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HIDDEN POWER
JAMES COCKAYNE
Hidden Power
The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime
A
A
Oxford University Press is a department of the
University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective
of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
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Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by
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Copyright © James Cockayne 2016
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
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You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
James Cockayne.
Hidden Power: The Strategic Logic of Organized Crime.
ISBN: 9780190627331
Acknowledgments xv
Abbreviations xvii
List of Tables xix
PART ONE
A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO ORGANIZED CRIME
1.╇Introduction 3
Making sense of criminal power 5
Entering a gallery of mirrors 7
About this book 10
2.╇The Strategic Organization of Crime 15
What do we know about political-criminal interaction? 16
Criminal strategy and governmental power 20
Individual, network or organizational strategy? 27
Social bandits and primitive criminal strategy 30
Criminal capabilities 31
â•…Coercion 32
â•…Corruption 34
â•…Communications 38
â•… Command and control 40
Conclusion 44
PART TWO
EPISODES IN CRIMINAL STRATEGY
3.╇Tammany: ‘How New York is Governed’, 1859–1920 47
NewYork’s government: machine made 51
vii
CONTENTS
â•… Guardians of the Revolution 51
â•… Gangs of New York 54
â•… The ghost in the machine 56
Boss Tweed: Lord of the Rings 59
â•… A quest for influence 59
â•… Monarch of Manhattan 63
â•…Downfall 67
â•… Honest graft 73
Conclusion 79
4.╇Mafia Origins, 1859–1929 83
Origins 86
â•… Profiting from transition 86
â•… Organizing the Sicilian mafia 90
Mafia migration 94
â•… The Black Hand 97
â•… Modern Family 98
â•… Illicit government 101
â•… The Iron Prefect 104
Conclusion 107
5.╇War and Peace in the American Mafia, 1920–1941 109
War 111
â•… Prohibition as a driver of innovation 111
â•… Civil war in the American mafia 114
â•… Mediation and betrayal 118
Peace 120
â•… Five Families 120
â•… Coup d’état 121
â•… A new governmental approach 123
Consolidating power 127
â•… Racketeering and union power 127
â•… Gambling innovation and political finance 129
Fall of a czar 133
â•… Playing kingmaker 133
â•… Mobbing up 135
â•… The Boy Scout 138
Conclusion 142
viii
CONTENTS
6.╇The Underworld Project, 1941–1943 147
‘This is a war’ 150
â•… Enlisting the underworld 150
â•… Regular guys 152
â•… Lucky’s break 154
â•… From watchdog to attack dog 158
Invading Italy 160
â•… Local knowledge 160
â•… Creating a fifth column 162
â•… Release and exile 164
Conclusion 165
7.╇Governing Sicily, 1942–1968 169
‘A bargain has been struck’ 170
â•… Black market rents 170
â•… ‘Wine and women and champagne’ 173
â•… ‘Our good friends’ 176
Mafia separatism 178
â•… Confrontation, accommodation or withdrawal? 178
â•… The logic of mafia separatism 180
â•… Seeking Great Power protection 182
â•… Negotiating peace with the mafia 184
â•… A bandit army 186
â•… Settlement and betrayal 190
Negotiating Sicily’s transition 193
â•… A Sicilian political machine 193
â•… Wisdom of the Mob 196
â•… The sack of Palermo 198
Conclusion 200
8.╇The Cuba Joint Venture, 1933–1958 203
Buying into Cuba 205
â•… Rise of a strongman 205
â•… The ‘Batista Palace Gang’ 208
â•…Gangsterismo 211
A joint venture in government 214
â•… The Havana Mob 214
â•… Rebellion in the Mob 218
ix
CONTENTS
â•… Revolution in Cuba 221
Conclusion 224
9.╇The Blue Caribbean Ocean, 1959–1983 227
‘A gangland style killing’ 229
â•… Accommodation or confrontation? 229
â•… Internationalizing Murder, Inc. 231
â•… Seeking protection 236
Subversion and its unintended consequences 237
â•… What went wrong at the Bay of Pigs? 237
â•… Learning from the Mob? 239
â•… Cold War wildcard: the Missile Crisis 245
â•… Did the magic button backfire? 249
The Bahamas and the birth of offshore capitalism 251
â•… Invading Haiti 251
â•… Casino capitalism 252
