Toward Dualism: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Way

Author(s): Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti and Chandana Chakrabarti

Source: Philosophy East and West , Oct., 1991, Vol. 41, No. 4, The Sixth East-West
Philosophers' Conference (Oct., 1991), pp. 477-491
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press

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TOWARD DUALISM: THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA WAY Kisor Kumar
Chakrabarti

Professor

This essay is expository and consists of three parts. TheCenter

firstfor Philosophy
part briefly
of Science
states the basic Nyaya-Vaisesika thesis about the self. The second part
University of
studies in detail some well-known Nyaya-Vaisesika arguments in support
Pittsburgh
of their theory of self and highlights some points of interpretation not
Chandana
heretofore clearly explained. The third part is devoted toChakrabarti
the Nyaya-
Vaisesika critique of the Buddhist theory of self. Professor
Department of
Philosophy
University of
According to Gotama,' the founder of the Nyaya school, Delaware (iccha),
desire
aversion (dvesa), volition (prayatna), pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), and
cognition (jnana) are the liiga of the self (atman). Each one of these is an
identifying mark (laksana) of the self and thus each one is a probans (hetu)
for inferring the existence of the self. When it is said that desire and so
forth are identifying marks of the self, what is meant is that each one of
these marks is a characteristic feature of all selves and of nothing else.
An identifying mark (laksana), like the definiens in Western philosophy, is
required to be coextensive (samaniyata) with the subject and should be
neither too wide nor too narrow. With the help of any one of such
identifying marks, the self may be distinguished from everything else that
is not a self; in this way the referent (sakya) of the word "self" or "I"
becomes fixed.

Desire and so forth are specific qualities (visesa guna) of the self; they
do not belong to any other kind of substance (dravya). The self also has
some other common qualities (samanya guna), such as number (sarmkhya),
separateness (prthaktva), and so forth, which it shares with all other
substances. These common qualities are not acceptable as identifying
marks of the self, because they are not limited to selves. Although each
one of the six specific qualities is acceptable as an identifying mark of the
self, the complex property produced by the conjunction of all these six
qualities, which, too, is coextensive with the self, is not acceptable as an
identifying mark of the self. This is because an identifying mark must be
not only coextensive with its bearer but also simple (laghu). The require-
ment of simplicity holds that, other things being equal, something with
fewer constituents is to be preferred to something with more constituents
(sarnra-krta-laghava). Thus the complex property resulting from thePhilosophy
con- East & West
junction of the six specific qualities, which has more components than 41, Number 4
Volume
any one by itself, does not qualify as an identifying mark. It mayOctober
also 1991
477-491
be noted that, in addition to the six already mentioned, the self also
possesses three other unobservable (atTndriya) specific qualities, namely,
? 1991
merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and impression (bhavana). Eachbyof University of
these is also coextensive with the self.2 But none of them counts as an Hawaii Press

477

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 identifying mark of the self: for (in yet another ramification of the require-
ment of simplicity), other things being equal, what is observed is to be
preferred to what is unobserved.

II

In what sense, then, are desires said to be the probantia (hetu) for the
inference of the self. One well-known proof briefly stated by Vatsyayana3
is as follows: "Desire, etc., are qualities; but qualities are supported by
substance; that which is the support of these is the self."4 Uddyotakara5
has observed that before one can conclude that the self is the support of
desire and so forth, one must eliminate the other eight substances recog-
nized by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school, namely, earth (prthivf), water (jala),
fire (tejas), air (vayu), akasa (the imperceptible substratum of sound),
space (dik), time (kala), and inner sense (manas). He suggested that the
fact that desire and so forth are directly known by the self (atmasahmvedya)
and the fact that these are not perceptible by the external sense organs
provides the ground for the elimination of other substances. Thus, the
qualities of the first five substances, namely, earth, water, fire, air, and
akaJa, are perceived not only by a particular person but also by other
persons; further, these qualities of earth and so forth are perceived by the
external sense organs. Since one's own desire and so forth can be directly
known only by oneself and not by anyone else and since these are not
objects of external perception, these cannot be the qualities of earth
and so forth. Further, desire and so forth cannot be attributed to the
remaining three substances, namely, space, time, and the inner sense, for
the qualities of these substances, like these substances themselves, are
imperceptible. Since none of the other recognized substances can be
accepted as the substratum of desire and so forth, an additional sub-
stance must be inferred as their substratum.
The argument above has two distinct parts. The first part (by confining
our attention only to desire) may be reformulated in the Barbara form as
follows:

All qualities belong to a substance.

