Journal of African Media Studies: Volume: 1 - Issue: 1

Journal of ISSN 1751-7974
Journal of African Media Studies | Volume One Number One
Volume One Number One

African Media Studies
Volume 1 Number 1 – 2009 1.1
3–7 Editorial
Articles
9–21 Repositioning African media studies: thoughts and provocations
Keyan G. Tomaselli Journal of
Media & Culture

23–34 Between journalism ‘universals’ and cultural particulars:

challenges facing the development of a journalism programme in
an East African context
Terje S. Skjerdal
35–54 Looking backward, looking forward: African media studies
and the question of power
Mohammed Musa
55–68 African media research in the era of globalization
Nkosi Ndlela
69–80 Missing links: African media studies and feminist concerns
Audrey Gadzekpo
81–90 The growth and development of African media studies:
perspectives from Nigeria
Abiodun Salawu
91–100 Fata Morgana: Mirage in the Desert - a sequence of images
Graham Evans
101–116 ‘We need to open up the country’: development and the Christian
key scenario in the social space of Kinshasa’s teleserials
Katrien Pype
117–133 Popular music and political change in Côte d’Ivoire: the
divergent dynamics of zouglou and reggae
Anne Schumann
135–154 Music advocacy, the media and the Malawi political public
sphere, 1958–2007
John Lwanda
155–171 The politics of corruption and the media in Africa
Helge Rønning
173–188 Book and film reviews
ISSN 1752-6299
11
intellect
9 771752 629009 www.intellectbooks.com
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Journal of African Media Studies

Volume 1 Number 1 2009
Aims and Scope Principal Editor
The Journal of African Media Studies (JAMS) is an interdisciplinary journal Winston Mano
that provides a forum for debate on the historical and contemporary Communication and Media
aspects of media and communication in Africa. It hereby aims to Research Institute (CAMRI)
contribute to the ongoing re-positioning of media and cultural studies University of Westminster
outside the Anglo-American axis. JAMS interprets media in a broad Harrow Campus
sense, incorporating not only formal media such as radio, television, print, HA1 3TP, Middlesex
internet and mobile telephony but also considers articles on ‘informal’, United Kingdom
‘small’ or ‘indigenous’ media such as music, jokes and theatre. JAMS
welcomes articles that discuss the relation of different media and forms of Tel: +44 (0) 20 7911 5000
communication to the broader social, economic, historical and political ext. 4427
context in Africa. JAMS has a preference for empirical work that is well E-mail: manow@wmin.ac.uk
grounded in theoretical debates and academic literature, and encourages
contributors to include images, photographs or other graphics. JAMS also Associate Editors
has a book and film review section and is published three times a year. Monica Chibita
Makerere University, Uganda
Editorial Board E-mail: monica@masscom.mak.ug
Richard Kpabi, University of Westminster, UK
Noureddine Miladi, University of Northampton, UK Wendy Willems
Herman Wasserman, University of Sheffield, UK School of African and Oriental
Maria Way, University of Westminster, UK Studies (SOAS), University of
London, UK
International Advisory Board E-mail: wendywillems@soas.ac.uk
Hussein Amin – American University in Cairo, Egypt
Kwasi Ansu-Kyeremeh – University of Ghana, Ghana Reviews Editor
Fackson Banda – Rhodes University, South Africa Nkosi Martin Ndlela
Louise Bourgault – Northern Michigan University, USA
Festus Eribo – East Carolina University, USA
Hedmark University College,
Kimani Gecau – University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Norway
Frances Harding – SOAS, University of London, UK E-mail: Nkosi.Ndlela@osir.hihm.no
Jill Hills – University of Westminster, UK
Sean Jacobs – University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Tawana Kupe – University of Witwatersrand, South Africa
Michael Leslie – University of Florida, USA
Mohammed Musa – University of Canterbury, New Zealand
Graham Mytton – Oxford University, UK
Lilian Ndangam – Rhodes University, South Africa
Joyce W. Nyairo – Moi University, Kenya
Francis B. Nyamnjoh – CODESRIA, Senegal
Folu F. Ogundimu – Michigan State University, USA
Foluke Ogunleye – Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria
Charles Okigbo – North Dakota University, USA
Helge Ronning – IMK, University of Oslo, Norway
Tarik Sabry – University of Westminster, UK
Abiodun Salawu – Ajayi Crowther University, Nigeria
Paddy Scannell – University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Terje S. Skjerdal – Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia
Colin Sparks – University of Westminster, UK
Debra Spitulnik – Emory University, USA
Daya K. Thussu – University of Westminster, UK
Keyan Tomaselli – University of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa
The Journal of African Media Studies is published three times per year by Intellect, ISSN 1751–7974
The Mill, Parnall Road, Bristol, BS16 3JG, UK. The current subscription rates are
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Manuscript Submission
Guidelines Presentation Journal for Communication Studies, 59:4,
• The title should be in bold at the pp. 295–310.
Journal of African Media beginning of the article, without Anonymous articles
inverted commas and written as an
Studies (JAMS) ordinary sentence (not all caps);
Anon. (2002), ‘Paragons of press freedom?’,
New African, 403, January, p. 22.
General • The text should be in Times New
Articles submitted to the Journal of African Roman, 12pt and double spaced; Conference papers
Media Studies (JAMS) should be original and • Headings and sub-headings should be Nyamnjoh, F. (2000), Africa and the
not under consideration by any other in bold; Information Superhighway: the Need for
publication. JAMS welcomes empirical work • Use italics for titles of books, films or Mitigated Euphoria, paper presented at the
that is well grounded in theoretical debates newspapers etc., or for foreign names Highway Africa 2000 conference,
and academic literature and encourages or phrases. Grahamstown, South Africa, 10–15
contributors to include images, photographs September 2000.
Quotations
or other graphics. Articles should be written Newspaper articles
• Use single quotation marks (‘ ’) for
in a clear and concise style and submitted Mulholland, H. (2006), ‘Journalists debate
terms and quoted phrases and
by e-mail as a Word document. Please do media reporting of developing world’, The
sentences and double quotation marks
not send WordPerfect files, Text files (i.e. Guardian, February 10, p. 10.
(“ ”) for quotes within quotations;
with suffixes ‘.wpf’ or ‘txt’) or articles pasted Reports
• Quotations longer than 40 words must
into an e-mail message. JAMS only accepts UNESCO (1980), Many Voices, One World,
be indented without quotation marks
completed articles and is unable to advise report by the International Commission
and in Times New Roman, 10pt;
on incomplete conference papers. All for the Study of Communication
• In case of indented quotations, citation
articles should be submitted to the Editor. Problems, Paris: UNESCO.
details should appear outside punctuation;
Book/film reviews should be submitted to
• Omitted material in quotations should Theses and dissertations
the Book Review Editor.
be signalled as follows: [...]. Saunders, R. (1991), Information in the
Language References and notes Interregnum: the Press, State and Civil
JAMS uses standard British English (with – Society in Struggles for Hegemony, Zimbabwe
• Explanatory notes should be kept to an
ize endings). The Editors reserve the right 1980–1990, Ph.D. thesis, Carleton
absolute minimum. Where they are
to alter usage to these ends. University.
essential, please use endnotes rather
Referees than footnotes. Endnotes should be Internet sources
JAMS is a refereed journal. Strict created by authors instead of using the Shanmugavelan, M. (2004), ‘Mobile
anonymity is accorded to both authors and endnote system in Word; Africa must not leave its villages behind’,
referees. The latter are chosen for expertise • The Harvard system should be used for http://www.panos.org.uk/global/
within the subject area and are asked to references in the text in the following featuredetails.asp?featureid=1187&ID=1002.
comment on comprehensibility, originality way: (Bourgault 1995); Kasoma (1997: Accessed 28 February 2006.
and scholarly worth of article submitted. 300); Tomaselli and Dunn (2001);
• Web references in the text must have Tables and graphics
Opinion
an author stated and Harvard style • Tables, graphs, photographs, images
The views expressed in JAMS are those
must be used; or other graphics should all be entitled
of the authors, and do not necessarily
• Use ‘et al.’ when citing a work by more ‘Figure’, numbered consecutively and
coincide with those of the Editor, Associate
than two authors, e.g. Tomaselli et al. accompanied by a caption as well as a
Editors, Editorial Board or Advisory Board.
(1989); source or copyright-holder
Submission • The letters a, b, c etc. should be used to acknowledgement;
• Articles should not normally exceed distinguish different citations by the • Graphics should be sent separately, not
6,000 words in length. Book and film same author in the same year, e.g. embedded into the document. Please
reviews should be no longer than Nyamnjoh (2004a; 2004b); ensure that an indication is provided
1,000 words; • Please do not use (ibid.) for consecutive as to where the figures should be
• Each article should include the references; placed in the text;
following metadata: • All references cited in the text should • Images should be in high resolution
• exact title of the article; be listed alphabetically and in full after (300 dpi is the minimum resolution)
• author name and short affiliation the notes, using the following style: and in the following formats: TIFF,
(not to be confused with JPEG, PSD, PDF. BMP images are
contributor details); Books not acceptable. It is the author’s
• article abstract, maximum 150 Bourgault, L. (1995), Mass Media in Sub- responsibility to ensure that they are
words; Saharan Africa, Bloomington: Indiana copyright cleared.
• six keywords, or two-word phrases University Press.
that indicate the core of what is Articles in edited collections Book and films reviews
discussed in the article; Tomaselli, K. and Louw, E. (1991), ‘The Please use the following style for film
• references, i.e. a full list of the South African progressive press under reviews:
works cited in the article; emergency, 1986–1989’, in K. Tomaselli and Tsotsi, Directed by Gavin Hood (2005)
• author biography, maximum of E. Louw (eds), The Alternative Press in South UK/SA: Miramax Films
three sentences; Africa, London: James Currey, pp. 175–90. Please use the following style for book
• author institutional and e-mail reviews:
addresses, for inclusion at the end Translated books Africa’s Media: Democracy and the
of the article. Fanon, F. (1986), Black Skin, White Masks Politics of Belonging, Francis B.
• The metadata should be placed at (trans. C. L. Markmann), London: Pluto Press. Nyamnjoh (2005) London: Zed Books,
the beginning of the article, with 308 pp., ISBN: 1-84277-582-0
the exception of references, author Journal articles
(hardback), £49.95, ISBN: 1-84277-
biography and addresses, which Kasoma, F. (1997), ‘The independent press
583-9 (paperback), £15.95.
should be placed at the end. and politics in Africa’, Gazette: International
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Journal of African Media Studies Volume 1 Number 1 © 2009 Intellect Ltd

Editorial. English language. doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.3/2
Editorial
Positioning African media studies
The Journal of African Media Studies (JAMS) provides a new platform to
debate issues about media, communication and culture in Africa. Our first
goal is to promote the often neglected but important area of media
research in Africa. This is borne out of a realization that most African
countries have different but shared geographies, histories and experiences.
Although the mass media were brought from outside the continent during
colonialism they now become a formidable power with influence on many
aspects of life on the African continent. JAMS aims to promote research
that deals with the everyday lived experiences of individuals and commu-
nities in their interaction with different kinds of media. The journal inter-
prets media in the broadest possible sense, incorporating not only formal
‘mass’ media, such as radio, television, print, Internet and mobile tele-
phony, but also ‘informal’, ‘small’ or ‘indigenous’ media such as music, jokes
and theatre.
The second imperative for JAMS derives from our desire to contribute to
the growing body of empirical work in media, communication and cultural
studies. In this regard, JAMS complements other existing English-language
and area-focused media, communication and cultural studies journals
that promote research on marginalized and often ignored contexts (e.g.,
Latin America, Middle East and Asia).
The third related, and more political, imperative for JAMS arose from
the now firm realization that the bulk of work in media theory is ‘based
upon data from just two spots, Britain and the United States, which have
[…] remarkably similar leitmotifs in their cultural, economic and political
history that mark them out from other nations on the planet’ (Downing
1996: x). We see the role of JAMS as providing perspectives that help free
the field from the stranglehold of theories from one particular context (see
also Ake 1982; Sparks 1998; Nuttall and Michael 1999; Park and Curran
2000; Hart and Young 2003; Abbas and Erni 2004; McMillin 2006;
Thussu 2007). We aim to contribute to the ongoing re-positioning of
media and cultural studies outside the Anglo-American axis. Left unchal-
lenged, this gives rise to ‘the most often mistaken impression that the
Western text and Western ways of making meaning are universal, and,
therefore, to be copied by academics the world over’ (Nyamnjoh 1999:
17–18). We are particularly interested in fresh empirical evidence and
theoretical perspectives that help engage with the dominance of Western
theories in the global field of media and communication.
This inaugural issue comprises two parts. The first half of the issue
engages with the meaning and positioning of ‘African media studies’ and
evaluates past and present work in the field. The second part provides case
studies on the relation between media and social change in different parts
of Africa and highlights the importance of music, oratory and popular cul-
ture in mediating social and political commentary.
JAMS 1 (1) pp. 3–7 © Intellect Ltd 2009 3

‘African media studies’ or ‘media studies in Africa’?

Contributors in the first half of this issue pose challenging questions con-
cerning the roots and direction of the trajectory of African media studies.
They assess the current state of the field and its desired future, and criti-
cally discuss whether it is possible to speak of ‘African media studies’, or
would ‘media studies in Africa’ more accurately describe the current
state of media and communication studies in Africa? Contributors con-
sider that the immediate challenge for African media studies is to be self-
examining and to produce a concise and critical rendering, not only of
mass-mediated experiences in pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial
Africa, but also of oral media and other traditional forms of communica-
tion that are ubiquitous in the continent. African media studies should
critically account for the endogenous and exogenous conditions that have
produced a media set-up that is both unique and comparable to other
mass media systems.
The debate raises up-to-date and fresh thinking on the past and future
of African media studies, raising specific questions about: national media
studies curricula; the issue of media power; dominant theoretical and
methodological approaches and the role of gender in existing research.
Most contributors emphasize the way in which African media studies mir-
rors the study of Africa in general, which has been chequered by a long
history of imperialism, mis-representation and under-representation.
Keyan Tomaselli enters the debate by tackling the dialectic between
metropolitan centres of knowledge production and Africa as one of the
dependent peripheries, exploring the alarming anti-democratic concep-
tual, policy and ideological shifts that occur when theory travels between
different contexts.
Terje Skjerdal draws from theoretical perspectives as well as from his
personal experiences teaching journalism on the first Masters degree
programme in journalism at Addis Ababa University, which was
launched in March 2004. Skjerdal participated in the initial project
preparations in 2002 and was a member of the working group that
developed the curriculum. He has been the academic coordinator of the
programme since August 2004. His paper illustrates the specific design
and development of programmes in journalism at Addis Ababa
University. His findings have profound implications for the planning of
similar programmes in Africa and other contexts with North–South
linkages in media teaching.
Mohammed Musa is concerned with the relation between media and
power in the African context. He argues that the ideological struggles of the
Cold War era were not insignificant in shaping the directions of African
media studies. Using historical and contextual analyses, Musa focuses on
factors that shaped early media research and teaching in Africa, including
the importation of modernization theory that later proved to be inadequate
in understanding the African condition.
Nkosi Martin Ndlela examines and rethinks the position of African
media studies within the context of the global and observes that its trajec-
tory has been driven by movements and changes at local and global levels.
He is particularly concerned to show how African media researchers are
4 Editorial
yet to extricate themselves from the methodological and theoretical

entrapments that have hindered the growth of new models and theories
that are inherently African in perspective.
Audrey Gadzekpo, head of the most vibrant communication studies
programme in Ghana, is interested in the relation between media and fem-
inism. She provides a feminist reappraisal of African media in the context
of democratic and economic changes, and proposes a research agenda
that aims to fill the gaps between African media and gender scholarship.
Abiodun Salawu provides an overview of the history of media studies
in Nigeria, his major criticism being that the country’s mass communica-
tion curricula have so far not sufficiently included courses on oral com-
munication.
Mediating the impact of capitalism in Africa is Graham Evans’s Fata
Morgan visual essay which, as he argues, presents us with a desert of com-
mercial signage made strange by its juxtaposition with the barrenness of
the Egyptian landscape.
Media and social change in Africa

The second half of the issue brings together contributors whose research is
concerned with the ways in which various forms of contemporary African
communication media – be they mass media or indigenous media – have
contributed towards social change in Africa.
Katrien Pype investigates the role of Kinshasa’s post-Mobutu teleserials.
She explores the production and consumption of teleserials in Kinshasa and
demonstrates how these engage issues of development and progress. Her
work clearly shows how producers of teleserials perceive their work from
utilitarian perspectives, contending that they aim to transform society,
counter the social and political crises and improve the nation in various
ways. Pype shows how Kinshasa’s television channels confront the issues of
tradition and modernity, represented by artistic depictions of witchcraft and
charismatic Christianity respectively.
Music offers a crucial vantage point for exploration of social change
processes in Africa. Anne Schumann investigates the increasingly impor-
tant social role of popular music in the Ivory Coast. Focusing on the genres
of reggae and ‘zouglou’ in particular, she provides a content analysis of
different songs, revealing an active interpretation of political develop-
ments there. Through their social commentaries, musicians facilitate
public opinion formation processes in the country. The polarization in
song lyrics mirrors social divisions in the Ivory Coast and attempts are
being made to bring stability through some of the songs. Popular music
can function as a means of mass communication and its themes can
reflect and contribute to the formation of public opinion. Citing Stuart
Allan (2004: 1), Schumann demonstrates how music functions as a
‘trenchant political site in Africa, primarily because it is the most widely
appreciated art form on the continent’.
John Lwanda explores the role of oratory in Malawi, where the media
system has generally been repressed or underdeveloped. Through oratory
and linguistic devices such as satire, irony and imagery, interpretations
and commentaries are given on otherwise difficult and controversial
Editorial 5
themes. In the face of limited mass media and high levels of illiteracy, music
remains an important sphere of communication in Malawi. Through linguistic
resonances, musicians have been able to make critical comments in an
environment characterized by restrictions on freedom of expression.
Lwanda’s analysis of music throughout different periods of Malawian his-
tory shows how orality remains an important feature of Malawian social,
political and economic discourses.
Helge Rønning, who has introduced university level media training in
Southern Africa, discusses the interrelationship between the struggle
against corruption and the role of media in democratization processes. His
paper deals with the mediation of corruption and the way in which citi-
zens in Africa encounter and perceive corruption (both grand and petty),
as well as the factors that may contribute to the development of corrupt
practices. He debates the ways in which the press in Africa deals with cor-
ruption and asks whether media could serve as a deterrent in combating
this form of criminal behaviour. Rønning’s paper stresses the vital role of
free and independent media in exposing corrupt practices and fostering
transparency.
The inaugural issue also contains two book reviews and two film reviews:
Maria Way reviews Larry Strelitz’ (2005) Mixed Reception: South African Youth
and their Experience of Global Media, which attempts to address the lack of work
on audiences in African media studies. Dumisani Moyo provides a critical
review of Ragnar Waldahl’s (2001) Politics and Persuasion. Media Coverage of
Zimbabwe’s 2000 Election. Herman Wasserman reviews Tsotsi (2005), an
award-winning South African film that brought the first Best Film Oscar to
Africa, while Mona Pedersen reviews Blood Diamonds (2006).
Altogether, the articles in this inaugural issue provide good examples of
theoretical and empirical issues that we believe are central to the trajectory
of African media studies. The contributors have managed to rise to the
challenge of defining and positioning African media studies. They have
also provided rich empirical case studies on the crucial role of different
forms of media in the processes of social change in Africa. A new debate
about African media studies has started and we would like to invite you to
participate in it.
References
Abbas, M. A. and Erni, J. N. (2004), Internationalizing Cultural Studies: an Anthology,
Oxford: Blackwells.
Ake, C. (1982), Social Science as Imperialism: the Theory of Political Development.
Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press.
Allen, L. (2004), ‘Music and politics in Africa’, Social Dynamics, 30:2, pp. 1–19.
Downing, J. (1996), Internationalizing Media Theory: Transition, Power, Culture:
Reflections on Media in Russia, Poland and Hungary, 1980–95, London: Sage
Publications.
Hart, S. and Young, R. (2003), Contemporary Latin American Cultural Studies,
London, Hodder Arnold.
McMillin, D. C. (2006), International Media Studies, Oxford: Blackwells.
Nuttall, S. and Michael, C.-A. (1999), Senses of Culture: South African Culture
Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6 Editorial
Nyamnjoh, F. B. (1999), ‘African cultural studies, cultural studies in Africa: how to

make a useful difference’, Critical Arts: A Journal of Cultural Studies in Africa,
13:1, pp. 15–39.
Park, M.-J. and Curran, J. (2000), De-Westernizing Media Studies, London:
Routledge.
Sparks, C. (with Reading, A.) (1998), Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media.
London: Sage Publications.
Thussu, D. K. ed. (2007), Media on the Move: Global Flow and Contra-Flow. London:
Routledge.
Editorial 7
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Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.9/1
Repositioning African media studies:

thoughts and provocations
Keyan G. Tomaselli University of KwaZulu-Natal
Abstract Keywords
This article engages with contemporary debates on the state of media studies in African culture
Africa. It comments on the dialectic between metropolitan centres of knowledge African media
production and dependent peripheries. A brief discussion of Fordism and post- media education
Fordism and their implications for Africa follows. Nation-building discourses are media research
opposed to hyper-real notions of ‘meaning’, calling on Africans to transcend their media freedom
idealized understanding of ‘culture’, ‘African values’ and identity as unchanging media theories
absolutes. The often alarming anti-democratic conceptual, policy and ideological
shifts that occur when theories travel between different contexts are examined.
Some research agendas for Africa in the postmodern age are proposed.
Introduction
Contradictions are always sharpest on the peripheries. This is what I con-
cluded with regard to my ten years’ study on representation, development
and land rights with regard to the Kalahari Bushmen (Tomaselli 2005).
These contradictions cast a penetrating light on the centre/core – the rela-
tions between those (post)industrial nations that drive global financial pol-
icy and economic growth on the one hand, and those less developed
countries that are supposedly amongst the beneficiaries of development
aid on the other hand. Such growth is measured in terms of Gross
National Product and not necessarily via indicators of the quality of life of
individuals or communities, especially those on the edges of the peripheries.
While awareness of exploitation amongst the marginalized, repressed and
poor is high, their ability to change their circumstances, conditions and
environments is usually low.
Media in Africa follow similar asymmetrical contours. Technological
developments, new media products and new uses race ahead in the
metropoles, while their introduction to Africa and the diasporas is seri-
ously impeded by stifling legislation, punitive import taxes, lack of develop-
ment in telecommunication infrastructures and very expensive and
restricted broadband and telephony, which make the cost of doing busi-
ness unacceptably high (see for example Dunn 2001; Panos 2004).
Overlaid on these impediments is the lack of internationally compatible
regulatory environments (where they exist at all), censorship and govern-
ment control. African governments have yet to admit that the media are
not constituted to do their bidding but to offer channels for the develop-
ment of economies, aid service delivery (for instance, phones, Internet,
public service broadcasting) and to forge public spheres, from local to

national, in the education of a critical citizenry (Alzouma 2005; Thomas

and Nain 2004). The communication of rights is as important as is the
right to communication (CRIS Campaign 2005; Miguda-Attyang 2005).
Economic development in many African countries is thought to be a
condition centring on opportunistic personal or clan accumulation (of
both power and wealth) at any price: often through corruption, violence
and self-promotion, especially by politicians who think of themselves as
Big Men (Bourgault 1995), above and beyond popular accountability.
Representation, however, is far more difficult for governments to control,
regulate and censor than are actual industries. If a newspaper contravenes
state preferences, its plant can be destroyed, its staffers imprisoned and
even killed. But ideas continue to find currency and circulation.
In terms of development periodizations, all African countries contain
within their borders remnants of the pre-modern, uneasily juxtaposed
with modernity and postmodernity. Into this mix have come new tech-
nologies like Internet, camera cell phones and a variety of other media
that can be received at the personal level no matter the location of the per-
son using them. SMS culture and blogging seem now to shape the way
urban youth interact, even when they are within hailing distance of each
other (see for example Al-Failakawi 2006; Cohen 2006). In countries
where fixed lines are extraordinarily expensive and difficult to obtain, cell
phones – much more costly but far more ubiquitous – have become the
most common form of communication in extensive urban-based informal
sectors, and with those outside and in between fixed line grids. Market
opportunities created by lethargic government monopolization of outdated
telephony has facilitated, as Ruth Teer-Tomaselli (November 2007) in her
Inaugural Address suggests, South Africa becoming the ‘new “imperial
power” on the African continent’ with the telecommunications sector as
an exemplary case in point. The relevance of telecommunications and
ICTs on societies has yet to become a major focus for African university
media departments (cf. also Tleane 2006).
Electronic technologies have relativized the world, taking it into post-
Fordist modes of production, post-structuralist concepts and postmod-
ernist conditions. In these ‘post’ times, the assumption of truth as a fixed,
transtemporal realm accessible only to empirical scientific investigation
has become contested. In the unashamedly contradictory ambit of post-
modernism, truth is subjective and relative to time, place and culture, all
of which are dynamic moments in the global information society.
Post-World War II societies are characterized by consumerism, mass
media, computerization and bureaucracy, where technology – particularly
information technology – is changing the way knowledge is stored,
accessed and consumed. While breaking with the past, this new era does
not negate it. At the heart of postmodernism is a paradoxical dualism, or
double coding that is both the continuation of Modernism and its tran-
scendence (Doll 1993).
Postmodernism challenges the way truth is constructed under the
modernist paradigm, truth being relative to the web of signifying systems
that construct the narratives and representations by which people make
meaning of their world. Just as Albert Einstein’s theories of relativity shook
the scientific establishment of the time, so does postmodernism undermine
10 Keyan G. Tomaselli
the closure of meaning assumed by modernist narratives like ‘nation-

building’. These discourses contributed to the demise of repressive mod-
ernist orders such as those found in the Soviet Union and apartheid South
Africa. Closed, universalizing narratives could not be imposed upon
humanity or even sections of it for ever, even within tightly controlled
nation-states.
The elision of time and space through global media and communica-
tions networks reassembles communities of interest into new and con-
stantly shifting networks of meaning, new telecommunities and new
forms of interacting. The electronic media – and especially Internet and
the World Wide Web – redefined time, space, identity, knowledge, culture,
production and consumption. A new, non-linear, self-organizing postmod-
ern world operating beyond modernist prescriptions emerged in the 1990s
(Varis 1992). The open-ended structure of Internet, for example, makes it
difficult for regulators anywhere to control or regulate its content. Herein
lies the basic contradiction for Africa – modernist economies rooted in
Fordist modes of production are being prejudiced in a global economy that
has fractured both the mode and relations of production across continents
and classes, through computers. The new commodities are information,
image, knowledge and ideas; the new inputs are time, artistic creativity,
multimedia and international labour competitiveness.
Convergence results in new modes of production such as post-Fordism
and ‘just-in-time capitalism’. Products and their design are changing on a
daily basis in dynamic response to international micro-markets whose
tastes are shifting and being shifted all the time. The management of a post-
Fordist economy is facilitated by new information technologies, globaliza-
tion of financial markets, dominance of the service sector, emphasis on
product diversity, types of consumers and mobilities of taste and fashion
and flexible specialization. Generic products made by slow and geographi-
cally bound Fordist methods simply cannot compete (Amin 1994). The
implication for media studies is that the old mass media paradigm assumes
Fordist conditions in a world where post-Fordism prevails – audiences are
considered active, are fractured and highly taste and consumer mobile.
The dilemma for Africa is that post-Fordist methods of production, mar-
keting and consequent consumption practices tend to be in opposition
to nation-building and culturally universalizing discourses. These are
cemented in the modernist notion of the uniformity and integrity (economic,
political, cultural, linguistic and cosmological) of the ‘nation-state’, national
versus global citizens and cultures bounded by geographical considerations.
A new definition of culture is required, which facilitates the above kinds
of information movements. Old anthropological definitions emphasizing
ways of life or literary high–low culture definitions based on spectrums of
taste, and sociological definitions emphasizing uniformities of social
behaviour, are found wanting in this new globalizing world of marketable
difference (Tomaselli and Aldridge 1997). What are the implications of
these for the African academy?
Teaching media studies

My experiences of how journalism, communication and media studies is
taught at many African universities, and of research assumptions, are
Repositioning African media studies: thoughts and provocations 11

informed by my having been an examiner at universities in Ghana,

Zambia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Kenya, and from my interac-
tions via conferences and seminars across the continent since 1988. They
also reflect my experience of articles submitted to the many journals for
which I referee and have edited (cf. UNESCO/UNDP 2001).
The explosion of information and content (from pornography to philoso-
phy), and the scale and volumes of data stored on the World Wide Web (from
blogs to Wikipedia), facilitates instant studying from electronic sources that,
unlike printed books and journal articles, are offered synchronically, in often
de-contextualized, fragmented bytes of largely discrete information where
issues of copyright are strongly contested (Morrison 2002). Students no
longer get a sense of where the web entry they are reading fits into the
scheme of things. Everything – including making sense – now occurs in the
continuous perceptual present. Students want instant knowledge and see this
as the equivalent of SMS discourses – fragmented, cryptic and disconnected –
but helpful in writing/plagiarizing essays. This occurs in those universities
where students have free access to the web, much less so in most African uni-
versities where web access is prohibitively expensive and difficult to obtain.
How does one make sense of these kinds of situations when teaching
courses on media studies in Africa? How does one approach the study of
media systems, media–society relations, representation and reception? Too
often, ‘communication’ departments concentrate on the ‘doing’, ignoring
the study of representation, reception and audiences. This would apply to
both ethnographies (see Roome 1999; Tager 1997; Strelitz 2005 for
examples on South Africa; Spitulnik 2000) and audience rating analysis
(for example Van Vuuren 1995; Mytton 1999). The old notion of ‘mass
media’, linear communication models and the assumption of passive and
vulnerable audiences who must be protected remains dominant. With the
exception of South Africa, the fracturing by cultural and media studies of
all these assumptions has yet to find its way into curricula and research.
How does one research and teach media studies on the continent
where new media are still scarce, where content is treated with suspicion
by autocratic governments and where media is still seen to be part of the
civil service (see for example Nyamnjoh 2005)? Similarly, universities are
increasingly being considered an extension of state departments, and com-
pliance with national policy is becoming the norm. This is reinforced by
the lack of analysis of representation in media courses taught on the con-
tinent. A perusal of Africa Media Review published by the African Council
for Communication Education suggests that studies of content, representa-
tion and reception/interpretation have been few and far between. This is
one lack that needs attention in any repositioning of African media studies
north of Zimbabwe.
Common-sense discourses within new African elites generate the fol-
lowing kinds of assumptions and actions:
• Industry regulators become de facto content censors (De Beer 2001).

