ANG TIBAY VS CIR and regulates the relations between them, subject to,
40 OG 7TH SUPP 129 and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
FACTS:
(The case was in Spanish)
Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There
was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to
temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union.
According to the Union however, this was merely a
scheme to systematically terminate the employees from
work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It
claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of unjust labor practice
because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against
the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the
National Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly
sympathetic to the employer.
The Court of Industrial Relation decided the case and
elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new
trial was raised by the NLU.
Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
The motion for new trial was raised because according
to NLU, there are documents that are so inaccessible to
them that even with the exercise of due diligence they
could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the CIR. That these documents,
which NLU have now attached as exhibits are of such
far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered therein.
ISSUE:
WON the issues should be properly directed, resolved,
or determined by the CIR.
RULING:
To begin with the issue before us is to realize the
functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103.
It is more an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended
to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike
a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only
when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant.
It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive
and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or disputes arising
between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free
from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental
issue involved due to failure to receive all relevant
evidence.
Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted and the
entire record of this case is remanded to the CIR.
ACUZZAR VS JOROLAN
GR NO. 177878
APRIL 7, 2010
FACTS:
Respondents Jorolan filed Administrative Case No.
2000-01 against petitioner before the PLEB ( People’s
Law Enforcement Board) charging the latter of Grave
Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with
respondent’s minor daughter.
Respondent also instituted a criminal case against
petitioner of child abuse.
Petitioners denied the allegations to before the PLEB.
Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
before the PLEB pending resolution of the criminal case
filed before the regular court. The PLEB denied his
motion for lack of merit and a hearing of the case was
conducted.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order with the RTC of Tagum City.
Petitioner opted to file a petition for certiorari before the
trial court on the pretext that the PLEB had no
jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until petitioner
is convicted before the regular court. According to
petitioner, although the case filed before the PLEB was
captioned as "Grave Misconduct," the offense charged
was actually for "Violation of Law," which requires prior
conviction before a hearing on the administrative case
can proceed. Thus, petitioner insists that the PLEB
should have awaited the resolution of the criminal case
before conducting a hearing on the administrative charge
against him.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner’s resort to certiorari was not
warranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of
the PLEB was available to him.
RULING:
Section 43 (e) of Republic Act No. 6975, is explicit, thus:
SEC. 43. People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). - x x
(e) Decisions – The decision of the PLEB shall become
final and executory: Provided, That a decision involving
demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed
by either party with the regional appellate board within
ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the decision.
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the
remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB to the
Regional Appellate Board was available to petitioner.
Since appeal was available, filing a petition for certiorari
was inapt.
A careful perusal of respondent’s affidavit-complaint
against petitioner would show that petitioner was
charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit
affair with respondent’s minor daughter, he being a
married man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner
would like to convince this Court. Misconduct generally
means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct,
motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.
The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases
are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal
cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed
whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may
proceed independently of criminal proceedings.
RE: Due process in administrative cases
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that he has not been
afforded all the opportunity to present his side, our own
review of the records of the proceedings before the
PLEB reveals otherwise.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process
has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or
with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as
well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.
In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the
complaint against him and in fact, he had submitted his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He
attended the hearings together with his counsel and
even asked for several postponements. Petitioner
therefore cannot claim that he had been denied of due
process. Due process in an administrative context does
not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in
courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process. The
requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy.
CARBONELL VS CSC
GR NO. 187689
SEPTEMBER 7, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioners Carbonell was an employee of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology, Makati City. She was
formally charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
and Falsification of Official Documents by the Civil
Service Commission.
This stemmed from the fact that Carbonell, during the
Career Service Professional Examination, allegedly had
a personal and physical appearance was entirely
different from the picture of the examinee attached to the
application form and the picture seat plan. It was also
discovered that the signature affixed on the application
form was different from that appearing on the verification
slip.
She later on admitted that he accepted the proposal of a
certain Betinna Navarro to obtain for petitioner a Career
Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing
an application form and paying the amount of
₱10,000.00.
However later on she denied the admission stating that
Navarro was only there to submit the requirements to the
CSC. She, however, admitted that she failed to take the
examination as she had to attend to her ailing mother.
