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An African Philosophy
of Personhood,
Morality, and Politics
Motsamai Molefe
An African Philosophy of Personhood,
Morality, and Politics
 Motsamai Molefe

An African Philosophy
of Personhood,
Morality, and Politics
Motsamai Molefe
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-030-15560-5 ISBN 978-3-030-15561-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15561-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019935513

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To the memory of my mother [Modiehi Molefe]
and
brother [Ketsho Isaac Molefe]
 Acknowledgements

The success of this work was possible because of a number of people to

whom I am eternally grateful. Space will not permit to express my grati-
tude to everyone.
First and foremost, I am exceedingly grateful to God for all that he is
and has done for and through me.
I cannot fail to express gratitude to Thaddeus Metz for all the sup-
port, mentoring and conversations about my career as an African phi-
losopher. Thanks for believing in me! I am truly grateful to have met an
individual who is exuding with personhood in the way that you do.
I wish to express special gratitude to Asithandile Zibaya for all the
support and love she has given me during the process of writing this
book.
I wish to thank Sizwe Koom, Sthembiso Khumalo, Tumi Mohotlane,
Xolani Msimango, Sihle Khanyile, Dumisani Mbanyele, Otto Matsapula,
Kgomotso Moshugi, Sanele Shabalala, Promise Aphana, Akhona Mafani,
Siyabonga Makwetu, Sabata Shongwe, Ps. Gcumeni, Sakhile Nkosi for
their unwavering friendship.
I wish also to appreciate the academic brothers that have supported
me in this journey. Professor Matolino, Mutshidzi and my brother
Dr. Mpofu. The idea of this book was birthed in Matolino’s office.
This book would not be possible without the generous financial sup-
port provided by the American Council for Learned Societies. I am
proud to be an African Humanities Programme fellow.

vii
viii    Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my current employer, Wits University, and my col-

leagues in the department of philosophy for all the support and
encouragement.
I thank you all!
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
The Concepts of Personhood in African Philosophy 2
Developments in the Literature on Personhood 5
Themes and Structure of the Book 10
References 13

2 A Conceptual Mapping of Personhood 17

Introduction 17
Menkiti’s Analysis of Personhood 18
Gyekye on Personhood 25
Matolino, Kaphagawani, and Ikuenobe on Personhood 29
Conclusion 32
References 34

3 An Exposition of Personhood as Moral Theory 37

Introduction 37
Being Human and Being a Person 38
Personhood Embodies a Character-Based Ethics 44
Means and Ends in Personhood 54
Humanism and the Instrumentality of Relationships 56
Rejection of Social Relationships as the Moral End 58
The Role of Relationships in Personhood 61
Conclusion 63
References 66

ix
x    Contents

4 Personhood: Partiality or Impartiality? 71

Introduction 71
Contextualising the Debate on Partiality and Impartiality
in Moral Philosophy 74
Personhood: Partiality or Impartiality? 78
Conclusion 88
References 90

5 Personhood and Options in African Moral Thought 93

Introduction 93
Wiredu’s Approach to Moral Philosophy 98
Tshivhase’s Criticism of Personhood 103
Conclusion 113
References 114

6 Personhood and Dignity in African Philosophy 117

Introduction 117
Ikuenobe’s Conception of Dignity 120
Personhood and Dignity 123
Personhood, Partiality and Dignity 124
The Young and the Marginal Cases, and Dignity 129
Conclusion 136
References 140

7 Personhood as a Political Theory of Duties 145

Introduction 145
The Idea of Rights 150
Menkiti and Two Conceptions of Personhood 152
The Minimalist Conception of Personhood and Rights 153
The Maximalist Conception of Personhood and Duties 158
Conclusion 167
References 169

Index 173
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This book is part of the overall project of contributing to the

development of the discipline of African philosophy. Specifically, its con-
tribution will be in the branches of moral and political philosophy. To
achieve this goal, I build on those philosophical contributions in African
philosophy that focus on the normative idea of personhood. I single out
the normative concept of personhood as the foundational moral category
to theorise about African moral and political thought. I do so for two
reasons: firstly, the idea of personhood is arguably the most salient moral
notion in the tradition of African philosophy. This view implies that the
idea of personhood is one of the most important indigenous axiological
resources; it requires our earnest philosophical consideration if we are to
articulate a robust monistic moral and political theory. Secondly, I am
attracted to this idea because there are facets of it—specifically in the
moral and political branches of philosophy—that remain under-explored
in the literature (details of which, I will provide below). I believe that the
philosophical development and elucidation of these facets will contribute
to the aim of articulating the robust monistic theory I seek.
This book, therefore, focuses on the under-explored and under-
developed moral and political facets of the idea of personhood. My
ultimate aim is to have the idea of personhood inform a fully fledged
moral-political theory.1 I am partially motivated to do so by one of
the leading scholars of African philosophy, Kwasi Wiredu’s (2009: 16)
observation that:

© The Author(s) 2019 1

M. Molefe, An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality,
and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15561-2_1
2 M. MOLEFE

The philosophical implications of the normative conception of a person are

legion, and we will not pursue them here.

In this book, then, I intend to pursue some of the ‘legion’ moral and
political implications of the idea of personhood. To give the reader a
bird’s-eye perspective of the philosophical issues that constitute the focus
of this book, I structure this introductory chapter as follows: since my
central focus is the idea of personhood, I begin by providing concep-
tual clarity regarding the view of personhood relevant to the discussion.
I do so because the idea of personhood is ambiguous (see Wiredu 1992;
Ikuenobe 2006a). To eschew this ambiguity, I distinguish four distinct
concepts of personhood in the literature, which many scholars of African
moral thought do not handle with the dexterity characteristic of philoso-
phy. I then proceed to identify some of the interesting and recent devel-
opments in the literature on personhood that I deem relevant. I do this
literature review for the sake of identifying (some of the) gaps that con-
stitute the focus of this book. Next, I proceed to specify the moral and
political issues that constitute the focus of my discussion. I conclude this
chapter by outlining the structure of the entire book.

The Concepts of Personhood in African Philosophy

I identify at least four concepts of personhood in African philosophy. Two
of these concepts are metaphysical and the other two normative. The first
metaphysical notion of personhood pertains to facts that constitute a thing
called a human being; it is a specification of the biological classification of
human beings as a species—Homo sapiens. For example, imagine that one
is hunting, and when about to shoot is notified: ‘Don’t shoot, that is a
person!’2 It is this notion of a person that Kwame Gyekye (1992: 108)
seems to have in mind when he makes the following comment:

What a person [human being] acquires are status, habits, and personality
or character traits: he, qua person acquires and thus becomes the subject
of acquisition, and being thus prior to acquisition process, he cannot be
defined by what he acquires. One is a person because of what he is, not
because of what he acquires.

Here, Gyekye refers to the notion of personhood in which one is a

person (human being) prior to any process of socialisation or acquisition
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

of habits/character. Since a person (human being), in this sense, cannot

be defined by what he acquires, this implies that there are certain onto-
logical facts that constitute a person qua human nature that have noth-
ing to do with any social or cultural factors. Scholars of African thought
refer to the philosophical inquiry that speaks to what defines a person
qua human nature in terms of the “ontological” or “descriptive” notion
of personhood (Wiredu 1996: 159; Ikuenobe 2016: 144; Oyowe 2014a:
46). The ontological notion of personhood is concerned with specifying
the descriptive features that constitute human nature. Commenting on
this concept of personhood, Ikuenobe (2016: 118) states that:

A descriptive conception of personhood seeks to analyse the features and

ontological make-up of an isolated [human] individual.