• Ethics becomes a mechanism used by governments to force media com-
pliance.
• Normative media theories are invoked by governments to manage the
media – the preferred discourse is a crude ‘developmental media’
approach harnessed to party political-led ‘nation-building’ and ‘patri-

otic journalism’ discourses.
• Media are blamed, especially by governments, for all ills in society.
• There is the popular notion in many countries that those in authority
are above and beyond critique.
• A blame-it-on-the-West/colonial syndrome is popularized, thus ignoring
self-induced problems and suppressing obvious solutions, and eliminat-
ing the different colonial contours left in Franco-, Luso-, Arabo- and
Anglophone Africas (Chinweizu 1999).
• Ethnic, racial and cultural essentialism take on ethnic cleansing char-
acteristics (Chalk 1999; Miguda-Attyang 2005), legitimized via coer-
cive majoritarian discourses (Louw 1994).
The following further observations stand out:
• Many media researchers and lecturers strongly oppose political censor-

ship but unequivocally support censorship of gutter and tabloid journal-
ism, nudity, suggestiveness and pornography. Students and editors think
of themselves as the moral arbiters of the nation.
• Student journalists tend to accept social taboos and propose sanitizing
unbecoming behaviours in their reporting, like rape (Tomaselli 2003).
• Cultural commissars assume a positivist, modernist and unchanging
view of the world, fixing African ‘culture’, ‘values’ and associated prac-
tices and their discourses into romanticized assumptions about history,
tradition and society (Raumolin 2006: 198–200).
• Some read libertarian media theory as an unwelcome licence to write
anything in any way and as promoting opportunistic and immoral sen-
sationalism. The deeper philosophical origins and democratic raison d’e-
tre of this normative theory is often misunderstood (Siebert et al. 1956).
• Most misunderstood is the nature of the public sphere, seen as an
imported concept of little relevance to the way things are done in
Africa (see below).
• Communitarian journalism approaches dominate policy makers who
fail to understand the notion of critique. The notion of ‘patriotic jour-
nalism’ and media serving an imagined community stem from this
notion, a kind of ‘naturalised ideology’ (Fackler 2003: 323).
• Many African academics tend to deify essentialist Afrocentric
approaches (cf. Kasoma 1994), reducing complex social and cultural
issues into a bland set of supposed ‘African values’, which are proposed
as some kind of normative template by which all media are expected to
function in relation to misplaced concepts of ‘respect’ for senior (male)
politicians, irrespective of their behaviour (also see Vilakazi 2004).
In my travels, I have come to realize that the way media studies – more
specifically communication and journalism – is taught in Africa and
elsewhere is an indication of both where and when African academics
studied in the North, and, since the end of apartheid, in South Africa
(Hochheimer 2001). Those journalist educators who study in the
United States of America bring back with them a largely positivist approach;
those who studied in the Soviet Union brought back an equally positivist,

anti-libertarian, Stalinist Marxism; those who study in the United

Kingdom and Norway tend to import a more nuanced British cultural
studies, partly re-contextualized into local conditions, examining texts in
relation to contexts (see Skjerdal 2006; Zhuwarara et al. 1997; Ronning
1997). African governments are more often than not suspicious of discus-
sions on what content means, how it is interpreted, or assign such analy-
sis to other disciplines like literature. However, the field of cultural and
media studies remains in many places an uncontextualized set of textual-
ist metatheories that have little or no relevance to local conditions, lives
or ways of making sense. Textualism offers security as the new canon,
depoliticized, a kind of ‘post-LitCrit’, which is evacuated of its ethical,
democratizing and political dimensions (Said 1983). Democratization of
the text does not equal democratization of society, as the case of Zimbabwe
reveals, a point developed below (Ranger 2005).
Further research into, and evaluation of, the relations between differ-
ent intellectual traditions, not only in Africa, but also in their original
contexts, would be useful. How have these schools of thought been appro-
priated and contextualized for the African situation? What implications for
metropolitan media theory might arise from such appropriations? A number
of such extensive studies have occurred in South Africa (Tomaselli and
Shepperson 2003), and with reference to other parts of Africa (Edeani
1995; Ocholi and Lisosky 2002).
Attempts by Northern countries to impact concepts of democracy in
Africa, to reorientate debate on media–society relations and to create crit-
ical intellectual nodes from which might emerge democratizing impulses
yield mixed results. Cultural and media studies when introduced in the
early 1980s – on the back of a social justice/historical materialist trajec-
tory to South Africa in the mid-1970s – uniquely found itself harnessed to
the ascendant democratic trajectory. In contrast, the introduction of the
field – linked to Jurgen Habermas’ (1989) concept of the public sphere – to
Zimbabwe in the early 1980s and 1990s failed to prevent that country’s
political decay. The critical significance of Norwegian–Zimbabwean collab-
orative work (Manhando 1997; Waldahl 1998) seems to have been
temporarily silenced in Zimbabwe’s alarming regression into a post-
millennium totalitarianism in which the very structure of the state was
destroyed by the government itself, setting off impulses that negatively
impacted the entire region, and which seriously compromised the integrity
of the British Commonwealth. However, the democratizing strength and
theme of these studies will hopefully underpin a re-emergence of a new,
more self-sustaining democracy once the historical contradictions that led
to the implosion have worked themselves out. Many critical Zimbabwean
academics are being educated outside that country and are now actively
contributing to a critical and theorized diasporic voice from the global
heartlands of intellectual production (see Moyo 2006). The Journal of
African Media Studies is one such outcome.
Habermas’ notion of the public sphere underpins the work of many of
our Northern colleagues (Andersen 1996; Keane 1996; Calhoun 1996).
This emphasis has not found much support in African media studies, as
academics tend to be in alliance with the Marxian ‘new class’ aligned to
new post-liberation governments, which have an unhealthy relationship
with the emergent bourgeoisies. It’s the new classes that need educating
on the necessity of dialogical spaces. The bourgeoisie in nineteenth-
century Europe itself once represented oppositional ideas, cut off as it was
from business and commerce (Bennett 1982). In Africa, typically, yester-
day’s resistance fighters become tomorrow’s repressive elites. These group-
ings then tend to betray the democratic principles for which they claimed
to have fought, by curtailing or controlling the nature of the public sphere,
as did their autocratic predecessors whom they deposed. As Helge Ronning
has argued:
It may seem far-fetched to bring up [Habermas’] theories, which have their

background in the historical analysis of early modern Europe, in a discussion
on the role of culture and communication in late twentieth-century Africa
[…]. The anti-colonial struggle took place within a counter public sphere to
the authoritarian colonial state, and had as one of its central aims to create
a new cultural identity merging political and emotional experiences. The
post-colonial authoritarian state, centred around concepts like ‘one nation,
one party, one leader’, are characterised primarily by employing representa-
tive publicness as a principle of the political and cultural process.
(Ronning 1997: 4)
Ronning further observes that: ‘Many intellectuals and political actors

have forgotten the essential role of the state as a regulating factor. It is
through the state that citizen’s rights are secured’ (Ronning 2002: 115).
Freedom of expression is one of these rights and should be studied in
Africa.
Hegemony – the discourse of ‘African Values’

The essentializing post-apartheid discourse of ‘African values’ is a not
uncommon refrain articulated by the new post-liberation South African cul-
tural commissars who attempt to legitimate regressive state attempts to
impede the development of and/or to censor already attained hard-won pub-
lic spheres (Vilakazi 2004). This kind of populist appeal to ‘traditional cul-
ture’, which invests media management with the ‘elders’ or self-constituted
patriarchal groups of ‘wise men’, recurs with disquieting regularity in
meetings, conferences, submissions to journals and in general discussion.
It usually emerges from a conservative Christian morality, a middle class
unease with sensationalism, sex and nudity and a disquiet enhanced by
reality TV shows like Big Brother Africa, which fracture commonly held
notions of Africanness (Mano and Willems 2008).
The global theoretical literature on regulatory issues is also often
invoked by African cultural commissars to imply the regulation of content
and representation, as well as notions of African morality, decency and
virtue (Kasoma 1994). This category confusion – between industry regula-
tion on the one hand, and morality on the other – is underpinned with
injunctions for the institution of content barriers to ‘protect’ Africans from
the allegedly insidious influences of so-called (Western) ‘foreign culture’,
‘alien’ genres of reporting (Kasoma 2000: 85) and to ensure that Africans,
as an essentially moral people, ‘constantly strive to lead good lives so that
their ethnic community can prosper’ (Kasoma 1994: xv). Embedded in this

definitional conflation is the utterly reductive assumption that cultural

identity merged with political and emotional experiences can be prescrip-
tively reduced to homogeneous sets of continent-wide social and cultural
‘African values’. These are as imagined and constructed as is the notion of
‘Africa’ itself, and the nations within its land mass, all of which are contested,
negotiated and mediated (Ojo 2006). Theories of regulation do not include
discussions on censorship:
A democratic state has no business in legislating for morality. Indeed, deeply

held belief and moral convictions often need to be attacked. A culture that
legislates against offence is one that not only openly fails to protect the basic
freedoms of the individual, but [is] one likely to stagnate and infantilise its
citizens.
(Ronning 2002: 123)
If there are two additional lessons that Africa can learn from the history of
struggle in Europe in ‘repositioning African media studies’, they are the
significance of the public and counter-public spheres on the one hand, and
inculcating a deep suspicion of essentialism and censorship on the other.
Censorship of the kind that claims the moral high ground always results
in censorship of a political kind. As Ronning concludes:
[…] one must view this process [the development of the public sphere] as
two parallel histories made possible by democratisation and the growth of
civil society. On the one hand, there is the commercialisation of culture and
communication, and on the other, the renewal of a more universal, compre-
hensive, and pluralistic public life.
(Ronning 2002: 116)
Defining culture in hyper-reality

A definition of culture responding to the above imperatives would explain
how networks of meaning and social identities emerge historically, are
socially constructed and are articulated and rearticulated through social
institutions, social interaction and the media into social practices and dis-
tinct ways of making sense. Two crucial elements are relevant here: first,
the agreements on interpretation are short lived, constantly shifting, refor-
mulating and fracturing into new and different meanings. The media and
new paradigms are directly implicated in this process. Second, the role of
the media, especially the electronic media (TV, radio, computers, Internet
etc.), has become that of the principal mediators of the continuous remak-
ing of meaning in both modern and postmodern societies. Such identities
question received categories like ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’, substituting less
formal categories bound up with ethnicity, origin, language and cosmology.
These sites of meaning – both inherited and made – provide self-identity in
the face of disintegrating and contested grand narratives, contending cos-
mological beliefs and their associated practices such as hyper-reality.
Subjectivities of individuals in the postmodern world cannot be
assumed static, stable or even predictable. The Subject/Object dichotomy
of Cartesian cosmology is being questioned by the New Paradigm. This
modernist split is returning to reintegration but in a new way. The ability to
create alternative meanings is itself a form of liberation. It is through this

process that the individual can be reconnected to the collective, though
the collective loses its concrete geographical, linguistic and cultural status
as it is itself always in a constant state of change and transformation.
Development becomes a way of connecting the local to the global and
the global to the local in ways that benefit all parties in the encounter. It is
not about fixing identity, imposing interpretation or deifying preferred
sets of values. Pluralistic public life cannot operate under conditions of
imposition.
Expatriates and analysis

I started with the observation that contradictions are always sharpest on
the peripheries. This is one of the conceptual benefits for academics of
working in Africa. The experience of the periphery both casts light on, and
can learn from, experience and histories at the centre. The dialogue occurs
at many levels. Few African universities encourage research. They fail to
understand that knowledge has a rapidly declining half-life and that publi-
cation is the prime ‘product’ of the tertiary sector. Research and publica-
tion are not luxuries, they are the foundation of knowledge production.
Universities are one of the last bastions of critical thinking. The public
sphere is premised on the concept of a critical citizenry.
That so many top-class media academics have relocated to the West for
a variety of reasons has undermined the African academy’s ability to cre-
ate the conditions for viable public spheres. Theories that underpin demo-
cratic imperatives in the North travel, arrive and are rearticulated at their
destinations into legitimizing prevailing essentialisms, state repression and
racially based majoritarian notions of democracy – minorities and the sub-
altern are demonized, excommunicated and sometimes exterminated vio-
lently as, for example, in the case of Rwanda and Darfur, or through
self-destruction of the state (Zimbabwe) or via neglect.
Expatriates, however, play a crucial role: most tend to offer a more ana-
lytical, distanced analysis; they forge particular spaces in which to write
about their countries of origin (Mano 2004) as do those who had oppor-
tunities to study and work overseas (Mak’Ochieng 1993). This is a differ-
ent kind of writing from those who live in the clear and present danger of
their subject material, generally under conditions of siege in Africa. The
expatriates engage the folks back home who are working at the coalface,
often under appalling conditions, barely able to think, reflect, let alone act.
But by working with those in often self-imposed exile, such as seems to be
represented by this journal, they can open up new spaces, an engagement
of a plurality of voices, and a new global dialogue, which is a public sphere
of sorts.
The expatriate community offers – or should offer – critical perspectives
that challenge those of us at ‘home’, in terms of the constantly shifting
dynamics of international theories and research (Masilela 1997; Thomas
2004). Those at ‘home’ need to similarly engage this ever-evolving inter-
national literature and come to terms with knowledge dynamics, under-
standing that Africa has been connected to the rest of the world for
thousands of years, that it cannot exist in isolation, secure in its miscon-
ceptions about itself, reliant forever on development aid and failing to

compete with the rest of the world. African media studies needs to present
a picture of itself as always in the making, always engaging, always cast-
ing light on other kinds of media studies.
Notes
My thanks to Abraham Mulwo and Terje Skjerdal for their comments on a previ-
ous draft.
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Suggested citation
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Contributor details
Professor Keyan Tomaselli is Director of the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies
at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. He serves on the board
of the Francis Kasoma Media Foundation and is a member of the Addis Research
Group.
Contact: Culture, Communication and Media Studies (CCMS), University of

KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, KwaZulu Natal, South Africa 4041.
E-mail: tomasell@ukzn.ac.za

JAMS_1.1_02_Tomaselli 9/11/08 9:23 AM Page 22
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JAMS_1.1_03_Skjerdal.qxd 8/5/08 11:30 AM Page 23

Between journalism ‘universals’ and

cultural particulars: challenges facing
the development of a journalism
programme in an East African context
Terje S. Skjerdal Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia
Abstract Keywords
One of the main dilemmas facing journalism education across Africa is whether journalism education
one can argue for a ‘universal’ set of journalistic standards while at the same time development journalism
maintaining a culturally sensitive journalism practice. Underlying the dilemma is African journalism
the question of whether there is a need to identify an ‘African journalism’ philoso- Ethiopia
phy that is normatively different from its Western counterpart. In light of a newly
started MA programme in journalism at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, this
article argues that rather than seeing journalistic practices as a negotiation
between journalism ‘universals’ and cultural particulars they ought to be seen as
the interplay between the two. Following this argument, the article calls for a
rethinking and distinction of the roles of conventional news media and alternative
media.
Introduction
The MA Programme in Journalism at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia 1. It is only appropriate
opened on 15 March 2004. The two-year programme accepted 27 students to inform the reader
about the subjectivity
in the first batch, and was the first full journalism programme in Ethiopia. of the author of this
A diploma in journalism was previously offered by the government-owned article. He took part
Ethiopia Mass Media Training Institute, and courses in journalism were in the initial project
preparations in 2002
offered by the private Unity College and the Institute for Language Studies and was a member
at Addis Ababa University, but this new programme was the first full jour- of the working group
nalism degree. In September 2006 the first 23 students graduated after that developed the
curriculum. Since
having successfully defended their MA theses before an international August 2004, he has
examination board. By August 2008, 90 candidates have completed their been the Academic
MA degree. Coordinator of the
programme.
The MA programme was specifically designed for Addis Ababa University
and was planned to meet the presumed needs for the emerging Ethiopian
media environment in particular, and the overall national development in
general. Needless to say, behind the programme was a lengthy planning
process with numerous considerations and discussions. In view of the cur-
riculum development of the Addis Ababa programme, this article aims to
discuss how ‘universal’ journalism standards are challenged in a local cul-
tural context, as well as to shed light on how journalistic practices are
related to participatory approaches in communication.1

2. I am indebted to Point of departure: a critical donor agenda

Solomon Hailemariam
for this translation. The philosophy of the Addis Ababa programme ought to be seen in light of
the media development agenda of the donor, which is the Norwegian govern-
ment through The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
(NORAD). NORAD had, for many years, a manifold approach in media devel-
opment support, an approach which was arguably suffering from a lack of
focus and direction. Much of the support allocated to media projects by the
Norwegian government (62 per cent in the five-year period from 1997) went
to a number of more or less fragmented information work initiatives rather
than to the promotion and support of free media (Geelmuyden Kiese 2002).
Following a scrutiny in 2002/03, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs decided to redirect its media-related assistance. A higher portion of the
contribution was to be devoted to initiatives that clearly promoted human
rights, open democracy and good governance (Johnson 2003; Skjerdal 2004:
5). The contribution to the erection of the Graduate School of Journalism and
Communication at Addis Ababa University epitomized this new policy.
The Addis Ababa project, which runs for five years with the intention
of continuing for five more years, is met by a solid local contribution from
the Addis Ababa University in terms of infrastructure, administration and
staff personnel. Most of the instructors in the programme, particularly in
the early years, are expatriate faculty members from various universities
in Africa, Europe and North America. They usually come in and teach
intensively for periods of two to four weeks. An important part of the pro-
ject consists of local staff development and external Ph.D. training in order
to make the programme and the school self-sustainable. This perspective –
the importance of sustainability and local decision making – and the
emphasis on democracy and human rights, have been the two foremost
ideological assumptions of the programme.
The backdrop: vulnerable but emerging local media

It may come as a surprise to some that the Norwegian government decided
to support a large media project in Ethiopia. Certainly, the country has a
vulnerable media industry, pressured from different sides, not least politi-
cally. The government-owned national broadcaster Ethiopian TV and Radio
controls the airwaves. It claims to present news fairly and representatively,
but its practice and editorial policy have been criticized by numerous media
organizations (Allen and Stremlau 2005: 223–25). As stated in the editor-
ial policy document of Ethiopian TV, ‘The government journalists must sup-
port the ruling party, which is elected by the interests of the public. The
ruling party’s policies must be reflected in each television programme’
(Ethiopian Television 2001: 5; translated from Amharic).2 On the radio
side, the only independent alternative to the state broadcaster since the
introduction of democracy in 1991 has been Radio Fana, which is still
operated by the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF). In February 2006, the first private licences
were granted to two local commercial FM stations. However, there are in
fact more radio broadcasts in Ethiopian languages being produced outside
of the country than inside, and these are mainly broadcasted on shortwave.
The print media in Ethiopia are partly government-run (six newspapers)
and partly private (58 newspapers; Ethiopian Ministry of Information
24 Terje S. Skjerdal
JAMS_1.1_03_Skjerdal.qxd 8/6/08 1:12 PM Page 25
2008). The government newspapers are the largest in terms of circulation,

but their distribution in the country as a whole is small. For example, only
1 per cent of the population of 77 million people read newspapers on a
regular basis. Studies have pointed to the great divide in opinion between
the private and the government press (Hailemarkos Ayalew 2006; Graduate
School of Journalism and Communication 2005). The private press is
opposition friendly, while the government press supports the ruling party
in its reporting and commentaries.
The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
explicitly supports the formation of a law that promotes media independence,
but concerns have been raised locally and internationally that the newly
passed Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation (July 2008) –
is designed to safeguard government information rather than facilitate
transparency and public debate (Ethiopian Ministry of Information 2003).
In recent years, a number of journalists and editors have been imprisoned
for various reasons. Demonstrations after the national elections in May
2005 resulted in at least fifteen editors and media owners being imprisoned
for alleged treason, though they were later acquitted (Reporters sans fron-
tières 2008). Students from the Graduate School of Journalism and
Communication have also felt the constraints. Four students have been
detained on three occasions while doing practical journalism assignments in
Addis Ababa.
The curriculum: emphasis on democracy and human rights

In line with the donor’s sharpened emphasis on free media, a curriculum
was designed with particular focus on democracy and human rights. The
curriculum was drafted from scratch and tailored to the emerging media
environment in Ethiopia. No similar curriculum was found in journalism
programmes elsewhere in Africa, although selected African and European
institutions were looked to in the process.
Table 1: Curriculum for MA Programme in Journalism, Addis Ababa University
Course title Credits

JOUR 601 Fundamentals of Journalism 3
JOUR 604 Investigative Journalism 3
JOUR 615 Communication Theory 3
JOUR 616 Media and Globalization 2
JOUR 617 Media Law and Media Ethics 2
JOUR 620 Media and Democracy 3
JOUR 625 Research Methodology 3
JOUR 605 News Writing for Print and Web; or
JOUR 610 Radio and TV Reporting 2
JOUR 607 Newspaper and Web Production; or
JOUR 611 Digital Editing 3
JOUR 606 Feature and Editorial Writing; or
JOUR 612 Radio Documentary; or
JOUR 613 TV Documentary 3
JOUR 602 Internship, four weeks 1
+ One semester master thesis
Between journalism ‘universals’ and cultural particulars 25

Students must choose between newspaper/web stream and radio/TV

stream. The programme runs over four semesters (two years), with the
last semester dedicated to thesis writing. Of the 28 credits in the first
three semesters, nine (about one third) are practical journalism subjects.
The significance of the programme structure lies first of all in its heavy
weight on critical issues in democracy and investigative journalism. More
than one third (ten credits) are devoted to such courses, and the topic is
naturally discussed in other courses as well. Topics to be covered are, for
instance, democratization theory, development paradigms, the Africanization
of journalism and scrutiny of the Ethiopian draft press law. Although little
material exists concerning the local media, constant attention is paid to
Ethiopianizing the teaching. In media law, for example, material has been
produced specifically for the programme.
A media and communication library is being established, with a special
emphasis on African media and international media issues. A considerable
part of the current 1,700 titles (in June 2008) is written from an African
media perspective, although the majority still come from Europe or the
United States of America. Lecturers are also encouraged to be conscious
about the nuances within the African media. The Ethiopian media scene is
largely different from neighbouring Kenya and Sudan, for instance. Local
examples are used in the instruction to the greatest possible extent. Most
important is that students investigate the local media in their thesis work.
Over time, the school intends to draw from the research production in its
own teaching. A separate research unit is also set up within the school,
and workshops and discussions are arranged in collaboration with various
Addis Ababa-based institutions.
Ideological preferences in the overall programme layout

From the description above it is apparent that there are some profound
academic, if not ideological, preferences in the layout of the Addis Ababa
programme. First and foremost, the programme is designed to educate
critical journalists. The emphasis in the practical skills courses is on news
and documentary genres, plus investigative journalism, which is taught as
a separate subject in the last teaching semester. Feature genres are visited,
but not in depth. So-called development journalism is not taught as a sep-
arate course, as it is at several other journalism programmes across the
continent. This will be discussed later.
Related to the solid journalism orientation in the programme is the
negligence of training concerning public relations and information work.
Although the theoretical and practical expertise in these areas may over-
lap with journalism studies, a principal decision was made by the curricu-
lum working group to maintain a clear demarcation between the two.
This was not done because of the limited credits in the programme, but
because of what was seen as a fundamental difference between two profes-
sional areas and schools of thought. It was argued that the role of the
media worker and the role of the information worker were essentially dis-
tinct both in terms of agency (independency vs. dependency), work method
(investigation vs. representation) and intention (friction vs. approbation).
This policy decision stemmed partly – but not solely – from the Norwe-
gian involvement in the planning process, as the media profession in the
Scandinavian countries has been through a demarcation process since the

mid-1990s, but it was also a result of considerations of a fruitful model for
an emerging democracy like Ethiopia.
This thinking stands in contrast to various other journalism education
models, for instance to that of many American colleges and universities,
where one can find journalism and public relations within the same
department. In the case of Ethiopia, where democracy is still in its early
years, it was deemed particularly important to be clear on the professional
role of the journalist. The working group nevertheless had to counter
arguments of the kind ‘since many more people in Ethiopia are employed
in the public relation sector than in the media industry, you should also
incorporate public relations’. As James Deane (2005: 84) rightly observes,
journalism schools in developing countries frequently experience the snap-
ping up of their graduates by PR agencies and advertising businesses. The
commercial pressure is remarkably global. The advertising industry in
Ethiopia is still rather small, but equally detrimental to losing journalism
graduates to the private advertising business would be to be swallowed by
the governmental PR/information offices.
Journalists as critical thinkers, not only skills workers

A principal decision was made to place the journalism programme on
graduate level (MA). This was done although there was no undergraduate
programme in journalism at the university. There were three main reasons
behind this decision.
Firstly, it was seen as a great benefit, if not a necessity, that the students
came into the programme with undergraduate degrees in various fields of
study, such as political science, history, language studies and so forth. The
variety of backgrounds would cater for a greater diversity among the grad-
uates, which was believed to serve the Ethiopian media situation better.
Most of the students would also have several years of work experience after
their undergraduate studies.
Secondly, it was seen as highly important to raise the status of journal-
ists in Ethiopia. The pre-existing undergraduate courses in journalism in
private and government institutions were not enough to give the profes-
sion the rank and significance it needed. An MA degree would mean a
greater confidence in the media profession from both the general public
and decision-making bodies.
Thirdly, a main objective of the programme was to educate critical
thinkers, not only skills workers. Journalism can be performed mechani-
cally or intellectually, and it was certainly the latter the programme was
aiming at. Knowledge and reflection about the socio-political environ-
ment, as well as a critical distance to the media’s own role in the social
development, were seen as important ingredients for the journalists-to-be.
That the programme was to be taught on graduate level brought some
challenges relating to the skills courses. A total of only one out of four
semesters would consist of practical training, which was hardly enough
for a reporter’s training. It was therefore decided to make the students
choose either print/web emphasis or radio/TV emphasis, and the focus in
the teaching would mainly be on news and documentary genres while
other areas in the reporting disciplines would be more modestly covered.

