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Sana Loue
Case Studies
in Society,
Religion, and
Bioethics
Case Studies in Society, Religion, and Bioethics
Sana Loue
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgments
I have been privileged to teach for the last 3 years a graduate-level course at Case
Western Reserve University School of Medicine entitled, unsurprisingly, “Religion,
Society, and Bioethics.” It is the many class discussions on the topics considered
here that prompted me to move forward with this writing. I greatly appreciate the
contributions of many of my students to these discussions. In particular, I wish to
thank Nathaniel Hanna, Kathryn Miller, and Glen Wurdeman for their insights. I am
delighted that several of my former students contributed their perspectives and
research efforts to this text. Madison Carithers, Hamasa Ebadi, Shaafae Hussain,
Ried Mackay, and Avery Zhou contributed extensively to Chapter 3, relating to the
body modification of minors, and Madison Carithers additionally contributed to
Chapter 1, which focuses on homosexuality. Brandy Johnson has been a contributor
to several of my previous edited works. I am thrilled that she was able to collaborate
once again with the preparation of Chapter 5 on the refusal of medical treatment.
Gary Edmunds is to be thanked for his assistance with much of the literature
research.
Several authors have generously permitted me to utilize their figures in this text.
The figure in Chapter 9 of Dolly, illustrating reproductive cloning, was made pos-
sible by Squidonius through Wikimedia. B. Cornell is to be thanked for granting
permission for the use of what is Figure 9.2, illustrating normal development, repro-
ductive cloning, and therapeutic cloning. The geographic representation of laws
relating to sexual orientation in Chapter 2 was made possible by the International
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) which permits its
use with acknowledgment. Portions of Chapter 5 originally appeared in a book I had
previously published with Springer Science+Business, LLC, in 2017, Handbook of
Religion and Spirituality in Social Work Practice and Research, and are reprinted
here with permission.
Finally, last but certainly not least, I am fortunate to once again have the oppor-
tunity to work with Janet Kim as my editor at Springer. I am very appreciative of her
insights, her support, and her consistently positive outlook.
v
Contents
vii
viii Contents
Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 257
xi
List of Tables
xiii
About the Author
xv
About the Contributors
Madison Carithers, MA, obtained her Masters of Arts in Bioethics and Medical
Humanities from Case Western Reserve University. Her Masters capstone focused
on issues arising at the intersection of religion and mental illnesses. She received
her BS degree from Clemson University with a focus on health science and a con-
centration in preprofessional health studies.
Brandy L. Johnson, JD, is a senior partner at Early & Miranda, P.C. She gradu-
ated from Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, in 2000 with a Bachelor of Arts
in Political Science with a minor in Administration of Justice. She received her Juris
Doctorate, magnum cum laude, from Southern Illinois University School of Law in
2003. She was admitted to practice law in Illinois in 2003 and in Missouri in 2004.
In 2015 and 2016, she was selected as an emerging lawyer by leading lawyers. In
2017, she received an AV Preeminent Rating and a Silver Client Champion Rating
from Martindale-Hubbell and was selected as a leading lawyer in 2017, 2018,
and 2019.
She is admitted to practice law in all courts in the states of Missouri and Illinois
as well as in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois. She is a member of the Illinois State Bar
Association, The Missouri Bar Association, the Jackson County Bar Association
(Illinois), the Inns of Court, and the Illinois Legal Aid Diversity and Inclusion
Working Group.
xvii
xviii About the Contributors
Ried E. Mackay, MA, is currently a PhD student at Texas A&M University in the
Department of Sociology studying Organizational, Political, and Economic
Sociology and Race and Ethnicity. His research interests include bioethics, Native
American healthcare, and Native American healthcare policy. In addition, he has a
recent interest in the new field of astrosociology.
Avery Zhou, MA, is currently a medical student at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas, School of Medicine. She graduated cum laude from the Integrated Graduate
Studies Program at Case Western Reserve University in 2019, earning a BA in
Psychology with honors, a BA in Biology, and an MA in Bioethics and Medical
Humanities.
