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Insiders versus Outsiders


Interest Group Politics
in Multilevel Europe
Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
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© Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo 2016
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2016
Impression: 1
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Acknowledgements
This book is the result of work that we started in 2008, when we were at
University College Dublin. Back then, in the framework of a project funded
by the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS,
Government of Ireland Research Project Grant), we decided to carry out a
survey of Irish interest groups. The success of this initial survey, which we
put into effect in 2009, made us decide to replicate our research in four more
countries. After our move to the University of Salzburg, we were fortunate
to receive funding for this research from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF,
Lise Meitner programme, grant number M1217-G16). Later, grants from the
Jubiläumsfonds of the Austrian National Bank (grant number 15513) and the
Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies (small project grant programme)
allowed us to add surveys of interest groups active on specific campaigns at
both the national and the European levels.
Without the willingness of a large number of interest group officials to take
time out of their busy schedules and respond to our surveys, this research
would not have been possible. Because we guaranteed them anonymity, we
cannot list them by name, but we very much appreciate their generosity.
Moreover, we are very grateful to Ilze Ruse for assisting us in carrying out the
survey in Latvia. Throughout this time, we were also lucky to be able to rely
on many excellent research assistants: Johanna Bötscher, Robert Huber, Justin
Leinaweaver, Gerald Lindner, Stephen Massey, Niall Morris, Ingo Nordmann,
Maximilian Rech, Jan Sand, Niklas Stappenbeck, Zdenek Staszek, and Markus
Vogtenhuber. Without their help, realizing the extensive empirical research
contained in this book would have been impossible.
Over the course of this research, we received many helpful comments and
suggestions from a large number of friends and colleagues. We owe much
gratitude to Dirk De Bièvre who commented on both the book proposal and
several parts of the book. Leonardo Baccini, Laura Baroni, Patrick Bernhagen,
Jan Beyers, Caelesta Braun, David Coen, Niamh Hardiman, Heike Klüver,
Andrea Liese, David Marshall, Sven-Oliver Proksch, Anne Rasmussen, Bernd
Schlipphak, Michaël Tatham, and Hannes Winner provided helpful feedback
on different parts of this book. Moreover, comments from audiences at
the Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association, the
v
Acknowledgements
General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, IMT

Lucca, Oxford University, University College Dublin, and the University of
Salzburg helped us refine our ideas.
Some portions of this book build on research that we previously published
as journal articles. Parts of Chapter 5 appeared in the European Journal of Polit-
ical Research (2013, Vol. 52, No. 5). Chapter 7 is a fully revised and expanded
version of an article that was published in European Union Politics (2014,
Vol. 15, No. 4). The case study on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
contained in Chapter 9, finally, draws on an article that was printed in the
Journal of European Public Policy (Vol. 21, No. 8). We are grateful to Blackwell,
Sage, and Taylor & Francis for the permission to reuse these materials.
Finally, the team at Oxford University Press was very helpful in improving
the manuscript and bringing it into print. Particular thanks are due to three
anonymous reviewers for Oxford University Press who offered excellent com-
ments and thorough feedback on an earlier version of this book.
We dedicate this book to our two children, Alexander and Julia, who quite
literally grew up while we were working on this project. They are the best
children we could hope for.
vi
Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xiii
1. Introduction 1
2. Lobbying Insiders and Lobbying Outsiders 16
3. Studying Lobbying in Multilevel Europe 38
4. A Map of Interest Group Activity in Europe 47
5. Strategies I: Gaining Access or Going Public 70
6. Strategies II: Insiders and Outsiders in Three Campaigns 97
7. Europeanization: Business Associations as Multilevel Players 124
8. Access: Bias in the Heavenly Choir 150
9. Influence: Lobbying, Public Salience, and Outcomes 182
10. Conclusion 208
Annex A: Questionnaire for the Actor-Centred Survey 225

Annex B: Questionnaire for the Policy-Centred Survey 233
Notes 237
Bibliography 247
Index 265
vii
List of Figures
3.1 Composition of country samples by group type 41

3.2 Response rates by country and group type 42
4.1 Cumulative proportion of groups created over time 48
4.2 Number of staff by group type and country 50
4.3 Time spent by interest groups on interest representation and
other activities 55
4.4 The importance of fifteen policy fields for interest groups 57
4.5 The number of policy areas that are important or very important
for a group 57
4.6 Correlating the importance of different policy areas 58
4.7 What the representation of interests entails 59
4.8 Share of lobbying on national and EU legislation 61
4.9 Frequency of contacts with a series of national institutions on
EU legislation 62
4.10 Frequency of contacts with a series of EU institutions 63
4.11 The use of lobbying tactics with respect to both national and
EU legislation 65
4.12 The number of tactics used by interest groups 66
4.13 Correlating tactics on both national and EU legislation 68
5.1 Explaining variation in the use of tactics on national legislation 76
5.2 Explaining variation in the use of tactics on EU legislation 77
5.3 Factor loadings 79
5.4 Choice of strategy by type of group 82
5.5 Resources, type of group, and choice of strategy 82
5.6 Strategy and policy field (national legislation) 83
5.7 Strategy and policy field (EU legislation) 84
5.8 Explaining variation in Relative inside (national) 85
5.9 The effect of group type for different levels of resources
(national legislation) 87
ix
List of Figures
5.10 The effect of group type in distributive and regulatory policy fields
(national legislation) 88
5.11 Explaining variation in Relative inside (EU) 89
5.12 The effect of group type for different levels of resources (EU legislation) 90
5.13 The perceived usefulness of tactics 93
5.14 Explaining variation in the perceived usefulness of tactics 94
6.1 Tactics on three cases (pooled across cases) 102
6.2 Tactics in general 103
6.3 Percentage of actors using a tactic at least once (tactics on three cases) 104
6.4 Percentage of actors using a tactic at least once (tactics in general) 105
6.5 Correlating tactics on cases and tactics in general 106
6.6 Percentage of actors using a tactic at least once (by group type
and campaign) 106
6.7 Tactics in general, by group type 108
6.8 Factor loadings (policy-centred survey) 109
6.9 Status quo defenders and status quo challengers by case 111
6.10 Positions by case and group type 112
6.11 Explaining variation in tactics on three cases 114
6.12 Explaining variation in tactics in general 117
6.13 Explaining variation in strategy choice on cases 118
6.14 Comparing strategy on cases with strategy in general 120
6.15 SQ challengers, SQ defenders, and strategy choice 121
6.16 Explaining variation in Relative inside (cases) 122
7.1 Distribution of dependent variables 132
7.2 Group type and Europeanization 134
7.3 Policy area and Europeanization 135
7.4 Explaining variation in EU lobbying 136
7.5 Interaction effect in EU lobbying (time) 138
7.6 Explaining variation in EU level 139
7.7 Interaction effect in EU level 140
7.8 Two-part models 141
7.9 Other measures of Europeanization 144
7.10 Regression results for other measures of Europeanization 145
7.11 Ordinal regression for Europeanization index 147
8.1 Contacts with a series of national and European institutions on
EU legislation 158
x
List of Figures
8.2 Group type and frequency of contacts with executive institutions 161
8.3 Group type and frequency of contacts with legislative institutions 162
8.4 Staff and mean frequency of contacts 163
8.5 Explaining variation in access to national institutions 165
8.6 Multivariate regression results (interaction effects, national
institutions) 167
8.7 Interaction effect between Business and Staff (national institutions) 168
8.8 Explaining variation in access to EU institutions 169
8.9 Multivariate regression results (interaction effects, EU institutions) 171
8.10 Interaction effect between Business and Staff (EU institutions) 172
8.11 Results by policy area (executive institutions) 174
8.12 Results by policy area (legislative institutions) 175
8.13 Number of citizen groups by type 175
8.14 Explaining frequency of contacts by type of citizen group 176
8.15 Perceived difficulty of access 178
8.16 Explaining perceived difficulty of access 179
9.1 Tactics used by the two sides in the three campaigns 195
9.2 Internet search volume for the three cases in three countries 197
9.3 Number of newspaper articles on the three topics 199
9.4 Importance attributed to the three campaigns by supporters and
opponents of the policies 203
xi
List of Tables
1.1 Lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders 5

