire that is hostile to what one
values as a rational being. Thus, rationality of persons is inseparably connected with

morality or moral personhood. Rather, morality is a distinctively rational affair in
the sense that the moral concern is grounded on reason. This makes persons, who
are constitutively rational beings, naturally moral beings, intrinsically endowed
with the propensity to act morally unless otherwise constrained. We thus comeback
here to what we described as ‘reciprocal personal stance’, which we claim to be
constitutive of personhood as a result of the person being a rational agent. Kant is
eminently noted for having demonstrated that to act rationally is to act ethically.
Moral personhood is thus the direct offshoot of the person’s rationality.
Spirituality and Moral Personhood
Let us now consider the impact of spirituality on the making of moral personhood.
If it is because of rationality that we adopt the reciprocal personal stance and treat
others as persons as we ourselves are, it is the faculty of spirituality that endows us,
persons, with the distinctive capacity of reflective self-transcendence, the capacity
to rise above our self-interest and egocentricity. Unfailing moral personhood, which
requires freedom from egocentricity, depends upon spiritual sustenance. Admittedly,
the basic function of reason is to discern oneself from others and to judge egoism as
ethically inferior to altruism. But merely judging that the latter is good and valuable
is not necessarily, or even invariably, connected with one’s actually being motivated
to realize this good. Merely having the valuational system, which no doubt is the
first important aspect of moral personhood, is not enough to have one’s motivational
system oriented accordingly. One has to identify with the value judgment in order to
be so motivated; the identification has to be typically relevant to moral motivation.
And such morally relevant sort of identification is possible only when it is character-
ized by spirituality. For in identifying with a value judgment, the agent is in spiritual
accord with the value judgment. Moral motivation is possible through spiritual
endeavours.
What I want to drive home is the point that reason, unaided by spiritual endeav-
our, does not eo ipso facilitate morality or lead to moral action. In order to realize
unfailing moral personhood, an agent must buttress his evaluation system with a
distinctively spiritual urge for self-excelling. His motivational system must add to
itself this unique spiritual urge for self-excelling that is not intrinsic to his evalua-
tion system. More importantly, this spiritual urge is not only extrinsic to the agent’s
evaluative system; it is extrinsic to rationality itself (see Baruah 2000). For the
attainment of unfailing moral personhood, rationality must be complimented by
spirituality, both of which are distinct but essential aspects of personal conscious-
ness. If we may put it this way, rationality, insofar as it promotes the evaluation
system in us, is a necessary condition of moral personhood, whereas spirituality,
insofar as it makes us identify with the value judgment or the moral point of view
and orients the motivational system in us after that (judgment of value), is the suf-
ficient condition; for the latter, in the company of the rational faculty, goes on to
Spirituality and Moral Personhood 5
complete the making of unfailing moral personhood. As discussed above, while

rationality makes us distinguish between the preya and the shreya, aptly envisioned
in Indian ethics, spirituality makes us alienate from the former and identify with the
latter. Reflective self-appraisal involves alienating or disvaluing something of our
common nature that is ‘person contingent’; such person- contingent features are
some specific needs and desires, moods and manners, which form the first-order
features of ordinary life. The first-order desires that persons have are largely part of
their human nature, which constitute the basic nature of a person. But humans
would not be persons if they were to be constituted of and confined to only the basic
features with which the moral being in them refuses to identify. For persons are
distinguished from other beings by virtue of the fact that they are capable of having
higher-order intuitions and attitudes towards their first-order desires from a valua-
tional point of view. This distinctive feature which tells persons from mere human
beings is what Harry Frankfurt calls ‘second-order desires’ (Frankfurt 1987).
Second-order desires mark the distinguishing character of persons as reflective self-
evaluators, and it is in their ability for reflective self-evaluation that the real freedom
of persons lies. For freedom consists not in acting upon our basic desires but in
being able to translate our higher-order desires into actual motivations for actions.
‘The free agent has the capacity to translate his values into action’, says Gary
Watson, ‘his actions flow from his evaluative system’ (Watson 1982). Compulsive
behaviours, like that of a kleptomaniac or of someone under coercion or under the
spell of hypnosis, are unfree, being responses to desires that claim fulfilment inde-
pendently of the agent’s evaluative system. By opting for reflective self-appraisal,
the moral person exercises his freedom and breaks away from his basic desires and
inclinations, which he finds alien to his nature, and identifies with the other desires
and inclinations which he values and glorifies. Because of his ability to be free and
ability to identify with the value judgment and to motivate himself to live in confor-
mity with it that the person is able to transcend the level of mere human existence.
The self-transcendence requires that the person’s motivational system be controlled
by his valuational system with which he identifies; his reason has to control his pas-
sion. The capacity to exercise spiritual self-transcendence, and freedom that leads to
it, is because of the fact that persons are capable of having second-order desires.
And it is in virtue of this that persons are normative beings. For the second-order
desires are higher-order normative self-attitudes and as such are judgments upon
our basic desires on the basis of valued norms. We do have such desires because of
the spiritual urge for self-excelling of which we are all potentially capable.
The foregoing points to the conclusion that moral personhood is the joint product
of man’s rationality and spirituality. As rational beings, we discriminate between
what is and what ought to be (if the former happens to be what ought not to be), we
distinguish what is desired from what is desirable, and we know that altruism is
preferable and worthwhile. As spiritual beings, we identify with the latter and alien-
ate from the former. And because of this spiritual urge, we rise above self-interest
and egocentricity and are motivated to act morally from the universal point of view.
Both these faculties together make us not only aware of the moral but also motivate
us to be moral and to act morally. Thus, moral inclination is innate to us, persons,
who are naturally endowed with the capacity for rational behaviour and spiritual
proclivities. Our intrinsic moral sense enables us to gather the acquired ability for
improving moral standards, by living up to which we may march towards moral
perfection. As has been said, ‘[m]uch of moral philosophy should be seen as just a
continuation …..of this project of improvement that all of us are engaged in well
before we have even heard of philosophy’ (Griffin 1996), much in the same way that
we all think and speak in accordance with the principles of logic even without being
aware of these principles. Thus, for a person, there cannot be any question about his
having or not having any moral standard; it is only a matter of having this or that
moral standard.
We are now in a position to see that the question ‘why should I be moral’ – like
‘why should I be rational?’ – is a logically improper question that cannot be asked
without risking some measure of self-inconsistency. Indeed our natural propensity
to act morally is strong enough and compelling enough to make this question utterly
improper. Besides, apart from the dubious reason (for rejecting this question as an
improper one), sometimes adduced, that ethical principles are overridingly impor-
tant (See Singer 1993), the more important reason is that this question must be
rejected on similar grounds on which we reject the question ‘why should I be ratio-
nal?’. For, as we have seen, this is logically improper because in asking this ques-
tion, we virtually question something that is logically presupposed. However, it may
further be asked, is the question ‘why should I be moral?’ as much an improper
question as ‘why should I be rational?’. To be sure, being rational is part of the defi-
nition of man or person; but can it be said that being moral is also a defining feature
of man? Would this question be also taken as presupposing morality that is purport-
edly being questioned? I am inclined to say ‘yes’ in view of our above analysis of
morality being the joint product of man being rational as well as spiritual in nature.
Added to that, we can also say ‘yes’ if the ‘should’ in the question is a moral
‘should’. For in that case, one would be asking for moral reasons for one’s being
moral. However, as Singer points out, it is not necessary to interpret this question as
a request for ethical justification of ethics. The ‘should’ here, he points out, need not
be a moral ‘should’. ‘Why should I act morally?’ can be asking for reasons for one’s
actions without specifying what kind of reasons is being asked for. There may be
several nonethical reasons one may be asking for, e.g. self-interest, public etiquette
or aesthetic consideration. And, sure enough, whether one acts morally for consid-
erations of ethics, self-interest, etiquette, etc. would be an open question. So non-
question beggingly, it would be a question about the ethical point of view asked
from a position outside it (ibid, p. 251). However, given the conception of ethics as
in some sense involving a universal point of view, the question ‘why should I act
morally?’ would be asking for reasons for transcending self-interest and acting on
universalizable judgments from the point of view of an ideal observer, an impartial
spectator. We thus come back again to reciprocal personal stance that we claimed to
be constitutive of personhood as a result of our being a rational agents. Kant, for this
reason, is noted for trying to demonstrate that to act rationally is to act ethically.
Thus, added to our rationality, our spirituality as an intrinsic faculty of our moral
personhood leaves us with no alternative to being moral. Incidentally, this is also
References 7
evident from some compelling facts about human nature like (1) that we all have
benevolent and sympathetic inclinations that make us concerned about the welfare
of others and (2) that we all have a natural conscience which gives rise to the feeling
of guilt when doing something we know is wrong (see Singer, ibid, p. 290). Because
of our rationality and spirituality respectively, awareness and acceptance of ethical
standards make us live up to these standards. And on Hare’s persuasive account of
ethics, one’s acceptance of ethical standards is likely to lead one to arouse similar
moral feelings in others. Ethics has the primary function of promoting values that
are common and conducive to the members of the society, and ethical judgments do
this by commending actions performed in accordance with these values. Further,
ethical judgments must be concerned with motives of (right) actions, not just the
rightness of actions, pace Kantianism and virtue ethics, because this is a good indi-
cation of the tendency of an action to promote good or evil and also because it is
here that praise and blame may be effective in altering the tendency of a person’s
actions. It is here also that applied ethics gets a firm foothold, for praise and blame
can help change a person’s moral evaluation system that is an effective means of
changing his behaviour in the direction of the moral. It is in this sense that morality
can be taught, and our natural propensity to be moral and act morally can be prop-
erly propelled to bring about a desirable moral order. Like learning counting or
knowing how to go on, morality can be taught in order that our intrinsic moral sense
could be sharpened to effect spontaneous moral conduct and actions.
With reasonable justification of ethics and grounds of our being moral fairly
demonstrated, we will now move on to the next chapter to focus on the nature of
ethics and possibility of its application with special emphasis on Indian theories of
morals.
References
Baruah, B. H. (2000). Persons and value: A sketch for a theory of moral personhood. In S. K.
Mohanty (Ed.), Persons, mind and value (p. 36). New Delhi: Decent Books in association with
DSA in Philosophy, Utkal University.
Flew, A. G. N. (1978). A rational animal (p. 90). Oxford: the Clarendon Press.
Frankfurt, H. (1987). Identification and wholeheartedness. In F. Schoeman (Ed.), Responsibility,
character and the emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Griffin, J. (1996). Value Judgment (p. 1). Oxford: the Clarendon Press.
Singer, P. (1993). Practical ethics (p. 250). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Singer, P. (2011). Practical ethics (3rd ed., p. 278). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Strawson, P. F. (1962). Individuals. London: Methuen.
Watson, G. (1982). Free will (p. 7). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chapter 2
Ethics, Applied Ethics and Indian Theories
of Morals
Ethical theories have often been hailed as exalted principles of morals meant for
guiding human life towards an ideal, desirable world; but more often than not, many
such theories are found to be inapplicable or difficult to apply to actual life situa-
tions. Let us make an attempt to explore the genesis of this apparent contradiction
and offer some methodological hints for effective application of ethics to practical
life. In this endeavour, I shall analyse some Indian ethical theories, especially the
theory of dharma which is a perfect example of moral theories meant for guiding
human conduct. Indian theories I consider to be of special significance since they
have in them rich potentials for applicability as much as they (many of them) typify
inapplicable abstract principles of morals. To this purpose, let me dwell at some
length upon the nature of ethical theories in general and, as we go on, we will see
that most of them are vulnerable because of our proneness for abstraction and abso-
lutism as well as for what may be called generalism. This will also be shown to be
a result of what I call ‘literalism’, i.e. of our tendency to take these theories in their
literal sense at the expense of their proper sprit. The proneness and the tendency,
jointly and severally, lead to the theories not only being misunderstood and vulner-
able but also to their applicability to practical life being seriously questioned.
Indian philosophers have always believed that our ethical theories are realiz-
able (Hiriyanna 1957) – that ‘ought’ means ‘can’. This, incidentally, points to the
fact – contrary to the opinion of some modern writers (McKenzie 1922)
[McKenzie, for an example, repeatedly says that ethical values are not to be
judged on their consistency. Ch IV, especially p. 242] – that ethics works within
the bounds of logic. For if ‘ought’ means ‘can’, then conversely ‘cannot’ means
‘ought not’. That is, if something is impossible (cannot be possibly achieved),
then one ought not to try to achieve it. Ethics does not ask for the impossible.
Thus it means that ethical theories can be applied in practice, because they are
principles we ought to follow.
Indian thinkers therefore insist that the ethical ideals are realizable. The matter
can be further explained by the fact that the purpose of ethics is to provide guidance
for practical life, and, if this is so, it should be possible to live and act in accordance
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 9