Chapter 1
Society, Religion, and Bioethics
Recent data indicate a decline in the numbers of individuals in the United States
who claim a religious affiliation and a corresponding increase in the number who
self-identify as unaffiliated with a specific faith tradition (Pew Research Center,
2015). Nevertheless, even among those who claim no religious affiliation, the vast
majority professes a belief in God, and a large proportion prays on a daily basis
(Pew Research Center, 2012b). Worldwide, more than 80% of individuals claim a
religious affiliation (Pew Research Center, 2012a), and, while the absolute number
of individuals who claim no religious affiliation is expected to grow by 2050, their
proportion of the worldwide population is expected to diminish.
But what is meant by religion? Some might suggest that religion consists only of
the sacred texts, formal beliefs, and authoritative pronouncements that are particular
to a specific faith. This conceptualization, however, leads to the essentialization of a
particular faith and an identity, thereby ignoring the nuances that shape understand-
ings and practice. Indeed, individuals may claim a religious affiliation or identity in
the absence of adherence to what may be considered the major tenets of a faith. It
should not be surprising that even within a specific religion or secular orientation,
perspectives are not monolithic, and multiple normative frameworks likely exist
(Clarke, Eich, & Schreiber, 2015; Coward & Sidhu, 2000; Iltis, 2011; Marshall,
Thomasma, & Bergsma, 1994; Pauls & Hutchinson, 2002; Reichley, 2003;
Thohaben, 2016). As has been noted:
[r]eligion … is not a realm distinct from the rest of culture. It is mediated, administered,
lived, contested, and adapted by socially situated agents, just like other forms of culture—
and in relation to them. (Bailey & Redden, 2011, p. 3)
Additionally, religious identity may be shaped and modified by race, sex, class, and
geography (Brody & Macdonald, 2013).
Bioethical issues often arise in the most intimate and private moments of an
individual’s life—whether to seek an abortion when an ultrasound examination or
other test reveals a defect that will cause suffering and shorten the life of a yet
unborn infant; whether family members will endorse a “do not resuscitate” order for
their loved one; and whether a physician should acquiesce to a patient’s request that
he or she pray with him for a cure for his cancer (see Lo et al., 2003). Many patients
may turn to their faiths and their religious authorities in an effort to find meaning in
both the question and the answer. So, too, many healthcare providers seek guidance
within their own faith traditions while recognizing that in any given situation, they
must act in the patient’s best interests and consider the patient’s wishes and prefer-
ences (Lo et al., 2003).
Although religion is often considered a private matter (Campbell, 1990; Wind,
1990) as in the scenarios indicated above, it is also in many ways a very public one
(Brody & Macdonald, 2013; Campbell, 2012; Wind, 1990). As an example, reli-
gious concepts of health and disease may give rise to and reflect both our individual
and societal understandings of the world, which may or may not be in accord with
each other. Is disease to be cured by prayer and faith or by reliance on medicine?
Are homosexuals sinners, as some faith communities would assert? Are they crimi-
nals, committing unspeakable acts? Or are they to be seen as victims of environ-
mental or genetic influences (see Campbell, 1990)? The interplay of religion and
bioethics in both the private and public spheres of our lives is reflected in societal
debates and efforts to resolve or accommodate various perspectives with respect to
mandates for childhood vaccinations (Kahn, 2016); forms of end-of-life care and
the availability of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia (Iltis, 2011; Kahn,
2016; Turner, 2005); the definition of death (Iltis, 2011; Kahn, 2016); the permis-
sibility and availability of abortion and contraception (Iltis, 2011); the provision of
medical care, including blood transfusion (Turner, 2004), to children whose parents
decline such treatment in favor of prayer; the establishment of religious exemptions
to child abuse and neglect laws (American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on
Bioethics, 2013); and the public funding of unproven religious or spiritual treat-
ments for illness and disease (American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on
Bioethics, 2013). Bioethical issues have become increasingly globalized as we
tackle cross-border issues related to organ donation and transplantation, physician-
assisted suicide and euthanasia, stem cell research, and accessibility of care, as well
as others.
