Anarchy: trust,

suspicion, and
security
dilemmas
POLI1016: Problems in Global
Politics| Lecture 2 | 1st February
2024
Today’s goals

• To think about what anarchy is and why it might be a problem

• To explain the role of trust and mistrust in Global Politics

• Think in-depth about the ‘security dilemma’ and strategies for

dealing with this
Understanding ‘Anarchy’

• (Most major) theories of IR assume that the international system is anarchic

• There is disagreement over exactly what this looks like and why it matters
• Different theories assume different responses to anarchy
• Not all assume anarchy is inevitably a problem

• Anarchy means two main things:

• (1) Lack of overriding authority above states  ordering principle
• (2) Disorder, chaos, and conflict  outcome

• The main challenger: hierarchy vs. anarchy

Uncertainty

• Under anarchy uncertainty is an existential condition

• Inherent and inescapable reality for individuals, groups, and states
• How uncertainty is perceived and dealt with is highly uneven
• Origin = actors’ inability to be certain about others’ current and future intentions

• Irresolvable uncertainty = conditions for the ‘security dilemma’

• Anarchy makes uncertainty the ‘quintessential problem’ of global

politics
The ‘Security Dilemma’
Why must states be uncertain?

• Traditional explanations  human nature, anarchy, cultural

differences?

• Ambiguous symbolism
• Distinguishing ‘offensive’ vs. ‘defensive’ capabilities (weapons)
• Are ‘defensive weapons’ (e.g ballistic missile shields, nuclear deterrence)
always defensive?
• Stability and leadership?

• ‘Other minds problem’

• Psychological explanation: limited understanding of motives, hopes, fears,
Defining the ‘security dilemma’

• Basic problem: states must make security

choices with only partial or uncertain information

• Two-level ‘strategic predicament’ (Booth &

Wheeler, 2008)
• First level: dilemma of interpretation
• Second level: dilemma of response

• The security dilemma is all about what choices

actors – both state and non-state – make to avoid
the worse of two (or more) potential negative
outcomes
Dilemma of Interpretation

• Great challenge for policymakers/analysts but only visible in retrospect yet demands
real-time decisions

• When faced with military developments by other actors, decision must be made on
whether these are:
• Defensive (self-help to maintain security/status quo)
• Offensive (to disrupt SQ and gain advantage)

• Some contemporary examples:

• What are the real intentions behind Iran’s nuclear programme?
• Did North Korea acquire nuclear weapons for defense?
• Is the USA’s BMD part of a future offensive strategy?
Dilemma of response:

• Once interpretation is made  actors must

respond

• Two broad options (Jervis, 1978):

• Route I – Reassurance via words and
deeds
• Route II – Deterrence (e.g. greater
manouevres)

• From ‘security dilemma’ to ‘strategic

challenge’
Security spirals and paradoxes

• If State X misreads state Y’s developments as

‘offensive’ (when these were defensive)  mistrust,
uncertainty, and hostility grow  future misreadings
more likely

• Jervis (1976) – spiral model’

• Unintended (ironic) outcome = security paradox

• “[S]ituation in which two or more actors, seeking
to improve their own security, provoke through
their words and actions an increase in mutual
tension, resulting in less security overall” Wheeler (2018)
Anarchy and fear: ‘kill or perish’

• The self-help nature of an anarchic system leads to a system of multiple fears

• Fear of attack (or vulnerability to attack)
• Fear of loss in prosperity or prestige
• Domestically: leaders fear losing power

• Fear and mistrust are ‘rational calculations’

• Historical precedent (India and Pakistan)
• Unpredicatablility or unprecedented issues

• Future uncertainty problem  Even if secure now, ‘assume the worst because
the worst is possible’ (Posen, 1997). Does this make the security dilemma
inescapable?
Three a priori logics:

• Given issues of information and time, decision-makers fall back on one of three
main types of logic:

• Fatalist logic:
• Competition cannot be escaped; human nature and self-help under anarchy 
constant conflict

• Mitigator logic:
• Security competition can be ameliorated and dampened (for a time)  never
fully eliminated

• Transcender logic:
Fatalism and ‘Offensive Realism’

• Type of logic = type of response

advocated

• Fatalistic logic seem competition as

inevitable and primordial  maximize
(military) power

• Clearest expression is in offensive

realism (e.g .Mearsheimer)
• Actors are aware of rivals’
responses as security spiral
• Great powers aim to become
Mitigating security competition

• Logic: the system is (technically) anarchic; but anarchy does always mean chaos
and violent conflict

• Two main strategies (or schools of thought)

• Building ‘security regimes’ mutual learning and institutionalization =
predictability
• ‘International society’ (English School)  confidence-building measures to
lessen dilemma
• International law and diplomacy
• Establishment of norms (e.g. transparency)

• Security Dilemma sensibility and ‘trust’

Beyond the ‘security dilemma’

• Transcender logic is a broad church  many competing (and clashing) strategies

• “Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992)
• Centralization of power (world government) vs. total decentralization of power
(abolition)

• Building ‘Security Communities’

• Main example: post-1940s Europe
• Integration and entanglement  foster shared goals and positive relations
• Cultivates trust  ‘sense of community’  belief that common social issues only
solved peacefully

• Criticized as ‘idealistic’ and overly localized (e.g. for global politics) and too slow
Thinking about the essay
‘Security Dilemmas’ in the 21st Century

• As the 21st century progresses, phenomena

such as growing populations, new
technologies, changing security environments
 security will be a ‘scarce commodity’

• Security dilemma dynamics will stoke fear,

heighten mistrust, and shutdown
cooperation…

• Three key illustrations:

• Prospect of a new Cold War
• New arms competitions
Prospect of a ‘New Cold War’

• Tensions, uncertainties, and unpredictability in changes of polarity and rise of new

powers

• Rise of China and relations with the USA

• Mutual interests (trade, stability in Korean peninsula, UNSC…)
• Flashpoints: Taiwan, interests in the South China Sea etc.
• Some aspects of rivalry benign (e.g. economics?) but likelihood of military conflict
growing

• Massive capabilities, but mistrust in intentions

• Chinese concerns over US BMD ‘shields’ and nuclear preemption
• Instability and long-term leadership
19
Dynamics of new arms competitions
• Several ’hotspots’, e.g. India vs. Pakistan

• Iran’s nuclear ambitions:

• Regional fear and mistrust
• Long-standing rivalries
• Religious and sectarian divides

• International dimension: the USA and Iran

• Changes of leadership and relations
• Iranian involvement via conventional and
proxy wars
• Concerns over ‘status quo’ and nuclear
Non-state actors: terrorism and identity

• ‘New security dilemmas’ are emerging  states not the only actors whose
interpretations and responses matter

• Violence between ethnic, identity or religious groups

• Islamic State
• Far-right and anti-government militias in the USA
• Cartels in Mexico

• From globalization to ‘individualization’ of the security dilemma  Suspicious

citizens

• The problem: new uncertainties feed new security dilemmas (e.g. disinformation)
Some takeaways:

• Anarchy creates conditions of uncertainty in the international

system  mistrust

• States (and other actors) find themselves in security dilemmas

and paradoxes

• Different logics suggest different possibilities and actions to

escape the security dilemma  a significant challenge
What’s coming up next week?
This week:

• Read before your seminar (readings available on

Moodle/TALIS)

• Diener, A. & Hagen, J. (2012) Borders: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press),
chapters 4 & 5
• Elden, S. (2019) ‘Why is the world divided territorially’ in Edkins, J. and Zehfuss, M. (2019)
Global Politics: A New Introduction (Routledge) pp. 212-233