Thus, when she received a certificate of eligibility despite
her failure to take the test, she was anxious to know the
mystery behind it.
She claimed that she went to the CSCRO IV not to get a
copy of the certificate of rating but to check the veracity
of the certificate. More importantly, she questioned the
use of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal
charge against her inasmuch as the same was made
without the assistance of counsel.
CSCRO IV rendered finding petitioner guilty of
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official
documents. The penalty of dismissal from the service.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC but was later on
dismissed for having been filed almost three years from
receipt of the decision (petitioner reasoned that her
counsel died thus the late appeal).
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, CA affirmed
thus this petition.
Petitioners assert that her guilt was was based solely on
the unsworn statement, thus there was grave abused of
discretion.
ISSUE:
WON there was GAD when CSC denied appeal. (NO)
RULING:
Appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period
when the decision had long become final and executory.
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to
conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the
judgment final and executory and beyond the power of
the Court’s review. Jurisprudence mandates that when a
decision becomes final and executory, it becomes valid
and binding upon the parties and their successors-in-
interest. Such decision or order can no loner be
disturbed or re-opened no matter how erroneous it may
have been.
RE: Judgement based solely on her uncounselled
admission.
It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave
credence to petitioner’s uncounselled statements and,
partly on the basis thereof, uniformly found petitioner
liable for the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct,
and falsification of official document.
However, it must be remembered that the right to
counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus,
the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of
the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
While investigations conducted by an administrative
body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the
fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty
rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not
always imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit the
imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining
the dignity of government service.
As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the
investigation may be used as evidence to justify her
dismissal.
DE LA CRUZ VS ABILLE
GR NO. 130196
FEB 26, 2001
FACTS:
Abille, now deceased, owns a substantial parcel of land
in Pangasinan, which Dela Cruz was an agricultural
tenant.
After his death, Balbino dela Cruz was, nevertheless,
issued a Certificate of Land Transfer dated October 25,
1981 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (that
emancipated all tenants farmers working on private
agricultural lands).
Abille filed a petition for exemption under Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings alleging, among
others, that he was not notified of the coverage of his
land. That prior to the issuance of the Certificate of Land
Transfer DAR did not notify him or his representative;
that he has been deprived of his constitutional right to
due process.
Later on the Regional director of Bureau of Agrarian
Legal Assistance denying the petition for extension
instead the right of retention of not more than seven (7)
hectares is hereby granted. Canceling the Certificates of
Land Transfer issued to the tenants on the retained area.
Abille selected the seven-hectare retention area, which
included the area covered by CLT issued to Dela Cruz.
hence, said CLT was automatically cancelled.
The heirs of Dela Cruz filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform a petition for the issuance of
emancipation patent.
The heirs of Abille opposed the petition and the order of
cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer of the
retained area, had become final and had been
implemented by the Provincial Agraria Officer of
Pangasinan; hence, the petition had become moot and
academic.
The heirs of Dela Cruz assert through a motion for
reconsideration praying that another Order be issued
declaring as null and void because thet were issued
allegedly without giving them a day in court, hence, there
was absence of due process of law, considering that
Balbino dela Cruz was already deemed owner of the
subject property.
ISSUE:
WON there was absence of due process. (NO)
RULING:
Although the petitioners were not given the opportunity
to be heard when it was ordered that cancellation of
Certificate of Land of Dela Cruz nevertheless, in their
petition for issuance of an emancipation patent,
petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard as
they raised in issue the validity of the cancellation of the
said CLT, which was resolved by DAR Regional
Director and also in their (petitioners') motion for
reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform and resolved in his Order.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to seek a basis for placing the petitioner under preventive
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.
Futher, the petition filed by landowner, Abille, which was
for exemption of his property from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer, did not require notice to
petitioners. Petitioners were able to question the validity
of said Order (cancelling CLT No. 0-064711) in their
petition for issuance of emancipation patent, which was
resolved by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his
Decision. Hence, petitioners were given an opportunity
to be heard.