All desires are qualities.

Therefore, all desires belong to a substance.

The second part of the proof may be reformulated as a disjunctive

syllogism as follows:

Desire belongs to earth or desire belongs to water or desire belongs to fire or

desire belongs to air or desire belongs to akaJa or desire belongs to space or
desire belongs to time or desire belongs to inner sense or desire belongs to
Philosophy East & West an additional ninth substance called the self.

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 Desire does not belong to earth and desire does not belong to water and
desire does not belong to fire and desire does not belong to air and desire
does not belong to akasa and desire does not belong to space and desire
does not belong to time and desire does not belong to inner sense.

Therefore, desire belongs to an additional ninth substance called the self.

The whole argument may be put in the symbolic notation as follows

(by presupposing that the predicates are non-empty):

Dx = x is a desire Qx = x is a quality Sx = x belongs to a substance

Ex = x belongs to earth Wx = x belongs to water Fx = x belongs to
fire Ax = x belongs to air Kx = x belongs to akasa Ix = x belongs
to space Tx = x belongs to time Mx = x belongs to inner sense
Nx = x belongs to an additional ninth substance called the self

(x)(Dx D Qx)
(x)(Qx = Sx)
Therefore, (x)(Dx = Sx)

(x)(Dx = Ex) v (x)(Dx = Wx) v (x)(Dx D Fx) v (x)(Dx = Ax) v (x)

(Dx D Kx) v (x)(Dx = IX) v (x)(Dx = Tx) v (x)(Dx = Mx) v (x)(Dx = Nx)

(x)(Dx -Ex) (x)(Dx D -Wx)' (x)(Dx - Fx) * (x)(Dx D -Ax).

(x)(Dx -Kx) (x)(Dx -Ix) (x)(Dx -Tx) (x)(Dx -Mx).
Therefore, (x)(Dx D Nx)

Vacaspati Misra (ninth century A.D.)6 offered another interpretation of

the argument from desire for inferring the existence of the self as a
spiritual, noncorporeal substance. He suggests that desire and so forth
could be taken as the subject of inference (paksa: similar to the minor
term), 'being a quality of a person belonging to the self' as the probandum
(sadhya: similar to the major term), and 'being qualities which do not
belong to the other eight substances' as the probans (hetu: similar to the
middle term). Now the inference may be recast as follows (to be called
the argument 'A'):

Whatever is a quality of a person that does not belong to the self is not a
quality which does not belong to the other eight substances, for example,
color and so forth.

Desire is a quality which does not belong to the other eight substances.

Therefore, desire belongs to the self.

Vacaspati Misra points out that in the proof above, the first general
premise should not be replaced by its contrapositive, namely, that what- Kisor Kumar
ever is a quality which does not belong to the other eight substances is Chakrabarti
a quality of a person that belongs to the self. If the truth of this gen- Chandana Chakrabarti

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 eral proposition is questioned, no particular positive examples (anvayi-
drstanta) can be adduced in its support. However, there is no dearth of
particular negative examples (vyatireki-drstanta) like color, smell, and so
forth, which are qualities of a person that do not belong to the self and
are also qualities which belong to some of the other eight substances.
Such examples can provide adequate evidence for the general premise
used in the proof if the truth of that premise is questioned.
The point can be clarified further by looking at another similar argu-
ment that the living body is not without a self because it breathes. In
accordance with the suggestions of Uddyotakara and Vacaspati Misra,
the inference may be formulated as follows:

Whatever is without the self does not breathe.

The living body breathes.

Therefore, the living body is not without the self.

