Realism I: Tragedy, pessimism and

déjà vu in International Relations

Dr David Norman
Learning Outcomes

• Recognise and be able to recount

the central ideas and claims of
realism.
• Recognise and understand the
differences between the realist
schools of thought
Realism: Tragedy,
pessimism and déjà vu

“a bleak world where insecurity is

rife, competition endemic, and
open warfare sometimes occurs.”
(Walt 2018)
Realism: The core
assumptions (1)

Problem- Power is
International
solving theory central to
Anarchy
/ Explanatory political life

Survival Self-help
Statism
system
Realism: The core
assumptions (2)

• Recognise and be able to recount

the central ideas and claims of The Security
realism.
Dilemma
• Understand the historical and
“In an anarchic domain, the
political context in which
source of one's own comfortrealism
emerged as isathe dominant world-
source of another's
worry” (Waltz 1988)
“Since none can ever feel
view or understanding of entirely secure in such a
world … power competition
international relations. ensues and the vicious circle
of security and power
accumulation is on” (Herz
1950: 157)
 Debates and theories
Unipolarity
within realism

Balance
“unipolar systems contain the
Balance of seeds of their own demise
because the hegemon’s

of Power Threat unbalanced power creates an

environment conducive to
the emergence of new great
powers” (Layne 1993)

“power is checked
most effectively by “The major powers recognise
counterbalancing that the United States is
power.” (Jervis 2003)
essentially a benign, security-
seeking state; therefore,
although extremely powerful,
“states tend to the United States does not
balance against threats
of hegemony over the pose a threat that warrants
system.” (Levy and
Thompson 2005).
balancing against” (Walt 2003)
Debates and theories
within realism

Hegemonic Power Transition

Theory (Organiski
Stability 1993)
Theory
Gilpin (1988) and
Krasner (1989): The
importance of a
dominant power to
(temporarily) stabilise
the international system
 ‘anyone who
abandons what is
Classical Realism done for what ought
to be done learns his
ruin rather than his
preservation’
‘The strong do what
they have the power Niccolo Machiavelli
to do and the weak (1469-1527)
accept what they
have to accept.’
‘I put for a general inclination
Thucydides (circa
of all mankind a perpetual and
640 b.c.)
restless desire of power after
power …
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)
 Classical Realism

Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations Carr’s The Twenty Year Crisis

(1948) 1919-1939
• Politics has its roots in human nature • Challenge to Utopian
thinking
• Foreign-policy makers ‘think and act
in terms of interest defined as power’ • War seems to be the only
• Humans are essentially self- way for states to redistribute
interested, as are states power within the system
• No nation has the right to claim its
moral code as the world’s moral code,
or to impose its ideology onto others
• There is no universal moral code.
 “balances result
not from the
malevolence of
Structural (neo-)Realism men or of states
but from the
condition in
which all states
exist” (Waltz
1959)

• Shift to scientific / behavioural analysis

• Shift in focus from human nature to
‘international system’
• No functional differentiation between states
• Focus on unequal distribution of capabilities
(power)
• A Theory of International Politics rather than a
theory of Foreign Policy
 Anarchy
(neo-
Structural (neo-)Realism realism)

• Offensive or Defensive realism?

• "For defensive realists, the international structure provides
states with little incentive to seek additional increments of State
power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing behaviour
balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing
it, is the main goal of states. Offensive realists, on the other
hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely found in
world politics, because the international system creates
powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to
gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of Human
nature
those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.”
(classical
Synder (2002: 151-152) realism)
 Offensive realism

• Status-quo powers rarely exist in the system

• Security is scarce – it can be ensured through
hegemony
• Inter-state relations are underpinned by “the
uncertainty of intentions” (Mearsheimer)
• Think about whether a state has ever been
satisfied with its place in the system…
 Defensive realism

• Security dilemma is inescapable yet security is

still plentiful
• Influence of ‘structural modifiers’ (Taliaferro
2001) e.g. access to resources and economic
relations
• Defensive strategies are more common than
offensive strategies today – ‘security maximisers’
• Nuclear politics and deterrence
• Prudence and the impact of domestic factors
• Conflict can be mitigated
 Implications for the
international system?

• Schweller’s ‘Balance of Interests theory’ (1998)

examines tipping points between status-quo and
revisionist powers
Discussion!

Do you think that the international system

contains more status-quo or revisionist
powers?
 The polarity of a
system

• Unipolarity: Global Hegemon

• Bipolarity: Dueling global hegemons
Unipolar Bipolar
• Multipolarity (balanced): more than two great
powers rough parity
• Multipolarity (unbalanced): more than two great
powers with regional hegemons

Multipolar
 The effects of “The major powers recognise that the
United States is essentially a benign,
Unipolarity? security-seeking state; therefore,
although extremely powerful, the United
States does not pose a threat that
warrants balancing against” (Walt 2003)
• Does a unipolar system offer more or less
stability?
• Why has no one seriously challenged US “…there is but one first-rate power and no
prospect in the immediate future of any
Supremacy? power to rival it”. (Krauthammer 1990)
• From Balance of Power (BoP) to Balance of
Threat? (BoT) “As of today, two years into the Trump
presidency, it is a gross exaggeration to talk
• Opportunity costs? of an end to the American world order. The
• Buck-passing? two pillars of its global power – military and
financial – are still firmly in place.” (Tooze
2019)
 Neo-classical Realism: A synthesis?

• Four key challenges to the Neo-Realist model (Ripsman,

Taliaferro and Lobell 2016):
• 1. The ability for leaders to perceive systemic stimuli
correctly
• 2. The clarity of systemic signals
• 3. Problems of presuming rationality
• 4. The need to mobilise state resources

• Neo-classical realism = systemically determined + filtered

via domestic variables