n c w c i v c.

JUN . 7 2003
THE WHITE HOUSE National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks

Office of the Press Secretary AJSd OStjO^fc:

Internal Transcript August 2, 2002

INTERVIEW OF
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CONDOLEEZZA RICE
BY SCOTT PELLEY, CBS

The Roosevelt Room

2:32 P.M. EDT

Q Well, let's start with the day. The first airplane

strikes. What the first you saw, the first you heard?
DR. RICE: The first that I heard was when my executive
assistant came into the office to say that a plane had hit the_ _
World Trade Center. I thought, what a terrible accident that is.
And I called the President, who was in Florida for an education
event. And I said, Mr. President, a plane has hit the World
Trade Center. And he said, what a terrible accident. And I
think we thought that maybe a twin engine plane of some-kind, a
small plane.
I then went to my staff meeting, my senior staff meeting
-downstairs in the Situation Room. And my executive assistant
handed me a note ancT said, a^second plane had hit the World Trade
Center. And I thought, my God, this is a terrorist attack.
Q You knew.
DR. RICE: I knew. I knew right away. Because one plane,
perhaps an accident -- and a horrible accident and foreseeable
accident, but an accident. The second plane I had no doubt. And
I think we had all known that there might be at some point in
time an attempt against the United States, perhaps that's in the
back of your mind at a time like that.
Q When you heard about the second plane, and you were
convinced in your own mind it was terrorists, whose name did you
put on that?
DR. RICE: It wasn't very long before I thought al Qaeda,
because we had gone through a fairly extensive review of policy
toward al Qaeda. I think George Tenet had, in February -- the
CIA Director had in February talked about the threat of al Qaeda
to the United States. And the fact that it was big and

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spectacular said to me this is probably al Qaeda. But that was
the least of my concerns at that moment.
Because shortly after the second plane hit the World Trade
Center, I went into the Situation Room, the Situation Center to
try and find the National Security Council principals, to bring
them to a meeting or to talk about what had happened. And it's
amazing the things that race through your mind at a time like
that.
Colin Powell I knew was in Latin America. And my first
thought was, is he in Colombia? Well, no, I think he's in Peru.
So trying to find Secretary Powell. And then I tried to find
Secretary Rumsfeld. And I couldn't raise him. And all of a
sudden I looked behind me and a plane had hit the Pentagon. And
it was not long after that that the Secret Service came and said,
you have to go to the bunker; the Vice President rs already
there, there may be something headed for the White House.
Q How did you get there?
DR. RICE: I hardly remember getting there. It was one
moment to stop and talk to the President again and to say that
Washington was under attack and so he should probably not come
Tback. We were beginning to talk about the fact that if he landed
at Andrews Air Force Base, would that just make Air Force One a
big target.
We, or course, in that particular point didn't know how many
planes were headed for various destinations and various symbols
of American power. I remember wandering along, or being pushed
along, in fact, in the corridors, stopping briefing just when I
got into the PEOC to call my family/ my aunt and uncle in
Alabama, and say, I'm fine, you have to tell everybody that I'm
fine. They started a kind of phone tree to let my relatives know
that everything was okay.
But then settling into trying to deal with the enormity of
that moment. And in the first few hours I think the thing that
was on everybody's mind was how many more planes are coming.
Q When you made the call to the President on your way to
PEOC, do you recall that conversations?
DR. RICE: I do recall the conversation. It was brief,
because I was being pushed to get off the phone and get out of
the West Wing.
Q They were hurrying you off the phone with the —
President?
DR. RICE: They were hurrying me off the phone with the
President. And I just said -- he said, I'm coming back. And
we said, Mr. President, that may not be wise. My defense
director, the person who does defense affairs for me, was

