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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/05/2016, SPi
Free Will and Theism

Free Will and Theism

Connections, Contingencies, and
Concerns
edited by
Kevin Timpe
and Daniel Speak
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
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© the several contributors 2016
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2016
Impression: 1
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prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
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contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
For Justin,
To yield and give way to our passions is the lowest slavery, even
as to rule over them is the only liberty
Fragments, Fragment 18, Justin Martyr
DS
For Magdalen,
And the heart of the old world then
Flings forth its ancient balm
And the burning eyes of men
Can work her no more harm
‘The New Magdalene,’
John Cowper Powys 1916
KT
Contents
Acknowledgements ix
List of Contributors xi
Introduction 1
Daniel Speak and Kevin Timpe
1. The Runeberg Problem: Theism, Libertarianism, and Motivated
Reasoning27
Manuel R. Vargas
2. Libertarianism and the Problem of Flip-flopping 48
John Martin Fischer
3. The Cost of Freedom 62
Laura W. Ekstrom
4. One Hell of a Problem for Christian Compatibilists 79
Jerry L. Walls
5. Relative Responsibility and Theism 99
Tamler Sommers
6. Libertarianism and Theological Determinism 112
Derk Pereboom
7. Against Theological Determinism 132
Timothy O’Connor
8. Classical Theism has No Implications for the Debate between
Libertarianism and Compatibilism 142
T. J. Mawson
9. Libertarianism as a Naturalistic Position 158
Helen Steward
10. Agent Causation and Theism 172
Meghan Griffith
11. Bringing about Perfect Worlds 195
Michael J. Almeida
12. Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian Freedom 214
W. Matthews Grant
13. Divine Conservation and Creaturely Freedom 234
Neal Judisch
viii c ontents
14. Reasons and Divine Action: A Dilemma 258

Rebekah L. H. Rice
15. God’s Freedom, God’s Character 277
Kevin Timpe
16. The Problem of God’s Immutable Freedom 294
Jesse Couenhoven
Index 313
Acknowledgements
We would like to express our gratitude to the staff at Oxford University Press (OUP)—
and especially to Peter Momtchiloff—for support, encouragement, and patience while
we worked on this project. Two readers for OUP also provided very valuable com-
ments on the volume, and the final product is better for their input. We here give our
gratitude to you, whomever you may be. We would also like to thank the authors who
have contributed to this volume for their time, thought, and energy. It should be obvi-
ous that without them this volume simply would not exist. In essence, we conceived of
this project as an opportunity to see what those whose views and arguments we respect
think about a set of issues we ourselves care about. In that sense, the contributors have
let us serve our own goals by their efforts. We would like to believe that we have treated
them as ends in themselves even while treating them as means to our own ends.
We are grateful for the support of our research that we have received from our uni-
versities and colleagues.
The John Cowper Powys epigraph on the dedication page is reprinted by permission
of Pollinger Limited (<www.pollingerltd.com>) on behalf of the John Cowper Powys
estate.
Finally, thanks to Tim Pawl for the suggestion of using van der Eyk’s Allegory of the
Theological Dispute between the Arminianists and their Opponents as the cover art for
the volume—and to OUP for allowing us to use it.
List of Contributors
Michael J. Almeida, University of Texas, San Antonio

Jesse Couenhoven, Villanova University
Laura W. Ekstrom, College of William and Mary
John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside
W. Matthews Grant, University of St. Thomas, Minnesota
Meghan Griffith, Davidson College
Neal Judisch, University of Oklahoma
T. J. Mawson, University of Oxford
Timothy O’Connor, Indiana University
Derk Pereboom, Cornell University
Rebekah L. H. Rice, Seattle Pacific University
Tamler Sommers, University of Houston
Daniel Speak, Loyola Marymount University
Helen Steward, University of Leeds
Kevin Timpe, Calvin College
Manuel R. Vargas, University of San Francisco
Jerry L. Walls, Houston Baptist University
Introduction
Daniel Speak and Kevin Timpe
Concerns both about the nature of free will and about the credibility of theistic belief
and commitment have long preoccupied philosophers. This is just to make the obvious
point that philosophical questions about whether we enjoy free will and about whether
God exists are truly perennial. In addition, there can be no denying that the history of
philosophical inquiry into these two questions has been dynamic and, at least to some
degree, integrated. In a great many cases, classical answers to the one have influenced
classical answers to the other—and in a variety of ways. Without pretending to be able
to trace the historical integrations of answers to these perennial questions, there is no
real question that these philosophical interrelations exist and are worthy of further
exploration.
The same is certainly true with respect to contemporary philosophical discussion of
these questions. The past three decades, in particular, have been marked by an explosion
of interest in philosophical debates both about the nature of free will—particularly
whether free will is compatible with the truth of determinism—and about the rationality
of religious belief. Although we should have every reason to expect that these contem-
porary debates would follow their past patterns in such a way as to be illuminated by
reflection on the dynamic integrations between these problems, we think that insuffi-
cient attention has been paid to these potentialities in the current discussion.1 The
principal goal of this volume is to begin to remedy this inattention.
Putting the volume’s goal in these (philosophically bland) terms could be thought to
disguise a more pointed motive for conceiving of it and commissioning its contents.
One could, after all, take up the goal of exploring the dynamic relationship between
theorizing about free will and theorizing about theism from simple philosophical curi-
osity. Interest in one or the other of these central problems, together with a nose for
fruitful philosophical connections, might very naturally lead one to want a collection
like the one now before you. In fact, it is not at all unlikely that you have picked this
volume up for just these sorts of perfectly legitimate reasons. We confess, however, that
our motivations for pursuing this volume’s central goal cannot be attributed to pure
1
In-group membership may be playing a role here. For discussion of the way that such membership
might impact views regarding free will in particular, see Lee and Harris 2014.
2 Daniel Speak and Kevin Timpe
philosophical intrigue alone. Or perhaps the point could be better put this way. We are
alive to the possibility that the dynamic relationship between beliefs about free will and
beliefs about the existence of God may turn out to be less philosophically innocent than
the motive of pure inquiry would suggest. In fact, we detect an undertone of suspicion
within the community of philosophers working particularly on the problems of free will;
the suspicion is that theistic beliefs are exerting an untoward influence upon the debates.
This suspicion is likely related to (or may simply be a sub-species of) a wider and
sometimes more vitriolic suspicion of philosophy of religion—and of philosophers of
religion—within some parts of the discipline. John Schellenberg illustrates this wider
suspicion in the following passage: ‘[w]hat Plantinga and Co. are doing is not really
philosophy at all, as I have mostly been assuming so far, but rather theology or theolog-
ical apologetics, on behalf of the Christian community as they understand it, using the
tools of philosophy.’2 Greg Dawes levels a similar charge in a recent interview:
While the arguments put forward by many Christian philosophers are serious arguments, there
is something less than serious about the spirit in which they are being offered. There is a direc-
tion in which those arguments will not be permitted to go. Arguments that support the faith
will be seriously entertained; those that apparently undermine the faith must be countered, at
any cost. Philosophy, to use the traditional phrase, is merely a ‘handmaid’ of theology. There is,
to my mind, something frivolous about a philosophy of this sort.3
Calling these suspicions part of an ‘undertone’ may, indeed, be an understatement

with regard to the free will debate. About a decade back, Manuel Vargas brought what
appears to us to have been the first explicit attention to the potentially pernicious role
that religious belief may be playing specifically in motivating libertarianism over com-
patibilism in contemporary discussions:
There is nearly always an unremarked upon elephant that lurks in rooms where philosophers
discuss free will. In this instance, the elephant may be more difficult to ignore. The elephant
is the role of religion in motivating and sustaining various libertarian accounts. It would,
I think, be revealing to do a survey of the religious beliefs of contemporary libertarians and
compatibilists. My guess is that we would learn that a disproportionate number—perhaps even
most—libertarians [in the philosophical community] are religious and, especially, Christian.
I suspect that we would also learn that the overwhelming majority of compatibilists are atheist
or agnostic. . . . [I] think that understanding the difference religion can make may be a key to
understanding some important methodological differences between religious libertarians and
their interlocutors. Though one might be a libertarian who is religious […], a religious libertar-
ian in my sense is one who, antecedent to and perhaps independent of philosophical inquiry, is
committed to a strong belief in a particular divine moral order that requires a strong notion of
human freedom. In the doxastic economy of the religious libertarian, libertarianism is inextri-
cably tied to a religious framework.4
2
Schellenberg 2009, 100.
3
Dawes 2014. For discussion and criticism of this more general suspicion of philosophy of religion, see
Taliaferro and Dressen 2013.
4
Vargas 2004, 408.
Introduction 3
There are a few claims here that will be taken up in various ways by the contributors to
this volume. For example, Vargas suggests that some significant number of participants
in the contemporary free will discussion are what he calls ‘religious libertarians’—
whose commitment to this view about free will is essentially bound up with their reli-
gious beliefs. Furthermore, he claims that insight might be gleaned into methodological
and meta-level elements of the contemporary free will debate by attending to the role
that religious belief is playing among its participants. But the big general claim is
that the libertarian position in the current debate is being underwritten largely by
Christian theistic belief.
The evidence Vargas musters for his big claim regarding the existence of this elephant
is (together, we suspect, with his not insubstantial personal experience with philosophers
working on the problems of free will, agency, and responsibility) a prediction about how
a survey would turn out. As it happens, recent sociological work on the beliefs of philos-
ophers confirms at least some of his predictions.5 In keeping with them, this sociology
indicates that theistic philosophers are significantly more likely to be libertarians than
are atheists, and atheists are significantly more likely to be compatibilists than are the-
ists.6 This isn’t to say that there aren’t counterexamples to these tendencies; in fact, coun-
terexamples to both tendencies will be found in the following pages. Still, the correlations
are quite striking; striking enough, by our lights, to motivate special attention to the real
philosophical interconnections between belief in free will and belief in God. We ought to
look very carefully at the pachyderm Vargas has called to our attention.
We re-emphasize, then, that even with a plurality of motives for engaging in its
inquiry, the primary goal of this collection is to address the interplay between the phil-
osophical debates about free will, on the one hand, and about theistic religious belief,
on the other. In the rest of this introduction, our aim is to put you in the best position to
profit from the chapters that follow by providing some context for them and by giving
you a brief overview of their content.
