1.

Pakistan Choosing Allies: The Cold War in South Asia

 The Cold War (1945–1991) was a global power struggle between the U.S. and USSR.
 Newly decolonized countries like Pakistan had to choose alignment:
o India pursued non-alignment under Nehru.
o Pakistan aligned with the U.S.-led bloc, driven by:
 Need for military and economic aid.
 Fear of India’s growing conventional and strategic superiority.
 Stephen Cohen summarized Pakistan’s strategic value in 1947:

Could Pakistan serve as a bulwark for India against Soviet pressure or Islamic
radicalism?

🟦 2. From 1947 to 1959: Beginning of the Alliance

 Jinnah’s Vision (1947):
o “Communism does not flourish in the soil of Islam.”
o Pakistan’s interests lie with democratic powers: U.S. and U.K.
 Liaquat Ali Khan’s U.S. Visit (1950):
o Advocated for Islamic democracy’s compatibility with Western ideals.
o Though Pakistan had recognized Communist China in 1949, it gravitated toward
the West.
 1954–1959: Formal Alliance:
o Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1954).
o SEATO membership (1954): aimed at stopping communist expansion.
o CENTO membership (1955) (originally Baghdad Pact).
o Bilateral Defense Pact with U.S. (1959).
 Strategic expectations:
o Pakistan wanted U.S. help against India, not just communism.
o The U.S. clarified its treaty commitments only applied to communist threats,
not India.

🟥 3. From 1959 to 1965: Fractures in the Alliance

 Under President Ayub Khan, Pakistan started engaging China and USSR.
o He outlined this in Friends Not Masters:

Pakistan’s location could become a strength if it had stable ties with all
neighbors—India, China, and the USSR.
 o Yet, U-2 spy flights from Peshawar (1959–1960) angered the USSR.
o CIA operations (including Gary Powers’ U-2 crash) made Pakistan a Soviet
target.
 U.S. discomfort grew over:
o Pakistan–China boundary agreement,
o Pakistan’s participation in Non-Aligned Movement meetings.
 The U.S. tolerated these divergences—but the mutual expectations diverged.

President Johnson told Ayub Khan privately:

“A wife can understand a Saturday night fling—as long as she remains the wife”.

🔻 4. Indo-Pak War and the U.S. Arms Embargo, 1965

 Operation Gibraltar (1965): Pakistani infiltration into Indian-occupied Kashmir aimed
to trigger uprising.
 India crossed the international border—a shift from Kashmir-only conflict to total
war.
 U.S. Ambassador Bowles’ Memo:
o Warned U.S. aid should only be used against China, not intra-subcontinent wars.
o Urged caution in giving India full support, and advocated U.S. pressure for
India–Pakistan reconciliation.
 U.S. imposed an arms embargo on both sides, but Pakistan saw this as betrayal:

Bhutto to McConaughy: “Pakistan, cornered, deserted, bitched…”

🧨 5. From 1965 to 1972: Bhutto’s Nuclearization of the

Pakistani Narrative
 April 12, 1967: U.S. officially announced permanent military aid suspension to both
Pakistan and India.
 Bhutto interpreted this as:
o A U.S. tilt toward India,
o An attempt to pressure Pakistan into submission.

Bhutto claimed:
“The U.S. created an arms race in South Asia... by arming both sides without resolving the core
dispute: Kashmir.”

 Pakistan’s response: Begin indigenous nuclear deterrent.

 After 1971 War and the breakup of Pakistan, Bhutto:
o Praised U.S. support during the conflict,
 o Signed the Simla Agreement,
o Initiated a reset in relations with both India and the U.S.

“We have no choice but to reconcile with the U.S.,” Bhutto conceded—but on Pakistan’s terms.

6. From 1974 to 1998: U.S. Sanctions and Nonproliferation

Disputes
 Bhutto’s era post-1971 saw efforts to reset U.S.–Pakistan relations through diplomacy,
normalization with India (Simla Agreement), and U.S. appreciation for Pakistan’s role in
China–U.S. rapprochement.
 However, Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons post-1974 (after India’s first test) led
to repeated U.S. sanctions:
o Symington Amendment (1976) barred economic and military aid to countries
enriching uranium without IAEA safeguards.
o Glenn Amendment (1985) added more conditions.
o Pressler Amendment (1990) led to aid cutoff as U.S. president couldn’t certify
Pakistan didn’t possess a nuclear weapon.
 Result: U.S. imposed economic, political, and military sanctions under nearly every
administration.
 Pakistan was known as “the most sanctioned ally” of the U.S..

Pakistan’s view:

 U.S. targeted Pakistan selectively while ignoring India’s nuclear trajectory.

