DIPLOMACY

LESSON FIVE
BY CLEYLAND LESHORE
 2

TRACKS OF DIPLOMACY
INTRODUCTION

• The complexity of intrastate and interstate conflict has become a

critical challenge to the field and to methods of conflict resolution
even though the number of conflicts has decreased
• In other countries such as Afghanistan, Angola (Cabinda
Province), Sri Lanka, Somalia, and Uganda, to mention only a few,
brutal conflicts have persisted despite the end of the Cold War
• The prevalence of ethnic conflict has proven that ideological
differences are no longer the major cause of conflict, but rather
ethnic identity and the distribution of resources are today’s main
sources of violence
• Conflicts in the Balkans, Kenya, Sudan and Rwanda stand as
prominent examples of ethnic identity conflicts - evidence that
conflict is endemic to human existence, survival and political
relations.
 3

..cont
• conflict is as much a part of our existence as is evolution and in trying to
find the best methods of resolving conflicts, a variety of types of
diplomacy have been identified.
• Nowadays terms such as “formal diplomacy”, “Track One Diplomacy”,
“Track Two Diplomacy” and “Multi-Track Diplomacy” are common in
conflict resolution vocabulary
• “Quiet Diplomacy” is popularly known as President Thabo Mbeki’s
approach to regional political problems in Southern Africa
• Regardless of the multiplicity of these levels of diplomacy, there are still a
lot of other conflict resolution activities that have not been clearly defined.
For example, peacemaking activities undertaken by nonpolitical third
parties between high political representatives of warring groups, or
governments does not fit in the definitions of Track One, Track Two, and
Multi-Track Diplomacy.
• Track One and a Half Diplomacy as operationalized at The Carter Center
in order to enhance the ongoing struggle for clarity of its definition.
 4

…cont
• the greatest strength of Track One and a Half is its ability
to apply both Track One and Track Two Diplomacy within
a strategic framework for peace.
• It is this ability that promotes and facilitates the
complementarity of all the tracks.
• Definitions of Tracks
• Outlines their strengths and weaknesses
• Present a model that shows the position of the three
levels of diplomacy and how they can complement each
other.
 5

TRACK ONE DIPLOMACY

• Track One Diplomacy is widely known as the official, traditional or

conventional diplomacy and amongst the oldest form of diplomacy.
• It entails the State and her official representatives involving inter alia
diplomats, high-ranking military officials and politicians with the sole aim
of resolving the diplomatic disputes at both inter-State and intra-State
levels.
• Track One Diplomacy is primarily concerned with ending the violence
and promoting peaceful co-existence.
• As such, Track One Diplomacy often is influenced by and influences the
structure of political powers in the conflicting countries.
• Together with Track Two Diplomacy, it was first developed as part of a
State’s foreign policy to facilitate the communication and relations
amongst conflicting nations.
• Since it is founded on the official communication platform between
States, Track One Diplomacy has the ability to leverage on the political
power in influencing the direction of negotiation and its outcome.
 6

…cont
• The most important feature that distinguishes Track One diplomacy from all other
forms of diplomacy is its formal application at the state-to-state level. It follows a
certain protocol to which every state is a signatory.
• Track One Diplomacy is usually considered to be the primary peacemaking tool of a
state’s foreign policy. It is carried out by diplomats, high-ranking government officials,
and heads of states and is aimed at influencing the structures of political power.
• The Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un Summit held in Singapore in 2018 is an
example showing the mechanism of Track One Diplomacy in its attempt to solve
diplomatic disputes. However, the efficacy of Track One Diplomacy has long been
supported18 and complimented by Track Two Diplomacy.
• Also included among the Track One players are the United Nations, the Vatican, and
regional economic and political groupings such as the European Union, the Arab
League, the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and
many others.
• Negotiation is sometimes used as a synonym for Official Diplomacy, whereas in fact
it is simply a conflict resolution process used by all those mentioned above to resolve
conflicts. While negotiating to further the interests of their polities, diplomats typically
identify the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the avoidance of war as common
interests.
 7

