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i

HUMAN DEPENDENCY AND

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Dependency is a central aspect of human existence, as are depend-

ent care relations: relations between caregivers and young children,
persons with disabilities, or frail elderly persons. In this book,
Sandra Sullivan-​ Dunbar argues that many prominent interpret-
ations of Christian love either obscure dependency and care, or fail
to adequately address injustice in the global social organization of
care. Sullivan-​Dunbar engages a wide-​ranging interdisciplinary con-
versation among Christian ethics, economics, political theory, and
care scholarship, drawing on the rich body of recent feminist work
reintegrating dependency and care into the economic, political, and
moral spheres. She identifies essential elements of a Christian ethic
of love and justice for dependent care relations in a globalized care
economy. She also suggests resources for such an ethic including
Catholic social thought, feminist political ethics of care, disability
and vulnerability studies, and Christian theological accounts of the
divine-​human relation.

Sandra Sullivan-Dunbar is Associate Professor of Christian Ethics at

Loyola University Chicago, where she teaches feminist ethics, social
ethics and sexual ethics. She holds a PhD in Religious Ethics from
the University of Chicago, an MA in Ethics and Social Theory from
the Graduate Theological Union, a Master of Divinity from the Jesuit
School of Theology at Santa Clara University, and a Master of Public
Policy from the University of California at Berkeley.
ii
iii

New Studies in Christian Ethics

General Editor
Robin Gill

Editorial Board
Stephen R. L. Cl ark, Stanley Hauerwas, Robin W. Lovin

Christian ethics has increasingly assumed a central place within academic theology.
At the same time, the growing power and ambiguity of modern science and the
rising dissatisfaction within the social sciences about claims to value neutrality
have prompted renewed interest in ethics within the secular academic world.
There is, therefore, a need for studies in Christian ethics that, as well as being
concerned with the relevance of Christian ethics to the present-​day secular debate,
are well informed about parallel discussions in recent philosophy, science, or social
science. New Studies in Christian Ethics aims to provide books that do this at
the highest intellectual level and demonstrate that Christian ethics can make a
distinctive contribution to this debate –​either in moral substance or in terms of
underlying moral justifications.

Titles published in the series.

1. Rights and Christian Ethics, Kieran Cronin
2. Biblical Interpretation and Christian Ethics, Ian McDonald
3. Power and Christian Ethics, James Mackey
4. Plurality and Christian Ethics, Ian S. Markham
5. Moral Action and Christian Ethics, Jean Porter
6. Responsibility and Christian Ethics, William Schweiker
7. Justice and Christian Ethics, E. Clinton Gardner
8. Feminism and Christian Ethics, Susan Parsons
9. Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, Lisa Sowle Cahill
10. The Environment and Christian Ethics, Michael Northcott
11. Concepts of Person and Christian Ethics, Stanley Rudman
12. Priorities and Christian Ethics, Garth Hallett
13. Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics, David Fergusson

(continued after the index)

iv
v

HUMAN DEPENDENCY
AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS

S A N D R A S U L L I VA N -​D U N B A R
Loyola University Chicago
vi

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

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Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/​9781107168893
doi: 10.1017/​9781316717677
© Sandra Sullivan-​Dunbar 2017
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2017
Printed in the United States of America by Sheridan Books, Inc.
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data
Names: Sullivan-Dunbar, Sandra, author.
Title: Human dependency and Christian ethics / Sandra Sullivan-Dunbar.
Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge
University Press, [2017] | Series: New studies in Christian ethics |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017034301 | ISBN 9781107168893 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781316619773 (pbk.)
Subjects: LCSH: Christian ethics. | Caring – Religious aspects – Christianity. |
Helping behavior – Religious aspects – Christianity.
Classification: LCC BJ1275.S855 2017 | DDC 241–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017034301
ISBN 978-​1-​107-​16889-​3 Hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of URLs for external or third-​party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
vii

Contents

Acknowledgments page ix

1 Human Dependency, Justice, and Christian Love 1

2 The Marginalization of Dependency and Care
in Political Theory 27
3 Economics and the Erasure of the Care Economy 52
4 Sacrificial Models of Christian Love: Distortions of Need,
Nature, and Justice 77
5 Agape as Equal Regard: Importing Moral Boundaries into
Christian Ethics 114
6 Contemporary Retrievals of Thomistic Accounts of Love
and Justice 148
7 Elements of Justice for a Dependent Care Ethic 186
8 Resources for a Conception of Justice Within a
Dependent Care Ethic 195

Select Bibliography 233

Index 241

vii
viii
ix

Acknowledgments

I could not have written this book without many kinds of support from
many different institutions and people. It is delightful, and pleasantly sur-
real, to finally be able to commit my thanks to paper for publication.
Some portions of this book began as parts of my dissertation. Though
he may be as happy as I am that the work has evolved a great deal since that
time, I am very grateful to my director, William Schweiker, who guided me
through that process. As I have continued to shape the manuscript in the
years since receiving my doctorate, I have often heard his voice in my head,
offering feedback. Sometimes the voice has appeared when, after grappling
with the material for some time, I saw a weakness he had pointed to long
ago, and thought, “Oh, no wonder Bill thought this needed correction!”
My education continues as I grow into my vocation, as does his influence.
Many other academic mentors helped this book come to fruition. I am
deeply grateful to Kathryn Tanner, who served on my dissertation com-
mittee, saw promise, and provided encouragement. Cristina Traina has
been a mentor now for many years and has provided advice and support
first in navigating my doctoral program and then through the process of
bringing my book to publication. As Chair of the Theology Department
at Loyola University Chicago, Susan Ross helped me to navigate my pre-
tenure years; she was a dedicated advocate for junior faculty and provided
a supportive ear. All three of these women provided invaluable affirmation
and critical feedback on my work as well. My debt to them is immense and
I will try to pay it forward.
I’ve been fortunate to receive feedback, critique, and mentorship as well
from members of the Society of Christian Ethics, including particularly
Barbara Hilkert Andolsen, Mary Jo Iozzio, Julie Hanlon Rubio, Patti Jung,
and several anonymous reviewers of conference presentations that have
worked their way into this book.
My friends and colleagues, Aana Vigen, Tisha Rajendra, and Devorah
Schoenfeld, have commiserated, critiqued, and supported me in countless
ix
x

x Acknowledgments
ways. And indeed, I am grateful to my entire department. I am very lucky
to have landed in an institution that feels like a true professional home
and to teach Loyola students, who are hardworking, appreciative of their
education, and deeply committed to social justice.
I am happy to publicly thank the American Association of University
Women, who awarded me an American Postdoctoral Research Fellowship
for the academic year 2014–​2015. I am grateful for the support of Loyola
University Chicago for granting me a semester’s research leave in 2011,
followed by a subvented leave during my American Association of
University Women (AAUW) fellowship year; without this support, com-
pletion of the book would have been difficult. I am also grateful for
financial support received during the early (dissertation) stage of writing,
as a Fellow of the Martin Marty Center at the University of Chicago,
and then as the recipient of a Dissertation Fellowship from the Louisville
Institute.
Mary Ellen O’Driscoll received many phone calls when I was not sure
I would be finishing a book. She was quite sure I would be, and her cer-
tainty allowed me to keep at it. I treasure her friendship.
This book reflects as well the academic formation I received at the Jesuit
School of Theology at Santa Clara University; the Graduate Theological
Union; and the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of
California at Berkeley. My teaching, writing, and thinking are still influ-
enced by faculty at these institutions, including particularly William
O’Neill, S.J.; Karen Lebacqz; Martha Ellen Stortz; John Donahue, S.J.;
Lee Friedman; and David Kirp.
The book has been made much better by the very thoughtful feed-
back I have received from the anonymous reviewers commissioned by
Cambridge University Press. My editor at Cambridge, Beatrice Rehl, has
been invaluable in helping me navigate the book review and production
process for the first time. Sara Wilhelm Garbers has provided outstanding
and detail-​oriented bibliographical and production assistance.
I would be remiss, in a book on dependent care relations, if I did not
acknowledge the deeply skilled and loving care my children received from
others while I studied and wrote. I especially thank Sahana Ward, Joanna
Spilioti, Catherine Scheib, Jayme Gualtier, and Sarah Hajduk Woltmann.
I am grateful to my parents, Richard Sullivan and Judith Haines
Sullivan, who provided the care that allowed me to grow into a parent,
professor, and now writer of a book. They are my unfailing cheerleaders.
They have provided support both emotional and financial, and thereby
made my academic career possible.
newgenprepdf

xi

Acknowledgments xi
Finally, and most pervasively, I am grateful to my husband, Don Dunbar,
who made it possible for me to do this work while co-​parenting our two
sons. He models for them deep paternal engagement in caregiving respon-
sibility. And I am thankful as well to my boys, Ian and Cullen, without
whom I would not likely be writing on this subject in this way. They are
delightful human beings, patient with their academic mother, and I know
they will work to make the world a place that is more hospitable to care
and just to its caregivers.
xii
1