From Whence the Elephant? Evil and Desert

It may help to begin by at least gesturing at some explanations for the presence of the
elephant in the free will room. And here it seems to us that there can be no ignoring
the profound impact that twentieth-century debate over the problem of evil has had
in this regard. In particular, it would be difficult to overstate the importance of Alvin
Plantinga’s Free Will Defense in response to the logical problem of evil (as this problem
5
See, for instance, the survey that David Bourget and David Chalmers conducted as part of PhilPapers;
see <http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl> (accessed September 2015). For more on some of the rele-
vant details of the survey’s findings, see Chapter 1. Another worthwhile discussion of the survey’s findings,
and their relevance to contemporary philosophy of religion, can be found in Kraay 2013. For responses to
Kraay, see Penner 2013 and Moser 2013.
6
The PhilPapers survey does not provide data regarding which of the theistic philosophers included in the
data set are Christian theists in particular; however, we think it is exceedingly plausible given what we know
about the make-up of the profession that a significant majority of them would in fact self-identify as Christians.
was most famously enunciated by J. L. Mackie).7 To put this factor in context, we should
recall that, by the middle of the last century, theistic philosophy of religion had been
pushed to the margins of the discipline.8 At least in the Anglo-American milieu, enor-
mous philosophical pressures were at work. The intrinsic attractions of naturalized
approaches to philosophy that could grant to science the vaunted epistemic credibility
it surely deserved had functioned to undercut traditional metaphysics—and theism
along with it. Positivist skepticism about metaphysical inquiry in general was only
the most visible expression of these impulses—impulses that inoculated a generation
(or two) of philosophers not only against post-Kantian idealism but also against any
projects that did not respect the emerging stringent empiricism. Many traditional
metaphysical topics and approaches were discredited or dismissed by dint of their fail-
ure to live up to the prevailing zeitgeist.
It was into this philosophical context that Mackie released his notorious paper, ‘Evil
and Omnipotence.’ Initially published in 1955, it might have promised to be a final nail
in the coffin of philosophically acceptable theism, arguing, as it did, that belief in a
perfect being is rendered positively incoherent by the existence of evil in the world. In
this bold project, Mackie appears to have been motivated by his dissatisfaction with
what he took to be the weaknesses of the more standard approach according to which
critics had shown (by his formidable lights) that there were no good philosophical
reasons to believe that God exists. Taking this approach still allowed the theist, he
lamented, to be insulated from some amount of rational criticism by way of retreat into
a form of fideism. Mackie hoped to block this way of retreat by showing that there is a
logical inconsistency in the set of propositions that the traditional theist accepts. To
maintain theistic belief in the face of an undefeated argument of the form he proffered
would be to abandon even the semblance of a substantive commitment to rationality.
Theism could then be dismissed once and for all, having revealed itself, in response to
this argument, as an insufficiently serious philosophical interlocutor.9
For many, Alvin Plantinga’s response to this argument was an instance of philosoph-
ical victory being snatched from the jaws of final defeat. At the very least, there can be
no denying that the tide turned. It is not just that the free will defense persuaded almost
everyone that Mackie-style efforts to undermine the essential coherence of theism on
the basis of the existence of evil could not succeed. The defense also, and certainly with
a great deal of work (both by Plantinga and others) on other philosophical topics, initi-
ated a renaissance in the philosophy of religion that would have been nearly impossible
to predict in, say, 1950.
The heart of Plantinga’s defense was, of course, an appeal to the possible existence
and value of libertarian free will, a form of human freedom that we would lack if ante-
cedent circumstances determined a unique outcome for all of our actions. Condensing
7
See Plantinga 1974 and 1977. A worthwhile recent collection of papers can be found in McBrayer and
Howard-Snyder 2013.
8
For discussions of the relevant history, see Swinburne 2005 and Wolterstorff 2009.
9
In what follows, we address the broad contours of the kinds of theism we have in mind.
Introduction 5
the complex argument considerably, Plantinga argued that it was possible, in light of
libertarian free will, that not even an omnipotent being could actualize just any possi-
ble world it wanted to. Even if there is a possible world containing free creatures who
always use their freedom well, it may be that God cannot unilaterally bring this world
about. Under the Molinist assumptions that Plantinga initially made,10 this will be
because the counterfactual conditionals of creaturely freedom with which God is stuck
may simply not allow it. It is now a standard element in the narrative of philosophy of
religion that Plantinga’s defense decisively silenced the logical problem of evil.11 To
illustrate this profound effect, consider one canonical judgment on the matter issued
by William Rowe (a friendly but vigorous opponent of theism):
Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the
existence of the theistic God. No one, I think, has succeeded in establishing such an extrava-
gant claim. Indeed, granted incompatibilism, there is a fairly compelling argument for the view
that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God.12
Conveniently, this quotation from Rowe both illustrates the standard view about the
success of Plantinga’s project and highlights the centrality of the incompatibilist con-
ception of free will for its success.
Of course, theism had a problem with evil long before Mackie came on the scene.
And, equally obviously, the appeal to free will in responding to this problem has been
around at least since Augustine. Nevertheless, Plantinga’s defense seemed to bring
crisply before the collective mind of theistically inclined philosophers just how crucial
an explicit account of the nature of free will would turn out to be for the rationality of
belief in God. No doubt this had something to do with radical stakes in the debate as
they had been raised by Mackie’s challenge. But there is a puzzle here. It is almost cer-
tainly true that Plantinga’s defense and its supposed success influenced a generation of
theistic philosophers in the direction of libertarianism. At the same time, however,
Plantinga’s defense depended not on the claim that libertarianism is true but only on
the weaker claim that it is possible that libertarianism is true. So, why the wide attrac-
tion among theistic philosophers to a thesis that the supposedly influential argument
appealed to only in its modally weakened form? To underscore the puzzle, Plantinga’s
10
Plantinga elsewhere denies that the free will defense depends on the assumption of Molinism, more
specifically on the assumption that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom can be true: ‘[Robert Adams] is
right in pointing out that my argument in The Nature of Necessity for the consistency of God’s existence
with the amount of evil [in the actual world] does indeed presuppose that some counterfactuals of freedom
can be true. As I see it, however, this presupposition is a concession to the atheologian. Without the
assumption of middle knowledge it is much harder to formulate a plausible deductive atheological argu-
ment from evil; and it is correspondingly much easier, I should think, to formulate the free will defense on
the assumption that middle knowledge is impossible’ (Plantinga 1985, 379). For a contrary evaluation of
the situation, see Perszyk 1998.
11
There have been some dissenters (DeRose 1991; Adams 1999; Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-
Hawthorne 1998) and we note, with interest, that efforts to resist this claim appear to be on the rise. See
Howard-Snyder 2013; Pruss 2012; Rasmussen 2004; Schellenberg 2013; and Otte 2009. See also Chapter 11.
12
Rowe 1996, 10, note 1.
defense also depended on the possibility of universal transworld depravity (on the
possibility, in essence, that every possible person would do something wrong in any
world in which they could be actualized with free will). However, theistically inclined
philosophers have not taken up the mantle for the unrestricted claim that everyone is
transworld depraved. Part of the explanation here must be that libertarianism already
had something going for it when its mere possibility made its way into Plantinga’s cen-
tral argument. The libertarian view did, of course, already have erstwhile and able
defenders (Roderick Chisholm and C. A. Campbell prominent among them). In any
case, the important point is that Plantinga’s defense and its perceived success can
reasonably be thought to have contributed substantially to the popularity of libertari-
anism among theistic philosophers.
In a similar way, the most important twentieth-century effort at positive theodicy
made explicit appeal not merely to the possibility but indeed to the plausibility of the
claim that human beings enjoy a form of freedom that is incompatible with causal
and theological determination.13 In his enormously influential monograph Evil and
the God of Love, John Hick proposed an Irenaen ‘soul-making’ theodicy that rested
rather fundamentally on the distinctive value of our free efforts to develop good
character traits in the face of adversity. Crucially, Hick argued that ‘one who has
attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptations, and thus
by rightly making responsible choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and
more valuable sense than would be one created ab initio in a state of either innocence
or virtue.’14 He goes on to add that on his view this process of soul-making ‘is not
taking place . . . by a natural and inevitable evolution, but through a hazardous
adventure in individual freedom.’15 Though Hick does little to defend the claim that
we actually enjoy this hazardous libertarian freedom (and he is explicit both that it is
libertarian freedom he has in mind and that defending it is a difficult business), he
does insist that ‘it is the one that seems intuitively most adequate to our ordinary
experience as moral agents.’16
The larger point here is that twentieth-century philosophers of religion attending to
the most important challenges to the rationality of belief in God in the latter half of
their century were treated to a substantial diet of libertarianism. As Hick in particular
illustrates, the diet included an emphasis not only on the argumentative strategic value
of this view of free will but also on its supposedly more intuitively satisfying nature.
Some further (though admittedly anecdotal) evidence for the claim that the prob-
lem of evil importantly lies beneath libertarian commitments among theistically
inclined philosophers can, we think, be discerned in the fact that theologians seem
decidedly more inclined toward compatibilist conceptions of free will than do their
philosophical counterparts. Our tentative explanation for this supposed data is that
13
For the relevance and importance of the distinction between ‘defense’ and ‘theodicy,’ see, for instance,
McBrayer and Howard-Snyder 2013.
14
Hick 1978, 255. 15 Hick 1978, 256. 16 Hick 1978, 278.
Introduction 7
theologians have not engaged with the problem of evil in the same way as have theistic
philosophers (whether this is good or bad we do not attempt here to say)—and that
theologians have been more concerned with accommodating and elucidating tradi-
tional doctrines of divine foreknowledge and providence than have philosophers
of religion.
In addition to the impact of the problem of evil on the reception of libertarianism
among theists, a second—and not wholly unrelated—part of the explanation for
the existence of Vargas’ elephant involves the extraordinarily robust conceptions of
responsibility that have typically accompanied theistic worldviews. The idea of sin,
understood as a serious moral and spiritual failure with respect to what one owes first
and foremost to an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being, can naturally
appear to raise the moral bar. And here we find another natural thought: that the
higher the moral bar is raised—i.e. the greater the punitive cost of immorality and the
greater the potential rewards for moral compliance—the more justice requires that
those subject to the heavier evaluative burdens possess an especially robust form of
agency.17 Part of the reason we find the harsh punishment of children unacceptable, for
example, is because we do not believe that children are generally able to govern them-
selves sufficiently by the light of the norms imposed upon them. However, as the powers
of self-governance develop, we ordinarily suppose that the costs of non-compliance
with social and moral norms can reasonably be raised. If we accept that justice estab-
lishes a linkage between possible punishments and rewards for moral behavior and the
robustness of underlying agency, then those who believe that serious punishments and
rewards are justified will be pressed to endorse stronger forms of agency.