P. K. Mohapatra, An Applied Perspective on Indian Ethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7503-3_2
10 2 Ethics, Applied Ethics and Indian Theories of Morals
with the principles of ethics. It must be possible to apply ethical theories in the
world we live in. As Rajendra Prasad puts it most appropriately (Prasad 1999), ethi-
cal theories have a sort of built-in applicability, and moral principles are such that it
must not only be logically possible but also empirically possible to live and act in
accordance with them. For any such theory to be applicable, Prasad points out, the
world must be such that (a) it must not make its application impossible and (b) the
people in it, by their very nature, consider it as a valid moral principle and are
inclined to act in accordance with it. With these conditions satisfied, any theory that
is still not applicable to the world is what I propose to call a bad ethical theory,
which will have nothing to contribute to the making of a morally desirable world. I
shall argue that such theories will have to be toned down, even violated, in view of
the world being as it is and human nature being as it is. This we have to do for a
morally good reason; and so this will be a justified violation.
We must now proceed to illustrate and examine some cases of ethical theories
that are not applicable or difficult to apply and how our foregoing analysis and argu-
ment can help solve the problem. Let us take the moral principle of truth-telling for
an example. In ancient Indian tradition (perhaps this is true also of ancient traditions
everywhere), truth-telling, and conversely not telling lies, was considered the high-
est kind of virtue – a sadharana dharma – which no other dharma can override.
This is what Lord Krishna says in the Mahabharat and so says Bhisma several times
in the Shanti Prava thereof. To be sure, truth-telling is a great virtue; but taken in the
absolute, literal sense, the theories become inapplicable or lead to undesirable and
even morally disastrous consequences, if applied. It is said of an ancient scholar that
he decided not to open his lips in discussions of contentious issues, and when asked
about the reason for his cryptic silence, he would reply, ‘anrtat bhayam’; he was
afraid that he might say something that might turn out to be false! At the other
extreme (Prasad’s example), there is the case of the ancient saint, Kaushika, who
had vowed to speak only the truth. It so happened that one day, a group of passers-
by went hiding under a thicket near where the saint lived, since they were being
chased by some vicious bandits. When the bandits came and asked about them, the
saint told them the truth, and the bandits looted and killed those innocent men. What
is noteworthy is that, according to the epic, the truthful Kaushika had to taste the
horror of hell for having spoken that particular piece of truth. It is clear to our mini-
mum moral sense that the theory of truth-telling, taken literally, is a bad ethical
theory and needs to be toned down, or even violated, in a demanding situation like
the one described. That is the reason why Krishna himself had persuaded Dharmaraja
Yuddhistra to tell the lie about the death of Aswathama in order that Drona, the
invincible, may lay down his arms, and the battle of Mahabharat could be won by
the deserving Pandavas. In fact, as Prasad pointed out, the Mahabharat prescribes
such justified violations of the principle of truth-telling in five specific demanding
situations (Karna Parva, P.398, 31–33). Now, what is the ethical theory which,
being applied here, makes the violations of this great moral principle morally justi-
fied? Surely, it is consequentialism – judging the morality of actions on the basic of
prizable consequences. The same goes for the other celebrated sadharana dharmas
of non-stealing (asteya) and non-killing (ahimsa). Rsi Viswamitra made a justified
2 Ethics, Applied Ethics and Indian Theories of Morals 11
violation of the former when he stole some meat to save the lives of his starving
family, while Bhisma gave a similar treatment to the latter when he commended that
scriptural owl for breaking hundreds of eggs of a poisonous snake, thereby prevent-
ing calamitous loss of human lives from the numerous venomous snakes that would
have hatched out of those eggs. Since a great good resulted from this, the so-called
adharma committed by the owl was as good as, or perhaps better than, the normally
considered dharma of non-killing. Classical Indian theories of dharma, thus, con-
sider such violation of celebrated moral principles not only permissible but also
commendable. Violations in the Viswamitra-like situations are justified as apad
dharma or duty in emergent, calamitous situations. It is a matter of important moral
significance that it is not always irrational not to do what conventional morality
requires us to do, nor is it always rational (approved by moral rationality) to act as
per the moral commandments in the received sense. Take, for example, the maxim
that to forgive is divine. The Mahabharat, which is naturally expected to give assent
to this, has implicit instructions to the contrary. Prahlada says this to his grandson,
Bali, regarding the moral virtue of forgiving:
“…tasmat nityam kshyama tata panditeirapi varjita”
(forgiving in all conditions is not allowed, even by the wise people.)
A blanket commandment to forgive, a literal adherence to this commandment, can-

not be morally justified. For forgiveness granted indiscriminately to every offender,
irrespective of whether or not he sincerely realizes his guilt and repents and hence
deserves forgiveness, may be morally counterproductive on occasions and even
undesirable, for:
Yo mnityam kshamate’ tata, bahun dosan sah bindati/
Bhrtyah paribhavantyena-mudasinastharayah.// (Mahabharat vol. II, p. 1022: 7)
(He who always forgives all offenders indiscriminately acquires many defects; his ser-
vants, enemies as well as people unrelated to him do not take him seriously and rather dis-
respect him, and no one behaves with him in humble manner.)
Forgiveness is morally justified only if it is extended on morally justified grounds,

i.e. when extended to the offender who really deserves to be forgiven. Forgiveness,
like most moral values, is thus a conditional virtue, which admits of justified viola-
tion in demanding situations. Classical Indian ethics, some modern writings on it
also included, often miss the point because of proneness for absolutism and
generalism.
Moral values instantiate those important kinds of things, i.e. principles and rela-
tions, which hold necessarily, though, on occasions, they may be defeasible in over-
riding circumstances, where another competing value demands precedence. The
necessity of moral values is a weaker sort of necessity (we will have more to say
about it in the next chapter) that is different from the strictly logical form of absolute
necessity, which is unexceptionable and hence inapplicable to practical life. For eth-
ics, unlike logic, is a product of the society and social living that aims at promoting
values common and conducive to effective and desirable social living. In this sense,
it operates at the empirical level of social process, and so moral principles grow out
of taking due note of the peculiarities and relevance of particular cases of moraliz-
ing. The appropriateness of a value to be pursued, therefore, cannot be thought apart