Ch apter 1

Human Dependency, Justice, and Christian Love

Dependency is a central aspect of human existence. We begin life ensconced

within and dependent upon the body of another human person, using
her body as a source of nutrients, oxygen, warmth, and space. When we
emerge into the world as a separate body, we remain utterly dependent
upon other human beings to feed us, to keep us warm, to hold us, to talk
to and socialize us, to protect us from harm. We are bodily dependent
again when we are sick, or when we are disabled, and if we live to old age,
we are often dependent on others in the frailty of our final years. And at
those points in our lives when we seem most autonomous, we nevertheless
remain deeply dependent on others in countless ways that we often fail to
acknowledge.
Because dependency is central to human existence, so are relations
of dependent care: relations between caregivers and small children, per-
sons with disabilities (permanent or temporary), or frail elderly persons.
In fact, such relations take up the bulk of human moral effort, and they
are deeply complex. However, as feminist theorists in various fields have
shown, much recent Western thought reflects a marginalization of human
dependency and dependent care.1 In keeping with the modern valuation

1
In economics, see, for example, Nancy Folbre, The Invisible Heart: Economics and Family Values
(New York: New Press, 2001), and Valuing Children: Rethinking the Economics of the Family
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); in political science, Mona Harrington, Care
and Equality: Inventing a New Family Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000); among legal theo-
rists, Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New York: New
Press, 2004), and Joan C. Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Work and Family Conflict and What
to Do About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); in political philosophy, Eva Feder
Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency (New York: Routledge, 1999);
Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument
for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993), and Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and
Justice (New York: New York University Press, 2013); in sociology, Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie
Russell Hochschild, eds., Global Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002).

1
2

2 Human Dependency and Christian Ethics

of human equality, choice, and self-​governance, emphasis has turned to
human autonomy, not human dependency. The human person has been
envisioned as a fully mature individual able to freely contract with other
fully mature individuals. This conceptual marginalization of dependency is
reflected in many economic and social structures, so that dependents and
their caregivers suffer injustice. Much dependent care is sequestered in the
sharply privatized family, now seen as separate and qualitatively different
from the economic and political sectors of human life. Care is provided
with little political and economic support, and assigned to persons with
less social power.
In this book, I argue that much recent Christian ethics, like much mod-
ern and contemporary Western philosophy, social theory, and political
theory, has failed to adequately address our human dependency. Similarly,
dependent care relations have largely been marginalized and rendered prob-
lematic in recent understandings of Christian love. Equality is a crucial
value, and Christian theology has long asserted the equality of all human
persons before God –​offering a stronger basis for such equality than secu-
lar bases such as rationality and autonomy. Notions of equality have been
responsible for many social developments that we hold dear, including
the expansion of basic economic and political rights to propertyless men,
women, and persons of color, and the abolition of many forms of slav-
ery. The link between equality and autonomy is somewhat problematic,
however, because our dependency is also part of the human condition.
These two realities, dependency and equality, stand in a paradoxical ten-
sion, because when we are dependent on another, there are important ways
in which we are not equal to that other, and many groups of persons have
had their dependency exaggerated and enforced precisely to exclude them
from equality and autonomy. But in creating more egalitarian social struc-
tures, we must continue to account for that dependency that is intrinsic
to human life, or else we will undercut the very equality we seek. I argue,
therefore, that we must acknowledge the centrality of dependency in our
theological anthropologies, our understandings of Christian love, and our
conceptions of the relation between Christian love and justice. In other
words, Christian theological ethics must integrate human equality with
human dependency.
The marginalization of dependency within Christian ethics is an injust-
ice to those who engage in the moral work of dependent care on a daily
basis. It devalues their labor in moral terms and reinforces the polit-
ical and economic devaluation of this work. But the marginalization of
human dependency and relations of dependent care is also problematic
3

Human Dependency, Justice, and Christian Love 3

for the substance of Christian love theologies. These relations are a focal
point for engaging a number of foundational issues in Christian ethics.
First, questions about the role of nature –​our human nature, and the
natural world around us –​are particularly relevant in light of depend-
ent care relations. In terms of human nature, Christian theologians offer
markedly different understandings of the moral status of our own natural
inclinations and desires and our efforts to satisfy them. Are our natural
inclinations a source of moral wisdom for human persons, as understood
by Roman Catholic natural law theories drawing (in various ways) on the
heritage of Thomas Aquinas? Or, is human nature so fallen that Christian
love is defined by its radical difference from our “natural” way of loving,
as for Anders Nygren or Soren Kierkegaard, for example? What are the
implications of either stance for the love and devotion we may be inclined
to shower on our dependents, whether they be our children, parents, or
clients? Thinking in terms of dependent care relations also re-​centers
inquiry from the goodness or selfishness of our own inclinations to the
moral valence of the inclinations of others. After all, these relations are
intended to support others in meeting basic biological needs and fulfilling
basic biological inclinations –​most notably, the inclination to persist in
being, to survive.
The work of care also draws us into the gifts, conflicts, and tragedies of
the natural world. Caregivers harness nature’s resources to promote the
survival and flourishing of the objects of their care. They offer other liv-
ing things, plants and animals, as food. They learn to facilitate the body’s
own healing processes and to foster natural developmental pathways.
They battle against viruses, injuries, and natural disasters. They shelter
their dependents within homes built from organic and inorganic materi-
als in the world around them. They make claims on moderately scarce
natural resources available to meet basic human needs. As we shall see,
many Christian ethicists take an overly simplified approach to the moral
implications of natural processes. Consideration of dependent care rela-
tions calls for a nuanced consideration of the moral implications of our
entrenchment in the natural world.
The negotiation of natural scarcity raises a second arena within
Christian ethics that takes on new dimensions in light of dependent care
relations: what is the relation between love and justice? Some Christian
ethicists see justice as sharply distinct from Christian love. For these think-
ers, justice seeks its own, and demands its desert through merit or con-
tract. Love, in contrast, does not think of itself and rises far beyond the
demands of justice in its self-​giving. Other Christian ethicists see justice
4

4 Human Dependency and Christian Ethics

as a virtue of individual persons and do not give sufficient attention to the
structures of injustice within which these virtuous individuals make their
moral choices. Most contemporary Christian love theologians do not con-
sider the relationship between love and distributive justice, although they
may consider distributive justice separately from their discussions of love.
From the perspective of dependent care relations, this omission is deeply
problematic. Dependent caregivers do their work within unjust social, pol-
itical, and economic structures, and their relative privilege or marginaliza-
tion within these structures profoundly affects their capacity to meet their
caring obligations. They require resources such as food, housing, health
care, and labor time to provide this care. Justice helps to enable the love
expressed through dependent care relations, and injustice can hinder such
care or even make it impossible.
In much recent Christian love ethics, the question of distributive jus-
tice has been subsumed under the question of “special relations,” or rela-
tions with kin, friends, colleagues, or other persons to whom we have a
particular, intensive bond. As outlined by Gene Outka in his 1971 work,
Agape: An Ethical Analysis, “special relations” are constituted by prefer-
ence, whereas agape is constituted by abstention from preference: we love
someone regardless of whether they are attractive to us or can make a
return on our love.2 The moral problem then becomes one of allocating
our love among preferential and nonpreferential relations, with any deci-
sion to favor our preferential relations requiring a special form of moral
justification outside of the scope of agape. Special relations are important,
and yet they are also dangerous distractions from disinterested, universal
agape. In other words, the distributive problem is seen solely in terms of
the free choices of the individual as she allocates her moral energies among
people she enjoys and people she does not. The problem of exclusion from
care and community is not located within social and economic structures
but is transferred to the will of the moral agent; it is not seen in terms
of distribution of the concrete goods required to foster another human
being’s survival and flourishing, nor is it understood in terms of the allo-
cation of one’s limited time and energy among potential recipients of the
labor of care. In this book, I challenge such a formulation and argue that
a Christian theology of love adequate to encompass dependent care rela-
tions must understand love (particularly the element of care provision) as
interdependent with justice.