The decision to put the journalism programme – with its practical

components – on MA level, challenged perhaps also the preconceived per-
ception that the craft of journalism really belongs to undergraduate studies.
One could ask why. If reporting is mainly seen as routine work with focus
on news coverage and dissemination, then it is rightly a matter of knowing
the practical skills. If, however, reporting is seen not only as dissemination,
but also as involvement in the public discourse and active engagement in
the cultural and national formation, then it becomes clearer that the jour-
nalistic craft involves more than simply knowing the techniques to be used
in the editing room.
Potential conflict with participatory communication ideals

The understanding of media and democracy as a theoretical subject in the
programme was informed by participatory democracy models as outlined
by, for instance, Jan Servaes (2004: 62): ‘Democracy thrives on public par-
ticipation. Media pluralism, private ownership of radio and television, and
the expansion of educational opportunities are necessary for the suste-
nance of democracy in Africa’. However, participatory communication as
an approach to development involves not only the conventional media. A
wider ‘communication for development’ approach was considered for the
Addis Ababa programme. The attempt to apply participatory models of
communication triggered some reflections that will be entertained in the
remainder of this article.
Two dilemmas in particular have arisen. The first is the potential con-
flict that exists between local cultural values and ‘universal’ journalistic
values (if we can speak in such essential terms; because values are not
necessarily essentialist in the sense that they are non-debatable in all pos-
sible systems of thought). The second conflict stems from the obvious fact
that the focus in a journalism programme tends to be on conventional news
media (newspapers, Internet, radio, TV), while the preferred discourse in
participatory communication revolves around so-called alternative or decen-
tralized media, which, by definition, are something other than media which
aim to reach broad segments of the population.
Journalistic ‘universals’: what to adopt, what to rediscover,

what to make new
One of the first questions that pops up when searching for a journalism
model that is suitable in a developing context is whether classic Western
journalism is adaptable to Africa. The question is a revealing exercise in
itself, because the term ‘Western journalism’ is difficult to discern. To the
extent that the term is being used in academic discussion, it is most prob-
ably a reference to a general type of libertarian fourth estate journalism.
But we know that journalistic traditions in, for instance, the United States
of America, France and Scandinavia are rather different; consult, for instance,
the different views of the journalism profession vs. the public relations
profession that were mentioned earlier in this article. Adding to this, one
can find many examples of ‘fourth estate’ journalism in, for instance,
Kenya and Zambia that arise in cultural contexts that are not ‘Western’
in their outlook, neither in social nor political terms. I would therefore
suggest that the scholar looks deeper into the terminology, instead of
JAMS_1.1_03_Skjerdal.qxd 8/6/08 1:14 PM Page 29
drawing a simplified Western vs. non-Western distinction.3 The discipline 3. The recent book
Making Journalists
should rather be seen as operating in the interplay between particulars (De Burgh 2005)
and universals within each cultural and media context. I will propose the is an exemplary
following table to illustrate the interplay: elaboration of various
journalism traditions
across the globe.
Table 2: Interplay between particulars and ‘universals’ as seen in culture and
journalism
Particulars ‘Universals’
Cultural values Defined local cultural Indispensable social
traditions, social interac- standards, value of
tion, ways of communi- human beings, collective
cation, etc. aspirations, etc.
Journalistic values Defined local media Fostering of truth, trust,
situation, including openness, critique, public
media law, socio- participation, etc.
economic constraints
and traditions of public
expression, etc.
The table suggests that it does make sense to speak about shared journalism
values across cultures and eras, just as one can speak about shared cultural
values in terms of human commonness across boundaries. However, the
same ‘universal’ values may also have a culture-specific face that ought to
be considered. The opening dilemma I proposed, suggesting a contestation
between journalistic generals and cultural specifics, is therefore deficient
since it ignores the fact that journalistic practices are also part of a local
framework, and that cultural values necessarily have a ‘universal’ side.
The table therefore suggests that journalistic values (in this case the
specific values) can change over time and with variations in society and
culture. It may therefore prove a fallacy to export one set of journalistic
practices from one culture to another without modifications. One such
example is public or civic journalism, which arose in the United States of
America in the mid-1990s. The practice was a culturally specific response to
the discomforting situation with an arguably insensitive fourth estate
media industry that left citizens increasingly unengaged (see for instance
Glasser 1999). Public journalism, with a participatory agenda, sought to
repair the mistrust in the media. The experiment proved successful in local
communities across the United States of America, at least in the view of
some analysts, and attempts have been made to export the idea to other
countries, some of them in Africa. But public journalism grew out of a cul-
turally specific context where the critical media had operated for decades,
and where there were immense expectations as to the media’s role as agents
in the public sphere.
If adopted in a developing democracy context like Ethiopia, the primary
incentive of public journalism – that of the decreasing public engagement
in political issues – is absent; even more importantly, the public sphere as
the West knows it is largely non-existent. Nevertheless, one can argue that
the underlying values of this new journalism trend, as encapsulated by

4. Actually, following the communitarian philosophy, could be adopted in an African context. In

rationale underlying
this article, one would
fact, Mark Fackler (2003) argues that it is not a question of adopting the
refute discourse about communitarian philosophy, but of recovering it in a culture where it is
a homogeneous already deeply rooted in history and communities. It is beyond the scope of
African culture, but
that is kept aside for
this article to discuss if communitarian philosophy, as it has been recently
the moment for the defined by Western scholars, is indeed naturally integrated in African
sake of argument. thought, but it suffices as an example of a potential ‘universal’ set of values
that is not necessarily tied in with particular cultural practices. To sum up,
a specific cultural practice like public journalism may fail if exported
uncritically into a context that does not share the historic and cultural
preconditions, but the same journalism practice may still have a shared
set of values that can be identified and successfully adopted across
cultures.
Is there such a thing as African journalism? If one agrees with the
table above and the argument behind it, the answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’.
Yes, because there are socio-political conditions that define journalistic
practices within the particular cultural sphere. No, because there are values
that transcend journalistic practices across cultures.4 There are different
views on this issue among journalism commentators. Joe Kadhi (1999)
for one, himself a veteran in the Kenyan media and now a journalism
teacher, acutely denies that there is a unique African journalism. Ngaire
Blankenberg (1999), writing from a South African/Canadian perspective,
takes the other position, and not only claims to identify an African ubuntu
journalism, but also argues for its aptness and necessity in bringing
about true African liberation. The Graduate School of Journalism and
Communication at Addis Ababa University does not have a creed on this
issue, but to the extent that a position can be identified, it is to both main-
tain the journalistic ‘universals’ while at the same time fostering and
esteeming the cultural and social particulars. Needless to say, the school
encourages open debate on this and other issues related to journalism
philosophy.
Rediscovering the conventional media

The second dilemma when attempting to apply a participatory model in a
journalism programme is that the participatory model typically favours
the use of alternative media, while mainstream journalism education tends
to be preoccupied with newspapers, Internet, radio and TV for larger
audiences. Can these two approaches be reconciled?
The strength of the conventional media lies inter alia in their broad
audience reach. As a source of news and information, they are fast and
wide reaching. They are sometimes seen as nation builders because of
their conceptualization and promotion of cultural identity, an example of
this being the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), which has
promoted a post-apartheid national identity (Orgeret 2006). The conven-
tional media can be well equipped to scrutinize, for instance, the public
administration. Not least, they reach the decision-making community and
are usually an arena for public debate. However, all these qualities are barely
transferable from a Western European country to a country in the Horn of
Africa. The mass media may be chief agents in the public sphere in
Western Europe, but hardly in Ethiopia, where even the concept of the
(Habermasian) public sphere is debatable. Advocates of the alternative 5. The attentive reader
will have noticed that
media point to their community orientation. They are the media not only the Graduate School
for the people, but by the people. They seek two-way communication and of Journalism and
participation. Behind this lies a deeper ideological agenda to rectify the Communication also
has ‘communication’
improper distribution of communication resources (Servaes 2004: 62). in its name. A more
The means of the alternative media may be posters and theatre, in addi- general communica-
tion to conventional media used in a localized manner, like community tion degree will be
created later, perhaps
radio. It is the media from below. with emphasis on
But the alternative media also require resources. The audience must development commu-
have access and the methodological know-how. This seems sometimes to be nication, but the
immediate need in the
forgotten. Community radios in South Africa may prove successful. They local context has been
have been proliferating in Uganda: there are now more than 100 of them. the strengthening of
But there are no independent community radio stations in Ethiopia. In journalism theory
and practice, thus the
addition to the licensing difficulties, the resources are not there to establish current focus.
and run them.
Alternative media tend to serve a different purpose than conventional
media. The aim is typically to educate and create action, for example in
health campaigns. Conventional media, on the other hand, seek to bring
news and investigate private and public organizations. Conventional media
tend to be more preoccupied with journalistic independence than do alter-
native media. An alternative media organization may operate even without
reporters: it can be staffed with information workers. In short, the roles of
the two types of media are different. Rather than trying to reconcile the
two, as if they have been combating, one could view them as having
distinct roles to play in the emerging democracy context.
In light of the re-focused media support strategy of the donor NORAD,
it hardly comes as a surprise that the journalism programme at Addis
Ababa University is oriented towards conventional media. This also has to
do with the limited number of students. With a realistic number of 20–25
graduates per year, some of whom will not end up in the media, it is vital
for the programme to retain its critical journalism focus.5
The absence of ‘development journalism’

Jeffrey Wimmer and Susanne Wolf (2005) report that there is a great
interest in ‘development journalism’ in various African journalism schools
(see also Nyamnjoh 2005: 98). Some schools offer it as a separate course. It
is, however, not altogether clear what is meant by ‘development journalism’,
and whether the discipline shares the same traits across the board.
Wimmer and Wolf suggest the following definition: ‘the reporting of ideas,
programmes, activities and events, which are related to an improvement of
the living standard, mainly in the rural regions’ (Wimmer and Wolf 2005: 2).
But development journalism can also be seen in more general and ideolog-
ical terms, implying that the role of the media is to contribute to overall
socio-economic development by assuming an active participatory role. The
media thus collaborate with the larger development team as one of many
agents. It is no longer sufficient to report about development, it should also
be reported in a certain way.
Development journalism is not offered as a course in the Addis Ababa
programme. The limited number of courses does not allow that, but even
with a higher number of courses it is uncertain that it would be offered.

Rather than seeing development journalism as a practice on the side of

other journalistic practices, the school sees this type of journalism as car-
rying the same standards as other good journalism. It ought to be truth-
ful, critical, fair, sensitive and representative; it ought to bring forth the
voices not often heard and tell the stories not often told; it ought to be
open for criticism and correctives; it ought to be humble, respectful and
responsible, albeit not tactical and strategic. Even with all these honourable
standards upheld, there is no guarantee that stories of development – be it
sunshine or rainy variants – will get their appropriate space in the media,
and be accordingly received by the audience. Constant attention must
therefore be kept among reporters to be conscious about the individual
role of the journalist and the institutional role of the media in the emerging
democracy context.
Concluding lessons
I realize, as I wrap up this article, that it is more a listing of viewpoints
than an empirical verification of the successes of the chosen approach to
journalism education. There are also many socio-political factors that
complicate the Ethiopia case but which I have not mentioned. And rightly,
the programme has run for too short a time to display measurable effects
on the free media situation or the extent of increased public participation.
These factors notwithstanding, I shall try to summarize and suggest three
parallel routes for journalism theorizing within a development communi-
cation context.
1. A conscious fostering of journalistic ‘universals’

Values like public transparency, free speech, people’s involvement, journal-
istic independence and truthful and fair reporting are non-negotiable. A
pacification of these values can prove harmful. Like all values, however,
these can also be misused. And contrary to popular thought, these values
are not rights on behalf of the media profession, but rights and obligations
on behalf of all parties.
2. An acclaim of the ‘cultural sphere’

The ‘cultural sphere’ can be seen as the arena where expressions of all
types meet and create a commonness within a particular culture. These
forms of expressions are seen as preceding the conventional mass media,
but there need not be a contradiction between the two. The modern media
may also be shaped and will find formats and ways of expression that are
particular to the local context.
3. A role division between the conventional and the

alternative media
The suggestion that arises from the Addis Ababa experience is to clarify
the roles of the conventional mass media and alternative media. While
conventional media speak to large audiences, alternative media speak to
communities. While conventional media are preoccupied with journalistic
independence, alternative media bring all actors on to the same stage.
While conventional media have a special obligation in inspecting the public
administration, alternative media invite parties to dialogue. The suggestion is
that rather than meshing different media approaches into the same theory
of communication, one should see the value of different media approaches
by appreciating their differences.
References
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O. Hemer and T. Tufte (eds), Media & Glocal Change. Rethinking Communication
for Development, Buenos Aires: Clacso, pp. 215–32.
Blankenberg, N. (1999), ‘In search of a real freedom: ubuntu and the media’,
Critical Arts, 13:2, pp. 42–65.
De Burgh, H. (ed.) (2005), Making Journalists, London: Routledge.
Deane, J. (2005), ‘Media, democracy and the public sphere’, in O. Hemer and
T. Tufte (eds), Media & Glocal Change. Rethinking Communication for Development,
Buenos Aires: Clacso, pp. 177–92.
Ethiopian Ministry of Information (2003), Draft Proclamation on Freedom of Information
Law for Ethiopia. Technical Draft for Discussion, October 2003, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.
Ethiopian Ministry of Information (2008), Monthly Statistical Data About Press
Products, April 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Ethiopian Television (2001), Editorial Policy of Ethiopian Television, unpublished
document, translated from Amharic.
Fackler, M. (2003), ‘Communitarian media theory with an African flexion’, in
J. Mitchell and S. Marriage (eds), Mediating Religion. Conversations in Media,
Religion and Culture, London: T&T Clark, pp. 317–27.
Geelmuyden, K. and COWI Consulting (2002), Report on Media Assistance through
NORAD.
Glasser, T. L. (ed.) (1999), The Idea of Public Journalism, New York: Guilford.
Graduate School of Journalism and Communication (2005), Monitoring the Media
Coverage of the 2005 Parliamentary and Regional Council Elections in Ethiopia,
unpublished report, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, May 2005.
Hailemarkos, A. (2006), News Bias in the Ethiopian Press During the 2005 National
Election, unpublished MA thesis, defended January 2006, Addis Ababa University,
Ethiopia.
Johnson, H. F. (2003), Norwegian Support to the Media, Democracy and Poverty
Reduction, speech at PRIO’s International Conference on Media Support, Oslo,
3 November 2003.
Kadhi, J. S. M. (1999), ‘Anglophone Africa: journalists – puppets of the propri-
etors’, in M. Kunczik (ed.), Ethics in Journalism: a Reader on the Perception in the
Third World, Bonn: The Division for International Development Cooperation of
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, pp. 82–133.
Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2005), Africa’s Media. Democracy & the Politics of Belonging,
Pretoria: Unisa Press.
Orgeret, K. S. (2006), Moments of Nationhood. The SABC News in English – the First
Decade of Democracy, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oslo, Norway.
Reporters sans frontières (2008), ‘Ethiopia – Annual Report 2008’. http://www.
rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=25387&Valider=OK. Accessed 24 June 2008.
Servaes, J. (2004), ‘Multiple perspectives on development communication’, in C. C.
Okigbo and F. Eribo (eds), Development and Communication in Africa, Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 55–76.

Skjerdal, T. (2004), Research into Scandinavian Development Agencies on Media-related

Assistance (NORAD, DANIDA and SIDA), unpublished report, February 2004.
Wimmer, J. and Wolf, S. (2005), ‘Development journalism out of date? An analysis of
its significance in journalism education at African universities’, in Elektronische
Publikationen der Universität München, Kommunikations- und Medienforschung,
Münchener Beiträge zur Kommunikationswissenschaft, 3, May 2005 (12 pp.).
Suggested citation
Skjerdal, T. S. (2009), ‘Between journalism ‘universals’ and cultural particulars:
challenges facing the development of a journalism programme in an East African
context’, Journal of African Media Studies 1: 1, pp. 23–34, doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.23/1
Contributor details
Terje S. Skjerdal is Assistant Professor at the Gimlekollen School of Journalism
and Communication, Kristiansand, Norway. From 2004 to 2008 he served as
Academic Coordinator and Thesis Coordinator at the Graduate School of Journalism
and Communication, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia.
Contact: Gimlekollen School of Journalism and Communication, Service box 410,

4604 Kristiansand, Norway.
E-mail: terje.skjerdal@mediehogskolen.no
JAMS_1.1_04_Musa.qxd 8/5/08 11:47 AM Page 35

Looking backward, looking forward:

African media studies and the question
of power
Mohammed Musa University of Canterbury, New Zealand
Abstract Keywords
The emergence and development of communication and media studies in Africa is African media studies
related to the continent’s colonial experience. Concerns with domination and the communication
denial of their right to self-determination under European colonialism gingered media power
Africans into establishing media institutions and to acquiring training to equip media syllabi
themselves with the professional competence and theoretical and methodological postcolonial education
tools to enquire into the roles and relationship of modern media and society. To social change
that extent, in the early days, concern with power relations and the desire to
bring change played a role in the rise of communication and media studies.
The replications of curricula from Western universities, as well as the training
of many African scholars in the field, were major factors in the reproduction of
some conservative scholarship in communication and media studies. The importation
and imposition of social scientific models of development in the post-independence
era resulted in the negative appropriation of the earlier focus of communication
and media studies on power relations, but the field has also suffered under-funding
and the intimidation and harassment of radical scholarship by some African rul-
ing elites. The ascendancy of a neo-liberal market system has only exacerbated
and consolidated domination suffered by Africa in most facets of social life. This
paper examines the extent to which the present era has provided communication
and media studies in Africa with an opportunity to return to its earlier focus on
unequal power relations and how these could be changed.
Introduction
The cross-disciplinary field of media studies has recorded peculiar and
curious developments in its growth in the African continent. From its
early days, it was concerned with the nature and effects of mass media on
African societies in their explosive transitory stages. Dating back to eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth-century colonial days, what were visible in
terms of media activities on the African continent were largely non-
African colonial media that were either ‘evangelical’ or served as the infor-
mational arm of expanding empires. The development of the media in this
way impacted significantly on early concerns and catalysed enquiry into a
relationship between media and society that soon gave birth to media
studies in Africa. As a response, a few Africans went into journalism and
others established what would be the first indigenous media to serve as the
informational arm of the emerging contemporary anti-colonial struggles.

Early independence was characterized by party politics, the construc-

tion of infrastructure, a growing economy and, therefore, media prolifera-
tion. This period of huge expectations amongst African populations was
also characterized by enormous cultural nationalism. The advance of con-
temporary African societies was juxtaposed with a development in social
scientific theories that aimed to provide understanding of such growth and
especially the contradictions of unequal capitalist expansion that were soon
manifested. Decolonization, for instance, imported and imposed moderniza-
tion theory that consolidated neo-colonialism in Africa. The New
International Information Order (NIIO), as well as its corollary the New
International Economic Order, agitations, with their roots in postcolonial
and dependency theories, became the major focus of attention in African
media studies that carried further the posture of resistance to domination
and asymmetrical power relations that had been embarked upon by the
anti-colonial independence fighters.
Anti-apartheid struggles in Southern Africa and their aftermath have
also continued to impact on African media studies and the critical theo-
retical tools applied by practitioners. But the newly emergent African rul-
ing classes have also impacted on the development of media studies in the
continent, as governmental policies neglected higher education and were
especially allergic to radical scholarship. The ideological struggles of the
Cold War era were not insignificant in shaping the directions of African
media studies. Indeed, the aftermath of that era, accompanied by two
major developments, i.e., the emergence of neo-liberalism as a dominant
global system together with an unprecedented development in communi-
cation technology provided a huge experience but also added curiosity
into the analysis of the relationships between media and society in Africa.
This paper therefore attempts to trace the emergence and focus of
media studies in Africa. In doing this, the paper will historically contextu-
alize the factors that shaped the early anti-hegemonic focus of African
media studies. The appropriation of that early radical focus through poli-
cies, as well as the importation of modernization models and how these
were challenged will also be highlighted.
Media in the colonial period

The rise of media studies as an academic discipline in Africa cannot be sepa-
rated from developments within the media institution. The beginning of
media activity in the continent came in the form of colonial media. At the
time there were the evangelical media, owned by the missionaries, as well as
media owned by the European explorers. Pockets of resistant press owned by
Africans also existed at the time, but what the first two have in common is
that both came to Africa from places where, and on terms in which, Africans
had no input. Both also came through a language that was European rather
than African. In the end, both tried to propagate European capitalist values.
A most remarkable outcome of the arrival of Europeans on African soil
is what would come to be known as colonialism and the loss of the right to
self-determination by Africans who experienced the massive pillage and
plunder of their resources. Some resources, in the form of raw materials,
were exported to the service of the European industrial revolution
(Williams 1980; Onimode 1985).
36 Mohammed Musa
Colonial media in those days were therefore telling stories of the expan-
sionist drive of the European colonizers from the latter’s point of view.
Such stories included, but were not limited to, sources and availability of
raw materials on the African continent, so that in the final count what
was European gain was Africa’s huge loss, with repercussions that would
permanently affect the development of the continent in a negative way. As
a result, Africans were largely being informed about themselves, their con-
tinent and its destiny by the colonial media that were not disinterested
parties in the unfolding experience of colonialism.
Clearly, therefore, the colonial social order was abhorrent to the major-
ity of Africans, because of the imposition of a hegemonic social relation
and the denial of the right to self-determination for Africans. The social
relations imposed by colonialism precipitated the emergence of antagonis-
tic groups and alliances in Africa. On the one hand there was a colonial
bourgeoisie determined to establish an imperial hegemony and, on the
other, an alliance of exploited Africans. The latter group comprised a few
educated elites who, in spite of their education, were poorly paid by the
colonial establishment in comparison to their European counterparts with
similar, or even less, educational qualification. It also consisted of harshly
taxed peasants and farmers whose farm produce was poorly priced and
taken to Europe to be processed as finished goods (Williams 1980).
The changing character of the struggle beyond class lines is also revealed
by the involvement of the privileged indigenous class of bureaucrats, mer-
chants, industrialists and bankers etc., who were opposed to colonial rule
because of the domination of the economic structure by the British-imported
bourgeoisie and the subsequent disadvantage this had placed them in. This
scenario therefore set the ground for anti-colonial struggle and indepen-
dence movements to resist European domination and colonialism where the
colonial media were seen as direct accomplices – as were other dominant
contemporary societal institutions, such as the colonial police, judiciary and
civil service. Previously I argued that it is the shared deprivation under colo-
nialism that mobilised forces across classes under the leadership of the edu-
cated elite to agitate for independence (Musa 1990). To the extent, therefore,
that Africans were poised to resist domination, it could be argued that the
emergence of indigenous media, and institutions of training and research,
were focused on challenging colonial hegemony and power relations.
Post-independence media and mass communication

Looking back at the emergence of modern media in West Africa it will
become clear that, as in other parts of the continent, the printed word pre-
dated broadcasting. Indeed, press culture dates back to the colonial days.
In those days the press either propagated the values of British capitalism or
challenged it. What needs to be stressed at this point, though, is that the
post-independence press was a response to two dialectically related devel-
opments. First, they epitomized the cultural nationalism sweeping across
Africa at the time, where the national flag was closely followed by such
other icons of nationalistic establishments as a national airline, national
currency, national police force, etc., established as new national symbols.
Second, the post-independence media, as one of these national symbols,
were also set up to consolidate the gain of national independence.
Looking backward, looking forward 37

In broadcasting, radio preceded television, as is the pattern in most

other countries of the world. In Nigeria, for instance, colonial broadcast-
ing was a re-run of BBC tapes. The first television broadcast was recorded
in 1959 when the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, one of the front-line
nationalists, established Western Nigeria Television (WNTV), two years
after the National Broadcasting Service (NBS) radio was set up. The trigger
to the establishment of WNTV was said to be the public slander of Chief
Awolowo and his nationalist activities by the colonial administration
through their radio. Awolowo, however, was denied a response on the
same channel: hence he set up the WNTV, with its slogan ‘First in Africa’.
It is important to appreciate that two different kinds of indigenous
press existed during the colonial days. On the one hand, there was the
missionary press and, on the other, the press owned by the nationalists
and independence fighters. While some thinking puts the motives of the
missionary press (in pre-independence Nigeria) as being the provision of
spiritual knowledge and the development of a reading culture among
Africans (Duyile 1987; Omu 1978), we have rejected this ecumenical the-
ory of the origin of the African press by insisting that the missionary press,
too, had a political role. There is ample evidence to establish a connection
between the activities of the Christian missions and the goals of colonialism
and a failure to appreciate this is to de-historicize the role of the mission-
ary press in the propagation of capitalist values and social relations (Musa
and Mohammed 2004; Murphy and Scotton 1987).
The post-independence era and its media in Africa marked the culmina-
tion of a struggle against domination and the denial of Africans their rights
to self-determination. That struggle was wedged by an alliance that cut
across class lines (under the leadership of the educated elite) but with a
shared sense of alienation and subjugation having been unleashed upon
them by colonialism. Even this alliance, though, was not without its contra-
dictions. For instance, a section of it, such as the workers and peasants, was
committed to the overthrow of the colonial system of domination and their
subordination to it. Some of the educated elite were merely committed to the
resistance to domination to the extent that its termination would mean
transfer of privileges to them. The importance of this point is that both
groups were opposed to domination and the accompanying power relations
it imposed. The emergence of post-independence institutions, including the
media and universities, needs to be understood from this perspective.
In the analysis of the emergence of a post-independence African media,
which was central in the rise of mass communication and media studies,
we shall concentrate on West Africa, a bias Ugboajah believes:
… is quite understandable because of the comparatively early origin of sus-

tained development and widespread proliferation of the press and other
forms of mass media in this part of Africa. West Africa also has a long his-
tory of experience in professional journalism. For example, many of its
national leaders began their careers as journalists.
(Ugboajah 1985: 15)
Political groups that arose during colonial rule in Nigeria and elsewhere
and metamorphosed into political parties also played a major role in the
38 Mohammed Musa
emergence of indigenous media. Names such as Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria

and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana were associated with newspaper owner-
ship but were later to become leaders of their countries. An improved busi-
ness climate as well as post-independence reconstruction saw a growing
need for information and advertising, and this also contributed to an early
entry into journalism by many contemporary educated Africans.
Mass communication and media studies

After political independence, former British colonies in Africa had either
inherited social institutions from the departing colonial masters or
transplanted them from European centres. In the civil service, judiciary,
police and other professions, the British system was replicated. The field of
journalism, however, saw the fusion of British media structure and practice
with some form of American orientation, courtesy of trained journal-
ists who had obtained formal qualifications and training in the United
States.
Whereas media studies in Britain emerged largely from the academic
study of English in the 1960s, in West Africa it was through the direct
study of mass communication, the curriculum of which combined theory
and research with professional skills. To this end, the term ‘mass commu-
nication’ is still used in many English universities in Africa, where media
studies are combined with vocational training. In most African countries,
therefore, the interdisciplinary element of communication and media stud-
ies had to do with the fact that the scholars in the field were also trained in
Western (mainly British and Western European) universities where media
studies was interdisciplinary. Others also trained in North America.
Pioneering journalists and front-line nationalists, such as Azikiwe, studied
journalism at Columbia University in the United States and returned to
practise the profession in both Ghana and Nigeria. His early link with the
US university might have influenced the establishment of the first Mass
Communication Department in Nigeria, at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka,
in 1961, which followed the US tradition.
Institutionally, journalism in West Africa bears a close affinity with
Britain in the sense that there was not much formal training, as the major-
ity of early practitioners learned ‘on the job’. This tradition continued up to
the early 1980s, after which formal training began to be a prerequisite for
entry into journalism. The requirement for formal training was informed
by the increasing number of Africans returning with formal training in
journalism from overseas, especially the United States, as well as the prolif-
eration of mass communication training institutions and departments in
African universities.
The experience of colonialism and the desire to challenge European
hegemony more broadly had encouraged the entry into mass communi-
cation and journalism of an early group of Africans. This was, of course,
to change as a central factor given that, today, media studies, journalism
and related disciplines have acquired and established their own attraction
and glamour as middle-class and job-gaining qualifications. The early
entry into media studies via mass communication and journalism by
Africans was, therefore, for two reasons. First, frustrated by their experi-
ence under colonial media, those Africans wanted to equip themselves

JAMS_1.1_04_Musa.qxd 8/6/08 1:16 PM Page 40
with the skills and competence to practise alternative journalism that

would challenge or respond to colonial media, or advance nationalists’
aspirations of consolidating independence. Not much thought, then, was
given to the capacity or otherwise of that kind of training to provide the
required ‘alternative’ tools of journalism practice. Secondly, their experi-
ence under colonial media raised the curiosity of those Africans about the
role of the media in the colonial project in particular, and the relationship
between media and society generally. Therefore, many Africans went into
media studies to acquire theoretical and methodological tools of enquiry
into the role of the media in society. To the extent that those pioneering
Africans who went into mass communication or media studies were
largely doing so as a result of their disappointment with colonial media
that were seen as the informational arm of an expanding European hege-
mony, one could argue that challenging domination and guaranteeing
citizens the right to self determination was at the heart of the emergence
of mass communication and journalism in Africa, as well as at the heart
of its early concerns.
Unlike psychoanalytical, anthropological, linguistic and ethnographic
studies, which have long been undertaken by foreigners, mass communi-
cation research is relatively new in Africa. For instance, United Nations
Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s (UNESCO) Report No. 21 which
reviewed mass communication research in the world sphere in 1956 was
unable to identify any single African country where a study in mass
communication had been undertaken. Of the developing world, the only
countries listed as having had mass communication research conducted in
them at that time were Brazil, Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Mexico and the Philippines (Ugboajah 1985: 281).
Table 1: Mass communication research pertaining to West Africa to 1979.
Area of research Up to 1944 1945–59 1960–69 1970–79
WEST AFRICA-GENERAL 2 3 10 18
Benin – 2 2 –
Cameroon 1 – 4 6
The Gambia – – 3 –
Ghana 2 5 33 29
Guinea – 4 5 22
Guinea-Bissau – – – –
Ivory Coast 2 3 10 11
Liberia 1 2 11 8
Mali – 2 5 4
Mauritania – 1 – 2
Niger – 1 4 3
Nigeria 5 12 71 63
Senegal 2 4 13 9
Sierra Leone 2 4 10 12
Togo 1 2 2 –
Total 18 45 183 167
Source: Ugboajah, F. W. (ed.) (1985), Mass Communication, Culture and Society in
West Africa, Hans Zell, Munchen.
40 Mohammed Musa
Table 2: Masters theses and doctoral dissertations in mass communication

pertaining to West Africa to 1978.
Area of research Up to 1944 1945–59 1960–69 1970–76 Total

Masters theses
Africa – – 4 14 18
Non-African – 1 5 9 15
Ph.D. dissertations
African – – 6 7 13
Non-African – – 7 13 20
Total – 1 22 43 66
Source: Ugboajah, F. W. (ed) (1985), Mass Communication, Culture and Society in
West Africa, Hans Zell, Munchen.
Except for South Africa (then under the apartheid regime) most countries
of sub-Saharan Africa had mass communication or journalism training
institutions or departments in the 1970s. These, as can be seen in Table 3
below, include countries such as Zambia, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya,
Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda and Congo (now DRC).
Table 3: Media training institutions as of 1978.
1. African Literature Centre, Kitwe, Zambia

2. Centre de Formation aux Techniques de l’Information, Niamey, Niger
3. Communication Training Centre, All African Conference of Churches,
Nairobi, Kenya
4. Department of Mass Communication, University of Nigeria, Nsukka,
Nigeria
5. École Superieure Internationale De Journalisme de Yaounde (E.S.I.J.Y)
Yaounde, Cameroon
6. Evelyn Home College, Lusaka, Zambia
7. Ghana Institute of Journalism, Accra, Ghana
8. Institut des Sciences et Techniques de l’Information, Université Nationale du
Zaire Kinshasa, Zaire [Democratic Republic of Congo]
9. School of Journalism and Communication Studies, Legon, Ghana
10. Institute of Mass Communication, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria
11. International Institute of Christian Communication, Nairobi, Kenya
12. Kenya Institute of Mass Communication, Nairobi, Kenya
13. Nigerian Institute of Journalism, Lagos, Nigeria
14. Nigerian Broadcasting Staff Training School, Lagos, Nigeria
15. Nyegesi Institute of Journalism, Nyegesi, Tanzania
16. School of Journalism, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya
17. School of Journalism, Institute of Public Administration, Kampala,
Uganda
18. School of Journalism, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Dar es Salam,
Tanzania
Source: UNESCO 1978.