As we said earlier, theistic traditions have ordinarily endorsed rather strong and
particular views about the nature and extent of human responsibility. The concept of
sinfulness has quite commonly been connected with a robustly retributive conception
of punishment according to which the propriety of punishment has to do with basic
desert. That is, the theistic concept of sin is often taken to presuppose that a person can
be properly blamed (and, therefore, punished18) only when he deserves to be in the
basic sense characterized by Derk Pereboom:
to be morally responsible for an action in the [basic desert sense] is for it to belong to him in
such a way that he would deserve blame if he understood that it was morally wrong, and he
would deserve credit or perhaps praise if he understood that it was morally exemplary, suppos-
ing that this desert is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve blame or credit just
17
The Christian might here point to Luke 12:48: ‘From everyone to whom much has been given, much
will be required; and from the one to whom much has been entrusted, even more will be demanded’
(NRSV).
18
It might appear that this way of framing the religious impulses to which we are appealing runs rough-
shod over the distinction between appropriate blame and appropriate punishment. We grant, of course,
that blame and punishment can come apart. However, the linkage between them is strong enough, we
suppose, for our generalizations to have the explanatory force we claim to detect. Thanks to Joe Campbell
for pushing us on this point.
because he has performed the action, given understanding of its moral status, and not by virtue
of consequentialist considerations.19
We contend that it is a common view within theistic traditions that punishment for
sin is justified by the supposed fact that sinners deserve this punishment in something
like Pereboom’s basic sense.
It is not unlikely that some powerful gravitation toward libertarianism among the-
ists can be accounted for merely in virtue of the common combination of views just
enunciated—sinfulness + basic desert. But an additional common feature of theistic
commitment will almost ‘seal the deal’ for many theists; for it is also quite common for
theists to believe that the moral stakes in human life are extraordinarily high, involving
both heaven and hell. Some people, by virtue of their proper moral/religious choices,
will enter into an eternal state of beatitude in the presence of God; and others, by virtue
of their improper moral/religious choices, will be forced to suffer in eternal torment and
despair apart from God. Furthermore, most theists who endorse traditional doctrines
of heaven and hell will want to insist that it is fair—that God is just in allowing—that this
is so. Given the natural thought we developed earlier linking the justice of the severity
of punishment with the robustness of the agency undergirding self-governance, the
endorsement of traditional doctrines of heaven and hell will almost necessitate imput-
ing to human beings the most dramatic kind of agency conceivable. Here we cannot
help pointing out the way that the concept of ‘heaven and hell responsibility’ functions
in Galen Strawson’s (in)famous argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.
According to Strawson, ‘true moral responsibility is responsibility of such a kind that,
if we have it, then it makes sense, at least, to suppose that it could be just to punish some
of us with (eternal) torment in hell and reward others with (eternal) bliss in heaven.’20
Strawson goes on to argue (in ways we will not attempt to evaluate here) that being
responsible in so deep a sense would essentially require that we have created ourselves.
However, since such self-creation is incoherent, the form of responsibility requiring
it is impossible. One natural route of response to Strawson’s argument has involved
denying that true responsibility really is of the ‘heaven and hell’ variety. This will be an
awkward route for theists who endorse a traditional doctrine of heaven and hell to
travel. In light of this concern, libertarianism can appear to be the only morally accept-
able option for many theists.21
19
Pereboom 2007, 197. He makes similar points in his contribution to this volume.
20
Strawson 1994, 9.
21
One assumption running through this paragraph is that libertarian agency is, in some unspecified
sense, ‘stronger’ or ‘more robust’ than its compatibilist counterparts. As Joe Campbell has pointed out,
making this assumption is bound to annoy those with thoroughly compatibilist sympathies. We apolo-
gize for any such annoyance. Our goal here is to offer a kind of socio-philosophical explanation for what
appear to be the data of theistic attraction to libertarianism and not to defend its attractiveness in the
face of the subtle resistance that compatibilists might offer. So, we hope we can be forgiven for more or
less reporting this outlook regarding the strength and robustness of libertarian agency among religious
libertarians.
Introduction 9
Thus, given both the twentieth-century debate over the problem of evil and the
traditional doctrines of heaven and hell, perhaps we should not be surprised about
the presence in the free will room of Vargas’ elephant.
Free Will in Philosophy of Religion

It is also true that concerns about freedom, the will, and agency are nearly ubiquitous
in contemporary philosophy of religion more generally. So even beyond the problem
of evil and the demanding theological conceptions of desert that we conjecture have
brought libertarianism in particular to such prominence for theistically inclined phi-
losophers, it may be illuminating to reflect a bit further on why concerns about free
will have been so central to debates in the philosophy of religion. We can consider, in
this regard, three contexts in which substantive conceptions of free will play a signifi-
cant role: the context of facing challenges to the rationality of theistic belief, the context
of reflection on divine attributes, and the context of engagement with specific theolog-
ical doctrines.
Challenges to rationality of theistic belief

As we have already emphasized, appeals to free will have been a standard part of the
strategy of addressing that most forceful family of objections to theistic belief running
under the banner of ‘the problem of evil.’ It may be worth noting, however, that the
importance of appeals to free will in theistic responses to this problem has not dimin-
ished over the last three or four decades since the appearance of Hick’s theodicy and
Plantinga’s defense. Nearly every recent systematic effort to address the shifting problem
of evil rests significantly on robust (and, indeed, quite frequently libertarian) freedom.22
Consider, in this regard, Richard Swinburne’s Providence and the Problem of Evil,23
Peter van Inwagen’s Gifford Lectures entitled The Problem of Evil,24 and Eleonore
Stump’s Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering.25 There are rich
and rewarding differences between the approaches taken by each of these authors; never-
theless, an essential appeal to the existence and value free will is shared by all of them.
And this commonality is not limited to these paradigmatic works, but can be found
much more broadly throughout the contemporary literature on the problem of evil.
Furthermore, the emerging ‘problem of divine hiddenness’ represents a somewhat
different challenge to the rationality of theistic belief that also invites reflection on
the nature of free will. As J. L. Schellenberg has recently formulated this problem, the
existence of reasonable unbelief functions as strong evidence against the existence of
22
An important counter-instance is the crucial work of Marilyn Adams (see especially 1999); Adams is
among the few contemporary Christian philosophers expressing skepticism both about the plausibility of
libertarianism and about its probative value for the problem of evil debate. Others—such as Turner 2013,
Judisch 2008, Howsepian 2007, and Mawson (this volume)—think that the compatibilist can also give a
version of the free will defense.
23
Swinburne 1998. 24 Van Inwagen 2006. 25 Stump 2012.
God.26 This is because a loving God (and only a loving being would be deserving of the
title ‘God’) would always make it possible for creatures to be in life-giving reciprocal
contact with this divine love. But a person can be in a life-giving reciprocal relationship
with God only if the person is able to believe that God exists. From this, Schellenberg
infers that a loving God would always make it possible for creatures to believe—to
believe, principally, that God exists. Thus, the existence of fair-minded and good-
hearted people who are not able to believe counts significantly in favor of the claim that
no perfectly loving being exists.
One important strand of reply to this argument invokes the importance of the pres-
ervation of human freedom.27 What proponents of this reply emphasize is that a degree
of epistemic clarity with respect to the proposition that God exists sufficient to elimi-
nate all reasonable unbelief might undermine free will by functioning, in essence,
coercively. One supposed value of free will is the special importance it would confer
upon right and good actions done from it. This is to say, for example, that my telling
you the truth of my own free will is more valuable than my telling you the truth as a
result of someone’s coercive influence upon me. However, if the existence of God had
been made transparently clear to human beings (so that no reasonable unbelief could
remain), then—so the argument goes—many people would have been under a kind of
epistemic coercion. Knowing that God exists, many people would have been unable to
do anything other than what they believed God wanted them to do. Thus, a perfectly
loving God who cared deeply about the preservation of free will would need to remain
at an epistemic distance from creatures, thereby making the space for what we call
divine hiddenness.28
Our goals require us to assess neither the problem of divine hiddenness nor the
influential line of reply in terms of epistemic coercion that we have sketched. Our pur-
pose here, again, is simply to highlight an important context (specifically involving a
challenge to the credibility of theistic belief) in which the philosopher of religion is
forced quite deeply into reflection on the nature and value of free will.
Divine attributes
Philosophers of religion are also regularly forced into reflection upon the nature of free
will when attempting to provide philosophical accounts of the divine attributes. This is
because many of the traditional divine attributes can be understood only against the
backdrop of substantive accounts of freedom and action. We highlight two agency-
intensive attributes for illustrative purposes.29
26
See Schellenberg 1993. 27 See, among others, Murray 1993.
28
Most theists think that more is needed for the kind of relationship that God desires with His creatures
than mere assent to true propositions, even if that is necessary. What is crucial is a certain kind of intimate,
relationship-engendering knowing, as Paul Moser stresses in his work; see Moser 2009 and 2010. See also
Williams 2011.
29
We do not think these two examples are exhaustive. Further concerns regarding human free will are
raised by other attributes—including, for instance, divine simplicity and aseity.
Introduction 11
Consider, first, competing accounts of God’s eternality. God’s eternality seems most
obviously to be a matter of God’s relationship to time. But it turns out that the debate
between atemporalists (who hold that God exists eternally outside of time) and tempo-
ralists (who hold that God exists eternally or everlastingly within time) is consistently
animated by intuitions and arguments regarding the implications these views have for
both divine and human action. For example, temporalists frequently worry that the
four-dimensionalist account of time that many atemporalists adopt would be incom-
patible with robust human freedom. In a similar vein, temporalists have also argued
that the timelessness of God would make divine action in the world, including the act
of creation itself, impossible or incoherent. Just as these objections rest on substantive
accounts of freedom and agency, so the defenders of these views cannot avoid advanc-
ing similarly substantive accounts in reply.30
The attempt to understand the divine attribute of omniscience also quite naturally
provokes philosophical reflection upon free will. On the most expansive views of
omniscience, God’s knowledge ranges over future contingents, including future con-
tingents of creaturely freedom—over what, for example, you will (but may not have to)
do next week. Thus, the attribute of divine omniscience, so understood, entails that
God has exhaustive foreknowledge of everything that will happen in the future.31 The
intuitive concern with exhaustive foreknowledge is that it is not easy to see how my
action can be an expression of my freedom when God knew in, say, 100,000 bce that
I would be performing it at this time in precisely this way (as this view of omniscience
insists God did know). On a standard view, a person performs an action freely only if
she could have (in some relevant sense of ‘could have’) done something other than
what she in fact has done. Those who object to an account of divine omniscience in
terms of exhaustive foreknowledge can rightly worry that, given God’s knowledge, no
one could ever have done anything other than what one has done.32 That is, no one acts
freely under exhaustive divine foreknowledge. Of course, proponents of the exhaustive
foreknowledge view of divine omniscience have replies to this kind of objection.