from social realities. The normal situational fact is that people live in the society,
which runs through various circles of interactions which, in turn, demand ‘various
kinds and degrees of cooperation, competition and conflicts’ (Mackie 1977). Moral
values like truth-telling, therefore, need to be pursued accordingly. It would neither
be reasonable nor prudent to tell the truth to an enemy or a business competitor. A
business boss is not being dishonest if she does not speak the ‘whole truth’ in a press
conference; nor is an ailing patient being untruthful when she responds with ‘Fine!
Thank you’ to a visitor’s courtesy ‘How are you?’, which she would be in respond-
ing in similar manner to her attending physician’s question. Withholding truth in
such situations would not be a blanket violation of the virtue of truth telling and
defeasibility of a virtue under demanding situations does not and cannot turn this
virtue to a vice at all. In sufficiently demanding situations, like the one in which
Kaushika spoke the truth, a considerate and useful lie would have been a better
option – a morally better one – to an undesirable revelation of truth. And this would
have been a proper example of justified violation of a (conventional) moral princi-
ple – sanctioned, as we noted, by our scriptures and the masters of reputed tradi-
tions. This is not, however, to lapse into unfettered relativism, for the violations are
justified by a reasoned balance between the spirit of the principle and the demands
of the situation, without which ethics cannot be the social affair it is primarily meant
to be. Perhaps because of considerations like this, Mackie has warned by pleading:
‘A prudent man will not squander his limited stock of convincing lies, but use it
sparingly to the best effect’ (Mackie 1977, p. 18).
One may see a tension here between prudence or self-interest and moral reason,
which I have taken to be the justification for violating a principle on appropriate
occasions. Sidgwick, for example, saw this tension to be irresolvable. But the ten-
sion is only apparent; it will lose its apparent strength when it is seen that egoism or
the self-interest theory is a moral theory that occupies an important place in any
viable moral system. For everyone, in his own interest, should desire that there be a
moral system. A parallel can be drawn from the area of business ethics: if the aim of
business is the maximization of owner value, an ethical conduct of business (like
taking care of customer satisfaction, maintenance of quality, maintaining reasonable
profit margin and employees’ welfare, etc.) will achieve this purpose in the long run,
though this may result in short-term losses. So it is in its own interest that business
should be ethical. Good ethics results in good business, as advocated by Milton
Friedman and others. Thus, what is important is a viable moral system based on
cooperation and reciprocity, even amidst conflicts and competitions. And even if an
existing moral system is found not to be suitable to one’s self-interest, one should
try to modify it and not destroy it or run away from it. This brings us back again to
the significance of justified violations of moral principles which points, in turn, to
the fact that moral values are necessary but defeasible.
The conventional theory that moral values are absolute and not violable under
any circumstances is formally known as rigorism or the theory of duty for duty’s
sake. But despite its profundity and respectability in both western and eastern ethi-
cal history, rigorous pursuit of this theory is questionable in principle. To say the
2 Ethics, Applied Ethics and Indian Theories of Morals 13
very least, the theory is not universal. It is true that people are normally lauded with
moral credit for doing things from a sense of duty, but this is not the case on all
occasions. We may sometimes justifiably praise somebody (morally, i.e.) for not
doing what normally was his duty, and we may, also justifiably, even blame him
(morally) had he done what was his duty just for the sake of doing his duty without
caring for and despite knowing well enough that it would lead to morally disastrous
consequences. In addition to our example of Rishi Kaushika and his truth-telling,
we may take another example from the area of professional ethics. A doctor, as a
normal human being, is normally obliged to convey the correct information about
the state of his patient’s health to the patient as well as to his family members. But
if the patient is suffering from a terminal disease, like blood cancer or brain cancer
and if, in addition, the patient’s father has serious cardiac history, then withholding
the correct information about his patient’s health, or even passing on an incorrect
information, would be morally praiseworthy. But passing on the correct informa-
tion, though it is the duty of the doctor as a normal human being, would not merit
moral credit, but rather in view of the catastrophe on the family, if it happens to
occur, would make him worthy of moral condemnation. Insisting steadfastly on
doing his duty and passing on the correct information would make him not only a
duty-fanatic but a bad professional too; for professional ethics demands a certain
sort of secrecy in the interest of an avoidable moral catastrophe. The compulsions of
his professional ethics, which require him to maintain the described secrecy, would
defeat and override the competing ethics of truth-telling, though a universal duty it
otherwise is. Sometimes, in situations like this, not to do one’s duty may become
one’s duty; by not passing on the correct information, he would be doing what it is
his duty not to do. This was so aptly expressed by Rajendra Prasad (Prasad 1989).
The concept of duty may thus merit modification, and a conventional duty thereby
may warrant violation as justified by the demands of the situation without making
any considerable departure from the spirit of the theory. Defeasibility and justified
violability, in our view, must define the nature and spirit of moral principles. On the
point of what I call justified violation and defeasibility of moral principles, a pos-
sible but recurring doubt will have to be got out of the way. We have seen that viola-
tion of a celebrated moral principle may be called for as morally justified under
demanding situations, but we have also been insisting that the demands of the situ-
ation must be properly balanced with the spirit of the principle at issue, which must
not be sacrificed and made totally subservient to the former. It must be remembered
that the aims of ethics, and hence of every moral principle, are to promote values
common and conducive to practical life and to provide effective guidance for moral
living. And the application of ethical theories must be made accordingly. But apply-
ing a principle in its absolute literal sense, we have seen, would in effect be contrary
to the spirit of the principle and would lead to morally undesirable consequences
(like the loss of innocent lives as a result of truth-telling by Kaushika). That is why,
toning down or even violating these principles, say of truth-telling, will be morally
justified in the sense that its result would be morally desirable and hence in keeping
with the spirit of the principle. Withholding the truth or even telling a lie on the part
of Kaushika in the described circumstances would not strictly be considered viola-
tion of the spirit of the principle of truth-telling which (the spirit) is, after all, meant
to promote moral good, and saving the lives of innocent passers-by, even at the cost
of telling a (morally desirable) lie, can never be anything other than moral good. In
making such (justified) violations, we would not be making any exception to the
morality of the principle but only to the scope of its application (Prasad 1989,
p. 272). There are, here, two principles in conflict, namely, truth-telling and saving
the lives of innocent people. The former is defeated under the circumstances and is
overridden by the latter, which is a more comprehensive value with higher authority.
In the face of this, revelation of truth is morally undesirable and hence is not morally
justified. This does not mean that truth-telling under normal circumstances would
cease to be a virtue; this only means that truth-telling, like most moral principles, is
a defeasible moral principle, violable under appropriately demanding situations.
Later on, I shall argue that the same applies in the case of the conflict between svad-
harma and sadharana dharma in the tricky situation that Arjuna faced in the battle
of Mahabharat and that in the interest of fighting a righteous war, Arjuna’s svad-
harma had an arguable overriding capacity. Because of this, I would also like to
argue, Yudhisthira’s telling the lie about Aswathama’s death had the overriding
claim in the interest of winning a righteous war which was morally justified and
which could not have been possible without his telling this lie. Tricky situations of
conflicts of principles, though few, are not rare and ignorable in the complexities of
practical life, and these situations call for sophistication, in the form of exercising
critical power, in moralizing. Violation of the absolute form of moral principles in
the greater interest of preserving the spirit of the principles is an important element
of this sophistication and is thus a significant aspect of applied ethics.
Absolute Standards Account for Inapplicability
It may be asked now: if the absolutistic version (should we say, literal version) of
these celebrated theories is thus bad ethical theories – because inapplicable or disas-
trous, if applied – then how and why our great seers had tended to stick to them? It
is mainly because they had failed to know the subtle nature of dharma (i.e. duty). To
know this, I would say, is to know when to follow a sadharana dharma (duty of all
men) and when to make a justified exception to it, to know to what extent and with
what stringency one has to follow a moral rule and when to make an exception to it
without sacrificing the spirit of the principle and without ignoring the demands of
the situation. Kaushika failed in this, and Viswamitra too would have failed had he
allowed himself and his family to die of starvation rather than living on stolen meat.
Besides this, there is another important factor which makes an ethical principle
inapplicable or unattractive. Generally ethical theories are formulated by men of
extraordinary nobility and exemplary strength of character, who set the moral stan-
dards too high for the common man with normal moral faculties to reach these
standards. Thus, if a normative ethical theory keeps its moral norms so high that
‘they become unreachable for the common man, prescribe principles he cannot
Absolute Standards Account for Inapplicability 15
emulate or recommend actions he cannot perform, it is bound to be dissuasive’