Bioethical Frameworks
One must ask, then, what framework or frameworks are available to us to explore
and address such critical issues. Attribution is often accorded to various theologians,
including Richard McCormick, Charles Curran, James Gustafson, Edmund
Pellegrino, Paul Ramsey, and others, for the initial formulation and development of
bioethics (Borry, Schotsmans, & Dierickx, 2005; Cahill, 2003; Jonsen, 2006;
Messikomer, Fox, & Swazey, 2001; Turner, 2004; see Brody & Macdonald, 2013),
and bioethics has often been linked to a particular religious framework (e.g., Becker,
1990; Dorff, 1996; Florida, 1993; Gustafson, 1975; Rosner & Bleich, 2000). Some
Bioethical Frameworks 3
1
For an example of reliance on specific biblical passages as the basis for ethical arguments, see
Payne, 2014.
2
The “narrative of emancipation” alleges that the development of secular bioethics represents a
freeing of bioethics from the worn, outdated, regimented approach offered by religiously premised
approaches (Kahn, 2016). For other analyses that examine this characterization, albeit without
using this term, see Carter (1993) and Hunter (1991). Hollinger (1989) has noted that evangelical-
ism has often led to efforts to apply moral principles in an absolutist, regimented fashion, an
approach that fails to address morally ambiguous situations and acknowledge social pluralism.
Gudolf (2013) similarly notes that the ethical system of many religions has been rule-based and
exceptionless.
4 1 Society, Religion, and Bioethics
The utilitarian approach, introduced by John Stuart Mill and later amplified by
Jeremy Bentham, posits that an action is good if it brings about the most benefit or
the least harm to the greatest number of individuals as possible (Driver, 2014). This
framework encompasses the principle of utility, to achieve as much good as possi-
ble; the measurement of goodness according to priority, which includes happiness,
satisfaction, autonomy, and personal relationship; an assessment of consequences
(consequentialism) such that assessment of an action is premised on the quality of
its consequences; and action on the basis of impartial and universal, rather than
personal, considerations (Beauchamp & Walters, 2003).
Consequentialism suggests that normative properties are based on consequences
alone. Classical utilitarianism is consequentialist, rather than deontological, because
it asserts that what is right depends entirely on consequences. However, saying that
the rightness of an action is dependent on the consequences does not address which
consequences are to be considered in judging the moral rightness of an action; con-
sequences may refer to the actual consequences, the intended consequences, the
value of the consequences, the total net good, or whether the consequences are good
to all people (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2019).
Casuistry seeks to address ethical dilemmas by analyzing precedents in other
situations that are similar in critical respects to the situation at hand. It has been
defined as:
the interpretation of moral issues, using procedures of reasoning based on paradigms and
analogies, leading to the formulation of expert opinion about the existence and stringency
of particular moral obligations, framed in terms of rules or maxims that are general but not
universal or invariable, since they hold good with certainty only in the typical conditions of
the agent and circumstances of action. (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988, p. 257)
Casuistry as a method for ethical analysis has been utilized by both rabbinic schol-
ars and Roman Catholic theologians (Gudolf, 2013) and is an important approach in
the context of clinical ethics (Freeman & Francis, 2006; Jonsen, 1991).
A secular, or “irreligious,” approach offers various advantages, including an
avoidance of ideological (religious) excesses; a basis for the identification of
implicit biases that may exist with a theological approach; recognition of the lack of
unanimity across religious bioethical perspectives (Murphy, 2012); the avoidance of
conclusions that can only be analyzed, evaluated, and justified on theological
grounds specific to a certain faith (Cohen, Wheeler, Scott, Edwards, Lusk, & the
Anglican Working Group in Bioethics, 2000; Murphy, 2012); and a refusal to toler-
ate or exhibit inequalities in access, equity, and standing in the here-and-now
(Murphy, 2012).
However, the neutrality of secular approaches to bioethics has been challenged
as value-laden and lacking neutrality,3 despite assertions to the contrary (Guinn,
2006; Kahn, 2016).4 It has been argued that the secular American bioethical model
3
One author has caustically asserted that when people “claim to be taking a neutral and impartial
view, it is far more likely that they just don’t know where they are” (Stempsey, 2012, p. 18).