While clearly this table is outdated, there is difficulty in getting the

most current data on training institutions in Africa. Peter Nwosu et al.
(2005) disclose that there are approximately 100 of such institutions in
the continent offering programmes in communication education. While
60 per cent of these are universities, the remaining 40 per cent are private
tertiary and vocational institutions. Much of the statistics confirm the ear-
lier claim of West Africa being home to a fairly large number of African
media and training institutions, with about 58 such institutions or depart-
ments. Central and Southern Africa have 17, East and North Africa have
10 each. Interestingly, too, while most of the programmes provide journal-
ism training, many also have courses focusing on media and social change.
In addition to these, the African Council for Communication Education
(ACCE) was established in 1976 as an umbrella organization for educators
and scholars in communication, journalism and media studies. Working
closely with UNESCO, ACCE’s major objective is to help develop communi-
cation in Africa through quality education, research and training activi-
ties and models of professional practice. The organization also aims to
foster journalism and communication education in African countries; pro-
mote awareness among African governments, policy makers and planners
of the significant role of communication and the mass media in national
development (ACCE website 2008). These are achieved through work-
shops, conferences, research programmes and the publication of its jour-
nal, the African Media Review (AMR). ACCE is a registered non-profit
organization and still exists in the sense that some national chapters
remain active and hold activities, such as conferences and workshops,
under the name. Generally, though, ACCE is not as vibrant in the conti-
nent as it was in the 1970s–1990s. Its last biennial conference was held
in Abuja in 2003. Its headquarters in Nairobi could be dormant today due
to the lack of donor funds required to employ and pay staff.
The proliferation of media outlets in Africa, the increasing portrayal of
Africa in non-African media and the increasing centrality of the media as
social institutions, explains the huge rise in the number of institutions
with media studies, communication or journalism departments. There is,
in addition, an increase in media and communication research within and
outside Africa. For instance, in a search undertaken on 23 November
2006, on ProQuest, for dissertations and theses (completed in the United
States of America and Canada) with the central variables of ‘Africa’ and
‘media, journalism or communication’ ‘1980–2006’, it was found that
there were 178 doctoral dissertations and 45 Masters theses. In compara-
tive terms, while there was a total of 66 doctoral and Masters dissertations
about West Africa in the whole world in a period of 32 years (1944–78),
there was a total of 223 of such dissertations on Africa in the United
States of America and Canada alone within a period of 26 years
(1980–2006). This buttresses the earlier point that a combination of fac-
tors, including a rise in the number of training institutions in Africa and
abroad, the increasing coverage of Africa at home and abroad and the
growing centrality of the media in social existence has resulted in a huge
rise in intellectual curiosity and enquiry in the field.
An important development in the post-independence era is the appro-
priation of popular struggle and aspiration by many newly emergent African
42 Mohammed Musa
leaders. This has affected higher education in general and communication

and media studies in particular. Having replaced the colonial masters by
taking the mantle of leadership in their respective countries, including the
privileges and advantages that this brings, African leaders became very
wary of intellectuals and the media in particular, as they feared they
would continue the agenda of confronting domination in all its forms.
This situation placed higher education and the media at loggerheads
with the new African ruling classes from the early days of independence.
The outcomes of this development were threefold. First, higher education
remained under-funded in most African countries. Second, radical intel-
lectuals were harassed and intimidated as a way of de-popularizing radical
scholarship. In Nigeria, for instance, during the military dictatorship of
General Ibrahim Babangida (1985–93), there was an attempt to flush out
of university campuses those academics allegedly found teaching what
they were not paid to teach The interpretation of this was academics with
a radical stance who were committed to questioning existing power rela-
tions and committed to social change. Thirdly, conservative intellectuals
and scholars committed to the preservation of the prevailing status quo
were co-opted into government in many African countries to serve as
members of think-tanks. This created a vicious circle in the reproduction
and sustenance of consensus and conservative scholarship in many post-
independent African countries.
The implications of this scenario for media studies were twofold. First,
it suffered from the general deliberate policy of under-funding to which
higher education was subjected in Africa. Second, and very importantly, it
meant that the majority of new mass communication and media studies
programmes launched in African countries were predictably mainstream,
or at least expected to be mainstream. Moreover, that most of them com-
bined vocational and theoretical subjects in their curricula meant they
were also capital intensive by the nature of equipment needed, such as
radio and television studios, printing presses, etc. Their radical posture did
not help them in attracting government funding for such equipment.
Communication and media studies scholars, such as the late Paul Ansah
of Ghana, the late Francis Kasoma of Zambia, Kwame Karikari of Ghana
and the late Jubril Mohammed of Nigeria had, at one time or another,
either had skirmishes with state security agencies or were under the close
watch of such agencies because of their radical intellectual ideals. All of
this goes to show that governmental policies in the post-independence era
have impacted on the development of media studies in Africa.
While communication and media studies departments have prolifer-
ated in the last twenty years in Africa, it is safe to assume that the popu-
larity of the courses with students was not predicated on their radical
ethos, but on the glamour of co-option into the middle-class professions
around the media. Such public relations-minded graduates are not inter-
ested in investigating the intricacies of media history and existing research
work. More work needs to be done to understand the way the media
institutions engaged with issues of domination and imperialism. It is
important to go beyond counting the number of institutions gained from
quantitative data. There is the need to observe the qualitative dimension
of such information, in order to understand how the earlier focus and

concern of African media research with the question of power relations is

sustained or fractured over time.
Both Edeani (1995) and Nwosu et al. (2005) have captured the
dilemma facing communication and media studies in Africa. Their find-
ings and conclusions, however, reveal and confirm the very problems
facing the field in Africa, even if the writers do not see it that way. In
responding to the question ‘Are there any clearly identifiable features
which can be used to characterize African communication research?’,
Edeani undertook a content analysis of all the issues of what was then the
only journal specifically dedicated to communication and media studies in
Africa between 1986 and 1994. As he sought an answer to the question,
Edeani (1995: 36) also claimed that he wanted to know ‘how far, and in
what respects, we are working toward the development of African identity
in communication research – an identity which we could rightly call our
own legitimate contribution to scholarship in our field?’.
Despite drifting into a lamentation that most published work in com-
munication and media studies is not empirical enough to be called scien-
tific, Edeani still celebrates the fact that:
A hefty 91 per cent of all the articles published dealt with development in all
its facets, and 35 per cent of these pertained to development communication
proper. Thus, only about 8 per cent of all the articles published in the journal
for the period did not address any topic on development.
(Edeani 1995: 36)
The table itself adds an interesting revelation on the focus of development

and its Eurocentrism, as a larger percentage has to do with modernization.
The problem with imported social science in Africa has to do with a
narrow conception and definition of terms, as well as looking at Africa in
the context of Europe. In this very table, for instance, the Schramm/Lerner
association of underdevelopment with traditional lifestyle is apparent, and
the attempt at modernization is therefore heralded, notwithstanding the
ahistorical conception of development and underdevelopment. Moreover, a
further breakdown of the table shows that rural development accounted
for only 12 per cent of the articles. This reveals the urban-centredness or
concern of the articles in a continent where the majority of the population
resides in rural areas. Here, again, one can see the inclination towards
Lerner’s urbanization/modernization nexus. The author also laments that
empirical/administrative research only accounted for 27 per cent of the
total. Such lamentation, like that earlier on ‘scientific research’, shows the
Table 4: Extent of research focus on development communication.
Area of research focus N %

Development communication 54 35.29
Development/modernization 86 56.21
Non-development issue 13 8.50
153 100
Source: Edeani 1995: 36.
44 Mohammed Musa
concern with positivistic empiricism that characterizes the focus of admin-

istrative, non-critical research in African communication and media stud-
ies. Edeani himself has acknowledged that research focus is, among other
things, ‘a function of the kind of normative standards which one has inter-
nalized from one’s role-model professors during graduate education’
(Edeani 1995: 41).
While Edeani’s article celebrates such development focus in African com-
munication and media studies research, however, it also laments ‘the absence
of studies in the area of technological development communications’ that will
‘appreciate the great importance of the new communication technologies
that are fast modifying[…]communication equipment’ (Edeani 1995: 44).
Clearly, there is an obsession with technological determinism, as the author
looks at technology as a value-free tool that would be the panacea to the
problems of Africa’s underdevelopment, with its roots in the continent’s colo-
nial history and its accompanying asymmetrical power relations.
At the end, though, Edeani touches on the theme of domination, even
though his prescription for a way out of it falls short: ‘African communi-
cation researchers need to be sufficiently concerned about what Africa
can do to free itself from Western cultural domination through communi-
cation’ (Edeani 1995: 46). By now, the romance with the market system
in Africa is becoming clear, as Edeani asks: ‘What definite steps are
African governments taking to encourage African entrepreneurs to go
into the communication business in sufficiently big ways to be in a posi-
tion one day to compete effectively with the giant Western communica-
tion octopuses?’ (Edeani 1995: 46–47) For him, and others like him,
there is nothing wrong with business involvement in, or take-over of,
communication. Rather, Africa should also join the bandwagon and
encourage business take-overs of means of public communication. This
‘catching-up’ thesis is one that sees the market as the solution to domi-
nation and underdevelopment.
In making a case for strengthening communication curricula in
Africa, Nwosu et al. (2005) provide an overview of communication studies
curricula in eight selected universities in Anglophone Africa, mainly based
in Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya and Egypt. While their concern is with
what they perceive as a neglect of human communication in the curricu-
lum, they have also identified twelve key areas that form the core courses
in both degree and non-degree programmes. These are:
1. Print media (reporting and news production)

2. Electronic media (news reporting, news production and programming)
3. Advertising and public relations
4. Media management and economics
5. Media history
6. Communication policies
7. Media Law and Ethics
8. Communication theory and research
9. Communication for development
10. Communication and society
11. International communication
12. Social marketing

A closer look at the above list only confirms our earlier claim that people
were acquiring formal training to gain the skill and competence to practise
journalism, or to acquire theoretical and methodological tools to under-
stand the relationship between media and society. In fact, one could claim
that the list reflects a balance in terms of emphasis between those courses
poised to provide critical insight into the media/society nexus and those
that are vocationally oriented.
Since the 1980s, two attempts have been made by UNESCO to refocus
communication education and training in Africa. These are in the areas of
textbook development and curriculum improvement. The move could be a
spin-off from the MacBride Commission’s recommendations which, among
others, called for self-reliance provision and the improvement of communi-
cation infrastructure in Africa as a step towards addressing global commu-
nication imbalance. The textbook project called for development of textbooks
and study material in the field as a way of enhancing self-reliance. The out-
come of the initiative according to Nwosu et al. is:
General reader texts with a bias towards communication and development,

public relations and advertising, training manuals and guides, as well as
texts in media ethics have been published. The textbook project has not pro-
duced works in communication theory and intercultural communication,
nor in any of the core areas of human communication.
(Nwosu et al. 2005: 19)
Again, the emphasis on advertising and public relations texts, and the lack
of books on theory is an indication of a shift in which theoretical and his-
torical contexts of media and communication are giving way to a market
and industry-oriented focus. Even the second project on curricula review
(1996–2000) did little to address this shortcoming.
The major conclusion drawn from the project revealed the need to expand the
curriculum of existing institutions to cover the broad spectrum of communi-
cation studies, rather than the narrow focus on journalism and communica-
tion. Some of the new concentration areas proposed include: interpersonal,
intercultural, organizational, inter-ethnic communication and new commu-
nication and information technologies.
(Nwosu et al. 2005: 19)
Again, not only is the market focus evident here, but it is also evident that
courses that instil critical thinking on African media and communication
issues in relation to domestic and global dynamics are lacking. Generally
speaking, media and communication research on Africa falls within the two
broad categories of administrative and critical research. Even in this one
would expect more of the critical type of research carried out in the 1970s
and 1980s, and more of the administrative type of research in the period
after 1990 as a result of developments within social sciences generally.
Critical research means policy-oriented enquiry that questions dominant
assumptions and is committed to socio-cultural change in society. A few of
such studies that might fall within the ambit of critical scholarship, because
of their resistance to established assumptions or a commitment to social
46 Mohammed Musa
change, could include, but are certainly not limited to Frank Ugboajah
(1985); Kwame Boafo (1987); Michael Träber (1987); Ansah (1988);
Jeremy Domatob (1988); Abdullahi (1991); Ekwuazi (1991); Francis B.
Nyamjoh (1996); Agbaje (1992); Tawana Kupe (1997); Masmoudi (1979);
Muhammed Musa (1990); and Muhammed Musa and J. Mohammed
(2004). ‘The premise of critical research, by calling into question and focus-
ing research efforts on changes in asymmetrical political and economic rela-
tions, and concluding that they are preconditions of significant change,
contradict and fundamentally threaten the administrative tradition’ (Melody
and Mansell 1983: 104–5).
Administrative research, on the other hand, refers to research where the
media are studied in isolation from the wider society: a tradition that devel-
oped in response to industry needs for efficiency and improved competition.
In administrative research, Melody and Mansell argue: ‘the issue relating to
the structure of economic and political institutions (and sometimes social
and cultural institutions as well), the centralization of power, the character-
istics of dominant–dependent relations and the incentives of vested interests,
are excluded from analysis’ (Melody and Mansell 1983:104).
The administrative kinds of research in African communication and
media studies are those studies that do not question or challenge established
assumptions but instead focus on how existing institutions, new technologies
or techniques, can be more efficient or more competitive. Edeani (1995: 47)
has argued that in his content analysis of 153 articles published in the African
Media Review, ‘empirical/administrative research constituted only 27 per cent
of the total’ (though the author does not endorse his categorizations).
Since interest in media enquiry and media vocation in Africa was a
response to society’s concern with the role of colonial media in the spread
and imposition of European values and colonization, the recourse to crit-
ical enquiry in the period immediately after independence can be under-
stood. In the same light, the presence of media-centred, administrative
research in Africa can be understood as part of the neo-colonial agenda,
where departing colonial masters handed down to new African leaders a
development agenda that emphasized faith in modern tools including
media as multipliers of achievement and motivation (Schramm 1964).
Role of social science in the unfolding contradictions

This paper argues that the concern and focus of pioneering African
media studies has been social change through a challenge of hegemonic
power relations imposed by colonialism, where the colonial media were
seen as active accomplices. In reality, today, the focus of African media
studies seems to have deviated from that early radical focus so that, by
and large, the social order is taken as given and no longer as an area
requiring overhaul. Media as modernizing institutions or as essential cat-
alysts for development has become the focus of a large number of media
and communication studies institutions in Africa and abroad in places
where research about African media was conducted. For example, most
departments in Africa have courses on media and development that fail
to place development in historical, political and other relevant contexts.
Instead, the focus is on the media as multipliers of a taken-for-granted
development. A few factors can be advanced to explain this appropriation

of popular sentiment that preoccupied African media studies at a given

time. These are:
1. Transplanting media and communication studies syllabi and curricula

from mainstream Western colleges and universities
2. The involvement of missionaries in setting up some of the early train-
ing institutions
3. The training of African scholars at mainstream Western institutions
4. The imported development models
5. The general contribution of social science in charting the path of
development
Transplanting training syllabi and curricula from mainstream Western

colleges and universities, as well as training African media and communi-
cation scholars at such institutions, where research is mainly a market
response to an industry need for efficiency and competition and is there-
fore non-critical, has, by and large, contributed to the domestication of a
mainstream media and communication studies agenda in many African
countries. Onimode (1985) observes:
By designing peripheral educational institutions along metropolitan models,

both the colonial church and state introduced imperialist social sciences into
the Third World countries: the peripheral and metropolitan curricula, books
and even teachers were (and largely still are) the same or drawn from the
same imperialist sources; the values, institutions and development model
promoted in these imperialist schools in Africa were (and still are) basically
the same; the colonial schools also aimed to cultivate dominant classes to
provide local support for imperialism.
(Onimode 1985: 33)
The legacy of colonialism in many African countries is the situation where

the departing European powers handed over a blueprint for ‘development’
to the newly emergent African ruling class that was meant to enshrine
neo-colonialism as a social order. This was certainly not coterminous with
the radical approach of early media and communication studies that
focused on social change.
A very important contribution that affected the focus of African media
studies came from the social sciences. It served as the major intellectual
force imported under neo-colonialism to orchestrate a cultural offensive
against the continent of Africa and the rest of the Third World. The legacy
of this offensive can be seen in the general crisis of underdevelopment that
characterizes institutions and society in Africa. One of its earliest symp-
toms is that the nationalists, who were the vanguard of anti-colonial
struggles, gagged the media when they assumed the mantle of leadership,
embraced neo-colonial development models and harassed radical intellec-
tuals and academics in many African countries, among other measures.
Specifically, Onimode highlights five defects of imported social science:
1. Its conception of reality is faulty and at variance with what exists

2. It is ideological and in the service of imperialistic and capitalist values
48 Mohammed Musa
3. Pose the wrong questions and come up with wrong answers (see also
Halloran 1983)
4. It prescribes irrelevant development models that seek to reproduce a
Western social order and values in Africa through a uni-linear concep-
tion of history
5. All these lead to the final outcome, which Onimode summarizes as:
The persistence of colonial mentality in scientific endeavours, and foreign

intellectual domination in teaching and research with respect to curricula,
publication and academic funding, which underscores this external intellec-
tual dependence. It leads to teaching and researching according to the pref-
erences of imperialist mentors, rather than according to the social
requirements of African and other poor countries.
(Onimode 1985: 27)
The total effect, on Africa, of these defects has resulted in general crises of
underdevelopment that have exposed the shortcomings and failure of past
models and initiatives. Attempts to define development within moderniza-
tion theories that preached the need to develop through the abandonment
of traditional ways and their wholesale replacement with modern Western
values and attitudes proved incapable of improving Africa’s lot.
Such failures, and especially the fact that independence has not
brought an end to Africa’s underdevelopment, nor guaranteed Africans
and Third World citizens the right to self-determination, evoked a response
from developing world social scientists, who came up with the dependency
and structural imperialism models as ways of understanding the crises of
underdevelopment engulfing these countries (See Amin 1977; Ake 1982;
Frank 1981; Leys 1996). These models denounced earlier social scientific
models that focus on factors such as GDP and modernization. Instead,
they argue that those models only perpetuate the dependence of African
and other Third World countries on the West. Moreover, they also estab-
lished a structural link between development in advanced capitalist soci-
eties and underdevelopment in peripheral developing world societies.
The influence of these models in African media and communication
studies could be seen in the late 1970s to mid-1980s, the decade of the
NIIO agitation that galvanized Africa and the rest of the Third World to
decry the domination of their media and informational spheres by the
media of the advanced Western countries (see Masmoudi 1979; Pendakur
1983; Musa 1990; Abdullahi 1991; Hamelink 1983; Roach 1997).
Once again, that period brought the focus of African media studies back
to its initial central concern with asymmetrical power relations and the
need to bring change. It was also the period of the Cold War that saw the
world divided along a bi-polar axis where Africa, Latin America and most of
Asia, as well as Eastern Europe, formed a united force in international orga-
nizations to demand a balanced, non-exploitative order in information and
the economy. At that time, the issue of the domination and subordination of
the African information and communication sphere by the advanced capi-
talist countries was a subject of study and research in almost every African
institution with a communication, media or journalism department. With
all its theoretical shortcomings, the NIIO debate in African media studies,

deriving its theoretical sustenance from dependency and postcolonial theo-

ries, had conscientized and brought back the issue of power as a central
agenda in African media studies, albeit momentarily.
Neo-liberal globalization and the future agenda for African

media studies
1990 was a turning point in world history, but particularly so for African
media studies. It was a turning point in world history because the world
saw the end of the Cold War and the ascendancy of the market system as
the dominant social order. This was happening at a time when, in Africa,
both economy and society were in a shambles, as was evident through an
increase in neo-colonial dependence, the promotion of kleptocratic accu-
mulation by a few, the rise in mass poverty, hunger and famine, balance of
payment crises, massive unemployment and structural inequalities. This
period, generally described as globalization, came with a prescription that
would promise salvation to African countries only if they joined the glob-
alization bandwagon.
It is a period that coincided with a triumphant rise to power by the
Right, as was seen in Britain under Margaret Thatcher and in the United
States under Ronald Reagan. But strangely enough, according to Philo and
Miller (2000), this period, that saw the established dominance of the mar-
ket system, is also the period when ideology was not present in academic
work in media and cultural studies. To the lived experience of the generality
of citizens, this period did not bring anything positively different, as social
relations remained the same, i.e., the subordination of labour to capital and
the tendency for the latter to accumulate (see Philo and Miller 2000).
In Africa, the prescription for the continent by the International
Finance Institutions (IFI) (IMF and the World Bank) was for a structural
adjustment programme as a solution. In other words, they must reform
their societies by deregulating the economy, and the state must also with-
draw from any form of participation in public life. Thus, in the media sec-
tor, there was the privatization of media institutions that used to be
publicly owned, as well as the proliferation of many private channels and
newspapers, all competing for ratings. Information that used to be for
social good was now a commodity for purchase by the highest bidder. The
newly emerging media channels in the continent imported fictional and
ideologically loaded programmes as the staple.
The privatization craze swept every sector on the continent, including
education, electricity and energy, telecommunications and health, so that
what belonged to citizens collectively was taken away from them without
their consent or approval, and placed into the hands of a very few people at
a low price. Access to these services, for citizens, now came at a prohibitive
cost. Thus, on a continent where more than half the population lives on
about a dollar a day or less, the social stratification and asymmetrical power
relations are exacerbated through an increased centralization of political
and economic power. In the prevailing situation, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) itself acknowledged, in its 2005 report,
that the prescription for market-based reform did not make Africa better.
Today, a new divide has been opened, called the digital divide, where
Africa again lags behind all other regions of the world in terms of per
50 Mohammed Musa
capita distribution and access to telephones and computers. For African

media studies, this is crucial given the convergence of telecommunications
and computing that has seen the increasing importance of online media
and journalism.
Contemporary social developments are indicating the path for African
media studies for two reasons. First, more than ever before, the media have
now acquired an ever-increasing centrality in the unfolding social realities
locally and globally. They have been central in the emergence of the neo-
liberal market system, just as they are markets in themselves. Second,
African media studies was, from the beginning, shaped by the societal con-
cerns with social developments and existence during colonialism. The con-
temporary social landscape in Africa today is one where the early
concerns with unequal power relations have returned in a more pervasive
and most vicious form under the neo-liberal market system. There are
changes all over the continent with significant effects on social existence.
Crises of underdevelopment are most brutal in Africa. Even by IFI yard-
sticks, GDP per capita in African countries is among the lowest in the
world. AIDS has reached pandemic proportions, and the continent has the
highest AIDS infection rate per capita and records the most deaths from
the disease as drugs are beyond the reach of citizens. Life expectancy is the
lowest and infant mortality the highest in the world. Multinational corpo-
rations investing in Africa are returning huge profits, especially as states
have shifted attention and protection away from citizens and on to provid-
ing an enabling environment for businesses.
The initial concern of African media studies with power relations makes
the current climate germane for a return to basics by attempting to under-
stand and contextualize the hegemony of capital. The experience of media
consumers and the proliferation and transformation of the media in Africa
are providing enough raw materials and raising enough important issues for
African media studies to pursue the theme of understanding and con-
fronting power relations. There is no luxury of celebrating subversive con-
sumption in Africa because the consequences of the prevailing developments
have so far shown one overwhelming outcome, i.e., the hegemony of capital.
Conclusion
An attempt has been made to look at the development of media studies in
Africa by focusing on the factors that shaped its rise as well as its appro-
priation. It has been indicated that early curiosity and enquiry into media
in Africa by Africans was informed by the social climate and development
of the time. The experience of European colonialism imposed asymmetrical
power relations on the continent. Colonial media, as the earliest modern
media form at the time, were seen as the informational arm of the imposed
colonial social order.
Africans studied the media for two reasons. They wanted to acquire
vocational skills to practise alternative or liberative journalism that would
respond to the media of the colonizers and to the needs of society for an
end to domination. They also wanted to acquire theoretical and method-
ological competence to study and understand the roles and relationship of
media and society. To that extent it has been established that media stud-
ies in Africa started with a concern over power relations in society.

However, decolonization was also a period that saw two major develop-
ments that impacted on communication and media studies in Africa. The
governmental policies of deliberate under-funding of higher education, and
especially of the harassment and intimidation of radical intellectuals and
academics, affected the development of media studies and ensured the
growth and sustenance of one particular kind of media studies rather than
another. Decolonization was also a period that saw the importation of social
scientific development models that led to an appropriation and shift in the
focus of media studies in Africa. It has also been argued that the Cold War
period, as well as the failure of imported social scientific models, led to the
emergence of more critical postcolonial and dependency theories and thus,
in media studies, a return to the earlier focus on power relations.
The global triumph of right-wing regimes and the rise of the neo-liberal
market system are bringing more pervasive and vicious crises of underdevel-
opment on the continent of Africa as states now shift attention to protecting
businesses rather than citizens. To the extent that social concerns and the cli-
mate of the time shaped the focus of media studies in Africa, the case is being
made for African media studies to, once again, return to its focus on power
relations, so as to remain relevant to society. If concern with imperialist dom-
ination of Africa informed the interest, curiosity and enquiry into media as a
vocation and field of study, the current vicious domination suffered by Africa
in the era of the neo-liberal market system accords communication and
media studies the opportunity to return to its roots, i.e., concern with society
and its main issues – domination, and how it can be resisted and changed.
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and Society in West Africa, Munchen: Hans Zell Publishers.

UNESCO (1978), Rural Press in Africa: Dialogue Between Cities and Villages, Paris:
UNESCO.
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Suggested citation
Musa, M. (2009), ‘Looking backward, looking forward: African media studies
and the question of power’, Journal of African Media Studies 1: 1, pp. 35–54,
doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.35/1
Contributor details
Dr Mohammed Musa coordinates the mass communication programme at the
University of Canterbury, New Zealand. His other areas of research are: news flow;
media and globalization; media and health issues; political economy of the media;
media and development; new communication technologies and social change.
E-mail: muhammed.musa@canterbury.ac.nz
54 Mohammed Musa
JAMS_1.1_05_Ndlela.qxd 7/23/08 4:44 PM Page 55

African media research in the era

of globalization
Nkosi Ndlela Hedmark University College, Norway
Abstract Keywords
This article revisits the position of African media and communication research in African media studies
the era of globalization. It examines the settings and philosophy of African media globalization
research, and its development and enmeshment in the contemporary context of African media
globalization. It asks: what is the status of African media research and what are research
its recurrent themes? How can African media researchers influence the dominant
paradigms that have guided the field of media and communication research?
Through a review of literature and dominant themes of media and communication
research in Africa, the paper argues that the parameters for research in African
media research have closely followed the research paradigms set by external schol-
ars, especially Western scholars. Despite the increasing number of African media
researchers, they have yet to extricate themselves from the methodological and
theoretical entrapments that have hindered the growth of new models and theo-
ries that are inherently African in perspective.
Introduction
This article explores the state of media research in Africa and its position
in a globalizing world, examining the major issues and theories in this
emerging field. African media research is a relatively recent area of research,
which has yet to take a distinct shape amidst a nexus of national varia-
tions and global influences. Even though there have been a number of
publications on various aspects of media and communications in Africa,
when assessed by way of important yardsticks such as the volume and
scope of research and theory development, these do not yet constitute an
identifiable body. What then is the status of African media research in this
era of globalization?
In the light of increased global transformations in recent years, glob-
alization is a useful concept in the location of African media research.
As David Held and Anthony McGrew (2000: 1) note, the concept of
globalization has acquired the mantle of a new paradigm that seems to
offer a convincing analysis of contemporary times. The concept has
acquired intellectual supremacy in the social sciences. The rapid spread
of new information and communication technologies, especially the
Internet, means that the concept of globalization can also be useful in
analysing and understanding developments in media studies. Changes
in the media and the subsequent realignment of media studies curricula
across the world demonstrate the importance of linking these develop-
ments to the phenomenon of globalization.