3.1 Number of groups by type and country (actor-centred survey) 41
3.2 Number of groups by case and country (policy-centred survey) 44
3.3 Percentage of groups by group type and case 45
3.4 Number of interviews by case and country 45
4.1 Membership size by member and group type (actor-centred survey) 53
5.1 Univariate summary statistics (Chapter 5) 81
6.1 Univariate summary statistics (Chapter 6) 113
7.1 Univariate summary statistics (Chapter 7, only variables not previously
introduced) 133
8.1 Univariate summary statistics (Chapter 8, only variables not previously
introduced) 160
10.1 Summary of the findings: strategy choice 209
10.2 Summary of the findings: Europeanization 210
10.3 Summary of the findings: access 210
10.4 Summary of the findings: influence 210
xiii
Introduction
Lobbying is ubiquitous in contemporary Europe. At various levels of

government, a wide variety of interest groups aim to shape political decisions.
On the issue of climate change, for example, thousands of groups lobby
national and subnational governments and the European-level institutions.
Environmental non-governmental organizations such as Greenpeace cam-
paign for stricter limits on carbon emissions. Lobby groups defending energy-
intensive industries, such as the European Chemical Industry Council, call
for subsidies that offset the costs created by the European Union’s (EU)
climate policy. Labour unions in the transport sector demand an expansion
of public transportation to reduce carbon emissions. Professional associations
such as the Standing Committee of European Doctors, finally, highlight the
dangers of climate change for countries’ health systems.
Marked differences exist in the lobbying behaviour of these actors. Some
interest groups mainly have direct contacts with decision-makers, partici-
pate in hearings, and contribute to public consultations. Other groups focus
on tactics that aim at mobilizing or shaping public opinion, such as press
releases, demonstrations, and internet campaigns. Moreover, interest groups
in Europe strongly differ in the targets of their lobbying activities. Some of
them are genuine ‘multilevel players’, that is, they lobby on both EU and
national political decisions and at both the national and the European levels.
Others, by contrast, are much more focused on national politics.
What explains these differences across interest groups—defined as orga-
nizations that have members or that rely on supporters for survival, try to
influence public policies, but do not run in elections (Jordan et al. 2004)1 —
in their lobbying behaviour? And what consequences do these differences
have for the access that groups gain to decision-makers and the influence
that they can exert on political decisions? Responding to these questions is
not only essential for a better understanding of lobbying in contemporary
Europe. Doing so is also a necessary step in a normative appraisal of the role
that interest groups play in democratic societies. Lobbying can be viewed as
1
interference with democracy that leads to the promotion of some interests to

the detriment of others. At the same time, lobbying may enhance democratic
processes by giving voice to many different interests and enhancing the
quality of political decisions. By explaining interest group strategies, access,
and influence in multilevel Europe, this volume helps move forward this
normative debate.
The Argument in a Nutshell
Our key claim is that a single theoretical framework that focuses on the
distinction between different types of interest groups and groups’ endow-
ment with material resources can shed much light on the whole lobbying
process from strategy choice, through access to influence. According to this
argument, group type—namely the distinction between business associa-
tions, citizen groups, professional associations, and labour unions—is key
in explaining which strategies groups choose, how much access they gain to
which decision-makers, and under which circumstances they are most likely
to exert influence over policy outcomes. Business associations are groups that
have either firms or associations of firms as members. This includes both
broad business associations, such as chambers of commerce, and sectoral
groups. Citizen groups (also known as public interest groups) have a poten-
tially broad membership and defend interests that are not directly related to
the professions or vocations of their members or supporters (Berry 1999: 2).
In most cases, the members or supporters of citizen groups thus do not
have a direct and concentrated material stake in the policies advocated by
the association. Among others, the category of citizen groups encompasses
groups concerned with animal welfare, consumer and environmental protec-
tion, and international development. Professional associations champion the
interests of a specific profession, such as lawyers, medics, or artists. They tend
to have individuals or associations of individuals as members. Labour unions
represent the interests of employees, both in negotiations with employers
and vis-à-vis political decision-makers.
We expect major differences in lobbying behaviour across these types of
groups because of two factors. First, for a variety of reasons, collective action
problems are less severe for business associations than for non-business
groups, and here especially citizen groups (Olson 1965; Offe and Wiesenthal
1980; Walker 1983; Dunleavy 1991; Dür and De Bièvre 2007). The difference
in ease of collective action means that for the former, the pursuit of influ-
ence and the pursuit of survival tend to go hand-in-hand, whereas for the
latter often a trade-off exists between survival and the effective exercise of
influence. Professional associations and labour unions are located in between
2
Introduction
the two other types of groups with respect to the severity of collective action
problems. Second, the different types of groups vary in the resources that they
can provide with a comparative advantage. Business associations tend to be
relatively better equipped with technical information, namely information
about the consequences of policy choices. They also tend to have a compar-
ative advantage in terms of ability to facilitate or hinder the implementation
of public policies. Citizen groups, by contrast, have a comparative advantage
in terms of political information such as information about constituency
preferences, representativeness, and legitimacy. Professional associations and
labour unions again adopt a middle position between these two types.
From these considerations, we derive the expectation that in multilevel
Europe, business interests focus more on inside lobbying than non-business
interests, meaning that they try to establish direct contacts with decision-
makers. They are also more likely to lobby on both national and EU
legislation and at both the national and the EU level. Moreover, they enjoy
better access to executive institutions and have a particularly large advan-
tage in shaping policy outcomes when mobilizing the public on an issue is
difficult. Citizen groups, in turn, find it more attractive to engage in outside
lobbying than business interests, meaning that they rely more strongly on
tactics that are aimed at mobilizing the public or changing public attitudes.2
They are less likely to engage in multilevel lobbying, find it easier to gain
access to legislative than to executive decision-makers, and have the greatest
impact on outcomes on issues that are amenable to an outside lobbying
campaign. Across most aspects of the lobbying process, professional associa-
tions and labour unions are more similar to citizen groups than to business
interests. Overall, we thus expect to observe two distinct logics of lobbying,
one pursued by business interests and the other by non-business interests.
The debate over the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship (TTIP) offers a nice illustration of these differences in terms of lobbying
behaviour across group types. Most European business associations support
the negotiations that are aimed at liberalizing trade and investment flows
between the EU and the United States. They focus on writing position papers,
participating in hearings, and gaining direct access to decision-makers. From
the moment when negotiations started, they enjoyed excellent access to
executive decision-makers, in particular the European Commission (which
conducts these negotiations for the EU), and were able to shape the EU’s posi-
tion in these negotiations to a considerable extent. By contrast, the groups
that oppose the negotiations—mainly citizen groups and labour unions—
started a highly visible outside lobbying campaign, relying on demostrations,
press releases, petitions, street advertising, campaign websites, and social
media. They complain about a lack of access to the European Commission but
enjoy good access to the European Parliament. They only managed to leave
3
their imprint on the EU’s negotiation position once their outside lobbying
campaign drew the public’s attention to the negotiations.
Group type alone, however, is not sufficient to explain variation across
interest groups in terms of strategy choice, access, and influence. Material
resources also play a role in that they augment the effect of group type. We
argue that the distinction between business associations and other types of
groups is largest for resource-rich groups. Business associations that are well
endowed with material resources are most likely to engage in inside lobby-
ing, to lobby on both EU and national legislation and at both the EU and
the national levels, and to enjoy good access to executive decision-makers.
By contrast, resource-poor business associations are more similar to citizen
groups, professional associations, and labour unions on all of these aspects
than to resource-rich business associations. Contrary to the expectation of
some studies that material resources reduce differences across group types in
terms of lobbying approach and impact (see e.g. Grant 2004; Binderkrantz
et al. 2015), we thus expect them to amplify these differences.
Moreover, our argument emphasizes the role of issue characteristics as a
moderator of the effect of group type. The distinction between distributive
issues (policies that offer concentrated gains to a few, while distributing
the costs among many, see Lowi 1964) and regulatory issues (which come
with concentrated gains for some and concentrated costs for others) affects
interest group strategies, as does a group’s position relative to the status quo;
and the degree to which an issue is amenable to outside lobbying matters
for interest group influence. Whereas the public salience of an issue does not
matter for interest group strategy, it does have an impact on the influence
that groups can exert on policy outcomes. The institutional setting in which
lobbying takes place also matters in a complex manner. Political institutions
affect both the amount of lobbying and, by determining which resources
groups can exchange for access, the access that groups gain to decision-
makers. By contrast, they only have a minor impact on the lobbying tactics
that groups use and which groups are able to shape policy outcomes. In short,
interest group characteristics are most important in understanding interest
group strategies, access, and influence. Issue characteristics mainly moderate
the effect of group type. The institutional setting, finally, primarily matters
because of its effect on the ease of lobbying, but without that changing the
basic patterns resulting from group characteristics.
Given the consistent differences between (resource-rich) business associa-
tions and non-business groups, we call the former ‘lobbying insiders’ and the
latter ‘lobbying outsiders’.3 The insiders mainly engage in inside lobbying;
are more likely to lobby on both national and European legislation and to
be politically active at both the national and the EU levels; enjoy privileged
access to executive institutions; and have an advantage in shaping political
4
Introduction
Table 1.1 Lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders
Lobbying insiders Lobbying outsiders
Prototype Resource-rich Citizen groups