4
In contrast to the narrative of emancipation, which claims that secular bioethics freed the field
from the intransigence of religious dogma, the “narrative of lamentation” argues that “religious
Bioethical Frameworks 5
has led to reliance on a “small and restricted set of concepts” (Stempsey, 2011,
p. 340), a prioritization of autonomy and individual rights over other considerations
(Fox & Swazey, 2008; Stempsey, 2011; Tham, 2008); a de-emphasis on the interde-
pendent nature of relationships; and a disfavoring of ethical relativism in favor of a
universalistic approach (Fox & Swazey, 2008; Stempsey, 2011). The resulting
devaluation of religion in bioethics and the favoring of philosophy, law, and the
medical humanities are alleged to have led to an overreliance on law for the resolu-
tion of bioethical concerns, denial of our simultaneous membership in both particu-
lar moral communities and larger, pluralistic communities, and deprivation of the
wisdom and knowledge that has been derived from long-standing religious tradi-
tions (Callahan, 1990; Durante, 2009; Stempsey, 2011). It has been asserted that it
was the deficiencies of the principlistic approach that brought about competing
secular models, e.g., narrative ethics, feminist ethics, and utilitarian ethics, each of
which is deficient and which ultimately led to relativism, nihilism, and the inability
of bioethics to provide moral guidance (Tham, 2008).
Many societies are pluralistic, multicultural, and multifaith (Durante, 2009; Iltis,
2006; Turner, 2004), and understandings of moral obligations, science, reason, and
religion are not singular (Muir Grey, 1999; Shweder, 1991). Tension often exists in
pluralistic societies between reliance on a religious foundation, which is not univer-
sally shared, and secular tradition, which is also not universally shared and proceeds
from different assumptions (Campbell, 1990). As Callahan observed:
How are we as a community, dedicated to pluralism, to find room for different values and
moral perspectives of different people and different groups How are we to respect particu-
larism? … how as a community made up of diverse individuals and groups to find a way to
transcend differences in order to reach a consensus on some matters of common human
welfare? How, that is are we to respect universalism? … There can be no culturally and
psychologically perceptive ethics without taking into account the diversity of moral lives,
but there can be no ethics at all without universals …. (Callahan, 2000, pp. 37–38)
In contrast, some countries, such as Greece, Russia, Romania, and Israel, may lack
a large plurality of religion and/or reflect one central dogma that represents a signifi-
cant voice in debates relating to bioethical issues (Griniezakis & Symeonides,
2005). Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, even communities that embrace the same
faith are not monolithic but rather may embrace a variety of perspectives.
Accordingly, secular perspectives are neither as hegemonic nor as relativistic as
has been claimed, and religious perspectives are often not as limited as has often
been asserted. Understandings of morality, of what is considered to be of intrinsic
value, of what is considered to count as virtue (Veatch, 1999), of what is right and
good, and of what is wrong and evil, within each domain—the secular and the reli-
gious—are nuanced and may vary considerably (Iltis, 2011). Islamic bioethics, for
example, brings together discourse from the realms of law, science, medicine, and
voices were marginalized” and “muted” (Lammers, 1996, p. 19) and that secular theorists
attempted to hijack bioethical inquiry in the guise of neutrality. Narratives and counternarratives
have been developed in an effort to solidify and proselytize each group’s position (Kahn, 2016).
6 1 Society, Religion, and Bioethics
the state; how these elements are assembled and the reasoning that is produced vary
across specific contexts (Clarke, Eich, & Schreiber, 2015). Similarly, across societ-
ies adhering to a secular approach to bioethical injury and action, the acceptability
of a particular model for the physician-patient encounter may vary, often depending
upon cultural norms, the governing medicolegal framework, and the guidance pro-
vided by relevant professional organizations, societies, and licensing bodies (Clark-
Grill, 2010; Dickenson, 1999; Vincent, 1998). Whether founded on philosophical or
religious reasoning, the approach must address fundamental issues related to exis-
tence—the meaning of vulnerability, the meaning of life and of death, the meaning
of dignity, and the meaning of purpose. There are no easy answers to these ques-
tions, whether they are posed at the individual level or at the community or societal
level. How those answers are to be found and what those answers are may well
vary—and may need to vary—with the context in which they arise (see Wildes, 2002).