Just as philosophers are apt to give metaphysical accounts of the mind,

of time, place, God and so on, with regard to this notion of personhood,
the task is to specify the ontological properties that constitute human
nature. Scholars will differ in terms of whether they take human nature
to be a function, entirely, of physical stuff or a combination of physical
and spiritual properties (Kaphagawani 2004). For an instructive example
of the philosophical debate regarding the metaphysical/ontological con-
ception of personhood in African philosophy, the reader may consider
the debate between Kwasi Wiredu (1995) and Kwame Gyekye (1995),
where they offer competing conceptions of human nature in the Akan
culture.
The second metaphysical notion of personhood involves issues
pertaining to the nature of personal identity. The debates in African
philosophy regarding the idea of personhood qua personal identity draw
their influence from debates between liberals and communitarians in the
Western philosophical tradition. There, the debate pertains to the role, if
any, the community plays in accounting for the socialisation and devel-
opment of personal identity (Neal and Paris 1990). On the one hand,
liberals tend to conceive of personhood in terms that de-emphasise the
role of social relationships; while, communitarians, on the other hand,
tend to accentuate the role of social relationships in accounting for
personal identity.
This debate regarding personal identity in the African tradition tends
to diverge between (1) those that account for it entirely in terms of social
relationships and (2) those that account for it by invoking a combination
4 M. MOLEFE

of individual and social features. Scholars like John Mbiti (1969) and
Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) tend to construe personal identity entirely in
terms of social relationships. For example, Menkiti (1984: 171, emphasis
mine) commenting on personal identity notes:

… the African view of man denies that persons can be defined by

focusing on this or that physical or psychological characteristic of the lone
individual. Rather, man is defined by reference to the environing community.

It strikes me as obvious that Menkiti’s reference to the idea of ‘man’ is

not referring to the ontological notion of personhood qua human nature.
This is the case precisely because the ‘environing community’ is not one
of the properties of human nature that one can single out like the body
and so on. The ‘environing community’ is a property that is external
to human nature. In this light, it is safe to conclude that Menkiti (with
Mbiti) is pursuing the notion of personal identity that one acquires by
being embedded in a community. Gyekye (1992), on the other hand, in
his defence of moderate communitarianism (among other things) offers a
conception of personal identity that balances the individual and communal
facets—I will say more on this specific discussion in the next chapter.
Both of these accounts of personhood are metaphysical insofar as they
specify some descriptive properties (facts) as the basis to account for the
respective concepts of personhood under consideration. On the one hand,
personhood qua human nature is a function of the body, the spiritual
component and any other property that is taken to be constitutive of
human nature; and, on the other, personhood qua personal identity
specifies internal or external features that are crucial for accounting for
socialisation or humanisation (Molefe 2018).
Furthermore, the literature tends to distinguish between two nor-
mative notions of personhood in African philosophy. The first claims
that one can assign moral value to some entity in virtue of possessing
certain ontological properties that render it morally significant. This
idea features significantly in bioethical contexts and also in politi-
cal discussions of dignity/rights (Behrens 2013; Toscano 2011). To
be called a ‘person’, in this sense, is to be specified as a moral patient,
i.e. a being towards which we owe direct duties of respect (DeGrazia
2008). Another term used to capture this idea of personhood is that of
moral status, which specifies things towards which we have direct duties
of respect (Molefe 2017a). What is crucial to note with regard to this
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

notion of personhood is that it invites respect to the entity in question

merely because it possesses the relevant ontological properties—be they
rationality, consciousness, or sentience—without regard to how one uses
them (Singer 2009; Metz 2013a).
The second notion treats talk of personhood as appropriate when
praising the agent for being a moral exemplar. Personhood, in this sense,
concerns the moral evaluation of the conduct/performance of the agent
in the light of some norms/values of a society (Presbey 2002). If the
individual performs well, then she counts as a person and if she does
poorly, then she is assigned the status of a non-person. In some crucial
sense, the ontological status of the humanity of the individual, on this
view, is not under scrutiny at all. What is under scrutiny, in this discourse
of personhood, is how the agent uses her ontological abilities, to either
perfect or defect her humanity. To be called a person is to acknowledge
that she has added dimensions of moral virtue to her humanity. And, to
be called a non-person is to acknowledge that she has lived below the
abilities of her humanity, without denying her humanity and the basic
respect due to her merely as a human being (Wiredu 2009).
Environmental ethics expert, Kevin Behrens (2013), aptly distin-
guishes the two normative notions discussed above. He distinguishes
between them in terms of one being patient-centred and the other
agent-centred. The patient-centred notion grounds respect on the basis
of certain ontological properties; and the agent-centred notion identi-
fies beings that have lived up to the standards of excellence prescribed
in their societies. It is the agent-centred notion of personhood that is
“dominant” or “germane” or “the pinnacle of an African difference
in philosophical theory” (Masolo 2010: 135; Ikuenobe 2006a: 117;
Wiredu 2009: 13). So, the central focus of this book is on the agent-
centred notion of personhood. It is this notion that is salient in the
­tradition of African philosophy.

Developments in the Literature on Personhood

What are some of the interesting developments regarding the notion of
personhood in the literature? I divide this literature review regarding per-
sonhood into three areas of focus: firstly, I consider the classical debates
regarding the notion of personhood; secondly, I look into some of the
recent (and salient) contributions in the discourse of personhood; and
finally, I consider criticisms against the idea of personhood.
6 M. MOLEFE

The classical debate regarding personhood pivots around two influen-

tial African philosophers, Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye (Matolino
2013). The debate in the literature has been between those that defend
the radical version of communitarianism and those that defend the mod-
erate one.3 Many scholars take Menkiti as the father of radical commu-
nitarianism. The defining feature of radical communitarianism is its
(supposed) denial of rights (Menkiti 1984: 181).4 The defining feature
of moderate communitarianism is its recognition of the primary status
of rights in the plausible characterisation of Afro-communitarianism
(Gyekye 1992, 1995). There are some thinkers (myself included) that
defend the view that Menkiti is no radical communitarian. In fact, these
thinkers tend to think that Menkiti, correctly construed, promises a
robust moral-political philosophy—an alternative moral-political vision
(Molefe 2016, 2017a; Ikuenobe 2017).5
Opposed to this characterisation, there are those scholars who tend
to think that there is no substantive difference between radical and mod-
erate communitarianism insofar as they both ultimately jettison rights
(Matolino 2009; Famanikwa 2010). What is not entirely obvious to
me—at least from where I am standing—is whether there is any relation-
ship between the normative idea of personhood advocated by Menkiti
and the idea of (natural) rights prevalent in the Western moral-political
tradition. If Menkiti, in the final analysis, is pursuing an analysis of the
normative notion of personhood, then one can rightly ask the follow-
ing question: How did the idea of rights become a central consideration
in this philosophical debate about the correct characterisation of Afro-
communitarianism? One of the ideas that I will be defending in this book
is the view that the idea of personhood embodies a moral-political theory
that takes duties to achieve the common good to be primary. Rights, if
they feature at all, will only do so incidentally. In other words, the argu-
ment will be that rights are foreign to the axiological system character-
istic of personhood (Donnelly 1982). The idea of personhood imagines
a good society on its own terms rather than by invoking the idea and
discourse of rights.6
It is important to take note of some of the positive developments
in the literature regarding the idea of personhood. Bernard Matolino
(2014), in his monograph titled ‘Personhood in African philosophy’,
intervenes in the debate between radical and moderate communitarian-
ism. Dissatisfied with both positions, Matolino proceeds to defend what
he calls limited communitarianism. Limited communitarianism endorses
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