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standing next to me and he whispered, tell him that it may not be
wise to come back here because Washington is under attack.
And so I did that and I said, sir, we'll be in touch. And
then I got off to the PEOC.
Q Just a point of information. Do you know where he was?
Was he in the motorcade, or was he on the airplane at that point?
Because these events happened pretty quickly.
DR. RICE: They happened pretty quickly. I believe that he
was already at the air strip, airport, ready to get back on Air
Force One in Florida. And I think that he had every intention at
that moment of trying to get back here. -
Q Try to take yourself back to the moment that that big
vault door is opened and you're whisked into the PEOC. What do
you see?
DR. RICE: I saw several people there. The first person —
that I went to, of course, was the Vice Pres-ident, who was
already there. And I said, I think there are a_ f ew things we
need to do. and I remember spotting Norm Mineta, the Secretary
of Transportation, and realizing all of a sudden that we were
going to have to start grounding aircraft around the entire
country. And there are thousands of aircraft flying at that
moment.
So Norm was sitting there checking tail numbers. And you
had the Vice President trying to write them down on a yellow
legal pad. but I went immediately from the central room in which
we were operating to a little side room, to make a couple of
phone calls. I asked my deputy, Steve Hadley, to call Deputy
Secretary of State Armitage, to get out a cable to posts around
the world, to diplomatic posts around the world that said: the
United States government is still functioning; the United States
has not been decapitated.
My old nuclear war training is that you want everybody to
know that you're up and functioning when something like that
happens. I was told that Secretary Rumsfeld had changed the
defense condition and that American forces were going on alert
around the world. And so one of the first phone calls in which I
participated was with President Putin of Russia, who knew that
our forces were going on alert and, therefore, stood down the
Russian forces that were on major exercises. And it was a lot of
trying to check-off boxes that at that point are extremely
important to preventing any further crisis from taking place.
Q You're an expert, a long expert in Russian affairs, you
speak Russian. Did you speak Russian to President Putin?
DR. RICE: No. Usually when you are doing such things you
work through a translator. But I heard him in Russian, and I

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knew exactly what he was saying. He was saying that he
understood that American forces were on alert. The first thing
he said is, this is a horrible thing and I should call President
Bush.
I explained that President Bush was not in Washington. But
he then said, we are going to stand -down our forces. And for an
old Soviet specialist like me, who had spent a lot of time
worrying about spirals of alert -- we would alert, they would
then alert and pretty soon we would be in a state of war -- it
was a quite remarkable statement by the President of Russia, that
he recognized our common interest at this particular moment in
time.
Q What did that mean to you?
DR. RICE: It meant a lot. I found it quite emotional at
that moment, because it meant that the United States and Russia
were, indeed, on a different path. The President had, prior to
this, back in July at Ljubljana, when President Putin met
President TBush for the first time -- the President had said,
you know, we're not enemies anymore, we have common security
problems and we're "going to develop a different kind of
relationship.
And here on the worst day that any American could imagine,
that new relationship is being vivified.
Q />"2f\t 93 is s
You're inside the PEOC and there's another airplane, (A
wondered whether the PEOC was going to survive that morning.
DR. RICE: You hardly think about the survival of yourself
or the building in which you're standing at a moment like that.
The confusion about what planes were flying and what planes
needed to be grounded, and trying to find what tail numbers were
not responding appropriately to instructions from air controllers
to get to the nearest possible airport -- that's what's on your
mind, and so you don't think we may personally be in danger here,
at that moment in time.
But one of the more awful moments that entire day was when
we heard that that plane had crashed. And an order, of course,
had been given that if a plane did not respond properly to
instruction and to the fighters that were sent up to intercept
planes, that it should be shot down. And there was that horrible
time when we wondered if Flight 93 had, indeed, been shot down by
an American pilot.
Q On the orders of the President?
DR. RICE: Yes. And it was hard for a few moments to verify
that it, indeed, had crashed, not been shot down. I think that
was one of the really awful moments of that period.

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 Q When word came that Flight 93 had gone down, it is
quite possible that those people gave their lives for you.

DR. RICE: It's entirely possible -- in fact, I think it's

probable. They gave their lives because Americans are like that
just countless acts of heroism that we saw on 9/11 that
really do speak to the best character of this country. And this
is a great act of heroism. They were not going to allow another
plane to go into a building in New York or Washington. And,
indeed, they gave their lives for their country more dramatically
than most.
It's also true that clearly the al Qaeda, the terrorists
were trying to take out as many symbols of government as they
could: the Pentagon, perhaps the Capitol, perhaps the White
House. That in and of itself, if all of those had gone down, it
would have been an even greater shock to this country. And these
people saved us not only physically, but they saved us
psychologically and symbolically in a very important way, too.
Q Let me ask you about one more thing in the PEOC. You
said the Vice President was writing down tail numbers? The Vice
President of the United States was writing down the tail numbers
of airplanes that were not responding? ~
DR. RICE: Yes. You-had the .Vice President of the United
States, the National Security Advisor and the Transportation
Secretary trying to make sense of this. At a time like that,
like what we experienced, you do what you have to do. And right
then there were several important things that had to be j3one. We
had to make sure that the rest of the world knew we were
functioning. We had to make sure that planes were getting
grounded and that more planes were not being used as missiles
against various places in the United States. We had to be sure
that there were fighters up to protect the American homeland.
And the Vice President was doing his part and we were all
doing our part. You don't ask at that time, is there somebody
else who can do this job. That's not like the Vice President.
He was just in there doing what had to be done.
Q There were multiple planes that couldn't be accounted
for. And, in addition to that, there were warnings that there
was a plane headed to Camp David, another plane headed to the
President's ranch in Texas, explosions on the National Mall,
explosions at the State Department.
DR. RICE: Yes.
Q What was that like in there?
DR. RICE: Well, you learn when you go through as many
crisis simulations as people like me -- I taught national