..cont
• Also included among the Track One players are the
United Nations, the Vatican, and regional economic and
political groupings such as the European Union, the Arab
League, the African Union (AU), the Organization of
American States (OAS), and many others.
• Negotiation is sometimes used as a synonym for Official
Diplomacy, whereas in fact it is simply a conflict resolution
process used by all those mentioned above to resolve
conflicts. While negotiating to further the interests of their
polities, diplomats typically identify the peaceful resolution
of conflicts and the avoidance of war as common
interests.
 8

Strengths of Track One Diplomacy

• Track One Diplomacy was developed as a foreign policy tool to

specifically improve relations among nations. Although the strengths of
Track One Diplomacy are numerous, the most widely cited in the
literature are four.
• First, Track One Diplomacy has the ability to use political power to
influence the direction of negotiations and outcomes. This power might
include using the threat of military force if a party decides to go against
international treaties.
• Second, Track One Diplomacy has the capacity to access material and
financial resources that give high leverage and flexibility in negotiations
• Third, Track One Diplomacy can employ in-depth knowledge about the
parties’ interests because of the use of various intelligence sources.
• Fourth, track one mediators have the competence to use broad
knowledge of their states’ foreign policies, and also the foreign policies
of the conflicting parties.
 9

Weaknesses of Track One Diplomacy

• Regardless of Track One’s strengths outlined above, track one

diplomacy has several identifiable weaknesses.
• The first weakness of Track One Diplomacy is that its conflict
resolution approaches are corrupted by power. State power can be
a liability to durable peace, rather than a facilitative tool. Power can
suppress underlying issues of weaker parties, thereby undermining
the sustainability of a peace agreement.
• Second, diplomatic missions, an asset to Track One Diplomacy,
are normally closed down at the peak of conflicts between
countries thereby reducing communication when it is needed most.
• Third, officials cannot, of course, speak against their country and,
as a result, may either be too rigid or delay negotiations through
consultations with their leaders at home.
• Fourth, Track One Diplomacy is affected by electoral cycles.
 10

TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY

• Like many other conflict resolution theorists and practitioners worried

about the failures of Track One Diplomacy, Montville coined the phrase
‘Track Two Diplomacy’
• He defines Track Two Diplomacy as, “unofficial, informal interaction
between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop
strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material
resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict”
• He emphasized that Track Two Diplomacy is not a substitute for Track
One Diplomacy, but compensates for the constraints imposed on leaders
by their people’s psychological expectations.
• Most important, Track Two Diplomacy is intended to provide a bridge or
complement official Track One negotiations
• Track Two Diplomacy is founded on the notion that States and their
actions per se cannot possibly bring change in conflict resolution. Thus, it
is a medium of interaction between unofficial representatives of conflicting
States in an unofficial diplomatic resolution setting.
 11

..cont
• Unofficial interactions between the non-official representatives are
normally in the form of consultation, dialogue and training.
• Track Two Diplomacy is widely considered as supplementing the
shortcomings of Track One Diplomacy, whereby the focus is on rebuilding
the trust between the conflicting parties; involving more civilians than
geopolitical figureheads and less intense during the negotiation process.
• Track Two differs from Track One in which it approaches the conflict by
identifying the root cause of the diplomatic problem with the aim of
improving relations and building a sustainable relationship between the
parties.
• Examples of Track Two organizations are Search for Common Ground,
West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), European Centre for
Conflict Prevention (ECCP).
• The abolition of the apartheid regime in South Africa was an example of
Track Two Diplomacy in successfully resolving international humanitarian
crisis.
 12

Strengths of Track Two Diplomacy

• First, Track Two parties are not inhibited by political or constitutional

power; therefore, they can express their own viewpoints on issues that
directly affect their communities and families.
• Second, Track Two officials do not have the fear of losing
constituencies because they are the constituency.
• Third, track two empowers the socially, economically, and politically
disenfranchised groups by giving them a platform from which they can
air their views on how peace can be achieved in their own
communities or nations.
• Fourth, Track Two is effective both at the pre-violent conflict and post
violent conflict stages; therefore, it is a very effective tool for violent
conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding.
• Fifth, Track Two involves grassroots and middle leadership who are in
direct contact with the conflict.
• Sixth, Track Two is not affected by electoral cycles.
 13