Globalization of media is about the transformation of media institu-

tions and the promotion of local and transnational networks of interac-
tion. Technological changes are fundamentally changing the media
landscape and thereby creating new opportunities and challenges to
media studies across the globe. In order to assess the current implications
of globalization on African media studies, it is prudent to contextualize
them within their historical and philosophical context. For African media
institutions, globalization has increased the degree of dependence on the
West rather than making them more independent. Peter Golding has
argued that ‘any analysis of the media in any single country will be empir-
ically and theoretically barren unless it takes into account both the histor-
ical fact of colonialism and the international context of dependence’
(Golding 1977: 291). Any discussion of the media research tradition in
Africa should therefore take into consideration the fact that African media
are indeed entangled with colonial history and the current marginalized
position of Africa in the global context.
Defining African media studies

Simply defined, ‘African media studies’ is used in this article to refer to a
systematic, scientific study of African media institutions and organiza-
tions, their history, role and content and their position in relation to other
similar institutions in the world. The phrase covers academic research that
has African mass media as its object of study, as well as different media-
related training initiatives in Africa and their relationship to media output.
The main focus of this article is on the research aspects of African media
studies. Questions can, however, be asked on the existence of such a thing
as ‘African media studies’ and if it does exist, to what extent can its canon
be identified?
There is a problem of ambiguity associated with the use of the word
‘African’. The term can be used as a geographical reference, to define all
research falling within certain identified physical boundaries that define
the African continent. African countries differ greatly in their social, polit-
ical, historical and cultural context, and hence North Africa is often
excluded in discourses on Africa as it is remarkably different. In this arti-
cle, ‘African media studies’ refers exclusively to the study of media in sub-
Saharan Africa. Another ambiguity in the use of the phrase is the term
‘African studies’, which is not rooted in the African continent, but rather is
associated with the corridors of European and American universities offer-
ing their students and researchers opportunities to study African peoples,
their institutions, culture and history.
Furthermore, ‘African media studies’ is rooted in an interdisciplinary
field of media studies that draws on perspectives from diverse academic
backgrounds, mostly the humanities and social sciences. These two fields
have been the main source of theoretical concepts and methods used in
media studies. There is no consensus on whether media studies should be
regarded as a field or a discipline. It remains an open question whether the
contributions from the humanities and social sciences have merged suffi-
ciently to constitute a traditional ‘discipline’, as defined by its subject mat-
ter and consensual methods ( Jensen 2002: 13). Wilbur Schramm (1950)
has argued that communication research itself has not yet matured into a
56 Nkosi Ndlela
discipline and should instead be regarded as a field of studies (quoted in

Ugboajah 1987: 2). What is clear, though, is the influence of the Anglo-
American research tradition on media and communication research. This
influence is evident through the structure and design of curricula, as well
as academic output in terms of books and articles about African media.
Since its inception, African media research has been a study of African
media and communication by Western researchers using Western theoret-
ical and methodological frameworks. Thus the history of African media
studies, a peripheral field within African studies, is rooted in these Western
traditions.
Locating media research in history

Any discussion of media research in Africa today necessitates mention of
the humble beginnings of modern media institutions and training of
media practitioners and media scholars during the colonial period. Media
research in Africa can best be understood when one examines the history
of media institutions during the colonial and post-colonial era. As Tom
Dickson puts it, ‘journalism existed as a professional field before the begin-
ning of academic training for journalists’ (2000: vii). With the introduc-
tion of the term ‘mass communication’ in the 1940s to refer to the entire
field, as well as the professional training for media-related fields other than
journalism, a number of African countries began to adopt names such as
‘journalism’ and ‘mass communication’.
Cornelius Pratt (1996: 38) introduces two useful concepts to the
understanding of the history of media education in Africa: ‘education’ and
‘training’. These concepts are not interchangeable. Education refers to the
formal exposure journalists receive in higher educational institutions such
as universities to pursue their professional duties. Training, on the other
hand, refers to skills-oriented activities journalists engage in, either on the
job or in polytechnics or various training institutions. This distinction sug-
gests a two-sided approach to the education and training of journalists in
Africa – at university and non-university levels. The main preoccupation
at non-university level has been with practical skills required for carrying
out journalistic duties.
Prior to the 1960s, journalistic skills were mainly attained through on-
the-job training and training was limited to skills-oriented activities. The
colonial training model required, therefore, that African journalists were
exposed to a semblance of the type of training that was available to colo-
nialists in their home countries (Pratt 1996: 37). This required that
African journalists took apprenticeships in media institutions where they
learnt the basics of journalism. However, this kind of training did not differ
much from that of mother countries, where journalism was then regarded
as a craft rather than a profession, and hence not part of university cur-
ricula (Dennis and Merrill 1984). Pratt (1996: 38) also notes that ‘in
much of Europe, journalism education had traditionally been kept out of
the ivory towers of higher educational institutions. […] Journalists were
given rigorous hands-on training and encouraged to mature professionally
on the job.’ This legacy of the non-professionalism of journalism has to a
great extent shaped the training of journalists in post-independence
African states.
African media research in the era of globalization 57

From the 1960s onwards, journalistic training in Africa became more

diversified but still reflected colonial histories, be it French, Portuguese or
British. Most African countries adopted the orthodoxies of the educational
and training systems of their former colonial governments. Anglophone
Africa introduced local journalism training schools in the late 1950s,
whilst Francophone Africa introduced such schools in the late 1960s
(Nyamnjoh 2005: 89). As Francis Nyamnjoh (2005) argues, the existence
of local training schools does not seem to have brought about appropriate
indigenization of the imported universal canons of journalism. The experi-
ence in Africa has so far shown that media and journalism education has
been shaped, and continues to be shaped, by developments in trendsetting
countries, mainly North America and Western Europe.
African media institutions

Closely linked to media and journalism education is the institutionaliza-
tion of the mass media in Africa. Mass media institutions in Africa have
their roots in the colonial era, when original institutional structures and
intentions were to serve the interests of a few European settlers. The intro-
duction and development of the mass media, especially the broadcasting
institutions, were strongly influenced by European models, particularly
the public service model. The early institutional structures of the mass
media alienated a majority of native Africans who at the time were mainly
illiterate. The legacy of colonialism prevails even after independence due to
the gaps between rural and urban populations, as well as the high rate of
illiteracy. The educated elite were quite comfortable with the media insti-
tutions and therefore maintained the status quo by not indigenizing the
media in relation to African-language programming. Local indigenous
cultural productions, which were stamped out by the missionaries and the
modernization enthusiasts, were not resuscitated after independence,
thereby maintaining the grand pattern of colonial structures which were
not built and designed for native Africans.
The perpetuation of colonial patterns in some of the media raises
one fundamental question that is recurrent: how African are African
media institutions? Tawana Kupe (2005) asks whether it is not more
accurate to talk about ‘media in Africa’ instead of ‘African media’. The
basis of his argument is that modern media in Africa – that is newspa-
pers, magazines, radio, television, film and the new media – did not
originate in the African context. If one looks at the exclusionary nature
of the media in Africa this argument is valid to some extent. For exam-
ple, most media still use colonial languages, be it French, English or
Portuguese, instead of African languages that are used and understood
by the majority of African populations. Radio is perhaps the only excep-
tion. The content of the media, especially newspapers and television,
also reflects an inclination towards Western media productions and for-
mats rather than local productions. Hence mass media are reduced to
being purveyors of Western culture, their lifestyles and celebrities, and
carry very little content about developments taking place within Africa
itself. Western frames of reporting, training and professional models
continue to be the key determinant factors of the journalism profession
in Africa.
58 Nkosi Ndlela
Even though the mass media in Africa have diversified in recent years
with the introduction of satellite broadcasting, there has been little indige-
nization of content and formats. The ongoing technological, cultural and
economic globalization exerts tremendous pressure on the media in Africa,
reshaping them in a manner that marginalizes local initiatives and pro-
motes a new global cultural order. Globalization in the audiovisual media
further diminishes the growth of authentic African media. Due to global-
ization processes, transnational media flows and content have increased
tremendously in Africa.
Media and communication research about Africa

What is the nature of ongoing media and communication research in
Africa? What factors have been driving this research? Has this research
crystallized into African-oriented research traditions with clearly identified
strategies, or is it merely a replication of the research formats that obtain
in America, Europe or the East, as Isaac Obeng-Quaidoo (1987) has argued?
To answer these questions, it is prudent to look into the history of research
on media and communications in Africa and point to some of the major
trends.
Major research studies on the nature of mass communication have been
carried out in the West, mainly in the United States. These studies have
made significant contributions to the scientific study of mass communica-
tion by introducing methodological procedures, techniques, communication
models and general theoretical frameworks. For newcomers from Africa,
these methodological and theoretical assumptions cannot be avoided.
Early research within African media studies has been dominated by
Western researchers with very little input coming from Africa itself. Their
(Western researchers) theoretical and methodological inclinations were
strongly influenced by perceptions of Africa in their mother countries.
These scholars offered a theoretical framework for the study of African
media and also prioritized certain themes, most often in line with the pri-
orities of Western countries. Some of the notable works are: William
Hachten’s Muffled Drums: The News Media in Africa (1971), Dennis Wilcox’s
Mass Media in Black Africa: Philosophy and Control (1975) and Graham
Mytton’s Mass Communication in Africa (1983). Like most studies of Africa,
these books focused on selected countries as case studies, depending on
the researcher’s interests or language capabilities. In the English language
books, it is common, therefore, to see comparative case studies done in
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon. Sometimes these coun-
tries are compared to cases in Francophone Africa. Even though South
Africa is an English speaking country, it did not feature much in the early
literature on African media.
Contributions by local researchers are mainly in article form and have
been written mostly by East and West African communication researchers,
mainly from universities in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya. These include con-
tributions to the journal Africa Media Review by Nigerian and Ghanaian
mass communication researchers such as Bernard Emenyeonu (1987),
Charles Okigbo (1987a), Obeng-Quaidoo (1987), S.T. Kwame Boafo (1987)
and Paul Ansah (1988). The African Council for Communication
Education (ACCE) and the Council for Development of Social Science

Research in Africa (CODESRIA) have been instrumental in spearheading

and disseminating mass communication research in Africa. It is very likely
that most work by African scholars, especially work by French-speaking or
Portuguese-speaking African researchers, has not been disseminated ade-
quately in comparison to work by Western scholars. The same applies to
work published in poorly funded local journals based in African universities.
There have been a number of studies on various aspects of media and
communications in Africa. The following section reveals which issues and
theories have been dominant in African media research in specific periods.
(a) Development-communication research

In the 1960s through to the 1970s, the international community was
concerned with development issues in the ‘underdeveloped countries’
and the media were seen as agents of social change. Works by Daniel
Lerner (1958), Wilbur Schramm (1963) and Everett M. Rogers (1978)
motivated theoretical debates on the role of mass media and communi-
cation in national development. Research on African mass media was
strongly influenced by the dominant perspectives on development, par-
ticularly modernization theory and its emphasis on the role of the
media in development. Research in this period took a functional view of
the mass media as tools for facilitating development, diffusing new
innovations, facilitating education and utilizing traditional systems of
communication for development purposes. It placed great emphasis on
the role of the mass media in the modernization of traditional societies
through diffusion of Western lifestyles and modes of production. The
perception of modernization theory, regarding the powerful role of the
media, was motivated by media effect studies. It was assumed that the
media could play a crucial role in promoting economic development
through attitude change and the encouragement of innovative behaviour
(Reeves 1993: 23).
As more African countries attained their independence in the early
1960s and 1970s, a new model of development journalism and media
research was introduced to Africa. This focus coincided with development
goals set by many national governments in collaboration with donor
countries. Some researchers have argued that these development para-
digms emphasized the contribution of the mass media towards the adoption
of Western-style capitalist development. As Oliver Boyd-Barrett (1982:
175) aptly put it, the transplantation of Western media technologies and
models would be an important factor in ensuring that poorer economies
would ultimately become facsimiles of advanced capitalist ones. However,
by the mid-1970s, it became apparent that the emphasis on the potential of
mass media in Africa had little relevance given the numerous limitations
that impeded their growth.
Researchers such as Frank Barton (1979) have shown in their studies
how African leaders hijacked the arguments on the role of the media in
national development to suit their political goals. Governments’ interven-
tion in the media often had less to do with advancing development goals
and more with maintaining political security. Usually this interventionism
was couched in terms of national unity, anti-imperialism and development
strategies that required a reduction in social conflict (Reeves 1993: 28).
60 Nkosi Ndlela
Radical researchers critical of the modernization perspectives advanced

a cultural imperialism thesis that had its roots in cultural dependency the-
ories. This approach had a strong influence on media education and
research in the 1960s and 1970s. As Geoffrey Reeves (1993: 28) puts it,
their argument was that the mass media in ‘Third World’ regions were not
the result of indigenous evolution but rather developed almost invariably
as derivatives of those in the major capitalist societies, and were trans-
planted and imposed from their metropolitan centres of origin during the
extension of colonial and imperialist power. Media research that took place
within this paradigm regarded colonial history as central to the study of
the mass media in Africa.
These development paradigms have been very influential in providing
theoretical frameworks to African researchers. The interrogation of the
role of African media in national development has been sporadic, but ana-
lytical viewpoints are visible in the 1980s. Examples include Des Wilson’s
Traditional Systems of Communication in Modern African Development: An
Analytical Viewpoint (1987), Emenyeonu’s Communication and Adoption of
Agricultural Innovations: Quantifications and Notes Towards a Conceptual
Model (1987) and Hansel Eyoh’s Theatre and Community Education: the
African Experience (1987). All these works appeared in the African Council
on Communication Education’s journal, Africa Media Review. As one of the
premium publication channels for African media researchers, the Africa
Media Review devoted a number of its volumes to articles interrogating the
role of the media, traditional media systems and community media in
development. In publishing these scholarly works on development com-
munication, the journal conscientiously played its role in sustaining the
development of communication research in Africa (Edeani 1995).
However, as Richard M’Bayo and Robert Nwanko argue,
much of the literature on development communication by African scholars in

this period constitutes what may be called reactive scholarship, in which the
concerns expressed were mainly in reaction to what Schramm, Lerner, Rogers
and others had said about Third World development communication problems.
(M’Bayo and Nwanko 1989: 10)
African media researchers have not yet succeeded in coming out with
African-oriented models for development communication.
(b) NWICO debates

Another issue that has attracted the attention of African media researchers
is the debate over information flows and media representations of the devel-
oping world within United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation (UNESCO) during the 1970s and early 1980s. The polarized
debates were mainly concerned with the uneven flow of information in the
international media. The debates culminated in a call for a New World
Information and Communication Order (NWICO). John Walcott summa-
rized the debates as follows:
Delegates from the East accused the West of cultural imperialism, delegates
from the South accused the North of neo-colonialism, and delegates from the

West complained about the absence of press freedom in the East and the
South.
(Walcott 2000: 1)
The MacBride Commission, which was tasked to assess the state of affairs
regarding world communication, raised a number of issues, and these
served as a reference point for research critiquing the world’s information
and technological imbalances.
Theoretical approaches such as neo-colonialism, cultural imperialism
and other Marxist perspectives have been used to analyse the situation of
the mass media in Africa and to critique the international flow of informa-
tion and media products. In an article entitled ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’s media
and neo-colonialism’, Jerry Domatob provided a review of the opinions of
some of the leading African scholars and politicians, and he argues that
‘sub-Saharan Africa’s media training, policies, technology, news values,
language, and advertising heavily favour the neo-colonial status quo’
(Domatob 1988: 151).
Researchers in the periphery have tried to comprehend the uneven cul-
tural flows and the implications of the forecast, made by researchers in the
centre, that the centre–periphery flow of culture would lead to the disap-
pearance of cultural differences. For example, Cees Hamelink argued that
‘the impressive variety of the world’s cultural systems is waning due to a
process of “cultural synchronization”’ (Hamelink 1983: 3). This alarmist
view on culture has seen some national governments adopting policies that
seek to counter the centre–periphery cultural flows. Some of these policy
measures, taken on the pretext of countering the threat of global cultural
homogenization, have proven to be a stumbling block to the development of
media in Africa and their position in a global society. The questions of
state–media relationships and control are intricately linked to the fears
raised by the rapid expansion and power of global communications net-
works. Nyamnjoh has noted that ‘African scholars and media activists have
joined the bandwagon of debates on media ownership and control, increas-
ingly informed by and largely focused on the effects of globalization and neo-
liberalism on media scenarios around the world’ (Nyamnjoh 2005: 49).
Researchers agree that there is no such thing as ‘global culture’, but
prefer to refer to an increased globalization of culture or cultural homoge-
nization due to influences of global communications. At the same time,
processes of cultural integration and cultural disintegration are occurring.
For Arjun Appadurai (2001), cultural flows are anything but centred
or unified under globalization. Appadurai argues that arguments about
Americanization and commodification in terms of a singular and all-
encompassing cultural homogenization have failed to account for the
dynamics of local indigenization of metropolitan forces. This line of argu-
ment can be further explored if African media research is seen in terms of
centre–periphery relationships. How do these relationships affect the theo-
rization of Africa media studies? Are the centre–periphery models ade-
quate for analysis of African media studies? As Ulf Hannerz (1997) notes,
there is an asymmetry in the process of globalization. In cultural terms,
the asymmetries of production and diffusion present a challenge that
African media researchers will have to grapple with. In a globalized world
62 Nkosi Ndlela
characterized by uneven power relations, cultural centres, as places where

culture is produced and from where it is diffused, are located in the centre.
A cursory analysis of the global cultural flow shows asymmetrical cultural
flows between the centre and the periphery.
The questions raised by the globalization of the media are too numerous
for African scholars to tackle alone, as they lack the resources to do so.
Hannerz has noted that ‘much knowledge concerning the periphery is
more available in the centre than in the periphery itself, and especially to
the specialists on the periphery from the centre, because of the greater
capacity from the centre’ (Hannerz 1997: 14). It is evident that for African
media researchers to be able to tackle the issues raised by globalization
there should be an increased synergy between African scholars and other
media researchers across the world. There is need for comparative research
on the implications of globalization and acknowledgement of the limits of
conventional theories on media and globalization in understanding African
media. The new global cultural structures defy analysis by existing centre–
periphery models.
(c) Media and democratization research

The democratization wave that swept across the world in the late 1980s
and 1990s, including in Africa, set in place a new research agenda for
African media researchers. Theorization on state–press relations has been
a major focus for a number of media scholars since this wave of democra-
tization. In African media studies, media and democracy theorization has
become a dominant research area alongside the media and development
research strand. Media and democracy research has also been linked to the
Western initiatives to spread liberal democratic ideas to Africa since the end
of the Cold War.
The state–press relations theorized in Frederick S. Siebert’s Four Theories
of the Press and presented in 1956 have been widely accepted and utilized
by media scholars researching the links between mass media and politics in
Africa. These normative theories – authoritarian theory, free press theory,
social responsibility and Soviet media theory – have been a major point of
reference. The demise of the Soviet Union as a super power, and the crum-
bling of its political ideology, decreased the legitimacy of the authoritarian
and Soviet press theories, seen to be incongruent with democratization.
The absence of press freedom in African countries has also been a dom-
inant theoretical perspective and this saw a revisiting of some of the works
covering the post-independence state–media relations such as Hachtens’s
Muffled Drums (1971) and Wilcox’s Mass Media in Black Africa (1975). For
many researchers, decolonization of the mass media in Africa resulted in
the muzzling of freedom of expression through state ownership of the mass
media. State intervention in the mass media served to move African broad-
casting and print media systems away from the European media models
and libertarian values on freedom of expression. Democratization, there-
fore, brought new hopes for the revitalization of the mass media. Popular
support for democracy in Africa hinged on the promises it was expected to
fulfil, such as increased freedom and improved livelihoods. This instrumental
view of democracy also extended to the mass media and their expected
roles in the democratization processes across sub-Saharan Africa.

The late 1980s and 1990s saw an increase in the number of articles
and books on the theme of press freedom and democracy in Africa, both by
Western and African scholars. Examples include: Gunilla Faringer (1991),
Louse M. Bourgault (1995), Nyamnjoh (2005), James Zaffiro (1992,
2002), Ruth Teer-Tomaselli and Keyan Tomaselli (1996), Helge Rønning
(1994), Francis Kasoma (1997) and Kwame Karikari (1996). Ansah’s
article, ‘In search of a role for the African media in the democratic process’
(1988), a collection of articles in Media and Democracy in Africa edited by
Goran Hyden, Michael Leslie and Folu Ogundimu (2002) and Festus Eribo
and William Jong-Ebot’s Press Freedom and Communication in Africa (1997)
all capture concerns among African and Western media researchers about
the potential role of the media in processes of democratization in sub-
Saharan Africa. These essays analyse past and present developments in
press freedom in Africa, the quest for freedom of expression across sub-
Saharan Africa and attitudes of governments.
Non-governmental organizations have also been instrumental in setting
the media and democracy research agenda by commissioning research,
arranging seminars and establishing media and democracy courses in
African universities and colleges. Work has been done by researchers in col-
laboration with NGOs such as the Media Institute of Southern Africa
(MISA), Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI), Article 19 and the Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung. Universities and NGOs have convened seminars and confer-
ences that take up the discourses of media and democracy. Discussion of and
research into this area has to an extent been primarily driven by Western
interests keen to promote liberal values. The media and democracy research
strand takes an instrumental view that the mass media, if properly consti-
tuted, can promote both democracy and development. The theoretical view
advanced by these organizations regards democracy as a valuable tool in
enhancing development in Africa, broadly defined to include general well-
being, and civil and political freedoms. Media scholars in this strand have
been keen to theorize the linkages between the concepts of democracy and
development.
(d) HIV/AIDS media and communication research agenda

The staggering prevalence of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa has set the
agenda for media research drawing on theoretical perspectives from a
variety of disciplines. HIV/AIDS is a global phenomenon and initiatives
have thus been adopted under the auspices of global organizations such as
the World Health Organization (WHO), UNAIDS and UNESCO. Sub-
Saharan Africa has been one of the major recipients of international aid.
The mass media in Africa have been singled out as crucial in the spread
of information and education about HIV/AIDS. Millions of dollars have
been poured into information campaigns drawn alongside globally
accepted models such as the ABC model (Abstain, Be faithful, use a
Condom). Media research in this category has focused on the evaluation of
campaigns in individual or multiple case studies and analysis of the effec-
tiveness and shortcomings of the mass media in Africa. The questions on
the relative utility and limitations of the media echo the research within the
development paradigms. A recurrent question is how significant are the
media in health communication campaigns.
64 Nkosi Ndlela
(e) Implications of new communication technologies

Another theoretical perspective that has dominated the African media
research agenda in recent years has been work on information and com-
munication technologies (ICTs), their proliferation in Africa and their
functionality in diverse areas in health communication, development and
democracy. The past years have witnessed unprecedented growth in infor-
mation and communication technologies, leading optimists to predict that
these technologies – if correctly harnessed – can speed up Africa’s develop-
ment processes. The area of ‘ICT for development’ has envisaged that ICTs
can be utilized in a wide scope of issues such as poverty eradication; social
and political empowerment of disadvantaged groups such as women, chil-
dren and rural people; education; and preventive healthcare and manage-
ment of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. Research on
ICT perceives new technologies such as the Internet as media, like any
other mass media, in addition to being platforms of other media.
Theoretical perspectives on ICT research are numerous and in some way
reflect the plethora of initiatives associated with international develop-
ment projects in Africa. The developments in new ICTs herald a new era in
media and communication research in Africa. Technology is not merely
the object of research but also carries the potential to make the research
results known to other scholars working on similar research topics.
Technology, therefore, carries hopes for systematizing academic enquiry
into the mass media and communication in Africa.
Conclusion
African media research reflects the tension between global perspectives
originating in the West and local practices moulded by national contexts.
The examples of dominant research perspectives presented above show
that much of the media research in postcolonial Africa has closely fol-
lowed theoretical developments and priorities set by the West. However,
while globalization has sometimes been viewed as a process that uniformly
subverts the national, researchers in Africa have not been passive players.
African researchers have reacted differently to global pressures, hence
there is a greater diversity in research, with some African publishers push-
ing for African perspectives.
Another central idea in African media research has been around the
issue of ideology. At various times in its development, Africa has been
struggling to shake off ideological dominance from other powers. During
the colonial era, the central idea was the maintenance of European hege-
mony in Africa. The post-independence era was marked by decolonization
but Africa could still not extricate itself from the ideological underpinnings
defined mainly by the West. New forms of colonialism persist under differ-
ent names such as neo-colonialism and globalization. Africa, therefore,
stills remains under the unchangeable grasp of the tentacles of external
forces. The introduction and development of African media research has
been highly influenced by Western scholars and their theoretical and con-
ceptual models. The former colonial powers continue to set the agenda in
the development of media institutions as well as media research in Africa.
Despite the increasing number of notable African media researchers, their
influence on the media research agenda remains minimal. This observation

is supported by M’Bayo and Nwanko, who noted that ‘as appears to be the
case with world politics and the ideologies that drive it, Africans seem to have
fallen into and accepted the simple role of taking sides with one dominant
research view or the other’ (M’Bayo and Nwanko 1989: 3). Okigbo (1987b)
has also noted that efforts by African scholars are not informed by any iden-
tifiable philosophies, be they indigenous or foreign. Authentic African per-
spectives about mass media or communication problems in Africa are not
visible in literature and as a result African communication researchers are
influenced by dominant views or paradigms that have external origins, as is
the case in other fields such as economics, culture and politics.
An academic enquiry into African media studies in this age of global-
ization will have to go beyond the fixed boundaries and recognize that
Africa is enmeshed in a globalized world. The mass media today can be
based anywhere in the world, outside Africa, or merely exist in the virtual
sphere of the Internet, managed and driven by individuals from other loca-
tions. African media research therefore must deliberate on the aspect of
relationships between researchers and regions. The objects of research
should themselves be active participants in the research process and
should acquire international or global dimensions. Through the building
of inter- and intra-disciplinary bridges, both Western and African scholars
have much to gain from an internationalization of African media research.
Initiatives such as the African e-Journals Project, a collaborative effort of
Michigan State University with the Association of African Universities and
the African Studies Association, makes journals published in Africa and
about Africa more available to scholars worldwide. Accessibility to research
by African researchers has been one of the stumbling blocks in the develop-
ment of communication and media research in Africa.
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Contributor details
Dr Nkosi Ndlela is Associate Professor of Media Studies at Hedmark University
College in Norway. He holds a doctorate from the University of Oslo, Norway. He
has also taught media and communication studies at the University of Zimbabwe.
Contact: Hedmark University College, Faculty of Business Administration, Social
Sciences and Computer Science, N-2450 Rena, Norway.
E-mail: Nkosi.Ndlela@osir.hihm.no
68 Nkosi Ndlela
JAMS_1.1_06_Gadzekpo.qxd 7/23/08 4:45 PM Page 69

Missing links: African media studies

and feminist concerns
Audrey Gadzekpo University of Ghana
Abstract Keywords
Political and economic developments in many African countries in the last two African media
decades have led to significant transformations in the media and enhanced African feminism
academic scholarship in the field. Despite the tremendous growth and the African research
changes in media and communication systems, there is a dearth of feminist communication
media scholarship in Africa that needs to be addressed. This article provides a research
feminist reappraisal of African media in the context of democratic and eco- gender
nomic change and proposes a tall research agenda for Africanist feminists media studies
aimed at filling the gaps in media and gender scholarship. The author argues
that research should interrogate afresh old concerns as well as new opportuni-
ties and challenges brought about by redemocratization, an expanded public
sphere of civil society activism, rapid technological developments and legal and
policy reforms of the media.
Introduction
From the late 1980s into the 1990s, African governments began a process
of redemocratization after decades of post-independence political instability
marked by military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. As a result,
there has been an opening up of political systems and democratic space
that has encouraged the liberalization of communication systems through-
out the continent. Strong constitutional provisions and legal reforms now
promote speech, expression and media freedoms. Consequently, state domi-
nation of media has given way to a multiplicity of privately owned newspa-
pers and broadcast stations in many countries across the continent.
Liberalized economic policies have led to the de-regulation of telecommuni-
cations industries and stimulated a rapidly growing mobile telephony and
new information and communication technologies (ICT) industry. The
increasing use of personal computers and cellular phones, the proliferation
of cybercafés in many cities and access to cable news networks and satel-
lites, illustrates clearly that Africa is part of the global information order.
An improving political and economic environment has similarly invig-
orated civil society and energized women’s organizations and movements
across Africa, providing fresh opportunities for non-state actors to mobi-
lize around old and new feminist agendas. Under the old political para-
digm of military or autocratic dictatorships, there was a tendency in many
African states for first ladies and/or quasi-state machineries to capture
women’s movements and commandeer state resources to build a powerful
political base in order to serve a parochial power-maintaining agenda