â•… Ballots, not bullets 255
Epilogue: a city by the Atlantic 257
Conclusion 260
PART THREE
THE MARKET FOR GOVERNMENT
10.╇Strategic Criminal Positioning 267
╇ The market for government 268
╇ Intermediation: mafia logic 273
╇ Autonomy: warlordism and gang rule 276
╇ Merger: joint ventures 280
╇ Strategic alliances 282
╇ Terrorism as criminal positioning strategy 285
╇ Relocation and blue ocean strategy 288
11.╇Innovation, Disruption and Strategy beyond the State 291
╇ Innovation and disruption 292
╇╅ Mexico: from narcocartels to narcocults 292
╇╅ The shifting sands of the Sahel 298
╇╅ The disruption of sovereignty 303
╇ Implications 306
╇╅ War and strategy beyond the state 306
╇╅ Combating criminal governmentality 308
x
CONTENTS
╇╅ Managing criminal spoilers in peace and transition
╇╅╅processes 312
╇ Envoi: the rise of criminal statecraft 321
Notes 325
References 417
Index 449
xi
‘In this episode … the pressure of a hidden power was felt…’
Michele Pantaleone*
*↜渀屮↜渀屮↜渕Michele Pantaleone, The Mafia and Politics (London: Chatto & Windus,
1966), p.â•–190.
xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This little expedition would not have found its way ‘there and back’
without a diverse set of supporters. I owe them all great thanks. The
navigational guidance from two advisers at King’s College London,
Professor Mats Berdal and Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, was cen-
tral to my safe passage. Several bosses indulged and even encouraged
my curiosity: at United Nations University, David Malone and Max
Bond; at the Global Center for Cooperative Security, Alistair Millar.
Comments on drafts from Louise Bosetti, Christopher Coker, Rachel
Davis, John de Boer, Sebastian von Einsiedel, Antonio Giustozzi and
Sonja Litz all helped send me in productive new directions. At Hurst,
Michael Dwyer and Jon de Peyer provided invaluable support.
â•… Staff at the New York Public Library, National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, Maryland, and the British National
Archives, Kew, provided considerable assistance. Lori Birrell and
Melinda Wallington at the University of Rochester deserve particular
thanks. The entire undertaking depended upon the financial support of
the Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy at King’s College London.
â•… A solo sailor also needs occasional visitors to his humble bark to
provide moral support and an intellectual puff in his sails. I am grateful
for such impetus to the following, some of whom may not fully appre-
ciate the stimulation they provided: Enrique Desmond Arias, Sara
Batmanglich, Ivan Briscoe, Mike Dziedzic, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Stefan
Feller, Mervyn Frost, Peter Gastrow, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Alison
Hawks, Camino Kavanagh, Walter Kemp, David Kennedy, David
Kilcullen, Michael Miklaucic, Rachel Locke, Francesco Mancini, Zoe
xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Mentel, Rob Muggah, Tuesday Reitano, Mark Shaw and Kimana
Zulueta-Fülscher.
â•… Were it not for two people in particular, however, I would long ago
have given up on the whole expedition. My chief investor, JMC, gave
me the means to set out in the first place, and the keel of faith that
allowed me to hold my course. There was room for only one observer
in the dinghy with me: RAD’s utter reliability, good humour, moral
encouragement, helpful commentary and grace, throughout the voy-
age, provided the wind in my sails. It is to those two hidden powers
behind this enterprise that the result is dedicated.
xvi
ABBREVIATIONS
xvii
ABBREVIATIONS
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States. (See
under US Department of State in ‘Published
official documents and government memo-
randa’, in the References section)
G-3 Experimental Detachment G-3, cover name
for Office of Strategic Services
GIA Groupe Islamique Armé (Algeria)
GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le
Combat (the Maghreb and the Sahel)
Islamic State al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham (a.k.a.