2
Gene Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972).
5

Human Dependency, Justice, and Christian Love 5

An analysis of Christian love in terms of dependency and care is made
more urgent by the contemporary phenomenon of “global care chains.”
This term, coined by Arlie Russell Hochschild, refers to “a series of personal
links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work
of caring.”3 About half of the world’s 232 million international migrants
are women, and of these, an increasing number are migrating on their
own (not as a part of family units) in order to serve as child care workers,
cleaners, home care aides, and health care workers, or in long-​term care,
both in domestic and institutional settings.4 Many of these women leave
behind their own children or elderly parents in the care of other family
members, neighbors, or even orphanages. In other words, care-giving labor
is effectively extracted from many less-​developed countries and imported
to more-​developed countries, in what Hochschild has dubbed a “global
heart transplant.”5 And some forms of needed care are simply not avail-
able at all: the migration of health care workers has significant detrimen-
tal impacts on a range of key health care indicators in sending countries,
many of which have disproportionate health care needs.6
This phenomenon confounds the paradigm used in so many recent
Christian love theologies that contrast universal, inclusive concern with
particular loves or pit the distant stranger against concern for those near
and dear to us. The globalization of the social organization of care means
that the problem that vexed the moderns –​the problem of our moral
obligations to distant persons with whom we share humanity and inter-
act in impersonal ways –​has turned in on itself, as that distant person
may now be living in our home and changing our children’s diapers (or
our own). We cannot discern the moral requirements of this situation
in terms of abstract universals, but neither can we draw upon a com-
munitarian focus on a shared vision of the good. This is because some
participants in the relevant moral relationships will not be part of our
community, but will be thousands of miles away, missing their mother,
or caring for the children of our nanny or home health care worker. They
will be living out ways of life that embody deep cultural, economic and
political differences from our own, and yet are profoundly impacted by

3
Arlie Russell Hochschild, “Global Care Chains and Emotional Surplus Value,” in eds. W. Hutton
and A. Giddens, On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism” (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000), 131.
4
Nicola Yeates, “Global Care Chains: A State-​of-​the-​Art Review and Future Directions in Care
Transnationalization Research,” Global Networks 12, no. 1 (2012), 139.
5
Arlie Russell Hochschild, “Love and Gold,” in Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 22.
6
Lisa Eckenwiler, “Care-​ worker Migration, Global Health Equity, and Ethical Place-​ making,”
Women’s Studies International Forum 47 (2014), 213–​222.
6

6 Human Dependency and Christian Ethics

our own way of life. A contemporary Christian ethic of dependent care
relations must include a conception of love that can encompass care,
and must integrate Christian love with a conception of justice that is
adequate to address this globalization of caregiving relations, this “global
heart transplant.”
There are multiple terms for (and some would say multiple forms of )
Christian love: agape, eros, philia. In this book, I focus primarily on
aspects of love most often captured by the word “agape,” while recogniz-
ing that not every thinker means the same thing by this word. In general,
though, agape connotes a steady other-​regard that often comes at some
cost to the self and is open to inclusion of all human persons (even if the
individual Christian cannot personally show love to all human persons).
Caregiving involves such other-​regard and cost to the self, even when it is
deeply rewarding. One of my primary concerns is the recognition of this
sacrifice in caregiving relations, and the integration of justice with care
such that this sacrifice, necessary to the continuation of human life itself,
is not disproportionately assigned to certain groups to their severe detri-
ment. I am also concerned that care be recognized more fully as moral
work. Put differently, I focus more on love as the sort of active benevo-
lence highlighted in the parable of the Good Samaritan than on love as the
spiritual communion highlighted in the Johannine literature. Dependent
care is also frequently rewarding, and the love that emerges in dependent
care relations can express the sort of deep, spiritual, affective, affirming,
mutual, and erotic aspects that are highlighted by many Christian think-
ers. I do not deny the importance of these dimensions of Christian love,
but my primary focus is elsewhere. The justice I seek in dependent care
relations can, in fact, make precisely this sort of rich, rewarding connec-
tion possible.

Christian Love as Inclusive, Extravagant Care

I will not develop a comprehensive or systematic account of Christian love
in this book. Rather, I affirm that any adequate account of Christian love
must be able to incorporate relations of dependent care. This is true because
of the centrality of such relations in human life, and because Jesus’s own
account of Christian love, offered in the parable of the Good Samaritan,
highlights caregiving. I will assess major schools of thought on Christian
love, asking how well they can account for dependency and care. This will
reveal certain characteristics that must be encompassed by any adequate
account of Christian love, of justice, and of the relation between love and
7

Human Dependency, Justice, and Christian Love 7

justice if these accounts are to inform a Christian ethic of dependent care
relations.
The parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus’s own explication of the
meaning of Christian neighbor-​love, would have been shocking to listen-
ers in two primary respects.7 One shocking element involves the identity
of both the man who fell among thieves and the one who helped him. We
have no way of knowing who, exactly, the unfortunate man is; he is naked,
which leaves him “without the signs of either nationality or social status.”8
In contrast, the identity of the helper is both known and thoroughly sur-
prising –​the one who helps is a Samaritan, a group viewed with great
contempt among Palestinian Jews in Jesus’s time. This aspect of the parable
lends itself to interpretations of Christian love that support inclusivity or
universality, in the sense of unwillingness to exclude any human person,
even a complete stranger or a member of a despised group. The Samaritan
reaches out to one who is anonymous and could well be an enemy; Jesus’s
hearers are invited to imagine the actions of their own enemy as a para-
digm of neighbor-​love.
The second shocking element of the parable is the sheer extravagance
of the care bestowed by the Good Samaritan on the unfortunate trave-
ler. Such intensive care, calling forth gifts of time, energy, and resources,
attending to the very particular needs of the individual recipient, is most
often exemplified in the arena dubbed “special relations” by many recent
Christian ethicists, because these relations often demand such intensive
care. That is, we generally bestow this kind of care on our children, parents,
or friends. We might recall the oft-​noted transformation that Jesus makes
to the question posed to him by his interlocutor. He is asked, “Who is my
neighbor?” and he responds with the parable and a question: “Whom do
you think proved neighbor to the man?” Jesus directs attention away from
the object of love to the subject of love and the content of love –​in effect,
he asks, what does it mean to prove neighbor? The answer is clear: attend-
ing to stark human need.
Many recent treatments of Christian love focus primarily on the inclu-
sive nature of love exemplified by the identities of the giver and the receiver
in the Good Samaritan parable. Such an interpretive emphasis would seem
to reflect certain characteristically modern (and profoundly important)
preoccupations, including the problem of our moral obligations to per-
sons outside of our direct circle of concern or those whom we will never

7
See Luke 10:25–​37.
8
John R. Donahue, S.J., The Gospel in Parable (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press: 1990), 130.
8