the foundational status of rights by following the trail of the naturalist

interpretation of rights similar to the one defended by Gyekye (see also
Matolino 2018a, b; Chemhuru 2018). Matolino, in his contribution to
the idea of personhood and communitarianism, does not quite tell us
why we should take the idea of rights seriously (Matolino 2009, 2013).
He simply assumes the ontological veracity and moral-political universal-
ity of the idea of rights.
Another interesting development regarding personhood is by
Polycarp Ikuenobe, one of the leading contemporary scholars of the
idea (2006a, 2016, 2017). Ikuenobe invokes the idea of personhood
to respond to the accusation that the idea of dignity is useless or vague
(Macklin 2003). He argues that the idea of personhood offers a plau-
sible conception of dignity. Typically, in both the Western and African
tradition of philosophy, dignity is construed in terms of some ontolog-
ical property (Gyekye 1992; Ilesanmi 2001; Deng 2004). The mere
possession of some ontological property, be it rationality on the part
of Immanuel Kant or capacity for harmonious relationships on the part
of Thaddeus Metz, accounts for dignity (Metz 2010, 2011, 2012).
Ikuenobe insists that dignity is a function of how the agent uses their
ontological properties, i.e. dignity is a function of developing person-
hood. He proposes an interesting approach to the discourse of dignity
given that the idea of personhood will be used in political contexts to
identify beings towards which we owe basic respect. I will develop the
idea in this work that the idea of personhood is not suitable to ground
the modern idea of dignity since these ideas play two contrasting moral-
political roles.
Another interesting development with regard to the idea of person-
hood is in the discourse on development (Klaasen 2017). The move here
is to ground the idea of development on the moral resources prevalent in
the African cultural context, specifically, the idea of personhood. This, in
many ways, is a novel and promising project, but it does not quite spell
out how the idea of personhood could ground a plausible conception of
development. One useful way to do this is by comparing it to approaches
endemic in the discourse of like development ethics or even the capabil-
ities approach (Goulet 1997; Nussbaum 2011). In this book, I will not
consider the idea of development in relation to personhood. Given the
space, I would have argued that developed societies are characteristically
those that provide the socio-economic and political conditions that make
the pursuit of personhood possible.7
8 M. MOLEFE

In my opinion, Jason Van Niekerk makes a crucial contribution to

the discourse on the idea of personhood. Van Niekerk’s (2007) engage-
ment with the idea of personhood begins as a response to Metz’s (Metz
2007a) contribution to the debate regarding a plausible interpretation
of African ethics (of ‘ubuntu’).8 Metz (2007a, b) identifies six possible
interpretations of African ethics, and he ultimately defends a relational
interpretation. Van Niekerk (2007), responds to Metz (2007a: 331)
by defending a view that Metz describes in these terms: “This is prob-
ably the dominant interpretation of African ethics in the literature”.
This dominant interpretation is based on the idea of personhood. Metz
(ibid., emphasis mine) points out that “[m]any thinkers take the maxim
‘a person is a person through other persons’ to be a call for an agent to
develop her personhood”. Van Niekerk (2007) defends the view that the
idea of a person—which he construes as an autocentric approach—is no
worse than the relational one defended by Metz. In his doctoral thesis,
dedicated to African ethics, he jettisons the autocentric interpretation of
the idea of personhood for the perfectionist interpretation of this idea
(Van Niekerk 2013). In turn, I will take the perfectionist interpretation
as a point of departure.9 I will also elucidate the components of this
interpretation that do not feature in Van Niekerk’s analysis, such as the
humanism and individualism that characterise it.
Recently, a special issue dedicated to the Menkiti-Gyekye debate
was published in the journal of Filosofia Theoretica.10 The special issue
largely focused on the “individual-community question in African
philosophy”, and we are further informed that this issue “is closely tied
to the question of personhood” (Agada 2018: 46). Some of the major
themes that emerged in the special issue deal with (1) the place and rel-
evance of (personal) autonomy (Chimakonam 2018)11; (2) The use of
the Menkiti–Gyekye debate to rethink African political philosophy, par-
ticularly in the light of decolonisation (African political) philosophy to
rethink some “our ethical outlooks and our social and political theories
to accommodate insights … from African philosophy” (Eze 2018: 1);
(3) The question of the place, relevance and justification of rights also
emerged in the special issue12 (Eze 2018; Chimakonam 2018; Matolino
2018a, b); (4) Crucial issues regarding the problematic methodology—
parasitic on Western assumptions—employed by both Menkiti and
Gyekye also feature (Amato 2018; Chimakonam 2018); The question
regarding animals ethics in the light of personhood also receive critical
attention (Horsthemke 2018).13
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

The reader should bear in mind that the burden of this book is inter-
pretative rather than argumentative. The aim is not to argue that the idea
of personhood, in and of itself, embodies the most plausible way to think
about morality and politics. This comparative task is beyond the scope of
this book. At this stage, the aim is to offer an interpretation of person-
hood and pursue some of its under-explored philosophical themes. To
offer only an interpretative book may not satisfy some readers, but this
does not mean that we should give up on the project. This project seeks
merely to lay a foundation for further comparative and argumentative
projects that others can venture into in the future.
We can now turn to some of the criticisms that have been levelled
against the idea of personhood in the literature. Three such criticisms
stick out for me. Firstly, there is the complaint that the idea of person-
hood is ‘gendered’ or male-centred, i.e. the idea of personhood is sex-
ist or patriarchal. The idea of personhood is denounced for reducing
women to a secondary status (Oyowe 2013, 2014a; Manzini 2018; Eze
2018). I am not entirely moved by this criticism. It is not clear to me
whether the criticism is focused on the nature of the concept itself, as an
embodiment of moral ideals, or on the sociology of the term—on how
the term tends to be used in African societies. It occurs to me that the
problem is not intrinsic to the term itself, it is the problem of cultures
and academics that are prejudiced by their male-centred societies. My
hunch is that the problem is with the practitioners, be it philosophers
or cultures of praxis, and not so much with the normative concept of
personhood. I believe this idea is open to interpretations that are “gen-
der-neutral” (Oyowe 2014a: 53). Or, at least, I will be using this con-
cept in a gender-neutral way insofar as it embodies moral insights that
are true for all genders.
Another crucial criticism against the idea of personhood comes from
Mpho Tshivhase (2013). Tshivhase’s major criticism is that the idea of
personhood is overly other-regarding. The excessive emphasis on oth-
er-regarding features in the discourse of personhood renders it unable
to accommodate crucial individualistic features necessary for a robust
human life. Specifically, it neglects autonomy and authenticity, which
are important concepts in appreciating the uniqueness of individu-
als. The individual, on the moral system imagined by this overly other-
regarding concept of personhood, is so absorbed in social relation-
ships that her personal life is neglected. It does so in a way analogous
to the way, according to Susan Wolf, that Western consequentialist and
10 M. MOLEFE

deontological accounts produce ‘saints’ that are slaves of morality, with

no regard for non-moral interests. The essence of her objection is that
this idea of personhood does not and cannot accommodate options—that
morality has limits and that we have interests that have nothing to do
with morality (McNaughton and Rawling 2006). In Chapter 4, I will
defend the view that the idea of personhood, at least as interpreted, can
accommodate options.
The third criticism is of a political nature. It argues that the idea of
personhood is essentially inegalitarian. As such, the political discourse
generated or implied by the idea of personhood will fail to capture the
plausible egalitarian features that capture modern political thought
(Oyowe 2018). The idea here is that those that have achieved person-
hood will be treated better in terms of distribution of resources/oppor-
tunities than those that have not. In Chapter 7, I will offer what I take to
be a plausible construal of the politics embodied by the idea of person-
hood, which will address Oyowe’s concerns.