Here, too, the first premise should not be replaced by its contrapositive,
namely, that whatever breathes is not without the self. Once again, no
particular positive examples can be provided in support of this general
proposition if its truth is challenged; from the very nature of the case
living bodies are the only things which both breathe and are not without
the self (in the Nyaya view animals, too, have selves; see later in this
essay). But there are innumerable particular negative examples like a
stone, a box, and so forth, which are without the self and also do not
breathe. With the help of them the truth of the general premise actually
used can be supported if needed.
It should be clear that Uddyotakara and Vacaspati Misra have taken
care to give some bite to these proofs against their materialist oppo-
nents. The materialist will reject the general proposition that whatever
breathes is not without the self. The dualist cannot use examples of living
bodies to support this general proposition, for living bodies are the sub-
ject of inference. The methodological principle (usually accepted by
Indian philosophers) is that the particular examples, whether positive or
negative, to be brought in support of the general premise must exclude
the subject. Since the bone of contention is whether living bodies are
without the self or not, it would be circular to use living bodies them-
selves as evidence for the premise. The dualist also cannot hope to find
any undisputed examples different from living bodies because, according
to his own position, living bodies are the only things which are not
without a self. To resolve this difficulty, Uddyotakara and others have
used 'whatever is without the self does not breathe' as the general
premise. Any inanimate object can be cited as evidence in support of
this premise; for the materialist, too, holds that things like stones are
Philosophy East & West without the self and do not breathe. Thus there are particular examples

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which can lend support to the general premise, and these examples
are acceptable to both the dualist and the materialist. But there are no
undisputed counterexamples. The only things which breathe are living
bodies. In the opinion of the materialist living bodies are devoid of any
self in the sense of a spiritual, noncorporeal substance. But the materialist
cannot cite living bodies as the counterexamples, for this is precisely
where the bone of contention lies. The living bodies are the subject of
inference. It is generally agreed (in the Indian logical tradition) that the
counterexamples to be brought in refutation of a premise must exclude
the subject of inference. Since there are corroborative examples accepted
by both the dualist and the materialist and there are no undisputed
counterexamples, the general proposition 'whatever is without the self
does not breathe' may be accepted as a reliable premise. The other
premise, namely, 'the living body breathes', is accepted as true by both
the dualist and the materialist. The argument is formally valid. Since both
the premises are reliable and the argument is formally valid, the conclu-
sion, namely, 'the living body is not without the self', may be claimed to
have been reasonably vindicated. The ball is now in the court of the
materialist, who should either find some convincing way of countering
the force of the argument or yield to the dualist. From the point of
view of merely formal validity it makes no difference whether 'whatever
breathes is not without the self' or 'whatever is without the self does not
breathe' is used as a premise; the argument would be formally valid in
either case. But for the reasons explained above only the use of the latter
is prescribed as a premise, and thereby the dualist is able to secure an
advantage over the materialist, which advantage would have been lost if
the former were used as a premise instead.
Let us now take another look at the argument 'A'. It has already been
explained why in this argument the first premise should not be replaced
by its contrapositive. But the really sensitive part in this argument lies in
the second premise, which makes two substantial claims, namely, (1) that
desire and so forth are qualities and (2) that these cannot belong to the
other eight substances. That desire and so forth are qualities is shown by
such experiences as 'I am happy', 'I know', ' wish', and so forth, in which
desire and so forth appear to be attributes of the I or the self. (Further
light will be thrown on this in connection with the discussion of the
Buddhist no-ownership theory of self.) The second claim clearly includes
the thesis that desire, cognition, and so forth cannot be regarded as
qualities of the body. Since this thesis is bound to be challenged by the
materialist, the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers have argued at length to
defend it. The main reasons for rejecting the view that desire and so forth
are qualities of the body are in what follows. Kisor Kumar
(1) If desire and so forth were qualities of the body, like other qualities Chakrabarti
of the body, these, too, should have been public objects and open to theChandana Chakrabarti