(Prasad 1989, p. 270). Indeed, in a very reasonable sense, such theories cannot be
called normative ethical theories in as much as their ‘norms’ fly far away from the
normal. As Rajendra Prasad makes the point, a normative ethical theory must per-
tain to what ought to be and what ought to be done as well as what normally is
and what normally is done, because the concepts of the normative and normal share
the common parentage in the concept of norm. As a result of long communicative
use to do different kinds of jobs, they may develop different logical (i.e. functional)
characters and obscure their family resemblance, but their parentage can never be
obliterated. It is not suggested that the norms of the ethical theories should be easy
and soft so that no effort would be necessary to live up to them. All I wish to say,
which I have put forth as a condition of applied ethics, is that living up to the ethical
norms must be possible not only logically but also empirically in the world we live,
move and have our being. A Platonic picture of the moral order as a single system
of actually existing perfect prototypes, (as found, e.g. in the divine command theory
and in the natural law theory) is useless and unhelpful. For, “it succeeds in creating
an indubitable and infallible authority of the prototype only by (stipulatively) defin-
ing it so and by making it altogether distinct and separate from our ordinary fallible
thinking and acting, but thereby making it useless for improving our actual [moral,
PKM] practice” (Baier 1997). Guidance for a good moral living, which a normative
ethical theory aims at giving, is needed more by the ordinary man than by a savant
or saint. Indeed, as some Indian moral philosophers have made clear, ethics and
ethical standards are not applicable in the case of these liberated souls. ‘It is obvi-
ous’, says McKenzie, ‘…that in a certain sense ethical categories are not applicable
[in these cases, PKM], He who has attained moksa is beyond good and evil’
(McKenzie 1922, p. 77).
The Chandogya Upanishad points out that no evil can cling to a knower just as
no water can cling to a lotus leaf (iv.14.3). The saints with the purity of their liber-
ated souls can do nothing moral or immoral. The ethical teachings of the Upanishads
are relevant and rather necessary for an individual’s preparation for this liberation.
It pertains to this lower stage of life of the ordinary man. The saint who is untouched
by evil and good can afford the luxury of the most arduous moral standards, which
he can follow but no ordinary man can. In the austerity of moral absolutism, where
angels revel, mortals are likely to falter. And in the fact of occasional failures lie the
key to all that goes to make the significance of human freedom and moral account-
ability. For only in the possibility of doing something wrong that someone’s con-
duct can be morally judged; and one who just cannot do anything wrong is outside
the scope of the moral scanner. It is because of this that the Buddha pleaded for an
ethical code known as madhyamarga or the middle path. He has very rightly said
that it is pointless to lay out a road on which only the extremely sturdy can walk. An
exalted but inapplicable ethical theory is like a marvellous mansion with cracks on
its roof; it will be held in high adoration as long as one is not going to live in it. What
is required, therefore, is that the described gulf between the infallible moral stan-
dards and the actual moral practice is bridged, so that the Platonic prototypes would
be brought down to earth and made applicable to society and the world at large. That
is why, Kurt Baier pleads for construing the moral order as a social order and moral-
ity as essentially applicable to society. A social order, Baier goes on to say, is a
certain character or quality possessed by societies, which may possibly be very dif-
ferent from each other but qualify as a moral order by virtue of sharing the same
social order (ibid).
Logical Consistency and Applicability
A moral theory, like any genuine philosophical theory, must be logically consistent.
Just as it is impossible to think illogically, so also a logically indefensible normative
theory cannot provide any guidance for a moral life and hence for what I have been
referring to as a desirable world. Only by making our moral theories logically con-
sistent (free from ‘cracks in the roof’) can we apply them to human life for the
promotion of the good life. The function of moral philosophy, as that of philosophy,
must not be merely reportive but analytic and reconstructive, by which our ethical
theories can be made logically consistent, wherever necessary, and applied effec-
tively to the world. Hence the justification of ‘justified violations’ of exalted theo-
ries of morals. Although, as we have seen, there have been some cases in classical
Indian ethics where this sort of exercise has been taken resort to, this has not been
so in many of our celebrated theories of morals, especially as envisaged in our epics
and the Bhagavad Gita. By way of illustration, I pick out two cases of what I call
bad ethical theories, one of which, because of flawed logic, could not be effectively
applicable and inevitably led to several moral crises, and the other, because of its
exalted absolute standards, led to morally disastrous consequences, when applied.
The former is the theory of dharmas (duties) in the Bhagavad Gita, and the latter is
the principle of promise keeping of Bhisma in the Mahabharat.
Let me briefly deal with the latter first. Bhisma pratijna – the promise keeping of
Bhisma – is a proverbial moral ideal in India’s scriptural tradition. Bhisma was
promise bound to protect the throne of Hastinapura and be loyal to the king, and he
kept this promise till his last breath. But in the process of his promise keeping, he
was forced to do what Dhritarastra desired him to do and even had to fight against
his dearest Pandavas, knowing fully well that king Dhritarastra and the heir appar-
ent to the throne, Duryodhana, were on serious immoral path. What is worse, even
after the deceitful game of dice, when the virtuous Draupadi was shabbily treated
and was going to be disrobed in public by the wicked brother of Duryodhana,
Bhisma, the paragon of virtues and dharma, remained a helpless spectator. Even
when asked by wailing Draupadi whether it was right and in accordance with
dharma on the part of Yudhishthira to put her on stake, after having lost his freedom
and hence his agency, in the game of dice, Bhisma pleaded inability to answer her
question on the plea that the meaning of dharma was too deep and subtle (Mahabharat
vol. II, Dyutaprva) to admit of a clear answer. This may be so with the meaning of
dharma; but our moral common sense cannot accept disrobing of a virtuous lady of
a great family – for that matter any woman – in public as a dharmic action in any
Dharmas, Conflicts and Defeasibility 17
sense of the term, much less can it accept the fact that Bhisma, whom Lord Krishna
described as the repository of dharma (“dharma mayonidhih”), did not have enough
knowledge to answer Draupadi’s question and prevent the pernicious immoral
attempt to disrobe her. It was a different matter that Krishna prevented the disrobing
of Draupadi, but morality was disrobed that day and nobody tried to prevent that. At
any rate, it was Bhisma’s literal adherence to the abstract theory of promise keeping
which not only kept him from preventing this particular act of immorality; it also
kept him from preventing a great moral disaster, the destruction of the whole royal
dynasty! His violating this principle under these demanding circumstances would
have told us a different story, most certainly about a morally desirable world.
Dharmas, Conflicts and Defeasibility
I now turn to Gita theory of dharma that recognizes two types of dharma – swad-
harma and sadharana dharma – both of which constitute a very fundamental nor-
mative structure of classical Indian ethics. First, let us consider the swadharma or
what is also known as varnadharma (one’s duty as a member of a particular varna).
It has been maintained in the Bhagavad Gita that, for a balanced and effective func-
tioning of the social system, God created four varnas of men and assigned to them
four different types of duties or dharmas. The duties of a person belonging to a
particular varna is called varnadharma or his swadharma: for Brahmins, it is wor-
ship, teaching and preaching; for kshatriyas, to rule over and protect the country; for
the Vaisyas, diligence, tread and commerce; and for the Sudras, to work for the
other three castes, presumably to enable them to perform their duties effectively,
thereby facilitating effective division of labour. Krishna says in the Gita that he
made this assignment of the different varnadharmas on the basis of gunas (nature,
qualities) and karmas (natural dispositions to act in certain ways): ‘guna karma
vibhagasah chaturvarnam maya srustam’ (Bhagavad-Gita, IV). Besides the four
types of swadharma, there are a set of general duties called sadharana dharma, or
samanya dharma, i.e. duties obligatory for all men irrespective of whichever varna
they belong to. These are the ones like truth-telling, non-killing, non-stealing, etc.
Both these types of duties – swadharma and sadharana dharma – are supposed to
be obligatory, a kind of categorical imperative, which are best performed in a nis-
karma way or desireless manner – with no desire or concern for consequences that
may follow their actions. Whether any action can at all be performed in this manner
is a debatable question, which will be dealt with later in Chap. 8. My present con-
cern is to examine the necessity of these imperatives and their applicability.
It has been shown already that the duties like truth-telling, non-killing and non-
stealing, which come under sadharana dharma, are not applicable if taken as obliga-
tory (for their application in some situations lead to morally disastrous consequences)
and should therefore be applied with exceptions under suitably demanding situa-
tions. We have now to see the logicality of the varnadharmas or swadharmas being
obligatory and categorical as claimed by the authors of this theory.
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haystacks. I enquired the meaning, and was told I was looking upon an
Indian village, and these were wigwams. I was delighted to behold a
veritable Indian lodge, and to see real Indians, instead of those half
civilized beings I had met at Niagara. They are a body of Chippeway
Indians who reside upon Warpole Island under the care of a Missionary of
the Methodist church. Their wigwams consisted of poles meeting at top,
around which, coarse matting, formed of reeds is fastened. From the apex of
these cones smoke was rising, telling of culinary operations going on
within. Around each lodge was a small patch of potatoes or corn. A small
church, with the missionary cottage and a few log cabins, were in the midst.
Groups of Indians were lounging upon the bank gazing at us, while others
unconcernedly pursued their usual occupations of fishing or hoeing. How
much more graceful were those wild sons of the forest, than the civilized
men I had observed upon the shores I had passed. Their mantles of cloth or
blanket stuff, trimmed with gay colors, were gracefully thrown around
them, and their ornamented leggins or moccasins glittered as they walked.
How dignified is the tread of an Indian! we remarked as we passed the
island, many in various occupations and attitudes, yet they never moved
awkwardly, nor sprang, nor jumped in a clumsy manner. The missionary
cottage was an object of great interest to us. I had often read of these self-
denying disciples of Jesus, but never before looked upon the scene of their
labors. Here in this lonely shore, away from all they love—their friends and
home—and almost shut out from the face of civilized man, they spend their
days in laboring to ameliorate the lot of these unhappy children of the
forest. In bringing them to the feet of their master, they are indeed
conferring a blessing upon them past all return. As a recompense for the
bright land their fathers have taken from the bereaved Indian, they are
leading them to another, brighter and more lasting. There is no change, nor