However, these replies, like the objections themselves, rely on considerations regard-
ing the nature and extent of human free will.33
30
Things are more complex than we have them here, as one need not endorse four-dimensionalism to
be an atemporalist, and one could be four-dimensionalist and a temporalist.
31
The ‘fore’ in foreknowledge might suggest that God is temporal, but this is not essential to the present
worry. If God is atemporal, the putative incompatibility of God’s unfailing atemporal knowledge with what
is for us the future can simply be generated in another way. See Zagzebski 1996 for a related discussion.
32
Following Nelson Pike’s (1965) influential development of this argument, it would seem a person
could have done otherwise than what she has done, given God’s foreknowledge, only if she could have done
something that would either (1) have rendered God’s prior belief about what she would do false, or (2) have
changed what God believed in the past. But no one can render the beliefs of an essentially omniscient being
false. And no one can change the past. Therefore, God’s foreknowledge blocks the ability to do otherwise.
The responses to this kind of argument are legion, of course; but, reiterating the point we are making in the
text, all of them require heavy engagement in the free will debate in various ways.
33
For replies in the spirit of Molinism, see Flint 2006 and Perszyk 2012; for a broader set of responses,
see Zagzebski 1996.
Specific theological doctrines

Finally, philosophers of religion also find themselves enmeshed in freedom-related
problems when attempting to elucidate and defend specific theological doctrines.
Again, we will be satisfied with providing two examples.
The doctrine of creation might at first seem somewhat remote from debates about
freedom of will. In fact, however, a moment’s reflection on the traditional view of crea-
tion brings questions of free will and agency immediately into view.34 In large part this
is because the standard doctrine of creation (in the Judeo-Christian and Islamic tradi-
tions, at least) emphasizes that God creates freely. Behind this emphasis is a view
according to which creation is a gift for which we can and ought to be thankful to God.
But gratitude will seem to be inappropriate to the degree that creation is not an expres-
sion of freedom but rather a necessary emanation. Already, then—just in the framing
of the doctrine—we find a substantive commitment to various claims about the nature
and value of freedom. But even if we simply grant this element of the doctrine of crea-
tion (the element according to which God creates freely), the question that we can
hardly escape is what it could mean that God creates freely. What would it be for a
maximally good, powerful, and knowledgeable being to bring about the existence of
the universe out of nothing—freely? And once the nature of God’s freedom is on the
table it will be hard to keep from wondering about the relationship between God’s free-
dom and our own. Does the concept of freedom apply to God in the same way that it
applies to human beings? And should, therefore, our model of human agency be iso-
morphic to our model of divine agency?35
A related doctrine of divine conservation raises equally puzzling questions about
divine freedom and action. According to this doctrine, God’s power with respect to the
world is not exhausted by creation. There is more to do after creation, for the created
order must be sustained. The idea, then, is that the universe depends not only on God’s
creative power but also upon God’s conserving power—a divine energy or action
maintaining it in existence. And just as creation is an expression of divine freedom, so
also, supposedly, is conservation. But here a problem emerges. If God freely conserves
everything in existence, then God freely conserves in existence the intentions and
material means by which wicked people will inflict horrible suffering on innocents (for
example). This should lead us to wonder why, insofar as God is at least partially caus-
ally responsible for the horrible event by virtue of conservation, God is not also at least
partially morally responsible. The theist who hopes to reconcile the doctrine of conser-
vation with the maximal goodness of God will, it seems clear, have to think quite
deeply about freedom, agency, intentionality, responsibility, and blame.
We hasten to emphasize that our cherry-picked sample of contexts and cases
wherein philosophers of religion have been forced to grapple with the questions of
34
For a different worry about the relationship between creation and freedom than the one we focus on
here, see Rowe 2004.
35
For one treatment of these questions, see Timpe 2012.
Introduction 13
action theory are intended simply to underscore the widespread overlap between these
two domains of contemporary philosophy.36
Finally, let us briefly address a worry that may be brewing. As is likely already notice-
able—and will no doubt become increasingly so in subsequent pages—the brand of
theism receiving primary attention throughout this volume is of the Christian variety.
The principal explanation for this fact, we contend, is that Christian theism has (as a
matter of sociological fact) dominated the larger discussions in philosophy of religion
to which our book aims to make some contribution. While we think that philosophy
of religion need not be so restricted, and indeed should not be, the dominance of
Christian theism is part of the philosophical context we have inherited. The goal of the
present volume is not to challenge this inheritance, though we welcome projects that
would expand it. Furthermore, we trust that much that is said here in a Christian key
could either be endorsed by those belonging to other theological traditions or be tran-
scribed into a key more fitting to them. With these points in mind, we can turn to a
brief overview of the contributions to this volume that we hope will allow you to get the
most from your careful study of each.
What is to Come
The first few chapters in the volume address some methodological issues arising from
philosophical inquiry into issues at the intersection of libertarianism and theism. The
volume opens with Manuel Vargas’ ‘The Runeberg Problem: Theism, Libertarianism,
and Motivated Reasoning.’ Drawing on the fictional character Nils Runeberg from a
short story by Jorge Luis Borges, Vargas describes ‘runeberging’ as a kind of motivated
reasoning in which we first accept a conclusion and only afterward construct, con-
sciously or not, an argument for that conclusion. While runeberging may happen in
many domains, Vargas is particularly interested in potential runeberging with respect
to libertarianism. He contends, on both empirical and conceptual grounds, that liber-
tarianism is often the result of motivated reasoning by theists. The empirical grounds
for his runeberging hypothesis are constituted by the recent survey data mentioned
earlier indicating that, among professional philosophers, theists (and non-naturalists
more generally) are significantly more likely to be libertarians than are naturalists. The
conceptual grounds he adduces have also been mentioned earlier. Here, Vargas
emphasizes that a robust account of the nature of free will is needed to make sense of
the possibility of the deserved damnation that many theistic traditions embrace. This
demand for robustness naturally presses the theist toward libertarianism. While
Vargas grants that these grounds do not entail that the runeberging hypothesis is true,
he argues that they support a strong prima facie case for the view that theists engage in
36
We have resisted the temptation to canvas the many other theological doctrines that implicate views
of free will. Consider, in this regard, the immense literatures on Heaven, Hell, Purgatory, Incarnation,
Atonement, etc.
motivated reasoning when considering arguments for libertarianism. Furthermore,

since such motivated reasoning is unlikely to track the truth, the runeberging hypoth-
esis (to the degree that it is plausible) gives us a substantive reason to be skeptical of the
accuracy of libertarian views of agency, especially those put forward by theists.
Vargas’ methodological criticism of theistic libertarianism is underscored by John
Martin Fischer’s ‘Libertarianism and the Problem of Flip-flopping.’ Whereas Vargas
argues that we have reasons to be suspicious of libertarian views insofar as they may be
the product of motivated reasoning, Fischer argues that we have independent reasons
comparatively to favor compatibilist views. Fischer makes this argument by way of
appeal to what he takes to be a relevant disadvantage of libertarianism by comparison
with compatibilism; namely, that the former is susceptible to a disturbing form of
empirical refutation in a way that the latter is not. Since libertarianism requires inde-
terminism, a libertarian who comes to believe that the laws of nature are deterministic
will either have to reject her earlier belief in freedom and responsibility or become a
compatibilist. In other words, to avoid free will skepticism this libertarian will have to
‘flip-flop’ on the compatibility question. Fischer uses Peter van Inwagen as an example
of a potential flip-flopper. This is because van Inwagen has admitted that if he were
to become convinced that libertarianism is false, he would become a compatibilist
rather than a free will skeptic, since denying that we are free agents ‘is simply not an
option.’37 On Fischer’s view, rejecting the premise of an argument (here, Rule Beta of
the Consequence Argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism) sim-
ply to avoid an unwanted conclusion is problematic, in part because the evidence
involved in coming to believe that determinism is true is not related to the evidence in
favor of the transfer principle at the heart of the Consequence Argument. Fischer then
extends his criticism of the flip-flopping maneuver to put unique pressure on libertari-
ans who are also theists. As indicated earlier, many theists think that libertarian agency
is needed to defend belief in God’s existence against the problem of evil. But if such a
theist were to come to believe that determinism is true, she would either have to flip-
flop now regarding not only libertarianism but also its relationship to the existence
of evil—or else give up her belief in God. But surely one’s religious beliefs should not
be in jeopardy in this way—they should not be held hostage to the possibility of eso-
teric discoveries about the structure of the laws of nature, for example. Therefore,
Fischer concludes, the theist in particular has reasons for preferring compatibilism to
libertarianism.
In her contribution ‘The Cost of Freedom,’ Laura W. Ekstrom directly addresses
the role that appeal to the existence of free will has played in the debates about evil,
particularly the way the former is used to justify God’s allowing the latter. Ekstrom
seeks to evaluate whether our having free will is, after all, worth the cost. That is, she
asks whether the value of our having free will would outweigh the costs of the vari-
ous evils that it would make possible. How we answer this question regarding the
37
Van Inwagen 2008, 341.
Introduction 15
value of freedom, Ekstrom notes, will depend on how we construe its nature. Here,
then, she canvases three general approaches to free will found in the contemporary lit-
erature and offers some reasons the theist might have for being attracted to each. The
first is what she calls the ‘rational abilities view,’ which holds that free will consists in
the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. While this view has its merits,
Ekstrom thinks that such an understanding of free will cannot do the work the theist
needs it to do regarding evil, insofar as one could have this kind of freedom without
having the ability to do evil. The second approach is a hierarchical understanding of
free will, modeled on the influential work of Harry Frankfurt. Here too, Ekstrom
argues that such an account of free will cannot do the work the theist needs done with
respect to the problem of evil; in this case because, on the hierarchical model, free will
appears to be compatible with divinely imposed good desires. The third approach she
considers is an incompatibilist account. As an instance, Ekstrom describes an event-
causal libertarian view on which freedom is grounded in causally indeterministic con-
nections between an agent’s reasons and her decisions. It is a libertarian conception of
freedom such as this one that has hope for undergirding a free-will-based response to
the problem of evil.38 Ekstrom then considers a number of ways that having libertarian
free will could be worth the cost of the evil it makes possible, in terms of the intrinsic
and extrinsic value of this freedom. She affirms that libertarian free will may be
required to secure both a veridical sense of self and moral responsibility of the sort
grounding deserved praise and blame. However, she argues that free will of the liber-
tarian variety is not required for love, for meaningfulness of life, or for creativity. Her
conclusion is that libertarian free will is not so clearly worth its costs..
The next few chapters directly address the relationship between libertarian views
and religious belief. In ‘One Hell of a Problem for Christian Compatibilists,’ Jerry L.