business associations
Strategy Relative more inside Relative more outside
Focus Multilevel National
Access Executive Legislative
institutions institutions
Conditions for Issues not amenable Issues amenable
influence to outside lobbying to outside lobbying
decisions when an issue is not amenable to outside lobbying. The lobbying

outsiders, by contrast, focus on outside lobbying; are more strongly embed-
ded in the national context; have a comparative advantage in gaining access
to legislative institutions; and are successful when the public salience of an
issue is high or when they manage to raise the public salience of an issue.
Resource-rich business associations and citizen groups are the prototypes for
these two categories. Labour unions and professional associations are located
in between these two prototypes, but generally they are closer to the lobbying
outsiders than the lobbying insiders. Table 1.1 summarizes the resulting
expectation of two logics of lobbying for the case of multilevel Europe.
Studying Interest Groups in Multilevel Europe
The volume draws on a rich empirical basis to examine this argument. First,
we realized an online and mail survey of interest groups in five different
European countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, and Spain). We call
this the ‘actor-centred survey’ (for this term, see Beyers et al. 2014), because
we drew the samples of groups that we contacted from lists covering all
or nearly all groups that exist in the five countries, independently of the
groups’ level of activity. Our use of bottom-up samples is an advantage com-
pared to several earlier studies with respect to some aspects of our research.
Samples that start with groups that became active on an issue likely lead to
an overestimation of the level of activity of interest groups and the resources
that they possess. The country selection also has important methodological
advantages, as it brings together small and large countries and countries with
different systems of interest representation, namely both corporatist and
pluralist countries (where in the former, access to decision-makers is more
regulated and institutionalized than in the latter). It also nicely complements
existing surveys of interest groups in Europe that mainly focus on a few
North-Western European countries by covering a Southern (Spain) and an
5
Eastern European (Latvia) country. We received 880 responses from business

associations, citizen groups, professional associations, and labour unions that
form the basis of our empirical analysis in three of the five analytic chapters
contained in this book.
Second, we carried out 258 interviews with interest groups in five dif-
ferent European countries (Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland,
and Spain) and at the EU level that were active on three major policy
issues debated in Europe over the last few years: the ratification of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in Europe, the formulation of an EU
position in the post-Kyoto climate change negotiations, and the European
Fiscal Compact.4 We call this the ‘policy-centred survey’, because we started
with groups that we identified as being active on specific policies. ACTA
was supposed to strengthen the transnational enforcement of intellectual
property rights. The debate about the EU’s position in international climate
change negotiations is about the extent to which the EU should (promise to)
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. The European Fiscal Compact, finally,
is a treaty that obliges participating states that have the euro as currency to
have a national budget that is either balanced or in surplus.
We selected these cases because they differ in how amenable they are to an
outside lobbying campaign (we will discuss this more in detail in Chapter 9).
In the ACTA case, we envisage the greatest impact of outside lobbying; and
in the Fiscal Compact case, the smallest impact. Another advantage of this
case selection is that all three cases could be expected to attract lobbying
from many interest groups across Europe and at both the national and the
EU levels. This allows us to compare lobbying across countries and levels
of governance. The interviews offer us both systematic, quantitative data,
and qualitative, in-depth information about groups’ lobbying behaviour and
influence. What makes the resulting dataset particularly useful is that it
contains data on interest groups’ tactics both with respect to a specific issue
and in general. This allows for an analysis of the extent to which groups tailor
their tactics to the specific issues they are active on. Moreover, our data do
not only cover (a few of ) the most active players, but also many groups for
which the specific topic that we asked them about did not have particularly
high importance. This is important, as the salience of an issue for a group
may also impact on its behaviour. Datasets in which salience to the groups is
censored then may lead to wrong inferences about interest group behaviour.
Third, we use several other data sources to further bolster our empirical
analysis. Among them are the EU’s Transparency Register (a voluntary register
of interest groups that engage in lobbying at the EU level), which as of 2014
contained the names of close to 7000 interest groups,5 a list of all groups that
participated in EU consultations between 2008 and 2012 (with about 10,000
entries), a list of members of EU-level expert groups, and a list of national
6
Introduction
groups with offices in Brussels. Finally, we draw on a large number of other

primary and secondary sources. For the ACTA case alone, for example, we
identified 306 position papers that we use as sources. We analyse this empir-
ical evidence using a combination of simple descriptive and more advanced
quantitative methods, and case study research, to provide a compelling case
in support of our argument.
The State of the Art
Our theoretical argument and the empirical analysis draw on and speak
to a large and rich literature on interest groups. This literature focuses on
three sets of explanatory variables. A first set concerns interest group char-
acteristics, such as interest group type, group resources, and groups’ level of
professionalization. These are the variables that also occupy centre stage in
our argument. A second set of factors captures different characteristics of the
issue on which the groups lobby. Issues can be of a distributive, regulatory,
or re-distributive type (Lowi 1964); they can be more or less complex; and
they can be more or less salient to the broader public. The third set of factors
encompasses characteristics of the political institutions in which lobbying
takes place. This concerns the system of interest representation, namely the
distinction between pluralism and corporatism; the extent to which political
institutions are dependent on the information provided by interest groups;
and the openness of political institutions to lobbying. A brief review of the
state of the art shows how these factors have been used to explain lobbying
strategies, access, and influence.
A well-developed literature analyses interest group strategies.6 Starting
with interest group characteristics, several studies find that group type mat-
ters for strategy choice (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Gais and Walker 1991;
Kollman 1998; Binderkrantz 2005, 2008; Betzold 2013). The general conclu-
sion of this literature is that business interests or interests with concentrated
material gains or losses from a policy tend to rely more on inside lobbying
than ‘diffuse interests’. Some studies also find that while group type mat-
ters, overall the differences between groups of different types are relatively
minor (Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz 2005). They reckon that inside and outside
lobbying tactics are complements rather than substitutes. Groups that rely
much on inside lobbying can at the same time engage in much outside
lobbying.
Whereas many studies find that group characteristics matter for strategy
choice, so far there is little evidence that issue characteristics matter.
Mahoney (2008), for example, only finds limited influence of issue character-
istics such as issue scope and issue salience on strategy choice in the United
7
States and the EU. For Baumgartner et al. (2009: 150), issue salience also
only plays a minor role in shaping interest group strategies. What matters,
according to them, is whether actors defend the status quo or pursue policy
change. In a study of environmental lobbying in the EU, however, Junk
(2015) finds that issue characteristics matter more than group characteristics.
She concludes that outside lobbying dominates on issues of high public
salience and low complexity.
Institutional factors, in turn, have been seen as playing a large role in
shaping interest group strategies (Beyers 2004; Kriesi et al. 2007; Naoi and
Krauss 2009; Woll 2012; Weiler and Brändli 2015). The openness of a political
system, for example, influences the extent to which groups rely on inside and
outside tactics (Kriesi et al. 2007). In open political systems, interest groups
face fewer incentives to go outside than in closed political systems. Moreover,
different political institutions demand different types of resources, creating
incentives for interest groups to focus on either inside or outside lobbying.
Groups that lobby the European Commission, for example, may benefit
less from outside lobbying than groups that approach the European Parlia-
ment (Beyers 2004). This might be so because members of the European
Parliament are directly elected, whereas public scrutiny of officials in the
European Commission tends to be low.
The question of which interest groups manage to gain access to which
decision-makers also has received much scholarly attention.7 Most studies
concerned with access put emphasis on group characteristics, in particular
the resources that groups possess (Bouwen 2002, 2004; Eising 2009; Kalla
and Broockman 2015). Access, the argument goes, is granted to groups that
can offer the resources that decision-makers demand. For the United States,
some evidence suggests that interest groups may be able to buy access to
decision-makers with the help of campaign contributions (Kalla and Broock-
man 2015). In the European context, more emphasis has been put on the
information that groups can exchange for access (Bouwen 2004; Eising 2009),
although material resources are also likely to play a role (Greer et al. 2008).
Moreover, the positioning of groups in or between coalitions may matter for
the access that groups gain (Beyers and Braun-Poppelaars 2014).
Whereas only little research has looked at variation in access by issue or
policy area (for an exception, see Rasmussen and Gross 2015), much work
focuses on the institutional determinants of access (Immergut 1992; Ehrlich
2007; Eising 2009; Naoi and Krauss 2009). What distinguishes pluralist from
corporatist systems of interest representation is that, in the latter, access to
decision-makers is regulated by political institutions. In a corporatist sys-
tem, access to decision-makers is institutionalized for both organizations
representing capital interests and organizations representing labour inter-
ests (Schmitter 1974). In multilevel Europe, however, the system of interest
8
Introduction
representation may no longer matter much for interest groups’ access to EU