shadow of turning—there, no enemy can destroy their homes—there, the
tears are wiped from their eyes, and all their sorrows soothed. Noble
missionary, who can appreciate thy sacrifice? None but those who have
come from a civilized land, where thou hast passed thy early days, and who
now sees thee among the endless forests with no associates save those
wretched savages, can understand the greatness of thy disinterestedness.
During the short summer, a residence may be tolerable, but when the rivers
and lakes are choaked up by ice, the short glimpse he has obtained of his
fellow man, while whirled past in a steamboat, will be denied him. The roar
of the winter wind will shake his cottage, and the wolf will scare him from
his slumbers. But what are earthly joys or sorrows to a child of Christ? His
meat and drink is to do the will of him that sent him, and in return for the
comforts and pleasures of civilized life, he receives a peace ‘the world
cannot give’—a joy, David in all the glory of his kingly life sighed for,
when he prayed ‘Give me the joy of thy salvation.’ A small settlement is
formed at the mouth of Black river, called Port Huron, which is to be the
termination of another canal across the state.
Here we found another vessel waiting for wind. It was the brig Rocky
Mountain, bound to Green Bay, being attached to our other side we passed
‘doubly armed.’ Near the point where the river leaves lake Huron stands
fort Gratiot, an United States military station whose white walls and
buildings, over which the American flag was waving, looked out brightly
from among the dark forest of the Michigan shore. A line of blue coats were
going through their morning drill; and a few cannons looked out fiercely
upon us. A small white Gothic church, and a cottage stood near; the whole
making a pretty cabinet picture. The river now narrowed to a quarter of a
mile, upon each side a point—the American side crowned by a light-house,
and the Canadian by a cluster of Indian cabins. A bark canoe, paddled by
five Indians, pushed off the shore and came after us with the greatest
rapidity, their long black hair flying wildly behind them. Our two vessels
retarded our motion a little, so that the Indians overtook us, and kept at our
side for some distance. They used their paddles with astonishing quickness,
and we were surprised to see them in their ‘light canoe,’ keep pace with our
large steamboat. It was however for a short distance only—they were soon
fatigued with such great exertion, and turned towards the point, and sprang
out, or rather stepped out with the greatest dignity, drew the canoe to the
shore, and then squatted down upon the bank evidently enjoying their race.
I use the above inelegant word, as being very expressive of their posture.
The Indian never sits down as we do—with his feet close beside each other,
and his body erect, he sinks slowly down—his blanket is then thrown over
his head and around his feet, so that nothing is seen except his dark glaring
eyes. Through the narrow pass before mentioned, between the two points,
the waters of Huron run with a swift current. Here we were furnished with
another evidence of the rise of these waters.
An officer of the army and his wife were our fellow voyagers, very
intelligent and agreeable persons. They had been stationed at fort Gratiot a
few years since, and had frequently roved over the beach around the light-
house in search of the pretty silecious pebbles, agate, camelian, and
calcedony, which are often found upon these shores. To their surprise, they
now found their favorite point, ‘curtailed of its fair proportions’ by a rise of
nearly five feet of water. Our steamboat and its two ‘tenders,’ passed
between the points out of St. Clair river, and we found ourselves at once in
a large and shoreless lake, with nothing in front, between us and the bright
blue sky, which touched the green waters in the far horizon beyond. The
transition is so sudden from the narrow opening, to the boundless lake as to
produce a grand and exciting effect. Once out upon the calm waters of
Huron, our two guests were loosened from their tackles, and spreading their
huge wings, they passed one to each shore, and we soon left them far
behind. About an hour after, the bell of our steamboat startled the still lake
with its clamors, denoting the approach of some vessel. We looked out in
time to see the noble steamboat Great Western rush past us as if upon the
wings of a whirlwind. She was on her way from Chicago to Buffalo. Her
bell answered ours, and the deck was crowded with passengers. One of
these standing alone by himself, and taking his hat off attracted our notice
and we discovered in him an old acquaintance from New York. These
meetings in a distant land are very interesting, carrying our feelings at once
to the home we had left. This steamboat is one of the largest upon the lakes,
is finished in a style of great elegance, and is said to be as long as the
English steamship of the same name.
This whole day since ten o’clock—we have been passing through Huron
under a cloudless sky. The lake is two hundred and fifty-five miles long,
and its waters are of a deeper tint than those we have passed, owing to its
great depth, as we are sailing over nine hundred feet of water, while in some
places it is said to be unfathomable. The color is a dark olive almost black,
and it is only when the sun shines through the waves that we can perceive
they are green. The cause of the various colors of water has produced many
a hypothesis. Sir Humphry Davy tells us the primitive color of water is like
the sky, a delicate azure.[13] He says ‘the finest water is that which falls
from the atmosphere—this we can rarely obtain in its pure state, as all
artificial contact gives more or less of contamination; but, in snow melted
by the sunbeams that has fallen upon glaciers, themselves formed from
frozen snow, may be regarded as in its state of greatest purity. Congelation
expels both salt and air from water whether existing below, or formed in the
atmosphere; and in the high and uninhabited region of glaciers, there can
scarcely be any substances to contaminate. Removed from animal and
vegetable life, they are even above the mineral kingdom.’ Water from
melted snow, then considered as the purest, Sir Humphrey goes on to
describe its color. ‘When a mass is seen through, it is a bright blue, and
according to its greater or less depth of substance, it has more or less of this
color.’ ‘In general when examining lakes and masses of water in high
mountains, their color is the same bright azure. Capt. Parry states that water
in the Polar ice has the like beautiful tint.’ The brown, green, and other
colors of rivers he imputes to substances over which they flow, as peat
bogs, vegetable and mineral substances. He allows the sea cannot be
colored from any thing upon the bottom, but imputes the tint to the infusion
of iodine, and brome which he has detected in sea water, the result of
decayed marine vegetables. Of this primitive water are our lakes formed,
originating as they do in regions of snow and ice. Lake Superior, from
whence they flow, is a vast basin of trap rock, of volcanic origin.[14] It is
the most magnificent body of water in the world, five hundred miles long,
and nine hundred deep, and perfectly pellucid. Into this pure, and originally,
azure primitive water, there flow forty rivers, upon the south side alone,
according to Mr. McKenney of the Indian department, who counted this
number from St. Mary’s to the river St. Louis. These rivers he tells us are
all amber colored. Why then may not these yellow rivers flowing into blue
water, produce green. You see I like to hazard a hypothesis as well as
others. I hope you will not call this absurd. Col. McKenney himself,
imputes the green color to reflection of the ‘rays of light passing through
the foliage of the shores, conveying their own green hue unto the surface of
the water from which they are reflected.’ This might be the case in small
rivers or lakes, but it cannot thus tint such a vast extent of water. A writer in
the American Journal of Science, is of opinion the color of water is
reflected from the sky, and is blue, dull, black, or golden, as the sky may be
—and that ‘green is produced in water, by the yellow light of the sun mixed
with the cerulean blue through which it shines.’ On the contrary the Count
Xavier de Maistre,[15] does not impute the color of water to any infused
substance, nor to reflection from above, but reflection from the surface
below, ‘as the blue color of the sky is owing to reflection from the earth
beneath.’ ‘Limpid waters, when they have sufficient depth,’ says the Count,
reflect like air, a blue color from below,—and this arises from a mixture of
air, which water always contains to a greater or lesser amount. This blue
color, being the primitive hue of water is sometimes clouded or lost by
earthy infusion, or reflections from a colored sky. The green tinge which he
sometimes observed in water, he tells us, is occasioned by reflection from a
white surface below. This he proves by his experiment of a sheet of tin
painted white let down beneath the water—and his description of the water
in the beautiful limestone grotto, on the shore of the Mediteranian at Capri.
The green tint observed in the ocean is only seen when it is so shallow, as to
reflect the sun’s rays from the earth beneath it.
As the States surrounding these lakes are more or less underlaid by
limestone, we may suppose the bottoms of the waters are in some places
paved with it; and from this, or the shores under the water and around it,
may be reflected, according to the Count’s theory, the light which gives the
water a green appearance. But I will not trouble you with any more
speculations; they come with an ill grace from me who only pretend to
describe all that passes before my eyes.
In the afternoon we were off Saginaw bay, an indentation in the coast of
Michigan running seventy or eighty miles deep and forty wide, making the
lake here very broad; in one spot we were out of sight of the land. A river of
the same name flows into the bay, upon which, about twenty-three miles
from its mouth, is a small town. A canal is proposed from this bay, across
the state to lake Michigan, at Grand or Washtenog river. How shall I convey
to you an idea of the loveliness which sat upon earth, air, and water this
afternoon! Certainly that sunset upon lake Huron is the most beautiful I
have ever beheld. The vast and fathomless lake, bounded by the heavens
alone, presented an immense circle, ‘calm as a molten looking-glass,’—to
quote from my favorite Job—surrounded by a band of fleecy clouds,
making a frame work of chased silver. Slowly and gracefully sank the orb,
the white clouds gently dispersing at his approach, and leaving their
monarch a free and glorious path. As he drew near that chrystal floor, all
brilliancy faded from the face of the lake, save one bright pathway from the
sun to us—like the bridge of Giamschid leading from earth to heaven. The
sun which I had always been accustomed to see above, was now below me,
near the water, on the water, under the water! A veil of purple is thrown
over it, and now the sun sleeps on lake Huron. The gold and rose which
painted the western sky have gone. Darkness has stolen over the world
below, and we turn our eyes above. What a high and noble dome of
loveliest blue! Upon one side there hangs a crescent of the purest pearly
white, while at its side steals forth one silver star, soon followed, as, saith
Ezekiel, by ‘all the bright lights of heaven,’ until night’s star-embroidered
drapery is canopied around us. What bosom is insensible to this gorgeous
firmament? Who hath not felt the ‘sweet influence of the Pleiades’ while
gazing at this starry roof above? I wish I could make you a piece of poetry
upon this subject, but as there is enough already composed upon the stars, I
will send you a bit of Byron and tell you—
Blue roll the waters—blue the sky
Spreads like an ocean hung on high,
Bespangled with those isles of light,
So wildly spiritually bright,
Whoever gazed upon them shining,
And turned to earth without repining.
Do you remember that little hymn our old nurse used to teach us in our
childhood:
Twinkle, twinkle, pretty star