(Arthur 2005). During that period voices of more autonomous organiza-

tions were effectively drowned or marginalized. The shift in the political
paradigm now enables many more local, regional and global women’s
NGOs working outside the state apparatus to flourish, network and mobi-
lize on a variety of issues.
The revitalized women’s movement in Africa has in turn produced a
small but growing corpus of research material resulting mainly from advo-
cacy work that has enhanced ongoing dialogue on women’s empowerment,
development and areas of concern. Contributing to such field material has
been scholarship emanating from gender centres and women’s research
institutions that are being established in universities in Africa. The African
Gender Institute in Cape Town, South Africa and the newly established
Centre for Gender Studies and Advocacy (CEGENSA) in Ghana are good
illustrations of such knowledge centres.
Redemocratization has also boosted the amount of advocacy and acade-
mic work on African media and politics/governance in the last two decades,
as exemplified by organizations such as the Media Institute of Southern
Africa (MISA) and the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA). In 2003,
MISA collaborated with Gender Links, a Southern African gender-oriented
non-governmental organization, to produce a comprehensive report on gen-
dered editorial content in the media. But there still exists a ‘missing link’ of
critical studies that interrogate the democracy–media–gender nexus in Africa,
especially in areas outside Southern Africa.
Given the central role of the media in mediating societal discourses and
influencing reform agendas on national and international levels, this obvi-
ous gap in scholarship must be addressed. The purpose of this article is to
assess and reappraise the field of media and gender in this transformative
period in Africa and to advance a ‘forward looking’ research agenda for
feminist scholarship in this area. The article provides a brief background
on media pluralism in Africa and contextualizes regional and interna-
tional women’s initiatives that have sought to engage the media in femi-
nist struggles. It then discusses the opportunities and challenges that have
been wrought by the changing media environment, and concludes by
proposing priority areas of action for feminist scholars working in and on
Africa.
Changes in the communications infrastructure

In the last decade and a half, Africa has transited from a situation of lim-
ited and controlled media, marked mostly by state monopoly of communi-
cations, to a liberalized, pluralistic media environment of privately owned
newspapers and magazines as well as radio and television stations. There
has also been tremendous growth in a related advertising and public rela-
tions industry, with many local advertising companies forging partnerships
with global advertisers to promote goods and services in an increasingly
competitive regional marketplace.
Just two decades ago, in a survey of the world’s mass media, L. John Martin
(1983) estimated that the African continent had the smallest number of
dailies in terms of its total population and that eight of the 46 states in
sub-Saharan Africa had no daily newspapers whatsoever. Nine others
had only bulletin-type dailies and in many of the other countries the
70 Audrey Gadzekpo
governments owned and controlled whatever dailies existed. Electronic

media were even more restricted. According to Martin (1983: 218), ‘no
African state permits its radio broadcasting to be controlled largely by
commercial interests’, and with the exception of a few countries, gov-
ernments owned and operated the broadcasting facilities as well.
By the end of the millennium the picture was remarkably different and
there was hardly a country in Africa that did not have a pluralistic media
system. In Benin, for example, 33 private dailies, 16 weeklies, 50 periodi-
cals and magazines, an online newspaper, 80 private radio and five televi-
sion stations were recorded in 2004 (MFWA 2004). Pluralism was similarly
evident in Africa’s most populous nation of Nigeria, where there has long
been a tradition of robust journalism. There are an estimated 300 print
titles, 209 television stations, including global satellite transmission sta-
tions and cable re-distribution stations, and 97 radio stations in Nigeria
(MFWA 2004). Similarly, Ghana can boast more than 100 print media
publications registered by its National Media Commission, the independent
media regulatory body, in addition to about 130 mostly privately owned
radio stations and six television stations (National Media Commission
Ghana 2006; National Communications Authority Ghana 2006).
De-regulation of telecommunications in many African countries has
expanded that sector as well. The International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) has observed that more Africans have begun using phones since
2000 than in the whole of the previous century (Ferrett 2004). By 2004,
mobile telephone subscribers had grown to over 50 million, representing
over 7 per cent of the population, with projections of the numbers expand-
ing at a rate of at least 35 per cent a year for the next few years (Scott Nigel
et al. 2004). At a recent conference held in Dakar in Senegal, it was
reported that the number of mobile phone subscribers in West Africa alone
will reach 47 million by the end of 2006 (The Ghanaian Times 2006: 9).
Recent attempts at creating a more regional broadcasting infrastructure, if
successful, will expand the media and communication choices of Africans
even further. The African Union has proposed the setting up of the Afristar
satellite system and a Kenyan-born entrepreneur is reportedly in the
process of setting up ‘a pan-African channel run by Africans for Africans’
(Ericsson 2006: 30).
Global focus on gender and media

Active public discourse on gender and media in Africa dates back to the
first United Nations World Conference on Women, in Mexico City in 1975,
where the media was first identified as a site for action. Many delegates to
that conference came back committed to looking more closely at the status
quo in their own countries. In Ghana, for example, a women’s magazine
publisher, Kate Abbam, raised the issue of women’s status in media organi-
zations. Abbam observed that only two of the 71 female employees at the
state-owned Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) were in decision-
making positions and argued that women were concentrated at the bottom
end of the organization and were rarely to be found in middle or top manage-
ment (Abbam 1975).
Since the Mexico City conference, key concerns relating to the status of
women have been mapped out largely through other global conversations
Missing links: African media studies and feminist concerns 71

facilitated by international bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the

Canada-based International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and
other organizations such as the Commission for Africa. Their efforts have
been complemented by advocacy groups working on gender inequalities
and inequities within various African countries. The media have remained
on the reformist agenda and were one of the twelve critical areas of concern
in the platform for action at the fourth United Nations World Conference
on Women, in Beijing in 1995. The conference drew attention to the fol-
lowing specific issues:
• Poor status of women in decision-making positions in the media;

• Continued stereotypical media portrayal of women and the increase in
violent and pornographic images of women;
• Lack of gender sensitivity in media policies and programmes;
• Poor access of women to media and ICTs;
• Poor participation of women in media and ICTs;
• Increased promotion of consumerism and its attendant drive towards
the objectification of women.
These identified areas of concern resonate with traditional feminist con-

cerns about the media (see the works of Tuchman 1996, van Zoonen
1997, Cameron 1998, Ross and Sreberny 2000). Thus issues of women’s
employment, position, status, representation, portrayal, access to and par-
ticipation in the media remain evaluative indicators of progress or the lack
thereof in contemporary African media.
Of particular importance in explicating the performance of the media
in Africa is the Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) which is coordi-
nated by the World Association for Christian Communication (WACC).
This project has produced three sets of quantitative research data (1995,
2000, 2005) on women and the media worldwide, including Africa. The
latest GMMP report, published in 2005, included eighteen African countries
out of a total of 76 countries and shows that there has been only modest
improvement over the ten-year period of the monitoring effort. For example,
in 2005, only 19 per cent of subjects of news in Africa were women. This
represents a slight improvement on 2000 (17 per cent) but is lower than
the global average of 21 per cent.
Women are silenced relative to men on topics in the news, and their
views are least heard on politics and government and the economy and
business (GMMP 1995, 2000, 2005). Monitoring also shows that stories
are more likely to reinforce than to challenge stereotypes in many regions
of the world, except for Africa where stories are equally likely to reinforce
as to challenge stereotypes. This particular finding is encouraging, as is
the steady increase in the number of women reporting the news in Africa.
Also, the feminist strategy of improving women’s employment status in
the media appears to be validated by GMMP’s findings that show that
more than half of the empowering stories on women were written by
women reporters, even though women roughly constitute only a third of
journalists.
In 2003, MISA and Gender Links conducted a study on editorial deci-
sions of Southern African media on the representation of women and men.
72 Audrey Gadzekpo
The study confirms much of GMMP’s findings and deepens the understand-
ing of gendered aspects of the media in Africa. For example, the study found
that gender equality was not considered newsworthy and that gender-blind
stories are failing to explore the gendered dimensions of important issues
such as HIV/AIDS. Significantly, the study found no marked differences
between the private and public media.
Africa’s gendered media

Under the old political order, journalists were co-opted, intimidated,
harassed and the media was generally considered an inhospitable site for
female employees as well as gender activism. Editors and journalists who
did not toe the government line were often jailed or hounded into exile and
a caged media reported mostly government news and pronouncements. In
terms of women’s issues, it was often the first ladies’ projects and pro-
nouncements that got reported, with few or no contending perspectives
either from the individual women who may have been the subjects of the
news, or from gender groups, activists or scholars.
With media freedoms and pluralism, and the rebirth of civil society,
there came the expectation that women would become more visible in the
media as employees, as decision makers, as subjects of the news and as
newsmakers. There was also the expectation that media content would be
more sensitive and respectful of women and would foster more balanced,
less stereotyped and less sexist gender images. It was hoped that the prolif-
eration of media outlets would mean that more women would have access
to the media and consequently would be able to participate more fully in
public discourses and debates.
A reappraisal of the media after more than a decade of democratic gov-
ernance indicates that there is reason for both optimism and pessimism.
The deepening culture of advocacy and activism has encouraged the for-
mation of women media associations and networks and these in turn have
tended to drive the feminist media agenda. For example, Gender Links pro-
motes gender equality in and through the media. The Association of
Women Communication Professionals (APAC), a pan-African association
with representation in about twenty countries in West and Central Africa
and the Magreb, works mainly to raise the image of women in and through
the media, and to strengthen the professional capacity of its members
through training. Similarly, the African Women’s Media Centre (AWMC) in
Dakar provides support to female journalists by helping to build their
capacity through workshops and seminars.
Media pluralism and the liberalization of the airwaves has provided
more opportunities for more women to publish their own newspapers
and magazines and to produce their own radio and television pro-
grammes, sometimes in alliance with women’s NGOs. In some African
countries, women have successfully helped to set up community radio
stations and are also managing these, for example Meridian FM in Ghana
and MAMA FM in Uganda. Such initiatives strive to counter the negative
portrayal of women and the under-representation of gender and women’s
issues in the mainstream broadcast media, while at the same time provid-
ing women, particularly the rural poor, with enhanced access to media
(Nattimban 2004).

However, there are still very few women owners and managers of main-
stream media organizations, whether print or broadcast. Micky Lee (2006)
argues that women are disadvantaged in the context of unequal global
wealth distribution. Given Africa’s enormous disadvantages in this regard,
it can be argued that African women are doubly disadvantaged on account
of their gender as well as geopolitical location. Not surprisingly, the emerg-
ing class of African media and communications technology entrepreneurs
and film producers are almost all men. Also, studies continue to show an
imbalance in the number of women working in middle to top-level decision-
making positions in the media. In many countries the gap in numbers
between male and female journalists is narrowing, but few women are
advancing to senior or management levels and therefore women have
limited control over how news is defined and have limited influence on
hiring and promotion practices (Morna 2002; Okunna 2002; ABANTU for
Development 2004; MISA and Gender Links 2003; GMMP 2005).
However, increased gender activism has resulted in more advocacy
stories on women, especially on such contentious issues as domestic vio-
lence and HIV/AIDS. The media have been instrumental in the fight
against HIV/AIDS in countries such as Uganda, Senegal, Ghana and
South Africa and some have helped to press the point that HIV/AIDS dis-
proportionately affects and impacts on women. But there are still not
enough stories on women’s equality and discriminatory practices in story
and source selection, as well as framing, continue to disadvantage women
(MISA and Gender Links 2003; GMMP 2005). While increasingly issues
such as gender-based violence are being ‘outed’ from the private sphere
into the media, patriarchal framing of stories, ill-considered language and
non-contextualized reporting undermine such stories.
In the main, the media fail to reflect the issues and perspectives that are
important to women and women continue to be largely invisible in the news
(Morna 2002; Gadzekpo 2003; MISA and Gender Links 2003; GMMP
1995, 2000, 2005). For example, the winds of democracy may be encour-
aging more women into politics in many African countries: the continent
recently produced its first elected female president. But the media routinely
continue to carry less coverage of women politicians than male politicians
(MISA and Gender Links 2003). Colleen Morna refers to the example of a
Zambian newspaper article from 2001 on people’s expectations of a new
president as a vivid reminder of women’s invisibility in certain areas of pub-
lic life (Morna 2002). According to Morna, all the sources and pictures in
the article were men and the article ended with the subtitle ‘the right man
(for the job)’ even though two of the seven presidential candidates were
women. In terms of being sources of information as well as subjects of news,
certain categories of women – rural women, elderly women, women from
minority ethnicities and religious groups, women living with disabilities and
working class women – are even more marginalized than their elite urban
sisters.
Another more contemporary challenge is raised by the adverse conse-
quences of the liberalized marketplace and unbridled commercialization in
many African countries. Within the expanding advertising industry, for
example, women continue to be portrayed in traditional roles that reinforce
gender stereotypes. In a study of five Nigerian newspapers, Nigerian scholar
74 Audrey Gadzekpo
Stella Okunna (2002) notes that out of 93 product advertisements that

used photos of women, 33 adverts (35 per cent) depicted ‘women in domes-
tic settings while 31 [adverts] (33 per cent) used women’s photos in the
background for mere decoration’. The objectification and sexualization of
African women has intensified as local advertising companies link up with
multinational ones to produce advertisements perceived to be more in con-
sonance with the tastes of a globalized, ‘sophisticated’ audience.
African women’s representation has been compounded by the thriving
Nigerian home video industry, the third largest in the world after the Indian
and United States market. Extremely popular across Africa, Nigerian videos
have expanded opportunities in the entertainment industry for female
actresses and to a much more limited extent have provided female produc-
ers, directors and scriptwriters with new opportunities. But there is consid-
erable angst about the disempowering depictions of women in most of these
videos. In a review article, Candice Johnson-Phipps (2002) argues that
Nigerian videos, which are mostly produced by men, define for women
stereotypical roles and ‘provide a contrary view of wives that is at odds
with their histories of women’s empowerment in Nigeria’ (Johnson-Phipps
2002). Okunna (2002) similarly complains that Nigerian videos put
women down and argues that they are filled with negative images that por-
tray women as wayward and of low morality, easily lured by material
things, subservient to men, the cause of family problems, fit for domestic
rather than professional and career roles and lazy and dependent on men.
Many also show women as scheming, vicious, morally-depraved creatures.
Even more insidious, perhaps, is the increasing number of ‘smut news-
papers’ on news-stands, which are peddling sex and objectify and deni-
grate women. In the face of such challenges, Morna’s recent critique of the
South African media sums up the problematic for the whole continent:
A vicious negative circle is at work. The gender imbalances in society reflect in

the institution of the media. These, in turn, reflect in the editorial content of
the media that is guilty both of the sins of omission, that is, stories not covered;
and the sins of commission, that is, the way stories are covered.
(Morna 2002: 3)
Is there better news for women in the growth industry of new media? The
literature on women and ICTs is both cautious and optimistic. Scholars
and activists have warned that, because technology is not gender neutral,
African women have been disadvantaged when it comes to ICTs, although
there have also been suggestions that the information age offers empower-
ing opportunities for African women (Hafkin 2000). A report published by
the Commission for Africa in November 2004 seems to support the latter
view by arguing that there is evidence that more women are using ICTs to
improve networking with friends and family, to save time, increase produc-
tion, to market and trade and to get news. Importantly, however, the
report concludes that mobile phones appear to be a gender neutral tool as
research has recorded few differences between the ways men and women
use them, whether in terms of access and frequency or the purpose of use.
Women-targeted ICT-based initiatives such as Flame – African
Sisters Online, where women around the continent share experiences

(Opoku-Mensah 2001), and a virtual newsroom project have linked

women and female journalists in such countries as Uganda, Kenya,
Zimbabwe and Ghana and helped them to improve writing skills and
find outlets for their stories.
The academic agenda

Clearly, then, the opportunities as well as challenges resulting from the
dynamic transformations in a cross-media environment call for academic
conversations on feminism and the media in Africa. It is obvious that old
concerns relating to women’s representation, voice in, access to and con-
trol of media persist. But the new dispensation also raises fundamental
questions about the extent and the ways in which old and new media
forms advance or impede women’s issues.
Answers to such crucial questions must come from empirical evidence,
of which there is still too little. African feminist media research has had a
short lineage but it can draw on the work of critical Africanist feminists
who have challenged the imperialist or global feminist approach to gender
issues and the assumptions Western feminists make about the universal
oppression of women (Amadiume 1987; Oyewumi 1997; Manuh 1993).
Western feminists have used the analytic category of gender as an explana-
tory model that accounts for women’s subordination and oppression.
Increasingly the meaning of gender when applied to Africa is being con-
tested, by African feminists especially. Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997), for
example, has argued that the social category of ‘woman’ did not exist in
Yoruba communities prior to the Western infusion of ideas. The body was
neither the basis of social roles, inclusions or exclusions, nor the foundation
of social thought and identity. Rather, other non-gendered categories such
as age determined status and power. Such perspectives are important in
directing an African-centred feminist agenda on the media, particularly in
the face of globalization and liberalization. Margaretha Geertsema (2005)
notes that global journalism has contributed to a new form of hybridized
journalism in ways related to new forms of feminism. She questions
whether the cause of gender equity may not be better served with a re-focus
on women rather than gender.
In Africa, where basic development remains the most pressing agenda,
feminist media academics need to raise fundamental questions about how
effectively the media are being used in securing economic and social justice
for women. Related to this are the kinds of communication and media policies
that are needed in order to address the broader development agenda on
the continent and the ways in which these could potentially bring a
change in gender relations. Old questions about the usefulness of gendered
spaces in addressing media content must be interrogated closely and
newsroom policies that seek to address gender inequalities and inequities
in the media must be reappraised. Geertsema’s study (2005) on the Inter
Press Service (IPS) indicates that there are several factors that hinder gender
policies in newsrooms, preventing even the best-intentioned efforts at
addressing the problems from succeeding. Despite its long history of imple-
menting such policies at IPS, male sources still account for three-quarters
of news sources, only 35 per cent of reporters are female and male by-lines
dominate the news (Geertsema 2005).
76 Audrey Gadzekpo
Are women best served through separate spaces or mainstreaming in

the African media? Traditional radical feminists prefer the former, liberal
feminism the latter, but where do African feminists stand on the issue? In
the wake of Beijing, there was a push for gendered spaces. But considering
the general trend of gender activists on the continent towards gender
mainstreaming, the new imperative is to lean towards front pages that
routinely reflect the concerns and priorities of women rather than special
pages targeted predominantly at women.
Addressing traditional feminists concerns as well as peculiar African
ones calls for deeper reflection on how different audiences in Africa –
rural, urban, privileged, under-privileged, young, old – experience, relate
to and use media. We need more reception studies to, for example, interro-
gate closely the impact of Nigerian home videos or the recent explosion of
Latino soap operas on African television screens. Equally worthy of research
are questions on the effects and influences of media globalization in Africa
from the perspective of the status and employment of women, as well as
content.
With the critical mass of activities in gender and ICTs and the
expanding range of media choices brought about by mobile telephony
and the Internet, feminist scholars need to re-open debates about gen-
der and technology and interrogate further suggestions that ICTs are
proving gender neutral (Opoku-Mensah 2001). For example, we need to
ask questions about low-cost SMS messaging and its widespread use.
How is it encouraging a culture of texting among different demo-
graphic groups of women? Are economically disadvantaged women tak-
ing advantage of this relatively inexpensive technology? We also need to
deepen empirical research on African women’s use of the Internet. Who
is creating websites addressed to whom? Who is blogging and podcast-
ing about what? In sum, therefore, we need to ask whether there is
enough reason and evidence to worry about a digital gender divide in
Africa, or if our only legitimate concern is the digital divide between
most of the world and Africa.
The dearth of scholarly material on African women and ICTs also
means that insufficient attention has been paid to the global economy of the
information society in Africa despite the enormous significance of the
telecommunications economy. Fundamental questions still persist about
the roles that women are playing in the information economy and the types
of economic opportunities that have been created for women because of
ICTs, for example the opportunities for African women to work from
home. African feminist research has to contribute more to debates
regarding media and globalization and the exploitative potential of ICTs.
Of particular concern is the spread of pornography and paedophilia via
the Internet and mobile telephony and its role in the trafficking and
exploitation of African women and children.
Deficits also exist in research on women and popular culture in Africa.
New genres of music in Africa such as the fusion of traditional Ghanaian
highlife with hip hop, known as ‘hiplife’, have created young superstars
and new role models for the young. What are the gendered implications of
the messages that these very popular hiplife stars are producing and what
are their effects on their audience?

The last decade has produced a new crop of African women writers
such as Amma Darko (Beyond the Horizon, Housemaid, Faceless) from
Ghana; Sefi Atta (Everything Good Will Come) and Chimamanda Ngozi
Adichie (Purple Hibiscus, Half a Yellow Sun) from Nigeria, whose works raise
questions about power relations in Africa and women’s exploitation and
victimization in the modern global economy. Opportunities exist for multi-
disciplinary work among gender literature scholars and feminist media
scholars on these new female voices coming out of the continent and their
relationship with gendered readers.
Even as we interrogate female voices, the African feminist research
agenda must also re-examine the concepts behind women’s spaces and the
content of women’s alternative media to determine their relevance and
impact on their audiences and whether and in what ways they reinforce
or contradict the broader feminist agenda. Finally, like the sankofa bird in
Ghanaian mythology, which symbolizes reaching back to retrieve some-
thing of value that has been forgotten, African feminist scholarship must
embark on a journey of historical rediscovery. The purpose of such a voyage
would be to retrieve African women’s media histories from obscurity and
to better document the trajectory of the African woman’s place and voice
in the media during major historical periods such as colonization.
Conclusion
From the discussions above, it is obvious that feminist media research has a
critical role to play in providing the missing links in African feminist schol-
arship on the media. Feminist media research in Africa must monitor old
concerns and define and articulate new ones. In the process, research must
generate Africa-specific data about emerging issues and trends in the media
and at the same time develop new feminist theories that take account of the
complex and fluid African condition.
Research data can be more easily generated if there is cooperation
among activists working in the broader field of gender and women’s empow-
erment, who possess intimate knowledge of the issues, and feminist acade-
mics whose skills in developing appropriate conceptual frameworks and
research instruments are invaluable. Some amount of synergy between
activism, practice and academia is already evident in the production of
media sections of major reports such as the ‘Beijing plus five’ and ‘Beijing
plus ten’ documents in some countries and in the drafting of a women’s
manifesto in Ghana. Similar collaboration can happen at the level of acade-
mic research if the false dichotomy between activism and academia is
bridged. In much the same way that technology is being taken from the
classroom into industry, feminist scholarship can be made accessible to
activists in the field of gender and the concerns of activists could be reflected
more in the academic agenda.
For this to happen, however, institutional constraints must be confronted
and the curricula and research agendas in schools and departments of media
and/or mass communication must be revised to encourage better collabora-
tion between academics and non-academics. Gender and media courses, still
missing in a lot of African mass media schools and departments and in gen-
der/women studies departments, must be included. Academic conferences
convened by academic media associations such as the African Council for
78 Audrey Gadzekpo
Communication Education (ACCE) must include panels on gender, while

international media associations such as the International Association for
Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) must be encouraged to con-
vene special panels or sections on African media in which gender issues can
also be explored. Ultimately all these combined efforts will translate into more
innovative research that will begin to repair the missing links in feminist
media scholarship in Africa.
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2002.
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in Uganda. The Case of MAMA FM Radio, MA Dissertation, University of Leeds.
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Century?, paper delivered at International Association for Media and Communication
Research (IAMCR) biennial conference, Barcelona, Spain, July 2002.
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Media Studies, 1:1, pp. 25–44.
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Gender Discourses, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
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British politicians’, in A. Sreberny and L. van Zoonen (eds), Gender Politics and
Communication, Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc.
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Commission for Africa, November 2004.
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24 June 2006, p. 9.
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(eds), Turning it on: a Reader in Women and Media, London: Arnold.
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Suggested citation
Gadzekpo, A. (2009), ‘Missing links: African media studies and feminist concerns’,
Journal of African Media Studies 1: 1, pp. 69–80, doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.69/1
Contributor details
Dr Audrey Gadzekpo is a Senior Lecturer, School of Communication Studies,
University of Ghana, a well-known Ghanaian journalist, and author or co-author
of several books, including Is There a Place for the State Media in a Constitutional
Democracy? and What Is Fit to Print?: Language of the Press in Ghana.
Contact: University of Ghana, School of Communication Studies, Legon, Ghana.
E-mail: agadzekpo@ug.edu.gh
80 Audrey Gadzekpo
JAMS_1.1_07_Salawu.qxd 7/23/08 4:46 PM Page 81

The growth and development of African

media studies: perspectives from Nigeria
Abiodun Salawu Ajayi Crowther University, Nigeria
Abstract Keywords
The paper discusses how Nigerian journalism education has been heavily influ- African media studies
enced by the American model. Nigeria, being a former British colony, at first fol- communication
lowed British models of vocational training in journalism. This is evident in the training
fact that the country’s universities did not initially embrace journalism and mass mass communication
communication studies. Formal university-level training in journalism only Nigeria
started in Nigeria in 1962, with the establishment of Jackson College of
Journalism at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. The college later developed into
the Department of Mass Communication. Other departments/schools of journal-
ism or mass communication have sprung up at various Nigerian universities,
notably that of the University of Lagos. In the past few years, there has been an
upsurge in the number of mass communication programmes across the country.
The programmes, apart from journalism, offer courses in broadcasting, public
relations and advertising, among other areas. The paper also discusses how con-
temporary postcolonial Nigerian media education has achieved a large degree of
uniformity in all the programmes as a result of initiatives taken by Nigeria’s
National Universities Commission.
Introduction
A number of challenging but interesting questions arise in any conscien-
tious attempt to interrogate the evolution and trajectory of African media
studies. One of these questions is that of defining exactly what African
media studies is all about (or should be about). Does the expression
‘African media studies’ refer to the study of media by Africans or the study
of African media by any interested party? If we accept the second option,
which seems more logical, how do we reconcile this with the assertion
that ‘the media are American’? If the media are American, would it still be
logical to talk about African media? In this article, I attempt to define
African media as well as African media studies as an entry point into our
discussion of the evolution and trajectory of African media studies from a
Nigerian perspective.
Contextualizing the two key concepts: ‘African media studies’

and ‘the African media’
Two key terms are germane to this discourse. They are ‘African media
studies’ and ‘African media’. In this section, I attempt to clarify the mean-
ing of these terms as used in this article.