Walls argues that while the philosophical case for libertarianism is not decisive, there
are a pair of sufficient reasons for theists to reject compatibilist accounts of human
agency. According to Walls:
if compatibilism is true by virtue of the reality that God has in fact determined all things and
that we are free and responsible for our actions, it is all but impossible to maintain the perfect
goodness of God. More specifically, it is all but impossible to maintain the perfect goodness of
God in a world full of sinners held blameworthy by God, and altogether impossible to do so if
orthodox Christianity is true.39
In particular, Walls contends that if compatibilism is true, then God could have created
a world in which all persons freely did only the good at all times. But it is clear that the
actual world is not such a world; and Walls thinks that the attempt to find a sufficient
justification, under determinism, for God’s creating the actual world rather than a
38
Here, Plantinga’s work on the logical problem of evil is, as mentioned earlier, particularly influential.
At the heart of his defense is not just libertarian freedom, but what he calls ‘morally significant freedom’,
which requires the ability to do morally good and morally bad actions. See Plantinga 1977, 30.
39
Walls (this volume), 80.
morally perfect world is unsuccessful. Here he draws a potentially damning compari-

son between divine determination of human agents to act in morally problematic ways
(this divine determination being required, he thinks, by the assumption of the con-
junction of determinism and classical theism) and manipulation. This manipulation
result constitutes his first formal reason for concluding that compatibilism sits uneas-
ily within an orthodox theistic framework. However, it is especially when we consider
his second reason for rejecting compatibilist accounts of free will, when issues related
to eschatological judgment are on the table, that Walls thinks theistic compatibilism
can be found decisively wanting. Walls argues from God’s necessary love for all crea-
tion to the claim, on the assumption of compatibilism, that necessarily God would
determine all creatures freely to accept divine love and be saved. But this kind of guar-
anteed universal salvation, he contends, is at odds with orthodox Christianity—which
holds that it is at least possible, if not actual, that some (and perhaps many) persons
will be lost. Compatibilists, then, must either deny that God truly loves all persons or
deny that damnation is possible for anyone. The orthodox Christian, and the classical
theist more generally, thus has good reason, Walls claims, for rejecting compatibilist
accounts of human freedom.
In ‘Relative Responsibility and Theism,’ Tamler Sommers extends the account of
responsibility developed in his recent book Relative Justice, bringing it to bear upon an
earlier version of Walls’ argument against compatibilism. One crucial conclusion of
Sommer’s book is that the quite substantive variations in cross-cultural attitudes and
intuitions about responsibility cannot easily be explained away. Given the roles that
these attitudes and intuitions have in motivating and defending competing accounts of
responsibility, he draws the relativistic conclusion that there is no principled way of
establishing universally true conditions of moral responsibility. Even within particular
theological traditions, Sommers notices conflicting claims about responsibility, such
as the commitment (within Christianity) both to a control condition on moral respon-
sibility and to the doctrine of original sin. Sommers argues that libertarian and
compatibilist Christians alike have a hard time taking all of the biblical data into
account. Here he appeals to cases such as God’s hardening of Pharaoh’s heart, contend-
ing that neither the libertarian nor the compatibilist has a satisfactory account of how
God can be perfectly good while holding agents responsible for things that are beyond
their control. Turning to polemics, Sommers focuses on two principles Walls has
enunciated in support of his libertarian conclusions:
(PP) When the actions of a person are entirely determined by another intelligent
being who intentionally determines (manipulates) the person to act exactly as the
other being wishes, then the person cannot rightly be held accountable and pun-
ished for his actions;40 and
(EMP) A being who freely and deliberately chooses to determine (manipulate)
another being to perform evil actions is himself evil. That being is even more perverse
40
Walls (this volume), 86.
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Tudela, writing about the middle of the twelfth century, testifies to the
tenacity with which many of the Jewish communities in Europe,
which he visited in his tour, clung to the belief that they were
destined to be redeemed from captivity and be gathered together in
the fulness of time. The various Messiahs whose rise and failure
have been narrated in the foregoing pages would never have
attained their wonderful popularity but for this belief. But even in
normal times it was the ardent desire of every good Jew to die in
Jerusalem, and the longing of some to live there. This desire was
nursed by the poets and thinkers of Israel. We have seen at the
beginning of the twelfth century Jehuda Halevi addressing Zion, in
accents full of tenderness, as his “woe-begone darling,” and in
fulfilment of a life-long vow ending his days among her ruins. A
century later three hundred Rabbis from France and
1211
England set out for Palestine.
1260 In 1267 Nachmanides, faithful to his own teaching,
performed the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and found the
city, owing to the ravages of the Mongols, a heap of ruins—a
devastation which was considered to indicate the near approach of
the Messiah. Nachmanides, in a letter to his son, thus describes the
melancholy sight: “Great is the solitude and great the wastes, and, to
characterise it in short, the more sacred the places, the greater the
desolation. Jerusalem is more desolate than the rest of the country:
Judaea more than Galilee. But even in this destruction it is a blessed
land.” He goes on to say that, among the two thousand inhabitants to
which the population of Jerusalem had been reduced by the Sultan’s
sword, he found only two Jews, two brothers, dyers by trade, in
whose house the Ten Men, the quorum necessary to form a
congregation for the purpose of worship, met on the Sabbath, when
they could; for Jews and Jewesses—“wretched folk, without
occupation and trade, pilgrims and beggars”—continued to come
from Damascus, Aleppo, and from other parts, to mourn over the
ruins of Zion. In spite of all the afflictions which met his eye, and in
spite of his longing for the friends and kinsmen whom the aged
pilgrim had forsaken without hope of ever seeing again,
Nachmanides is able to declare that for all those losses he is amply
compensated by “the joy of being a day in thy courts, O Jerusalem,
visiting the ruins of the Temple and crying over the ruined Sanctuary;
where I am permitted to caress the stones, to fondle the dust, and to
weep over thy ruins. I wept bitterly, but I found joy in my tears. I tore
my garments, but I felt relieved by it.” Nor does the Jew’s sublime
optimism fail him even in view of that desolation: “He who thought us
worthy to let us see Jerusalem in her desertion, he shall bless us to
behold her again, built and restored when the glory of the Lord will
return unto her ... you, my son, you all shall live to see the salvation
298
of Jerusalem and the comfort of Zion.”
The example of this noble old man was followed by many Jews
of Spain and Germany, both in his own and in subsequent times.
Down to this day a pilgrimage to Jerusalem is considered a sacred
duty, and many devote the savings of a laborious life to defray the
expenses of a last visit to the Fatherland—“our own land.” Like
shipwrecked mariners long tost on the waves, they drift year after
year from all parts of the world to this harbour of rest and sorrow and
hope. On the eve of the Passover aged Jews and Jewesses of every
country on earth may be seen leaning against the grim ruin of the
Temple—all that remains of the magnificence of Israel—weeping and
wailing for the fall of their nation. They kiss the ancient stones, they
water them with their tears, and the place rings with their poignant
lamentations.
And yet, though many come to lament the faded lustre of their
race, and are happy to die in Palestine, how many are there who
would care to live in it? This is a question to which different Jews
would give different answers. It may be urged that the longing for
Zion is a romantic dream which might lose much of its romance by
realisation. It can also be shown that the Jewish people has seldom
thriven in isolation; that a narrow environment is uncongenial to its
temperament; and that the Jew has always instinctively preferred the
life which is more suitable to the free development of his gifts—that
is, the life of competition with foreign nations. All this may be to a
great extent true; but, none the less, there are Jews who believe that
the majority of their race, or at all events the suffering portion of it,
would, under favourable conditions, gladly return to the land of their
ancestors. The same belief has been held by several distinguished
Christians, British and American, who at various times have lent their
support to the movement for Jewish rehabilitation—some actuated
by an enthusiasm for the Millennium, others by an enthusiasm for
British interests in the East. Among the latter may be mentioned Lord
Palmerston and Lord Salisbury, both of whom years ago
countenanced the attempts made to obtain from the Sultan a
concession of territory in Palestine for the purpose of establishing a
299
self-governing Jewish colony.
But while the bulk of the race enjoyed comparative toleration,
few Jews were there found willing to relinquish the land of their
adoption for the gratification of a merely sentimental yearning
towards that of their remote forefathers. It was not until the revival of
persecution under its more rabid and sanguinary forms that the
Zionist Utopia became a living reality, and the assertion of Gentile
Nationalism led to a corresponding invigoration of Jewish
Nationalism. Then the Jews began to consider seriously the problem
of the future of their race, and to cast about, once more, for a refuge
where they could worship their God unmolested, develop their moral
and intellectual tendencies uninfluenced by an alien environment,
and pursue their daily occupations unfettered by legal restrictions.
Such a refuge could only be found in Palestine. One of the
promoters of this idea summed up the reasons, which led him to the
choice of Palestine, in the following terms:
“In Europe and America it is a crime to have an Oriental genius
or an Oriental nose; therefore, in God’s name, let the Jew go where
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his genius will be free and his nose not remarked.”
The massacres of Russian Jews in 1881 and 1882 coincided
with the publication of various schemes of rescue by members of the
persecuted race, who found many sympathisers outside Russia. The
practical fruit of the agitation was the birth, among other committees
and societies all over Russia and Roumania, of an association under
the name of “Chovevi (Lovers of) Zion,” the programme of which was
to promote the settlement of Jewish refugees in the Holy Land with a
view to the ultimate creation of an autonomous Jewish State. This
was the origin of the movement now known all over the world by the
name of Zionism. From the very first it met with a reception which
proved how sincere and how widespread was the desire for a return
to the Land of Promise. A writer, well qualified to speak on the
subject, thus describes the welcome accorded to the proposal: “It
has seized upon the imagination of the masses and produced a
wave of enthusiasm in favour of emigration to Palestine, the force
and the extent of which only those who have come in contact with it,
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as I have done, can appreciate.”
It was not, however, until 1896, when Dr. Theodor Herzl came
forward with a definite plan, that the movement acquired
cosmopolitan importance and was placed on a solid practical
foundation. Dr. Herzl was a Jewish journalist of Vienna, born in
Buda-Pesth on the 2nd of May, 1860. He was the son of a well-to-do
merchant, and was educated in Vienna, where his parents had
removed shortly after his birth. Having for some time practised at the
Bar, he subsequently gave up Law for Literature, contributed to the
Berliner Tageblatt and other journals, and wrote several novels and
plays. In 1891 he was appointed Paris correspondent of the Vienna
Neue Freie Presse, and it was during his sojourn in Paris that Dr.