Weaknesses of Track Two Diplomacy

• Regardless of its advantages, Track Two Diplomacy also has several

weaknesses. The first weakness is that Track Two participants have limited
ability to influence foreign policy and political power structures because of their
lack of political power.
• Second, Track Two interventions can take too long to yield results.
• Third, Track Two has limited ability to influence change at the war stage of a
conflict.
• Fourth, Track Two participants rarely have resources necessary for sustained
leverage during negotiations and for the implementation of agreements.
• Fifth, Track Two is not effective in authoritarian regimes where leaders do not
take advice from lower-level leaders.
• Sixth, Track Two actors due to their lack of political power, are in most cases
not accountable to the public for poor decisions.
• Seventh, because of their multiplicity Track Two actors/organizations are
notoriously known for their lack of coordination because the definitions of Track
One and Track Two Diplomacy do not cover the full range of peacemaking
activities found in the current field of conflict.
 14

…cont
• In addition, both tracks, because of their limitations leave
certain gaps in the peacemaking and peacebuilding
activities which have already been filled in by certain
unique individuals such as retired politicians, religious
leaders, and by organizations such as The Carter Center,
the Conflict Management Group, the Norwegian Refugee
Council, Caucasus Links, the Center for Humanitarian
Dialogue, and the Crisis Management Initiative. Since
these individuals and organizations’ activities do not fit in
the definitions of Track One and Track Two Diplomacy,
evidence in the following section shows that these
activities can be labelled Track One and a Half Diplomacy.
 15

TRACK ONE AND HALF DIPLOMACY

• Track One and a Half is a term that has been used in conversations by
many people in conflict resolution. The origins of the term “Track One
and a Half Diplomacy” are elusive and its operationalization confusing.
However, the commonly called “Track One and a Half.” is a long-term
unofficial facilitated joint analysis among negotiators (LUFJAAN)
• It can also be defined as public or private interaction between official
representatives of conflicting governments or political entities such as
popular armed movements, which is facilitated or mediated by a third
party not representing a political organization or institution.
• The aim of such interaction is to influence attitudinal changes between
the parties with the objective of changing the political power structures
that caused the conflict
• Track One and a Half as diplomatic initiatives, is facilitated by unofficial
bodies, but directly involve officials from the conflict in question (in that
the parties are official representatives, but facilitators are ordinary
citizens)
 16

…cont
• Therefore, the main feature that distinguishes Track One and a
Half from Track One is that the third party is not a representative
of a political institution.
• Pure Track One conflict resolution efforts are facilitated or
mediated by government representatives or representatives of
political institutions such as the UN and regional groups. President
Clinton’s Camp David mediation between Yasser Arafat and Ehud
Barak is purely Track One, while Former Finnish Prime Minister
Martti Ahtisaari’s mediation in Aceh is Track One and a Half.
• On the other hand, the main feature that distinguishes Track One
and a Half from Track Two is the parties to the process. In Track
Two Diplomacy, the parties involved in the conflict resolution
process are not official representatives of the conflicting sides, but
influential citizens.
 17

…cont
• This is not the case for Track One and a Half where the
parties involved in the conflict resolution process are
official representatives of the conflicting groups.
Therefore, Track One and a Half Diplomacy can also be
called “hybrid diplomacy” because it is a cross-fertilization
of Track One and Track Two that gives the third-party
diplomatic agility to flip from Track One to Track Two
conflict resolution techniques in accordance with the
situation. It refers to the unofficial interactions between
official representatives of the conflicting States and/or
political entities which are often mediated by a non-
partisan and/or unofficial third party.
 18

…cont
• It bridges Track One and Track Two Diplomacy by promoting
complementarity between these Tracks of Diplomacy. This is
achieved by combining the official approach in Track One with
the unofficial diplomatic approach in Track Two Diplomacy.
• It involves the interventions by highly respected individuals or
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in international conflict
resolution process.
• Track One and a Half Diplomacy also allows a neutral mediator
to mediate either via direct mediation or conciliation.
• These experienced individuals whom are supported by
independent organizations are skilled and seasoned to carry out
peacemaking efforts. Due to their reputation, obtaining funding
from the private and/or public bodies is relatively convenient
than most of the Track Two Diplomacy practitioners.
 19