405
security policy, I worked at the Pentagon, I've been on the
National Security Council staff before and you go through crisis
simulations. And the one thing they always say is, first reports
are always wrong.
And perhaps just a little bit in the back of your mind is a
little skepticism that that report might be wrong. And you try
to react in any case, but you try not to overreact. And what was
remarkable about the PEOC that day is that it was a calm
environment; you didn't have people running around, throwing
paper and yelling. You had a very experienced group of people
who were going about their jobs as best they could and doing what
needed to get done.
But I remember no sense of panic or being overwhelmed by the
moment. There were quite emotional times. And as I've said many
times, the sense that Flight 93 might have gone down by America's
own hand was very difficult to deal with. But there was no sense
of panic.
Q You asked at that time, did-we shoot it down?
DR. RICE: I asked, did we shoot it down? And we couldn't
initially get a clear answer from the Pentagon. They were pretty
busy, too and they were dealing, of course, with their own
crisis, given that the Pentagon, itself, had been hit.
But we eventually, after asking for several minutes -- you
must know, because a fighter would have reported that they
engaged; have any fighters reported that they engaged? -- we
learned that no fighters were reporting engagement with a
civilian aircraft. And at that point, it became clear that
something else had happened, that the plane had been driven into
the ground by some other means.
Q You were watching the World Trade Center on television
monitors in the PEOC?
DR. RICE: The television monitors were on in the
background. But -- again, you see it out of the corner of your
eye, but you're very busy doing a lot of other things.
Q You saw the towers come down?
DR. RICE: I did see the towers come down.
Q In the PEOC, on television? '
DR. RICE: Yes. Yes. Someone said to me, "Look at that!"
I remember that, "Look at that!" And I looked up, and I saw just
I just remember a cloud of dust and smoke, and the horror of
that moment.
Q And the feeling in your gut?

406
 DR. RICE: That we'd lost a lot of Americans. And that
eventually we would get these people.
Q You felt the anger rising in you?
DR. RICE: I felt the anger. Of course I felt the anger.
You couldn't help but feel anger at that moment.
But you have to keep it under control. You, at a time like
that, have to keep the emotions under control and just try to do
what you need to do to make sure that you're dealing with all the
requirements of avoiding an even bigger crisis.
Q Let me leap forward now quickly, because we're down in
terms of time. Much later that evening -- well, let me ask you
the question, because I don't know the answer. "At some point,
within hours of the attack, a decision was made that we weren't,
going to go after just these terrorists, we were going to go
after all terrorists, and all nations that harbored them. Where
did that idea come from?
DR. RICE: We had a National Security Council meeting as
soon as the President was at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska.
And on that teleconference, the President -- videoconference
the President said, The people who got us, we're going to get
them. This is an~act of war, and he said to Rumsfeld and to .
Tenet, you better get ready, because we're going to get them.
He also recognized right away that-it was global, that this
could, have been London or Paris; that these people were not just
after us, they were after" freedom and after our values. And
that, in and of itself, made it pretty clear from the very
beginning that this was not going to be responding to what
happened in New York and Washington. This was going to be a
bigger challenge, of fighting global terrorism.
We had done a lot of work on terrorism, on how these people
were supporting themselves. We knew that Afghanistan was the
center of their operations, and we knew that they were being
harbored in a number of places. And so the line that appears in
the President's statement from the Oval that night, that says not
just the terrorists, but those who harbor them, came out of what
had been a pretty intensive discussion, over several months,
about how to really deal with international terrorism.
You couldn't just carve terrorists out one by one. You had
to destroy their sanctuary. A terrorist that hijacks a country
in the way that al Qaeda hijacked Afghanistan has the -advantages
of territoriality, places to train, places to run financial
operations, places to hide. And knowing that we also had to
after the Taliban, and then later anyone who harbored terrorists,
was pretty deeply ingrained in this national security team, and
particularly in this President.