(a) ‘African media studies’

In this article, I define African media studies as a systematic attempt to
understand the structure and workings of the African media from the per-
spective of African and Africanist scholars, irrespective of their race or
location. The defining characteristic of African media studies, from our
standpoint, is that it is focused on the African media. This takes us to the
next point, the definition of what African media is all about.
(b) ‘African media’

The African media, which are the focus of African media studies, are
defined in this article as the media systems of Africa as influenced by their
unique experiences and challenges. The African media are not exactly like
the European or American media, because they emerged and operate
under different socio-political, cultural and economic circumstances. With
regard to this, Louise M. Bourgault has observed that:
The oral tradition, the discourse style it fostered, and the value systems it
nurtured disappeared neither with colonialism nor with independence
which followed it. African traditional culture simply became intermixed with
the alien forms thrust upon it. African traditional forms are, prima facie,
forms of communication, and they are suffused in and through both the
practices and the content of the mass media of Black Africa.
(Bourgault 1995: 20)
The above statement concurs with this view of African media as unique.
My paper is interested in looking at some of these aspects that produce a
African media studies tradition that is similar and yet different from those
found in other parts of the world.
A historical overview of media studies in Africa

Unarguably, journalism is dominant in the field of media education in
Africa. In this section I shall attempt an overview of journalism educa-
tion in Africa, with a specific focus on Nigeria. Journalism education in
Africa was heavily influenced by the American model. This was because
the Europeans who were the colonial masters had no clear academic
model of journalism education. Nnamdi Azikiwe, a Nigerian nationalist,
publisher and journalist, believed that the British university model was
too theoretical for Africa. He was particularly attracted to the vocational
orientation of the American land-grant universities (Murphy and Scotton
1987: 14). Azikiwe wanted Nigeria’s first programme to be twinned to a
specific American department rather than follow Kwame Nkrumah’s
general American-style journalism programme, introduced at the Ghana
Institute of Journalism in 1958. In the early 1960s, the land-grant model
was imported to the new University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Okafor (1973)
and Hachten (1971) reported that Michigan State University, under con-
tract and with substantial American aid, supplied the structure, staff and
much of the curriculum, including a journalism programme.
American-style journalism training in Africa started in 1935 at the
American University in Cairo. Four years later, nearby Cairo University
began its own programme. UNESCO adopted the same model and its first
82 Abiodun Salawu
training course for journalists in Africa was held at the University of

Dakar in 1961. By 1970, there were UNESCO-supported journalism pro-
grammes at universities in Algeria, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria,
Senegal and Zaire, although not all were degree-level programmes. All
these programmes attracted African students from other countries, so
their influences began to spread throughout the continent (Murphy and
Scotton 1987: 15).
Mass communication is not traditional in Africa. European colonial
powers brought into Africa the techniques of reaching large numbers of
people scattered over large areas. Printed publications and broadcasting
were developed in the West and imported by Europeans living in Africa
(Murphy and Scotton 1987: 15). Missionaries wanted to use publications
to control schools by spreading religious messages. Government wanted
official gazettes, so much a part of European governmental authorities.
They trained Africans as printers and soon Africans were producing their
own publications. West Africans were far ahead, publishing their own
newspapers and pamphlets in the then Gold Coast (Ghana) and Nigeria by
the mid-nineteenth century.
Until independence, African journalists were mostly trained on the job.
A few were enrolled in formal apprenticeship systems such as the one
operated by Argus Newspapers in South Africa and Rhodesia (Murphy
and Scotton 1987: 16). These programmes mainly provided the technical
skills needed to operate equipment and to produce materials that could be
formatted into a readable publication. Other journalists were taken on as
assistants by European publications, usually to help produce materials for
African audiences. A good many future African political leaders also
learned on the job as they struggled to publish the newspapers and news-
sheets that ‘spread the fire of nationalism’ (Kaggia 1975).
The need to use the media for development and political purposes
brought about an upsurge in the number of media institutions and facili-
ties across Africa. Naturally, this also brought about the need for the
training of personnel to man these institutions and facilities (Murphy and
Scotton 1987: 16). Arising from this development, by 1972 there were at
least 30 training programmes in journalism and mass communication in
Africa, with about two-thirds of them in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding
South Africa (Scotton 1972). By then, arguments had emerged about
what should be the orientation of the training, and about the lack of
African content in the programmes.
Sharon Murphy and James Scotton (1987) observe that in Nigeria,
which had large programmes developed with professional-technical or
academic emphasis, became the centre of the arguments. A polarized divi-
sion about the form of these programmes emerged and the positions are
aptly captured in the following statements made in the late 1960s by two
of the proponents of the opposing ideas. Murphy and Scotton quote
Professor Ezenta Eze, then head of the Department of Journalism at the
University of Nigeria, Nsukka, as having said: ‘Graduates of universities
invariably perform better’ (1987: 17). In response, John Lahey, director of
the professionally-oriented Nigerian Institute of Journalism, said: ‘A uni-
versity degree separates a person from the man on the street and is often
therefore a handicap for a journalist’ (Murphy and Scotton 1987: 17).
The growth and development of African media studies: perspectives from Nigeria 83
These two positions reflect the different perspectives on journalism train-

ing in the United States and Britain at the time.
Even though, at the very beginning, the dominant perspective on jour-
nalism training in the United States had been of the professional-technical
kind, this later changed to a more academic focus. Britain held on much
longer to the professional-technical orientation. This earlier British orien-
tation appeared to have been adopted in Nigeria, a former British colony.
This was evident in the fact that the Nigerian university system did not
initially embrace journalism and mass communication. At least, the first
Nigerian university, the University of Ibadan, did not have a department of
communication until much later with the serial transmutation of a read-
ing centre to a department of language arts, and later into the Department
of Communication and Language Arts, where mass communication is not
currently as pronounced as it is in other communication departments
across the country.
Journalism education and media studies in Nigeria

Journalism training in Nigeria started in an informal way. It started in
1954 with a two-week vocational course for working journalists. It was
held at the University of Ibadan. Two years later, in 1956, a two-year in-
service journalism training was organized for Nigerian radio broadcasters
by the news department of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation, now
the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (see Ralph Akinfeleye 2003).
In 1959, the then United States Information Services (USIS), now the
Public Affairs Department of the United States Embassy, sponsored the
Journalism Travelling Workshop. In 1960, the International Federation of
Journalists conducted a Nigerian journalism course. However, formal
training in journalism started in Nigeria in 1962 with the establishment
of Jackson College of Journalism at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. The
college later became the Department of Mass Communication at the same
institution. Since then, other departments/schools of journalism or mass
communication have sprung up in various Nigerian universities, notable
among which is that of the University of Lagos, Akoka.
At the start of the twenty-first century, Nigeria had 48 media and jour-
nalism training institutions (Akinfeleye 2003). 23 of them are integral
parts of universities (JAMB 2002) while thirteen are integral parts of poly-
technics (JAMB 2003). The number of universities has definitely increased
now, as almost all the private universities established in recent times have
departments of mass communication. This is apart from the older and
public (federal) universities that have recently added departments of mass
communication to their repertoire. There is evidently a boom for commu-
nication programmes in Nigeria. Mass communication programmes that
were hitherto units of other departments have now been established as
independent programmes. Such mother departments, from which mass
communication programmes and departments have sprung up, include
English, theatre arts and sociology. There are still others where communi-
cation remains integrated with other departments. An example is the
Department of Linguistics and Communication Studies at the University of
Port-Harcourt. At the time of writing, the Department of English Studies
at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, was working on establishing a
84 Abiodun Salawu
unit of mass communication within the department. Meanwhile notable

among journalism institutions that are neither parts of universities nor
polytechnics are the Nigerian Institute of Journalism (NIJ), founded in
1971, and the Times Journalism Institute.
The above-mentioned journalism training institutions have different
approaches to journalism. However, the overall purpose of journalism edu-
cation in Nigeria is somewhat similar, as is noted by Ralph Akinfeleye:
The aims and objectives of the journalism programmes in Nigeria are to both
train journalists, educate them and make them responsible and useful citi-
zens of Nigeria as they use their journalistic expertise to build a new Nigeria.
(Akinfeleye 2003)
Referring to the provisions of the National Board for Technical Education

(NBTE) and the National Universities Commission (NUC), Akinfeleye indi-
cates that the four specific objectives of journalism education in Nigeria
are to produce:
(a) graduates who meet the middle-and-higher level manpower communica-

tion requirements of Nigeria;
(b) qualified communication/journalism teachers for the Universities, poly-
technics and other similar institutions;
(c) technically qualified graduates who can be self-employed upon gradua-
tion; and
(d) socially responsible journalists and communicators.
(Akinfeleye 2003)
One significant observation about the regulation of mass communication

programmes at universities and polytechnics under the NUC and the
NBTE is that the programmes are heavily homogenized. What is offered in
one university is not significantly different from what is offered in others.
No programme has a distinct character of its own and none of the pro-
grammes is known to have a particular emphasis. Most programmes and
departments go by the same name: mass communication. There are few
variations, and where they exist the NUC does not recognize the training
as communication studies, and therefore different benchmarks and a dif-
ferent set of experts are used for accreditation of such programmes. This is
unlike what obtains in South Africa, where communication studies pro-
grammes in each university go by different names such as Communication;
Culture; Communication and Media Studies; Film and Media Studies;
Journalism; Journalism and Media Studies; Communication Science.
Another important point is that there is at present only one communi-
cation programme in Nigeria with the status of a school, which is the
School of Communication Studies at Lagos State University. The school
was established in 2001 and has seven departments. In actual fact, the
school remains an ambition as it lacks the requisite manpower, infrastruc-
ture and facilities. Its departments reflect the core divisions or sequences
in the traditional mass communication programmes in Nigeria. These core
divisions are print media, broadcast media, public relations and advertising.
Mojaye (2006) discusses the issue of location of mass communication

departments in Nigerian universities, and discovers that the percentage of
mass communication departments located in faculties of social sciences is
slightly higher (51.5 per cent) than the percentage located in faculties of
arts (48.5 per cent). According to him, though the NUC has not made an
official proclamation on the issue, its accreditation teams have been rec-
ommending the movement of mass communication departments located
in faculties of arts to social sciences. Instances were those of Ebonyi State
University, Abakaliki, Delta State University, Abraka and Olabisi Onabanjo
University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State. Mojaye (2006: 5) notes that the reloca-
tion of the mass communication department at Delta State University,
Abraka, has now been effected.
Communication research traditions in Nigeria

Certain research methods have become quite traditional in communica-
tion research in Nigeria, such as survey and content analysis. The
choice of these particular methodological tools for communication
research in Nigeria can be traced to the training orientation received by
early communication scholars in the country. Almost all the early com-
munication scholars were trained in the United States, where the focus
was on quantitative empiricism. Hence the dominance of these quantita-
tive methodologies in the Nigerian communication research tradition
(see Oduko 1992).
In rare cases, language studies research methodologies or stylistic analy-
sis methods are used, for example by the Department of Communication and
Language Arts at the University of Ibadan. Notwithstanding, I believe that
research methodologies in communication studies should be interdiscipli-
nary enough to accommodate research methods that are relevant to the
particular interrogation. This is because communication itself as a human
habit cuts across the entire gamut of human activities.
The methodology of cultural studies has been clearly absent in research
methodology, pedagogy and discussions in Nigerian communication schools
and academic forums. However, it is discernible in the works of certain
political scientists who work in the area of media and governance.
The place of indigenous languages in media studies in Nigeria

The language question in Nigerian media studies is not an issue that many
people want to focus on. It appears that, to Nigerian communication
scholars, it does not really matter if the communicators that we train are
not able to communicate in the indigenous language of the people they
serve. The utmost emphasis is for the trainees to be adept at the use of the
English language, which is the language of the nation’s former colonial
masters. Currently, the study of indigenous languages and indigenous lan-
guage media is not part of the core communication curriculum in Nigeria.
A credit pass in any of the indigenous languages is not part of the admis-
sion requirements into the core communication programmes. The only
exceptions are found in programmes where communication studies is
combined with the study of an indigenous language (Salawu 2007). This
article is of the conviction that the study of indigenous languages and
indigenous language media in our media training is very important
86 Abiodun Salawu
because we believe every educational programme should be socially relevant

and culturally sensitive. In other words, application of learning outcomes
should benefit the immediate community of the learner, and should suit
and impact on the learner’s cultural background.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to plot the trajectory of media studies in
Nigeria. It made an excursion into the history of journalism education
and media studies, while also looking at its recent developments and
contents. It is hoped that, in the coming years, media studies in Nigeria
will become more robust and vibrant. One major criticism against the
mass communication curriculum in Nigeria is that there is no room for
courses in oral communication, with perhaps the exception of the
University of Ibadan programme. This was a major point of discussion dur-
ing the 2003 biennial conference of the African Council for Communication
Education (ACCE), held in Abuja, Nigeria. During this conference,
African communication scholars based in the diaspora, mostly in the
United States, levelled this criticism against the communication curricu-
lum in Nigeria.
The furore about the location of mass communication departments
within universities in Nigeria is unnecessary. Rather than making an issue
out of that, we should be more concerned about the contents of our cur-
ricula. We cannot discount the multifaceted nature of the discipline.
Werner Joseph Severin and James Tankard share this view when they
maintain that ‘mass communication is part skill, part art, and part sci-
ence’ (Severin and Tankard 1992: 1). The authors elaborate more on their
view of the field:
It is a skill in the sense that it involves certain fundamental learnable tech-

niques such as focusing a television camera, operating a tape recorder or
taking notes during an interview. It is an art in the sense that it involves cre-
ative challenges such as writing a script for a television programme, develop-
ing an aesthetic layout for a magazine ad or coming up with a catchy lead
for a news story. It is a science in the sense that there are certain principles
involved in how communication works that can be verified and used to make
things work better.
(Severin and Tankard 1992: 1)
Similarly, scholars such as Denis McQuail (2005) and Oliver Boyd-Barrett

and Chris Newbold (1995: 2–7) concur with the ambivalence in approaches
to the study of mass communication.
Notes
The contribution offered by Dr Ogu Sunday Enemaku to this article is acknowledged.
Appendix I
Nigerian universities offering communication degrees:
1. Abia State University, Uturu.

2. Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko.
3. Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

4. Ajayi Crowther University, Oyo.
5. Anambra State University of Science and Technology, Uli.
6. Babcock University, Ilishan-Remo.
7. Bayero University, Kano.
8. Benson Idahosa University, Benin-City.
9. Benue State University, Makurdi.
10. Bowen University, Iwo.
11. CETEP City University, Lagos.
12. Covenant University, Ota.
13. Cross River University of Technology, Calabar.
14. Delta State University, Abraka.
15. Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki.
16. Enugu State University of Science and Technology, Enugu.
17. Igbinedion University, Okada.
18. Imo State University, Owerri.
19. Kaduna State University, Kaduna.
20. Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos.
21. Madonna University, Okija.
22. Nasarawa State University, Keffi.
23. Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka.
24. Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye.
25. Redeemer’s University, Ede.
26. Rivers State University of Science & Technology, Port-Harcourt.
27. University of Ibadan, Ibadan.
28. University of Jos, Jos.
29. University of Lagos, Yaba, Lagos.
30. University of Maiduguri, Maiduguri.
31. University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
32. University of Port-Harcourt, Port-Harcourt.
33. University of Uyo, Uyo.
The list was compiled from the 2005 University Matriculation Examination Brochure
of the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board.
Appendix II
For departments running core mass communication programmes, the following are
the general mass communication courses that can be found in their curricula:
• Introduction to Mass Communication;

• History of the Nigerian Mass Media;
• African Communication System;
• Writing for the Mass Media;
• News Writing;
• Theories of Mass Communication;
• Reporting;
• Features Writing;
• Foundations of Broadcasting;
• Radio Programme Writing and Productions;
• Radio/TV Studio Operations;
• Marketing Foundations for PR and Advertising;
• Principles of Public Relations;
• Writing for Public Relations;
• International Communication;
88 Abiodun Salawu
• Issues in Nigerian Mass Media History;

• Newspaper Management and Production;
• Science and Technology Reporting;
• Broadcast Management and Programming;
• Public Affairs Broadcasting;
• TV Programme Writing Production;
• Consumer Affairs;
• Advertising Media Planning;
• Communication for Development;
• Ethics of Mass Communication;
• Reporting Population Issues;
• Data Analysis in Communication Research;
• Rural Community Newspaper;
• Drama and Documentary Production;
• Education Broadcasting;
• Rural Broadcasting;
• Editorial Writing;
• International Public Relations and Advertising;
• Consumer Behaviour; and
• Advertising and Public Relations Campaign.
Others are:
• New Communication Technologies;

• Fundamentals of Journalism;
• Editing and Graphics of Communication;
• Foundations of Communication Research;
• Advanced Reporting;
• Health Reporting;
• Introduction to Photojournalism;
• Radio News Reporting and Production;
• Announcing and Performance;
• Advertising Media Planning;
• Communication and Society;
• Reporting the Economy;
• Comparative Mass Media Systems;
• Magazine Management and Production;
• Book Publishing;
• TV News Reporting and Production;
• Broadcast Commentary and Critical Writing;
• International and Foreign Broadcasting;
• Film Production for Television;
• Advertising and Public Relations Research;
• Community Relations;
• Advertising and Public Relations Campaign;
• Mass Media Law;
• Message Design and Development for Population HIV/AIDS;
• Foreign Correspondence;
• Critical Review and Writing;
• Issues in Broadcasting;
• Station Management and Operations;
• Organization and Management of Advertising/PR Agencies;
• Special Topics in Public Relations and Advertising; and
• Economic and Social Problems in Public Relations and Advertising.
References
Akinfeleye, R. A. (2003), Fourth Estate of the Realm or Fourth Estate of the Wreck:
Imperative of the Social Responsibility of the Press, inaugural lecture, University of
Lagos: Nigeria.
Bourgault, L. M. (1995), Mass Media in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Boyd-Barrett, O. and Newbold, C. (1995), ‘Defining the field’, in O. Boyd-Barrett
and C. Newbold (eds), Approaches to Media: A Reader, London: Arnold.
Hachten, W. A. (1971), Muffled Drums, Ames: Iowa State University Press.
Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) (2002), UME/DE Brochure:
Guidelines for Admissions to first degree courses in Nigerian Universities
2003/2004 Session, Lagos: JAMB.
Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) (2003), M.P.C.E. Brochure:
Guidelines for Admissions to Programmes in Monotechnics, Polytechnics and Courses
in Colleges of Education, 2003/2004, Abuja: JAMB.
Kaggia, B. (1975), ‘Spreading the fire of nationalism’, in B. Kaggia (ed.), Roots of
Freedom, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, pp. 78–86.
McQuail, D. (2005), McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory (5th ed.), London: Sage
Publications.
Mojaye, E. M. V. (2006), Issues of Location of Mass Communication Departments in
Nigerian Universities, paper presented at the 2006 annual South African
Communication Association (SACOMM) Conference, held at the Spier Conference
Centre, Stellenbosch, Winelands, Capetown, South Africa, 28–30 September.
Murphy, S. M. and Scotton, J. (1987), ‘Dependency and journalism education in
Africa: are there alternative models?’, Africa Media Review, 1:3, pp. 11–35.
Oduko, S. (1992), Guide to Students’ Research: A Bibliography of Mass Communication,
Lagos: VDG Press Ltd.
Okafor, N. (1973), ‘University of Nigeria – Nsukka’, in T. M. Yesufu (ed.), Creating
the African University, Ibadan: Oxford University Press, pp. 185–95.
Salawu, A. (2007), An Advocacy for the Study of Indigenous Language and Indigenous
Language Media in Mass Communication Curriculum in Nigeria, paper presented at
the National Workshop on Mass Communication Curriculum in Nigeria,
Teachers House, Abeokuta, November.
Scotton, J. (1972), ‘Mass communications training in Africa’, Communication in
Africa, 1:4, pp. 6–12.
Severin, W. J. and Tankard, Jr., J. W. (1992), Communication Theories: Origins,
Methods and Uses in the Mass Media (3rd ed.), New York: Longman.
Suggested citation
Salawu, A. (2009), ‘The growth and development of African media studies:
perspectives from Nigeria’, Journal of African Media Studies 1: 1, pp. 81–90,
doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.81/1
Contributor details
Dr Abiodun Salawu is Head of Media and Communication at Ajayi Crowther
University, Nigeria. He was previously a Senior Lecturer at the University of Lagos and
has been the project coordinator for Africa’s indigenous language media. His most
recent publications include the edited book, Indigenous Language Media in Africa (2006).
E-mail: salawuabiodun@yahoo.com
90 Abiodun Salawu
JAMS_1.1_08_art_Evans.qxd 7/24/08 8:25 PM Page 91

Fata Morgana: Mirage in the Desert - a

sequence of images (2005)
Graham Evans Department of Music, Film and Fashion,
University of Westminster
Abstract Keywords
A road movie of stills on a journey through the Egyptian desert, Fata Morgana Egypt
was the original hallucination or mirage conjured from the heat bending light on ideology
the extremes of the horizon. Here the natural is supplanted by the cultural world advertising
of commodity free trade, which comes to obliterate the visible desert and instead mirage
presents us with the desert of the commercial signage which is made strange by hallucination
its juxtaposition with the barrenness of the Egyptian landscape. desert
Fata Morgana was the original hallucination or mirage conjured from the
heat bending light on the extremes of the horizon. Here the natural is sup-
planted by the cultural world of commodity-free trade that comes to obliter-
ate the visible desert and instead presents us with the desert of the
commercial signage, which is made strange by its juxtaposition with the bar-
renness of the Egyptian landscape.
In Fata Morgana we take a journey through the Egyptian desert, from
the toll booth that proclaims Pepsi, to the airport where the president signs
us off, via the pyramids, which disappear beneath a burgeoning traffic sys-
tem: the conduit through which the advertising hoardings bombard us on
our odyssey through the new commercial sectors of modern Egypt. The
images also pay homage to Werner Herzog, whose film Fata Morgana (1969)
left a generation with indelible images of the mirage in the desert. This is a
series of images linked by the continuity of the road, the journey to a bright
new consumer destination, a ride across the desert into a material world,
emptiness replaced by plenitude, the arrival in a nirvana of possession.
This new landscape of the dreams and desires of the market is at odds
with our expected heritage trip to the pyramids. While at home in the
West advertising is taken for granted, on the periphery the massive edifices
that deliver capitalism to Africa stand mightily, like manna from heaven,
and create their own horizons of commodity consumption for the future.
We each of us see billboards every day and hardly register them. In the
Egyptian desert they are a new occurrence and startling in their intrusion
into the flat landscape of the desert, a space we think of as pure and empty.
This is also the meeting place between East and West, where the industrial
meets the nomadic and agrarian, and so the contrasts increase, the impact
of the drive to capitalize on new desires and new markets.
In this making strange of the representation of commodity production
we are able to discern more readily the incorporation of the subject, the

92 Graham Evans
Fata Morgana: Mirage in the Desert - a sequence of images (2005) 93

94 Graham Evans

96 Graham Evans

98 Graham Evans

consumer, into the ideology of desire for material existence, a form of life
almost unregistered in the blankness of the desert. Along with this realization
comes also the awareness of the global force of capitalism that is taking us on
a ride through another uncharted territory; the map of free trade becomes
imprinted upon any journey we make. Our reception of these advertisements
and their often subliminal effect upon us becomes conscious to us once more
along with the frightening fact that this bombardment is happening all over
the globe. What we have most in common with other cultures is not differ-
ence, but our common desire to consume the products of the new Rome.
Suggested citation
Evans, G. (2009), ‘Fata Morgana: Mirage in the Desert - 17 colour Photographs
(2005)’, Journal of African Media Studies 1: 1, pp. 91–101, doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.91/1
Contributor details
Graham Evans is a photographer and academic teaching at the University of
Westminster. Through many group and solo shows, and writing in the sector,
Graham has made work on the subject of everyday lives and their transformation by
structures of power and representation. Themes of artwork revolve around social
and domestic histories and the portrayal of people to include an insight into the ide-
ological relations that shape their lives. Issues of globalization, heritage and history,
natural and cultural, and personal and vernacular history are all subjects that have
found expression in Graham Evans’ work over the last fifteen years. His work has
been shown at: The Design Museum, London, Impressions, York, Cornerhouse,
Manchester, Ikon, Birmingham, and Site Gallery, Sheffield.
Contact: Department of Music, Film and Fashion, School of Media, Arts and
Design, University of Westminster, Harrow Campus, HA1 3TP, UK.
E-mail: g.evans@zoom.co.uk
100 Graham Evans

JAMS_1.1_09_Pype.qxd 8/5/08 11:51 AM Page 101

‘We need to open up the country’:

development and the Christian key
scenario in the social space of Kinshasa’s
teleserials
Katrien Pype Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium
Abstract Keywords
This article discusses discourses on development in the social space of Kinshasa’s Kinshasa
post-Mobutu teleserials. The producers (dramatic artists and born-again Christian media
leaders; some are both) contend that their work will transform society, counter the time
social and political crisis and improve the nation in various ways. Pentecostalist narrative
Christianity meets the genre of the melodrama in the way the teleserials focus on Pentecostal-charismatic
the individual’s spiritual development. This article argues that the fictive represen- Christianity
tation of witchcraft relates to a Pentecostalist diagnosis of the crisis and that the
narrative unfolding of the teleserials points towards the cultural key scenario
asserted by Pentecostal-charismatic churches.
Introduction
In a substantial discussion of development discourse in Kenya, Ivan Karp
(2002: 88) states that theories of development are not exclusively made
and produced in the ‘developed world’ and then exported to the ‘underde-
veloped’ rest of the world. On local levels, new meanings are given to the
notion of ‘development’ and the interrelated concept of ‘modernity’. He
argues that, for anthropologists, it is interesting to study what ideas of ‘devel-
opment’ co-exist, how they shift according to the speakers and what cate-
gories of persons are privileged in these discourses over other ideas of
personhood and subjectivity. It is fascinating to study how modern mass
media are employed within modernization campaigns. In their study of the
intertwinement of media and diverging notions of ‘development’, Harry
West and Jo Ellen Fair (1993) present a social approach towards media in
their study of the role of the media within development programmes. The
authors deconstruct the taken-for-granted corollary between ‘moderniza-
tion’, ‘development’ and electronic media on the one hand, and ‘tradition’
and ‘indigenous media’ such as song, dance, theatre and sculpture on the
other hand. West and Fair argue that it is not the technologies – television
sets, radios or other so-called ‘modern’ apparatus – that impose a certain
understanding of ‘development’ on the programmes offered by the media,
but that these meanings are attributed by social actors.
For the sake of introduction, I contend that, in post-Mobutu Kinshasa, for-
eign NGOs to a large extent dominate the field of popular theatre (performed

1. The data for this in public spaces), which consequently professes a Western definition of ‘devel-
article were gathered
during field research
opment’, while on local television channels a range of diverging interpreta-
in Kinshasa between tions of ‘development’ and ‘modernization’ can be observed. The varying
2003 and 2006. approaches diffuse the traditional binary thinking on the understandings of
I studied both
production and
‘technology’, ‘modernity’ and ‘development’. Data on Kinshasa would con-
reception of several firm that the social relations encompassing the media determine the signifi-
teleserials and cance of discursive acts and the accompanying images.
worked intensely
with one particular
This article studies discourses on development in the social space of
theatre company, Kinshasa’s post-Mobutu teleserials (in Lingala maboke or télédramatiques).1
Cinarc, which The producers (dramatic artists and born-again Christian leaders; some
explicitly produces
teleserials to
are both) argue that their work will transform society, counter the social
evangelize the city. and political crisis and improve the nation in various ways. In this article,
Like other groups I discuss how Kinshasa’s television serials relate to the political imagina-
that produce
teleserials, Cinarc
tion and the kind of ‘development’ they profess. In contrast to Kinshasa’s
is closely connected first serials that were produced during Mobutu’s authenticity campaign,
to a Pentecostal- and serials in other African countries such as Egypt (Abu-Lughod 2005)
charismatic church
where they meet their
and South Africa (Kruger 1999), the aesthetics of Kinshasa’s more recent
fans, debate with television serials depict a specific kind of reality and development that does
their pastor and not reflect secular approaches towards progress.2
prepare, both on
a spiritual and
The analysis of Kinshasa’s television serials lends coherence to other-
artistic level, their wise dissimilar topics of media and religion that are now receiving consid-
performances. erable attention (cf. De Vries and Weber 2001; Meyer and Moors 2006). In
Fieldwork included
observation,
Kinshasa, debates about the value of the representation of witchcraft (Li.
participation as an kindoki, French sorcellerie)3 and conversion to Christianity (Li. bobongoli) in
actress and formal local telenarratives emerge in a period in which the city’s media world has
and informal
interviews with
become increasingly influenced by Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity
dramatic artists, (‘born-again Christians’, ‘nouveaux-nés’, members of revival churches), a
their Christian Protestant-inspired type of African Christianity that floods the continent’s
spiritual leaders and
the social milieus in
urban centres and beyond (cf. Gifford 1992; Corten and Marshall-Fratani
which the Christian 2001; Meyer 2004).4 As in other African societies, the distinction between
artists move. so-called independent churches and Pentecostal-charismatic churches is
2. Abu-Lughod (2005: difficult to maintain in Kinshasa, where the latter are increasingly domi-
81), for example, nating both the public sphere and major religious practices (cf. Meyer
describes the
aesthetics of
2004: 450–453). Talk about witchcraft within the serials’ plots enunci-
Egyptian serials ates the role of the witchcraft idiom in the construction of meaning of the
as ‘developmental city-dwellers’ life-worlds, and, as I will show, fashions the design of a
realism’ that idealizes
education, progress
Christian ‘cultural key scenario’ (Ortner 1973) and privileges a new type
and modernity within of culture hero, the ‘Pasteur’.
the nation. Because of their emphasis upon ordinary citizens, the importance of
3. Lingala (Li.) is the emotions, the strong Manicheistic scheme of the narratives and the unam-
lingua franca in biguous outcomes, I define the serials as ‘melodramas’ (cf. Brooks 1976;
Kinshasa. French, Abu-Lughod 2002: 116).
Lingala, Ciluba,
Swahili and Kikongo The text begins with a brief sketch of the evolution and subject matter of
are the national Kinshasa’s telenarratives as a reflection of altered power contexts in Kinshasa
languages. and its media world. This is followed by an investigation of a discussion about
4. These churches a contested trophy, awarded to the troupe of Muyombe Gauche for its involve-
do not belong ment in the nation’s development. This debate reveals local aesthetics of the
institutionally to
the mainstream teleserials and links up the teleserials to the religious imagination of the pre-
Catholic or Protestant sent crisis. Finally, I turn to the value of narrative (Ricoeur 1984) in the con-
churches, though struction of meaning and the production of alternative (Christian-inspired)
102 Katrien Pype

