Technological Principles and

Policy Challenges of the

Global Positioning System
Marlee Chong
May 6, 2013
 Overview
 History
 Technology
 Applications
 Policy
 Overview
 History
 Technology
 Applications
 Policy
 Where am I?
Where am I going?
 Landmarks
 Dead reckoning
 Coordinate system
Latitude
Longitude
 Challenges
 Size of the Earth
 Describing celestial and planetary
motion
 Timekeeping
 Measurement in motion
 Reducing error
 Radionavigation

Transit

Long Range Aid to Timation

Navigation
(LORAN) System 621B
 Opportunity
 Limitations
 Accurate radionavigation required remaining
within the line of sight
 Transit required a latitude to fix position and 10-
15 minutes of processing time: too slow for
aircraft
 Transit (APL, 1960): satellite navigation using orbits
 Timation (US Navy, 1964): stable timing of space-
based satellite clocks
 System 621B (US Air Force, 1963): digital signals and
global coverage
 Developing GPS
 Defense Navigation System (NAVSTAR) Global
Positioning System
 Designed for civil and military use to “drop five
bombs in the same hole” for less than $10,000
 Department of Defense combined elements from
Transit, Timation, and System 621B
 Spearheaded by US Air Force
 Draper Prize
 Awarded in 2003 “for their technological
achievements in the development of the
Global Positioning System (GPS)”

Bradford Parkinson and Ivan Getting

 Overview
 History
 Technology
 Applications
 Policy
 Overview
 History
 Technology
 Applications
 Policy
 Technology
 System Elements
 Signal
 Ranging
 Vulnerabilities
System Elements
 Space Segment
 24-31 satellites identified by space
vehicle number (SVN) and PRN code
 20,200 km altitude
 12 hour cycle
 6 planes of
4 satellites
 Solar powered with
backup batteries
 Rocket fuel limits lifespan
 Constellation considerations
 Global coverage
 4 satellite minimum, 6 practical standard in
case of anomalies
 Good geometrically distribution
 Robust if a satellite fails
 Inexpensive repositioning
 Minimal maneuvering to remain in orbit
 Reduce tradeoffs of power requirements by
distance
 Control Segment
 2nd Space Operations Squadron of the United States
Air Force tracks satellites, monitors transmissions
and sends commands and information
 Master Control Station
 Monitor Stations
 6 USAF
 10 National Geospatial-Intellignece Agency sites added in
2008
 Ground Antennas
 4 ground antennas located with monitor stations
 8 tracking stations in Air Force Satellite Control Network
 Control Segment Map

http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/control/
 GPS receivers
 Single- or dual- frequency
receivers access L1 or L1
and L2 carrier frequencies QuickTime™ and a
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 Tracking channels (9-12)

track specific satellites
 Signals
 Unique Psuedo-random noise (PRN) Codes
 Coarse Acquisition
(C/A code) L1
 Precision Code
(P code) L1 and L2
 Microwave signals
 L2 = 120 ƒ

 L1 = 154 ƒo
 Clock carrier frequency
 ƒo=10.23 Hz
 Security Designs
 Anti-Spoofing (AS)
 P-code encrypted as Y-code; L2 unavailable
 Selective Availability (SA)
 March 25, 1990-May 1, 2000
 Provided civilians with Standard Positioning Service,
compared to military standard Precise Positioning Service
 Decreased performance by factor of 7
 Delta error: dither (add random noise to) all satellite clocks
 Epsilon error: slowly varying orbital errors almost identical for
users with short separation distances
 Pseudoranging
 Inherently indeterminable due to bias
in system and user time measurements
Geometric range time ∆t
Satellite Signal
clock reaches
reads receiver ∂tD tu
∂t time w/o error time
Ts Signal Ts +∂t T’u Signal T’u +∂t
leaves reaches Receiver
satellite receiver clock
reads
Pseudorange time time
 Psuedorange errors
p=c[(Tu’ + tu)-(Ts+∂t)=∆t+c(tu-∂t+∂tD)
 tu = receiver clock error
 ∂t= satellite clock error
 ∂t= clock bias + clock drift * (t-tclock reference time) + frequency
drift* (t-tclock reference time)^2+relativistic correction
 Relativistic correction: ~ 4.5*10^-10
 SR ~ -8*10^-11; GR ~ 5*10^-10
 Adjust satellite clock frequency by correction
 ∂tD=∂tatmosphere +∂tnoise+∂tmultipath+ ∂thardware
and
interference
 Atmospheric errors
Ionospheric
divergence
 Signal info delayed
 np=1-c2/f2-c3/f3-… QuickTime™ and a
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 vp=c/np
 Carrier phase early
 ng=1+c2/f2+c3/f3+…
 vg=c/ng
 Atmospheric errors
Troposphere
 Nondispersive
 Refractivity of
hydrostatic and
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nonhydrostatic
components
 Geometric Dilution of
Precision
 Effect of satellite geometry in
estimating range error propagation