 U.S. only sanctioned Pakistan when it was no longer strategically useful.

🟨 7. Pakistan, U.S., and the Future of Afghanistan

 Pakistan’s strategic thinking shifted post-2011:
o Blowback from Afghan jihad created a militant nexus in FATA: Pakistani
Taliban + Al-Qaeda + Central Asian groups.
 Islamabad realized that a stable, peaceful Afghanistan was vital to Pakistan’s national
security.
o “Stability in KP and FATA is closely linked to stability in Afghanistan.” — Amir
Haider Hoti.
 Pakistan released 9 Afghan Taliban leaders in 2012 at Kabul’s request—seen as a
confidence-building gesture toward reconciliation.
 Pakistan’s facilitative role included:
o Hosting peace talks,
o Enabling Taliban’s political office in Qatar,
o Releasing Mullah Baradar to support Doha talks.
🟥 8. Pakistan’s Role in Shaping the U.S.–Afghan Peace
Process
 Doha Agreement (2020) between U.S. and Taliban was possible only through
Pakistan’s facilitation.
o Pakistan initiated contact with stakeholders as early as 2009.
o Established Afghanistan–Pakistan Joint Commission for Peace in 2011.
o Supported Taliban liaison office in Doha (2012).
o Participated in Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) with U.S., China,
and Afghanistan (2016).
 Mullah Baradar met FM Shah Mehmood Qureshi in 2019 in Islamabad to finalize terms
of U.S.–Taliban talks.
o Pakistan’s role enhanced its diplomatic capital regionally and globally.

🟧 9. Challenges for Pakistan in Navigating the Sino–U.S.

Rivalry
 Key concern: Balancing ties with China (CPEC) and U.S. (strategic aid/engagement).
 Fears of a “with us or against us” binary are prominent, especially under Trump (2018–
2020).
 U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis rejected the One Belt One Road (OBOR) as
expansionist, citing its passage through disputed territory.
o Pakistan and China rejected this critique and defended CPEC’s legality.
 Pakistan must communicate to Washington that:
o CPEC is not zero-sum, and
o Pakistan aims to achieve economic transformation via CPEC by 2030 (energy,
infrastructure, jobs).

Pakistan’s Challenges of the Growing Indo–U.S. Strategic and Defense Partnership

 The U.S.–India defense partnership has deepened through foundational agreements:

o GSOMIA (2002) – allows India access to U.S. defense tech.
o LEMOA (2016) – grants logistics access to military bases.
o COMCASA (2018) – enables secure communications.
o BECA (2020) – provides real-time SIGINT and classified satellite data.
 These agreements effectively place Pakistan and China in India’s targeting scope:
o India can plan conventional or nuclear strikes with enhanced situational
awareness.
“Pakistan should raise these concerns with the Biden administration,” Akhtar stresses, noting
China shares similar apprehensions.

 India’s rapid defense modernization:

o 2nd largest arms importer, especially post-Balakot and Galwan clashes.
o Rafale purchases positioned to intimidate Pakistan, under the concept of
“surrogate deterrence” against China.

“India’s muted response to China and escalated response to Pakistan reveals its strategy to ‘bog
down’ China’s ally near CPEC,” she notes.

 Strategic instability:
o U.S. must recognize how its support for India contributes to regional deterrence
fragility.
o “Three nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, China) sharing disputed borders cannot
afford U.S. indifference,” Akhtar warns.

🧾 Is Past the Prologue?

 Author’s central claim: Pakistan wants a fresh prologue in its ties with the U.S.,
centered on:
o Economic security,
o Regional connectivity,
o Developmental partnerships.
 However, this reset requires understanding of each other’s geostrategic compulsions:
o Pakistan’s alignment with China through CPEC is non-zero-sum,
o U.S. must avoid viewing Pakistan through Af-Pak or counterterrorism lens.
 Rabia Akhtar maps the bilateral timeline as a rollercoaster:
o From early alliance in the 1950s,
o To arms embargo post-1965,
o To sanctions for nuclear pursuits in the 1970s,
o To proxy cooperation against USSR in the 1980s,
o To post-9/11 alliance,
o To renewed divergence in the 2010s.
 Today’s challenges are not entirely new:
o Afghanistan, India, and China continue to define the triangle of strategic
decisions.
o The difference: Pakistan now seeks to anchor foreign policy in economic
security, not just geopolitical maneuvering.

“If Pakistan plays its cards right, without compromising on core interests,” she writes,
“then this uneasy but essential relationship can come back with more force and vigor.”

“The past will definitely be the prologue—but only if the right lessons are learned by both sides.