Can’t you tell us what you are,
Up above the world so high
Like a diamond in the sky.
Yes, from childhood to manhood, we wish to penetrate into the mysteries of

those golden regions, and ever ask them to tell us ‘what you are.’ We see
them gem the night with their lustrous beauty; we watch them as they pace
their azure courts, and lose ourselves in high imaginings, too vast for us,
while earth still keeps our souls its prisoner. How much deeper must be the
interest with which the astrologer of old followed them in their ‘golden
tracks.’ In them he read his destiny, and thought to see the scenes of earth
reflected in their light. How must he have gazed upon them, as their rays
paled or brightened, while reading in them ‘the fate of man and empires.’
Man’s efforts to penetrate the mysteries of these glorious creations have not
been all in vain. The Almighty architect, from time to time, graciously
bestows upon him, knowledge of ‘parts of his ways.’ How much more has
been vouchsafed to us than to the early nations. Looking back through the
vista of the past, we shall see great men appear, as ‘stars to rule the night’ of
our darkness and tell us of creation’s mysteries. Solomon, Ptolemy,
Gallileo, Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Paschal, Newton, Herschel, with a host
of satellites, have been graciously shown the book of knowledge, to light
man’s pathway through the earth, and enlarge his ideas of the magnificence
and the benevolence of his Creator. ‘In the beginning,’ it did not enter into
God’s purpose to tell mankind more of the starry host, than that they were
‘lights to rule the night,’ and for ‘signs and for seasons;’ now see what
amazing things have been shown to us. We know they are worlds like our
own, filled with mountains and seas; having night and day, summer and
winter. We see their fields, now white with snow, now dark with returning
vegetation. How our hearts bound with hopes of future knowledge; and
imagine the time will come, when we can gaze upon their landscapes, and
‘listen to the hum of their mighty population.’[16] We have seen nature in all
its power and grandeur, while tossed on Erie’s waves, or listening to the
thunder of Niagara; but here she is at rest in all her quiet loveliness; and
would her worshippers behold her in her fairest mood, let them come and
gaze at evening on lake Huron.
July 4th.—The sun and I arose at the same time. When I left my state-
room, as if waiting to greet me, it arose majestically from the bosom of the
water, flooding the lake with light. No land was descried upon the east, but
we were near the Michigan shore off Thunder bay. The Shanewaging
islands which stretch across it were distinctly visible, and presented various
beauties of shape and tint. All trace of man has now disappeared, for the
northern part of Michigan has never been settled owing to the intense cold
of the winters. We have passed a long line of coast without any inhabitant
(except a forlorn woodman’s hut in one spot) stretching for two hundred
and fifty miles, covered with boundless forests, in whose green recesses
there are paths ‘which no fowl knoweth, and which the vultures eye hath
not seen.’ Here is the home of the bear, the elk, and the moose-deer—and
upon the aspen, oak, and maple trees, sport the blue bird, the robin, and
yellow hammer, undisturbed by the foot of man. We have now past the
bounds of civilization, and our vessel is the only spot of life in this vast
region of forest and water.
From the entrance of Lake Huron to Mackinac, there were but two
places where man was visible. At the mouth of the Zappa river soon after
entering the lake, there is a cabin where a woodman resides in the summer
season to supply the steamboats; and at Presque Isle where we stopped in
the afternoon there is another cluster of cabins, and woodpiles. Our Captain
did not stop at this latter place, as he did not like their wood, it being chiefly
swamp ash. The shore is low, covered with trees, having below, a beach of
yellow sand, until just before coming in sight of Michilimackinac when the
land becomes a little elevated. Ten miles this side of the last mentioned
place, we passed Boisblanc, a large wooded island, taking its name of
‘white wood’ from the silver barked birch tree. This island belongs to
government, and its only inhabitants, save a few straggling Ottowas are the
family of the light-house keeper whose pretty tenement, and stately light-
house, appear upon a projecting point. There is also a farm upon the island
given by government to the Missionaries of Michilimackinac, who
sometimes maintain a farmer upon it. O Mackinaw, thou lonely island, how
shall I describe thy various beauties! certainly for situation, history, and
native loveliness, it is the most interesting island in our States. We approach
it through an avenue of islands, Drummond and Manitoulin, dimly seen on
our east, and Boisblanc, and Round, in our western side. Stretching across
our path, far away in front of us, is Mackinaw, painted against the clear blue
sky. The island of Michilimackinac, or Mackinaw, or Mackinac as it is
commonly spelt and pronounced, is a high and bold bluff of limestone
about three hundred feet above the water, covered with verdure. Its name
signifies in the Indian tongue great turtle, as it is something of the figure of
this animal. At the foot of the bluff are strewed the buildings of the town.
Among the most conspicuous of these are, the agency house and gardens,
residence of Mr. Schoolcraft, Indian Agent—and the church and mission
house. Along the beach were several Indian wigwams, while numerous
pretty bark canoes were going and coming, as this is the Indian stopping
place. A very beautiful, and conspicuous object was the United States fort,
presenting at a distance the appearance of a long white line of buildings
inserted, into the top of the island high above the town. As we approached,
its picturesque block-houses and the pretty balconied residences of the
officers, came out to view, having the banner of the ‘stripes and stars’
waving over them. While gazing at this fair picture, suddenly a brilliant
flame, and volumes of white smoke arose above the fort, while a booming
sound told us they were firing their mid-day salute in honor of the day. This
added much to the beauty and grandeur of the scene. As our boat was to
remain there for some hours, we disembarked and ascended to the fort to
visit our friends the commanding officer and his family. We found them
sitting upon their balcony, looking down upon the newly arrived steamboat.
After the first greetings and mutual enquiries were over, we were shown all
it was thought would interest us.
The view from our friend’s balcony was beautiful in the extreme. The
bay in front, the lovely islands around covered with a luxurious vegetation
—the town spread out at our feet—the Indian lodges, and the canoes
skimming the bright waters, each called forth our expressions of
admiration. Passing into the interior of the fort, and through the fine parade
ground and a large gateway, we found ourselves upon the summit of the
island. Our path lay through copses of white birch, maple, and various other
trees, and over green sward covered with strawberries and a variety of wild
flowers. Our friends kindly gathered for me a variety of these, among which
was a fine scarlet lilium superbum, blue bells, and kinni kanic, or Indian
tobacco, and a pretty plant called Indian strawberry. Suddenly the silver
tones of woman’s voice, sounded near, and in a fairy dell we came upon a
tent, surrounded by a party of ladies and gentlemen, busily engaged
preparing for a fete in honor of the day. Among them was the daughter of
our host, and some of the celebrated family of S——t. We were presented
to the party, and were quite chagrined our limited time would not permit us
to accept their invitation to remain and partake of their festivities. The grace
and beauty of Mrs. S——t made great impression upon us. To me she was
peculiarly interesting from the fact of her being descended from the native
lords of the forest; for you know I have always taken the greatest interest in
the fate of our Indian tribes. From the accent, the deep brunette of her
smooth skin, and her dark hair and eyes, I should have taken her for a
Spanish lady. From the tent we wound our way up to a high peak of the
island. When near the summit, we left a grove, and saw before us one of the
most picturesque and singular objects imaginable. It was a high arched rock
of white limestone, stretching across a chasm before us, making a pretty
natural bridge, through which we gazed far down into the waves of Huron,
at least two hundred feet below. The surprise, the beauty and novelty of this
striking object, brought forth expressions of admiration from us. The white
arch was adorned with tufts of wild flowers, and shrubbery. Ascending the
arch, we gazed down upon the white beach below, whose pebbles could be
here distinctly seen under the limpid water although many feet deep—and
out upon the fair waters, and the pretty islands, which
“——Like rich and various gems inlay

The unadorned bosom of the deep.”
We were obliged to be satisfied with a hasty view of this charming