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS))
JICA US Joint Intelligence Collecting Agency
Kefauver Committee US Senate Special Committee to Investigate
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce
(81st Congress, 1950–51)
MAA Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (Mali)
McClellan Committee US Senate Select Committee on Improper
Activities in Labor and Management (85th
and 86th Congress, 1957–60)
MIS Movimento per l’Indipendenza della Sicilia
(Movement for the Independence of Sicily)
MNLA Mouvement National de Libération de
l’Azawad (Mali)
MUJAO Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en
Afrique de l’Ouest (West Africa and the
Sahel)
ONI US Office of Naval Intelligence
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PLP Progressive Liberal Party (The Bahamas)
PRG Provisional Revolutionary Government
(Cuba, 1933–34)
PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Mexico)
UBP United Bahamian Party
xviii
LIST OF TABLES
xix
PART ONE
A STRATEGIC APPROACH
TO ORGANIZED CRIME
1
INTRODUCTION
3
HIDDEN POWER
extortion, money-laundering, drug trafficking and controlling offshore
investments in strategic industries (including aluminium and energy).3
By 2012, a leading observer of transnational organized crime, Moisés
Naím, was warning of the risk of ‘mafia states’ emerging worldwide.4
Other leading analysts including Misha Glenny, Douglas Farah and John
T. Picarelli all raised similar concerns, highlighting the convergence of
€
criminal, political and business power in Latin America, Africa and Asia.5
â•… It is not hard to find other signs of an apparent worldwide ‘conver-
gence’ of organized criminal activity and armed political and military
activity. The North Korean government stands accused of participation
in global counterfeiting and drug-running activities.6 In the Middle
East, organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Islamic State in
Syria and Iraq combine social service provision, localized governance
and participation in a range of offshore illicit activities with militant
activity.7 Armed groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mali and Myanmar
have engaged in drug trafficking, sometimes with the connivance or
even participation of state actors. In Central Africa, the traffic in min-
erals and wildlife seems to fuel conflict.8 In Somalia, organized piracy
emerged a decade ago as a central factor in the country’s political
economy—and its complex politics and long-running civil war.9 In the
Sahel and North Africa, militant, terrorist and militia fortunes have
been tied to dynamics in organized hostage markets and in drug, oil
and cigarette smuggling.10 In the Balkans, cigarette smuggling, organ
trafficking, human trafficking and the trade in stolen cars have all been
factors in the sub-region’s recent bloody past and post-war politics.11
And in Central America, skyrocketing homicide rates, the result of
local actors’ struggles to control the drug trade, human trafficking and
extortion markets, have topped those of active war zones such as
Afghanistan, Syria and South Sudan.
â•… Global governance institutions such as the World Bank and United
Nations Security Council increasingly recognize that organized crime
and political instability have become entwined.12 Global powers such
as the United States have also begun to warn that this ‘convergence’
threatens their core interests. The 2011 White House Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime asserted that criminal networks:
threaten US interests by forging alliances with corrupt elements of national
governments and using the power and influence of those elements to further
their criminal activities… to the detriment of the United States.13
4
INTRODUCTION
â•… What are the strategic implications of this apparent ‘convergence’ of
political, military, business and criminal power? Some authors such as
Naím and Farah argue that criminal power is now so ubiquitous and
significant in the international system that it threatens to disrupt states’
established ways of doing business. We may be entering, they imply, a
dangerous new ‘era’ of mafia states. How are strategic decision-makers
to tell if the executive in his $3,000 suit and his Gucci loafers is a
government spy, a businessman, a crook—or all three? And if we can-
not tell them apart, how are we to prevent mafias, or other criminal
groups, from infiltrating global politics and abusing the privileges and
powers of statehood? How do we prevent states from working with, or
acting like, mafias? And how can states deal strategically with groups
whose whole strategic approach is intended to keep their power—over
governments, markets and civil society—hidden?