8 Human Dependency and Christian Ethics

meet. However, an exclusive emphasis on the universalist dimension of
agape renders problematic the second aspect of the parable, the intensity
and extravagance of the Good Samaritan’s care, which reflects the love
expressed within dependent care relations. As several commentators have
noted, the Good Samaritan could not have offered such extravagant care
to every person he encountered.9
I argue that an adequate Christian feminist conception of agape, one
that encompasses relations of dependent care, must incorporate both the
universally inclusive scope and the extravagant nature of the care offered
by the Good Samaritan. All persons are entitled to necessary care, and
the care required for human persons to survive is extravagant care. We are
deeply needy. Therefore, to meet both the inclusivity and the extravagance
of Christian neighbor-​love, agape must be not only a foundational ques-
tion in personal ethics; it must also be a social ethic. Once we focus on
fulfillment of human need, it becomes clear that no individual agent can
love universally; meeting the universal needs of human beings for care
requires a collective, social, political, and institutional approach. To the
extent that agape is focused on providing the scarce resources of time,
energy, and material goods necessary to give care to a dependent human
being, it is enabled or obstructed by social, economic, and political institu-
tions and policies governing the allocation of such resources. In this book,
then, I will focus sharply on agape as a matter of social justice. This focus
recognizes and honors the moral contributions of caregivers as the basic
elements of a collective effort to ensure the dignity and well-​being of every
human person, rather than casting these care relations as distractions from
a universal love.
In my focus on Christian love as action in response to need, reaching
out inclusively to friends, strangers, and enemies, I highlight some particu-
lar concerns of recent Protestant love ethics. At the same time, I advocate a
more Roman Catholic emphasis on the social nature of the human person
and our existence in a prevoluntary web of communal relationships that,
in part, define our particular moral obligations, and a Roman Catholic
emphasis on the integration of love and justice. As we shall see, I argue that

9
Gilbert Meilaender asserts that because of our inherent finitude and commitments to friends and
family, a love like that shown by the Good Samaritan is “not a love fitted for society,” though this
makes it no less required of us. Gilbert Meilaender, Friendship: A Study in Theological Ethics (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 34. Sally Purvis notes that the Good Samaritan
would not have the resources to provide this extravagant love to every person he encounters. Sally B.
Purvis, “Mothers, Neighbors and Strangers: Another Look at Agape,” Journal of Feminist Studies in
Religion 7, no. 1 (Spring 1991), 32n31.
9

Human Dependency, Justice, and Christian Love 9

a theology of love that addresses dependent care relations cannot denigrate
nature to the degree that many Protestant love theologies have done, and
yet it cannot rely uncritically on nature for moral wisdom to the degree
that Roman Catholic love theologies have often done.
In sum, my goals in this book are threefold. First, I set out to demon-
strate an inadequacy in many recent accounts of Christian love: they do
not adequately account for relations of dependent care. Second, I aim to
reveal some of the theological distortions introduced by the theoretical
avoidance of dependency. Third, I elucidate some necessary parameters for
conceptions of love and of justice that would be adequate to underwrite a
Christian ethic of dependent care relations. In pursuit of these goals, the
book develops a critical dialogue between recent Christian theologies of
love, feminist economics, feminist political theory, and feminist political
ethics of care. For the latter, the qualifier “political” is crucial. Most femin-
ist care thinkers have moved well beyond Carol Gilligan’s dyadic, gendered
account of two internal, psychological moral orientations,10 to propose
an integrated account of love and justice, one that should be instantiated
in concrete social, political, and economic structures that organize care
relations. This necessary movement has not yet occurred within Christian
ethics.
I wager that the dialogue between Christian ethics and these feminist
disciplines can bring important insights to both conversations. Feminist
political and economic theory helps to reveal systematic connections
between the work of care and social and political structures, and thus
between dependency and equality, love and justice, personal ethics and
social ethics. At the same time, however, the question of the integration of
equality and dependency may not be resolvable, at the most foundational
level, within the parameters of secular feminist theory. In these secular
feminist literatures, the integration of equality and dependency is treated
as a political problem. But ultimately, the question of how we can be pro-
foundly dependent creatures, and yet invested with a fundamental equality
and dignity, is also a Christian theological question. Christian theology
provides a way to affirm that we can, in fact, be dependent (on God and on
each other) and equal (because loved and endowed with dignity by God)
at the same time.
The work of dependent care has primarily, though certainly not exclu-
sively, accrued to women. Women are the primary caretakers of young

10
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
10

10 Human Dependency and Christian Ethics

children and of aging parents; they represent the bulk of those who pro-
vide basic, bodily care (as opposed to highly specialized and technological
care) in health care settings; and they are the majority of home health
care workers aiding the disabled. Within the broad category of “women,”
women of color, poor women, and immigrant women provide even more
care and often under more exploitative conditions than do more privi-
leged women. Accordingly, the critique of recent Christian love ethics that
I undertake here is a feminist critique, and I strive for attentiveness to
the many dynamics of marginalization and exploitation in dependent care
relations, including dynamics of race, class, nationality, and immigration
status.

A Framework for Integration: Four Forms of Equality

As I have framed my project as an integration of human equality and
human dependency within Christian theologies of love and justice, let me
say more about what I mean by “equality” and what I mean by “depend-
ency.” Four interrelated notions of equality can be seen operating in the
debate within Christian ethics, in Western political thought, and in recent
feminist revisions to the Western political tradition. Often, these levels of
equality are not clearly distinguished by classical or contemporary think-
ers. On one level, we find assertions of a moral equality pertaining to all
human persons. This equality may be grounded in different ways by dif-
ferent thinkers: in theological terms, because we are all equally created by
God; in terms of human rationality, which can be grounded either theo-
logically (as in Thomas Aquinas or, arguably, Immanuel Kant) or philo-
sophically (certainly in Kant); or, in some recent thought, in other features
of our humanity such as our relationality (Eva Feder Kittay)11 and our vul-
nerability (Martha Fineman).12 In contemporary discourse (including dis-
course about both Christian love and justice), the notion of moral equality
is also frequently linked to the term “universal”: equality is something that
each and every person possesses, based on some universal human charac-
teristic, such as human rationality or relation to God.
This moral equality grounds each person’s claim to the second and
third sorts of equality. The second form is equality as autonomy. In much
Western thought, “equality” has been conceived of largely as liberation

11
Kittay, Love’s Labor, especially pages 23–​26, 68–​71.
12
Martha Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State,” Emory Law Journal 60 (2011),
251–​75.
11

Human Dependency, Justice, and Christian Love 11

from hierarchical power structures based on inherited status, and thus as
the ability to make certain choices about the shape of one’s life, which,
over several centuries, gradually became more widely available –​choices
about marriage partner, economic vocation, and political leadership, for
example. Notions of equality as autonomy have often been constructed
through evasion of the implications of long periods of dependency that
human persons experience on the way to partial autonomy, and sometimes
after partial autonomy. Social contract thought, for example, posited the
origins of political society in the free choice of already mature individuals
capable of entering into agreements in their own self-​interest. For John
Locke, the connection between freedom and equality was very explicit in
his definition of the state of nature as
a state of perfect freedom (of persons) to order their actions, and dispose
of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of
the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any
other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another.13
Even Hobbes, for whom the sole purpose of the social contract between
equal persons in the state of nature was to exchange autonomy for total
obedience to a sovereign in return for protection, had to understand per-
sons as first equal and autonomous in order to make the contract.14 In sum,
equality, universality, and autonomy are deeply linked concepts in much
modern thought.
The third kind of equality is a claim to the universal fulfillment of cer-
tain basic material and emotional needs, needs that are simply part of the
human condition, needs that must be fulfilled in order for each of us to
survive and enjoy a very basic level of well-​being. The third form of equal-
ity is instantiated through the fulfillment of these basic human needs. Thus
this form of equality is one that responds to the dependency that I will
discuss shortly.
A complex relationship exists among these three forms of equality. The
second and third types of equality –​equality as autonomy and equality
as the right to have our basic needs met –​stand in a relation of inter-
dependence and tension with each other. Equality as the fulfillment of
basic human needs is a practical prerequisite to our enjoyment of equality