Themes and Structure of the Book

I divide this book into two sections: one focusing on moral issues and
the other on political ones. The first section of the book will deal with
the following moral issues: (1) personhood as a moral theory; (2) the
meta-ethical debate between partiality and impartiality; and (3) the idea
of options in the light of personhood. I will also focus on three political
themes in relation to personhood, namely: (1) dignity; (2) rights; and
(3) historical injustices.
I structure this book as follows. The second chapter conceptually
maps the idea of personhood in African philosophy. In it, I revisit some
of the influential texts and debates on personhood in African philoso-
phy. This mapping is necessary because many of the discussions of the
idea of personhood have been characterised by conceptual ambiguity
and confusion. If this book is to be a success, it must revisit important
texts with regard to the notion of personhood to dispel all conceptual
confusion. This chapter is important insofar as it will help the reader to
get a sense of how I read extant influential accounts of the idea of per-
sonhood. The third chapter concerns itself with spelling out the idea of
personhood as a moral theory. Ultimately, I advocate the humanistic and
perfectionist egoistic view of personhood as a moral theory. The fourth
chapter focuses on the meta-ethical question of whether personhood is
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

best construed in terms of partiality or impartiality. I observe there that

the idea of personhood embodies partiality. The fifth chapter offers gen-
eral reasons in support of the supererogatory view that the idea of per-
sonhood can accommodate options. The sixth chapter deals with the
question of whether the idea of personhood can ground a plausible con-
ception of the idea of dignity. I will note there that personhood cannot
ground a plausible conception of dignity. The seventh chapter exam-
ines whether personhood is suitable to ground a plausible conception of
rights. Here, I will defend a duty-based moral-political view. The eighth
and final chapter concerns itself with the question of historical injus-
tices. There, I specify the bare minimum criteria that should characterise
efforts towards restorative justice.

Notes
1. In pursuing this project, I am indebted to the philosophical foundation
laid by Ifeanyi Menkiti on the idea of personhood. In this book, I join
the efforts by Kwasi Wiredu (1992, 1996, 2005, 2008, 2009), Polycarp
Ikuenobe (2006a, b, 2016, 2017), Bernard Matolino (2009, 2014),
Jason Van Niekerk (2007, 2013), and Anthony Oyowe (2014a, b, 2018),
among others, who are contributing to the development of moral and
political discourse on personhood. My contribution pursues those facets
that these scholars have not yet considered.
2. I adopt this particular example from Gyekye (2010).
3. In my opinion (see Molefe 2016), which echoes the position of other
scholars like Wiredu (1992, 2004), Metz (2013a), and Ikuenobe (2017),
there has been no debate between Menkiti and Gyekye. In fact, the posi-
tion that is emerging among these scholars is that Menkiti advocated no
radical communitarianism; he has just been misunderstood.
4.  An accurate representation of Menkiti’s view does not necessarily
­repudiate rights; instead, he relegates them to a secondary status in rela-
tion to our duties to others. To reduce rights to a secondary status, for
most scholars of the natural approaches to rights, would be tantamount
to their tacit rejection. It is for this reason that Gyekye has understood
Menkiti to be rejecting rights.
5. I articulate this alternative moral-political vision in Chapter 7.
6. One of the things that have struck me is that Menkiti (1984: 180) at
the end of his discussion of the idea of personhood mentions that rights
occupy a secondary status in African philosophy. Menkiti does not elabo-
rate or defend this position, but the response (in the literature) has been
to argue for the centrality of rights by his detractors. The literature does
12 M. MOLEFE

so in ways that are very concerning. On the one hand, the idea of rights
is never defined; it is almost (always) taken to be self-evident. Those that
attempt to give an account of rights rely on Western conceptions of it.
Gyekye takes Kant’s conception of dignity and rights as a point of depar-
ture in his defence of moderate communitarianism. No justification, be it
historical or philosophical, of this move is offered.
7. In a forthcoming article, I defend an African conception of develop-
ment that I believe gives insights regarding how the idea of personhood
accounts for development (Molefe 2019).
8. In this book, I will take the talk of ubuntu to be the same as a talk of per-
sonhood. I say so because at the heart of the idea of ubuntu is the idea
of personhood. The idea of ubuntu is captured in terms of the maxim—a
person is a person through other persons. The italicised word—person—
refers to the normative idea of person salient in African philosophy. At
the heart of ubuntu is the idea of a human being achieving personhood
(see Metz 2007a, 2010, 2013b; Molefe 2017b; Oyowe 2018). As such,
the reader should not be shocked at instances where I use these words
interchangeably. To say one has ubuntu is the same thing as to say they
have achieved personhood, and vice versa.
9. I prefer the perfectionist approach over the autocentric view of person-
hood for two reasons. Firstly, I agree with all the arguments raised against
autocentrism by Van Niekerk. Secondly, the language and analogies
employed by scholars of African thought tend to capture personhood as a
perfectionist orientation.
10. I am grateful to the reviewer for bringing this literature to my attention,
which was not published when I initially submitted my manuscript for
review.
11. I do think that one useful way to deal with the question of autonomy
in African philosophy is to be mindful of the distinction between the
individualistic and relational versions of it. I give some attention to
this distinction regarding the concept of autonomy in Chapter 5. I am
aware that Ikuenobe (2015) argues that relational autonomy is an intrin-
sic feature of personhood. I also believe that the discourse of person-
hood can learn a lot regarding the idea of autonomy in the discourse of
care/feminist ethics.
12. The reader should note that I deal with the question of rights in the light
of personhood in Chapter 7 of this book.
13. In this book, I do not quite talk to the issue of the environment and ani-
mals in the light of the idea of personhood. I am aware, however, that
this is one of the criticisms against the idea of personhood. This should
not come as a surprise given that I explain in Chapter 2 that the idea of
personhood is humanistic, which means it accounts for morality entirely
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

in terms of some facet(s) of human nature to the exclusion of animals.

To make this observation, however, is not tantamount that the idea of
personhood has no resources at all to resolve the question of animals
(though indirect like in the fashion of Kant). It is not within the scope of
this book to reflect on the questions of animals and environment in the
light of personhood.

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 CHAPTER 2

A Conceptual Mapping of Personhood

Introduction
In this chapter, I conceptually map the concept(s) of personhood in
African philosophy. That is, I revisit some of the texts that I deem to
have played a decisive role in shaping the discourse on personhood in
African philosophy. This conceptual mapping is neither exhaustive nor
chronological. As a result, I may leave out some texts that some may
deem crucial in their own estimation. In this analysis, I focus on the fol-
lowing scholars/texts: I begin by elucidating Menkiti’s analysis of the
notion of personhood. I then proceed to consider Gyekye’s criticism of
Menkiti’s notion of personhood. I conclude by considering Matolino’s
treatment of the concept of personhood in the light of the philosophical
disquisitions of it by Dedier Kaphagawani and Ikuenobe.
I am doing this conceptual analysis on personhood to demonstrate
two facts. Firstly, I aim to show the reader that the idea of personhood
has not been handled with the philosophical dexterity that one would
usually expect to characterise the practice of philosophy. Secondly, I do
so for the sake of being precise regarding the concept of personhood
crucial to this book. Additionally, I do this conceptual exercise to give
the reader a sense of how I understand the idea of personhood.
I turn now to consider Menkiti’s treatment of the concept of
personhood.

