AMEGBE v.

TEPA
[1960] GLR 7

Division: IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

Date: 19TH JANUARY, 1960.
Before: KORSAH C.J., VAN LARE J.A. AND GRANVILLE
SHARP J.A.

Defamation—Customary law—Innuendo that elected chief an imposter—Whether “a matter of a

constitutional nature”—Jurisdiction of Native Court.

HEADNOTES
In an action in the Kpandu District Court “A” for defamation based upon publication of words to the
effect that a chief, (an Odikro and declared by a competent tribunal as such) was an imposter,
judgment was given for the plaintiff. The defendant applied to the High Court for a writ of certiorari
to remove the proceedings and judgment to the High Court for quashing on the ground that the matter
raised was a “matter of a constitutional nature” over which the Native Court had no jurisdiction. The
application was refused and the applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal against this decision.
Held: the action for defamation in the Native Court did not raise a political or constitutional question
(under customary law) between chiefs. It was a personal suit and the Native Court had jurisdiction.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the decision of Ollennu, J. refusing an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari
to remove the proceedings and judgment of the Kpandu District Native Court “A” in an action for
slander to the High Court for quashing for want of jurisdiction. The judgment of Ollennu, J. is
reported in 3 W.A.L.R. 392, where the facts are fully set out.

COUNSEL
Dr. Danquah for the appellant.
No appearance for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF KORSAH C.J.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Divisional Court, Accra refusing to grant an order of
certiorari to remove and quash the

[p.8] of [1960] GLR 7

proceedings and judgment of the Kpandu District Native Court “A” in a suit in which plaintiff
claimed damages for defamation. He alleged that he had been slandered in that the defendant had said
at a public meeting:-
(a) that plaintiff must cease applying the title of “Odikro” to himself;
(b) that he (the defendant) would sue plaintiff before any competent court if plaintiff continued
using the title of “Odikro”.
The plaintiff had, in fact, been elected and installed, and had been known as “odikro” over a period of
eight years, and there has been, and is, no dispute as to this fact.
The defendant admitted publishing these words concerning the plaintiff, and explained that he gave
this warning because one Katamantu once said in an arbitration that the real post or title of the
plaintiff in the Twi language is “mankrado” and not “odikro”, Defendant further contended that the
predecessors of the plaintiff were called “afetor” and not “odikro”. It should be noted that “afetor”
means in the Ewe language “head of a house” (that is, of a community). The Twi title “odikro” means
precisely the same thing. The Native Court rejected the defendant’s explanation, held that the plaintiff
had been slandered, and entered judgment for him for £70 damages and costs.
There has been no appeal from that judgment of the Native Court on the merits. Counsel for the
defendant elected rather to take his stand upon a contention that the proceedings instituted by the
plaintiff raised a question relating to political or constitutional relations (under customary law)
between chiefs, which, under the State Councils (Colony and Southern Togoland) Ordinance, is
triable only by the State Council. It is enough to say that we accept the contrary view, expressed by
the learned judge who heard the application, that it is not such a matter, but is a personal suit over
which the Native Court had full jurisdiction.
We would wish to take this opportunity of pointing out that justice may well be defeated by a party
who accords too much importance to, and lays an exaggerated and (as in this case) unjustifiable
emphasis upon, the impingement of the law relating to constitutional matters on the facts of a case. In
the present case, if there was a slander at all (and we for ourselves would say that it is a moot point) it
is a slander of such trivial significance as to merit an award of damages much less than was awarded
by the Native Court. We are precluded, however, as was also the learned trial judge from passing
judgment on the Native Court’s award of £70 damages with costs, by reason of the fact that the
appellant’s advisers have chosen to raise a constitutional issue, and to apply for the prerogative writ of
certiorari on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction in the Native Court. It is upon the learned judge’s
ruling on that application (and on that alone) that the appeal comes before the court.
We therefore dismiss this appeal.

DECISION
Appeal dismissed.