…cont
• It allows the third-party mediator the diplomatic flexibility to alternate from
Track One to Track Two Diplomacy’s dispute resolution techniques;
depending on the changes of the circumstances. Hence, it may be concluded
that Track One and a Half Diplomacy is a hybrid of Track One and Track Two
Diplomacy.
• While it effectively influences the political structures of the conflicting States,
Track One and A Half Diplomacy is not motivated by any politicians or
government’s political agendas. For instance, the Carter Centre which was
founded by former U.S. President and Peace Nobel Prize Winner Jimmy
Carter is a non-profit organization helmed by a highly respected personality
who specializes in Track One and A Half Diplomacy. When Jimmy Carter
successfully intervened in the U.S. – North Korea nuclear weapons crisis in
1994,46 he had already completed his term as the U.S. President after his
defeat to seek for reelection in the 1980 U.S. Presidential Elections. The
Carter Center is an example of an organization that practices Track One and
a Half Diplomacy. In December 1999, Former President Carter and his staff
mediated between President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Omar
Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan.
 20

…cont
• This is a pure Track One and a Half activity because The Carter
Center’s involvement was not driven by a political institution’s agenda
but by its own philosophy. By operating at a Track One and a Half level,
The Carter Center has the advantage of applying an eclectic approach
to international and ethnic conflict, such as the use of high-level
diplomacy, private problemsolving workshops, direct mediation,
interactive conflict resolution, and other confidencebuilding
interventions. In 1995 the Carter Center negotiated the “Guinea Worm
Ceasefire” between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army/Movement in order to allow the Carter Center to treat
communities affected by the guinea-worm disease (Carter, 1995). In
addition, in 1994 Former President Carter helped neutralize the nuclear
tension between North Korea and the United States. Again in 1996
President Carter together with Retired General Colin Powell prevented
an imminent disastrous military confrontation between the Haitian
military government and the U.S. government.
 21

Conduct of the Process

• Track One and a Half as a hybrid form of diplomacy can be

conducted in various ways. It can be carried out privately in
the same manner Track Two activities are conducted, or
publicly like Track One Diplomacy. President Carter’s
intervention in Haiti in 1996 was carried out in the full
awareness of the public and the media, whilst his go-
between role in the North Korean- U.S. conflict in 1994 was
private. The Sudan-Uganda mediations that were
undertaken by the Carter Center from 1999 to 2003 were
mostly private and confidential, except for the agreement
signing ceremony in Nairobi. The decision to have a private
or public Track One and a Half process cannot be
prescribed, but is determined by the situation and the
people involved.
 22

Characteristics of Track One and a Half Third Parties

• The uniqueness of Track One and a Half Diplomacy

necessitates a close examination of the characteristics of the
third parties who practice this type of peacemaking. The most
notable characteristic of these third parties is their international
political visibility. Former Presidents Nelson Mandela and
Jimmy Carter are people of great visibility because of the
political posts they held. The Carter Center’s International
Council for Conflict Resolution (ICCR) roster is composed of
similar eminent persons who are very suitable for Track One
and a Half activities. This characteristic carries with it influence
and perceived power that enhances their leverage
capabilities during negotiations. However, this characteristic
does not automatically translate into effectiveness because of
other variables such as personality of the third party,
characteristics of the parties, and the situation.
 23

…cont
• Another characteristic is academic visibility. Well known
scholar/practitioners such as Bill Ury and others are also
members of the ICCR, and have been involved in Track
One and a Half Diplomacy efforts with The Carter Center.
Even though professors employed in the field of conflict
resolution have worked extensively at a Track Two level,
they have the potential to operate at a Track One and Half
level on their own or, if assisted by politically eminent
persons, to secure access to high level parties. Also
indirectly, academic/practitioners have for a very long time
advised the politically eminent peacemakers in their
peace efforts.
 24

…cont
• Another very important characteristic of Track One and a Half third
parties is both a national and international commander of respect.
Again, to use former President Carter and Nelson Mandela as examples,
these former presidents command international respect among both
politicians and ordinary citizens. It is this respect that facilitates their
access to other world leaders or important players in conflicts around the
world.
• Related to respect is the importance of trust. Most people involved in
conflict resolution know that trust of the third party is the cornerstone of
every conflict resolution intervention. The continued involvement of the
Carter Center in the Sudan conflict is a sign of trust between the Carter
Center and the conflicting parties. This trust is not limited to third parties
only, but also other stakeholders, who have an interest in the outcome of
a peace process. These former presidents’ well-known record for
reliability enables serving presidents and rebel leaders to trust that the
third party will facilitate the attainment of common interests among the
parties without bias.
 25