© The Author(s) 2019 17

M. Molefe, An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality,
and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15561-2_2
18 M. MOLEFE

Menkiti’s Analysis of Personhood

Menkiti has penned two essays dedicated to the idea of personhood in
African philosophy. The first essay by Menkiti (1984) is titled ‘Person
and Community in Traditional African Thought’ and the second (2004)
‘The Normative Concept of Personhood’. I will focus on the first essay
because it is the one that has been at the centre of major debates in the
literature and most scholars—in their disquisition on personhood—tend
to focus on it (Asante 2018; Amato 2018). Furthermore, the second
one is a restatement and clarification of some of the issues that Menkiti
thought necessary to correct, but the substance is more or less the same.
It is crucial to note that the titles of both essays promise to focus on one
specific concept of personhood. The title of the first essay is not specific
about which notion of personhood will be under consideration (remem-
ber I distinguished four notions of personhood). The second essay
does, however, specify that Menkiti is pursuing the normative notion of
personhood.
In the first essay, Menkiti (1984: 170) is very clear that he aims “to
articulate a certain conception of the person found in African tradi-
tional thought”. The strategy he employs to explicate the philosoph-
ically under-explored African notion of a person involves contrasting
it against the salient view of personhood in the West. He draws two
contrasts between the African and Western term. In the first place, he
indicates that the Western notion of personhood defines it in terms of
some “lone” property of the individual (ibid.). Typically, the Western
view invokes some psychological property like consciousness, rational-
ity, memory and so on as the basis for defining personhood. In contrast,
the African view defines it by appeal to the “environing community”
(ibid.). What is clear from this contrast is that personhood in the Western
tradition is defined in terms of some property internal to the human
individual (be it physical or psychological) and the African tradition
defines it (almost entirely) in terms of properties that are external to the
individual.
In other words, on the one account, you look inside the individual to
assign personhood; and, on the other, you look outside of the individ-
ual to account for personhood. Another useful way to capture this way
of thinking about these distinct approaches to personhood is in terms
of Descartes’ and Mbiti’s formulations of personhood. Descartes for-
mulates personhood in these terms: ‘I think therefore I am’; and Mbiti
 2 A CONCEPTUAL MAPPING OF PERSONHOOD 19

as follows: ‘I am because we are, since we are, therefore I am’. So,

Descartes reduces personhood to the possession of rational capacity.
Mbiti reduces it to the significance of social relationships. It occurs to
me that this discussion of personhood, contrasting Western and African
views, is strikingly a metaphysical one. Under consideration appears to be
the question of personal identity. In other words, Menkiti may be rea-
sonably construed to be adumbrating the factors that may be considered
crucial to account for the socialisation of individuals (Molefe 2016a). In
the West, emphasis is placed on individual properties and less emphasis
is placed on social relationships. In Africa, more emphasis is placed on
social relationships and less on individual properties.
This interpretation of Menkiti (as elaborating on the metaphysical
theme of personal identity) is supported by Menkiti’s (1984: 171) sum-
mary of these contrasting approaches:

A crucial distinction thus exists between the African view of man and the
view of man found in Western thought: in the African view it is the com-
munity which defines the person as person, not some isolated static quality
of rationality, will, or memory.

It is obvious that on this view the community does not define ‘man’ qua
human nature or ‘person’ qua ‘human being’, which is a biological/
ontological fact. However we may define a ‘person’, it does not take
away the ontological fact that they are characterised by certain isolated
static qualities of body, rationality, will, or memory. They have these
properties independent of the community. As Gyekye (1992: 108)
rightly observes, the community discovers these properties—all it does
is to nurture them. In other words, these properties are part of what it
means to be human qua human nature. What is it then that the commu-
nity defines? Menkiti provides an answer to this question. In the light of
the Mbiti formulation, Menkiti (1984: 172) says:

…as far as Africans are concerned, the reality of the communal world
takes precedence over the reality of individual life histories, whatever these
may be.

I think reference to ‘the reality of the communal world’ is the same thing
as talk of the ‘environing community’. This talk of ‘the reality of the
communal world’ points to the idea that the cultural context serves as a
20 M. MOLEFE

social incubator within which individuals have to commence and nego-

tiate their own lived experience (see Amato 2018: 38). The point is to
emphasise the priority and the inescapability of the social reality that the
individual needs in order to be humanised or socialised (Gyekye 1992).
In other words, without this social incubator, human experience and
possibilities will elude the individual. She will be a lost cause insofar as
humanity and all that it promises is concerned. Menkiti (ibid.) continues
to comment that:

… the individual comes to see himself as man, and it is by first knowing

this community as a stubborn perduring fact of the psychophysical world
that the individual also comes to know himself as a durable, more or less
permanent, fact of this world.

It is becoming clear that Menkiti is giving an account of the socialisation

of the individual. The idea proposed by Menkiti is that the ‘environing
community’ provides the socio-cultural context, with its multiplicity of
institutions and social relationships that helps individuals to see them-
selves as part of the social world. It is these socio-cultural structures that
facilitate the development of the human consciousness and make it possi-
ble for individuals to see themselves as part of the furniture of the human
world. Menkiti is very clear that the “collective facts” play a decisive role
in the individual’s acquisition of “language”, which is crucial for cog-
nitive development (what Menkiti (ibid.) refers to as the “constitution
of mental dispositions and attitudes”). The acquisition of language and
cognitive development are crucial for individuals to understand them-
selves as members of this or that family or even “specific human group”
(ibid.).
Finally, Menkiti (ibid., emphasis mine) notes: “What is more, the
sense of self-identity which the individual comes to possess cannot
be made sense of except by reference to these collective facts”. What
emerges quite vividly from Menkiti’s assertions is that his reference to
personhood, at least in this instance, is tantamount to talk of human
socialisation. According to Menkiti, personal development that leads to
personal identity (personhood) is best accounted for by appeal to what
he refers to as the ‘environing community’, or ‘the reality of the com-
munal world’ or ‘collective facts’. This talk of ‘collective facts’ is virtually
the same as the position that construes personal identity entirely in terms
Another random document with
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welcomed by the colored as by the white members of the household.
Just before her arrival, a bottle of medicine with a strong odor of
Bourbon had been uncorked, and, afterward, set away. After the first
greetings were over, she exclaimed:
“I smell spirits. What have you been doing?”
Old Aunt Chloe, who had lingered in the room so as to be near
the beloved new-comer, turned with an air of triumph to her mistress,
who had often rebuked her belief in ghosts, and burst out with:
“Dar, Missus! Didn’t I allus tole yo dere was sperits in dis yere
house? Sometimes I see ’em, sometimes I hear ’em, an’ yo wood’n
b’lieve me; but now, Miss Lizzie’s done gone SMELL ’em!”

The first chapter of a Western novel is said to contain the

following striking passage:
All of a sudden the fair girl continued to sit on the sands, gazing
upon the briny deep, upon whose bosom the tall ships went merrily
by, freighted, ah! who can tell with how much joy and sorrow, and
pine lumber, and emigrants, and hopes and salt fish!

“The story,” said our host, with his inexhaustible humor and
irresistible brogue, “is of a man who died, and forthwith presented
himself at Heaven’s gate, requesting admittance.
‘Have ye bin to Purgatory, my mon?’ says St. Peter.
‘No, yer Riverence.’
‘Thin it’s no good. Ye’ll have to wait awhile.’
While the unlucky ‘Peri’ was slowly withdrawing, another
candidate approached, and the same question was asked him.
‘No, yer Riverence, but I’ve been married.’
‘Well, that’s all the same,’ says St. Peter; ‘Come in!’
At this, the first arrival taking heart of grace, advanced again, and
says he:
 ‘Plaze yer Riverence, I’ve been married twice!’
‘Away wid ye! Away wid ye!’ says St. Peter: ‘Heaven is no place
for fools!’”

When, some years since, a coalition was talked of between the

New York World, the Times, and the Herald, the Tribune remarked
that, after all, it would be nothing new; it was only the old story of
“the world, the flesh, and the devil.”

In 1871, when the French President was undecided and inactive,

in the face of all the frightful dangers that threatened the nation,
some wit quoted at him the well known verse from Tennyson:
“Thiers! Idle Thiers! We know not what you mean!”