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 observation by one's own self as well as other selves (atmaparatmaprat-
yaksa). But on the contrary these are private and open to observa-
tion only by one's own self (atmasamrvedya). This goes to show the
difference of cognition and so forth from the qualities of the body
(sarTragunavaidharmya). The latter are either imperceptible (atTndriya) or
perceptible by an external sense organ (bahyakaranapratyaksa) such as
the eye, the ear, and so forth. But cognition and so forth are neither
imperceptible nor perceptible by an external sense organ, but intro-
spectible only by the inner sense (manovisayatvat) (Nyayadarsanam, pp.
893-895). Thus the materialist thesis has to be rejected to account for
the privacy of our inner experiences.
(2) Consciousness (chetana) cannot be a quality of the body (na
sarTraguna) because it permeates the whole body (sarnravyapitvat). The
point is that consciousness is found in every part of the body (with the
exception of the hair, nails, and so forth, which, according to these
philosophers, are not parts (avayava) of the body in the strict sense). If
consciousness were a quality of the body, since the parts of the body are
numerous, there should have been numerous cognizers and selves in the
same body (praptam chetanabahutvam). The materialist could reply that
the body as a substantial whole (avayavin) is different from its parts and
is numerically one. Consciousness could be regarded as a quality of only
the body as a substantial whole and not of the numerous parts; thus the
difficulty of there being many selves in the same body could be avoided.
But this reply would be futile, for there is no satisfactory way to explain
why, from the materialist point of view, consciousness should be a quali-
ty of only the body as a substantial whole and not of the parts as
well. It would not help on the part or the materialist to suppose that
consciousness is a quality of only one particular part of the body. For
then it cannot be explained satisfactorily why consciousness is found in
every part of the body. The materialist cannot escape by boldly suppos-
ing that there are many selves in the same body. Then the experiences
of one part would be accessible only to that part (pratyayavyavasthapra-
sanga) just as the experiences of one person are accessible only to that
person (Nyayadarsanam, p. 892).
(3) Consciousness is not a quality of the body because it is non-
cotemporal with the body (ayavaddravyabhavin). The body may con-
tinue to exist for a while after death without any noticeable material loss
although no consciousness can be possibly found in it at that time. Thus
it is clear that consciousness does not belong to the body as long as the
body exists. This strongly suggests that the presence of consciousness in
the body is not due to the body itself but its association with another
substance. It is true that the quality of a substance need not be co-
temporaneous with it. But in every case where the quality of a substance
Philosophy East & West changes, one can find an opposite (pratidvandin) quality in it. In the dead

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body can be found no such opposite quality which can explain the loss
of consciousness. It is also true that certain processes which are essential
for conservation of life, such as exhalation and inhalation, constant circu-
lation of blood, and so forth, are always missing in a dead body. But to
explain the loss of consciousness in a dead body as being due to the
stoppage of such vital processes would be grossly circular: from the
Nyaya-Vaisesika point of view the very presence of such vital processes
in a living body serves as a pointer to the existence of an immaterial
substance which possesses consciousness as a quality. In other words,
the constant and perfectly regular upward and downward motions tak-
ing place in a living body require, from the Nyaya-Vaisesika standpoint,
for its explanation the volition (prayatna) of a conscious superintendent
(adhis.thata).7 Similarly, such typical phenomena as a living organism
growing to its maturity (vrddhi) or recovering from bodily injury (ksata-
bhagnasarhrohana) cannot be accounted for without the volition of a
conscious agent.8 Arguing from the analogy of a house owner making
additions or repairs to his household, the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers
maintain that the conscious self inhabiting a living body supervises the
process of organic growth and repair of wounds. They are not deterred
by the fact that if the presence of life is to serve as a sign for inferring the
self, not only the bodies of humans but also the bodies of all animals as
well as plants would have to be regarded as being inhabited by conscious
selves. They hold without any ambiguity that there are selves for humans
as well as for other animals and also plants and maintain unhesitatingly
that even the plants and vegetables have consciousness hidden inside
them (antahsarhjina) and are capable of experiencing pain and pleasure
(sukhaduhkhasaman vitah),
(4) Consciousness cannot be a quality of the body because the body
is a material product. This argument is based on the premise that what-
ever is a material product is not conscious (yat bhutakaryam na tat
chetanam).9 The premise is well supported by innumerable positive ex-
amples such as pots, stones, and so forth, which are admittedly material
products as well as unconscious. There are also no undisputed counter-
examples. Although the materialist claims that the living body is con-
scious, the dualist rejects that claim. Since a legitimate counterexample
must be acceptable to both the parties in a dispute, it would be futile
on the part of the materialist to cite living bodies as counterexamples.
The argument may be restated as follows:

Whatever is a material product is unconscious.

All living bodies are material products.

Therefore, all living bodies are unconscious. Kisor Kumar

Chakrabarti
The same argument may be stated in the symbolic notation as follows Chandana

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 (M = material product, U = unconscious, L = living body):

(x)(Mx = Ux)
(x)(Lx = Mx)
Therefore, (x)(Lx = Ux)

(5) Another similar argument is that consciousness cannot be a quality

of the body because it is colored. The argument is based on the premise
that whatever is colored is not conscious (yat rupavat na tat chetanam).
Once again, the premise is supported by numerous positive examples
like pots, houses, and so forth, which are colored and unconscious. There
are no undisputed counterexamples as well. It would not be permissible
to produce living bodies as counterexamples, for the dualist rejects the
claim that living bodies are conscious. The argument may be reformulated
as follows:

Whatever is colored is devoid of consciousness.