scene, as our time was limited; and we turned reluctantly towards our boat,
without visiting the ruins of fort Holmes, upon the high summit of the
island. While passing through the town we observed several antique houses
which had been erected by the French, who first settled this place in sixteen
hundred and seventy three.
These are frail delapidated buildings, covered with roofs of bark. Upon
the beach a party of Indians had just landed, and we stood while they took
down their blanket sail, and hauled their birch bark canoe about twenty feet
long, upon the shore. These are the Menominies or wild rice eaters, the
ugliest Indians I had ever seen—also Winebagoes, with dark skin, low
foreheads and shaggy hair, and having no pretentions to dress. I saw a chief
however afterwards who was gaily bedizened with tinsel, beads, and paint,
having one side of his face a light pea green, and the other cheek scarlet.
We watched them erect their lodges which was done very soon—a few
poles were placed in a circle, one end of each stood in the earth, while the
others met at the top—coarse matting was folded around these, leaving an
opening for a door, over which a blanket was hung. Some matting being
spread upon the floor inside, the children and moveables were placed
inside, and the canoe drawn up near it. We visited some of the shops and
laid up a store of Indian articles, which are made by these poor people and
sold here. Among them were small baskets called Mococks, made of birch
bark embroidered with porcupine quills, stained different colors—this was
filled with maple sugar. It is pleasant to meet friends so far from home, but I
think the pleasure is almost counterbalanced by the pain of parting. This we
felt keenly, when the planks had withdrawn, and our friends had been
forced to leave us, as we gazed after them winding their way up to the fort,
the shores, and waters around seemed more desolate, more lonely than
before.
Just before the steamboat started we had an opportunity of judging of the
boasted transparency of this water, its depth having prevented this on our
voyage. I looked down into it from the boat, where it was twenty feet deep,
and could scarcely believe there was anything but air between us and those
shining pebbles below. We had also an opportunity of hearing some Indian
music. Upon the shore sat a group of unearthly beings, one of whom struck
several taps upon a sort of drum, accompanied by the others, in what
sounded like a wolf recitative—at the end of this all united in a yell which
dyed away over the lake, much in the style of a howling blast accompanied
by the shrieks of a drowning traveller. Our fishing party left us here to go
up the Sault St. Mary, into lake Superior, spending their summer days
among the picturesque scenery of that magnificent lake. We bade adieu with
much regret to this pretty island, whose green terraces, fort and picturesque
town, Indian lodges, and light canoes, made a beautiful scene—but the most
interesting point in the view, was that white handkerchief waving farewell
from the fortress balcony.
This island is 615 miles from Buffalo; 319 from Detroit. There are water
marks upon the rocks 200 feet above the lake, proving the water had once
stood so high. The scenery here has been prettily described by an author of
talent, Mrs. Jameson; but, as much pleased as I was with her book, I must
regret she came here under such circumstances. It is with reluctance I
censure one so gifted, but it is with a view of warning you, and my young
friends to whom I know you will show my letters, against errors to which
the very witchery of her genius would blind you. However passionate a
desire you may entertain for the picturesque, I hope you may never leave
the protection of your friends and wander in search of it alone. May your
curiosity to see great men never lead you to invade the retreat of a world
hating bachelor; and may you never stray in wild forests, through storms
and tempests, with no companion save a rude Indian, or a ‘bronzed,
brawney, unshaven, back-woodsman,’ ‘very much like a bear upon his hind
legs,’ and you ‘a poor, lonely, shivering woman.’ I quote her words. You
had better be a ‘tarry at home traveller,’ or write ‘voyages around my own
room.’ If you do thus, you must expect the ladies where you visit will look
‘formal and alarmed,’ as she tells us the ladies of Toronto looked upon her.
But now I have done scolding and will pursue my journey. Upon a green
slope of the Michigan shore, a pile of ruins were pointed out as the site of
old fort Mackinac, which was taken by Pontiac with a stratagem and
afterwards every one within were massacred. How must those unfortunates
have felt, upon this desolate shore, hundreds of miles away from their
country, and at the mercy of savages. A band of Chippewa’s or Ojibwa’s
were just passing in canoes thirty feet in length. This tribe stands higher in
rank than the others, and their language, like the French, is the polite tongue
among the Indian tribes. They have a ruler whose office has been hereditary
for ages. He is called Mudjikiwis, and they pride themselves much upon his
and their own rank and lineage. There is an anecdote, related by
Schoolcraft, of one of this tribe, which, if you have never seen, will amuse
you. Chi Waishki, alias the Buffalo, was presented by the commissioners of
the treaty of Fond du Lac, with a medal as a badge of distinction. ‘What
need have I of this?’ he said haughtily. ‘It is known whence I am
descended!’ These canoes are the prettiest and lightest things imaginable.
They are formed of the bark of the birch tree, sewn together with a thread
made from fine roots of cedar split. The bark is soaked to make it more
pliable. Sometimes they are very gaily painted and ornamented. The
paddles are of light wood. Our Captain placed before us at dinner a very
fine lake trout, which he had purchased at Mackinaw. It was two feet long,
and very delicious. Fine salmon are also taken in these lakes. We were now
upon the great lake Michigan, which stretches from here three hundred and
twenty miles, to the Illinois shore, and is nine hundred feet deep. Our
course lay near the Michigan shore, which presented high bluffs and points
of limestone, with banks of pebbles, and high jagged hills, or dunes of sand.
These pebbles and sand are said to be thrown up by the north-western
winds, but I should rather imagine them left up by the floods which have
swept over the land. Upon our right were Fox and Beaver isles, beyond
which, Green bay runs into Wisconsin, one hundred and three miles. This
northern shore of Michigan is uninhabited, and covered with dense forests.
The ledges and masses of white limestone upon some of these islands
looked like fortresses or other buildings.
July 5th.—Sunday upon the lake. When I left my cabin, I found the
morning was misty, and the sun looking like the yolk of an egg, was
bobbing up and down upon the water. It had just peeped above the waves,
which, dashing about, sometimes obscured it from our view. We were lying
at one of the Manitou islands, taking in wood. This is a pretty crescent
shape islet, covered with trees. In the centre we were told is a lake which is
unfathomable, and supposed to be connected with lake Michigan. It is filled
with the large trout, salmon and white fish of the lakes. There is a
woodman’s hut, and several large piles of wood upon the shore. ‘Oh that the
woodman would spare those trees.’ Soon the pretty island will be denuded
and forlorn. It is a sacred island—the Indians imagining it to be the
residence of their Manitou, never dare to land there, as they believe such an
intrusion would be followed by the anger of their Deity. One Indian, who
despised such superstition ventured upon the shore, and was never heard of
since. The forests and lake in the interior, they imagine is the abode of the
blessed after death, whose hours will there pass in hunting and fishing. The
Manitoulin islands in lake Huron, are also sacred; but they are much larger
than these, one of them being fifty-five miles in length. I secured a handful
of pebbles from the shore, which, like those of other lakes, are agate,
chalcedony and other sileceous minerals. Upon the shores of lake Superior
these are found very fine, mixed with trachte, lava, and other volcanic
rocks, and with masses of native copper. I had brought with me a package
of well selected tracks, which I opened this morning, and laid a few upon
the table of the ladies saloon. Soon after, a pretty little girl knocked at my
state-room door, saying her mother wished to know if I had any more tracts,
as she should like to read one. I asked her where were those I laid upon the
table? those, she replied, some ladies were reading. I gave her several. The
chambermaid next appeared begging for some; and then the cabin boy came
with the same request. While I was selecting one which I thought might suit
him, I observed a brawny dusky figure, with his shirt sleeves rolled up, and
his person begrimed with soot and smoke, gazing earnestly towards us.
‘That’s Tom, one of the fire-men,’ said the cabin boy with a snigger; ‘he
heard you had books to lend and wants one dreadfully.’ I beckoned to him,
and he came forward with alacrity, while behind him I discerned several
other ‘grim visaged’ beings peeping out from their compartment towards
us. I gave him a package to distribute among his fellows; and during the day
had the pleasure of observing the greater part of the crew and passengers
busily engaged with my books. During our long voyage, those who had
books had read them out, and those who had none, were getting very weary,
so that they eagerly received any thing in the shape of reading. But some of
them, I trust, read them for the sake of the benefit they hoped to receive
from their contents. It was a source of great satisfaction to behold so many
persons engaged in themes of high import to their soul’s best interest. These
seeds were sown with a prayer for their success; and who can tell what
immortal plants may spring up in some of their hearts, growing to a tree of
life, and bearing fruit to flourish in the garden of paradise. Let me urge you
never to travel without these, or other useful books to distribute on your
way—like the girl in the fairy tale of our youth, shedding gems and
treasures in your path. There is no library in this boat as upon our Hudson
and Eastern steamboats, and we were often amused with the alacrity with
which our books were snatched up when we laid them down for a strole, or
to look at some object upon the shores. When we returned we were always
sure to receive them again, and felt no vexation, as we knew they meant no
impoliteness, and would be willing to lend us their own in return. My
companion had never been used to such socialisms in his country, and was
quite amused at this free and easy sort of thing. Our books were some of
them French, and upon one occasion we found them in the hands of a
simple hearted son of the forest, to whom books were so rare a treasure he
could not resist examining them. He returned it with a smile, and said,
shaking his head, ‘how you can make any sense out of that I can’t see, for I
cannot read a word of it.’
We lost sight of the Michigan shore at ten o’clock, and stretched across
the lake towards the Wisconsin coast, which we first saw at four o’clock P.
M., thus being nearly all day out of the sight of land. This may give you an
idea of the vastness of these lakes. Wisconsin, or Ouisconsin, or Wiskonsan,
here presents a high bank, called ‘red banks,’ from the color of the soil,
covered with forests, and showing no trace of man, except at the mouth of
the river Sheboygan, two hundred and twenty miles from Mackinaw, where
is a small settlement called by the name of the river.
Fifty miles from Sheboygan we stopped at the town of Milwaukie,
towards which the tide of emigration has been rapidly flowing. As the bay
is crossed by a bar, our large boat could not enter, and a small steamboat
took from us much of our merchandise and most of our emigrants. We did
not go on shore, but contented ourselves with seeing the town from the
boat. It looked neat, with some comfortable dwellings, several shops, hotel,
court house, &c. It stands upon the Milwaukie river. Its population is 1,000.
Several rail-roads and canals are in contemplation from this place across the
territory, as rail-roads to Winnebago lake; from Belmont to Dubuque; from
Belmont to Dodgeville in the mine district; a canal from Milwaukie to the
Black river, and another through the Fox and Wisconsin to the Mississippi.
Wisconsin will be soon covered with a dense population, as it is now a
favorite point for emigration. The soil is very rich, from one to ten feet
deep, the surface undulating prairie and woodland, consisting of 100,000
square miles of fertile land. The grassy plains make fine pasture lands, and
the lakes and rivers produce abundance of fish, and give great
manufacturing power. Lakes Superior and Michigan, and the river
Mississippi surround three sides, thus enabling them to send their produce
to market. Flour, rye, corn, barley, white-fish, and many other articles have
been exported this year. Their lead mines are very rich, and their valuable
forests of pine trees will be another source of wealth. These growing to the
height of one hundred and eighty or two hundred feet, crown the heights of
the northern region of the country, which is mountainous, containing
several waterfalls, one of which is two hundred and fifty feet in height. The
scenery is very picturesque. Madison, the capital, is a pretty, thriving town,
surrounded by four transparent lakes, upon the shore of one of which it is
situated; it sometimes goes by the poetical appellation of ‘city of the four
lakes.’ When the roads and canals are formed, Wisconsin will soon become
a thoroughfare to the Mississippi and the vast regions beyond; and those
who have ‘the world before them,’ cannot make a better choice than this.
Here we left our Buffalo hunters. Racine is a town twenty-two miles below
Milwaukie. The houses looked new, and were arranged in rows upon the
high green bank. The court-house was quite showy, having a portico in
front, with pillars reaching to the roof, which was painted red, surmounted
by a tin cupola. It stands at the mouth of Root river. We were now again in
sight of Michigan, as the lake grows narrower towards the end. We have
passed completely around this state, it being in the shape of a triangle. It is
destined to be a great and flourishing State, surrounded as it is by the lakes,
crossed by rivers, canals, and railroads, and covered by a rich soil. It is two
hundred and eighty miles long by one hundred and eighty, and covers
40,000 square miles. It has only been admitted into the Union as a State in
1837, and now possesses a population of 211,705. The country is level,
except a table land in the center from which the rivers flow into lakes St.
Clair, Huron, and Michigan. The remainder is covered with grassy prairie
land, with transparent lakes, and tracts of woodland. Here grows the
valuable maple from which they obtain their sugar; the white birch, whose
bark is used for making canoes, roofing houses, or even when split fine, in
writing letters by the early settlers; the oak, the beech, the hickory,
sassafras, and various other valuable trees. Its energetic inhabitants are
busily engaged laying out canals and rail-roads to intersect it in every
direction, as means of conveying their produce to its market. One hundred
and thirty-one miles of rail-road has been contracted for, but only forty-four
miles finished, from Detroit to Ann Arbor. Over this 41,896 barrels of flour
were conveyed this year to Detroit. Three years since the inhabitants of this
state sent to Ohio for their flour, and now they export 125,000 barrels of
flour this year. Education is not neglected; the legislature have appropriated
1,200,000 acres of land as a school fund, which, as the land is rapidly
rising, will be of great value. The celebrated Schoolcraft tells us, it was
deemed so inaccessible from swamps, that in 1818, it was not thought fit for
the soldiers bounty lands. This was, however, soon discovered to be a
mistake. He further informs us, the soil is an argillaceous soil, mellowed
with sands and pebbles, underlaid with schistose and calcareous rocks,
clothed with an open growth of oaks and hickories, the ridges covered with
walnut, ash, beech, and maple, while the valleys are first rate corn land,
diversified with limpid lakes, grassy prairies and pebbly bottomed brooks.
July 6th.—When approaching Chicago, the ‘haven where we would be,’

