Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Fixed Exchange
Rates and
Foreign
Exchange
Intervention
Slides prepared by Thomas Bishop Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.
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• Assets
Foreign government bonds (official international reserves)
Gold (official international reserves)
Domestic government bonds
Loans to domestic banks (called discount loans in US)
• Liabilities
Deposits of domestic banks
Currency in circulation (previously central banks had to give
up gold when citizens brought currency to exchange)
To prevent the
domestic currency
from appreciating,
the central bank
buys foreign assets,
increasing the
money supply
and decreasing
interest rates.
8.5
7.5
Mexican pesos per US dollar
6.5
5.5
4.5
3.5
2.5
1-Jul- 1-Aug- 1-Sep- 1-Oct- 1-Nov- 1-Dec- 1-Jan- 1-Feb- 1-Mar- 1-Apr- 1-May-
1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995
January
January1994
1994………………
……………… $27
$27billion
billion
October
October1994
1994…………………$17
…………………$17billion
billion
November
November1994
1994………..……
………..…… $13
$13billion
billion
December
December1994
1994 ………..……$
………..……$66billion
billion
During 1994, Mexico’s central bank hid the fact that its
reserves were being depleted. Why?
Source: Banco de México, http://www.banxico.org.mx
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-40
CASE STUDY:
The Mexican Peso Crisis, 1994–1995
• 20 Dec 1994: Mexico devalues the peso by 13%. It
fixes E at 4.0 pesos/dollar instead of 3.4 pesos/dollar.
• Investors expect that the central bank has depleted
its reserves.
• ↑ further due to exchange rate risk: investors expect
the central bank to devalue again and they sell
Mexican assets, putting more downward pressure on
the value of the peso.
• 22 Dec 1994: with reserves nearly gone, the central
bank abandons the fixed rate.
• In a week, the peso falls another 30% to about 5.7
pesos/dollar.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-41
The Rescue Package: Reducing
Exchange
rate, E
DD If nominal interest
rates are zero, a
temporary monetary
expansion will not
lower interest rates
1 and will not affect
Ee
1 – R* exchange rates nor
output: a liquidity trap.
AA1 AA2
Y1 Yf Output, Y
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-60
Interest Rates, Exchange Rates
and a Liquidity Trap (cont.)
A permanent monetary
Exchange expansion will raise
rate, E expectations of
DD inflation and cause
markets to expect a
depreciation of the
2
domestic currency:
E1 inflationary money
1 policy depreciates the
Ee
1 – R* currency and raises
output.
AA1 AA2
Y1 Yf Output, Y
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-61
Interest Rates, Exchange Rates
and a Liquidity Trap (cont.)
Exchange
rate, E
DD
A devaluation of the
E0 currency could achieve
2 the same goals if
1 – R*
E0 market expectations
do not change: a
1
Ee devaluation to E0
1 – R* raises output.
AA1 AA2
Y1 Yf Output, Y
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-62
Interest Rates, Exchange Rates
and a Liquidity Trap (cont.)
• Prices and wages have fallen (deflation),
allowing a real depreciation of Japanese
products.
Low output and employment has gradually risen as
prices, wages and the value of Japanese products
have fallen.
• In addition, Japan has maintained low interest
rates, has increased the growth rate of its
money supply and has tried to depreciate the
yen by purchasing international reserves.