In ’73 a print was widely circulated in Germany, representing

Bismarck pulling away at a rope which was fastened to the massive
pillars of a Cathedral. At his side stood His Satanic Majesty, who
thus questioned him:
“Well, my friend, what are you doing?”
“Trying to pull down the Church.”
“Trying to pull down the Church? And how long do you think it will
take you?”
“Oh, perhaps three or four years.”
“Very good, my friend, very good! I have been trying that for the
last eighteen hundred years; and, if you succeed in three or four, I’ll
resign in your favor!”

When a certain United States Senator disappointed his Ohio

constituents by voting on what they thought the wrong side of a
question, some one (who must have enjoyed his opportunity) hit him
with the following quotation: “He’s Ben Wade, and found wanting.”

“John P. Hale is an old goose!” exclaimed General Cass. Some

friend was kind enough to repeat this saying to the Senator; who
replied with a smile, (and, surely this was the “retort courteous,”) “Tell
General Cass that he’s a Michi-gander!”

At a public dinner in Boston, nearly twenty years ago, Judge

Story proposed as a toast: “The Orator of the Day: Fame follows
merit wherEVER IT goes!” To which Mr. Everett responded: “The
President of the Day: To whatever height the fabric of jurisprudence
may aspire in this country, it can never rise above one Story!”

A newspaper wit announces the discovery of a buried city in the

following pathetic terms: Another lost city has been found on the
coast of Siberia. Now let the man who lost it make his appearance,
pay for this advertisement, and take his old ruins away.

It has been said that the faculty of generalization belongs equally

to childhood and to genius. Was she a genius, clad in sable robes,
and bewailing the recent loss of her husband—she was certainly not
a child—who observed in conversation, with most impressive pathos:
“For we are all liable to become a widow!”

CHARACTERISTIC SAYINGS OF AMERICANS.

Franklin said many things that have passed into maxims, but
nothing that is better known and remembered than “He paid dear,
very dear, for his whistle.”
 Washington made but very few epigrammatic speeches. Here is
one: “To be prepared for war is the most effectual means of
preserving peace.”
Did you ever hear of old John Dickinson? Well, he wrote of
Americans in 1768: “By uniting we stand, by dividing we fall.”
Patrick Henry, as every school-boy knows, gave us, “Give me
liberty, or give me death,” and “If this be treason, make the most of
it.”
Thomas Paine had many quotable epigrammatic sentences:
“Rose like a rocket; fell like a stick;” “Times that try men’s souls;”
“One step from the sublime to the ridiculous,” etc., etc.
Jefferson’s writings are so besprinkled that it is difficult to select.
In despair we jump at “Few die and none resign,” certainly as
applicable to office-holders now as in Jefferson’s time.
Henry Lee gave Washington his immortal title, “First in war, first in
peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen.”
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney declared in favor of “Millions for
defence, but not one cent for tribute.”
“Peaceably if we can; forcibly if we must,” is from Josiah Quincy,
1841.
John Adams did not say, “Live or die, survive or perish, I am for
the constitution,” but Daniel Webster said it for him.
The revolutionary age alone would give us our article, had we
time to gather pearls. Coming down, we pass greater, but not more
famous men.
Davy Crockett was the illustrious author of “Be sure you are right,
and then go ahead.”
Andrew Jackson gave us “The Union—it must be preserved.”
Benton almost lost his original identity in “Old Bullion,” from his
“hard money” doctrines.
 Governor Throop, of New York, was called “Small Light Troop” for
years, from a phrase in a thanksgiving proclamation.
Scott’s “hasty plate of soup” lasted his lifetime.
Taylor’s battle order, “A little more grape, Captain Bragg,” will be
quoted after he is forgotten by “all the world and the rest of
mankind.”
Seward is known for the “irrepressible conflict,” wherever the
English language is spoken.
To Washington Irving we owe “The Almighty Dollar.”
Rufas Choate gave us “glittering generalities.”
Tom Corwin’s “welcome with bloody hands to hospitable graves,”
gave him more unenviable criticism than any other saying in his life.
Calhoun gave us “state rights” as a most pernicious and absurd
equivalent for national supremacy under the constitution.
Douglas applied “squatter sovereignty,” though it is probable that
Cass invented it and Calhoun named it.
Stringfellow was the original “Border Ruffian.”
War times gave us no end of epigrammatic utterances. Those of
Lincoln alone would fill a volume—chief of these, is that noble
sentiment: “With charity to all, and malice toward none.”
McClellan’s “All quiet along the Potomac” was repeated so often
that its echo will “ring down through the ages.”
To Gen. Butler the country was indebted for the phrase
“Contraband of War,” as applied to fugitive negroes found within our
lines.
Grant gave us “Fight it out on this line,” “Unconditional surrender,”
“I propose to move immediately upon your works,” “Bottled up,” and
a hundred others. It seems to have escaped notice that Grant is
responsible for more of these characterizing, elementary
crystallizations of thought, than any other military leader of modern
times.
 One odd example occurs, in his response to Gen. Sheridan’s
telegram: “If things are pushed, Lee will surrender.” “Push things!”
was the reply, and that has passed into a proverb.

DIALECTICAL.
The peculiarities of the Yankee dialect are most amusingly
exemplified by James Russell Lowell, in the Biglow Papers,
especially in the First Series, from which the following extract is
taken:
I ’spose you wonder where I be; I can’t tell fur the soul o’ me
Exactly where I be myself, meanin’ by thet, the hull o’ me.
When I left hum, I hed two legs, an’ they wa’n’t bad ones neither;
The scaliest trick they ever played, wuz bringin’ on me hither—
Now one on ’em’s I dunno where, they thought I was a-dyin’,
An’ cut it off, because they said ’twas kind of mortifyin’;
I’m willin to believe it wuz, and yet I can’t see, nuther,
Why one should take to feelin’ cheap a minute sooner ’n t’other,
Sence both wuz equilly to blame—but things is ez they be;
It took on so they took it off, an’ thet’s enough for me.
Where’s my left hand? Oh, darn it! now I recollect wut’s come on’t.
I haint no left hand but my right, and thet’s got jest a thumb on’t,
It aint so handy as it wuz to calkylate a sum on’t.
I’ve lost one eye, but then, I guess, by diligently usin’ it,
The other’ll see all I shall git by way of pay fer losin’ it.
I’ve hed some ribs broke, six I b’lieve, I haint kep’ no account of ’em;
When time to talk of pensions comes, we’ll settle the amount of ’em.
An’ talkin’ about broken ribs, it kinder brings to mind
One that I couldn’t never break—the one I left behind!
Ef you should see her, jest clean out the spout o’ your invention,
And pour the longest sweetnin’ in about a annooal pension;
And kinder hint, in case, you know, the critter should refuse to be
Consoled, I aint so expensive now to keep, as wut I used to be:—
There’s one eye less, ditto one arm, an’ then the leg that’s wooden,
Can be took off, an’ sot away, whenever there’s a pudden!
 (Letter from Birdofreedom Sawin, a Mexican volunteer, to a friend
at home.)

The Dundreary “dialect” is admirably illustrated in

A LONDON EXQUISITE’S OPINION OF “UNCLE

TOM’S CABIN.”

Aw must wead “Uncle Tom,”—a wawk

Which aw’m afwaid’s extwemely slow:
People one meets begin to talk
Of Mrs. Hawiet Beechah Stowe.

’Tis not as if aw saw haw name

To walls and windahs still confined;
All that is meawly vulgah fame:
Aw don’t wespect the common mind.

But Staffa’d House has made haw quite

Anothah kind of pawson look;
A countess would pawsist last night,
In asking me about haw book.

She wished to know if aw admiawd

Eva, which quite confounded me;
And then haw ladyship inquiawed
Whethaw aw didn’t hate Legwee.