5
HIDDEN POWER
crime to be explicitly named, lest the representatives of the country in
question take offence and cease cooperating.
â•… As a result, many of the responses that states and international orga-
nizations use to tackle organized crime overlook the central, uncom-
fortable truth laid out by Jim Woolsey in 1999—politics and crime are
much harder to tell apart in practice than they are in theory. The White
House Strategy, mentioned above, talks about organized criminals ‘forg-
ing alliances’ with state actors ‘to further their criminal activities’ to
the detriment of the United States, but has little to say about how
criminals forge and use these alliance—that is, their strategies.15 This
lack of attention to criminal strategy is not uncommon: one review of
the academic literature on organized crime found that most studies
focus on ‘the structural dimensions and their determinants without
attending to theory of organizational behavior’.16 But by overlooking
the power of criminal groups to shape their own strategic—including
political—environments, our responses to criminal groups tend not to
anticipate criminal spoiling behaviour.17 They are, in other words,
a-strategic.
â•… This is dangerous. By ignoring the political power and strategies of
criminal groups, we risk overlooking a major force shaping contempo-
rary global affairs. Scholars have argued since the early 1990s that
criminal actors were gaining power and influence within the interna-
tional system,18 and some have even suggested that organized crime is
corroding state capacity and the state system itself.19 The dangers are
manifold: that we are forced to respond to threats from organized
crime without a clear understanding of what strategies will be effective
against it;20 that security becomes a private service sold by criminal
actors in a global market, rather than a public good provided by
states;21 and that states lose the ability to trust each other, undermining
international cooperation.22
â•… Our failure to understand the political strategies of criminal groups
also makes it difficult to make sense of the large-scale criminal violence
we see today in Central America, Afghanistan and parts of West Africa.
Some of this rivals—or even outstrips—the violence of contemporary
wars. Between 2007 and 2014, some 103,000 people were killed in
Iraq and Afghanistan. In comparison, there were 164,000 homicides in
Mexico in the same period.23 For those caught within it, this organized
6
INTRODUCTION
criminal violence is just as devastating, and just as totalizing, as war was
when it was explained by Clausewitz two hundred years ago.24 As
Roberto Saviano, an Italian public intellectual who grew up among the
Camorra organized crime group in Naples, put it:
When the armies take to the streets, it is impossible to move according to
any other dynamic than their strategy; it is they who decide meaning,
motives, causes.25
â•… An insider of the Sicilian mafia (Cosa Nostra) is even more explicit
about the similarity between large-scale organized criminal violence
and war:
It was as if I was a soldier for a state, my state Cosa Nostra … I was only
interested in the opinion of my people, the people of Cosa Nostra, I wasn’t
interested in anybody else’s opinion, just as an Italian soldier wouldn’t be
interested in the opinion of [enemies such as] the Yugoslavs or Germans.26
â•… As things stand, however, we struggle to explain this criminal vio-
lence and power, central to many people’s lives today. We cannot fore-
see how and when criminal groups will develop the kinds of govern-
mental power—the power to set norms, resolve disputes, and allocate
resources—that can lead to this all-defining, all-consuming violence.
We struggle to make sense of criminal strategy.
7
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Fjodorovitš katuu tekoaan, minä tiedän sen, ja jos hän vain voi tulla
luoksenne tai, mikä olisi parasta, tavata teidät taas samassa
paikassa, niin hän pyytäisi teiltä anteeksi kaikkien kuullen… jos sitä
haluatte.
— Ei, ei, päinvastoin hän tekee kaiken, mitä vain haluatte ja miten
vain haluatte!
7.
Ja raittiissa ilmassa
— Ilma on raitista, mutta minun saleissani on todellakin
tukahduttavaa sanan kaikissa merkityksissä. Kävelkäämme, hyvä
herra, hitaasti. Kovin tekisi mieleni herättää teissä mielenkiintoa.