13
John Locke, “Second Treatise, or An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil
Government, par. 4, in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1967), 287.
14
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin Classics 1985 [1651]), 183–​217.
12

12 Human Dependency and Christian Ethics

as autonomy; we cannot easily represent ourselves in the political sphere
or make choices in the economic sphere if we are starving to death. At
the same time, however, our very neediness seems a contradiction of our
autonomy. Furthermore, because it is costly to provide for each and every
person’s basic needs, the claim to this sort of equality encounters resist-
ance, or it is simply ignored. This is particularly true when an individ-
ual requires significant resources of time, energy, and material goods to
achieve basic well-​being, as in the case of young children or the severely
disabled. Thus, the claim to equality at the level of basic human well-​
being must also be grounded in an account of the first kind of equality,
our moral equality, in order to have any practical effect. If we are all
equally possessed of a basic human dignity, of personhood, we can make
claims on scarce communal resources necessary to provide for our basic
well-​being. If we have no such basic dignity, it is easy to argue that fulfill-
ing our needs places too great a burden on our family, community, and
society. Likewise, claims to practical instantiation of the second form of
equality –​the right to political, economic, and personal autonomy –​must
also be grounded in a notion of our moral equality. Appeals to this moral
equality have been instrumental in the expansion of rights to political
and economic autonomy for women and people of color, for example.
At the same time, some thinkers (Kant is a prime example) locate our
moral equality precisely in our capacity for autonomy. This means that
our claim to equality of basic need fulfillment is ultimately also grounded
in our capacity for autonomy, yet this capacity, as we have seen, stands in
tension with our neediness.
A Christian ethic of dependent relations must find a way to integrate
these first three forms of equality. This integration is a challenging task,
because the first three forms of equality depend on one another in some
respects and constrain one another in other respects. As we shall see in
the coming chapters, disinterested and sacrificial accounts of Christian
love tend to highlight equality as autonomy and moral equality, while
failing to address equality of basic need fulfillment; recent reclama-
tions of the Thomistic understanding of Christian love as an affective
union do not adequately account for equality as autonomy; and secular
feminist political ethics of care do not offer a robust grounding of our
moral equality.
A fourth form of equality –​equality of power –​is more ambiguous; it
is worth striving toward, but is not fully achievable, and we must acknow-
ledge its elusiveness to neutralize the negative impact of power differentials.
This form of equality was of central importance to some Enlightenment
13

Human Dependency, Justice, and Christian Love 13

thinkers, who assumed it as a foundation of their theories, rather than
casting it as a project or goal. For Thomas Hobbes, our rough equality of
power was the reason the state of nature is also a state of unceasing war: no
one is strong enough to decisively dominate anyone else; hence, persons
must make an agreement to be dominated and protected by a single ruler.
As we shall see, Hobbes needs to effectively erase childhood to tell this
story about the origins of political authority. Rousseau emphasizes that
persons in the state of nature are capable of self-​governance very early in
life; parents spend very little time caring for their children.15 David Hume
does not erase childhood to pretend that we are all naturally equal, but
justice, which for him is based in utility, can only apply to rough equals.
He explicitly excludes from the scope of justice creatures who are so much
weaker that they are easily dominated.16
Equality of power is an important project and goal, to the extent it is
achievable (and this extent is a complex and contested question). Many
forms of dependent care seek, among other goals, to foster increased agency
in the person cared for, and thus to equalize power as far as possible. In
addition, because the social organization of care is a locus of inequality
and exploitation, it is important to try to equalize power among persons
holding different social positions with respect to responsibility for care.
On the other hand, full equality of power is not possible, precisely because
dependency is such a pervasive reality in human life. To the extent that
inequalities of power are built into the human condition and inevitable, a
Christian ethic should seek to neutralize their impact. Children, persons
with disabilities, and the frail elderly are to be fully incorporated into the
community and the scope of justice, even though they cannot negotiate
from a place of equal power.
With respect the different traditions of thought about love and care
examined in this book, each emphasizes two of the first three forms of
equality, while failing to address the importance, implications and chal-
lenges of the third form. Therefore, none manages to fully integrate the
first three forms of equality. As we shall see, disinterested and sacrificial
accounts of Christian love tend to highlight equality as autonomy and
moral equality, while failing to address equality of basic need fulfillment;
recent reclamations of the Thomistic understanding of Christian love as an

15
Jean-​Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, tr. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1992 [1755]).
16
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in Hume: Moral and Political
Philosophy, ed. Henry D. Aiken (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1948 [1751]), 185–​201.
14

14 Human Dependency and Christian Ethics

affective union do not adequately account for equality as autonomy; and
secular feminist political ethics of care do not offer a robust grounding of
our moral equality.
What I mean by “dependency” also requires further elucidation. I will
focus most sharply on dependency as the need for care and assistance
from other persons to survive and achieve basic well-​being, and thus to
achieve the third form of equality that I have discussed. Dependency can
be very stark; an infant, for example, will die very quickly if a caregiver
does not provide nutrition, hydration, shelter, and physical touch. At the
same time, however, even mature, fully abled adults are still profoundly
dependent. We are dependent, for example, on government institu-
tions to ensure order and provide protection; on economic institutions
to deliver those goods that we are not able to provide for ourselves in
a modern, specialized, industrialized world; and on employers to give
us a role in production within this highly developed economy. We are
also dependent in ways that are not as clearly material. For example,
we all need others for companionship and emotional support; children
especially require strong, reliable affective bonds in order to survive and
flourish.
Those dependencies that are mediated through complex social and eco-
nomic systems are instantiations of our more basic dependencies. Even if
we buy frozen dinners at the grocery store, with money we earned working
in a white-​collar profession, and cook them in the microwave, we are still
dependent on others (our employer, the manufacturer of kitchen appli-
ances, the grocery store shelf stocker and cashier, and the frozen food com-
pany) to meet our nutritional needs. But these complex forms of social
interdependence are less visible as dependencies, and strategies to fill needs
through the market are often considered more dignified than the more
direct fulfillment of basic needs. I frequently emphasize those dependen-
cies that require direct, hands-​on care from another human person, which
are necessary for survival, and which a person simply cannot provide for
herself (for example, because she is an infant or very ill), to demonstrate
more clearly how dependency is often overlooked in Christian ethical the-
ory. However, I will attempt to reveal more complex interdependencies
in arenas in which we often see ourselves as autonomous, for example, as
we make consumer choices or decisions about employment. These latter
choices, which involve a complex interplay of our dependence and auton-
omy, have come to be perceived as more purely autonomous as society has
become more complex, while the conceptual realm of “dependency” has
altered and been stigmatized.
15

Human Dependency, Justice, and Christian Love 15

Care and the Exercise of Complex Moral Agency

In the coming chapters, we will see political theorists, economists, and
theologians either failing to address dependency and care relations at all or
describing these relations in extremely simplified terms. In contrast, I will
argue that relations between caregivers and dependents involve complex
and challenging moral dynamics. Caregiving calls upon the capacity for
deep respect for the agency of dependents, combined with the ability to
shape the thoughts and behaviors of others, patience and persistence, well-​
formed emotions, sophisticated psychological insight, physical stamina,
language and communication skills, the capacity to quickly survey and
assess complex situations, self-​knowledge, the capacity to ask for and to
grant forgiveness, profound investment combined with a certain detach-
ment from outcomes, humor, and the capacity for joy. When dependency
and care are marginalized within a theory, the complexity of caregiving rela-
tions is also obscured, and the theory itself is distorted. Conversely, a desire
for theoretical simplification is one reason why dependency is obscured in
the first place. We need to confront the complexity, however, not only to
have better theories, but to adequately support and value the real persons
who wrestle with that complexity in their daily lived experience.
The complexity of caregiving arises, in part, from the fact that depend-
ents are also moral agents. Autonomy and dependency are not mutually
exclusive. As Cristina Traina has pointed out, “from a very early age, chil-
dren are always and already deeply morally implicated and engaged in the
ambiguous world around them.”17 Just as there are no purely autonomous
human beings –​our autonomy is always conditioned, shaped, and con-
strained –​so even in our most dependent phases of life, we find ways to
express our desires and achieve our ends. Parenting in particular requires
a difficult balance between respecting the desires and agency of depend-
ent children, squelching those ends that threaten the child’s survival or
harm to others, helping to shape our children’s sense of the good, engag-
ing and shaping the social context that presents the moral challenges they
must navigate, and knowing when to step back and allow children’s sense
of moral autonomy to guide them without our interference. We can see
similar dynamics occurring in relations between adults and their aging par-
ents, whose own history of lived moral agency, including their history of
caregiving, adds a dimension to the respect for agency due to any human