All living bodies are colored.

Therefore, living bodies are devoid of consciousness.

Other similar arguments to show that consciousness is not an attribute

of the body may be derived from the fact that the body is changeable
(parinaimitvat) and from the fact that the body has a definite structure
(sannivesavisistatvat).10 These two arguments rely, respectively, on the
premises that (1) all that is changeable is devoid of consciousness and
that (2) all things having a definite structure are without consciousness.
For these premises, too, there are numerous positive examples in their
favor, but there are no undisputed counterexamples.
(6) If consciousness were a quality of the body, it becomes difficult to
explain how a person is able to remember in his old age his childhood
experiences (sarnrasya chaitanye balye vilokitasya sthavire smarananupa-
patteh). If consciousness belonged to the body and the self and the body
were the same, the old body would have to be the agent of remembering
and the infant body would have to be the agent of having the original
experience. But the old body and the infant body are different, and it is
clear that what is experienced by one cannot be remembered by an-
other. Thus the old body, being different from the infant body, cannot
remember what was experienced by the latter."
The materialist could claim by adopting the Aristotelian view that in
spite of the phenomenal difference in shape, size, and so forth, the old
body, insofar as it is a substance, is the same as the infant body. From the
Aristotelian standpoint, what makes a substance the same as an earlier
substance is that its matter is the same, or derived from the matter of the
Philosophy East & West former substance by gradual replacement, without losing the essential

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properties which represent its form. For living things, moreover, even
total replacement of matter-provided it is gradual, and provided the
structural change, too, is gradual-will not destroy identity. Since thus
the old body may be said to be the same as the infant body in spite of
the total replacement of matter, the difficulty of accounting for child-
hood memory may be resolved.
But this solution, it must be pointed out, is not acceptable from the
Nyaya-Vaisesika point of view. According to the latter, even the re-
placement of a single part (avayava) would destroy a substantial whole
(avayavin) and bring about another substance which, though utterly
similar, is absolutely different from the former substance. This position
has been adopted by the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy, not as an ad hoc
assumption suitable for the present case, but as a solution to the wider
issue of substantial change and sameness. It would not be profitable to
enter into a discussion of the merits/demerits of the Nyaya-Vaisesika and
the Aristotelian views of the sameness of a substance here. Suffice it to

note that, given the Nyaya-Vaisesika view, the problem of accounting for
childhood memory remains a difficult issue for the materialist.
Even if it is conceded that the old body is different from the infant
body, the materialist could say by way of a rejoinder that the former is
related to the latter by an unbroken causal chain and that the impression
(sarhskara) of the childhood experience passed on through the chain
could be revived on the appropriate occasion.'2 In response it may be
noted that the materialist in that case should find an explanation of why
the experiences of the mother are not passed on to the child. It will not
do on the part of the materialist to suppose that the experiences of the
mother belong to a particular part of the mother's body which the child
does not have and hence that the experiences of the mother are not
passed on to the child. The point is that the mother's body is causally
related to the child's body. If the experiences belonging to one body can
be passed on to other bodies by virtue of a causal relationship, the
same should happen with the mother and child as well. There is no
difference between the two cases. Further, the materialist would have to
suppose also that each time a new body is added to the causal chain, the
impression residing in the previous body is destroyed and a new impres-
sion produced. Thus the materialist would have to be committed to the
origin and destruction of an indefinitely large number of impressions.
From the Nyaya-Vaisesika point of view, however, the self is different
from the body and remains the same in spite of the bodily changes.
There is, then, no need to suppose that the impression is replaced by a
new impression each time a new body is added to the causal chain.
In this respect the dualist view appears to be more economical, forKisor
it can
Kumar
account for childhood memory by postulating far fewer impressions than
Chakrabarti

required in the materialist view. Chandana Chakrabarti

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 Ill

Just as the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers have sought to refute the