institutions (Eising 2009). Access has also been shown to depend on the
electoral system (Naoi and Krauss 2009) and the number of electoral districts
(Ehrlich 2007).
Finally, a large literature studies interest group influence, that is, the impact
of lobbying on policy outcomes.8 Again, interest group characteristics play
a key role in this research area. In fact, a key debate in this field concerns
whether business interests are more influential than other interests. On
the one hand, some authors find a ‘business bias’ in interest group poli-
tics. This may be a result of business interests’ superior ability to mobilize
(Schattschneider 1960; Gilens and Page 2014; Drutman 2015), their structural
power in capitalist societies (Domhoff 2013; Hindmoor and McGeechan
2013) and their superior endowment with resources (Dür and De Bièvre
2007). On the other hand, some authors conclude that business interests are
not more successful in getting their preferred policy outcomes than other
interests. This may be a result of conflict among different business interests
(Falkner 2007) or because business interests are opposed by other interest
groups that manage to sway decision-makers in democratic political systems
(Dür et al. 2015; Hojnacki et al. 2015). Resources, as another group charac-
teristic, may also matter for interest group influence. Some studies even find
a direct impact of financial contributions to politicians on policy outcomes
(Quinn and Shapiro 1991), but many more cast doubt on such a direct link
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Baumgartner et al. 2009; McKay 2012). The
information—of both a technical and a political nature—that groups possess
is likely to play a larger role (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Baumgartner et al.
2009). Such information can either persuade decision-makers or serve as a
‘subsidy’ to decision-makers who already take a position in line with the
demands voiced by the groups.
Influence is also likely to depend on issue characteristics (Heinz et al.
1993; Mahoney 2008; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Klüver 2011; Bunea 2013;
Bernhagen et al. 2015). In a seminal article, Lowi (1964) argued that busi-
ness’s ability to shape American trade policy was larger in the 1930s when
trade was a distributive issue than in the 1950s when trade had become
a regulatory issue. Much work also suggests that the public salience of an
issue matters for the extent to which specific interest groups can shape
policy outcomes (Culpepper 2011; Bernhagen 2013; Klüver 2013; M. K. Ras-
mussen 2015). Finally, political institutions may allow some interests to exert
more influence than other interests (Dür 2008a: 1215–17). The easy access
to decision-makers that is provided by the political system of the United
States, for example, may have lowered the influence of farm lobbies in that
country compared to the more closed political systems of France and Japan
(Sheingate 2001).
9
Two conclusions emerge from this brief overview of studies on interest

groups and lobbying. On the one hand, most researchers focus on the same
sets of factors when explaining lobbying strategies, access, and influence.
Consistently, we found references to group characteristics, issue character-
istics, and the institutional setting. Nearly all arguments present in the lit-
erature, however, apply to only one of these three aspects of lobbying. This
focus of much research on only one aspect of lobbying, in turn, has made
it difficult to fuse the various strands of literature into a unified whole or
a few competing theories, despite the parallels that are present across these
three strands of literature. On the other hand, most arguments focus on the
direct effects of one or several variables on strategies, access, or influence.
Largely missing are arguments that theorize how different variables interact
in producing certain outcomes.
The Value Added
This volume directly addresses these two issues. Our key contribution to the
literature is to show that a single argument, building on group type as main
variable, can explain variation across groups in their choice of strategy, their
access to decision-makers, and the conditions under which they can exert
influence. Our argument suggests that lobbying insiders differ from lobbying
outsiders across all of the stages of the influence production process (for this
term, see Lowery and Gray 2004) and that these differences can be traced back
to collective action problems and groups’ resource endowment. The volume
thus brings research on interest groups one step closer to specifying the
‘linkages and potential feedbacks among the several stages of the influence
production process’, an aim formulated by Lowery and Gray (2004: 164) and
still not reached (Bunea and Baumgartner 2014). More generally, by showing
how collective action problems shape interest group behaviour, but without
making lobbying only a battle of ‘special interests’, the argument makes a key
contribution to the neopluralist research agenda in the interest group field
(Lowery and Gray 2004; McFarland 2007).
The resulting theoretical argument that we use to explain strategies,
access, and influence, moreover, goes beyond postulating direct relationships
among variables. Rather, we stress how different factors interact in produc-
ing the patterns of lobbying that we observe. Following our argument, the
effect of group type is conditional on factors such as the material resources
groups possess and issue characteristics. Group type thus matters differently
for resource-rich groups than for resource-poor groups; and when groups
lobby on distributive issues than when they lobby on regulatory issues.
10
Introduction
Also political institutions moderate the effect of group type, for example in
that business associations have better access to executive institutions and
non-business groups to legislative institutions. We thus emphasize interac-
tions between variables, whereas much of the earlier literature solely looked
at the additive effects of different factors.
A further key contribution of this book is that we put together an unprece-
dented amount of empirical data to test our argument. As already described,
our data cover a large number of interest groups of different types, across
all policy areas and several countries and at the EU level, with respect to
strategies, access, and influence. Other quantitative studies of interest groups
in Europe are either limited in terms of type of interest groups studied
(for example, only business associations, as in Eising 2009, or only agricul-
tural associations as in Klüver 2010); policy area (for example, only health
policy as in Greer et al. 2008 or only external trade policy as in Beyers and
Kerremans 2012); or country coverage (for example, only Belgium as in Beyers
2002). Moreover, we not only collected data on what interest groups do ‘on
average’, but also how they behave when lobbying on specific cases. No
similar mapping exercise of the European interest group landscape has been
carried out before.9
Another value added of this book is that both our theoretical argument
and the empirical analysis capture lobbying at two levels of governance.
This allows us to show that not only can a single theoretical argument
shed light on strategy choice, access, and influence, but also that it can
do so largely independent of the institutional context. Much research has
been undertaken on interest groups at the EU level (see e.g. Coen and
Richardson 2009b); and a few studies have focused on what happens in
terms of interest group politics at the national level (for example, Heinisch
2000; Duvanova 2007; Reutter 2012; Beyers and Braun-Poppelaars 2014).
Studies such as ours that combine data on national activities with data on
EU-related activities and data on national groups with data on groups orga-
nized at the transnational level, by contrast, are rare. This makes our study
particularly well-suited to discuss similarities and differences in lobbying
behaviour between the two levels. Interestingly, we find relatively small dif-
ferences in terms of interest group strategies and access across levels. A group’s
relative focus on inside or outside lobbying tends to be stable across the two
levels of governance. Moreover, groups that enjoy good access to executive
(legislative) institutions at the national level also enjoy privileged access to
executive (legislative) institutions at the European level. Contrary to some
existing studies (Pollack 1997; Mazey 1998; Geddes 2000), our argument
about lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders thus lets us conclude that
a shift of authority from the national to the supranational level is unlikely
to empower the weak.
11
The resulting theoretical and empirical breadth of our book makes it partic-
ularly well-suited to contribute to a normative evaluation of interest groups’
role in democracies. Over the last two decades, many political systems have
given a greater role to ‘civil society’. In the EU, for example, the Lisbon
Treaty (which entered into force in 2009) created a legal obligation for Euro-
pean institutions to consult ‘representative associations and civil society’
(Article 11). The hope was that participation by civil society would act as
‘a remedy to the legitimacy crisis of the EU’ (Kohler-Koch 2010: 101). In
fact, the resulting greater participation by interest groups in policy-making
may enhance the legitimacy and quality of decisions by allowing for different
voices to be heard and expertise to be transmitted to decision-makers (Green-
wood 2007). The involvement of interest groups, however, may also have the
opposite effect, for example if some segments of civil society have privileged
access to decision-makers or if the information that decision-makers receive
from lobbyists is incomplete or even misleading.
Our argument suggests that better access to decision-makers for interest
groups is unlikely to be a panacea for the ails of contemporary democracies.
Both our study and other research show that in many cases, business interests
and citizen groups take opposite and quite unified positions in policy debates
(see e.g. Dür et al. 2015; Hojnacki et al. 2015; and also Chapter 9). For the
case of the United States, for example, Hojnacki et al. (2015) found that
only in about 10 per cent of all policy debates, do business interests face
off against other business interests. Much more frequent are cases in which
unified business faces a unified front of citizen groups. For the case of the EU,
Dür et al. (2015) also found that most legislative debates are shaped by such a
constellation of interests. In light of this evidence on the structure of conflict,
the existence of two distinct logics of lobbying means that institutional
reforms that enhance access will benefit some interests more than others.
Making access cheaper hence will not create a situation in which business
interests and other interests enjoy equal access to decision-makers. Rather,
business interests will find it even easier to gain access, whereas the incentives
for citizen groups to focus relatively more on outside lobbying are likely to
persist. Later, we argue that this may not be particularly problematic, but
decision-makers engaging in institutional reforms should still be aware of
this effect.
A Short Guide through This Book
In Chapter 2, we present the theoretical framework that forms the basis for
the more specific arguments developed in later chapters. It stresses variation
across group types in the severity of collective action problems and the
12
Introduction
resources they possess relatively abundantly. The combination of collective