17
Cristina Traina, “Children and Moral Agency,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 29, no. 2
(2009), 20.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
sana intencion y que no sea dado
á mi hacer bastante informacion
de lo verdadero para evitar la
idolatria; pecan los principes que
lo consienten por sus particulares
intereses; mas dejemos agora
esto, que es muy larga cuestion;
yo os quiero hacer saber que
entre otras cosas notabres que yo
vi en la iglesia de Santa Ana en
Dura, que en un altar junto á la
madre vi á Nuestra Señora la
madre de Dios tan al natural de
una linda mujer en una imagen
que con todas las partes de su
rostro y cuerpo mostraba estar
viva; en sola una cosa me
descontentó, que es en los
vestidos que tenía, porque de
creer es que fuese ella la más
honesta que en el mundo nunca
mujer nasció ni fue; pues no sé
porqué la atavian los cristianos
tan deshonestamente con unos
carmesis y brocados cuchillados
de colores y puestos que
reprueban aun las mujeres por
mostrarse honestas en si. Esto
queria yo qu'el pueblo cristiano
mirase sin pasion ni boba aficion
é se piensen mas la servir si la
pintan y la visten en hábito que
por la reverencia que le debo
quiero callar; con unas mangas
acuchilladas y llenas de
bocadillos y con colores de afeites
en el rostro y con grandes pechos
descubiertos y con camisas
rayadas y polainas muy galanas y
polidas, y dicenme que en
España son en esto muy
demasiados, porque les ponen
unos verdugados que usan allá y
unos rebociños en el cuello y
otras cosas deshonestas que
fuerzan á los hombres á pecar
teniendo con las tales imagines
poca reverencia y devocion, y
acaesce muchas veces que si un
pintor ha de pintar una imagen de
Nuestra Señora ó de la Madalena,
toma ejemplo de alguna mujer
deshonesta ramera la qual tiene
puesta delante por muestra de su
labor y pintura; yo no digo esto de
mí, porque en la verdad yo lo he
visto. Dijo mi amo; en este caso
solamente tienen la culpa los
obispos porque en sus obispados
no vesitan ni proveen estas
cosas, pues nos va en ellas tan
gran parte de nuestra cristianidad,
no se habian de descuidar con
sus regalos y deleites y con sus
rentas y tesoros, los cuales
habiendose de gastar juntamente
con todas las rentas de toda la
Iglesia, digo del Papa y de los
Cardenales y obispos y todas las
otras dinidades con los pobres y
otras muchas obras de caridad, y
consumenlas en juegos, en
banquetes y fiestas y otros
muchos deleytes del mundo, que
yo no digo, que solo en decirlo me
paresce seria deshonesto y sin
tener memoria del morir ni de la
estrecha cuenta que han de dar á
Dios, porque me paresce á mi
que pues los obispos son
obligados á visitar cada año su
obispado y no lo visitan, sino
repelanlo, no quedando mejor que
de antes; por el mismo caso ansí
habian de ser obligados los
Papas á visitar su papazgo de
dos en dos años, porque de
contino se pierden las ovejas por
el descuido del pastor; antes son
ellos en ocasion de perderlas y
destruirlas desasosegandolas con
guerras y tumultos, tiranizando en
la cristiandad con mayor crueldad
que todos los Dionisios juntos
tiranizaron en su tiempo; por
cierto yo querría ser dos años
Papa y no mas porque en estos
yo pornia en orden el Pontificado
y lo haría tan ejemplo y regla de
Cristo y de sus apóstoles que
ninguno le viese que se quejase.
Respondio el italiano: ¡ay, señor!
por amor de Dios que no lleveis
tal carga acuestas porque yo os
doy mi fe que es la más
incomportable que nunca
hombres pudieron sufrir, ni tenga
ninguno envidia á sus deleites ni
banquetes y placeres, porque os
doy mi fe que desde el Papa
hasta el muy mísero sacristan
viven en contina miseria y dolor;
tomense para si sus placeres y
pasatiempos los obispos si
juntamente con ellos han de rezar
por toda su familia, emitar á los
apostoles en cuyo lugar vinieron á
suceder y á lo qual cumplir con lo
que denota su habito obispal; que
aquella túnica blanca lavada,
limpia, blanca, sin mácula hecha
á ejemplo de pueblo[293]; ¿qué
sinifica la mitra con dos cuernos si
no el cuidado que han de tener en
declarar al pueblo ambos
testamentos Viejo y Nuevo? qué
denotan los guantes limpios en
sus manos? la administracion
pura de los sacramentos; ¿qué
los zapatos que le calzan en los
pies? la vigilancia de su gley;
¿qué la cruz é báculo que le dan
en la mano? la Vitoria y triunfo de
los humanos afetos; y lo mismo
es al Cardenal; ¿no os paresce
que el que debe tener esto de
contino en su pecho y
consideracion que tiene trabajo?
pues alléganse á esto otros dos
mill embarazos de la vida que á
un momento no le dejan
descansar el ánima, porque la
trae solicita en mill cuidados que
le menoscaban la vida: la
visitacion de su obispado, el
examen de sus curas é
beneficiados los quales han de
encargar la administracion de su
iglesia y ánimas de sus feligreses;
la visitacion de los pobres y
destribucion de sus bienes; aquel
contino despachar negocios para
la Corte romana é imperial, aquel
asestir á pleitos que les ponen en
las dinidades é pensiones; ¡oh
Dios inmortal! pues tambien
tienen ellos sus prestamos y
censuras de las quales demandan
prestados á nunca volver; pues
¿qué trabajo tienen en las
judicaturas de todo el día, oyendo
quejas é pleitos de agraviados;
con todos ha de complir, á todos
ha de responder, á todos ha de
satisfacer, á ninguno ha de inviar
quejoso, sino á todos contentos y
satisfechos. Pues vengamos al
descanso y deleite del Papa; por
cierto si bien considerase su dolor
y trabajo contino, no hay hombre
de sano juicio que un dia le
pudiese sufrir, ni aunque se le