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 Q In that first teleconference, was that the first time
that the President heard al Qaeda attached to this?
DR. RICE: That was the first time. And -- George Tenet
was just asked, Who do you think did this to us? And he said,
Sir, I believe it's al Qaeda. We're doing the assessment, but it
looks like, it feels like, it smells like al Qaeda.
The President had heard of al Qaeda. We'd been tracking
them and looking at them. Several times he'd said, when
presented with evidence that al Qaeda might strike here, might
strike there -- mostly overseas, by the way; almost all of the
information was that al Qaeda was preparing to strike-American
interests overseas, as they had done before.
But as he heard that information, the President said, you
know, I'm tired of swatting at flies. I need a strategy to
eliminate these guys. That he had done in the spring. So he
knew al Qaeda, and we all knew what we were going to iave to do.
Q By the next morning, there was evidence. What was
that?
DR. RICE: Well, again, you -- it wasn't as if we didn't
know this group. And we were getting reports on chatter about
what had happened.
But we were also putting together a picture of people that
had a certain modus operand!. And once we had that, and we knew,
we were ready to put forward an ultimatum to those who were
harboring them, the Taliban, which was their sponsor.
Q Leaping ahead, the speech at the National Cathedral.
When the President finished that speech, there was perfect
silence. What were you thinking?
DR. RICE: That service was so important to the country, and
to me personally. Earlier that day, in the Cabinet Room, the
President had held a Cabinet meeting. And he had gotten a little
choked up when he talked about what he was about to do in going
to this national service.
And I remember Colin Powell turning to him and just saying,
you know, try not to use emotional words.
Q Try not to choke up, Mr. President, when you make this
speech?
DR. RICE: Try not to use emotional words -- he said, I
find it helpful not to use emotional words. But of course, the
President had to use emotional words. And it was remarkable, his
clarity and his steadiness. And it was a bit of a metaphor for

408
the way he would then lead the country, with a kind of steadiness
and clarity that I think came through at that moment.
Q Was it a turning point?
DR. RICE: It was a turning point for many people that I've
talked to in the administration,"friends that I've talked to who
watched that service.
I'll tell you what the turning point for me personally was.
I was very sad going into that service. We had gone down
Massachusetts Avenue in the motorcade, and it felt like a funeral
procession. And on the street, there was a man holding a sign
that said, "God Bless America; We Will Not Be Terrorized." And
it was a very emotional moment.
And we went up Massachusetts Avenue, and there were church
bells tolling. And we got to the cathedral, we went into the
cathedral, and it was very, very sad.
And I looked at the program, and I thought, Why are we not
singing the national anthem at the end of this service? And we
were singing instead the Battle Hymn of the Republic. And as we
stood to sing the Battle Hymn of the Republic, you could feel the
entire congregation -- and I could certainly feel myself --
stiffen, the kind of spine. And this deep sadness was being
replaced -by resolve.
And the lines in the Battle Hymn of the Republic are so
stirring that I think it really was transforming. And by the end
of this service, I think we all felt that we still had mourning
to do for our countrymen who had been lost, but that we also had
a new purpose -- in not just avenging what had happened to
them, but making certain that the world was eventually going to
be safe from this kind of attack ever again.
Q Let me leap ahead to Sunday morning. You've had the
meetings at Camp David. The President wakes up Sunday morning,
he sees you, and what does he say?
DR. RICE: I saw him Sunday morning at Camp David, and
actually, he said, I want to talk to you a little bit later. I
think I know what I'm going to do.
And it was when we got back here to the White House, and we
got off the helicopter, and he said, I want you to come with me.
And we went up to his office in the Residence, and he said, I
know what I want to do.
He had listened to his advisors at Camp David. He had asked
them what they thought -- it wasn't as if there were wide
divergences about what to do. People had addressed the problem
from different angles and from different perspectives. And in
very, very rapid, almost staccato fashion, he said, I want to

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issue an ultimatum to the Taliban that tells them, give up the al
Qaeda now or face their fate. I want to use more than just
airpower; this has got to have, as we came to call it, boots on
the ground to show that America is really serious. And he went
through piece after piece after piece.
And I can remember writing, and I was writing very fast,
trying to keep up. And he said, And I want to meet with my
national security team tomorrow morning and tell them what we're
going to do.
Q And as you were writing, you thought what?
DR. RICE: As I was writing, I thought, We know what we're
going to do. We've got a plan, we've got a strategy, and now
it's going to be up to us to make this work.
Q By God, he's going to do it
DR. RICE: By God, he's going to do it. His resolve was so
clear. And the sense that this was not just going to be-a:
pinprick or an effort to avenge this one event, but that he was
going to take on these terrorists in a major way, and that this
was going to be a global war on terrorism that would be a war for
against all those who hated freedoms. It was very clear; it
was clear in his eyes, it was clear in his voice, and it's been
clear to everybody ever since.
END 2:57 P.M. EOT

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