Introduction to Philosophy

Lecture XVIII
Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part I
Dr. Daniel Kaufman

College of Continuing Education & The Extended University

Missouri State University
Lecture XVIII Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part I
Two primary senses of the verb 'to know':
1. Epistemic or propositional sense: "I know that P" —
by which we mean that a person has a certain true,
justified belief.
2. Performative sense: "I know how to Q" — where we
mean that a person is competent in performing a task
or engaging in an activity of some kind.
Lecture XVIII Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part I
Traditional Philosophical Tendencies:
1. Mentalism — the view that all deliberate human activity is the result of
conscious mental states.
2. Rationalism — the view that human beings are defined by their rationality
and that consequently, one should not believe things or act in ways that
cannot be rationally justified.
3. Intellectualism — the idea that competent activity is the result of prior
thinking; that knowledge, in the performative sense, is a matter of being in
possession of the relevant body of knowledge, in the propositional sense,
that we "know how" to do things, because we have propositional knowledge
of the right instructions and rules (e.g. for the Intellectualist, I know how to
play chess because I have propositional knowledge of the rules of chess).
(Ryle, pp. 212; 215)
Lecture XVIII Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part I
Traditional Philosophical Tendencies:
Implications of Intellectualism for Education
Implies that the teaching of skills should be done via explicit instruction,
i.e. by way of the imparting of truths. Makes "knowing how" a function of
"knowing that".
• Intellectualism leads us away from an apprenticeship model of
education and towards a model grounded in classroom instruction,
the latter of which is the best venue for the imparting of information.
• If Ryle is correct, however, and competent performance is "not"
primarily a function of having some body of propositional knowledge,
then our current methods of education are wrongheaded.
Lecture XVIII Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part I
Ryle's Two Main Theses:
A. Knowing-how is not reducible to knowing-that.
Competence in performance is not the result of a
pre-obtained body of propositional knowledge.
B. In fact, knowing-how is prior to knowing-that: i.e. in
order to obtain propositional knowledge, one must
already know how to do things, in the performative
sense. (Ryle, p. 215)
Lecture XVIII Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part I

Ryle's Two Main Theses:

There are two major stages of Ryle's
argument:
A.Propositional knowledge is not sufficient to
explain competent performances.
B.Acquiring and applying factual knowledge are
examples of competence performances.
Lecture XVIII Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part I
Next time: Examine in detail Ryle's arguments
against the idea that knowing-how can be reduced
to knowing-that and on behalf of the view that
knowing-that, in fact, presupposes knowing-how.
Things to think about while you read:
• How do you acquire a skill, whether in sports, crafts,
social interaction, etc.…?
• In your own experience, is it typically a matter of
acquiring propositional knowledge or rather,
performative knowledge?