action problems and resource endowment means that, for non-business
groups, the pursuit of survival and political influence do not necessarily
go hand-in-hand. For them, but not for business associations, sometimes
the aim to achieve one of these two objectives goes to the detriment of
attempts at reaching the other. The expectation then is for different types
of interest groups to follow distinct logics of lobbying—an insider logic and
an outsider logic.
In Chapter 3, we briefly describe our methodological approach. We present
the actor-centred and the policy-centred survey that allow us to examine our
argument empirically. The chapter contains information, such as on response
rates, that is essential to assess the plausibility of the findings presented in
later chapters. Chapter 4 then provides a map of interest group activity in
multilevel Europe. We draw on data from both the actor-centred survey and
the policy-centred survey to discuss key characteristics of the interest groups
that lobby in the European multilevel system and to give a first descriptive
overview of lobbying behaviour. The descriptive analysis of our data also
allows us to offer initial empirical support for some assumptions underlying
our argument and for some steps in our causal reasoning.
In Chapter 5, we use the argument set out in Chapter 2 to explain vari-
ation in lobbying strategies across interest groups. Basically, groups can
directly contact decision-makers (inside lobbying) and/or try to influence
policy-making by shaping public opinion or mobilizing the public (outside
lobbying). We argue and empirically show that business associations are more
likely to engage in inside lobbying and citizen groups and labour unions are
more likely to go public, with professional associations taking an interme-
diary position. The effect of group type, however, is conditional on groups’
endowment with material resources and the issue context: the differences are
largest for resource-rich groups and groups lobbying on distributive issues.
At the same time, we find few differences in strategy choice across types of
legislation (national versus European), suggesting that interest group char-
acteristics have a greater influence on strategy choice than the institutional
context. These findings offer powerful support for the theoretical framework
developed in Chapter 2.
The arguments presented in Chapters 2 and 5 suggest that group type and
resource endowment predispose groups towards an inside or an outside strat-
egy. In Chapter 6, we not only offer a second test of this argument, but also
push it a step further. In particular, we expect that the differences between
business actors and citizen groups in terms of strategy choice are largest when
they defend the status quo. By contrast, when they challenge the status quo,
the strategies chosen by the two types of groups tend to converge. We also
argue that business groups are lobbying insiders independently of both the
13
public salience of an issue and the relationship between their demands and
public attitudes on that issue. We find support for these expectations relying
on data from the policy-centred survey. Of particular interest is the result that
the distinction between lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders is valid for
each of the three campaigns that we covered in that survey.
In multilevel Europe, interest groups not only face a choice between more
or less inside and outside lobbying. They also need to decide how much
of their lobbying they should focus on national politics and how much
on EU politics. Much variation exists across groups with respect to this
aspect of lobbying strategy, with some groups being more ‘Europeanized’—
that is, more focused on the EU—than others. We explain this variation in
Chapter 7. Again drawing on the theoretical framework developed in
Chapter 2, we argue that the distinction between lobbying insiders and
lobbying outsiders offers a response to this question. Concretely, we expect
lobbying insiders—namely resource-rich business associations—to be more
Europeanized than other groups. Using data from our actor-centred survey of
interest groups in five European countries, we find support for our argument.
Data on groups’ Brussels offices, participation in EU consultations, member-
ship in EU-level expert groups, registration in the EU’s Transparency Register,
and membership in EU federations also back our argument.
In Chapter 8, we look at variation in the extent to which interest groups
gain access to different political institutions. The theoretical framework pre-
sented in Chapter 2 allows us to develop a theoretical argument that suggests
that business associations and professional associations should enjoy privi-
leged access to executive institutions such as the European Commission and
national governments; and citizen groups and labour unions to parliaments.
Again, we expect the difference across group types to be conditional on
resource endowment: the business advantage in terms of access to executive
institutions should be largest for groups rich in material resources. Relying on
data from the actor-centred survey, we find support for these expectations,
even while controlling for differences across groups in strategy choice. Our
findings thus are supportive of a view that sees the EU’s system of interest
representation as a form of ‘elite pluralism’ (Coen 1997). They also suggest
that contrary to some studies (Pollack 1997; Mazey 1998), a shift of authority
from the national to the supranational level does not necessarily grant better
access to groups with few contacts with national decision-makers. In other
words, lobbying outsiders remain in that category across different levels of
governance.
In a final empirical chapter (Chapter 9), we assess how the differences in
lobbying behaviour and access to decision-makers stressed in the previous
chapters shape groups’ ability to influence political decisions in Europe’s
multilevel polity. We do so by looking at three major decision-making
14
Another random document with
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To arrive there in time we should have to take the train next
morning. I went accordingly to the princess, who was the only person
whom I knew in Roumania, to ask her if she would come to my
assistance.
I called on her at nine o’clock in the morning. I was taken to the
second storey of the palace, to a room that was even prettier, if
possible, than the one in which I had been received the first time.
The princess received me. She was in her night-robe, and had
put on a dressing-gown of white silk over which her beautiful
dishevelled hair hung. She was still engaged in her toilet when I
arrived, but in order not to make me wait, she bade me come into
her little boudoir, where no one would disturb us. The room, filled
with well-chosen first editions, was in charming taste. Everywhere
there were little draped statuettes on pedestals. Beside the fireplace
was a very comfortable corner. In the midst of all these beautiful
objects one might have thought oneself in a miniature museum.
I asked her what she liked best among all the things there and
she replied, “the rosaries,” of which she had quite a collection. What
an artist she must be to bring together all these beautiful things.
“This is my room,” she said, while we were talking, “in which
whatever happens no one is permitted to bother me. I take refuge
here from time to time, and remain until I feel myself ready to face
the world once more.”
I then told her my troubles. She rang a bell, and gave an order to
let M. X—— know immediately that Miss Fuller would come to see
him with a card from her, and that M. X—— would kindly do
everything in his power to assist Miss Fuller.
I looked at her for some time and then I said to her:
“I should have liked greatly to know you without being aware that
you were a princess.”
“But,” she said, “it is the woman whom you now know and not the
princess.”
And that was true. I felt that I was in the presence of some one
who was really great, even if her birth had not made her so. I am
certain that she would have accomplished great things if she had not
found her career already mapped out for her from the day of her birth
in her father’s palace.
Everyone knows that a princess’ life precludes liberty, and
contains no possibility of breaking with the conventions for the sake
of doing something extraordinary or notable. These chains are so
strong that if one contrives to break them, it generally happens under
the impulse of despair, as a result of irritation and not for the sake of
a purely inspired work.
When I arose to take leave of the princess she kissed me and
said:
“If ever I come to Paris I shall call on you at your studio.”
She caused an attendant to accompany me to the master of
ceremonies, with whom I was to go to the bank. There the master of
ceremonies communicated Princess Marie’s order to the effect that I
was to be accommodated in any way I might desire.
The money I needed was advanced in return for a cheque, and I
left Bucharest.
The journey was full of troubles. Vexatious delays occurred.
Finally I arrived at Rome, where my appearance had to be
postponed until my baggage, lost in transit, had been found. Three
thousand people, who had come to my first performance, went away
without seeing me. That certainly was very hard luck. If I had been
able to foresee all that, I should never have ventured to intrude upon
the Princess.
In that case I should not have discovered what an admirable
woman she is.
XV
SEVERAL SOVEREIGNS
I N the course of my travels about the world, east, west, north and
south, over oceans and across continents, I have had the
experience of seeing or of encountering many persons of
distinction, including not a few sovereigns and members of royal
households.
It has seemed to me that it might be interesting to bring together
at this point some of the most typical of the incidents that occur to
me. Just as they come, drawn haphazard from memory, without
order or sequence, and with no thought of literary composition, I am
going to put them simply on paper, one by one.
How I Failed to see Queen Victoria.