Numerous perspectives exist with respect to the ideal role of the state or society
in such debates, whether and to what extent one framework for morality should be
privileged over another (Iltis, 2011), whether the state is to have a limited or expan-
sive role, and whether individuals are to be left alone or mandated to use or not use
specific practices or procedures. As an example, in the United States, the First
Amendment to the Constitution provides for the separation of church and state,
mandating against the establishment of any religion as that of the state (the estab-
lishment clause) but also prohibiting interference in the exercise thereof (the free
exercise clause). The state may not discriminate between religions, favor a particu-
lar religion over others, or favor or disfavor religion over non-religion (Everson v.
Board of Education, 1947; Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia,
1995). That said, states are not precluded from regulating behavior even though
moral norms embedded in the country’s laws and institutional policies and proce-
dures, such as the prohibition of and punishment for murder, may reflect religious
precepts and commandments. However, the state must provide a secular justifica-
tion for the law.
Regardless of whether the state’s role is ultimately determined to be limited or
expansive, some groups and persons will be unhappy and dissatisfied due to the
resulting implications of what they can and cannot do. One writer has observed that:
[a]ll discourse requires a foundation—a series of assumptions—that generate content.
Moral content does not come from nowhere, and to privilege some sources …over others …
is to ignore the fact that all these position rely on fundamental assumptions that cannot be
definitely defended as the valid starting point for deliberation and none of which can be
proven to be the right starting point. (Iltis, 2009, p. 230)
Although at least one author has pessimistically asserted that the differences in per-
spective in many contested areas may be so large as to negate the possibility of any
compromise (Iltis, 2011),5 others have identified potential pathways toward collabo-
ration and/or compromise between religion or theology and secular bioethics
5
Englehardt’s assessment of Christian bioethics seems to suggest that no compromise is possible
between secular and Christian bioethics. He has observed:
Bioethical Frameworks 7
(Cahill, 2003; Griniezakis & Symeonides, 2005; Kahn, 2016; Thohaben, 2016).
Griniezakis and Symeonides observed:
If by the word theology we mean a particular and unique line of argumentation, which
demands conclusion that will have only a religious character, then theology could rarely
exist within bioethical science. Narrow theological thoughts, restrictions, and dry apho-
risms, cannot lead to ethical axioms, to arguments, or particular conclusions with religious
character.…One can conclude that theology’s presence in bioethical discussion helps
inform the fullness of the faithful about contemporary bioethical achievements, and gives
the green light to the faithful to participation in various developments of life that do not
offend human nature.…Theology must produce challenges for working out decisions, not
of religious, but of theological character. Furthermore, theology will play a determinative
role in the cooperation between bioethics and other theoretical sciences. Theology can
stand as the binding link for these sciences. (Griniezakis & Symeonides, 2005, pp. 10–11)
Thohaben (2016) has suggested that it may be best to address prescriptive ethics in
the public square from middle axioms, that is, one level removed from foundational
discussions, which would facilitate participation by a broader array of individuals
and groups, and may permit practical agreement on specific moral issues (see also
Hollinger, 1989). He has also suggested that although Christians’ values may be
based on faith, they can translate those values in such a way as to permit cooperation
with others, recognizing that there may nevertheless continue to be some conflicts
(Thohaben, 2015). Cahill (2003) has posited that religion is especially poised to
contribute to issues related to social justice as it relates to access to healthcare and
the for-profit marketing of global research biotechnology to those consumers who
have access to greater wealth.
Each of the chapters of this text examines the interplay between religion, society,
and the resolution of a specific bioethical issue as reflect in practice and/or in law.
The sheer vastness of this inquiry precludes the inclusion of all possible examples
in this volume, despite their relevance to the focus of this work, e.g., definitions of
death, debates relating to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining mecha-
nisms, abortion, contraception, organ donation, and transplantation.
