Introduction to Philosophy

Lecture IX
A New Science of Man — Part II
Dr. Daniel Kaufman

College of Continuing Education & The Extended University

Missouri State University
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Skinner's reasons for rejecting mentalism stem
entirely from his conception of science.
— These reasons can stand separately from the
social policies that he advocates, but for Skinner,
the two are connected.
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Skinner wants a science and technology of human behavior,
because he thinks they are necessary, if we are to successfully
alleviate human suffering.
• He is simply not satisfied with the level of progress we have made thus
far and wants a level of control over human life and behavior that is only
possible with a behavioral science.
• Skinner's attitude and ambitions reflect a reductive and overly simple
conception of the human good. He can only conceive of human needs in
material terms. This is not to trivialize material needs, but only to deny
that material needs are the only things we are concerned about.
• The point is this: even if we accept Skinner's critiques of mentalism, we
need not accept the social-political program that he wants to build on top
of that critique.
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Skinner's Critique of Mentalism (A1)
• Skinner believes that to explain a behavior in terms of a mental cause is to explain
it in terms of something that is unobservable (because it is internal) and to
discourage investigating further, observable causes, such as the environment.
• For example: Behavior = X drinks a glass of water. Explanation (mental state) =
because X is thirsty.
• The cause of the mental state (the thirst) must still be explained. Mental state= X is
thirsty. Explanation (environmental conditions) = X spent 3 hours in the hot sun.
• Skinner believes that if we ignore the environmental cause, then we really have not
explained the behavior.

Environmental Mental state

Behavior
cause (mental cause)
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Skinner's Critique of Mentalism (A2)
• Skinner believes that mentalistic explanations are vacuous
(empty).
• What does it mean to say that someone is thirsty other than that
he/she is likely to drink?
• Thus, to say that X drank a glass of water, because he/she was thirsty,
is to say that he drank a glass of water because he was likely to drink,
which does not tell us much.
• A more general sense in which mentalistic explanations are vacuous:
Mentalistic explanations explain human behavior in terms of the
mental states of a Cartesian self or Lockean person, which Skinner
refers to as a "homunculus" or "inner man" — which is never explained
itself, but is described, instead, as "autonomous."
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Skinner's Critique of Mentalism (B)
• Skinner thinks that involving unobservable, inner causes in explaining external,
observable behavior is problematic if we are trying to develop a science of human
behavior. Scientific investigation requires that both causes and effects be observable.
• Recall also, that the reason why Skinner wants a science of human behavior is to
develop a technology of human behavior that will allow us to manage human life, in
such a way as to eliminate human problems. Internal cases of behavior — causes that
are inside the mind — are difficult, if not impossible to control.
• We have the ability to control the mind with drugs, but they are a very crude instrument. Skinner
thinks that we can exercise a greater and more precise degree of control over the environmental
causes of behavior. Behavioral conditioning is more precise and more effective than psychotropic
drugs.
• Causality is a transitive relation. Thus: if the environmental cause causes the mental state, which
causes the behavior, then the environmental cause causes the behavior. Skinner's idea is to ignore
the mental causes of behavior altogether and to focus entirely on understanding and mastering the
environmental causes of behavior.
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Summary of Skinner's Criticisms of
Mentalism
1. Mentalistic explanations leave the ultimate
(environmental) causes of behavior unaccounted
for.
2. Mentalistic explanations are, in any event,
vacuous.
3. The mental causes of behavior are difficult to
observe and control.
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Skinner's Social and Political Program: The Scientifically
Planned Society
• Skinner thinks that our conception of ourselves as autonomous, moral beings (as
persons, in the Lockean sense) prevents us from developing a scientific
psychology and a technology of behavior.
• Prehistoric and Ancient man explained all natural phenomena in terms of mental
causes and intentions. (Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, pp. 7–8.)
• Progress in the natural sciences was marked by the abandonment of this
"personified" conception of nature and the adoption of purely mechanical,
quantitative conceptions of nature and of scientific explanation.
• Skinner believes that similar progress has not been made in psychology, because
we insist on clinging to a personified conception of human nature and to
mentalistic forms of psychological explanation. (Skinner, Beyond Freedom
Dignity, pp. 9–10.)
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Skinner thinks that there are several reasons why we cling to this
personified self-image:
• We are invested in the idea of being uncaused — of being free — as a
matter of vanity. To accept the idea that our behavior is caused by
external forces seems like a kind of "demotion" in the order of being.
• Our autonomous self-image is wrapped up with a number of other
concepts that we regularly apply to ourselves: in particular, moral
and legal concepts of responsibility. We fear that if we abandon our
personified, autonomous self-image, we will no longer be able to
coherently apply moral and legal concepts to ourselves. (Skinner,
Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 19.)
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Skinner thinks that there are several reasons why we cling to this
personified self-image:
• Skinner admits that a truly scientific picture of human nature and
behavior will force us to give up these moral and legal notions. (Skinner,
Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 21.)
• Skinner thinks that these notions and practices are worth giving up, for
the bounty that an advanced scientific psychology will give us, in terms of
solving of the problems that the human race faces.
• We also cling to the personified, autonomous self-image, because we fear
the tyranny of the scientific planners. Skinner argues that this fear is
misguided, because the scientific planners are as much creatures of their
environment as we are and thus, no more in "control", really, than
anyone else.
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Some contrary visions of the scientifically planned
society that are worth looking into:
• Aldous Huxley, Brave New World
• C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man; That Hideous
Strength (Volume 3 of the Space Trilogy)
Lecture IX A New Science of Man — Part II
Next time: First exam on the first part of the
course.
Next lecture: What is knowledge? How is it
acquired?