— Kyllä, hyvin kipeästi, ja hän oli hyvin ärtynyt. Hän kosti minulle
teidän puolestanne, koska olen Karamazov, se on minulle nyt
selvää. Mutta olisittepa nähnyt, miten hän oli kivisodassa
koulutovereittensa kanssa! Se on hyvin vaarallista, he voivat hänet
tappaa, he ovat lapsia ja ymmärtämättömiä, kivi lentää ja voi
puhkaista pään.
— Ja onkin jo sattunut, jos ei päähän, niin rintaan, sydämen
yläpuolelle, siihen on tänään kivi iskenyt, siinä on mustelma, tuli
kotiin itkien ja voihkien ja on nyt sairas.
Aljoša oli sanomattoman iloinen, että oli tuonut niin paljon onnea ja
että miesparka oli suostunut ottamaan onnensa vastaan.
— Seis, Aleksei Fjodorovitš, seis, — tarttui alikapteeni taas
uuteen, äkkiä mieleen nousseeseen haaveeseen ja riensi taas
puhumaan hurjan kiireesti, — tiedättekö, että me Iljuškan kanssa
kenties muitta mutkitta toteutammekin haaveemme: ostamme
hevosen ja rattaat, pikimustan hevosen, ja lähdemme matkaan,
niinkuin toissa päivänä kuvailimme. Minä tunnen K:n
kuvernementissa erään asianajajan, hän on lapsuudenystävä,
minulle on ilmoitettu luotettavan miehen välityksellä, että jos menen
sinne, niin hän muka antaa siellä minulle konttorissaan
kirjeenvaihtajan toimen, niin että mene tiedä, vaikkapa antaisikin…
Jospa siis panisi ajopeleihin äiti-kullan ja Ninan ja panisi Iljuškan
kuskipukille ja jos siitä sitten syyttä suotta tulisikin velkaa niskaan
täällä, niin ehkäpä riittää siihenkin!
Aljošan teki mieli syleillä häntä, niin tyytyväinen hän oli. Mutta
katsahdettuaan alikapteeniin hän yht'äkkiä jäi liikkumatta seisomaan:
tämä seisoi kaula kurotettuna, huulet pitkälle venytettyinä, kasvot
raivostuneen näköisinä ja kalpeina, ja kuiski jotakin huulillaan, aivan
kuin olisi tahtonut saada jotakin lausutuksi. Ääntä ei lähtenyt, mutta
huulet liikkuivat yhä, ja se oli perin omituista kaikki.
— Mitä nyt! — sanoi Aljoša hätkähtäen jostakin syystä.
— Minkä tempun!
— Siinä ovat teidän rahanne! Siinä ovat teidän rahanne! Siinä ovat
teidän rahanne! Siinä ovat teidän rahanne! — Hän hypähti äkkiä
takaisin ja ojentautui suoraksi Aljošan eteen. Koko hänen
olemuksensa ilmaisi sanoin selittämätöntä ylpeyttä.
— Mitä olisin voinut sanoa pojalleni, jos olisin ottanut teiltä rahoja
häpeämme korvaukseksi? — Ja tämän sanottuaan hän lähti
juoksemaan kääntymättä enää ympäri. Aljoša katseli hänen
jälkeensä sanomattoman murheellisena. Oi, hän ymmärsi, että tuo
mies aivan viimeiseen silmänräpäykseen saakka ei tietänyt, että hän
puristaa setelit kokoon ja paiskaa ne menemään. Pois juokseva ei
käännähtänyt kertaakaan, Aljoša tiesi kyllä, että hän ei katsoisi
taakseen. Hän ei tahtonut lähteä miehen jäljessä juoksemaan eikä
kutsua häntä, hän tiesi minkä tähden. Mutta kun toinen katosi
näkyvistä, otti Aljoša maasta molemmat setelit. Ne olivat hyvin
rypistetyt, litistetyt ja hiekkaan poljetut, mutta aivan eheät, vieläpä
rutisivatkin kuin uudet, kun Aljoša levitti ne auki ja silitti niitä.