…cont
• The last characteristic is that Track One and a Half interveners
whether they are individuals or organizations have reasonable
resources to carry out peace initiatives. It is due to their
reputation that third parties are more likely to get funding from
private and public organizations than most Track Two
practitioners. This is facilitated by the fact that former highlevel
politicians and leading scholars interact with highly influential
and powerful people who have personal or public funds.
However, it is important to mention that these third parties
whether they are former presidents, scholars or organizations,
can never have unlimited funding or resources because of
the numerous conflicts that require their attention. The
characteristics of Track One and a Half actors mentioned above
are also important to the third parties’ entry into the
peacemaking process.
 26
Entry into peace-making Process

• There are three ways through which Track One and a Half third parties can gain entry
into peacemaking processes.
1.Invitation by one or both parties
2.Requests for intervention by other concerned outsiders, and
3.Initiation by third parties themselves.
• Regardless of the secrecy surrounding the way Track One and a Half actors enter into
conflict situations, there are a few documented examples that can be cited. Former
President Carter’s intervention in the North Korean-US standoff was based on
President Carter’s longstanding invitation to visit the country from Kim Il Sung and their
personal relationship. As a concerned citizen, Carter informed President Clinton of his
desire to visit North Korea and talk about the situation. By giving due respect to both
President Clinton and the Great Leader Kim Il Sung of North Korea, President Carter
gained entry into the peacemaking process and finally defused the situation. Unlike the
North Korean-US intervention in which President Carter initiated, his involvement in
Haiti was based on an invitation by the Commander in Chief of the Haitian military,
General Raoul Cédras.
• With these few examples, it is clear that Track One and a Half actors are flexible like
any other conflict resolution actors in the way they enter into conflict situations.
 27

Strengths of Track One and a Half Diplomacy

1.The first strength of Track One and a Half Diplomacy is that it

complements Track One and Track Two and its actors fill in the gap
between the two tracks.

2.Track One and a Half is that it directly influences the power

structures, yet it is not driven by governmental political agendas. It
has been noticed that some Track One and a Half officials get into
conflict situations in which their governments may not be interested
because of antagonistic relations. A good example is the Carter
Center’s 1995 GuineaWorm Ceasefire negotiations in Sudan. “The
United States had branded Sudan a supporter of world terrorism,
and accusations of religious persecution were a major issue in the
civil war”. Regardless of the enmity between the U.S. government
and Sudan, the Carter Center never stopped attempts to pursue
peace in Sudan.
 28

…cont
… in its peace interventions the Carter Center engaged
President Museveni of Uganda and President Bashir to resolve
the bilateral dispute between them. Also, The Carter Center
attempted to solve the civil war between the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Government of Sudan on one
hand, and the civil war between the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) and the Government of Uganda on the other hand. Given
the current violent situation in Sudan, Track One and a Half
involvement could complement ongoing traditional diplomacy
interventions. For example, former President Jimmy Carter’s
involvement could be helpful given his longstanding relationship
with President Bashir of Sudan. Carter’s inability to impose
solutions through political power makes him less threatening to
Bashir and he could thus be viewed as a more trusted facilitator.
 29

…cont
3.Another advantage of Track One and a Half is its diplomacy agility.
When a direct highlevel approach is not possible, a Track One and a
Half intervener can reach out to lower-level indirect approaches to
peacemaking such as the use of humanitarian interventions to gain
the trust of the parties. Health programs such the guinea-worm
eradication program in Sudan is a good example. Therefore, Track
One and a Half interventions can be applied at different stages of a
conflict such as prevention during the latent stage, mediations during
war, and other interactive conflict resolution techniques during the
peacebuilding stages. Theoretically, the ICCR has the capacity to
intervene at various levels of a conflict because of the expertise it
carries such as Former President Carter, Bishop Desmond Tutu of
South Africa, Harold Saunders, Ambassador Bethune Kiplagat, and
professors Vamik Volkan, Christopher Mitchell, and William Ury, just
to mention a few (Carter, 1995). Very few organizations can match the
combined peacemaking talent of these people.
 30