Furthermore the CLT was validly cancelled since the
landowner Herminio Abille having selected as part of his
seven-hectare retention the area tilled by Balbino de la
Cruz, covered by a certificate of land transfer in his
name, the CLT was correctly cancelled.
To hold otherwise would be to deprive the owner
Herminio Abille of his right of retention and to select the
portion he wanted to retain.
The portion tilled by Balbino de la Cruz having been
chosen by the owner Herminio Abille as part of his
seven-hectare retention, petitioners as heirs of Balbino
de la Cruz are not entitled to an emancipation patent
over the same. Balbino de la Cruz was entitled to an
agricultural leasehold contract to the area tilled by him
and this is what petitioners inherited.
Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that
there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality,
imposition or mistake on the part of a department head,
in rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of
substantial evidence to support the same, such
administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and
respect and will not be interfered with.
VIVO VS PAGCOR
GR NO. 187854
NOVEMBER 12, 2013
FACTS:
Vivo was an employee of PAGCOR and was PAGCOR’s
Managing Head of its Gaming Department at the time of
his dismissal from office.
Vivo received a letter via PAGCORs senior managing
head of HR advising that he was being administratively
charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering,
conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and
loss of trust and confidence; that he should submit a
written explanation of the charges; and that he was at
the same time being placed under preventive
suspension.
Vivo’s counsel, replying to HRs letter, assailed the
propriety of the show-cause memorandum as well as the
suspension.
The petitioner received the summons for him to attend
an administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear
before PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU). At
the petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was
conducted at his residence on said date.
The memorandum of charges was based on the
statements of PAGCOR personnel who had personal
knowledge of the accusations against him. However,
when his counsel requested to be furnished copies of the
statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the
ground that he had already been afforded the sufficient
opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges
against him during the administrative inquiry.
There was an investigation held again and the counsel
requested to move the said date however Adjudication
Committee denied the request upon the reason that the
presence of counsel was not necessary in the
proceedings.
Vivo here received PAGCORS resolution to dismiss him
from service. Vivo appealed to CSC.
The CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the
petitioner’s right to due process, and accordingly set
aside his dismissal. Petitioner takes the CA to task for
not considering: (1) PAGCOR’s failure to furnish him
copies of the Board Resolutions referred to by Ela in the
memorandum served on him, and (2) the refusal of
PAGCOR to have him be represented by counsel.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioner’s right for due process was not violated
transgressed the fundamental rules in administrative due
process. (Yes, there was no violation of due process)
RULING:
It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due
process where the opportunity to be heard either through
oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded.
The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of
the investigation and hearings conducted by PAGCOR.
He received the letter from Ela apprising him of his being
administratively charged for several offenses, and
directing him to submit an explanation in writing. He was
later on properly summoned to appear before the CIU,
which conducted its proceedings in his own residence
upon his request. During the administrative inquiry, the
CIU served him a copy of the memorandum of charges,
which detailed the accusations against him and specified
the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses.
He was also given the opportunity to appear before the
Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory
questions. Lastly, he was informed through a
memorandum of the decision of the Board of Directors
dismissing him from the service.
He made no credible showing of the supposed violation
of his right to due process. He was heard through the
written statement he submitted in response to the
memorandum of the charges against him. He actively
participated in the administrative inquiry conducted by
the CIU at his own residence. He was afforded the
opportunity to clarify his position in the proceedings
before the Adjudication Committee.
The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as
applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is
not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure
are not strictly applied.
The petitioner was not denied due process of law, for he
was afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain his side. That, to us, was sufficient to meet the
requirements of due process.
GLOBE TELECOM VS NTC
GR NO. 143964
JULY 26 2004
FACTS:
Smart filed a complaint with NTC praying that NTC order
the immediate interconnection of Smart’s and Globe’s
GSM networks, particularly their respective SMS or
texting services. Smart alleged that Globe, with evident
bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smart’s request for
the interconnection of SMS.
Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a
Complaint to effect the interconnection of their SMS or
texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc.
(Globe). Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smarts
complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also
pointed out that another network, Islacom, was allowed
to provide such service without prior NTC approval.
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
ruled that both Smart and Globe were “equally
blameworthy” and issued an Order penalizing both on
the ground of providing SMS under Value Added
Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The
Court of Appeals sustained the NTC Order.
Globe filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order. CA issued a
TRO. 3 months later, CA promulgated a decision
affirming NTC’s Order. Globe filed a motion for partial
reconsideration but the same was denied.
Globe argues that the NTC has no power under Section
17 of the Public Service Law to subject Globe to an
administrative sanction and a fine without prior notice
and hearing. Specifically, due process was denied
because the hearing actually conducted dwelt on
different issues.
ISSUE:
WON globe was denied due process. (YES)

RULED:
The assailed Order violates due process for failure to
sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered,
for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for
imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine
on, Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing
which would have afforded Globe the right to present
evidence on its behalf.
Penalized Via a Quasi-Judicial Process,
Globe and Smart are Entitled to
Corresponding Protections
It is essential to understand that the assailed Order was
promulgated by NTC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. The case arose when Smart had filed the
initial complaint against Globe before NTC for
interconnection of SMS.
NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe
in the promulgation of the assailed Order.
First. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial
evidence. Neither does it sufficiently explain the reasons
for the decision rendered. Any inconsistent decision
lacking thorough, ratiocination in support may be
struck down as being arbitrary. And any decision
with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.
Second. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to
present evidence on the issues relating to the nature of
VAS and the prior approval.
Until the promulgation of the assailed Order Globe and
Smart were never informed of the fact that their
operation of SMS without prior authority was at all an
issue for consideration. As a result, neither Globe or
Smart was afforded an opportunity to present evidence
in their behalf on that point.
It necessarily follows that if no evidence is procured
pertinent to a particular issue, any eventual resolution of
that issue on substantive grounds despite the absence of
evidence is flawed. Moreover, if the parties did have
evidence to counter the ruling but were wrongfully
denied the opportunity to offer the evidence, the result
would be embarrassing on the adjudicator.
Third. The imposition of fine is void for violation of due
process
Globe claims that the issue of its authority to operate
SMS services was never raised as an issue in
the Complaint filed against it by Smart. Nor did NTC
ever require Globe to justify its authority to operate SMS
services before the issuance of the Order imposing the
fine.
Sections 17 and 21 of the Public Service Act confer two
distinct powers on NTC. Under Section 17, NTC has the
power to investigate a PTE compliance with a standard,
rule, regulation, order, or other requirement imposed by
law or the regulations promulgated by NTC, as well as
require compliance if necessary. By the explicit language
of the provision, NTC may exercise the power without
need of prior hearing. However, Section 17 does not
include the power to impose fine in its enumeration. It is
Section 21 which adverts the power to impose fine and
in the same breath requires that the power may be
exercised only after notice and hearing.
OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN VS MANUEL VALENCIA
GR NO. 183890
APRIL 13, 2011
FACTS:
Valencia was the then the chief customs operation
officer of the BOC.
On July 21, 2003, not satisfied that the entries made by
Valencia in his SALN were reflective of his actual net
worth, Napoleon P. Guenero (Guerrero), Intelligence
Officer of the Department of Finance, filed a
complaint/motion for Subpoena/Subpoena Duces
Tecum.
In his complaint, Guerrero alleged that Valencia
maintained two (2) US dollar time deposit accounts with
the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC).
The first account with the amount of US$2,013,248.80,
while the second, with the amount of US$1,812,165.38.
According to Guerrero, these huge amounts were "the
actual fruits of his illegal transactions and activities of as
an employee of the Bureau of Customs. The complaint
also alleged that the house and lot declared by Valencia
in his SALNs was grossly undervalued considering that
the house, described as "impressive,”.
Finally, it was alleged that from the credit card billings of
his Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Mastercard, it
could be inferred that Valencia maintained a lavish
lifestyle.
Consequently, an accused charged with Unexplained
Wealth cannot claim to have been denied due process
should he be held administratively liable for Dishonesty.
It should be pointed out that the actual recital of facts of
the complaint shows that the nature and cause of the
accusation hurled by Guerrero includes the charge of
Dishonesty.
According to Valencia, the said order of the Ombudsman
requiring him to file his comment after eight (8) long
months of inaction was "irregular, unprocedural and in
violation of his constitutional right to due process."
CA reversed the decision of the Ombudsman and has
explained that the charge of unexplained wealth in
relation to Sec. 8 of RA 3019 was separate and distinct
from the offense of dishonesty. It held that to hold
Valencia liable for dishonesty when in fact the charge
against him was for unexplained wealth, violated
Valencia’s right to due process, especially his right to be
informed of the charges against him. It added that even if
the offense were to be considered, there was no
substantial evidence presented as the pieces of
evidence presented were of no value, as these were only
photocopies of petitioner’s TCTs, alleged letters of
agreement and unauthenticated copies of Valencia’s BPI
Mastercard transactions. The CA ordered Valencia’s
reinstatement.
ISSUE:
WON Valencia was deprived of due process. (No)
WON there was enough evidence to hold Valencia
Liable. (No)
RULING:
RE due process:
On due process, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman
that Valencia was not deprived of his constitutional right
thereto.
Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of
wealth, the evil sought to be suppressed and avoided,
and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth
in the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is
aimed particularly at curtailing and minimizing, the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public
service. "Unexplained" matter normally results from
"non-disclosure" or concealment of vital
facts. SALN, which all public officials and employees are
mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy of
accountability of all public officers and employees in the
government. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor
movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a valid
check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed
properties and wealth.
Consequently, an accused charged with Unexplained
Wealth cannot claim to have been denied due process
should (IF) he be held administratively liable for
Dishonesty.
It should be pointed out that the actual recital of facts of
the complaint shows that the nature and cause of the
accusation hurled by Guerrero includes the charge of
Dishonesty. Well-settled is the rule that what determines
the real nature and cause of the accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information or complaint and not the caption or preamble
of the information or complaint, nor the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law.
The Court, however, sustains the finding of the CA that
there is no substantial evidence to hold Valencia liable
for Dishonesty.
To dismiss a public officer or employee on the basis of
photocopies of private documents which are questioned
and disputed is to set a dangerous precedent. It can be
abused by oppressive or abusive superiors who may
want their own protege to replace the charged officers or
employees or by any individual who may want to harass
a public employee for no legitimate reason at all.
Photocopies should only be considered as evidence if
they are not contested, if they are admitted, or if they
constitute matters which need not be proved. Unverified
photocopied private documents are not evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
As observed by the CA, the Ombudsman totally ignored
the affidavit of BPI Service Manager Olaguer certifying
that he could not locate any time deposit record
belonging to Valencia. Being a responsible officer in
custody of the supposed time deposits, his attestation is
the best evidence that the bank does not have a record
of any time deposit In sum, with the presented SALNs
being the only competent evidence for the prosecution,
the Court upholds the finding of the CA that there is no
substantial evidence that respondent Manuel P. Valencia
[1] acquired property though unlawful means, [2]
maintained US time deposit accounts, and [3] lived a
lavish lifestyle.
BARROSCO VS COA
GR NO. 253253
APRIL 27, 2021
FACTS:
Barrosco was the Supervisor of Cashiering Department
and President of BSU.
Administrative Officer II Mag-abo was granted a cash
advance of P574,215.27 for the payment of the salaries
of the BSU employees. Mag-abo went to Landbank
Malaybalay to encash the payroll check. Since there
were several customers at that time, she left the check
with the bank verifier and returned to BSU (Bukidnon
State University).
that same day, Mag-abo went back to Landbank
together with four (4) other BSU employees who had
business there. After encashing the check, Mag-abo et
al. walked back to BSU.
As they passed Caltex gasoline station, an unidentified
man grabbed Mag-abo's bag containing the payroll
money. The incident was reported to BSU Chief
Administrative Officer Gregory who accompanied Mag-
abo to the police station to report the incident.
COA Audit Team Leader Teresita Quijada informed
petitioner of Mag-abo's cash shortage of P574,215.27.
Quijada also issued a Demand Letter to Mag-abo
directing her to produce the unliquidated amount and
explain within 72 hours why the cash shortage occurred.
Mag-abo explained the incident to petitioner. In a
separate letter to the COA Legal Adjudication Office,
Mag-abo, too, requested relief from her cash
accountability. Mag-abo's request got denied. The COA
Adjudication and Settlement Board affirmed Mag-abo's
liability.
Mag-abo elevated her case to the COA Commission
Proper (COA Proper) via a petition for review. However,
his appeal was denied.
Aggrieved, Mag-abo moved for reconsideration,
attaching the affidavit dated March 2014 of retired BSU
Accountant Gloria P. Torres (Torres) stating that Mag-
abo requested for a security escort and vehicle from her
supervisor, but none were provided.
COA Proper denied Mag-abo's motion and held her,
petitioner, and Gregory solidarily liable for the stolen
amount, owing to their supposed negligence when the
loss occurred.
The ruling surprised petitioner, considering he was never
a party to the case and was never even furnished copy
of Torres' affidavit. Thus, petitioner filed his own motion
for reconsideration, invoking his right to due process and
questioning the basis of his supposed liability.
It ruled that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due
process. For although he was not impleaded in the
proceedings below, he was able to file a motion for
reconsideration anyway right after he was found
solidarily liable with Mag-abo and Gregory.
As for petitioner's liability, the COA Proper found that
petitioner failed to exercise the diligence expected of a
good father since he did not adopt precautionary
measures to safeguard the funds of BSU. It was only
after the robbery incident that petitioner realized the
importance of sound internal control in the custody of the
agency's cash.
COA however stated that since petitioners filed for a
motion to reconsider, he is assumed to be informed of
his charges.
ISSUE:
WON COA violated Barrosco right to due process. (YES)
RULING:
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations bears the
requisites of due process in administrative
proceedings, viz.:
1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right
to present one's case and submit evidence in
support thereof;
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented;
3) The decision must have something to support
itself;
4) The evidence must be substantial;
5) The decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties;
6) The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the facts
and the law of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision; and
7) The board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding will know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision.
The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration does not
cure due process defects, especially if the said motion
was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the
right to due process and the lack of opportunity to be
heard on the merits.
Here, petitioner was found liable though he was never
charged. The proceedings prior to the COA Proper's
reconsideration all pointed to Mag-abo as sole negligent
party responsible for the loss of the P574,215.27
representing the salaries of BSU personnel. Petitioner
only got involved in the proceedings when the COA
Proper denied Mag-abo's motion for reconsideration and
ordered him to pay the unliquidated amount. Notably,
petitioner was brought in as party at a much later stage.
Applying Fontanilla, petitioner here was similarly
deprived of the opportunity to present and submit
evidence to establish non-culpability via memorandum or
oral arguments before the COA Commission pursuant to
Section 3, Rule X of the 2009 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the COA. Worse, he was deprived of the
opportunity to examine the evidence against him, for he
was never served a copy of Mag-abo's submissions
which formed the very basis of the adverse ruling of the
COA Proper.
Though petitioner raised this due process violation issue
before the COA Proper, the latter never addressed his
concern. It simply ruled that the very pleading which
raised due process violation was the very pleading which
afforded him due process. But this cannot be the case.
Petitioner was constrained to limit the discussion in his
motion for reconsideration to the issue of due process.
Surely, this cannot be considered the opportunity to be
heard within the concept of administrative due process.
INCIDENTAL POWERS AND RES JUDICATA
PASCUAL VS BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
28 SCRA 345
FACTS:
Salvador and Entiqueta Gatbonton filed a complaint
against Arsenio Pascual, Jr. for alleged malpractice.
Counsel for complainants announced that he would
present as his first witness Pascual himself. Pascual
made a record of his objection, invoking his right to be
exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board
of Examiners took note of such plea and at the same
time stated that at the next scheduled hearing, Pascual
would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless
he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority.
The trial court ordered a writ of preliminary injunction
issue against the respondent Board commanding it to
refrain from hearing or further proceeding with the
administrative case. The Board answered that the right
against self-incrimination is available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a
witness. The Gatbontons also alleged that the right
against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an
administrative hearing.
ISSUE:
WON the right against self-incrimination is available in
an administrative hearing.
RULING:
Yes. As held in the case of Cabal vs. Kapunan, while the
proceeding for forfeiture is administrative in character,
such proceeding possesses a criminal or penal aspect.
The case at bar is not dissimilar; the petitioner would be
similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture
of property but the revocation of his license as medical
practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation. The
right against self-incrimination of the defendant includes
the right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand.
We hold that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent
Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with
the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his
consent.
DUMARPA VS DIMAPORO
177 SCRA 478
FACTS:
Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board of
Canvassers as Mayor-elect of Marogong.
Petitions were filed questioning the election results.
While these petitions were pending adjudgment by the
COMELEC First Division, the Secretary of Local
Governments issued on May 19, 1988 a memorandum
designating Maclis Balt as Officer-In-Charge, Office of
the Mayor of Marogong. The designation of the OIC was
made in view of the election controversy that has arisen
over the mayoralty race, and to ensure that the
democratic process is respected throughout the
transition period.
The petitions seeking annulment of Datu Dimaporo’s
proclamation were ultimately dismissed by the
COMELEC First Division. A motion for reconsideration
was filed.
Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of
his status as mayor-elect of Marogong, as confirmed by
the COMELEC. His counsel sent a letter to the Provincial
Governor praying that official matters involving the affairs
of the Municipality of Marogong be accorded to
Dimaporo. This letter, along with other documents
collated by the Office of the Governor, were referred to
the Provincial Fiscal for legal opinion on the matter.
The legal opinion, signed by Asst. Provincial Fiscal
Danganan and with the conformity of Provincial Fiscal
Dumarpa, is that Datu Maclis Balt is still the mayor of the
Municipality considering that a motion for reconsideration
was timely filed by the OIC and hence the decision of the
Division is not yet final and executory.
On learning of this legal opinion, Datu Dimaporo filed
with the COMELEC en banc a motion to hold Fiscals
Dumarpa and Danganan, and Vice Governor Alauya in
contempt, that their communication is an act of improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; that
OIC Maclis Balt had no right to file a motion for
reconsideration as he has never been a candidate for
Mayor in Marogong during the local elections.
The COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the
Dumarpa et al. guilty of contempt. They filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition for nullification of COMELEC’s resolution.
ISSUE:
WON Dumarpa, Danganan and Alauya should be cited
in contempt.
RULING:
No. It appears that the resolution in question not only
lacks factual foundation of any sort but is contradicted by
such relevant facts as may be discerned from record.
That opinion was rendered in answer to the inquiry of the
Acting Governor as to whether or not, in view of the
judgment by the First Division of the COMELEC
upholding the proclamation by the Board of Canvassers
of Datu Dimaporo as Mayor-Elect of Marogong, the duly
designated OIC Mayor, therefore acting as such, Datu
Maclis Balt, could still be recognized as the Mayor of the
Municipality.
The inquiry had been made necessary in view of the
conflict in claims to the mayoralty then being asserted by
both Datu Dimaporo and Datu Balt, which conflict had to
be swiftly and legally resolved to prevent its resolution by
arms and bloodshed.
The fiscals' opinion was based on "Sec. 3, paragraph C,
Article IX of the Constitution which mandates that
motions for reconsideration from a decision of a Division
of the Commission on Elections shall be decided En
Banc by the Commission." They declared that since "a
motion for reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC,
the decision of the Division is not final and executory.
The decision of the Commission En Banc is not yet even
final until and after 5 days whenever no restraining order
is issued by the Supreme Court."
The Court, quite frankly, sees in the text of the opinion
nothing even remotely resembling an affront to the
COMELEC, or a criticism of the First Division's
judgment. On the contrary, the opinion simply
paraphrases --- correctly, it would appear the
COMELEC's own Rules of Procedure on the subject it
addresses. But even if, as the questioned Resolution
declares, the views therein expressed are clearly wrong,
it cannot for that reason alone be considered
contumacious otherwise, liability for contempt would
invariably attach to every declared instance of orders or
judgments rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, or otherwise attended by
serious error of one kind or another. The absurdity of
such a rule or policy need not be belabored.
Nor may the Acting Governor be faulted for consulting
the lawyers of the province as to the effects of a
judgment on the authority and actuations of municipal or
provincial officials, or the fiscals for advising him on such
matters.
ENCINAS VS AGUSTIN
GR NO. 187317
APRIL 11, 2013
FACTS:
Respondents were both fire officers in Nueva Ecija. They
claimed that Encinas, who was then the Provincial Fire
Marshall of Nueva Ecija, informed them that unless they
gave him P5,000, they would be relieved from their
station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung
areas. Four days after, Agustin and Caubang came up
short and was only able to give P2,000. When they failed
to deliver the balance, Encinas issued instructions
effectively reassigning respondents.
Respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection a
letter-complaint for illegal transfer of personnel under the
DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6795). Later, it was docketed by
the BFP for preliminary investigation for violation of RA
3019. The BFP recommended the dismissal of the
administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office
in Pampanga. Essentially the same facts but this time,
their action is based on Sec. 4(c) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. The formal charge was dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of service. The CSCRO ordered his dismissal from
service.
Encinas proffered the defense of res judicata. The
CSCRO rejected such argument and ruled that the
dismissal of the BFP complaint was not a judgment on
the merits rendered by a competent tribunal.
Encinas then filed an appeal memorandum with the CSC
main office, wherein he argued that the respondents
were guilty of forum-shopping for having filed 2 separate
administrative complaints. The same was denied. He
filed a petition before the CA, which was also denied.
Hence this recourse to the Court.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents are guilty of forum-shopping.
(NO)
RULING:
Forum-shopping
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis
pendentia requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
(1) Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same Interests in both actions;
(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata
in the other case.
Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule
that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not
constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO
Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the part
of respondents.
Res judicata
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a
subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:
(a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment
on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first
and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity
of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the
merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of
formal, technical or dilatory objections;"or when the
judgment is rendered "after a determination of which
party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point.”
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in
contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal of
the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005
was the result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes
of determining whether a formal charge for an
administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights
and liabilities of parties were determined therein with
finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely
administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative
proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding
involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented;
and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the
facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions
involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and
obligations of the contending parties are; and based
thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the
respective rights and obligations of the parties.
SORIANO VS LAGUARDIA
587 SCRA 79
FACTS:
Petitioner, as host of Dating Daan, during a broadcast
made cussing remarks directed towards a certain
Michael stating:
“Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang
babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang
doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang
itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi
ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.”
Two days later, affidavit complaints were filed in the
MTRCB against petitioner in connection with the said
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt
directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a
minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program
Ang Tamang Daan. After notice and a preliminary
conference, the MTRCB preventively suspended the
showing of Ang Dating Daan for 20 days. Petitioner filed
a MR but eventually sought to withdraw it after filing with
the Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify
the preventive suspension order issued.
The MTRCB rendered judgement imposing a 3-month
suspension on Soriano from his program, “Ang Dating
Daan”. Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues, among others, that PD 1986 is not
complete in itself and does not provide for a sufficient
standard for its implementation thereby resulting in an
undue delegation of administrative power since the law
does not provide for the penalties for violations of its
provisions. Moreover, he argues that the IRR provisions
are invalid insofar as PD 1986 do not expressly
authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.
ISSUE:
WON there was undue delegation of legislative power.
RULING:
No, there was no undue delegation of legislative power.
Administrative agencies have powers and functions
which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory,
quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as
may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They
have in fine only such powers or authority as are
granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.
And in determining whether an agency has certain
powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But
once ascertained as existing, the authority given should
be liberally construed.
PD 1986 expressly empowered the MTRCB to regulate
and supervise television programs to obviate the
exhibition of broadcast of indecent or immoral materials
and to impose sanctions for violations and to prevent
further violations as it investigates. Simply put, MTRCB’s
mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by
the agency of the authority to issue the challenged
order of preventive suspension as this authority
stems naturally from, and is necessary for the
exercise of its power of regulation and supervision.
There was no undue delegation of legislative power as
Section 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor
extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB,
by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun
its authority under the law. More so, the preventive
suspension was done in furtherance of it.

Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a

penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. And the power to discipline
and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power
to investigate administrative complaints and, during such
investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject
of the complaint.