Herzl, filled with indignation at the outburst of French anti-Semitism,
and dismayed by the triumph of the enemies of the Jews in Austria,
resolved to undertake the lead in the movement for the rescue of his
co-religionists. Even if no practical result were attained, he felt that
the effort would not be utterly wasted, as it would, at all events, tend
—in the words of the Zionist programme adopted at the first
Congress in Basel, in 1897—to promote “the strengthening of Jewish
individual dignity and national consciousness.”
Firm in this conviction, the young leader expounded his scheme
in a pamphlet which appeared in 1896 in the three principal
European languages, under the title, The Jewish State: an attempt at
a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question. According to Dr. Herzl’s
proposal the State was to be a self-governing republic tributary to the
Porte. Christian susceptibilities would be consulted, and diplomatic
complications avoided, by establishing the principle of broad
religious toleration, and by excluding from Jewish jurisdiction the
scenes of Christ’s life and death, and the shrines of the different
Christian communities in Palestine. The plan was received with
applause by a minority in every quarter, and Dr. Herzl found
enthusiasts in both hemispheres ready to help the cause with their
pens and with their purses. A Zionist newspaper was founded in
Vienna (Die Welt), a new Zionist Association was organised with
numerous ramifications in all parts of the Jewish world, and in less
than seven years from its beginning the movement numbered
several hundred thousand of adherents. The Association holds
annual Congresses in various great European centres, with a view to
disseminating the idea, discussing all details connected with the
movement and deciding on the practical steps necessary to its
success.
It is obvious that the first requisite was the Turkish Government’s
consent to the acquisition of land in Palestine on the terms already
described. For this purpose Dr. Herzl paid a visit to Yildiz Kiosk in
May, 1901, and again in August, 1902. The latter expedition was
undertaken in response to a telegraphic invitation from the Sultan
himself, who expressed the desire to be informed of the precise
programme of the Zionists. Regular conferences took place with high
officials both of the Palace and of the Porte, and in the end Dr. Herzl
drew up and laid before Abdul Hamid a minute statement of his
views, explaining the demands of the Zionists and formulating the
conditions of a Jewish settlement in a part of Palestine and
elsewhere in Asia Minor, on the basis of a charter. The proposals
were duly considered, and the Sultan expressed his deep sympathy
with the Jewish people, but the concessions which he was prepared
to make for a Jewish settlement were not considered adequate by
the leaders of the Zionist movement, and the negotiations led to no
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definite result.
Indeed, the obstacles in the way of a satisfactory arrangement
on the basis of the Zionist programme are neither few nor small. The
Turks, it is true, have always displayed towards the Jews a degree of
toleration such as the latter have seldom experienced at the hands
of Christians. As we have seen, in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries Turkey was the only country that offered an asylum to the
Jewish refugees from the West. Religious sympathy may be partially
responsible for this toleration, strengthened by the fact that the Jews
of Turkey, devoid of all national aspirations, are distinguished among
the Sultan’s subjects by their loyalty to the Ottoman rule, and by their
readiness to help the Porte in the suppression of Christian rebellion.
It has also been suggested that Abdul Hamid was anxious, by a
display of sympathy with the Jews generally and the Zionists in
particular, to secure their powerful championship in the West against
the host of enemies which the Armenian massacres had raised to his
Empire. Hence the present Sultan’s attitude towards the race—an
attitude which in its benevolence contrasts strongly, if not strangely,
with the treatment meted out to his Christian subjects. In 1901 Abdul
Hamid appointed members of the Hebrew community to important
posts in the Turkish army, and attached two more to his personal
entourage. On another occasion, when a blood-accusation was
brought against the Jews by the Christians of the East, he caused
the local authorities to take steps to prove its groundlessness and
clear the Jews of the heinous charge. And yet, it would be hard to
imagine the Sultan giving his sanction to the creation of a fresh
nationality within his Empire, and thus adding a new political problem
to the list, already sufficiently long, which makes up the
contemporary history of Turkey. Moreover, concerning the return of
the Jews to the Land of Promise, there are certain old prophecies to
whose fulfilment no true Mohammedan can be expected to
contribute. For both these reasons, political and religious, the Turkish
Government in 1882, upon hearing that the Jews who fled from
Russia were meditating an immigration into Palestine, hastened to
arrest the movement.
But, even if the Sultan could be brought, as Dr. Herzl hoped, “to
perceive the advantages that would accrue to his Empire from a
Jewish settlement on the basis of the Zionist programme,” it should
not be forgotten that the Sultan is not the only, or indeed the most
important, agent in the matter. Palestine, and Asia Minor generally, is
a field for the eventual occupation of which struggle most of the
Great Powers of Europe. Missions of a semi-religious, semi-political
character, representing several European nationalities, and
sedulously supported by several European Governments, have long
been at work in the land. Among them may be mentioned the
Russian, the French, the Italian, and the German. Russia, who
persecutes the Jews at home, would not see with any degree of
pleasure a hostile population, consisting for the most part of her own
victims, settled in a province to the ultimate absorption of which she
aspires; the less so as that population will in all probability be under
British influence. Although, for reasons not difficult to fathom, the
Russian Consuls in Palestine and Syria are instructed to extend over
the Russian Jews in those countries a protection with which the latter
very often would gladly dispense, the Russian Minister of Finance, in
1902, forbade the sale of the Jewish Colonial Trust shares in the
Czar’s dominions—a step which created great perturbation in the
ranks of Polish Zionists, the most deeply affected by the
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prohibition. This measure, harmonising as it does with Russia’s
well-known designs in Palestine, throws on that Power’s real attitude
towards Zionism a light too clear to be affected even by the Russian
Government’s assurances of a benevolent interest in the
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movement. An analogous opposition, in a minor degree, may
reasonably be anticipated on the part of the rival Powers, especially
Germany, and that despite the promises which the German Emperor
made to the delegation of Zionists who waited on him during his visit
to Palestine in 1898. Both Russia and Germany enjoy a strong
ascendancy over the present Sultan, whose fear of the one Power
and appreciation of the other’s friendship are too lively to permit of
any action calculated to offend either. The Christians of the East are
also a power to be reckoned with, and they, any more than the
Christians of the West, would not bear to see the sanctuary of
Christendom falling into the hands of the “enemies of Christ.” The
extra-territorialisation of Jerusalem has indeed been suggested by
the Zionists. But is it to be expected that the Jews will ever really
resign themselves to the final abandonment of Zion? The more
powerful they grew in Palestine the less inclined would they be to
suffer the ancient capital of their nation to remain in any hands but
Israel’s.
To these external difficulties must be added the lack of unanimity
among the Jews themselves. Although the Zionist movement is
undoubtedly enjoying a considerable measure of popularity, it is
subject to a measure of opposition no less considerable. The great
Jewish financiers of the West, who, thanks to their wealth, have little
reason to complain of persecution, have hitherto shown themselves
coldly sceptical, or even contemptuous, towards the idea. Nor has its
reception been more cordial among the high spiritual authorities of
Israel. Both these classes hold that the plan of restoration, even if it
prove feasible, is not desirable. To the cultured and prosperous Jew
of the West the prospect of exchanging the comforts and elegant
luxuries of civilised life in a European or American city for the barren
obscurity of an Asiatic province is not alluring. The re-settlement of
Israel in Palestine has no charm for him. To him the old prophecies
are an incumbrance, and their fulfilment would be a disappointment.
For such a Jew nothing could be more inexpedient or more
embarrassing than the advent of the Messiah. This attitude is well
illustrated by a saying attributed to a member of the wealthiest
Jewish family in Europe: “If ever the Messiah came,” is this
gentleman reported to have said, “I would apply for the post of
Palestinian ambassador in London.” Less polished, but not less
significant, was another Western Jew’s terse reply to the question
whether he would go to Palestine: “Pas si bête.”
Even so, what time Cyrus permitted the captives of Babylon to
return to the land of their fathers, many preferred to remain in rich
Mesopotamia. The sacrifice of present comfort in the pursuit of a
romantic ideal presupposes a degree of emotional fervour and of
material wretchedness that it would be unreasonable, if not
uncharitable, to demand from a whole nation. But this opposition, or
indifference, to the Zionist efforts at repatriation does not necessarily
and in all cases spring from worldly motives of self-indulgence. It is
only one manifestation of a sincere divergence of sentiment which
has its sources deep in the past of the Jewish race, or, one might
say, of human nature, and which can only be adequately treated in a
separate work on Modern Judaism. Here it is sufficient to describe it
only in so far as it bears on the subject immediately under
discussion. Zionism, while acclaimed with enthusiasm by the Jews of
the East, has met in the West with two sets of adversaries who,
though asunder as the poles, have found a common standpoint in
their opposition to the movement. These adversaries are the
extreme Liberal and the extreme Orthodox Jews of Western Europe
and America—the Sadducees and Pharisees of to-day. The one
scoffs at the movement as too idealistic, the other as not idealistic
enough. The contempt of the one is based on commonsense; that of
the other on the Bible. The one objects to all Messiahs; the other
refuses to follow any but the Messiah. To the one Dr. Herzl appeared
as a dreamer of dreams; to the other as a prosaic utilitarian. The
sentimental aim of Zionism is an offence in the eyes of the one; the
other condemns its methods as sordidly practical. They both, starting
from diametrically opposite premises, arrive at the conclusion that
the movement is a set-back of Jewish history, an agitation, artificial
and superfluous, which “has no roots in the past and no fruits to offer
for the future.”
The Liberal Jew’s ideal is not separation from the natives of the
country of his adoption, but assimilation to them. He has long lived in
political freedom. All careers are open to him; all objects of
distinction for which men strive are within his reach. He is an ardent
patriot. The political toleration to which he owes his liberty is
accompanied by a religious breadth, or may be scepticism, in which
he fully participates. Like his Christian neighbour, he is content to live
in the present. He has gradually abandoned the ceremonial
observances of the Law and the belief in a Messianic restoration,
and is trying to obliterate all traces of tribal distinction. By
intermarriage and education he endeavours to identify himself with
the country of which he is a citizen. In point of nationality he calls
himself a German, a Frenchman, an Italian, an Englishman, or an
American. In point of creed he may be a Reformed Jew, a Unitarian,
a Theist, an Atheist, or a placid Agnostic. This attitude is as
intelligible as the sentiment from which it springs is respectable.
Such a Jew feels that he cannot be a citizen of two cities. He must
choose; and in his choice he is guided by self-analysis. He feels that
the country of his birth has greater claims upon him than the country
of his remote origin; that he has more in common with his next-door
neighbours than with the Patriarchs and Prophets of Asia.