materialist view, so also they have argued at length against the Buddhist
view (similar to the Humean view) that the self is nothing more than a
bundle of particular perceptions, feelings, and so forth. Hume wrote:
"When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble
on some particular perception or other.... I never catch myself without
a perception" (Treatise, Bk. 1, pt. 4, no. 6). Significantly, some Nyaya-
Vaisesika philosophers agree with Hume that we can never catch our-
selves without a perception, and so forth. Visvanatha writes clearly:
"... the self is perceived as related to cognition, pleasure, etc., and not
otherwise-through such awarenesses as 'I know', 'I do', etc."'3 Thus
Visvanatha rules out that the self can be perceived without some partic-
ular perception, and so forth. Still the disagreement with Hume remains
fundamental. Hume claims that he fails to find the self or the common

subject. But according to these Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers (as also the

MTmamsa philosophers), the self is perceived through I-consciousness
(aharm-pratyaya-gamyatvat atma pratyaksa) (Nyayamanjarn, pt. 2, p. 4).
Thus "the awareness that I am happy directly reveals the self also" (aharh
sukhTti tu jinaptiratmanah api prakasika) (ibid., p. 7). Moreover, the aware-
ness that I know cannot be maligned even by a small grain of fault: of this
the self is the chief content (na khalu aham janami iti pratyayah kenacit
alp?yasa dosarenuna dhusarfkartumr paryate tadasya atma eva mukhyo
visayah) (ibid., p. 4). In other words, in such particular experiences as 'I am
happy', 'I know', 'I wish', and so forth the self is revealed as the common
subject. This direct testimony goes against the Buddhist (and the Humean)
view.

Other Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers have denied that the self is per-

ceived and have offered reasonings (fully endorsed also by those holding
that the self is perceived) to prove the selfs permanence. Desire and so
forth play the crucial role in these reasonings, too. "When a person has
earlier experienced pleasure from some kind of thing, upon coming
across later another thing of the same kind and remembering its pleas-
antness he wishes to acquire it. A wish originating in this way leads to the
inference of a subject (asraya) capable of synthesizing past and present
experiences (purvaparanusandhanasamartha)" (ibid., p. 8). The claim, then,
is that desire can be accounted for only by accepting that the owner of
the past and the present experiences is the same (samanakartrka).
In the same way aversion (dvesa) also serves as a sign for personal
identity and continuity. "When a person has experienced pain from
some kind of thing, upon coming across again that sort of thing and
remembering its painfulness he has aversion for it. This cannot be ex-
plained without the same synthesizer (pratisandhata)" (ibid., p. 9). Simi-
Philosophy East & West larly, pleasure, pain, volition, and cognition would prove personal identity

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so long as these are based on memory, for "a thing experienced by
one cannot be remembered by another (na anyad.rstah arthah smartum
anyena sakyate)." In particular, each of the four sources of knowledge
(recognized by the Nyaya), namely, perception, inference, upamana, and
verbal knowledge, lends support to the identity and continuity of the self.
Thus "recognitive perception (pratyabhijna) could not take place if the
knower were different. Just as it proves the sameness of the known
object, so also it proves the sameness of the knowing person" (ibid.,
p. 15). In other words, when a person recognizes something he is seeing
now, say a statue, to be the same as that which he has seen before,
the truth of such recognitive perception can be accounted for only if the
statue seen now is the same as that seen before and the person recog-
nizing it is the same as he who saw it before. Again, "Knowledge of
universal connection (avinabhavagrahanam), knowledge of the probans
(lingajnanam), remembrance of the relation (anvayasmaranam) between
that and the probandum, knowledge of the probandum (lirigipramiti)-
since inference involves these, it could not take place if the knower were
different" (ibid., p. 15). To explain: when one infers that the probandum
(lirigin) belongs to the subject (paksa) on the basis of the knowledge that
the probans (liriga) belongs to the subject and the knowledge that the
probans is universally concomitant with the probandum after having
ascertained earlier through observation that the probans and the prob-
andum are so related, the accounting for such a process requires that
there be an abiding knower going through all the successive steps.
Further, "After one [who has never seen a buffalo] has received the
instruction that a buffalo is similar to a cow from a forester and seen an
animal in the forest similar to the cow, one learns [for the first time] the
name of that as the result-since upamana is such, it would be impossi-
ble if the knower were different" (ibid., p. 15). Finally, "Hearing the letters
in succession, understanding the word-meanings (padarthagraha) by way
of remembering the semantic connections (samayasm.rty), reviewing
the word-meanings (tadalocanam) with the help of their impressions
at the time of apprehending the last letter (tatsamskarajam antyavar-
nakalanakale), understanding the meaning of the sentence as a whole
(vakyarthasampindanam) by means of the syntactic and other relation-
ships (akamrksadinibandhananvayakrtam)-all these would be extremely
difficult to explain without the selfsame knower" (ibid., p. 15). In other
words, linguistic communication presupposes an abiding knower, for
understanding the meaning of a word requires the synthesis of the letters
heard in succession, and understanding the meaning of a sentence re-
quires the synthesis of the word-meanings grasped in succession.
In the Buddhist version of the no-ownership theory, there is not only
Kisor Kumar
no permanent self, but, moreover, each internal state (in conformity withChakrabarti
Chandana
the general doctrine of momentariness applying to all reals) is strictly Chakrabarti