One day at Nice some one came and asked me to dance before
Queen Victoria. She had just arrived on the Riviera to pass the
winter months, as she was accustomed to do every year.
It may well be believed that I was flattered by such a request. I
assented, naturally, and set myself to work making all my
preparations for this important event.
There was a knock at the door. A maid brought a telegram. It was
signed by my manager, and was couched in the following words:
“Take train this evening, to sail day after to-morrow; destination, New
York.”
I replied with a message pleading for a delay, for the purpose of
dancing before Queen Victoria.
I received simply the following laconic telegram:
“Impossible. Leave at once. Time is money.”
That’s why I did not dance before Queen Victoria.
I stop the Queen of the Belgians in the Street.

I was engaged for some performances at Spa. The evening of my
first appearance the Queen and Princess Clementine were in the
royal box. That was a gala evening, one on which the hall was
resplendent with magnificent gowns and jewels.
Everything went off perfectly.
Next morning I went for a walk with my mother. We were crossing
the causeway when a carriage, drawn by two spirited horses driven
by a middle-aged woman, bore down upon us.
Frightened on account of my mother, I threw up my arms in front
of the carriage, which stopped.
The lady allowed us to pass and, while thanking her, I remarked
to myself that a woman ought not to drive such lively horses.
I had forgotten the incident when, shortly after my return to the
hotel, I saw the same carriage go by.
Two gentlemen were talking on the landing near us.
“See. There is the Queen,” said one of them.
It was the Queen whom I had stopped!
Princely Simplicity.
At the Hague I was asked to give a performance before the
Grand Duke and Duchess of Mecklenburg, Princess Victoria of
Schaumburg-Lippe and their retinue.
The hall was well filled. I had the Philharmonic Society’s
orchestra.
This was a gala evening, and in every way a very successful one
for me.
Next day on coming down from my room I encountered on the
stairway of the hotel a lady with a very sweet expression, who asked
me:
“You are Miss Loie Fuller? Your dances interest me greatly. My
husband has gone out on the beach. Wouldn’t you like to come and
talk to him about your lighting effects. I am sure that would prove
very interesting to him.”
I gladly acquiesced and followed her.
I was delighted to talk to this woman and her husband, who
proved to be a most delightful man. I explained to them all my
schemes of lighting and my dances. I then took my leave and joined
my mother, who was waiting for me.
When I returned to the hotel the proprietor came to me and said:
“You met with great success yesterday, Miss Fuller, and with
even greater this morning.”
“This morning?”
“Yes. Do you know who the gentleman is with whom you have
just been talking?”
“No. Who is he?”
“The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg.”
This same day I boarded a street car.
On the car several people appeared to know me. One lady came
and sat beside me and began to talk.
When we arrived at our destination I asked her if she would not
tell me her name.
“Victoria de Schaumburg-Lippe.”
One evening when I was dancing at the Hague the princess was
in the hall with Major Winslow and others of her retinue. She sent for
me, and asked me to show her one of my robes.
I brought her the robe which I put on for the butterfly dance.
She took the stuff in her hand and said:
“The robe is really wonderful, but it is after all only what you do
that counts.”
I remember that she asked me to sign a photograph for her. And
when I returned to the hotel the manager of the Kurhaus handed to
me an exceedingly pretty watch, on the cover of which were
engraved these words:
“In memory of the performance given for Princess Victoria.”
The Curiosity of the Archduchesses of Austria.

I was once at the Swedish gymnasium at Carlsbad, where
machines with electrical vibrations shock you from head to foot. I
was just about to dress myself when one of the women of the place
came to me, and said:
“Won’t you please return to the hall, and pretend to take the
electric treatment again in order that the archduchesses, who are
there, with a whole crowd of court ladies, may see you?”
I replied: “Tell the archduchesses that they can see me this
evening at the theatre.”
The poor woman then declared to me that she had been
forbidden to mention their Royal Highnesses, and that they had
bidden her get me back into the hall on some pretext or other.
She was so grieved at not having succeeded that I returned to
the machines, and had my back massaged, in order that the noble
company might look at me at their ease, as they would survey an
interesting animal.
They looked at me, all of them, smiling, and while they viewed
me I never turned my eyes away from them.
The odd thing was that they did not know that I knew them. I was,
therefore, as much amused by them, and without their perceiving it,
as they were amused by me.
How I was not decorated with the Order of the Lion
and the Sun of Persia.
During one of the visits that the Shah of Persia pays to Paris, the
Marquis and Marquise d’Oyley, who were great friends of the
Sovereign and who were very fond of my dancing, brought the Shah
to one of my performances at Marigny.
After my appearance on the stage the Marquis and Marquise,
accompanied by some dignitaries of the sovereign’s retinue, came to
my dressing-room and brought me a Persian flag, which they
begged me to use in one of my dances.
What could I do with that heavy flag? In vain I racked my brain. I
could not discover any way. I could not refuse, and I was unable on
the other hand to convince them that it was impossible to try
anything so impromptu without running the risk of a failure.
More and more perplexed I made my entrance for the last dance.
I had the great flag in my arms. I tried to wave it gracefully, but I did
not succeed. I tried to strike a noble attitude, still holding the flag.
Again I failed. It was a woollen banner and would not float. Finally I
stood stock still, holding the staff upright, in as imposing an attitude
as possible. Then I bowed until the curtain fell.
My friends were surprised to observe that my last dance had
displeased his Majesty. The Shah finally told them that he did not
see why the Persian flag had been desecrated. No one dared to tell
him that the idea had not come from me, but from persons of his
retinue, or to inform him how I had received the flag.
My friends, the d’Oyleys, consoled me by saying that my pose
had been very noble and that even the flag, falling around me in
heavy folds, had produced a very striking effect.
The Shah decorates everybody who has attracted his attention;
that is a habit he has acquired. For my part, thanks to the brilliant
idea of the dignitaries from the court of Teheran, I have never seen
either the tail of the Lion or a ray of the Sun peculiar to Persian
decoration.
I have been told on other authority that on this evening the
Shah’s first thought was of a bomb which, so it had been announced,
was to be thrown at him in the hall. He was thinking of this rather
than of my person, my dances or even of the Persian flag I
“profaned.”
My Adventure with a Negro King.