A community’s morality depends on the moral premises, rules of evidence, and rules of
inference it acknowledges, as well as on the social structure of those in authority to rule
knowledge claims in or out of a community’s set of commitments. For Christians, who is an
authority and who is in authority are determined by the Holy tradition, through which in
Mysteries one experiences the Holy Spirit. Because of the requirement of repentance and
conversion to the message of Christ preserved in the tradition, the authority of the commu-
nity must not only exclude heretical teaching but heretical communities from commu-
nion … Christian bioethics should be non-ecumenical by recognizing that true moral
knowledge has particular moral content, is communal, and is not fully available outside of
the community of right worship. (Englehardt, 1995, p. 182)
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 address issues that may arise in the context of interac-
tions between a healthcare provider, patient, and patient’s family: sexual orienta-
tion, male infant circumcision and female genital cutting, medical error, the refusal
of medical treatment for religious reasons, and medical deportation. That exchange,
however, is impacted not only by provider and patient conceptualizations of what is
right and wrong, or good or fair, but also the positions of professional organizations
and religious authorities, as well as the determinations of legislatures and courts.
These very private matters have very public dimensions. The interwoven nature of
religion, bioethics, and society is similarly evident in the context of research, which
is explored in Chaps. 7, 8 and 9, with discussions of the Nazi medical experiments,
the use of animals in research, and cloning for reproductive and therapeutic purposes.
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of a European questionnaire. Intensive Care Medicine, 24, 1251–1256.
Wildes, K. W. (2002). Religion in bioethics: A rebirth. Christian Bioethics, 8(2), 163–174.
Wind, J. P. (1990). What can religion offer bioethics? Hastings Center Report, 20(4), 18–20.
Legal References
Constitution
Cases
It was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that men who had
sexual relations with other men were viewed as a class apart, as individuals who,
because of their behavior, were seen as deviant (Foucault, 1978). Prior to that time,
it was the act of sex between males and the act of anal sex, whether between two
men or between a man and a woman, that was shunned and in some way penalized.
Judaism
1
All passages from the Old and New Testaments are from Coogan, 2007.
The story of Lot and the angels in Sodom has also been used as the basis to charac-
terize male-male sexual relations as a sin and those who engage in it as sinners
(Goss, 1993; Ukleja, 1983; West, 1999). The story is written as follows:
The two angels came to Sodom in the evening, and Lot was sitting in the gateway of Sodom.
When Lot saw them, he rose to meet them, and bowed down with his face to the ground.
2
He said, “Please, my lords, turn aside to your servant’s house and spend the night, and
wash your feet; then you can rise early and go on your way.” They said, “No; we will spend
the night in the square.”3But he urged them strongly; so they turned aside to him and entered
his house; and he made them a feast, and baked unleavened bread, and they ate. 4But before
they lay down, the men of the city, the men of Sodom, both young and old, all the people to
the last man, surrounded the house; 5and they called to Lot, “Where are the men who came
to you tonight? Bring them out to us so that we may know them.”6Lot went out of the door
to the men, shut the door after him, 7and said, “I beg you my brothers, do not act so wick-
edly. 8Look, I have two daughters who have not known a man; let me bring them out to you,
and do to them as you please; only do nothing to these men, for they have come under the
shelter of my roof.” 9But they replied, “Stand back!” And they said, “This fellow came here
as an alien, and he would play the judge! Now we will deal worse with you than with them.”
Then they pressed hard against the man Lot, and came near the door to break it down.
(Genesis 19:1–9; NRSV)
The story has been interpreted by those who condemn homosexuality and/or homo-
sexuals as meaning that the men’s desire “to know” the visitors reflects a desire to
know them sexually, that is, to engage in male-male sex (De Young, 1991); that
Sodom and Gomorrah and the surrounding towns gave themselves up to sexual
perversion and immorality (cf. Alter, 1990, 157); that the destruction of Sodom and
Gomorrah evidences the immorality of male-male sex, i.e., homosexuality (Feinberg,
1985; Fields, 1992; Ukleja, 1983); and that Lot is horrified that visitors may be
raped and the homosexual nature of sex is so wrong that Lot is willing to offer his
daughters. However, these asserted meanings have been highly contested by those
who argue that such readings ignore the historical and societal context in which the
passage was written (Furnish, 1994).