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 momentary. Each internal state endures for exactly one moment and
ceases to exist in the following moment. Each preceding state, however,
serves as the cause of the succeeding state, and thus the entire stream
(santana) of momentary states is linked by an unbroken causal chain.
Faced with the difficulty of accounting for memory and such acts as
recognitive perception, synthesis of word meanings, and so forth, which
presuppose memory, the Buddhist has responded as follows. Since the
stream is linked by an unbroken causal chain, the momentary state to
which the original experience belonged is able to produce an impression
of the experience in the succeeding state, which in its turn is able to
produce another impression in the next state, and so on. In this way the
impression of any previous experience may be passed on to any later
member of the same stream. Hence any later member of the stream
possessing the impression of the original experience may be able to
remember the same in spite of being different from the earlier state
having the experience. The impressions required in such an explanation
are certainly far more numerous than those required in the theory of
an abiding self. In this respect the Buddhist theory is bound to be less
economical. But the Buddhist is not perturbed by such proliferation in
the number of entities, for this is an inevitable consequence of the
doctrine of momentariness to which the Buddhist is already committed
on independent grounds.
One problem in this view, however, is that since the Buddhist cannot
fall back on a permanent entity like the brain or the body as the material-
ist can, he must suppose that every momentary internal state will have a
successor so that any discontinuity in the causal chain is avoided. The
claim that every momentary internal state has a successor (until at least
attaining nirvana, and even after attaining nirvana, according to some
Buddhists) has, from the Nyaya-Vaisesika point of view, all the appear-
ance of a forced solution. For one thing, the Buddhist must maintain that
even when a person is sound asleep and not dreaming, the momentary
internal states continue to be generated ceaselessly. The Nyaya-Vaisesika
philosophers find this to be nothing more than an ad hoc assumption, for
there is no evidence to prove that any actual cognitive or noncognitive
internal state is produced during dreamless sleep. The difference be-
tween the Nyaya view and the Buddhist view on this point is clear. For
the former, all that needs to be maintained is that the impressions of past
experiences continue to exist as dispositions. But the latter must hold
that actual, and not merely dispositional, internal states are generated
continuously even during dreamless sleep, and that each such state is
capable of performing the role of being the cause of the succeeding
state. In this respect the ontological burden of the Nyaya view turns out
Philosophy East & West to be lighter.

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 It may further be asked what kind of mental states could be plausibly
said to be uninterruptedly generated (and destroyed) during dreamless
sleep. Such states could not be those of pleasure, pain, awareness of any
object, and so forth, for then the question would be: if these were
actually produced during dreamless sleep (susupti), why does not any-
one ever come to know of their occurrence? One suggestion advanced
by some Buddhists is that these are purely subjective states of I-
consciousness (alayavijinana) which are formless (nirakara) as well as non-
intentional (nirvisayaka). Now the admission of nonintentional states of
consciousness may be welcome from the Buddhist point of view, particu-
larly from that of the Yogacara school. But to the Nyaya-Vaisesika philos-
ophers this is objectionable, for according to them all cognitive states are
intentional (savisayaka). Further, the supposition that self-consciousness
persists (albeit as a series of momentary states) in a dreamless sleep virtu-
ally amounts to a departure from the original spirit of the no-ownership
theory and brings it dangerously close to the theory of a permanent self.

Finally, a crushing objection has been succinctly stated in the following

passage.