diesen con toda la posesion y
mando de universo mundo no le
querria tomar por un momento;
mas la desordenada codicia que
agora reina en nuestras ánimas
causa en todos tan gran
ceguedad que no hay quien mire
con ojos libres su tan trabajada
carga é la repudie y la eche de sí;
¡oh! qué trabajo considerar que ya
no se abscondan los hombres
como hacian en otro tiempo los
santos por no ser Pontífices, mas
antes hay ya quien mucho antes
que vaque lo negocia con
sobornos inlícitos y si menester
es con yerbas le aben (sic) antes,
y que no hay uno en toda la
cristiandad de quien se presuma
que si se lo diesen no lo tomaria.
Pues si se ponen á considerar
que tiene el Papa las veces de
Cristo y que está puesto en su
lugar en el mundo y que le debe
remedar y seguir en la pobreza,
en los trabajos, en la dotrina, en
la cruz, en el menosprecio del
mundo, en las continas lágrimas,
en los ayunos, en las oraciones,
en los sospiros, en los sermones,
en otras dos mill fatigas, decirme
¿quien le querrá? ¿quien le
tomará? y esto no es nada en
comparacion de lo que á esto se
les allega: aquella guarda de
tesoros; aquella conservacion de
honras, aumentar las vitorias,
acrecentar los oficios y multiplicar
las dispensaciones, engrandecer
las rentas, ensanchar las
indulgencias, proveerse de
caballos y mulas, de grandes
familias y criados, que conoscer
de nuevo tantos escritores, tantos
notarios, tantos abogados, tantos
fiscales, tantos secretarios, tantos
caballerizos, tantos despenseros;
á todos ha de mirar é favorescer,
con todos ha de cumplir, á todos
ha de pagar con proveer al uno el
obispado, al otro el abadia, al otro
el beneficio, al otro la canonjía, é
la dinidad, por pagar sus
servicios; pues ¿qué trabajo es el
despachar cada día los indultos,
las indulgencias, las
compusiciones, las espetativas,
los entredichos, las suspensiones,
las citaciones y descomuniones?
Por cierto que me paresce á mí
que por penitencia no lo habia un
bueno de tomar á cargo é ya no
es tiempo sino que todos trabajen
é rueguen por el Pontificado,
porque ya no es tiempo que los
Papas hagan milagros como los
santos lo hacian antiguamente, ni
ya enseñan al pueblo porque es
trabajoso, ni declararán las
Sagradas Escrituras porque es de
maestros de escuelas, ni lloran
porque es de mujeres, ni
consienten en su casa pobreza
porque es gran miseria; procuran
siempre vencer porque es gran
vileza ser vencido; seguir la cruz
es gran infamia; huir cuanto
pueden de la muerte porque les
es el morir muy amargo. Pues si
algunos soberbios papas acaesce
predominar en la monarquia del
mundo, ¡oh! Dios inmortal, qué
trabajo incomplensible tienen en
conservar su ruin vida con sus
odios, enemistades é sediciones;
para salir con su tirania hacen
grandes ligas con soldados, con
tiranos y robadores, los cuales les
hagan espaldas y los favorezcan
y defiendan, y para estas cosas
echan susidios, bulas,
indulgencias y préstamos;
vereislos tan solícitos y tan
cuidadosos en recatarse de
todos, en no se fiar de alguno;
todos le son enemigos y le cavilan
la vida; uno le da el veneno; otro
le procura matar porque suceda
su patron; ¡oh! qué trabajo, ¡oh!
qué fatiga, ¡oh! qué curiosidad
vana, ¡oh! qué costosa vida, ¡oh!
qué desabrida muerte, ¡oh! qué
infernar de ánima é martirizar del
cuerpo; de verdad os digo, señor,
y creame quien quisiere, que no
tengo mas que os decir sino que
me quiero ser mas esto poco que
me soy con no tener más cargo
de mi, ni de más tengo de dar
cuenta á Dios que ser cualquiera
destos papas que agora se
ofrecen, porque con sus trabajos
é cuidados yo no podía mucho
vivir; tómelo quien quisiere que ni
á mi me lo dan, ni yo lo demando,
ni yo lo querria. Como el italiano
acabó su tragedia dijo mi amo:
por Dios, señor, que teneis mucha
razon; que es gran trabajo su
vida; buena sin alguna
comparacion; si la hacen mala
porque viven siempre en
sobresalto y desasosiego,
muriendo siempre sin nunca vevir.
Estas cosas y otras semejantes
iban [pa]sando tiempo por aquella
floresta y ya iba calentando el sol,
por lo cual procuraron darse
alguna priesa por llegar á comer á
un lugar que cerca estaba.
Micillo.—Admirado me tienes
¡oh! fortunuoso Pitágoras con tan
inumerables trabajos y tan bien
representados que con mis
mismos ojos me los haces ver;
basta que me pensaba yo que
esos grandes Pontífices se tenian
la suprema felicidad, porque
pensaba yo que los grandes
Pontífices junto con los grandes
tesoros y riquezas y el gran
mando no tenian que desear otra
cosa alguna. Agora que tengo
visto su dolor paresceme que
ellos viven en el estado mas
misero de los mortales. Prosigue
por amor de mi y acaba tu
tragedia como mientras fueste
asno, ¿que te sucedio?
Gallo.—Pues llegado al lugar, lo
primero que se proveyó en
entrando en la posada fue dar á
nosotros las bestias de comer;
fueron luego muy llenos los
pesebres, donde matamos
nuestra hambre del caminar;
despues se salieron ellos á un
portal fresco donde con mucho
placer les aparejan su comer; por
estar yo lejos de su mesa y
porque venia cansado no oi nada
de lo que en la mesa pasó; mas
despues que todos hubimos
reposado y que fue caida la siesta
despedieronse los italianos de
nosotros diciendo que iban por
otro camino á su tierra,
demandada licencia de los
compañeros, saludandose se
fueron con Dios; nosotros
tambien, pagada la huéspeda,
comenzamos nuestro camino.
Pierres, que ansi se llamaba uno
de los dos mis amos dijo á
Perequin que ansi se llamaba el
otro: hermano Perequin, si mi
juicio no me engaña en
pronosticar...
 NOTAS:
[293] Parece que falta algo en el manuscrito.
 CAPITULO XIX