Two passages in Leviticus are frequently referenced as well. Leviticus 18:22
provides: “You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination”
(NRSV). Leviticus 20:13 (NRSV) commands: “If a man lies with a male as with a
woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall be put to death;
their blood is upon them.”
Christianity
2
See, for example, the varying meanings attributed to this passage by Banister, 2009, Brooten,
1996, Hays, 1986, Scroggs, 1983, Smith, 1996, Townsley, 2011, Ward, 1997, and Winkler, 1990.
Same-Sex Relations as Sin 15
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of
those who by their wickedness suppress the truth. 19For what can be known about God is
plain to them. 20Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature,
invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made.
So they are without excuse; 21for though they knew God, they did not honor him as God or
give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their senseless minds were
darkened. 22Claiming to be wise, they became fools; 23and they exchanged the glory of the
immortal God for images resembling a mortal human being or for birds or four-footed
animals or reptiles. 24Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to
the degrading of their bodies among themselves, 25because they exchanged the truth about
God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed
forever! Amen. 26For this reason God gave them up to degrading passions. Their women
exchanged natural intercourse for unnatural, 27and in the same way also the men, giving up
natural intercourse with women, were consumed with passion for one another. Men com-
mitted shameless acts with men and received in their own persons the due penalty for their
error. (Romans 1:18–27, NRSV)
Some writers have argued, for example, that Paul’s words proclaim unequivocally
homosexuality’s sinfulness (Jepsen, 1995, 123; Malick, 1993, 340), its “distorting
consequence of the fall of the human race in the Garden of Eden” (Malick, 1993,
340), and its “perversion of God’s design for human sexual relations” (Malick,
1993, 340).
It has been asserted that Paul’s words served, as well, to draw a link between
sodomy and man’s lower physical impulses, suggesting that participation in such
acts defied man’s spiritual nature and constituted a repudiation of God (Gilbert,
1980/1981). For Paul had stated:
It follows, my friends, that our lower nature has no claim upon us: we are not obliged to live
on that level. If you do so, you must die. But if by the Spirit you put to death all the base
pursuits of the body, then you will live. (Romans 8:5–7, 12–13, NRSV)
Do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be
deceived! Fornicators, idolaters, adulterers, male prostitutes, sodomites, 10thieves, the
greedy, drunkards, revilers, robbers—none of these will inherit the kingdom of God.
11
And this is what some of you used to be. But you were washed, you were sanctified, you
were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God. (1
Corinthians 6:9–11, NRSV)
The Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas characterized sex between two men and
sex between two women as the “vice of sodomy,” a sin more grave than even incest
or rape and exceeded in seriousness only by bestiality, “because use of the right sex
is not observed” (Aquinas, 1947, II–11 Q 154 Art. 11, 12).
16 2 Homosexuality: Sin, Crime, Pathology, Identity, Behavior
Islam
The Qur’an, Allah’s revelation to the Prophet Muhammad, serves as the foundation
for both the sacred and the everyday aspects of life (‘Abd al-Haqq, 2011; Jafari &
Suerdem, 2011). Other important sources include the Hadith, a collection of sayings
and deeds attributed to the Prophet Muhammad that were compiled by scholars after
his death, and Shari’a, or Islamic law. The four primary schools of Sunni legal
thinking (Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, and Hanbali) and the two main schools of Shiite
legal thinking (Jafari and Zaidi) differ with respect to their interpretation of portions
of the Qur’an, their (non)acceptance of specific Hadiths or the weight to be attrib-
uted to them, and the extent to which analogy and inference may be utilized in
examining a question (Abdoul-Rouf, 2010; Mejia, 2007; US Agency for International
Development, n.d.). In addition to variations in the interpretation of relevant scrip-
ture stemming from these different schools of teaching, significant cultural differ-
ences exist between the many Muslim communities throughout the world and even
within one country. This discussion is not intended to diminish or trivialize these
differences but, instead, to identify common threads across these diverse interpreta-
tions and traditions that are relevant to the issues raised.