If momentary, what has, been experienced long ago cannot be remembered,

for the cognizers are different. If it is said that what was experienced by an
earlier momentary state may be remembered by a later state because of their
being related as cause and effect, this is inappropriate. If there were no self,
the relation of cause and effect could not be ascertained. The cognitive state
which would be the effect is yet to come into being when the cognitive state
which is the cause is there, and by the time the former comes into being, the
latter ceases to be. Since there is no knower other than these two which
remains the same, how could it be known that these two successive entities
are related as cause and effect? It may be suggested that the earlier state
which is self-revealing also becomes aware of its nature as the cause which
is non-different from itself; similarly the self-cognizing later state also be-
comes aware of the fact of its being the effect which is non-different from
itself.... But this is an undue fabrication. Each of the two earlier and the later
cognitions is confined to itself; how then could the awareness that I am the
effect of this or the awareness that I am the cause of that take place? The fact
is that each is ignorant about the other.14

In brief, cognition of succession has to be distinguished from succes-

sion of cognition (which may remind one of a well-known argument of
Kant); the former cannot be accounted for without an abiding knower.
To conclude: we have explained how the Nyaya-Vaisesika philoso-
phers have argued for the theory of self as an abiding, noncorporeal Kisor Kumar
substance and defended their view against both the Carvaka materialists Chakrabarti
and the Buddhist no-ownership theorists. The discussion is by no means Chandana Chakrabarti

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 comprehensive. A fuller account would have to include copious refer-
ences to such works as Udayana's Atmatattvaviveka (tenth century
A.D.).15 It is hoped nevertheless that the discussion would provide food for
the thought of contemporary philosophers of mind although not many
of them support the theory of self as a permanent, immaterial substance.

NOTES

1 - Gotama is the reputed author of the Nyayasutra (sixth/fifth

B.C.). Since it is written in an aphoristic style, it has to be read wi
commentary of Vatsyayana called the Bhasya (second century
For these dates see U. Misra, History of Indian Philosophy,
(Allahabad: Tirabhukti Publications, 1966), pp. 25-36. Both o
works have been translated into English by Gr. Jha (Poona: O
Book Agency, 1939).

2 - This entire discussion applies only to individual, nonliberated

3 - Vatsyayana is the famous commentator on the Nyayasu

note 1.

4 - Nyayadarsanam of Gotama with Vatsyayana's Bha.sya, Uddyotaka-

ra's Varttika, Vacaspati Misra's Tatparvatika and Visvanaatha's Vrtti,
ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha,
2d ed. (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985) (abbreviated as
Nyayadarsanam), pp. 156-157.

5 - Ibid., p. 157. Uddyotakara's Nyayavarttika (sixth century A.D.) has

been translated into English by Gr. Jha, Indian Thought (Allahabad:
E. J. Lazarus & Co., 1910-1920).

6 - Ibid., p. 157. A portion of of Vacaspati Misra's Tatparyatika has been

translated into English by T. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol. 2 (New
York: Dover, 1962).

7 - Vaisesikasutropaskara of Sankara Misra with the Prakasika Hindi com-

mentary by Dhundiraja Sastri, ed. Narayana Misra (Varanasi: Chow-
khamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1969), pp. 239-240.
8 - Ibid., p. 241

9- Padarthadharmasa.mgraha of Prasastapada with the Nyayakandaff

of Sridhara, ed. Durgadhar Jha (Varanasi: Benares Sanskrit University,
1963), p. 173.

10 - Nyavamanjarnof Jayanta Bhatta, ed. Surya Narayana Sukla (Varanasi:

Philosophy East & West Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1936), pt. 2, p. 12.

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11 -Ibid., p. 10.

12 - Vaisesikasutropaskara, p. 242; also Karikavali with Siddhantamukta-

vali, Prabha, Manjusha, DinakarTya, Ramarudrfya, and Gaigaramaja-
tiya, ed. C. Sankara Rama Sastry (Madras: Sri Balamanorama Press,
1923), pp. 386-387.

13 - Ibid., p. 410.

14- Padarthadharmasa.mgraha, pp. 170-171.

15 - One of Udayana's works, namely, Nyayakusumanjali, has been trans-
lated into EngLish by E. B. Cowell (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press,
1864).

Kisor Kumar
Chakrabarti
Chandana Chakrabarti

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