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 Vulnerabilities
 Signal
 Infrastructure
 Incidental
 Signal
 Commercially available parts and
publicly available directions
Jamming Spoofing
Intentional Valid signal
interference with time
Detectable and delay
illegal QuickTime™ and a
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No easy
detection or
solutions yet
 Infrastructure
 Damage to control center, satellite
network, and cyber attacks
Alternate master control center
Extra satellites in orbit
 Incidental
 Target: ubiquitous and well-known
 Spectrum interference
 Solar flares: thickens ionosphere
 Magnetic storm:
solar wind interacts
with magnetic field
 uV increases,
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ionizing and heating

thermosphere
 Mitigation
 Receivers and users detecting
anomalies
 Firewalls and cyber security
 Alternative technologies and
redundancy systems for must
vulnerable and critical
 Overview
 History
 Technology
 Applications
 Policy
 Overview
 History
 Technology
 Applications
 Policy
 Applications
 Original mission:
military navigation
technology for
positioning and
navigation
 Designed with dual QuickTime™ and a
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use in mind
 Assessment Scheme
 Highly Critical: application able to perform some
functions with alternative technologies and/or
systems after severe disruption and consequences
 Moderately Critical: application able to perform
most functions with existing alternative
technologies and/or systems with compromised
accuracy and precision
 Not Critical: application able to perform all
functions and can utilize alternative technologies
and/or systems with minimal disruption
 Positioning
 Smart Bombs: ex. Joint Direct Attack Munition
 JDAM receiver finds
position of bomb
 Aircraft receiver finds
position of target QuickTime™ and a
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bomb position as
control computer
adjust tail fins
 40 feet accuracy
 Highly Critical Positioning
 Inertial guidance system
as an alternative
 Loss of accuracy and
precision leads to
collateral damage QuickTime™ and a
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 Nuclear Test Detection
 US Atomic Energy Detection System
Global network of sensors to detect
nuclear events operated by US Air Force
Sensors aboard the GPS
satellites monitor space
and the atmosphere QuickTime™ and a
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 Moderately Nuclear Test
Critical Detection
 GPS system failure likely leaves
satellites and sensors in orbit
 Other satellites could
host future sensors

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 Positioning
 US Geological Survey measures the
relative position of stations relative
near active faults
Calculate strain, slip and ground
deformation
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 Not Critical Positioning
 USGS could easily substitute other
methods to conduct surveys, such as
LORAN-C, because the time resolution
is large

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 Navigation
 Mobile phones with built-in receivers
Assisted GPS uses carrier network
 Mobile apps
can access
GPS data QuickTime™ and a
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 Moderately Navigation
Critical
 Triangulation from cell towers
 Vibrant community to code patches
or other apps
 Spoofing
apps change QuickTime™ and a

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read by other
apps
 Timing
 NYSE and
Nasdaq data
centers execute
and timestamp
trades
 Network Time
Protocol
synchronizes
servers every
second with
GPS
 Highly Critical Timing
 Without GPS
 Trades not
synchronized
 Trading houses
cannot obtain time
from cellular
networks from GPS
 Without local
receiver
 Internet NTP has
2s offset
 Resolution disrupts
high frequency
trades
 Weather Forecasting
 Radio Occultation
 Measure atmospheric density
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from the refraction of signal

passing through atmosphere to a
low-Earth orbit satellite
 Can compensate for lack of
meteorological observation
stations for oceans and the
poles
 Moderately Weather
Critical Forecasting
 Less complete models
 Accuracy issues regardless
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 Less precise instrument

calibration
 Alternatives such as satellite
imaging
 Overview
 History
 Technology
 Applications
 Policy
 Overview
 History
 Technology
 Applications
 Policy
 Policy
 Mandate
 Governance
 Funding
 Interoperability
 Privacy
 Spectrum protection
 Replacement?
 Mandate
 Presidential policy (2010 National Space
Policy)
 “The United States must maintain its leadership
in the service, provision, and use of global
navigation satellite systems”
 Law (Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Section 2281)
 Created in National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1998
 Responsibility of Secretary of Defense
 Governance
National Executive Committee for Space-Based
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
 National Coordination Office runs policy with
working groups
 NASA advisory board
 Defense (co-chair), Transportation (co-chair),
State, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland
Security, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NASA
 Funding: $1.5 billion
Dept of Defense Dept of Transportation
 Develop  Civilian GPS beyond
 Acquire gen III
 Operate  Joint funding
 Sustain
 Brownouts
 Replacements delayed
Relaxed, insufficient oversight
 Options
Use retired satellites
Speed up production
Power management of secondary missions
 Interoperability
 UN’s International Committee on Global Navigation
Satellite Systems (ICG)
 Compatibility and interoperability
 Cooperation: coordinate and share information and save
costs
 Position, navigation and timing information helps society’s
security and environment
 Working groups and individual agreements
 Privacy
 United States vs Jones (Jan 2012)
 Supreme Court: warrant needed to secretly
install a tracker
 United States vs Katzin
 Challenging decision regarding tracking, which was not
considered a search
 Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act
[Sen. Wyden D-Ore, Rep. Chaffetz (R-Utah),
and Sen. Kirk (R-Ill)]
 Introduced to Senate in 2011, House in May 2012
 Proposes a standard for government access
 Spectrum protection
 Commercial products: FCC and NTIA
Lightsquared barred from using
neighboring spectrum
Importing, marketing, selling, and
operating jammers is illegal (up to
$100,000 fine)
 Replacement?
 DARPA’s All Source Positioning and
Navigation (ASPN)
Phase 2 June 2012 to design algorithms
“low cost, robust, and seamless navigation
solutions for military users…with or
without GPS”
 Acknowledgements
 Thank you all for coming
 Special thanks to Prof. Venky
Narayanamurti and Dr. Tolu Odumosu
for their mentorship and assistance