Que cuenta en pronosticar lo de

los agüeros; cosa de notar.

Estoy turbado de una cierta ave

que agora voló y vengo á
conjeturar que nos ha de suceder
en esta noche algun enojoso
acontescimiento, por lo cual
encomendemonos á Dios y
aparejemonos á padescer, pues
no se puede escusar. Perequin,
se rió mucho burlando de Pierres;
y dijo: por Dios que me maravillo
de tí que con todo tu saber des
crédito á liviandades tan sin
razon, y si en agüeros crees
nunca harás cosa buena, porque
si viendo esas vanidades esperas
á ver si aciertan ó no, agora por
temor, agora por engaño del
demonio puedes peligrar en tu
salud, por lo cual te ruego que
depongas de tu pecho esta tu
errada opinion y no le des alguna
fe, porque permitirá Dios que
acaezca el mal pronosticado por
castigar tu yerro y no porque de
allí hubiese de suceder
necesariamente. Respondio
Pierres: más me maravillo yo de
tí, porque me quieres convencer
que sea arte de vanidad, pues en
todos los acaescimientos
pronosticados he hallado que
vengan á suceder segun é como
yo los he agüerado; y no pienses
que lo supe de mi, que mucho
trabajo me costó á la deprender
de grandes sabios que me la
enseñaron; y cree tú que tiene
gran fundamento, pues todos los
sabios antiguos mentan que
tenian en suprema veneracion y
le daban tanta fe como á los muy
dinos oráculos de su Dios,
pronosticaban de cosas
acaescidas de improviso, agora
en cuerpos muertos de animales
sacrificados á sus dioses, agora
de vuelo a graznido de las aves, y
convenciales á lo creer las
grandes experiencias que se les
ofrecian, como fue lo que cuentan
de Julio Cesar, qu'el primero día
que se asentó en la silla imperial
sacreficó un buey á Júpiter y
abriendole fue hallado sin
corazon, de lo qual los agüeros
pronosticaron tristemente y le
señalaron todo el mal, lo qual así
ha sucedido, que de veinte é tres
puñaladas fue muerto en el
senado. Y tambien leemos que
Cayo Claudio é Lucio Petilio
cónsules sacreficaron como lo
habian de costumbre á los dioses,
y en matando el buey ante las
aras le sacaron el corazon, el qual
de improviso se corrompio de
podre, por lo qual los agüeros
venieron á pronosticar triste
suceso en sus muertes, á los
cuales dijeron que moririan muy
breve; é ansi fue, que no mucho
tiempo murio Claudio Cayo de
una grave enfermedad y Petilio en
la guerra. Como Antioco rey de
Siria tuviese guerra con los partos
acontecio que estando en el real
hizo una golondrina nido en su
mismo pavellon, de lo qual los
agüeros denunciaron mal suceso
de la batalla, y así fue, que en el
comitimiento de los ejércitos fue
muerto el rey Antioco y todo
desbaratado y perdido. Otros
muchos enjemplos de las
historias notables te pudiera yo
agora traer para corroboracion de
que fue creida mi verdad; mas
pues tu pertinacia me lo ha todo
de destruir, aguardemos á lo que
hubiere de acaescer. Luego le
respondió Perequin: por hombre
para poco me tienes si confiando
en Dios no te convenciere á que
creas sin hacerme algun perjuicio
tus argumentos ser falsos y
diabólico y vano el agorar; yo te
probaré que estos sus
acaescimientos no pueden ser
causa ni ocasion para que dellos
se pudiese pronosticar lo que está
por venir, y porque no parezca
que mi persuacion procede sin
autoridad, sabras que se lee en
los Proverbios del sapientisimo
Salomon que no queramos ser
como los hombres mintirosos que
se mantienen de viento y dan
credito á las aves que vuelan,
porque en la verdad gran
liviandad es seguir cosa tan
incierta y cosa que nunca se
puede saber; [de] sentencia de
tanta autoridad se puede colegir
la vana supersticion que está en
esta ciencia; despues desto
quiero que vengamos á
considerar cuanta fuerza é
sustentacion de las aves é
cualesquiera otros brutos en el
ser y obras del hombre; de las
unas aves con su canto ó con su
vuelo o chellido; los brutos con
sus corporales dispusiciones de
corazon ó bazo, para que señalen
lo que nos ha de acaescer, y
porque tú y cuantos nascieron
mejor se pueden convencer,
vengamos á la razon natural que
muestra mi entencion. Á todos es
notorio que los brutos animales
tan solamente se mueven por un
sentido aquello que de presente
le es y solo se aplican aquello que
ante si tienen, sin consideracion
de lo que en ausencia les está. É
ansi todas las aves mueven su
cuerpo, alas é pies por solo
impeto de su naturaleza, por
hacer cualquiera ejercicio, como
para hablar, para comer ó cantar,
sin ser de otra parte costreñidos á
ello é sin primero lo pensar que lo
salgan hacer; pues esto es ansí
¿quien será tan falto de saber que
pueda afirmar que las aves con
su vuelo ora en la mano diestra ó
siniestra cantan ó no, que senifica
en nuestras obras bien ó mal? si
con hambre comen ¿qué tienen
que hacer si yo moriré? y si con
sed beban ¿qué tiene que hacer?
y si comiendo algo se les caiga
del pico, ¿qué convenencia tiene
con si me sucederá
prósperamente un viaje? ¿qué
razon lieva que los hombres
veneren todas las obras y
movimientos de los brutos y
tengan por muy cierto que todo
aquello les venefique que ellos de
su libre albedrio han de hacer?
por cierto gran bajeza. Y despues
pensar que Dios onipotente
hiciese un tan perfeto animal
como es el hombre y de tan alto
intendimiento que conosciese lo
que estaba por venir por las obras
de las miserabres avecicas y de
brutos sin uso de razon, las
quales como ellas mesmas
comienzan á volar no saben
donde van ni qué les pueda
suceder, pues cuanto ellas en
este caso puedan muy bien nos lo
mostró Mosolamon indio, hombre
de muy iminente saber é industria
de la guerra, de muy facunda
prudencia; de aqueste leemos
que siguio á los griegos y
macedones despues de la muerte
de Alejandro, y como un día fuese
con él al ejército é por el camino
acaesciese que se puso un ave
en un arbol é como los agoreros
la viesen comenzaron agorar
sobre si debian de pasar
adelante; paró alli el Mosolamo
como los vio en esta disputa,
tomó el arco y mató el ave,
burlando de la veneracion del
agorar; y como el agorero mayor
lo vio entristeciose mucho, é
alzando Mosolamo el ave del
suelo dijo ansi: decir porque os
acelereis; nunca esta ave supiera
lo que nos habia de acaescer
pues de si misma no supo
procurando por su salud, y pues
inorante de su muerte se puso en
el arbol para que la matase yo,
mal podria saber nuestro mal ó
bien acaescimiento; ansí que de
todo esto se puede muy bien
deducir la vanidad del agorar de
las aves é brutos cualesquiera é
de cualesquiera otros
acontecimientos que se puedan
ofrecer, como varonilmente nos lo
mostró aquel glorioso y felice gran
capitan español Gonzalo
Hernandez de Córdoba, varon
que despues que la fama lo
conoscio solo él quiso, no César
inmortal, porque aunque muerto,
la eternal memoria de sus buenos
hechos le hace revivir; fue en fin
tal que si le alcanzaran los
gentiles que á Aquiles y á Mares y
á Palas hicieron sacreficio, á este
sin controversia le adoraran todos
por Dios. Leemos dél que estando
aparejado en Nápoles para
acometer con su ejército gran
compañía de enemigos acaescio
por mal recado se les prendio la
polvora de la artilleria, y
entristeciéndose toda la gente
teniendolo por mal agüero, salió
ante todos con gran ánimo
diciendo: no desmaye nadie,
caballeros; esforzad el corazon,
que estas almenures (sic por
luminarias) son de nuestra vitoria;
y diciendo esto los esforzó tanto
para acometer que brevemente
destruyó los enemigos.
Convencido me estoy yo bastante
á creer que todo género de agorar
sea vano y de ninguna
certedumbre, ni sé mas de que el
demonio nos quiere engañar con
hacernos entender que todo sea
ansí como nos lo muestra y
trabaja con toda su industria que
suceda aquello que nos mostró ó
que pronosticaron del vuelo del
ave, ó de cualquiera otra cosa, y
esto aunque nunca hubiera de
acontecer, porque solamente le
creais; y agora me temo yo, señor
Pierres, que pirmitirá Dios que
nos suceda el mal que vos habeis
agorado, por castigaros el yerro
que cometisteis en dar crédito á
cosa tan vana y tan errada, la
qual es de pura industria y
engaño del demonio y no porque
creo que hubiese ansi de
acaescer. Pierres quedó
convencido y atemorizado con el
miedo que lo puso Perequin de
parte de Dios porque daba crédito
al agorar; y asi razonando fueron
toda la tarde en esta materia
hasta que llegamos á una aldea
de pocos vecinos.
Micillo.—Pues, tú Pitágoras,
¿porque no diste en aquel arte tu
parescer, que bien se te entendia,
pues fueste discípulo de los
magos?
Gallo.—Porque mientras fue
asno no pude hablar. Como
fuemos llegados á la aldea
aparejóse la cena, porque
llegamos tarde é despues de
haber cenado fuéronse mis amos
á reposar y sosegose la casa.
Sucedio que junto á la media
noche, en lo mas sabroso del
sueño, entran en casa unos
ladrones y roban las arcas del
huéspede, que era rico, y
levantados con la presa porque
no lo podian levar acuestas,
vienen al establo y tomanme á mí
para que mis hombros lo lieven, y
como vieron que tenían cogido
quien lo levase sin trabajo suyo,
tornaron á hurtar, doblado y
cargaronme de aquellos tesoros y
buena ropa una carga que no la
levaran dos como yo, y abiertas
las puertas sin ser sentidos me
sacaron fuera del lugar. Tenian su
vivienda en una cueva que habian
hecho cinco millas de aquella
aldea y habiamos de pasar un rio
para ir allá por un vado, y como
los ladrones viniesen tan alegres
con su priesa y fuese algo oscura
la noche, perdieron el vado, y
llegados al rio, confiando en que
yo pasaría delante aguijáronme
para que pasase y en entrando no
muy lejos de la orilla, lancé los
pies y las manos en un tremadal,
y como el agua era alta luego me
ahogué y la hacienda todo se
perdio sin poder cobrar nada.