To this category evidently belongs the anonymous author of a
book that may be regarded as the Liberal Jew’s apologia pro vita
sua. After having demonstrated that among modern Jews there is,
strictly speaking, neither racial nor religious unity, the writer goes on
to explain what, in his opinion, should be the attitude of “the modern
Occidental Jew”:
“Such a Jew, educated in an English, German, French, or
American school and university, is certainly in looks, manners,
character, habits, tastes, and ideas as different from a Jew of Turkey,
or Egypt, or Russia as he can well be. The people to whom he
corresponds in all essential points are the people of his own country
in which he was born and bred and has lived.... Now, what must
such an Occidental Jew say of himself, if he is true to himself, and if
he recognises truth in all matters as the supreme guide of man? He
will have to say that the strict racial unity of the Jews is doubtful,
even with regard to the past; and as regards the present he will have
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to deny it altogether.”
The author proceeds to point out that, with regard to his moral
and intellectual development, the Occidental Jew has undergone the
same educational influences as his Christian compatriot and
contemporary: Hebraism, through the Bible, Hellenism through the
Renaissance, Catholicism, Chivalry, Reformation, French
Revolution: “He must finally, above all, remember his indebtedness
to the moral standard of modern times, that love of man as man
which is the result of no one of these currents alone, but is the
outcome of the action of all of them, and to the standard of truth, as
intensified by modern science. Now, realising all this, he must admit
that a very small portion of his moral and intellectual existence is
Jewish in the Oriental sense of the term, and he cannot thus be
cramped back into the laws which are to govern the thought and life
of a Jew as laid down in the Talmud and embraced by the practices
of the devout and observant Jew. He is speaking and living a lie if he
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denies this by word or deed.”
The practical question arises: “Recognising the evils of racial
exclusiveness, what ought such a modern Occidental Jew to do?”
The answer is: “He has simply to live up to his convictions in every
detail of his life. He must not only, as he has ever done, perform the
duties of a citizen in the country in which he lives, fully and
conscientiously, but he must refuse, as far as the race question
goes, in any way to recognise the separate claims of the Jews within
his country.... He may feel justly proud of being a descendant of a
race which is not only the oldest and purest, but has through many
centuries steadfastly followed the guidance of a great spiritual idea
to the blessing of mankind, just as a Norman, or a Saxon, or a Celt in
Great Britain may, when called upon to do so, consider, and be
gratified by, the memory of his own racial origin. Beyond this he must
not go. He must spurn and avoid all those symbols and rites which
have been established to signify a separate, even though a chosen,
people. His marriage and his choice of friends must be exclusively
guided by those considerations of inner affinity which are likely to
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make such unions perfect as far as things human can be perfect.”
Such a Jew’s advice, if asked by his less advanced brethren of
Eastern Europe, would be, not to perpetuate the narrowness of
antiquity, but to share in the broad development of modern
civilisation. Not to go back to the political and religious isolation of
Palestine, but to move on with the political and religious progress of
modern Europe and America: to seek for light not in the East but in
the West. He regards the memories of Israel with indifference, and
its aspirations with perplexity. He can hardly enter into his Polish
brother’s soul and realise his modes of thought and feeling. To him
the longing for Zion is an incomprehensible mystery, the attempt to
gratify it a wild and hopeless adventure. If Eastern Europe will not
have the Jews, he is ready to help them to migrate to Western
Europe, or to America; but with the Zionist Utopia he neither can nor
will have anything to do. When told that Western Europe has
eloquently declared her hostility, and America may soon follow, he
calmly answers that anti-Semitism is a passing cloud; the wind which
has wafted it over the western sky will, sooner or later, dissipate it.
Precisely similar are the views entertained by the cultured
minority of Russian and more especially of Polish Jews. Despite the
strong anti-Semitic feeling displayed by the Christian inhabitants of
those countries, the more advanced representatives of the race offer
a vigorous opposition to Zionism and its separatist tendencies,
holding that the re-animation of Jewish national sentiment is a
temporary infatuation due to the cruel treatment of the Jews and
destined to die out with it. These Jews also have abandoned the old
Jewish national ideals, convinced that a man may frequent a Jewish
synagogue and have a Semitic nose and yet be as good a Polish or
Russian patriot as any other. They feel that a thousand years’
residence in Poland has weaned them effectually from any
sentimental attachment to Palestine and that, born and bred as they
are in the North, they are physically unfit for a southern climate. In
one word, they consider themselves both in body and in mind
children of the land in which they have lived and suffered for so
many centuries.
In direct opposition to this type of Jew stands the irreconcilable
and uncompromising Israelite—a man who after twenty centuries’
residence in the West still persists in calling himself Oriental, in
cultivating obedience to antiquated modes of thought, and in
adhering to formulas obsolete and, in his altered circumstances, a
trifle absurd. Like the Zionist of the Russian pale, this Oriental Jew of
the West is ready to exclaim with the Psalmist: “If I forget thee, O
Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember
thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not
Jerusalem above my chief joy.” But, unlike the Russian Zionist, he
declines to support the movement, the object of which is to restore
him to Jerusalem. His wish is to remain distinct from the Gentiles,
and yet to remain amongst them. He clings to the Pharisaic ideal of
social isolation, while he recoils from geographical and political
segregation. He abhors the Liberal Jew’s doctrine of assimilation and
ridicules the Zionist’s efforts at repatriation. Is the heroic endurance
of Israel under all its sufferings to lead to nothing but racial extinction
by intermarriage—the very thing which, had it been allowed to
happen twenty centuries ago, would have obviated those sufferings?
Such an idea implies a negation of divine justice, and lowers the
solemn tragedy of Jewish history into something quite different. It
also forms a negation of what the orthodox Jew holds to be the
mission of Israel on earth. This mission, according to the orthodox
Jew of the West, is to maintain intact the monotheistic dogma among
the nations of the world. In order to fulfil this mission, Israel must
remain severely apart and yet scattered among the nations. It is the
argument “that it may possibly have been God’s will and meaning,
that the Jews should remain a quiet light among the nations for the
purpose of pointing at the doctrine of the unity of God”—an argument
which Coleridge answered by his famous retort: “The religion of the
Jews is, indeed, a light; but it is as the light of the glow-worm, which
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gives no heat and illumines nothing but itself,” and which a
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modern Jewish writer has described as “a controversial fiction.” It
might, perhaps, be more justly described as an unhappy
afterthought.
A Jew of this type may, or may not, believe in the ultimate
political restoration of his race; but if he believes in it, he holds that it
is to be brought about by some mysterious and miraculous
dispensation of Providence, such as the Pharisees expected to bring
about the conversion of the heathen. He opposes Zionism on the
ground that it discredits Providence by striving to effect by human
means that which, according to the prophets, is to be the special
task of God. His attitude is that of the typical Oriental. Persuaded of
the futility of personal action, he trusts in a vague impersonal Power
which envelops all things and shapes the course of events to an
inevitable and predestined end.
An eminent example of this way of looking at life is presented by
a recent publication, apparently authoritative, though anonymous.
On the one hand the author deplores the liberalism of the Occidental
Jew, and on the other he denounces the Zionism of Dr. Herzl. With
regard to the first, he says: “The miraculous preservation of the Jews
is itself an argument for their election. By every law and rule of
history they should have been exterminated long since, yet we see
them to-day in all parts of the world, fighting steadily and
pertinaciously for the purpose they are set to fulfil. That purpose
carries with it the bar on intermarriage, which, despite occasional
breaches, is still jealously observed by the overwhelming majority of
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Jews as an essential condition of their survival.” The purpose in
question is the one explained already, “to be a light to the nations.”
With regard to Zionism, the author’s position is, to say the least, very
emphatically set forth. For that movement, and for its leader, he
reserves some of his choicest sarcasms. Dr. Herzl is “this
redoubtable Moses from the Press-club”; he is accused of having
“traded on the resources of prophecy”; “Dr. Herzl, with ingenious
effrontery, represented his scheme of evading the mission of the
exiles, and their duty to the lands of their dispersion, as a fulfilment
of the ancient prophecy.” “Dr. Herzl and those who think with him are
traitors to the history of the Jews.” These and similar titles are
abundantly bestowed on the man who has been guilty of the heinous
sin of seeking to redeem his co-religionists from the house of
bondage by purely human means, without waiting for a direct
interference on the part of the Deity,—or of the European Concert:
“The restoration of the Jews to the land of their old independence,”
affirms the author, “may occur in one of two ways. It may be by the
concerted act of the Governments of the countries of their
dispersion, devised as a measure of self-protection against the
spread of the Jews; or by the fulfilment of prophecy when the Jewish
mission is complete.... But Dr. Herzl’s plan makes short work of the
spiritual element in the new exodus of Jewry. He would force the
hand of Providence. The restoration, instead of occurring on the
appointed end of the dispersion, would be interpolated in the middle
of it as a means of evading its obligations. This plan, which is a
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travesty of Judaism, is equally futile as statecraft.”
Many Jews also, who sympathise with the Zionist idea, shrink
from associating themselves with a movement which for the
attainment of its object must necessarily solicit the favour of Abdul
Hamid. They feel that the Sultan, owing to his drastic methods in the
treatment of domestic complaints, is not popular abroad, and they,
not unreasonably, apprehend that any practical advantages which
the movement might derive from its relations with the Sultan would
be more than counterbalanced by the loss of the moral support of
the Christian nations.
Lastly, even among Dr. Herzl’s own adherents, the men who
year after year gathered from all parts of the world in Basel, drawn
thither by one common desire, there did not reign that degree of
concord which is essential for the success of any enterprise of the
magnitude of the Zionist movement. The proceedings in those
congresses have been described by a Jew of the Occidental school
with a vivacity which need not be less accurate because it is
prompted by candid scepticism. “There,” says the chronicler, “at the
gateway to the playground of more than one continent, the Zionists
met annually to disagree in many languages on the advisability of
setting up Israel among the nations again; and here the descendants
of Abraham proved themselves no longer a race but a fortuitous
concourse of peoples: an exceptionally cosmopolitan and polyglot
multitude. More than that, their differences were accentuated by the
very enthusiasm that had drawn them together. The Zionism of the
English stockbroker and the French boulevardier is different entirely
from the sacred hope which the same word connotes for the rabbi of
Eastern Europe.... The young, up-to-date German student in
University club cap, who looked as if he might have stepped out of
‘Old Heidelberg,’ made no secret of his contempt for the gabardined
and long-curled rabbi. To the latter the cigarette which the student
coolly puffed on the Sabbath was desecration; the non-Jewish meals
in which the student indulged daily were regarded with pious horror
and indignation. Not for this had the other come to Basel, and the
sad-eyed and silent delegate who tramped half-way across Europe
on what he deemed a holy pilgrimage sighed and thought that Israel
was in greater darkness in the centre of its new-born hope than in
the unhappy land of persecution wherein he was suffered to exist.