At the Colonial exposition in Marseilles in 1907 I was with some
friends in the pavilion of one of the exhibitors when a magnificent
negro, six feet high, who looked like some prince from the Thousand
and One Nights, came upon the terrace where we sat. He was
accompanied by a large retinue. The other negroes were dressed
the same as he, but none of them had his magnificent presence.
Some French officials accompanied the visitors, who, naturally,
created a tremendous effect with their costumes, which were simple
but exquisitely finished. When they came near I exclaimed:
“He might be called a king out of a fairy tale!”
They passed before us and took their places in the reception hall.
The proprietor presently came to our group, and asked us if we
would not like to assist him in receiving the King of Djoloff in
Senegal.
“He is visiting the Exposition as a private citizen,” he added. “If
you would like to make his acquaintance come and I will present
you.”
I was charmed.
When I was in the presence of the king, I said quietly to my
friends, in a distinct voice and in French:
“What a handsome savage; I wonder if they are all built on this
model in Africa.”
I was presented to the king. He extended his hand, and, to my
consternation, I heard him say in very good French:
“I am delighted to make your acquaintance, Miss Fuller. I have
applauded you frequently. My education was gained in Paris.”
I could not repress an exclamation.
“Good heavens! Then you heard what I said, and you never
raised an eyelash!”
“No, since you did not suppose that I understood you.”
I looked at him for a minute or two to find out whether he had
been irritated or not. He smiled diplomatically and I felt that we
should be friends.
I was dancing at Marseilles at that time. He came to the theatre
to see me after the performance.
“What can we do that will give you pleasure in exchange for the
great satisfaction that your dances have just brought us?” he asked
me.
I thought the matter over a minute.
“I should like it very much if I might be present at one of your
religious ceremonies.”
The black chief promised to come to my hotel, and to give me an
idea of the ritualistic practices of his country.
The next day, accordingly, I made preparations for a tea-party in
the hotel garden. Rugs were spread on the grass and everything
was in readiness to receive the monarch.
“When will the ceremony begin?” I asked the king as soon as he
had arrived.
“We shall say our prayer at six o’clock, just at sunset.”
As night came on I observed that the king and his followers
began to survey the sky in every direction, and I wondered why.
Noting my wonderment, the king told me that they were
endeavouring to get their bearings in order to be certain of the point
toward which the sun was tending at the end of his journey.
“We are required,” he said, “always to pray with our faces toward
the setting sun.”
He gave the order to begin the ceremony then and there. I wish I
could describe it as perfectly as I saw it.
The unity of the motions of all these men was simply wonderful.
All together they said the same brief prayer, and with mechanical
precision made the same movement, which, from the point of view of
devotion, seemed to have similar importance to the words of their
ritual. The large white cloaks, spread over long blue blouses, waved
round their bodies. The men prostrated themselves, touched the
ground with their foreheads and then raised themselves together.
The rhythm and precision were most impressive. It was really very,
very beautiful.
After the prayers the king told me that his father had been
dethroned and then exiled from Senegal by the French Government.
As for himself, in his turn he had been nominated chief of his tribe,
for in reality there was no longer a king. He was a French subject,
and in his country, which was tributory to France, he was no more
than chief of his clan.
But the majesty remained, nevertheless, magnificently expressed
in his features.
While we were conversing I asked permission to put some
indiscreet questions. After he had consented, all the while smiling his
peculiarly winning smile, I asked him if he was married?
He replied in the affirmative. He had four wives. As I appeared to
be surprised to note that he travelled without them, especially in a
country where there are so many pretty women, he, in his turn,
looked at me for some time, and replied:
“From the point of view of my wives a white woman has neither
charm nor beauty.”
This surprised me greatly, and I asked him whether that was
because they had never seen any white women.
“Oh,” he replied, “in any case they would not be jealous of a white
woman. It seems to them absolutely impossible that a pale-faced
woman can play any part in my life.”
“And you? Are you so sure of that? If a white woman with long
blonde hair should suddenly appear in your country, among your
black women, would she not be taken for an angel?”
“Oh, no. She would be taken for a devil. Angels are black in our
Paradise.”
This, I must confess, opened new vistas in the domain of religion.
It had never before appeared so clear to me that men make their
gods in their own image, rather than that the gods make men after
theirs.
How the Empress of China Degraded a Mandarin on

my Account.
I was dancing in New York when several of Li Hung Chang’s
followers came to the theatre. Some friends presented me to the
American military attaché, Mr. Church, who accompanied the
Viceroy.
Thanks to Mr. Church I was able to satisfy my curiosity and
become acquainted with these high Chinese dignitaries. When they
left for their own country my manager went with them, in the hope
that, through their good offices, I might dance at the Chinese court in
the presence of the dowager Empress and her son.
As soon as my representative was in China, he cabled me that
everything had been arranged and that I was to take the first
steamer leaving Vancouver.
After crossing the continent I was on the point of embarking with

my mother, when the state of her health caused me the keenest
anxiety. Her prostration was so complete that I was obliged to send a
message to China, indicating the impossibility of keeping my
engagement.
My manager rejoined us utterly dejected.
At Pekin a magnificent reception had been prepared for me. I
was to dance before the Emperor and Empress and then in Japan I
was to appear before the Mikado. The theatre of the best Japanese
actor, Danjero, was to be put at my disposal. And all that to no
purpose whatever. My manager brought back from this oriental
country the most marvellous of embroideries, which Li Hung Chang
had sent over for me.
I experienced genuine regret at the failure of this trip, then I forgot
all about it.
One evening in London one of my friends at dinner found herself
seated next to a very high Chinese official. Apropos of the rich
colouring of the mandarin’s garments, they came to speak about me
and my coloured dances, and my friend said to her companion:
“You are acquainted with Loie Fuller, I presume.”
“Well, yes, madam,” he replied. “I am only too well acquainted
with her, if I may say so.”
“How is that?”
“I went to the United States with Li Hung Chang. Loie Fuller’s
manager accompanied us on our return to China, and, through the
influence of the Viceroy, we gained permission for Loie Fuller to
appear before the Empress. Just as she was about to leave for
Pekin she broke her agreement. It fell upon me to inform her Majesty
that Loie Fuller was unable to obey the Imperial mandate. The
Empress had me degraded! That was eight years ago. I lost my
yellow jacket, which has only recently been restored to me.”
My friend pleaded my case, alleging the condition of my mother’s
health, and the seriousness of her malady at the time of my failure to
report in the celestial empire.
I suppose that it would be too much to expect of His Excellency
to ask him to forgive my mistake. If I had known that my failure to
appear would be attended with such consequences, I should,
instead of cabling to my manager, have forwarded a long dispatch to
the Empress herself, telling her the reasons for my failure to keep an
engagement. A woman with a heart, even if she be an Empress,
could not blame a daughter for doing her duty towards her mother.
How Queen Alexandra did not fail to see me.

One morning the papers said that the King and Queen of
England were going to spend several days in Paris.
I was then dancing at the Hippodrome and, remembering what
Princess Marie of Roumania had told me, I decided not to let this
occasion slip, and I wrote to the Queen herself, asking if she would
be kind enough to set aside an hour in which I might give a
performance, at her own convenience and whenever she chose.
I should never, indeed, have supposed it possible to ask her to
come to the Hippodrome. One of her maids of honour answered the
note, saying that Her Majesty’s stay was of limited duration, and that
she had already accepted too many invitations to undertake any new
engagements.
After that I thought no more of the Queen.
Arriving at a matinee one Thursday, I noticed in front of the
Hippodrome quite an impressive line of carriages, all displaying the
royal insignia.
“The Queen has sent some one to my matinee,” I thought. “She
wants to know whether my dances are really worth seeing. If I make
a pleasant impression the Queen will perhaps some day ask me to
dance before her.”
I went into my dressing-room. I had nearly finished my
preparations when the manager rushed in post haste calling out:
“It’s four o’clock and the Queen has been waiting since half-past
two.”
“What! The Queen is here! Why didn’t you inform me sooner?”
He was too unnerved to make a lengthy explanation. I hurried
down and two minutes later I was on the stage.
In the middle of my dance the Queen arose and left the theatre
with all her attendants. I saw her rise and go!
I thought the floor would open and engulf me. What had I done to
offend her? Was she indignant that I had made her wait? Was this
her way of punishing me for my discourtesy, or did my dances
displease her? What was I to think?
I went home in utter despair.
I had just realised one of my dearest wishes, that of dancing
before the Queen. Never had I experienced such dejection. I should
have preferred a thousand times that she had not come.
I learned afterward at the theatre that a telephone message had
come shortly after noon to the effect that the Queen wished to see
Loie Fuller, but that she would have to leave at four o’clock.
The manager, who had supposed that the Queen was coming to
see the Hippodrome, had not attached any importance to the
intimation regarding me, and did not even take the trouble to find out
whether I was there or not.
Next morning all the papers recorded that the Queen of England
had come to the Hippodrome, despite her many appointments and
engagements made some time earlier, and so forth and so forth.
There was not a word about me.
However, as I had written to the Queen to ask her to come it
seemed to me that I ought to excuse myself for my apparent
discourtesy. I wrote to her accordingly, telling her how distressed I
was at my failure to appear earlier—a failure that would not have
occurred if some one had come to apprise me. I regretted that the
message had not been forwarded to me instead of to the manager.
That same evening one of my friends came to tell me that she
had written the day before to one of the Queen’s maids of honour,
whom she knew personally, asking her to come and see me dance
at the Hippodrome.
Photo Lafitte
THE DANCE OF THE BUTTERFLY
“That will make your new dances celebrated all over the world,”
said my friend. “The Queen will come, I am certain of it, if it is at all
possible.”
Overcome with surprise, I looked at my friend, and exclaimed:
“Well, then, that is why she came this afternoon!”
“Has she already come to see you? I should not have expected
such promptness.”
“She came to the matinee.”
And I told my friend the whole story in detail.
She still could not understand why the Queen had left so hastily,
and enquired into the reason.
Presently everything was explained.
The Queen had agreed to visit a painter’s studio at half-past
three and then, at four o’clock, to call upon M. and Mme. Loubet.
Nevertheless she remained at the Hippodrome until ten minutes past
four. The King went alone to the studio and the Queen arrived late at
the President’s house.
After that I fully appreciated her kindness, her patience. I still feel
endless gratitude to her for having waited so long, for not having left
the theatre without seeing, if it was only for a moment, Loie Fuller
and her dances.
As for the manager, he is still convinced that the Queen did not
come to see Loie Fuller, but the Hippodrome, and only the
Hippodrome.
XVI
OTHER MONARCHS
I SHALL always remember with great pleasure my six hundredth

