PROCESS HAZARD

ANALYSIS
Of Turbo Phase Module
Group Members
Mirza Adeel Baig B-1533013
Muhammad Aamir Sultan B-1533015
Taha Zafar B-1733043
Contents
Basic Process Description
Qualitative Risk Assessment
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study
PFD’s
Summary

HAZOP STUDY 2
Introduction
Project Objective: Evaluate CCPP Efficiency: Improving the throughput & efficiency of Gas Turbine
Via Hot Air Injection

Basic Process Description

• TPM works on the principle of Hot Air Injection to meet the Air deficiency due to absence at
ISO condition operations.

• Turbo-phase would start once all the above permissive are met. If any deviation it won’t start &
would come out from the TPM injection Mode

• TPM would operate as a separate Compressor to that of the GT & it would be controlled by the
Mark-VI and TPOC combined via vendor adjusted consonant in the GT Control Module.

3
HAZOP STUDY
Qualitative Risk Assessment
Hazard Identification: The case study takes under consideration the identification of hazards
initiated from Gas inventory used for gas turbine operation are as follows:

1. Fuel gas system:

• Flammable fuel spillage due to pipe break or reservoir failure.

2. Steam boiler:

• Overheating results when the boiler operation continues after the water level has fallen below the
minimum safe operating level set by the boiler manufacturer.
• Fire hazard at the fuel firing area.
• Risk of explosion in the mills when firing high Volatile Matter coal.
• Risk of explosion due to abnormal pressure and temperatures
• Overheating and exposure of coal to hot surfaces

HAZOP STUDY 4
 3. Gas and steam turbines:

• Loss of lubrication causing internal rubbing and the destruction or casing of the bearings.
• Turbine over speed causing severe damage due to imbalance, higher vibration etc.
• Water induction can cause any of the following: rub damage, thrust bearing destruction, blade damage,
thermal cracking, warping distortion and possible casing damage.
• Higher vibrations may lead to damage to journal bearing and other internal components.
• Fire hazard at lube/hydraulic/seal oil system.
• Poor water and steam quality can lead to internal corrosion and erosion leading to successive damages.
Foreign objects causing impact damage to blades and internal components.

4. The generator:

• Foreign objects damaging rotor and stator

• Partial discharge can damage windings and result in a ground fault.
• Overheating will cause insulation deterioration, resulting in ground fault, shorted turns.

10/23/2022 PRESENTATION TITLE 5

 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study:
This Study addresses deviations in the operating parameters in the system and whether these
deviations will produce a hazardous effect. All possible deviations are studied in a rigorous fashion
and if required using guide words to suggest possible deviations for each parameter.

TABLE 1.1 HAZOP STUDY 6

Background:
• Power shortage due to IGV opening; limiting the power
augmentation for site requirement
• Overcoming the power augmentation limitation via hot air
Injection at base load operation after evaluation of different
options.
TPM

Combustion
Chamber
Comp.

Turb
HAZOP STUDY 7
 Tie-In PFDs
Natural Gas Tie-In

 Line Size: 2 Inches

 Material: Carbon steel – B2RF3 (150 lb. rating)
 Offtake Point (Line): NG- 24001-10”-B2RF3 – Existing 4”
Valve
 P&ID: T07B01-45-2400PS07-01
 Lineup: NG Main Line to NG Skid
HAZOP STUDY 8
 PHA-WHATIF CHECKLIST
Process Hazard Analysis Description: Turbophase Module Installation - TPM 2450
Team: MAS,MAB,TZ

Date: 20th November 2021

Remarks &
S. No. Process Step or Equipment What- If Consequences Protection Now Action
Recommendations

Turbophase Module Tie-Ins

Inadequate flow for combustion Line Material as per specification.
at TPM. Leading to tripping of Tripping of TPM with Electrolyser
1 Line Leaks
system as per Package unit. Fire given to save the system from any
Hazard sudden frequency variation
Carseal open of These valves to be
Inadequate combustion at TPM. ensured.
Inadvertent Manual
Leading to tripping of system as Tripping of TPM with Electrolyser
Valve closure
Natural Gas Tie-In per Package unit. given to save the system from any
(For TPM operations) sudden frequency variation
Line Material as per specification.
Inadequate flow for combustion
Tripping of TPM with Electrolyser
No Flow at TPM. Leading to tripping of
given to save the system from any
system as per Package unit.
sudden frequency variation
Inadequate flow leading to
Low flow reduced output of TPM. No HSE
Concern

TABLE 1.2 HAZOP STUDY 9

 Tie-In PFDs
FCV-
Polish Water Tie-In 2451
A
3/4
" TP
GT- M
A Tie 3/4"
-In
Tie IA-23141-2"-A2TJ1
GT- -In
Tie -- IA Main Header
B
-In
3/4
FCV-"
2451
 Line Size = 2” B
 Material = E2RF1
 Valves = 2” – Ball Valve (Quantity =02)  Header Size= 3/4”
 Material: A2TJ1
 Fitting rating = 1300 psi
 Valves type = Ball Valves
 Quantity = 6 x ¾ Inches

10/23/2022 HAZOP STUDY 10

 PHA-WHATIF CHECKLIST
Process Hazard Analysis Description: Turbophase Module Installation - TPM 2450
Team: MAS,MAB,TZ

Date: 20th November 2021

Remarks &
S. No. Process Step or Equipment What- If Consequences Protection Now Action
Recommendations

Turbophase Module Tie-Ins

Line material compatible
with service
2 No Flow No HSE concern.
Required for one time
makeup only

Carseal Close of These

Overflow of PW
valves to be ensured.
PW Tie_in Valve Passing from Aircooler
Spectacle Blind to be added
(Used for One time filling Only) /Inadvertant opening system. PW Wastage
to counter this issue of Valve
. No HSE Concern
passing if any.

Line material compatible

with service
Line leaks No HSE concern.
Required for one time
makeup only

TABLE 1.3 HAZOP STUDY 11

 Summary
Based on the above action plan was formulated which obtained optimum ‘buy-in’ by the plant responsible parties and the
company management

Main immediate benefits

• Formal report
• Precise & concrete action / focus on solution
• Very useful for current and future new projects or modifications in the plant

HAZOP study process has proved to be also very effective in terms of safety culture as:
• it proves the important role of line management in safety and familiarizes managers with risk identification12
and controls
• it builds strong cooperative spirit based on safety intra departments
• it proves that existence and observance of clear rules for all operations is a crucial preventive control for safety

HAZOP STUDY
Thank you