It has been asserted that all Islamic legal schools view male-male sex as unlaw-
ful, although they may differ in the severity of punishment (Wafer, 1997). Like
Judaism and Christianity, Islam relies to a great extent on a story similar to that of
Lot and Sodom and Gomorrah as the basis for its objections to same-sex sexual
relations. Unlike the Old/First and New/Second Testaments that proceed in a some-
what chronological order with their telling of events, the Qur’an does not. Various
chapters (sūrah) and verses together relate the story and the displeasure with the
conduct of the men against the strangers.3 Sūrah Al-A’raaf 7:80–84, for example,
provides:
And Lot! (Remember) when he said unto his folk: Will ye commit abomination such as no
creature ever did before you? Lo! ye come with lust unto men instead of women. Nay, but
ye are wanton folk.
Other sūrahs continue to express disapproval of the men’s behavior toward the
strangers as an abomination or senseless act:
And unto Lot we gave judgment and knowledge, and We delivered him from the commu-
nity that did abominations. Lo! they were folk of evil, lewd. (Sūrah An-Anbiyaa 21:74)
Must ye needs lust after men instead of women? Nay, but ye are folk who act senselessly.
(Sūrah An-Naml 27:55)
For come ye not in unto males, and cut ye not the road (for travellers), and commit ye not
abomination in your meetings? But the answer of his folk was only that they said: Bring
Allah's doom upon us if thou art a truthteller! (Sūrah Al-Ankaboot 29:29)
3
For a more complete understanding of the Qur’an’s story of Lot, see also sūrahs 11:77–83, 15:59,
26:165–175, 37:133 and 54:33–39. For a discussion of the relationship between male penetration
and aggression, see Duran, 1993 and Wafer, 1997.
Same-Sex Relations as Sin 17
An additional sūrah has been interpreted by some scholars to apply to all illicit
intercourse, while others have argued that it refers to men who engage in sexual
relations with each other (Ben Nahum, 1933). The interpretation may depend upon
the translation from the original Arabic and the extent to which one places the pas-
sage within the historical and cultural contexts at the time of its writing:
As for those of your women who are guilty of lewdness, call to witness four of you against
them. And if they testify (to the truth of the allegation) then confine them to the houses until
death take them or (until) Allah appoint for them a way (through new legislation). And as
for the two of you who are guilty thereof, punish them both. And if they repent and improve,
then let them be. Lo! Allah is ever relenting, Merciful. (Sūrah An-Nissa 4:15–16)
Narrated Abdullah ibn Abbas: If a man who is not married is seized committing sodomy, he
will be stoned to death. (Book Al-Hudud 38, Hadith #4448)
One writer has claimed that the scholar Ibn Abbās said, “The sodomite should be
thrown from the highest building in town and then stoned” (Bell, 1979). Abd al-
Rahman Doi, a professor of Shari’a, has asserted:
Sodomy or homosexuality is an unnatural act of sex to satisfy one’s passion … The Prophet
is reported to have said, “If a man commits an act of sex with a man, they both are adulterers
and if a woman commits such acts with a woman, then both of them are adulteresses [for
whom the punishment is death].” (Quoted in al-Haqq Kugle, 2003, p. 24)
MANDARA MUSICIANS.
Published Feb. 1826, by John Murray, London.
(Large-size)
Published as the Act directs Feby. 1826, by John Murray Albemarle St. London.
Had either the Mandara or the sheikh’s troops now moved up boldly,
notwithstanding the defence these people made, and the
reinforcements which showed themselves to the south-west, they
must have carried the town with the heights overlooking it, along
which the Arabs were driving the Felatahs by the terror their
miserable guns excited; but, instead of this, they still kept on the
other side of the wadey, out of reach of the arrows.
From a Sketch by Major Denham. Engraved by E. Finden.
ATTACK ON MUSFEIA.
Published Feb. 1826, by John Murray, London.