appearance in Paris.
I was then dancing at the Athénée. The whole house had been
bought up by students. When I came on the stage each spectator
threw a bunch of violets at me. It took five minutes to gather up the
flowers.
When I had finished dancing, a fresh avalanche of flowers poured
upon the stage. During the performance I received from my
admirers, along with an album of sketches signed with names,
several of which are now famous, an exquisite statuette representing
me in a characteristic attitude.
When I was ready to leave the theatre, the students took my
horses out of the shafts and drew my carriage themselves. At the
Madeleine the crowd was so dense that the police warned us to
stop. But as soon as they had learned that it was “La Loie” in whose
honour the triumphal procession was decreed, we had permission to
go our way without interruption. The young men drew my carriage all
the way to Passy, where I lived. They conscientiously awakened all
the inhabitants with their outcries.
Finally we reached the house. I did not know what I was going to
do with these boys, but they themselves solved the problem without
delay.
After they had rung the bell and as soon as my gate had swung
on its hinges they emitted a shout all together, and started to run
away as if possessed. I could hear them for a long time afterwards,
shouting: “Vive l’art! Vive La Loie!”
I have often wondered whether the police were as lenient on their
return.
In Marseilles, at the time of the Colonial Exposition, one of the
commissioners of fine arts asked me if I would not like to perform
out-of-doors.
That was one of my dearest wishes, and I consented readily.
Preparations were made at once for my performance, which was
to be given in the same place where we had admired the King of
Cambodia’s dancers. The stage was built opposite to the Grand
Palais.
The director of the Exposition had placed behind the platform
some great plants, in order that I might be relieved against a
background of green foliage, which would be particularly favourable
to the brilliancy of the figures in the foreground. Below the stage
were two little ponds, with sparkling fountains.
The evening of my first appearance arrived. I was feverishly
impatient.
Nothing had been done to advertise it to the public of Marseilles,
for we regarded this first evening as a kind of rehearsal, which we
should repeat a week later, if it met with success. It was only this
next performance that we expected to announce formally.
It was a starlight night. There were at least thirty thousand visitors
at the Exposition.
The lights were put out and the crowd rushed towards the
platform. In spite of its impromptu character the performance was a
remarkable success, and the committee decided from this time on to
continue to give outdoor performances.
During the second evening, just as the lights were about to be
extinguished, a man came and said to me as I was on my way to the
stage:
“Just look, before they put the lights out, at the human wave
curling at your feet.”
I had never seen anything like it.
After the electric lights had been shut off I began to dance. The
rays of light enveloped me. There was a movement in the crowd,
which reverberated in echoes like the mutterings of a storm.
Exclamations followed, “Ohs” and “Ahs,” which fused into a sort
of roar, comparable to the wailing of some giant animal.
You can hardly imagine anything like it. It seemed to me that on
my account alone this spectacle was presented by all this moving
crowd before me.
A calm ensued. The orchestra, not a very large one, seemed to
me utterly ineffective in such a space. The audience, which was
seated on the other side of the fountains, certainly could not hear it.
The first dance came to its close. The extinguishing of my lighting
apparatus left us, the public and me, in utter darkness. The uproar of
the applause became something fantastic in the dead of night. It was
like the beating of a single pair of hands, but so powerful that no
noise in the world could be compared with it.
I danced four times, and the different sensations expressed by
the audience were most remarkable. They gave me the most vivid
impression I have ever experienced. It was something immense,
gigantic, prodigious.
That day I had a feeling that the crowd was really the most
powerful of monarchs.
There are other monarchs as well as kings and crowds. Certain
emotions are kings, too.
At Nice, at the Riviera Palace Hotel, I noticed one day at a table
near mine a young man of distinguished appearance whose glance
met my own several times successively, almost, one would fancy, in
spite of himself. During the following days we surveyed each other
again and again at meal times, but without progressing further
towards acquaintance.
I had a number of friends with me. He was alone. Gradually my
heart went out to him, although we had never exchanged a word. I
did not know who he was, and I had no notion of seeking his
acquaintance. Yet his brown eyes and his type of personality, calm
and simple, exerted a sort of fascination over me. A week later I
discovered, to my great confusion, that I was perpetually haunted by
his eyes and that I could not forget his smile.
One evening there was a ball at the hotel. I was invited, of
course.
As I have already said, I had a great many friends there. All at
once, in a corner, I noticed my neighbour of the dining-hall. He spoke
to no one. He was not dancing. I began to feel sorry to see him so
entirely alone. My sympathy went out more than ever towards him.
Some days later I was engaged for a performance that was to
take place at the hotel in honour of a Russian grand duke, two kings
and an empress.
I remember that Patti was in the front row. When I appeared
before this choice assembly, a single figure persisted in detaching
itself from the rest of the crowd. It was the figure of my unknown
young man. Who could he be to be noted thus, in the role of an
invited guest, among these princes and princesses? He rested his
elbow on the back of his chair. His hand was under his chin. His legs
were crossed with easy negligence. He looked at me continuously.
Everybody applauded over and over again. He alone did not lift a
finger.
Who was this man? Why did his countenance haunt me? Why
did he watch me so insistently? Why did he not join in the applause?
The next day, on the verandah, I was comfortably seated in a
rocking-chair, all the while wondering who my handsome dark man
could be. Coming back to earth I saw him there by my side,
ensconced in one of those odd willow seats that enclose you as in a
sentry box.
His eyes again met mine. We did not speak, but both of us
experienced a deep desire to exchange greetings. Just at that
moment the hotel manager came up and began to talk to us. Then,
observing that we were not acquainted, he introduced us. I learned
then that he was son of an industrial leader of international standing

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Insiders versus Outsiders

Insiders versus Outsiders

Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo

General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, IMT

2. Lobbying Insiders and Lobbying Outsiders 16

3. Studying Lobbying in Multilevel Europe 38

4. A Map of Interest Group Activity in Europe 47

5. Strategies I: Gaining Access or Going Public 70

6. Strategies II: Insiders and Outsiders in Three Campaigns 97

7. Europeanization: Business Associations as Multilevel Players 124

8. Access: Bias in the Heavenly Choir 150

9. Influence: Lobbying, Public Salience, and Outcomes 182

10. Conclusion 208

Annex A: Questionnaire for the Actor-Centred Survey 225

3.1 Composition of country samples by group type 41

1.1 Lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders 5

Lobbying is ubiquitous in contemporary Europe. At various levels of

Insiders versus Outsiders

interference with democracy that leads to the promotion of some interests to

The Argument in a Nutshell

Insiders versus Outsiders

Table 1.1 Lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders

Lobbying insiders Lobbying outsiders

Prototype Resource-rich Citizen groups

decisions when an issue is not amenable to outside lobbying. The lobbying

Studying Interest Groups in Multilevel Europe

Insiders versus Outsiders

Eastern European (Latvia) country. We received 880 responses from business

groups with offices in Brussels. Finally, we draw on a large number of other

The State of the Art

Insiders versus Outsiders

representation may no longer matter much for interest groups’ access to EU

Insiders versus Outsiders

Two conclusions emerge from this brief overview of studies on interest

The Value Added

Insiders versus Outsiders

A Short Guide through This Book

resources they possess relatively abundantly. The combination of collective

Insiders versus Outsiders

How I Failed to see Queen Victoria.

I stop the Queen of the Belgians in the Street.

The Curiosity of the Archduchesses of Austria.

My Adventure with a Negro King.

How the Empress of China Degraded a Mandarin on

After crossing the continent I was on the point of embarking with

How Queen Alexandra did not fail to see me.

I SHALL always remember with great pleasure my six hundredth

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