Bai Jove! Aw was completely flawed;

Aw wished myself, or haw, in Fwance;
And that’s the way a fellah’s bawed
By evewy gahl he asks to dance!

Aw felt myself a greataw fool

Than aw had evaw felt befaw;
Aw’ll study at some wagged school
The tale of that old blackamaw!
 It must be this same kind of Englishman, of whom the following
story is told: He was traveling on some American railroad, when a
tremendous explosion took place; the cars, at the same time, coming
to a sudden halt. The passengers sprang up in terror, and rushed out
to acquaint themselves with the cause and extent of the mischief, all
but His Serene Highness, who continued reading his newspaper. In
a moment some one rushed back, and informed him that the boiler
had burst. “Awe!” grunted the Englishman.
“Yes, and sixteen people have been killed!”
“Awe!” he muttered again.
“And—and,” said his interlocutor, with an effort, “your own man—
your servant—has been blown into a hundred pieces!”
“Awe! Bring me the piece that has the key of my portmanteau!”

THE LEGAL “DIALECT.”

ODE TO SPRING.

WRITTEN IN A LAWYER’S OFFICE.

Whereas, on sundry boughs and sprays

Now divers birds are heard to sing,
And sundry flowers their heads upraise,
Hail to the coming on of spring!

The birds aforesaid, happy pairs!

Love ’midst the aforesaid boughs enshrines,
In household nests, themselves, their heirs,
Administrators and assigns.

The songs of the said birds arouse

The memory of our youthful hours,
As young and green as the said boughs,
As fresh and fair as the said flowers.
 Oh, busiest term of Cupid’s court!
Where tender plaintiffs actions bring;
Seasons of frolic and of sport,
Hail, as aforesaid, coming spring!

“Broad Wiltshire” is sampled below, in a psalm given out by the

Clerk of Bradford Parish Church during an Episcopal visitation:
Let us zing to the praayze an’ glawry ’o God, dree verses of the
hundred an’ vourteenth zaam,—a version specially ’dapted to the
’casion, by myself:

Why hop ye zo, ye little hills,

And what var do’ee skip?
Is it acoz you’m proud to zee
His grace, the Lard Biship?

Why skip ye zo ye little hills,

And what var do’ee hop?
Is it acoz to preach to we,
Is comed the Lard Bishop?

Ees—he has comed to preach to we,—

Then let us aal strick up,
An’ zing a glawrious zong of praayze,
An’ bless the Lard Bishup!

Persons fond of economizing words, sometimes use figures (are

they figures of speech?) and letters, in their stead. Thus, the fate of
all earthly things is presented by the consonants DK—a view of the
case entirely consonant with our own observation.
The following is a printer’s short-hand method of expressing his
emotions:

2 KT J.
An SA now I mean 2 write
2 U, sweet KT J,
The girl without a ||,
The belle of UTK.

I 1der if U got the 1

I wrote 2 U, B4
I sailed in the RKDA,
And sent by LN Moore?

My MT head will scarce contain

A calm IDA bright,
But, 8T miles from U, I must
{
M this chance to write.

And first, should NE NV U,

B EZ, mind it not;
Should NE friendship show, B true;
They should not be forgot.

But friends and foes alike DK,

As U may plainly C,
In every funeral RA,
And every LEG.

From virtU never DV8;

Her influence B9
Alike induces 10dernS,
And 40tude divine.

This SA until U I C,
I pray U 2 to XQQ;
And not to burn in FIG
My young and 10der muse.

Now fare U well, DR KT J,

I trust that U R true;
When this U C, then U can say
An SA IOU.
AN AFFECTING STORY.

IIAR BB loved a maid,

He loved her to XS,
And XRSIId his NRGG
2 C her and confS.

Says he, “A meeting I’ll proQR,

B4 the day is past;
In spite of all my NMEE,
She shall B mine at last.”

Now UUULe, MLE

Was 10dR and B9,
FMN8 and gentL 2,
Some th0 she was Divine,

But poor IIAR made her X,

She said he was a calf—
SPCLE ODS;
0 spoke in his B½.

She said, “Should you go on UR nEE,

And melt awA in TRR,
Or WR at 10tions 4
The futR 50 years.

“U still would 0 B 2 me,

UR not 2 my mind,
So prA B YYR, sir, and go
Some betR maid 2 find.

“DR MLE, my love’s XS,

PrithE X10U8,
XQQ—4give—and love me, or
I’ll take an OP8.”

And so he did. Alas! poor man!

Kind readR shed a TR,
He took the OPM so strong,
It laid him on his BR!
GEORGE AND HIS POPPAR.
FEB. 22, A.D. 1738.

There livèd once a plan-ti-er

With his son, his only love,
To whom, upon his birth-day,
A brand new ax he guv.

This farmer had a gar-di-ing,

All filled with apple trees,
Which, for the city mar-ki-et,
He trièd for to reeze.

The son he takes the hatch-i-et,

Quite jolly and jocund,
And, going to the apple trees,
He chops them to the grund.

The farmer called his serv-i-ents,

And ranged them in a row;
“Now, who has chopped my apple trees,
And killed them, root and bo’?”

The servants stand ama-zi-ed,

All drawn up in a line;
Then comes a running up to him,
His young and hopeful sci’n.

“I cannot tell a lie, poppar,”

This truthful boy began;
“’Twas I who chopped your apple trees,
’Twas I, your little san.”

Now, who’d you s’pose this buffer was?

And who his filial kin?
It was the immortal Bushrod,
And the late G. Washingtin!

Feb. 22, 1875. MORAL.

Now, whoso takes a hatch-i-et,

And apple trees cuts down,
Will be, if he lives long enough,
 A great and pious moun.

The preceding poem, while it places in a new light the immortal

history of the hatchet, also illustrates the wonderful adaptability of
the English language to the purposes of the poet. Thus, in the last
stanza, a rhyme is required for “down,” while the sense demands the
word “man” at the end of the corresponding line. Instantly the
ingenious author perceives the remedy, and changes “man” to
“moun,” which doesn’t mean anything to interfere with the sense,
and rhymes with “down” in the most satisfactory manner.
Other fine illustrations of this kind are found in that learned
translation of a part of the Eneid, published a few years since at
Winsted, Connecticut. Thus:

“The hair stood endwise on his powdered wig,

Like quills upon the fretful porcupig;
He wants to go, and then again he doesn’t;
The situation is indeed unpluzzent.”

The temptation is strong to quote just here several parallel

passages from Davidson’s very literal translation and from this
Winsted version. We will give one, for the sake of the contrast.
“Returning Aurora now illuminates the earth with the lamp of
Phœbus, and has chased away the dewy shades from the sky, when
Dido, half-frenzied, thus addressed her sympathizing sister:
Sister Anna, what dreams terrify and distract my mind! What think
you of this wondrous guest who has come to our abode? In mien
how graceful he appears! In manly fortitude and warlike deeds how
great! I am fully persuaded, (nor is my belief groundless,) that he is
the offspring of the gods. Had I not been fixed and steadfast in my
resolution never to join myself to any in the bonds of wedlock, since
my first love by death mocked and disappointed me, I might,
perhaps, give way. Anna, since the death of my unhappy spouse
Sichæus, since the household gods were stained with his blood,
shed by a brother, this stranger alone has warped my inclinations,
and interested my wavering mind. I recognize the symptoms of my
former flame. But he who first linked me to himself, hath borne away
my affection. May he possess it still, and retain it in the grave. (Liber
Quartus. Ibid.)