Nor here did he expect to see the sacred Mosaic ordinances openly
flouted, nor those who had committed the greatest of sins—that of
marrying out of the faith—received with enthusiasm. Intermarriage is
the very antithesis of the Zionistic ideal, and here they were
endeavouring to run hand in hand. Here is the canker which is
gnawing at the hope of the sons of Zion. The Jewish race has
always been held inseparable from the religion of Judaism, and it will
ever remain so. But the old tradition, ‘All Israel are brethren,’ no
longer holds good for all that. Like the Christian, the Jew is now a
member first of the land that gave him birth, or which he adopts, and
a Jew afterwards.”
The writer goes on to comment on the inevitable outcome of this
diversity among the delegates: sections, plotting and counter-plotting
against one another, faction, cabal, personal animus, tumult,
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Babel.
This lack of unanimity will, no doubt, become more and more
pronounced as the movement advances from the purely theoretical
to the practical stage. Let us for a moment picture Israel back in
Palestine. Each community of immigrants, bound together by the ties
of language, habit, and particular home associations, will live in a
separate quarter. They will instinctively cling to their mother tongue
and bring up their children in it. The British Jews will despise their
Polish and Roumanian brethren as ignorant, and will, in their turn, be
despised by them as spurious Jews. The Spanish-speaking
Sephardim will scorn and be scorned by the Yiddish-speaking
Ashkenazim. All the differences, social and national, which underlie
the religious unity of Israel will emerge to the surface. The feeling of
brotherly equality will be superseded by class distinctions and, in one
word, freedom will bring about the disruption which oppression had
checked. Even as it is, the difference between the various sections
of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine is noticeable at every turn.
There is, for instance, a small community, dwelling in a secluded
valley of Northern Galilee and first discovered by Lord Kitchener in
the course of his survey work in Palestine. These are said to be the
remnant of the ancient inhabitants. They speak the tongue of their
Syrian neighbours—an Arabic dialect retaining many elements of
Aramaic—they till the soil as their neighbours do, and, though
scrupulous in the observance of their religion and abstaining from
intermarriage with outsiders, they live on the best of terms with them.
On the other hand, the Jewish immigrants are not only distinct in
dress, dialect, and mode of living from these native Jews, but are
amongst themselves divided by the barrier of language, the Spanish
Jews being utterly unable to understand or to make themselves
understood to their brethren from Northern and Central Europe,
though they all employ the Hebrew characters in writing; and by
manners, the Spanish immigrants, owing to their longer residence in
the country, being more Oriental than the new-comers. The
Sephardim have adopted the Eastern garb and head-dress, and,
besides their Spanish mother-tongue, also speak Arabic. The
Russian and Polish Jews are clad in long flowing gowns of silk or
cloth, and their heads are covered with fur caps. The German Jews
affect the quaint long coat and low wide-awake of the land of their
origin. None of the Ashkenazim are permitted by their Rabbis to
learn Arabic. Their domestic life is that of the Western Judenstadt.
But they all cultivate the long ringlets which the Levitic law
prescribes. Not less marked is their difference in character, “The
Sephardim,” a recent traveller attests, “are tolerant, easy-going, and
sociable. They earn their living largely by manual labour, are fishers
at Tiberias, porters at Jerusalem and Jaffa. The Ashkenazim limit
their activities to traffic, shun work with their hands, are rigid
separatists, sticklers for the observance of the oral law, and
conservative in their Judaism. The Sephardim are stationary in
numbers; the Ashkenazim increase by leaps and bounds. They
constitute the wave of Jewish immigration and stand for the
development of Judaism in Palestine. There are two other sections
of Jews in the country insignificant in number. One comes from
Bokhara, the other from Yemen; the latter are very poor, and follow
the humblest callings. The shoe-blacks of Jerusalem are recruited
from their ranks. These various groups of the Jewish population, one
in race and faith, are so strongly marked off from each other that
313
they may be regarded as diverse nationalities.” Finally, it should
be added that, besides the orthodox Jews, both Chassidim and
Karaites are represented in the population of the country.
Diversity of political ideals will intensify the discord arising from
social, sectarian, and national differences. In the new Jewish
commonwealth, it is to be feared, the old feud between the
Pharisees and the Sadducees will be revived under a new aspect.
The more advanced Jews from the West will be anxious to
administer the country on Western, that is secular, principles. The
Rabbis, with the fanatical populace of Eastern, Polish, and
Roumanian Jews at their back, will insist on establishing on a large
scale that supremacy of the Synagogue which formed the basis of
the ancient Hebrew State, and of the internal constitution of the
Jewish communities whilst in exile. And the Rabbis will be supported
by the traditions of the race. The Jewish catechism distinctly states
that the Law of Moses is only in abeyance, and that “whenever the
Jews return to their own land, and again constitute a state, it will
have full force.” Synagogue and State will thus repeat the struggle
which Church and State waged in Christendom for so many
centuries. And, whichever party won, the result would be almost
equally disastrous. Should the Rabbis succeed in establishing the
Levitical polity the country would, in the opinion of a high authority,
“either pass away through internal chaos or would so offend the
modern political spirit that it would be soon extinguished from
outside. If it were secular, it would not be a Jewish State. The great
bulk of its present supporters would refuse to live in it, and it would
ultimately be abandoned to an outlander population consisting of
314
Hebrew Christians and Christian Millennarians.”
However, be the practical difficulties as serious as they may, so
long as anti-Semitism endures the enthusiasm for Zionism is bound
to endure. Mr. Israel Zangwill, one of the most eminent champions of
the cause in England, has repeatedly expounded the views of his
brother-Zionists. In his address to a meeting in May, 1903, he
declared that “the only solution of the Jewish question was to be
found in a legally-assured home in Palestine.” He pointed to the
recent butchery of the Jews at Kishineff as a proof “that the question
was just where it was in the Middle Ages,” and expressed his
conviction that “the rest of Europe also tended to slide back into the
Dark Ages.” Hence arises the necessity for leaving Europe. Referring
to Baron Hirsch’s emigration scheme, Mr. Zangwill said, “Baron
Hirsch left £2,000,000 for emigration only, and £7,000,000 for
emigration principally. His trustees had reduced emigration to a
minimum. They despaired of emigration. But because colonists in
the Argentine and Canada were a failure, was that a reason for
despair? How dared they despair till they had tried the one land to
315
which the Jew’s heart turned?”
In August of the same year the Zionist Congress met at Basel,
and several interesting details were given concerning the progress of
the movement. It was stated that the number of members had risen
from 120,000 to 320,000, all of whom were directly represented at
the Congress by so-called shekel payments. The Report of the
Committee of Management showed that the year’s receipts
amounted to £9886, that Zionism was on the increase everywhere,
and that the Zionist Colonial Bank in London was already declaring
316
small dividends. This bank, it should be noted, was founded
under the name of Jewish Colonial Trust, with a capital of
£2,000,000 in £1 shares, over £350,000 of which has been
subscribed from among the poorer Jews, with the result that it boasts
no fewer than 135,000 shareholders. In addition to this institution,
two more Jewish National Funds have been started, one of them
known as the Shekel Account. In October of the same year the
Odessa newspapers reported that a number of persons, acting on
behalf of 107 Jews, mostly of the working classes, were taking steps
to effect, through the medium of the Colonial Bank, the purchase of
an immense tract of land in Palestine for the purpose of
317
colonisation. In the Zionist Congress of 1904 there were
represented about 2,500 organisations in various parts of the world.
These facts amply prove that Zionism has stirred a very real
enthusiasm among a vast section of the Jewish race, even though it
has stirred an equally real opposition.
In the meantime the Jewish population of Palestine has been
increasing steadily and rapidly, by immigration chiefly of Ashkenazim
refugees from Central and Northern Europe. In 1872 there were
scarcely 10,000 Jews in the Holy Land; by 1882 they had risen to
20,000; in 1890 there were only 25,000; in 1902 they were estimated
at 60,000—distributed in the various towns of Jaffa, Jerusalem,
Safed, Tiberias, and others. In all these places are to be seen new
Jewish colonies housed in neat white-washed buildings which
stretch in barrack-like lines—the bounty of a Rothschild or a
Montefiore. In addition to these urban colonies, there are numerous
agricultural settlements in Central Judaea, Samaria, and Galilee.
Immigration, stimulated by the persecution to which the Hebrew race
is subjected in Eastern Europe, and facilitated by the construction of
the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, which has now been running for twelve
years, continues, partly under the auspices of the Alliance Israélite
Universelle. This society maintains many schools for boys and girls,
endeavouring to infuse French culture and the new spirit into the
ancient body of Judaism, which in Tiberias especially has always
sought its refuge and its tomb. Besides general instruction, the
pursuits of agriculture and gardening are assiduously encouraged.
From the elementary schools the most promising pupils are sent to
the Professional School of Jerusalem or to the Model Farm of
Mikweh, founded in 1870, whence, at the conclusion of their studies,
the students are placed in the Jewish colonies of Palestine and Syria
as head-gardeners and directors of agriculture, while others are
apprenticed to handicrafts, thus being gradually formed a population
both morally and materially equipped for life’s work under modern
conditions. The agricultural colonies, divided into three groups—
Palestine, Samaria, and Galilee—have helped, it is said, to attach to
the soil some 5000 out of the 60,000 Jews of the country. Other
centres of the same nature are in the course of formation across the
Jordan, towards the Howran range of mountains, where vast tracts
of land were acquired a few years ago, and are slowly reclaimed
from the waste of sand, rock, and marsh by the perseverance and
untiring industry of the Jewish colonists.
But, while dwelling on this bright side of the Zionist movement—
the side of enlightened enterprise—it is well to note another side not
so promising. The recent traveller, already quoted, gives a very
pessimistic account of his impressions. It is to be hoped that his
statements are exaggerated and his pessimism inordinate; but, in
the interests of historic truth, we feel compelled to listen to his tale:
“The Ashkenazim,” he tells us, “preponderate so largely as to swamp
the others. If there is ever a Jewish State, it will be Ashkenazim. The
great mass of them is located in Jerusalem, and the rest in Safed,
Tiberias, and Hebron. Gregarious by instinct, urban by habit, they
herd together in the towns, creating new ghettos similar to those they
have left in Europe. A fraction of them maintain themselves by petty
commerce; the rest live on Haluka, a fund provided by their wealthy
co-religionists in the West. This amounts to £50,000 annually in
Jerusalem. Its object is to enable its recipients to study the Talmud
and engage in religious exercises vicariously for those who
contribute it. Haluka is a fruitful source of sloth and hypocrisy, and
places undue power in the hands of the rabbis who are charged with

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