4.Track One and a Half Diplomacy also helps world leaders

who are stuck in difficult situations by providing them with
an honourable way out of their problems. This face-saving
ability of Track One and a Half diplomacy is facilitated by
the characteristics of the third parties such as
nonpartisanship, political prominence, trustworthiness, lack
of real political power, respect for and by both parties, and
honesty. To summarize this capability President Carter
(1995) wrote, In Sudan, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea, the
Carter Center persuaded peace by giving people a chance
to choose an honourable alternative to war.
 31

5.Track One and a Half efforts can facilitate communication between leaders
whose communication has been severed by conflict. In international conflicts,
countries involved in a conflict normally cut diplomatic relations to indicate that
formal communication is no longer appreciated between the two nations. Once
this has happened, the situation deteriorates between the two nations,
possibly leading to war or serious antagonism. The same can be said for
intrastate conflicts where the sitting government refuses to talk to the
resistance movement as a sign of power and pride. In both cases, Track One
Diplomacy is ineffective because the involvement of sitting heads of state or
UN officials can be undermined by various political agendas. In internal
conflict, the sovereignty clause makes Track One less effective because
nations try to respect each other’s sovereignty. Track Two as well can be too
risky to carry out because citizens are discouraged from talking to each other.
If they do, they may risk being killed. It is at this point that Track One and a
Half can be used to bridge the communication gap, as what happened during
the North Korean-U.S. standoff. As mentioned previously, President Carter
visited North Korea in 1994 as a private citizen to help resolve the tension
between the US and North Korea.
 32

…cont
• The North Korean government had withdrawn its membership from the
International Atomic Energy Agency raising suspicion by the US that
North Korea “had developed nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty”. President Carter’s visit to North Korea in his
unofficial capacity ended the crisis between the U.S. and North Korea. In
his own words President Carter said: My meeting with Kim II Sung ended
the immediate crisis. I did not make any concessions to him. I simply
gave the highest leader of the country the opportunity to talk with me and
to know that his words would be communicated directly to the president
of the United States. Negotiations resumed on a lower level to work out
technical issues. These issues included matters of national pride… This
is another example of how difficult it is for people in a conflict to overcome
their hostility. Yet, with good faith and perhaps a trusted mediator, it is the
kind of issue that can be overcome. This shows the effectiveness of
Track One and a Half in opening channels of communication between
conflicting nations, and its face-saving role for sitting heads of states.
 33

Weaknesses of Track One and a Half Diplomacy

• The mediator is sometimes viewed by the parties as representing his/her home

country’s foreign policy. Such an attitude may jeopardize the process if the home
country has an aggressive foreign policy towards one of the parties.
• Track One and a Half mediators have limited ability to use inducements and directive
mediation techniques because they do not have the political power to command
resources. Track One and a Half actors have no technical, financial, and military
resources needed either to encourage an agreement or to support or enforce
agreement implementation. Moral authority is one of the major strengths of Track
One and a Half actors such as Jimmy Carter, Nelson Mandela and others, and yet it
is one of the biggest weaknesses of their organizations.
• Successes driven by moral integrity of the mediator cannot be duplicated by others in
the same organization because such successes depend on a particular individual’s
personality.
• Last, Track One and a Half interveners’ activities may run contrary to their country’s
foreign policy; this may undermine their peace efforts. However, one of the most
effective ways of reducing the impact of the weaknesses of the three forms of
diplomacy on peacemaking is by the complementary application of the various
diplomatic activities (Nan, 1999).
•
 34

MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY

• In recognizing diplomatic dispute as a realm of multiple segments (i.e., actors

and non-actors) in which different and flexible forms of preventive actions are
required, Multi-Track Diplomacy encourages complementarity of various
Tracks of Diplomacy.
• In a modern world whereby, most countries function inter-dependently and
conflicting parties’ background mutually affect each other, Multi-Track
Diplomacy underpins on the efficiency of networking amongst the various
types of Tracks of Diplomacy. It balances between the competing national
and global interests. Thus, inclusivity and networking are the elements
that secure suitable and sustainable solutions to diplomatic issues.
• Examples of Multi-Track Diplomacy are the inter-continental Asia-Europe
Meeting (ASEM) and the 2001- 2004 Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue Group
organized by the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy IMTD). The former being
a unison between China and the European Union (EU) to weather through
the ongoing global economic slowdown and the latter being a neutral
platform for stakeholders from both countries to reach a common ground on
contested issues.
 35

Complementary application of tracks of diplomacy

• The development of several tracks of diplomacy

demonstrates that conflict is a complicated phenomenon,
requiring a multi-dimensional approach if it is to be
effectively managed and resolved. Since each track of
diplomacy has its own strengths and weaknesses, it is
important to find a way by which the weaknesses of each
can be reduced in order to improve the chances of
resolving conflicts without loss of life and material
• However, in practice not all institutions or organizations
have the capacity to utilize or apply all forms of diplomacy
in resolving conflicts. These limitations arise from the
specialized nature and resources available to individual
institutions/organizations.
 36

…cont
• This then calls for the complementarity of conflict resolution
efforts. The need for joint efforts using different types of diplomacy
has been frequently noted in recent conflict resolution literature.
• In preventive diplomacy, early deployment of economic, diplomatic
and military tools could be effective at preventing or even resolving
conflicts before they escalate. For example, the Oslo Accord signed
by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization was the result of
joint efforts between Track Two institutions that facilitated and
enhanced Track One initiatives. Private citizens know how things
should be done, and officials develop and widen these ideas.
• It also helps state actors and non-governmental organizations think
systemically because resolving a conflict is composed of many
different but related elements. Playing an isolated role to resolve a
conflict without realizing how other people’s efforts influence, or are
influenced, by this role leads to over expenditure of time, and
resources.
 37

Summary

• Diplomacy is dynamic, hence developing a variety of

‘Tracks’ to manage the evolution and the changes it
brought to international relations is necessary. The diversity
of diplomacy.
• The root causes of diplomatic conflicts are manifold –
economic, legal, political, religious, and cultural. Thus, a
comprehensive solution needs to include all stakeholders
and requires relevant opinions sought from multiple angles.
• Solutions which are inclusive and democratic will produce a
framework that is sustainable for the future. Uniquely, the
various Tracks of Diplomacy operate in an ecosystem
which compliments each other instead of competing
against each other.
 38

..cont
• Democratic, interdependency and inclusiveness are the foundations of
a lasting diplomacy, particularly so with the involvement from the non-
conventional actors/players in international relations such as the
academicians, religious leaders, entrepreneurs, and athletes. In
modern diplomacy, these non-actors have achieved the celebrity-like
status that carries diplomatic leverage.
• Track One and a Half Diplomacy is not just to enrich conflict resolution
vocabulary, but to highlight its theoretical and practical utility in
resolving interstate and ethno-political conflicts by bridging the gap
between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy.
• Track One and a Half, as operationalized by The Carter Center,
reduces the limitations of the other two by its demonstrated
understanding of both official diplomacy and the strengths of Track Two
actors. It has been noted that diplomatic agility and nonpartisanship
are some of the main strengths of Track One and a Half Diplomacy.
 39

…cont
• Political, academic, and situational visibility, are some of the main
characteristics of individuals that practice Track One and Half Diplomacy.
• Regardless of its advantages it has also been noted that limited inducements
and interference with foreign policy are some of the weaknesses of Track One
and a Half Diplomacy.
• The interconnectedness of tracks of diplomacy, leadership levels and the
activities of the actors at different levels of diplomacy shows other conflict
resolution practitioners, academics, and conflict resolution organizations that
there is another form of diplomacy that can help to fill in the gaps left by Track
One and Track Two Diplomacy.
• With good and timely collaboration, Track One and a Half actors can facilitate
communication between Track One and Track Two. In addition, organizations
can compensate for some of their weaknesses by realizing that their activities
can be augmented by other organizations through cooperation and
coordination.
• Therefore, the introduction of Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the
complementarity of tracks and organizations will effectively equip the peace
community with the tools needed to intervene at any given stage of a conflict.
 40

…end