Next day the sun rose at the proper time,

And much improved the Carthaginian clime,
When thus her sister Anna she addressed:
“Sister, my nights are full of wild unrest:
This nice young man that’s now a-stopping here
To my affections is a-growing dear;
Celestial is his origin I know,—
Such fearless souls don’t emanate below.
My grief! what savage fights that man has fit,
And how genteel he can get up and git!
’F I hadn’t vowed not to unite again,
I’m not quite certain but I should cave in.
Since poor dear Sic was slew by brother Pyg,
For no live man I’ve ever cared a fig,
Till unto Carthage this brave hero came—
But now—I swan—I feel the ancient flame.
Yet, while Sichæus keeps his coffined state,
My heart lies with his ashes—that’s my gait.”

Prizes having been offered for rhymes corresponding to

“Ipecacuanha,” and “Timbuctoo,” it is to be hoped that the ingenious
authors of the following verses gained them:

As I was walking in the grove

With my Julianna,
Some oranges I gave my love,
Pine-apple and banana;
And then, her headache to remove,
Some ipecacuanha.
 If I were a cassowary
On the plains of Timbuctoo,
I would eat a missionary,
Flesh and bones, and hymn-book, too.

“And the moral of that is,” as the Duchess observed:

That step can find no place

In rhyme, is not the case:
’Tis quite absurd:
To find a rhyme for “step,”
You only have to sep-
Arate a word.

Also: (“month” having been declared unrhymable;)

They seized a soldier in Broadway,

December was the month;
He saw his pistols thrown away,
He also saw his gun th-
rown away!

In W. G. Clarke’s youth he was requested by a young lady in the

millinery line to contribute a poem to her album. Her “Album” was an
account book diverted from its original purpose, and he responded
as follows:
To Miss Lucretia Sophonisba Matilda Jerusha Catling:
Thou canst not hope, O nymph divine
3 9
That I should ever court the
Or that, when passion’s glow is done,
1
My heart can ever love but
When, from Hope’s flowers exhales the dew,
2
Then Love’s false smiles desert us
Then Fancy’s radiance ’gins to flee,
3
And life is robbed of all the
And Sorrow sad her tears must pour 4
 O’er cheeks where roses bloomed be
Yes! life’s a scene all dim as Styx;
6
Its joys are dear at
Its raptures fly so quickly hence
18d
They’re scarcely cheap at
Oh! for the dreams that then survive!
25
They’re high at pennies
The breast no more is filled with heaven
27
When years it numbers
And yields it up to Manhood’s fate
28
About the age of
Finds the world cold and dim and dirty
30
Ere the heart’s annual count is
Alas! for all the joys that follow
25
I would not give a quarter dollar.

1 97½

Thus, my dear maid, I send to you

The balance of my meter due;
Please scrutinize the above amount,
And set it down to my account.

“FRAGMENTS OF AN ORIGINAL LOVE STORY.”

BY
J. G. STAUNTON, AND A SOUTH CAROLINA LADY.

After a “lovers’
quarrel,” when the party of the first part
——Meekly approached and knelt down at her feet,
Praying loud as before he had ranted,
That she would forgive him, and try to be sweet,
And said “Can’t you?” the dear girl re-canted.

Then softly he whispered “How could you do so?

I certainly thought I was jilted;
 But come now with me; to the parson we’ll go!
Say, wilt thou, my dear?” and she wilted.

Then gaily he took her to see his new home;

A cottage by no means enchanted;
“Ah! here we can live without longing to roam,”
He said, “Sha’n’t we, my love?” and they shantied,

And gently beamed o’er them love’s rose-colored ray;

(The bridegroom and bride of this ballad;)
He said “Let us walk at the close of the day,
My own lovely Sall,” and they sallied.

He plucked her the sweetest and loveliest flowers

That scented the path where they wandered;
And when she exclaimed “Let us turn from these bowers,
To roam near the pond!” then they pondered.

Old time softly paused o’er the home of this pair,

Nor grief nor perplexity haunted;
And when the meek husband asked “What shall I wear?”
“Plaid pants,” she replied, and he panted.

She, like a good wife, made his wardrobe her care;

(Neglecting it seemed to her wicked;)
So, when she brought linen, all shining and fair,
Saying “Wear this, dear Dick!” then he dickied.

And when a bright bud of divinity came,

To gladden the home where it tarried,
They put it to vote that the young stranger’s name
Sweet CARRIE should be, and ’twas carried.

But perhaps the most “pronounced” example of adaptability, as

referred to above, is found in a poem recently contributed to a
Rochester paper.

Spring, sprang, beautiful sprung!

The wild-winged warblers are wanging a wung,
And the soft southern breezes are brazing a broze,
That thaws up the ice with remarkable thoze.
 O betterest time of all moments of tome,
I’ll rhyme thee a rhimelet in tenderest rhome,
And tell thee how oft in my longing, I’ve lung
To welcome thy coming, O beautiful sprung!

Symbolical season! exquisitest soze!

All nature uprising in gleefulest gloze,
Wide opens its larynx to sing and to shout,
Exuberant pleasure and gratefulest grout.

The blithe little rivulets run to the seas,—

The little buds start on the hemlocks and trees;
The wild geese are screaming their vigorest scream,
And the frogs that were dreaming no longer will dream.

Of course there is sadness in thinking the thought

That there’ll be no more skating for skaters who skaught;
But the Erie Canal, with its decrease in tolls,
Will cause us to smile a succession of smoles.

If “the exigencies of rhyme” need not be considered in

constructing English verse, neither need the exigencies of rhythm, as
shown by the following highly artistic couplets:

The wind blew down our well-sweep,

And father and I put it up again —— sheep.

Wasn’t Pharaoh a Rascal

Because he wouldn’t let the children of Israel go three days’ journey into the
wilderness, to celebrate the Paschal?

In ’73, a modest volume of poems was published by an Hon. and

Rev. gentleman of Central New York,[3] in which occur the following
rather surprising verses: (not consecutively, but here and there.)
 O bright shining morn of the year,
I cannot foretell thy events;
Trusting in God, why should I fear,
Though having so many relents!
* * * * *
I looked on his form; ’twas like mine;
Transparent his body did seem;
His vigor could never repine;
With glory his features all gleam.
* * * * *
Oh, that the great ocean of love,
Where all the inhabitants bathe,
Ere they go to the bright realms above,
In His sight to whom they have clave.
* * * * *
We saw there as beacons of light
God’s temples of worship, so fair;
We saw there, enlisted in fight,
The wicked who cursed God with dare.
* * * * *
O then they all sang as before,
And the prophets they came rushing down;
And skipping, they came to that shore
Where saints shall forever be crowned!

To find the “concealed sense” (concealed nonsense!) of the

verses that follow, the first and third, second and fourth lines, are
read consecutively:

That man must lead a happy life,

Who’s free from matrimonial chains;
Who is directed by a wife,
Is sure to suffer for his pains.

Adam could find no solid peace,

When Eve was given for a mate;
Till he beheld a woman’s face,
Adam was in a happy state.
 In all the female race appear
Hypocrisy, deceit, and pride,
The tokens of a heart sincere,
In woman never did reside.

What tongue is able to unfold

The failings that in woman dwell?
The merits in her we behold,
Are almost imperceptible.

Confusion take the man, I say,

Who makes a woman his delight!
Who will no court to women pay,
Keeps always reason in his sight.

This is nonsense, too; though, certainly, women are the faultiest

of human beings—except men.
Be that as it may, few women have ever been more severely, or,
perhaps, more justly, cauterized, than poor Job’s poor wife, in
Coleridge’s celebrated Epigram:

Sly Beelzebub took all occasions

To try Job’s constancy and patience.
He took his honor, took his health,
He took his children, took his wealth,
His servants, horses, oxen, cows—
But cunning Satan did not take his spouse.

But Heaven, that brings out good from evil,

And loves to disappoint the Devil,
Had predetermined to restore
Twofold all Job had lost before:
His servants, horses, oxen, cows.
Short-sighted Satan! NOT to take his spouse?

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE.