ANG TIBAY VS CIR regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
40 OG 7TH SUPP 129 accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
FACTS:
(The case was in Spanish)
Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There
was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to
temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union.
According to the Union however, this was merely a
scheme to systematically terminate the employees from
work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It
claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of unjust labor practice
because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the
National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National
Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to
the employer.
The Court of Industrial Relation decided the case and
elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new
trial was raised by the NLU.
Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion. The
motion for new trial was raised because according to NLU,
there are documents that are so inaccessible to them that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence
in the CIR. That these documents, which NLU have now
attached as exhibits are of such far-reaching importance
and effect that their admission would necessarily mean
the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
therein.
ISSUE:
WON the issues should be properly directed, resolved, or
determined by the CIR.
RULING:
To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions
of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the
Commonwealth Act No. 103.
It is more an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended
to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a
court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only
when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant.
It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive
and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or disputes arising
between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and
SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free
from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of
an administrative character. There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved due to failure to receive all relevant evidence.
Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted and the entire
record of this case is remanded to the CIR.
ACUZZAR VS JOROLAN
GR NO. 177878
APRIL 7, 2010
FACTS:
Respondents Jorolan filed Administrative Case No. 2000-
01 against petitioner before the PLEB ( People’s Law
Enforcement Board) charging the latter of Grave
Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with
respondent’s minor daughter.
Respondent also instituted a criminal case against
petitioner of child abuse.
Petitioners denied the allegations to before the PLEB.
Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings
before the PLEB pending resolution of the criminal case
filed before the regular court. The PLEB denied his motion
for lack of merit and a hearing of the case was conducted.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order with the RTC of Tagum City.
Petitioner opted to file a petition for certiorari before the
trial court on the pretext that the PLEB had no jurisdiction
to hear the administrative case until petitioner is convicted
before the regular court. According to petitioner, although
the case filed before the PLEB was captioned as "Grave
Misconduct," the offense charged was actually for
"Violation of Law," which requires prior conviction before
a hearing on the administrative case can proceed. Thus,
petitioner insists that the PLEB should have awaited the
resolution of the criminal case before conducting a
hearing on the administrative charge against him.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner’s resort to certiorari was not
warranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of
the PLEB was available to him.
RULING:
Section 43 (e) of Republic Act No. 6975, is explicit, thus:
SEC. 43. People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). - x x
(e) Decisions – The decision of the PLEB shall become
final and executory: Provided, That a decision involving
demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed
by either party with the regional appellate board within ten
(10) days from receipt of the copy of the decision.
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the remedy
of appeal from the decision of the PLEB to the Regional
Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Since appeal
was available, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt.
A careful perusal of respondent’s affidavit-complaint
against petitioner would show that petitioner was charged
with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with
respondent’s minor daughter, he being a married man,
and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to
convince this Court. Misconduct generally means
wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.
The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases
are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal
cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas
in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence
is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings.
RE: Due process in administrative cases
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that he has not been
afforded all the opportunity to present his side, our own
review of the records of the proceedings before the PLEB
reveals otherwise.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process
has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence
in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as
to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.
In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint
against him and in fact, he had submitted his counter-
affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended
the hearings together with his counsel and even asked for
several postponements. Petitioner therefore cannot claim
that he had been denied of due process. Due process in
an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process. The requirements are satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy.
CARBONELL VS CSC
GR NO. 187689
SEPTEMBER 7, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioners Carbonell was an employee of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology, Makati City. She was
formally charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
Falsification of Official Documents by the Civil Service
Commission.
This stemmed from the fact that Carbonell, during the
Career Service Professional Examination, allegedly had a
personal and physical appearance was entirely different
from the picture of the examinee attached to the
application form and the picture seat plan. It was also
discovered that the signature affixed on the application
form was different from that appearing on the verification
slip.
She later on admitted that he accepted the proposal of a
certain Betinna Navarro to obtain for petitioner a Career
Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing
an application form and paying the amount of
₱10,000.00.
However later on she denied the admission stating that
Navarro was only there to submit the requirements to the
CSC. She, however, admitted that she failed to take the
examination as she had to attend to her ailing mother.
Thus, when she received a certificate of eligibility despite
her failure to take the test, she was anxious to know the
mystery behind it.
She claimed that she went to the CSCRO IV not to get a
copy of the certificate of rating but to check the veracity of
the certificate. More importantly, she questioned the use
of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal
charge against her inasmuch as the same was made
without the assistance of counsel.
CSCRO IV rendered finding petitioner guilty of
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official
documents. The penalty of dismissal from the service.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC but was later on dismissed
for having been filed almost three years from receipt of
the decision (petitioner reasoned that her counsel died
thus the late appeal).
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, CA affirmed thus
this petition.
Petitioners assert that her guilt was was based solely on
the unsworn statement, thus there was grave abused of
discretion.
ISSUE:
WON there was GAD when CSC denied appeal. (NO)
RULING:
Appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period
when the decision had long become final and executory.
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to conform
to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final
and executory and beyond the power of the Court’s
review. Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision
becomes final and executory, it becomes valid and
binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest.
Such decision or order can no loner be disturbed or re-
opened no matter how erroneous it may have been.
RE: Judgement based solely on her uncounselled
admission.
It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave
credence to petitioner’s uncounselled statements and,
partly on the basis thereof, uniformly found petitioner
liable for the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
falsification of official document.
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel
under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a
suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body
may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact
remains that, under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty
rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not
always imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit the
imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining
the dignity of government service.
As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the
investigation may be used as evidence to justify her
dismissal.
DE LA CRUZ VS ABILLE
GR NO. 130196
FEB 26, 2001
FACTS:
Abille, now deceased, owns a substantial parcel of land in
Pangasinan, which Dela Cruz was an agricultural tenant.
After his death, Balbino dela Cruz was, nevertheless,
issued a Certificate of Land Transfer dated October 25,
1981 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (that
emancipated all tenants farmers working on private
agricultural lands).
Abille filed a petition for exemption under Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings alleging, among
others, that he was not notified of the coverage of his land.
That prior to the issuance of the Certificate of Land
Transfer DAR did not notify him or his representative; that
he has been deprived of his constitutional right to due
process.
Later on the Regional director of Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance denying the petition for extension instead the
right of retention of not more than seven (7) hectares is
hereby granted. Canceling the Certificates of Land
Transfer issued to the tenants on the retained area.
Abille selected the seven-hectare retention area, which
included the area covered by CLT issued to Dela Cruz.
hence, said CLT was automatically cancelled.
The heirs of Dela Cruz filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform a petition for the issuance of
emancipation patent.
The heirs of Abille opposed the petition and the order of
cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer of the
retained area, had become final and had been
implemented by the Provincial Agraria Officer of
Pangasinan; hence, the petition had become moot and
academic.
The heirs of Dela Cruz assert through a motion for
reconsideration praying that another Order be issued
declaring as null and void because thet were issued
allegedly without giving them a day in court, hence, there
was absence of due process of law, considering that
Balbino dela Cruz was already deemed owner of the
subject property.
ISSUE:
WON there was absence of due process. (NO)
RULING:
Although the petitioners were not given the opportunity to
be heard when it was ordered that cancellation of
Certificate of Land of Dela Cruz nevertheless, in their
petition for issuance of an emancipation patent,
petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard as they
raised in issue the validity of the cancellation of the said
CLT, which was resolved by DAR Regional Director and
also in their (petitioners') motion for
reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform and resolved in his Order.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
Futher, the petition filed by landowner, Abille, which was
for exemption of his property from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer, did not require notice to
petitioners. Petitioners were able to question the validity
of said Order (cancelling CLT No. 0-064711) in their
petition for issuance of emancipation patent, which was
resolved by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his
Decision. Hence, petitioners were given an opportunity to
be heard.
Furthermore the CLT was validly cancelled since the
landowner Herminio Abille having selected as part of his
seven-hectare retention the area tilled by Balbino de la
Cruz, covered by a certificate of land transfer in his name,
the CLT was correctly cancelled.
To hold otherwise would be to deprive the owner Herminio
Abille of his right of retention and to select the portion he
wanted to retain.
The portion tilled by Balbino de la Cruz having been
chosen by the owner Herminio Abille as part of his seven-
hectare retention, petitioners as heirs of Balbino de la
Cruz are not entitled to an emancipation patent over the
same. Balbino de la Cruz was entitled to an agricultural
leasehold contract to the area tilled by him and this is what
petitioners inherited.
Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that
there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality,
imposition or mistake on the part of a department head, in
rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of
substantial evidence to support the same, such
administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and
respect and will not be interfered with.
VIVO VS PAGCOR
GR NO. 187854
NOVEMBER 12, 2013
FACTS:
Vivo was an employee of PAGCOR and was PAGCOR’s
Managing Head of its Gaming Department at the time of
his dismissal from office.
Vivo received a letter via PAGCORs senior managing
head of HR advising that he was being administratively
charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering,
conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and
loss of trust and confidence; that he should submit a
written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the
same time being placed under preventive suspension.
Vivo’s counsel, replying to HRs letter, assailed the
propriety of the show-cause memorandum as well as the
basis for placing the petitioner under preventive
suspension.
The petitioner received the summons for him to attend an
administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before
PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU). At the
petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was conducted
at his residence on said date.
The memorandum of charges was based on the
statements of PAGCOR personnel who had personal
knowledge of the accusations against him. However,
when his counsel requested to be furnished copies of the
statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground
that he had already been afforded the sufficient
opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges
against him during the administrative inquiry.
There was an investigation held again and the counsel
requested to move the said date however Adjudication
Committee denied the request upon the reason that the
presence of counsel was not necessary in the
proceedings.
Vivo here received PAGCORS resolution to dismiss him
from service. Vivo appealed to CSC.
The CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioner’s
right to due process, and accordingly set aside his
dismissal. Petitioner takes the CA to task for not
considering: (1) PAGCOR’s failure to furnish him copies
of the Board Resolutions referred to by Ela in the
memorandum served on him, and (2) the refusal of
PAGCOR to have him be represented by counsel.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioner’s right for due process was not violated
transgressed the fundamental rules in administrative due
process. (Yes, there was no violation of due process)
RULING:
It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due
process where the opportunity to be heard either through
oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded.
The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of
the investigation and hearings conducted by PAGCOR.
He received the letter from Ela apprising him of his being
administratively charged for several offenses, and
directing him to submit an explanation in writing. He was
later on properly summoned to appear before the CIU,
which conducted its proceedings in his own residence
upon his request. During the administrative inquiry, the
CIU served him a copy of the memorandum of charges,
which detailed the accusations against him and specified
the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses.
He was also given the opportunity to appear before the
Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory questions.
Lastly, he was informed through a memorandum of the
decision of the Board of Directors dismissing him from the
service.
He made no credible showing of the supposed violation of
his right to due process. He was heard through the written
statement he submitted in response to the memorandum
of the charges against him. He actively participated in the
administrative inquiry conducted by the CIU at his own
residence. He was afforded the opportunity to clarify his
position in the proceedings before the Adjudication
Committee.
The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as
applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not
always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are
not strictly applied.
The petitioner was not denied due process of law, for he
was afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain his side. That, to us, was sufficient to meet the
requirements of due process.
GLOBE TELECOM VS NTC
GR NO. 143964
JULY 26 2004
FACTS:
Smart filed a complaint with NTC praying that NTC order
the immediate interconnection of Smart’s and Globe’s
GSM networks, particularly their respective SMS or
texting services. Smart alleged that Globe, with evident
bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smart’s request for
the interconnection of SMS.
Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a
Complaint to effect the interconnection of their SMS or
texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc.
(Globe). Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smarts
complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also pointed
out that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide
such service without prior NTC approval.
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
ruled that both Smart and Globe were “equally
blameworthy” and issued an Order penalizing both on the
ground of providing SMS under Value Added Services
(VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The Court of
Appeals sustained the NTC Order.
Globe filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order. CA issued a
TRO. 3 months later, CA promulgated a decision affirming
NTC’s Order. Globe filed a motion for partial
reconsideration but the same was denied.
Globe argues that the NTC has no power under Section
17 of the Public Service Law to subject Globe to an
administrative sanction and a fine without prior notice and
hearing. Specifically, due process was denied because
the hearing actually conducted dwelt on different issues.
ISSUE:
WON globe was denied due process. (YES)
RULED:
The assailed Order violates due process for failure to
sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered,
for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for
imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on,
Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing
which would have afforded Globe the right to present
evidence on its behalf.
Penalized Via a Quasi-Judicial Process,
Globe and Smart are Entitled to
Corresponding Protections
It is essential to understand that the assailed Order was
promulgated by NTC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. The case arose when Smart had filed the initial
complaint against Globe before NTC for interconnection
of SMS.
NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in
the promulgation of the assailed Order.
First. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial
evidence. Neither does it sufficiently explain the reasons
for the decision rendered. Any inconsistent decision
lacking thorough, ratiocination in support may be
struck down as being arbitrary. And any decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.
Second. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to
present evidence on the issues relating to the nature of
VAS and the prior approval.
Until the promulgation of the assailed Order Globe and
Smart were never informed of the fact that their operation
of SMS without prior authority was at all an issue for
consideration. As a result, neither Globe or Smart was
afforded an opportunity to present evidence in their behalf
on that point.
It necessarily follows that if no evidence is procured
pertinent to a particular issue, any eventual resolution of
that issue on substantive grounds despite the absence of
evidence is flawed. Moreover, if the parties did have
evidence to counter the ruling but were wrongfully denied
the opportunity to offer the evidence, the result would be
embarrassing on the adjudicator.
Third. The imposition of fine is void for violation of due
process
Globe claims that the issue of its authority to operate SMS
services was never raised as an issue in
the Complaint filed against it by Smart. Nor did NTC ever
require Globe to justify its authority to operate SMS
services before the issuance of the Order imposing the
fine.
Sections 17 and 21 of the Public Service Act confer two
distinct powers on NTC. Under Section 17, NTC has the
power to investigate a PTE compliance with a standard,
rule, regulation, order, or other requirement imposed by
law or the regulations promulgated by NTC, as well as
require compliance if necessary. By the explicit language
of the provision, NTC may exercise the power without
need of prior hearing. However, Section 17 does not
include the power to impose fine in its enumeration. It is
Section 21 which adverts the power to impose fine and in
the same breath requires that the power may be exercised
only after notice and hearing.
OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN VS MANUEL VALENCIA
GR NO. 183890
APRIL 13, 2011
FACTS:
Valencia was the then the chief customs operation officer
of the BOC.
On July 21, 2003, not satisfied that the entries made by
Valencia in his SALN were reflective of his actual net
worth, Napoleon P. Guenero (Guerrero), Intelligence
Officer of the Department of Finance, filed a
complaint/motion for Subpoena/Subpoena Duces Tecum.
In his complaint, Guerrero alleged that Valencia
maintained two (2) US dollar time deposit accounts with
the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC).
The first account with the amount of US$2,013,248.80,
while the second, with the amount of US$1,812,165.38.
According to Guerrero, these huge amounts were "the
actual fruits of his illegal transactions and activities of as
an employee of the Bureau of Customs. The complaint
also alleged that the house and lot declared by Valencia
in his SALNs was grossly undervalued considering that
the house, described as "impressive,”.
Finally, it was alleged that from the credit card billings of
his Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Mastercard, it
could be inferred that Valencia maintained a lavish
lifestyle.
Consequently, an accused charged with Unexplained
Wealth cannot claim to have been denied due process
should he be held administratively liable for Dishonesty. It
should be pointed out that the actual recital of facts of the
complaint shows that the nature and cause of the
accusation hurled by Guerrero includes the charge of
Dishonesty.
According to Valencia, the said order of the Ombudsman
requiring him to file his comment after eight (8) long
months of inaction was "irregular, unprocedural and in
violation of his constitutional right to due process."
CA reversed the decision of the Ombudsman and has
explained that the charge of unexplained wealth in
relation to Sec. 8 of RA 3019 was separate and distinct
from the offense of dishonesty. It held that to hold
Valencia liable for dishonesty when in fact the charge
against him was for unexplained wealth, violated
Valencia’s right to due process, especially his right to be
informed of the charges against him. It added that even if
the offense were to be considered, there was no
substantial evidence presented as the pieces of evidence
presented were of no value, as these were only
photocopies of petitioner’s TCTs, alleged letters of
agreement and unauthenticated copies of Valencia’s BPI
Mastercard transactions. The CA ordered Valencia’s
reinstatement.
ISSUE:
WON Valencia was deprived of due process. (No)
WON there was enough evidence to hold Valencia Liable.
(No)
RULING:
RE due process:
On due process, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman
that Valencia was not deprived of his constitutional right
thereto.
Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth,
the evil sought to be suppressed and avoided, and
Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in the
SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed
particularly at curtailing and minimizing, the opportunities
for official corruption and maintaining a standard of
honesty in the public service. "Unexplained" matter
normally results from "non-disclosure" or
concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public
officials and employees are mandated to file, are the
means to achieve the policy of accountability of all public
officers and employees in the government. By the SALN,
the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of
a public official; it is a valid check and balance mechanism
to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.
Consequently, an accused charged with Unexplained
Wealth cannot claim to have been denied due process
should (IF) he be held administratively liable for
Dishonesty.
It should be pointed out that the actual recital of facts of
the complaint shows that the nature and cause of the
accusation hurled by Guerrero includes the charge of
Dishonesty. Well-settled is the rule that what determines
the real nature and cause of the accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information or complaint and not the caption or preamble
of the information or complaint, nor the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law.
The Court, however, sustains the finding of the CA that
there is no substantial evidence to hold Valencia liable for
Dishonesty.
To dismiss a public officer or employee on the basis of
photocopies of private documents which are questioned
and disputed is to set a dangerous precedent. It can be
abused by oppressive or abusive superiors who may want
their own protege to replace the charged officers or
employees or by any individual who may want to harass
a public employee for no legitimate reason at all.
Photocopies should only be considered as evidence if
they are not contested, if they are admitted, or if they
constitute matters which need not be proved. Unverified
photocopied private documents are not evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
As observed by the CA, the Ombudsman totally ignored
the affidavit of BPI Service Manager Olaguer certifying
that he could not locate any time deposit record belonging
to Valencia. Being a responsible officer in custody of the
supposed time deposits, his attestation is the best
evidence that the bank does not have a record of any time
deposit In sum, with the presented SALNs being the only
competent evidence for the prosecution, the Court
upholds the finding of the CA that there is no substantial
evidence that respondent Manuel P. Valencia [1] acquired
property though unlawful means, [2] maintained US time
deposit accounts, and [3] lived a lavish lifestyle.
BARROSCO VS COA
GR NO. 253253
APRIL 27, 2021
FACTS:
Barrosco was the Supervisor of Cashiering Department
and President of BSU.
Administrative Officer II Mag-abo was granted a cash
advance of P574,215.27 for the payment of the salaries
of the BSU employees. Mag-abo went to Landbank
Malaybalay to encash the payroll check. Since there were
several customers at that time, she left the check with the
bank verifier and returned to BSU (Bukidnon State
University).
that same day, Mag-abo went back to Landbank together
with four (4) other BSU employees who had business
there. After encashing the check, Mag-abo et al. walked
back to BSU.
As they passed Caltex gasoline station, an unidentified
man grabbed Mag-abo's bag containing the payroll
money. The incident was reported to BSU Chief
Administrative Officer Gregory who accompanied Mag-
abo to the police station to report the incident.
COA Audit Team Leader Teresita Quijada informed
petitioner of Mag-abo's cash shortage of P574,215.27.
Quijada also issued a Demand Letter to Mag-abo
directing her to produce the unliquidated amount and
explain within 72 hours why the cash shortage occurred.
Mag-abo explained the incident to petitioner. In a
separate letter to the COA Legal Adjudication Office,
Mag-abo, too, requested relief from her cash
accountability. Mag-abo's request got denied. The COA
Adjudication and Settlement Board affirmed Mag-abo's
liability.
Mag-abo elevated her case to the COA Commission
Proper (COA Proper) via a petition for review. However,
his appeal was denied.
Aggrieved, Mag-abo moved for reconsideration, attaching
the affidavit dated March 2014 of retired BSU Accountant
Gloria P. Torres (Torres) stating that Mag-abo requested
for a security escort and vehicle from her supervisor, but
none were provided.
COA Proper denied Mag-abo's motion and held her,
petitioner, and Gregory solidarily liable for the stolen
amount, owing to their supposed negligence when the
loss occurred.
The ruling surprised petitioner, considering he was never
a party to the case and was never even furnished copy of
Torres' affidavit. Thus, petitioner filed his own motion for
reconsideration, invoking his right to due process and
questioning the basis of his supposed liability.
It ruled that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due
process. For although he was not impleaded in the
proceedings below, he was able to file a motion for
reconsideration anyway right after he was found solidarily
liable with Mag-abo and Gregory.
As for petitioner's liability, the COA Proper found that
petitioner failed to exercise the diligence expected of a
good father since he did not adopt precautionary
measures to safeguard the funds of BSU. It was only after
the robbery incident that petitioner realized the
importance of sound internal control in the custody of the
agency's cash.
COA however stated that since petitioners filed for a
motion to reconsider, he is assumed to be informed of his
charges.
ISSUE:
WON COA violated Barrosco right to due process. (YES)
6) The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the facts
and the law of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision; and
7) The board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding will know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision.
The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration does not
cure due process defects, especially if the said motion
was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the
right to due process and the lack of opportunity to be
heard on the merits.
Here, petitioner was found liable though he was never
charged. The proceedings prior to the COA Proper's
reconsideration all pointed to Mag-abo as sole negligent
party responsible for the loss of the P574,215.27
representing the salaries of BSU personnel. Petitioner
only got involved in the proceedings when the COA
Proper denied Mag-abo's motion for reconsideration and
ordered him to pay the unliquidated amount. Notably,
petitioner was brought in as party at a much later stage.
Applying Fontanilla, petitioner here was similarly
deprived of the opportunity to present and submit
evidence to establish non-culpability via memorandum or
oral arguments before the COA Commission pursuant to
Section 3, Rule X of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure
of the COA. Worse, he was deprived of the opportunity to
examine the evidence against him, for he was never
served a copy of Mag-abo's submissions which formed
the very basis of the adverse ruling of the COA Proper.

RULING: Though petitioner raised this due process violation issue

before the COA Proper, the latter never addressed his
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations bears the concern. It simply ruled that the very pleading which
requisites of due process in administrative raised due process violation was the very pleading which
proceedings, viz.: afforded him due process. But this cannot be the case.

Petitioner was constrained to limit the discussion in his

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right motion for reconsideration to the issue of due process.
to present one's case and submit evidence in Surely, this cannot be considered the opportunity to be
support thereof; heard within the concept of administrative due process.
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence INCIDENTAL POWERS AND RES JUDICATA
presented;

3) The decision must have something to support PASCUAL VS BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
itself; 28 SCRA 345

4) The evidence must be substantial; FACTS:

5) The decision must be rendered on

the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least Salvador and Entiqueta Gatbonton filed a complaint
contained in the record and disclosed to the against Arsenio Pascual, Jr. for alleged malpractice.
parties; Counsel for complainants announced that he would
present as his first witness Pascual himself. Pascual
made a record of his objection, invoking his right to be
exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board
of Examiners took note of such plea and at the same time
stated that at the next scheduled hearing, Pascual would
be called upon to testify as such witness, unless he could
secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
The trial court ordered a writ of preliminary injunction
issue against the respondent Board commanding it to
refrain from hearing or further proceeding with the
administrative case. The Board answered that the right
against self-incrimination is available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a
witness. The Gatbontons also alleged that the right
against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an
administrative hearing.
ISSUE:
WON the right against self-incrimination is available in an
administrative hearing.
RULING:
Yes. As held in the case of Cabal vs. Kapunan, while the
proceeding for forfeiture is administrative in character,
such proceeding possesses a criminal or penal aspect.
The case at bar is not dissimilar; the petitioner would be
similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture
of property but the revocation of his license as medical
practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation. The
right against self-incrimination of the defendant includes
the right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand.
We hold that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent
Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the
self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded
against to take the witness stand without his consent.
DUMARPA VS DIMAPORO
177 SCRA 478
FACTS:
Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board of
Canvassers as Mayor-elect of Marogong.
Petitions were filed questioning the election results. While
these petitions were pending adjudgment by the
COMELEC First Division, the Secretary of Local
Governments issued on May 19, 1988 a memorandum
designating Maclis Balt as Officer-In-Charge, Office of the
Mayor of Marogong. The designation of the OIC was
made in view of the election controversy that has arisen
over the mayoralty race, and to ensure that the
democratic process is respected throughout the transition
period.
The petitions seeking annulment of Datu Dimaporo’s
proclamation were ultimately dismissed by the COMELEC
First Division. A motion for reconsideration was filed.
Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of his
status as mayor-elect of Marogong, as confirmed by the
COMELEC. His counsel sent a letter to the Provincial
Governor praying that official matters involving the affairs
of the Municipality of Marogong be accorded to Dimaporo.
This letter, along with other documents collated by the
Office of the Governor, were referred to the Provincial
Fiscal for legal opinion on the matter.
The legal opinion, signed by Asst. Provincial Fiscal
Danganan and with the conformity of Provincial Fiscal
Dumarpa, is that Datu Maclis Balt is still the mayor of the
Municipality considering that a motion for reconsideration
was timely filed by the OIC and hence the decision of the
Division is not yet final and executory.
On learning of this legal opinion, Datu Dimaporo filed with
the COMELEC en banc a motion to hold Fiscals Dumarpa
and Danganan, and Vice Governor Alauya in contempt,
that their communication is an act of improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice; that OIC Maclis Balt
had no right to file a motion for reconsideration as he has
never been a candidate for Mayor in Marogong during the
local elections.
The COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the
Dumarpa et al. guilty of contempt. They filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition for nullification of COMELEC’s resolution.
ISSUE:
WON Dumarpa, Danganan and Alauya should be cited in
contempt.
RULING:
No. It appears that the resolution in question not only
lacks factual foundation of any sort but is contradicted by
such relevant facts as may be discerned from record.
That opinion was rendered in answer to the inquiry of the
Acting Governor as to whether or not, in view of the
judgment by the First Division of the COMELEC upholding
the proclamation by the Board of Canvassers of Datu
Dimaporo as Mayor-Elect of Marogong, the duly
designated OIC Mayor, therefore acting as such, Datu
Maclis Balt, could still be recognized as the Mayor of the
Municipality.
The inquiry had been made necessary in view of the
conflict in claims to the mayoralty then being asserted by
both Datu Dimaporo and Datu Balt, which conflict had to
be swiftly and legally resolved to prevent its resolution by
arms and bloodshed.
The fiscals' opinion was based on "Sec. 3, paragraph C,
Article IX of the Constitution which mandates that motions
for reconsideration from a decision of a Division of the
Commission on Elections shall be decided En Banc by the
Commission." They declared that since "a motion for
reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC, the decision
of the Division is not final and executory. The decision of
the Commission En Banc is not yet even final until and
after 5 days whenever no restraining order is issued by
the Supreme Court."
The Court, quite frankly, sees in the text of the opinion
nothing even remotely resembling an affront to the
COMELEC, or a criticism of the First Division's judgment.
On the contrary, the opinion simply paraphrases ---
correctly, it would appear the COMELEC's own Rules of
Procedure on the subject it addresses. But even if, as the
questioned Resolution declares, the views therein
expressed are clearly wrong, it cannot for that reason
alone be considered contumacious otherwise, liability for
contempt would invariably attach to every declared
instance of orders or judgments rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, or
otherwise attended by serious error of one kind or
another. The absurdity of such a rule or policy need not
be belabored.
Nor may the Acting Governor be faulted for consulting the
lawyers of the province as to the effects of a judgment on
the authority and actuations of municipal or provincial
officials, or the fiscals for advising him on such matters.
ENCINAS VS AGUSTIN
GR NO. 187317
APRIL 11, 2013
FACTS:
Respondents were both fire officers in Nueva Ecija. They
claimed that Encinas, who was then the Provincial Fire
Marshall of Nueva Ecija, informed them that unless they
gave him P5,000, they would be relieved from their station
at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas.
Four days after, Agustin and Caubang came up short and
was only able to give P2,000. When they failed to deliver
the balance, Encinas issued instructions effectively
reassigning respondents.
Respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection a
letter-complaint for illegal transfer of personnel under the
DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6795). Later, it was docketed by the
BFP for preliminary investigation for violation of RA 3019.
The BFP recommended the dismissal of the
administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office
in Pampanga. Essentially the same facts but this time,
their action is based on Sec. 4(c) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
The formal charge was dishonesty, grave misconduct,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. The
CSCRO ordered his dismissal from service.
Encinas proffered the defense of res judicata. The
CSCRO rejected such argument and ruled that the
dismissal of the BFP complaint was not a judgment on the
merits rendered by a competent tribunal.
Encinas then filed an appeal memorandum with the CSC
main office, wherein he argued that the respondents were
guilty of forum-shopping for having filed 2 separate
administrative complaints. The same was denied. He filed
a petition before the CA, which was also denied. Hence
this recourse to the Court.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents are guilty of forum-shopping. (NO)
RULING:
Forum-shopping
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia
requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same Interests in both actions;
(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case.
Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that
the dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute
res judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus,
there is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents.
Res judicata
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a
subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:
(a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment
on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and
the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of
subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the
merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of
formal, technical or dilatory objections;"or when the
judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party
is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon
some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.”
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in
contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal of the
BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was
the result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of
determining whether a formal charge for an administrative
offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of
parties were determined therein with finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely
administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative
proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves
(a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts
based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an
order or decision supported by the facts proved. The
exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a
determination, with respect to the matter in controversy,
of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of
the contending parties are; and based thereon and the
facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights
and obligations of the parties.
SORIANO VS LAGUARDIA
587 SCRA 79
FACTS:
Petitioner, as host of Dating Daan, during a broadcast
made cussing remarks directed towards a certain Michael
stating:
“Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae
o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas,
o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola
ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.”
Two days later, affidavit complaints were filed in the
MTRCB against petitioner in connection with the said
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt
directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a
minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang Daan. After notice and a preliminary conference,
the MTRCB preventively suspended the showing of Ang
Dating Daan for 20 days. Petitioner filed a MR but
eventually sought to withdraw it after filing with the Court
a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
preventive suspension order issued.
The MTRCB rendered judgement imposing a 3-month
suspension on Soriano from his program, “Ang Dating
Daan”. Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues, among others, that PD 1986 is not
complete in itself and does not provide for a sufficient
standard for its implementation thereby resulting in an
undue delegation of administrative power since the law
does not provide for the penalties for violations of its
provisions. Moreover, he argues that the IRR provisions
are invalid insofar as PD 1986 do not expressly authorize
the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.
ISSUE:
WON there was undue delegation of legislative power.
RULING:
No, there was no undue delegation of legislative power.
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which
may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-
legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may
be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have
in fine only such powers or authority as are granted
or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in
determining whether an agency has certain powers, the
inquiry should be from the law itself. But once
ascertained as existing, the authority given should be
liberally construed.
PD 1986 expressly empowered the MTRCB to regulate
and supervise television programs to obviate the
exhibition of broadcast of indecent or immoral materials
and to impose sanctions for violations and to prevent
further violations as it investigates. Simply put, MTRCB’s
mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the
agency of the authority to issue the challenged order
of preventive suspension as this authority stems
naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of its
power of regulation and supervision.
There was no undue delegation of legislative power as
Section 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor
extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by
imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. More so, the preventive
suspension was done in furtherance of it.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a
penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. And the power to discipline
and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power
to investigate administrative complaints and, during such
investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject
of the complaint.