Ethics and

Metaethics

Based on Kernohan, A. (2012).

Environmental ethics: An interactive
introduction. Buffalo, NY: Broadview
Press, Chapters 1 & 2.

Prepared by D. G. Ross, Auburn University. Images copyright D. G. Ross, unless otherwise noted.
When we make ethical decisions, we’re
making normative decisions.
• Normative = How things ought to be. Thus, normative
decisions guide action and seek agreement.

“Punching your classmate is wrong.” (Ethical judgment)

=
“Do not punch your classmate.” (Action guiding)
= OW!
“We can agree that you should not punch your
classmate.” (Agreement seeking)

D. G. Ross, Auburn University

Ethical situations generally involve (1) a moral agent,
(2) an action or series of actions, (3) consequences,
and (4) a recipient of the consequences. Consequence
1. Moral Agent: Responsible for Agent Action
action (the doer, or the actor, to OW!
which praise or blame is typically
assigned)
2. Action: Something that occurs as
a results of the moral agent’s
decisionmaking process
3. Consequences: Result from
action
4. Recipient: Receives the
consequences of the moral
agent’s action(s)
Recipient
D. G. Ross, Auburn University
Three overarching ethical theories directly relate to
the four primary elements of an ethical situation:
• Virtue Ethics: Relate to the Virtue of? Consequences of?
moral agent’s character
• Deontological Ethics: Relate
to the agent’s duties and
obligations in any given
situation
• Consequentialist Ethics: Are
concerned with the outcome
of an agent’s choice of action
and what that means for
(the) recipient(s) Obligation to?

D. G. Ross, Auburn University

To work through any given ethical situation, we
must determine who or what is given moral
standing.
• Moral Standing: Of ethical concern
– Anthropocentrism: Only humans have moral standing
– Non-Anthropocentrism: Extends moral standing to
non-humans
• Zoocentric: Assigns moral standing to all animals
• Biocentric: Assigns moral standing to all living things,
including plants
?
• Ecocentric: Extends moral standing to ecosystems
(communities of living organisms in conjunction with non-
living components)

D. G. Ross, Auburn University

Consider this image from a non-anthropocentric view. Under zoocentrism, what
has moral standing? Biocentrism? Ecocentrism? What do these models mean with
regards to action?

D. G. Ross, Auburn University

How we act towards non-humans is contingent
upon our perceived duty towards the non-
human.
• Indirect: The duty (toward a non-human) is owed to
a human
• Direct: The duty (toward a non-human) is owed to
the non-human Because you own that
lake, I will not dump
my used car oil in it.

D. G. Ross, Auburn University

As we weigh ethical decisions, we often assign
value to elements involved in the decision.
• Instrumental
value: X can be
used to bring
about (cause)
value
• Intrinsic value: X
has value in its
own right

D. G. Ross, Auburn University

 When we study the meaning of ethical
judgments, we’re engaging in metaethics.
“Metaethics is the attempt to understand the
metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and
psychological, presuppositions and commitments of
moral thought, talk, and practice. […] Metaethics explores
as well the connection between values, reasons for
action, and human motivation, asking how it is that moral
standards might provide us with reasons to do or refrain
from doing as it demands, and it addresses many of the ?
issues commonly bound up with the nature of freedom
and its significance (or not) for moral responsibility.”
Sayre-McCord, Geoff, "Metaethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/metaethics/>.

D. G. Ross, Auburn University

We can categorize the various approaches to
metaethics as follows:
• Nihilist: There is no right or wrong
• Skepticist: There may be right or wrong
• Universalist: Given a similar situation, right is right for everyone, wrong is
wrong for everyone
• Relativist: Right and wrong are culturally dependent
• Expressivist: Saying an action is right or wrong implies attitude towards
action
– This model explains why ethical judgments shape action, but not how or why
judgments are made
• Prescriptivist: Saying an action is right or wrong implies a command toward
action
• Cognitivist: Saying an action is right or wrong asserts belief
– This model explains how judgments are made, but not how judgment shapes action

D. G. Ross, Auburn University

Because ethical judgments are normative (action guiding and agreement
seeking), “moral agents cannot be obligated to perform actions that they are,
by their very nature, unable to perform” (Kernohan, p. 19). This is the
difference between “ought” and “can.”
Help!!

I ought to save that

person!

D. G. Ross, Auburn University

Another aspect of the normative nature of ethical
decisions is that we can never derive ethical judgment
purely from facts. Facts are inert. For a case to be of
ethical interest, there must be an ethical premise.
• Inert: Not active. Doing nothing. Lacking the ability to do.
• Ethical premise: A proposition from which we base
argument, derived from some ethical theory (Relativism,
Divine Command, Egoism, Consequentialism, Deontology,
Moral Pluralism, Justice, Virtue, Feminism, etc.) OW!

“A 100-pound rock dropped

directly on a human’s bare foot
will cause pain”

D. G. Ross, Auburn University

“Hume’s Guillotine” helps us separate “is” (Fact)
from “ought” (Normative Statements.)

• Fact (is) 1. Guns shoot bullets.

• Fact (is)
2. Bullets can hurt people.
• Normative statement/ ethical
premise (ought)
3. Hurting people is bad.
• Conclusion/normative
statement
4. Guns
(1) And (2) have no ethical value—there’s should
nothing be banned.
to argue. The
argument is in (3), then, from (3), (4). Any argument from (1) and (2)
is ethically inert (and invalid).
D. G. Ross, Auburn University
And back to the beginning: Ethical judgments are normative
decisions which guide action and shape agreement—each
aspect of the analytical process helps us refine our
decisionmaking process and our argumentation.

D. G. Ross, Auburn University