I did not so much watch for the appearance of that famed town, as look
back with regret at the beautiful lake I was leaving, for I was well assured ‘I
ne’er should look upon its like again.’ Two days and two nights I had been
sailing over it, never tired of gazing at its varied shores, or beauteous
waters. Those who have never beheld these masses of pellucid, brilliant,
green waters, can never imagine the extraordinary loveliness of the scene.
They cover a surface of 150,000 square miles, and contain nearly half the
fresh water upon the surface of the globe. That the water is fresh, is of great
importance to those who dwell upon their shores, as it can be of more use
for household purposes, and machinery. The valley in which the lakes
repose, is said to have been hewed out by the deluge, leaving the deep
chasms in which the waters lie; this is called the valley of the St. Lawrence,
and very properly; but I must object to this immense chain of lakes, four
and five hundred miles long, and nine hundred deep, being called the ‘river
St. Lawrence,’ as some fashionable tourists have of late. The St. Lawrence
river is an outlet, but is no more entitled to this designation, than is Niagara
or St. Clair river. These lakes all lie in a valley which interposes between
the primitive and secondary formations. The northern shores are granite
rocks, sterile, and scarcely inhabited; while the southern is rich alluvion,
covering sandstone and limestone.
The bustle of arrival aroused me from these reflections, and we were
soon seated in the parlor of the Lake Hotel, in the famous state of Illinois,
and town of Chicago. The rapid growth of this place you have heard of: in
1833 it could only count three frame dwellings and two hundred and fifty
inhabitants; and now enumerates six churches, one hundred shops, several
hotels, dwelling houses, and ware-houses, and between six and seven
thousand inhabitants. Chicago, or Tshicawgo, as the inhabitants and Indians
call it, is divided by a river of the same name into two parts, between which
is a free ferry and a bridge. The shops are upon one side, and the dwellings
upon the other. These last are in the style of country residences, enclosed
with white palings, surrounded by piazzas and gardens; some of brick, but
many of wood and neatly painted. Every thing looks quite new, as indeed it
might; for where now the town stands, was, as late as 1833, a fort, before
which was encamped seven thousand Indians. Fort Dearborn was erected
for the purpose of protecting the frontier. It was attacked in 1812 by the
Indian tribes, and their allies, and those who escaped massacre, sought
protection in fort Wayne. Another fort was built in 1818, but is now
deserted and let out for tenements. There are houses of worship here for
several denominations; among them the Presbyterian church is most
conspicuous. It is of brick and neatly finished. Part of the money required
for its erection, was acquired by the ladies in a Fair. The Lake House is a
very good hotel, situated among the dwelling houses. It is built of brick,
painted white, which, with its green blinds, gives it a pleasant appearance;
every thing within was comfortable and good of its kind. According to our
usual practice, we ascended to the cupola of the hotel, where is a lovely
view of the cottages and gardens at our feet, the broad prairies beyond, and
the bright waters of Michigan behind us. This town is beautifully situated
upon the borders of the lake, through which it holds constant
communication with Buffalo and the east. The other route I mentioned,
from Detroit continues over the rail-road at that city, and by cross roads to
St. Joseph’s upon the lake, from which place steamboats are continually
plying to Chicago. It is a shorter road, and gives the traveller a view of the
interior of Michigan. The Illinois and Michigan canal commences here,
which is to be carried to Peru on the Illinois river, a distance of one hundred
miles, thus opening a communication with the Mississippi and the Gulf of
Mexico. It is six feet deep and sixty feet wide, and is nearly finished. The
climate here is variable. In the summer the wind will one day blow over the
surface of the prairies, and the weather will become very hot; but the next
day, perhaps, it will come from the lake and cool it again. In consequence of
the vicinity of the lake there is not much snow, and it is not very cold.
We spent here one day only, but were able to see every thing in and
about the town, and in conversation with those friends residing here,
obtained every information. We intended making a longer stay, but learned
that the regular line of stages left town that evening, which obliged us to go
on or to stay longer than our time would admit. Before reaching here, it was
our intention to go to Michigan City, which is in Indiana, upon the shores of
the lake, and from thence cross Indiana to Madison, upon the Ohio, through
a fine succession of rail and Macadamized roads. Our friends here,
however, seemed to think it so monstrous a thing to return without
beholding the celebrated Mississippi, when within a few hundred miles
only, that we determined to alter our course and go down the Illinois river.
At nine o’clock at night we entered a commodious stage drawn by four
good horses, which was to take us to Peoria, upon the Illinois, one hundred
and fifty-seven miles distant, for which we were to pay twenty-two dollars,
eleven each, bed and board included. Beside us were two other passengers.
Crossing the bridge, we took up the mail at the post office, and then drove
through a long range of cheerfully lighted shops until we found ourselves
out of town. Here the road crossed the wet prairie, as it is called, which, in
some seasons, when the lake is high, is overflown. Through this wet land
we went splash, splash, nearly half the night. A rail-road is proposed here,
which will render travelling more pleasant. Hour after hour passed away,
my companions all dozing while I sought sleep in vain. The vast plain over
which we were moving, seen through the dusk of a cloudy night, seemed a
fitting place for dark deeds—a fine Hounslow heath, or Indian lurking
place. But there are no bandits here, and the Indians were all over the
Mississippi, and I was bidding such idle fears avaunt, when suddenly a low
plaintive wail sounded over the waste, startling my companions from their
slumbers. ‘What was that unearthly cry?’ I asked. ‘Only a prairie wolf
madam.’ ‘Dear me!’ exclaimed the other passenger, a youth. ‘I hope there
are not many of them, for sometimes wolves attack horses.’ ‘Not in these
prairies, sir,’ replied the other passenger, ‘they are rather shy, and afraid of
us.’ ‘I am glad, at least, to see a light,’ returned the youth, ‘there must be a
house yonder.’ ‘Yes, a bower in the rushes, nothing else,’ replied the other
man. ‘If you follow that light it will lead you a pretty chase through the
marshes; it is a jack-o’lantern.’ The hour, seen by the light of the coach
lamp, proved to be twelve, and each settled in his corner for another doze.
A sudden halt of the stage awakened us. The coachman took down a lamp
and began to search for something on the ground. ‘Halo, driver, what have
you lost?’ asked the youth. ‘Only my road sir,’ he replied. ‘Lost your road!’
exclaimed the youth in dismay; ‘Lost in these lonely moors among
wolverines and jack-o’lanterns! Here’s a pretty fix!’ ‘Driver you ought to
keep the skin off your eyes in such a dark night, I guess,’ said the other
passenger. I only wondered he could ever keep his road, as there was no
house or tree to mark his course even in the day, and one might easily pass
over the worn pathway in these grassy plains. The driver soon resumed his
seat, having discovered his path; and gave us the agreeable intelligence, he
had gone three miles out of his way. A few hours after this, a huge body
suddenly appeared before the window—it turned out to be a tree, a sign we
were approaching a river. Soon after we found ourselves before the door of
a small house, upon the banks of a narrow but deep and placid stream
fringed with trees. This was the Des Plaines, a river which rises so near lake
Michigan, that in times of its overflow, boats have passed from one to
another. This interlocking of waters which flow different ways, Darby
considers ‘an astonishing hydrographical anomaly.’ All the waters we had
passed, have fallen into the Atlantic, while those we were now following
find their way into the gulf of Mexico. The Des Plaines is called a branch of
the Illinois, which joins with the Kankakee, and afterwards the Fox, and the
united streams take the name of the Illinois. Many modern writers consider
this as the Illinois, and drop the name of Des Plaines, which I should judge
a proper arrangement. We awakened the drowsy owner of the house,
procured some refreshment, and with fresh horses resumed our journey.
July 7th.—I fell asleep, and when I was awakened at dawn this morning,
by my companion, that I might not lose the scene, I started with surprise
and delight. I was in the midst of a prairie! A world of grass and flowers
stretched around me, rising and falling in gentle undulations, as if an
enchanter had struck the ocean swell, and it was at rest forever. Acres of
wild flowers of every hue glowed around me, and the sun arising from the
earth where it touched the horizon, was ‘kissing with golden face the
meadows green.’ What a new and wonderous world of beauty! What a
magnificent sight! Those glorious ranks of flowers! Oh that you could have

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An Applied Perspective on Indian

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Cultural Anthropology An Applied Perspective Gary

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Neither wolf nor dog on forgotten roads with an Indian

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ISBN 978-981-13-7502-6 ISBN 978-981-13-7503-3 (eBook)

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India P. K. Mohapatra

1 Introduction: Justification of Morality�������������������������������������������������� 1

6 Dharma as Moral Duty���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 65

P. K. Mohapatra Former Professor of Philosophy at

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 1

c­onsciousness. This is because consciousness inevitably has two prominent

Rationality and Moral Personhood

values as a rational being. Thus, rationality of persons is inseparably connected with

Spirituality and Moral Personhood

complete the making of unfailing moral personhood. As discussed above, while

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 9

A blanket commandment to forgive, a literal adherence to this commandment, can-

Forgiveness is morally justified only if it is extended on morally justified grounds,

ing. The appropriateness of a value to be pursued, therefore, cannot be thought apart

Absolute Standards Account for Inapplicability

emulate or recommend actions he cannot perform, it is bound to be dissuasive’

Logical Consistency and Applicability

Dharmas, Conflicts and Defeasibility

Twinkle, twinkle, pretty star

Yes, from childhood to manhood, we wish to penetrate into the mysteries of

“——Like rich and various gems inlay

We were obliged to be satisfied with a hasty view of this charming

July 6th.—When approaching Chicago, the ‘haven where we would be,’

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Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India P. K. Mohapatra

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6 Dharma as Moral Duty�� 65

consciousness. This is because consciousness inevitably has two prominent

Rationality and Moral Personhood

Spirituality and Moral Personhood

Absolute Standards Account for Inapplicability

Logical Consistency and Applicability

Dharmas, Conflicts and Defeasibility