Introduction to Philosophy

Lecture VII
A Mentalist Myth? — Part II
Dr. Daniel Kaufman

College of Continuing Education & The Extended University

Missouri State University
Lecture VII A Mentalist Myth? — Part II
Gilbert Ryle
Ordinary language philosophy
Believed that philosophical problems arise out of
confusions in language; typically the result of failing to
attend to the many different ways in which words may
be used. Philosophers tend to oversimplify things; to
present things as black and white; as pro or con; as one
way or another.
Lecture VII A Mentalist Myth? — Part II
Gilbert Ryle
Mind/Body problem
The problems that arise from a dualistic or mentalistic
view of mind and body (i.e. mental-physical causation;
problem of other minds, etc.).
Lecture VII A Mentalist Myth? — Part II
Gilbert Ryle
Mind/Body problem
Category mistake: a linguistic error, in which a person mistakes one
type of word for another.
Ryle thinks that all of the problems that comprise the mind/body problem are the
result of category mistakes, which arise out of our use of mentalistic words.
1. University example
2. Military parade example (examples on pp. 16–17)
Ryle argues that we commit a category mistake, with respect to mentalistic words.
We think that they refer to mental entities and processes, when in fact they do
not. (p. 16)
Lecture VII A Mentalist Myth? — Part II
Examples of common category mistakes, with
respect to mentalistic words
1. John hits Bill.
2.John hates Bill.
This assumption that if 'hits' refers to a physical
action, then 'hates' must refer to a mental action is
an example of what Ryle means, when he says that
our belief in the existence of mental states is the
result of a category mistake.
Lecture VII A Mentalist Myth? — Part II
• Behavioral
• John kissed Jill.
• John drank a glass of water.
• John voted against George Bush [or any other president].
• Mentalistic
• John loves Jill.
• John is thirsty.
• John thinks George Bush [or any other president] is the worst president
ever.
In each case, there is a temptation to think of sentences in the second group, along
the same lines as the sentences in the first. The verbs in the first group denote
physical activities of various kinds, while the verbs in the second refer to mental
activities of various kinds. This leads us to imagine two separate realms: the realm of
thought and the realm of behavior, which may construe dualistically or not. (p. 19)
Lecture VII A Mentalist Myth? — Part II
Ryle argues that the assumption that the
sentences in the two groups are
importantly similar is a mistake.
* Specifically, it is the category mistake that gives
rise to the mind/body problem and to all the
further problems that follow from it.
Lecture VII A Mentalist Myth? — Part II
Ryle argues that the assumption that the
sentences in the two groups are
importantly similar is a mistake.
Mentalistic words do not denote mental
objects or events. Our mentalistic
language is a shorthand for talking about
how we are likely to behave.
Lecture VII A Mentalist Myth? — Part II
• Mentalistic
• John loves Jill.
• John is thirsty.
• John thinks that George Bush [or any other president] is the
worst president ever.
• Dispositional
• John is likely to kiss Jill, ask her out on a date, etc.
• John will drink a glass of water or other refreshing liquid, if it
is offered to him.
• John is inclined to vote against George Bush [or any other
president] campaign against him, protest him, etc.
Lecture VII A Mentalist Myth? — Part II
Next time: B. F. Skinner
Things to think about while you read:
• What does Skinner believe are the aims of science?
• Why does Skinner believe we need a "Science of
Man"?
• What does Skinner think is unscientific about the
mentalistic concept of a person?