Introduction to Philosophy

Lecture XIX
Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part II
Dr. Daniel Kaufman

College of Continuing Education & The Extended University

Missouri State University
Lecture XIX Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part II
Ryle’s critique of intellectualism:
The myth that competence in performance (knowledge
how) is the result of one’s prior possession of a body of
true beliefs (knowledge that).
Ryle’s view is that our ability to acquire true beliefs and
deploy them in our activities is itself a form of competent
performance.
* Thus, contrary to the traditional philosophical view,
knowledge-how precedes knowledge-that. (p. 219)
Lecture XIX Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part II
Ryle’s argument for both theses is comprised of
the following elements:
Ryle observes that if propositional knowledge — knowledge-that — was
sufficient to explain performative knowledge — knowledge-how — then one
would expect that with the relevant propositional knowledge, a competent
performance should be assured.
• We know, however, that this is not true. One can have all of the relevant
propositional knowledge and still not perform competently (e.g. one could
have propositional knowledge of all the rules and strategies of chess and still
be a lousy chess player).
• Conversely, one could be an expert performer and have none of the relevant propositional
knowledge (e.g. one could be an excellent chess player, without ever having had
propositional knowledge of the rules or strategies of chess). (p. 215)
Lecture XIX Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part II
Ryle’s argument for both theses is
comprised of the following elements:
Ryle points out that both the acquisition and appropriate
deployment of propositional knowledge can be done
competently or incompetently.
• One can be a poor learner, and even if one is a good learner, one
can be a poor applier of what one has learned. (p. 216)
• Thus, acquiring and correctly deploying propositional knowledge can be
done competently or incompetently, which means that such acquisitions
and deployments are themselves instances of knowing-how.
Lecture XIX Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part II
Ryle’s argument for both theses is
comprised of the following elements:
• The infinite regress problem: intellectualism devolves into an infinite
regress of competencies seeking propositional foundations. For, if acquiring
propositional knowledge is a matter of knowing-how, and every instance of
knowing-how requires some further set of prepositional knowledge-that, then
we will never ultimately be able to ground either the propositional or the
performative knowledge-that we have.
• It is this problem that convinces Ryle that the intellectualist gets things
backwards; that it is performative knowledge — knowing-how — which make
propositional knowledge — knowing-that — possible, not the other way
around. (p. 219A; pp. 224–225)
Lecture XIX Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part II
Ryle’s argument for both theses is
comprised of the following elements:
Two questions still remain:
A)What role does propositional knowledge (knowledge-
that) play, with respect to competences (instances of
knowledge-how)?
B)How are competencies acquired?
Lecture XIX Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part II
Ryle’s argument for both theses is
comprised of the following elements:
What role does propositional knowledge (knowledge-that) play, with
respect to competences (instances of knowledge-how)?
Ryle maintains that performance-relevant propositional knowledge — i.e. rules,
instructions, principles, etc. — do not provide the grounds from which competent
performances arise, but rather a description of what a competent performance
consists of. (p. 218; p. 222)
The rules of chess describe competent chess playing. They are not a set of
instructions, the memorization of which will produce competent chess players.
The competent chess player doesn’t follow the rules, he plays in accordance with
them. (p. 223)
Lecture XIX Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part II
Ryle’s argument for both theses is
comprised of the following elements:
How are competencies acquired?
• Propositional knowledge — knowledge-that — does have a role to play in acquiring
competencies, but it is only one piece of a complex puzzle; it is one of showing a
person how something is to be competently done. To read a recipe, a chess manual, or
a logic textbook, is one way of showing how food is competently cooked, chess is
competently played, and arguments are competently made. Ryle calls propositional
knowledge that takes the form of rules or institutions a “manual for novices,” and
“Banister for toddlers” (p. 221).
• Practice and habituation, however, are the primary means by which competencies are
acquired. This is a behavioral, rather than an intellectual means of acquiring
knowledge-how. (p. 223)
Lecture XIX Is Knowledge a State of Mind? — Part II
Implications for Education:
If what we’ve just said is true and competencies are
acquired primarily by way of practice and habituation,
then formal education should consist primarily of
apprenticeships and tutorials.
• Notice that apprenticeships and tutorials employ both explicit
instruction and practice/habituation, but the balance is
weighted in favor of the latter, rather than the former.
• Classroom learning, however, of the sort that one gets at a
typical American university, almost exclusively involves explicit
instruction; the imparting of propositional knowledge.