temporalities. Using the serial Caroline and Poupette as a case, I demonstrate most of them have
been grouped in
how Pentecostalist Christianity meets the genre of the melodrama in the ser- the ‘League of Revival
ial’s emphasis on the individual’s spiritual development, and how its repre- Churches’ (‘Ligue
sentation of elders sustains a Christian understanding of time. des Eglises de Réveil’)
which was established
in 2003. These
Television in Kinshasa churches also differ
During his reign, Mobutu held the monopoly over national media and considerably from the
other independent
used the two national channels for personal propaganda. Around the African churches,
1990s, the president allowed two channels to enter into the broadcasting like Kimbanguism
public space. However, only the arrival of Laurent Kabila in 1997 marked and other churches
of the Holy Spirit
an end to the monopoly of Office Zaïrois de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision (cf. Devisch 1996)
(OZRT) and Kabila renamed the national radio and television channel that combine
Radio Télévision National du Congo (RTNC). The approval of a new law traditional religions
and Christianity
opened up the space of the audiovisual media and it became significantly in very creative
easier to set up a television station. With US$25,000 and the permission ways. Churches of
of the authorities, one can set up one’s own private television channel in the Pentecostal-
charismatic type
Kinshasa. As a result, wealthy families (e.g. Raga TV) and dynamic indi- reject in their
viduals – some with commercial interest (e.g. NzondoTV, TropicanaTV), discourse all
others with proselytising goals (e.g. AmenTV, HopeTV) – applied for ancestral-related
beliefs and practices.
broadcasting license and this has resulted in an incredible boom in For an overview of
indigenous5 Congolese media.6 At the beginning of my fieldwork in 2003, the main diverging
Kinshasa’s population could watch 25 television channels, of which 22 strands of Christianity
in Kinshasa, see De
were urban-local. This number increased to 37 and 33 by the end of my Boeck (2004:
fieldwork in July 2006. These numbers are significant in comparison to 93–113).
the total amount of television channels in Congo. In 2004, researchers 5. The term ‘indigenous
for the Panos Institute counted 52 television channels at national media’ has been
level.7 introduced by Faye
Ginsburg (1995)
After Laurent Kabila came into power in 1997 not only was political and indicates
leadership changed, but the city’s public space was also transformed. For media-related
example, there was an increasing presence of charismatic-Pentecostal activities of minority,
indigenous groups
churches. Pentecostalist-charismatic groupings that had for a long time (First Nations). Now,
worked underground during Mobutu’s reign could now operate in public. the term is used as a
They have increasingly occupied the city’s public spaces (cf. De Boeck cover term for media
products ‘ranging
2004) and also Kinshasa’s media world. More than half of the local chan- from community-
nels are owned by either a Pentecostalist Christian leader or group. owned and operated
Changes were also reflected in the design of television shows, the airing of radio, television, and
video operations to
Christian music and in particular in the content of local teleserials.8 In the locally produced
meetings in the church compounds, as well as via the mass-mediated pub- programmes that
lic sphere, an apocalyptic ideology (cf. De Boeck 2005), which translates appear on national
television’ (Spitulnik
all mischief as the outcome of devilish activity, is sent out. This ideology 1993: 304).
stresses the necessity of conversion and the role of the Holy Spirit as healer.
From its early days, the producers of Kinshasa’s television serials intended 6. Congolese channels
also diffuse
to contribute to the nation’s development. The first serials originated during international soap
Mobutu’s authenticity campaign and reflected the leader’s vision of develop- operas like Top Models
ment. The first serial, Salongo (1981), was produced on behalf of Mobutu, who and series like Friends
(both American
ordered local artists to create a play that would encourage the Zaïrians to work shows) and Ca va se
for the nation and thus contribute personally to the nation’s growth (cf. Pype savoir (Belgian) with
2006). Salongo and the other telenarratives produced during Mobutu’s early Chinese ‘martial arts’
serials, and
reign mainly focussed on the notion of ‘work’ (Li. salongo). At the turn of the international films
millennium, the producers of Kinshasa’s serials stressed that the spiritual and (both from Hollywood
‘We need to open up the country’ 103

and Europe). the material are closely interlinked,9 thus preaching the interconnectedness
International
channels like TV5 between the individual’s spiritual condition and the nation’s ‘health’.
(French) and DRTV
(Congo-Brazzaville) The Mwana Mboka case
are also received in
Kinshasa.
Muyombe Gauche (leader of one of the most popular theatre companies in
the city) is an ambiguous figure in Kinshasa’s media landscape and offers us
7. See Kayembe, Malu an interesting entry in Christian approaches towards ‘development’. The dis-
and DRIM (dir.),
‘Situation des course within his serials and in the social space evoked through reception of
medias en RDC’, his narratives is indicative of the plurality and at times contrasting temporali-
www.panosparis.org/ ties present in Kinshasa. His serials, always broadcast on Sunday evenings in
fr/doc/Situation.pdf.
prime time (9pm), are immensely popular, but viewers speak in an ambigu-
8. An important ous manner about his work. Despite his fame, Muyombe Gauche is an out-
influence in the
transformation of sider among Kinshasa’s dramatic artists for a number of reasons. More than
the serials was the any other maboke, Gauche’s serials speak about ‘ancestrality’ (Li. ya bankoko)
impact of a subgenre and they are often set and filmed in rural communities. For a while, his com-
of Nigerian films
that were shown pany included a transvestite (Li. mobali mwasi), a young man who is not only
early on in the new a woman in the fictive world but who also dresses and behaves like a woman
churches and rapidly in real life. While most presidents of Kinshasa’s theatre companies grant
on Kinshasa’s
television screens themselves with the most popular and socially esteemed role of ‘Pasteur’,
(cf. De Boeck 2004: Gauche always incarnates the role of ‘ndoki’ (witch).
186–188). It is fasci- His fame was asserted when he won the first ‘Mwana Mboka’ for best
nating how Nigerian
witchcraft films have theatre company in 2004. This event was shown live at prime time on
become an essential Antenne A (AA), one of the many private television channels that are acces-
part of the viewing sible to city dwellers. The trophies of Mwana Mboka (in Lingala literally:
experiences of
Kinshasa’s child of the city/country) are awarded to individuals and/or associations
population. who engage themselves in the economic, political and cultural development
9. For Christians of the nation. Like other locally produced serials, his narratives deal with the
in Kinshasa, battle between good and evil. Emotional investment by the viewers is facili-
development is tated through an interesting mix of tragedy and comedy. However, in the
both spiritual and
material (cf. weeks after the presentation of the award, viewers and other dramatic artists
Bornstein 2003: 49). engaged in various debates and protest. It was not only other actors and a
considerable proportion of viewers that protested, but the government also
contested Gauche’s victory. More than once, his opponents speculated on
the subjectivity of AA – which organized the distribution of the trophies – as
Gauche’s serials are broadcast on this very channel. A stronger argument
that surfaced again and again in these conversations was that Gauche
blocked the nation’s development through his focus on witchcraft. The
debate served as a key moment of reflection on the relevance of the repre-
sentation of witches and their practices in locally produced serials.
One actress belonging to a rival theatre group complained that Gauche
borrowed too much from ‘customs’ (Li. makambo ya kala, literally old things)
and refused to embrace ‘modernity’ (Li. makambo ya sika, literally new
things) at its fullest. ‘The things he does are too old, they are nearly ances-
tral. He transfers village life to the city, which is contradictory to reality,’
she explained. She even contended that ‘it is as if Muyombe Gauche initi-
ates the viewers into witchcraft’. To illustrate this, she summarized a
sequence of one of the many subplots in La Vie Africaine (The African Life):
A young man from Boma [a provincial town in Lower-Congo, near the origi-
nal village of the leading actor] is sent by an elder relative to Kinshasa to
104 Katrien Pype

drop off a package, but, just before departure, the uncle warns him not to 10. I had this
open it. Of course, during the trip, the man gets curious and opens the small conversation in
February 2005
box. To his utmost surprise, he stares at Muyombe Gauche’s head that is when RTG@, the
staring straight back. [She laughs as she recounts this] Bien sûr, he is horri- broadcasting channel,
fied. This head starts to ask sacrifices in return. Everywhere the man would was not yet available
nationwide. As soon
look Muyombe Gauche’s head would pop up and remind him of his debt. as the channel was
(Nene, 10 December 2004) broadcast via satellite
and could be received
in Congo’s main
At the time of this conversation, I had already spent several months with provincial towns, the
the troupe in which she participated (Cinarc) and, from what she was say- artists stated that
ing, I could not see a crucial difference between Gauche’s serials and those they contributed
to ‘national
produced by Cinarc. But for her, there was no comparison possible. She development.’
stated that both groups were doing opposite things: Cinarc’s serials aided
11. ‘un irresponsable, qui
in the city’s/nation’s development (Li. nkola)10 while Gauche’s serials did est négatif pour le
not contribute to any progress (Li. bokoli). progrès du pays (…)
The concerns of Kinshasa’s artists were collectively expressed in a letter Nous devons (…)
jouer le rôle de
from the Association des troupes indépendantes du théâtre populaire transformateurs positifs
(ATITP) (an organization representing Kinshasa’s popular theatre actors) dans la mentalité de
published in a local newspaper. The writers openly derided Gauche, with notre société par des
spectacles instructifs
some choosing to portray him as ‘an irresponsible man, negative for the et non normalisateurs’,
progress of the country’ (Forum des As, 8/4/2004). Rivalry might have from a letter written
pushed the artists to write this letter. Gauches’ opponents deployed argu- by President
Massumu Debrindet
ments relating to social expectations of artists. According to the letter, the (Théâtre Plus) and
role of artists should be to act as positive transformers of Kinois mentality General Secretary
by creating instructive and not conformist spectacles, meaning that they Elombe (Théâtre
Simba), President and
should contribute to society’s development, perceived as the outcome of a General Secretary of
transformation (Li. ntombwana).11 They characterized Gauche’s maboke as ATITP, published in
magical (Fr. magico-fêtichiste), ‘ambiguous’ and ‘retrograde’, three features the journal Forum des
As, 8 April 2004.
that are the total opposite of what ‘good serials’ should be like: Christian,
transmitting a clear message and pushing the nation forward. For
Kinshasa’s Christians, this triad constitutes the three pillars of the role of
popular culture in general. Devoting, as it does, so much attention to the
work of diviners and ‘féticheurs’, it is not surprising that Gauche’s serials
were not considered to be ‘Christian’. The latter two adjectives, ‘ambigu-
ous’ and ‘retrograde’ are worth exploring further in order to understand
the role of Kinshasa’s television serials within the development of the
nation.
The critical remarks did not deny the phenomenon of witchcraft, but
they subjected the represented balance of good and evil to close moral
scrutiny. Although Gauche’s serials are eagerly watched for their enter-
tainment value, many Kinois feel uncomfortable about their moral con-
tent. Kinshasa’s viewers explained the artist’s popularity (Li. lupemba) as
deriving from his emphasis upon occult practices, thus exploiting sensa-
tional activities at the cost of educating the public. Granting victory to the
‘Pasteur’ or another Christian figure and painting witches as losers fits
within a cultural scheme that underlies the actor’s work and guides the
expectations of the audience (both are interacting in a dialectical way).
This was, however, a moral movement that was not always followed in
Gauche’s serials. Furthermore, rumours spread about conflicts between
Gauche and his spiritual advisors. By the end of fieldwork, Gauche did not

12. As one government thank any ‘Pasteur’ in his serials’ acknowledgements, which seemed to
official told me.
justify Kinois’ assumptions that he was a pagan. During talk shows,
Gauche was regularly questioned as to which church he prayed at.
Sometimes he avoided a clear answer and at other times he mentioned a
few churches, but most often he would reply that he had been invited to
talk about his dramatic work and thus shied away from giving too much
detail about his spiritual life.
All the groups that criticized Gauche’s victory stressed that artists are
in the first instance ‘educators’ (Li. molakisi) of the nation. The idea that
an actor should do more than merely entertain urban audiences under-
pins Kinois people’s reflections upon television serials. Viewers expect that
the actors will promote good values both in the serials and in their private
lives. During public interviews, the actors also inscribe themselves in this
project and many of them attempt to connect with foreign NGOs that
advocate a Western agenda of human rights, democracy and elections,
and that often use local theatre companies to spread their message. These
performers do not perceive the development agenda of these foreign NGOs
as contradictory to Christian interpretations of how the city/nation should
develop.
Some actors even called Gauche’s dramatic work ‘retrograde’, implying
that it looks backward instead of forward. In the Christian urbanites’ sym-
bolical universe, place and space are intertwined. ‘Backwards’, in the stag-
ing of reality, means ‘focusing too much upon village life’, as a Cinarc
actress already indicated. The past resides in villages, while the city
embodies the promises of a ‘future’ located within ‘modernity’. Witchcraft
practices, although transformed in an urban context, are considered a
tenacious remnant of that past world.
Government officials also expressed their discontent over the confer-
ring of the ‘Mwana Mboka’ award on Gauche. In reaction to his victory,
the Ministry of Culture sent a letter to a number of television channels in
which they were requested to ‘minimize witchcraft’ in their programmes
because ‘all those stories pollute the minds of the people’ (Li. babebisi
mikanisi ya bato).12 Both the government’s concern about the ‘over-
representation’ of witchcraft, and the ATITP’s remark that too strong a
focus on witchcraft would not contribute to the nation’s progress, coin-
cide with the Christian interpretation of the contemporary conditions of
life in the city.
Defining the Christian key scenario

These discussions define the contours of a Christian key scenario. I borrow
the concept of ‘key scenario’ from Sherry Ortner (2002 [1973]) who, in
her treatment of ‘key symbols’, identified this as one of a culture’s key
symbols. In Ortner’s analysis, two main types of symbol are at play in a
culture: summarizing and elaborating symbols. Both symbols should be
viewed as ideal types on both ends of a continuum that organizes all sym-
bols in a society. Elaborating symbols sorts out complex and undifferenti-
ated feelings and ideas and makes them comprehensible to the individual,
communicable to others and translatable into orderly action (Ortner
2002: 161). They are analytic and therefore occupy a central status in a
culture. Ortner identified two kinds of elaborating symbol: root metaphors
106 Katrien Pype

and key scenarios. For our discussion, only the ‘key scenario’ is important.
She formulates the American key scenario – best known as ‘the American
dream’ – like this: poor boy of low status, but with total faith in the
American system, works very hard and ultimately becomes rich and pow-
erful (Ortner 2002: 162). This key scenario offers a clear-cut mode of
action appropriate to correct and successful living in America. More
abstractly, key scenarios formulate local definitions of the good life, of suc-
cess, and also formulate key cultural strategies with which to attain this.
‘Good’ post-Mobutu serials define evil (especially coming from the vil-
lage) and portray how the Devil threatens Christian families. These narra-
tives thus depict how those who remain strong in their prayers and keep
their faith in God do not fall victim to the evildoers. Evil results in death
and bad luck. At a certain point, real Christians recognize the distress,
sickness or marital conflicts as the effects of diabolical work, but often they
have a hard time in convincing others that they are surrounded by evil.
Only in the end does the evildoer get rescued, when s/he admits that God
is more powerful than the Devil. More abstractly, we could reframe this
scenario as follows: Christians are endangered by the Devil who invades
the domestic sphere with the help of other human beings. The latter
threaten individual and collective health (in a physical and social sense),
but if Christians continue to pray, evil cannot harm them.
Based on Milton Singer’s (1958) analysis of rituals as scenarios or
dramatizations of valued end states and effective means of achieving them,
Ortner (2002: 163) argues that rituals may be included in the category of
key scenarios. In the post-Mobutu serials (and also in the public testi-
monies, another key narrative in the city), conversion, confessions and
deliverance rituals are identified as important turning points in the unfold-
ing of the cultural plot. The representation of Christian purification rituals
as an effective means with which to purify society promotes Jesus’ path,
offering success and the inspiration to be good.
The strategies by which the post-Mobutu serials seek to construct
Kinois cultural identity differ from those employed in the serials produced
during Mobutu’s regime (the so-called Salongo serials). In the serials pro-
duced during Mobutu’s reign, the protagonist is a citoyen (citizen in
French) who aims to perpetuate ancestral traditions and folklore under
the authenticity programme of the nation’s leader. Besides this appraisal of
the nation’s past, virtue (Li. bokasi), honesty (Li. bonkonde) and hard work
(Li. mosala) give the individual not only wealth (Li. bonkita), but also dig-
nity (Li. bosembo), which helps the nation as a whole to shine. Today, a
good Christian is someone who prays and performs cleansing rituals like
testimonies and deliverances. The Christian has thus replaced Mobutu’s
citoyen.
It is interesting to note how this Christian key scenario also inspires the
reception and evaluation of ‘foreign’ media narratives. A powerful exam-
ple is the reception of the American show Top Models (The Bold and the
Beautiful), which is eagerly watched in Kinshasa. Several channels broad-
cast the same episodes in the morning and the evening. Early in the morn-
ing, many Kinois watch the love affairs of Ridge, Brooke, Massumo,
Stephanie and others, all of whom have become household names. The
avid reception of this soap opera does not equate with social approval of

13. In a recent article the fictive characters’ actions and social and sexual lives, but stems from a
on the political
imagination in
curiosity in the lives of others, other worlds in other times and other
Congo-Brazzaville spaces. Nevertheless, the American soap is brought closer to home, ele-
during the 1990s, ments are transposed to personal experiences and the aesthetics are com-
David Eaton (2006)
has described a
pared to local aesthetics of good serials. One informant recounted to me
similar discourse. with much disdain how one of the soap’s protagonists (Brooke Logan) had
14. This idiom has been
slept with her daughter’s boyfriend: ‘Ambre is naive. She is not responsible
noted in a wide range for her own actions. She and her mother (Logan) are the superstars of the
of ethnographies show, and they take all men of other wives. These are really the incarna-
on African societies
struck by political
tions of Theresia,’ she said, referring to one of the Cinarc actresses who
and economical usually performs the role of an adulterous wife and/or wicked woman in
crisis (Ferguson 1999; the Cinarc serials. This young woman continued her evaluation of the Top
Gable 1995;
Hutchinson 1996;
Models’ protagonists: ‘Elle (Logan) m’énerve: a mother who falls in love
Sanders 2001; Prince with her son in law and even gets pregnant with his child!’ Without me
2006). asking her any questions, she took this serial as a starting point to recount
a story that was going on at that moment in her mother’s family. Her sis-
ter’s husband had made her niece pregnant. An abortion had ended the
pregnancy, but once the girl was married and a pregnancy was not
announced, the Holy Spirit revealed to another aunt that the girl had to
perform a soul healing (Fr. cure d’âme). During this private session with a
Christian leader, she confessed her illicit love affair and showed regret. The
actress evaluated the confession and the regret as important turning
points in the niece’s life. This is in contrast to the female characters in Top
Models who continue their illicit love affairs without questioning the impact
of their behaviour on their future lives. Important here is how the young
actress articulates parallels between a global narrative like the American
soap opera and local serials (‘She is like Theresia’). Furthermore, it is fasci-
nating to see how the actions of fictive characters dwelling in an American
upper-class white world offer an entry for an evaluation on the morality or
amorality of this actress’ family members. Besides her evaluation of global
fictive characters along cultural norms, her spontaneous account after-
wards, that puts forward the need for confession and pleading guilty,
reflects key practices in the Pentecostalist Christian construction of the
moral person, of how humans should relate to each other and come to
terms with their own asocial behaviour and that of others. This emphasis
on the need for confession plays a crucial role in Kinshasa’s teleserials.
The crisis
How does the debate on the representation of witchcraft in the serials
relate to a project for the nation? The lived reality of loss, alienation, inse-
curity and displacement, which the crisis has come to symbolize, pervades
the lives of all Kinois (young and old, rich and poor, Christian and non-
Christian). In Kinshasa’s political imagination, idioms of affliction and
their occult origin are used to diagnose national politics and the experi-
ence of crisis.13 Bodily metaphors of illness and death dominate reflections
about the city and the country as a whole. Some say ‘the country is sick’
(Li. mboka ezobela) while for others ‘the country is dying’ (Li. mboka ekufi).14
For Kinshasa’s born-again Christians, it is clear that Satan governs/
governed the country and has bewitched the leaders. In local thought,
political success derives inevitably from occult powers. According to the
108 Katrien Pype

Kinois, Mobutu had no other option than to align with occult experts, 15. White’s research
on the political
thus explaining why, in popular recollections of the Mobutu regime, stories imagination in the
abound of occult sacrifices. For example, a lethal plane crash in the middle Congolese diaspora
of a market in Kinshasa in 1996, or the death of ministers during discusses the ongoing
negotiations of
Mobutu’s reign were attributed to the leader’s presumed bonds with occult Zaire’s past within
malignant powers.15 Similar ideas about the occult connections of potent a transnational
political leaders were also heard in discussions about Joseph Kabila. One Congolese public
sphere. He mentions
Christian informant found much truth in rumours that Kabila had con- some Internet
sulted a diviner in Mbandaka to solidify his power. According to her, discussions that
Kabila had to seek mystical force so as to dominate his adversaries. From portray Mobutu as
a permanent resident
this emerges a particularly dark image of Congo: in order for its leaders to of Hell (White
be strong, they have to connive with the Master Witch, the Devil. 2005: 75).
Kinois often state: ‘tozalaka na rond point’, (‘we are at a roundabout’),
which indicates that they feel that the country is unable to move forward.
This is opposed to ‘tokende liboso’ (‘let’s go forward’), which evokes a linear
image of progress and development. ‘Toza lié’ (‘we are bound’), is also often
heard in the same context, here using a common metaphor for witchcraft.
Metaphors of tying, linking and binding are widespread throughout
Congo, and denote local notions of health, life, fertility and well-being
(De Boeck 2004: 118; Devisch 1993). To be in good health, or to be
morally healthy, is expressed in metaphors of ‘being well-connected, well-
knotted’. In the knotting, the individual is connected to the descent group,
which enables the transmission of vital life flow (Li. bomoyi) and thus
guarantees the continuation of the whole group. Witches disrupt the
healthy knots and ‘tie one with cords or knots’ (Li. kokanga) into ‘a disinte-
grative and negative bond that counters and undoes or unties the vital
integration between the corporeal, social and cosmological fields’ (De Boeck
2004:118). The rope that ties one down refers metonymically to the goat
that played an important role in rituals. Within the witchcraft idiom, the
bound goat thus refers to a person who is controlled and who has lost his
freedom. Just as a bound goat can only make circles around the stake to
which his rope is attached, young Kinois men may find a job only to lose it
a few months later, or a disease can be cured for several weeks but
inevitably will come back. Opening up the rope’s knot or ‘untying the
country’ (Li. kofungola mboka) is a metaphor that captures the only solu-
tion to countering the spiritual or bewitched condition of the postcolonial
African city. Prayers and exorcizing rituals are Christian technologies with
which to alter the condition of bewitchment.
Here, the Christian twist to ‘bokoli’, another word for ‘development’, is
crucial. The concept of bokoli (from the verb kokola) means ‘to ripen, to
obtain its finality, its endpoint’ (Kawata 2003), which is already latently
present and needs time and social encouragement to fully realize itself. In
Christian discourse on national development, it is said that the finality of
the country (Li. suka ya mboka) is what ‘God wants the Congo to be’. The
Creator of all things has a particular purpose with his creations. God
wants the Congo to be prosperous, it is said, indicating that it is the
nation’s finality to be well developed on all levels: economically, politically,
socially and spiritually.
The idioms described above are by no means unique to the post-
Mobutu period. As Filip De Boeck has observed, the experience of crisis did

16. He uttered this not emerge in the 1990s but had already begun during the colonial
phrase in French.
There seems to be
encounter, continuing throughout the Zaïre-state until post-Mobutu
no Lingala expression Congo (De Boeck 1998: 25; see also White 2005: 66). The Christian solu-
for it. A similar tion for the nation’s instability and corruption is not a recent religious
expression is ‘tokomi
vivre lokola banyama’
innovation either. Even in the early Mobutu period, Congolese prophetic
(‘we have begun to movements (like Kimbanguism, ‘Eglise de la Foi’) proposed, as a major
lead a life like ‘remedy’, to reveal the witches, to make the ‘fetishes’ (magical objects) dis-
animals’) – an
expression with a
appear and to pray to God (Bernard 1971: 154).
particular tone in a How exactly do Kinshasa’s dramatic artists experience and reflect on
Christian discourse ‘la crise’ in their private worlds, and how is this translated in the teleseri-
that equates pagans
with animals.
als? Cinarc’s leader gave his own analysis of life in the city: ‘Here we do not
live, we merely exist’.16 The distance between living and existing that he
17. Note the nostalgia
for the colonial times.
speaks off does not merely reside in the acquisition of commodities but is
See De Boeck (1998) more profound, as he explained to me later on: ‘Here in Kinshasa, there
for a problematization are no rules. People just do what they want and how they want it.’ He
of this play between
forgetting the
articulated the fundamental lack of meaning these youngsters perceive in
atrocities of the their social relationships, in their daily struggle to survive and in their
colonial project and experiences with the state. Insecurity, for example, is inherent in the
emphasizing its local
fruits.
nation’s historical course and analysis of the general political situation is
transposed onto a larger spiritual frame:
A society that has no rules is led by the Devil, who enjoys chaos. If God
would govern this country, we would have the same roads as we had during
colonial times. During colonial times, our city was really a beautiful city. We
had boulevards like in Paris and the roads were not as dirty as they are now.
Congolese have chased God away. It is time that we all ask God to come back
to Congo.17
(Bienvenu, Cinarc’s leader, 4 November 2004)
Uncontrolled soldiers, an increasingly filthy urban environment and lack

of infrastructure (roads, electricity, water and so on) are interpreted as
physical outcomes of a spiritual battle. The same goes for economic hard-
ships (difficulties of finding jobs despite education, continuous poverty and
the overall condition of a ‘virtually wealthy’ underdeveloped country), the
political transition, the tense social relations disrupted by suspicion and
the alienation of the country from its traditional worlds (now, by many,
diabolized), all aspects on which many of my fieldwork subjects reflected.
For the artists, the difference between living and existing resides in the
presence or absence of rules to obey. A society without rules means chaos
(Li. mubulu) where no ‘life’ is possible.
The utterance ‘we merely exist, we do not live’ is reminiscent of Robert
Desjarlais’ difference between ‘experience’ and ‘struggling along’. Desjarlais
defines these concepts as two phenomenal categories that depict two dis-
tinct ways of being. ‘Experience’ entails coherence and transcendent mean-
ing, ‘of tying things together through time’ (Desjarlais 1996: 87), while
‘struggling along’ depicts the experience of displacement and unrest, the
incapability of making sense, of finding any possibility of blending encoun-
ters and moods into a meaningful narrative. The difference between these
two modes of being rests on the kind of environment in which one lives:
absence of security and trust, the lack of any orientation towards the
110 Katrien Pype

future, or the utmost experience of crisis creates a mode of ‘struggling 18. The serial was
produced and
along’ (Desjarlais 1996: 88). broadcast in Kinshasa
over eight episodes,
Personal pasts between January and
March 2004.
In the construction of telenarratives, Kinshasa’s dramatic artists attempt
to enter into the experience mode. An example is the serial Caroline et
Poupette,18 which tells the story of Beti (in the serial, Caroline) who played
one of the leading roles. The youngest girl of a family of six children, she
became an orphan at the age of twelve. Her mother had died one year ear-
lier and her father then remarried his deceased wife’s sister, following the
traditional sororat, a practice still enacted among the Bamongo, both in
the original region in the Equateur province and in Kinshasa. Six years
later her father died too, poisoned by Mobutu, it was said. She has no idea
what position her father occupied in the Mobutu government but she
knows that ‘he was close to Mobutu’. Around the time of her father’s
death, an aunt took her to a revival church. Her aunt promised Beti a
church ‘where people really pray and where miracles happen’. She said:
I was reluctant at first, but as soon as I entered the church compound I saw
people falling down and being touched by the Holy Spirit. I heard of people
who found a job after they had been touched by the pastor. And that made
me believe that there might be a solution for the problems in my life.
Because, you know, at that moment I needed God to give me a sign that he
would take care of me. And I think at that moment I received that sign.
(Beti, 18 January 2005)
Convinced about the power of God’s word and having witnessed the mira-
cles in that revival church, Beti began to evangelize the city dwellers. She
became a member of the evangelizing drama group, Cinarc, and informed
its leader about her personal distress and how God brought peace and order
back into her life. Inspired by this account, the troupe’s leader decided to
translate her biography into a fictive story.
The serial narrates the hardship of two orphaned sisters who have been
sheltered by their maternal uncle. His wife, however, who perceives
Caroline and Poupette as an unwelcome nuisance in her household,
engages in witchcraft to kill the two girls. Her aunts and a féticheur aid her
in the occult work. For some time their demonic acts are effective: Poupette
is dying in hospital. A pastor saves the girls – who have not lost their faith
in the Christian God – from the demonic afflictions: he exorcizes the evil
spirit that has occupied Poupette’s soul. As if by magic, a Nigerian business
man, also a Christian believer, crosses their path. Distressed by the condi-
tion of the two young girls, he financially contributes to their education
and medical treatments. In the end, the Nigerian marries one of the girls
and announces that he will take his wife and her sister to Europe. The ser-
ial’s finale stages the aunt showing regret, demanding forgiveness for her
actions and accepting Jesus, for otherwise death – the other side of occult
practices – would have been her fate.
Although the story can be read as a reflection on Beti’s personal past,
the actress and the company at large wished to expand the dramatic
events to reflect the experiences of many Kinois. The actors considered this

urban Cinderella story as an admonition to both Beti’s real aunt and all
the other households in which orphans are badly treated. In a television
show, Beti asked people to treat orphans in a decent way: ‘They suffer even
more than you who have them in your house’. Through the re-enactment
of their personal dramas and the plot, in which either conversion or death
are the ultimate options, the youngsters pointed at their parents and family
and demonized the behaviour of their family members in a Pentecostalist
frame of interpretation. Again and again, Beti has framed her biography
within a Pentecostalist narrative, saying that ‘God wants people to treat
each other in a good, decent way, and if you are badly treated, you should
pray to God, for He will hear your prayers, and will make life better.’ She
continues: ‘Look at me, how I am well now. I do not have any problems.
Life has changed since I have received Jesus Christ.’
Accusing the elders

What is striking about the social space of these serials is the way elders are
addressed. In the post-Mobutu serials, elders (like the aunt Theresia in the
serial Caroline et Poupette) are identified as the sources of witchcraft. For
most young Kinois, elders are identified as village people. Members of both
these categories are believed to be heavily engaged in witchcraft and most
Kinois youngsters display an ambivalent attitude towards ‘their village’
(Fr. mon village, Li. mboka na ngai) as they call the land of their ancestors.
One artist explained:
In the village, your aunt can invite you to have dinner but in fact she will put
something in your food because she will want you to leave your money over
there. We are Christians and we do not have to fear anything if we keep on
praying. One day, I want to visit my ancestors but I know that I will have to
pray very hard if I make the visit.
(Dinghi, Cinarc actor, 20 December 2004)
This same actor immediately referred to the role of his group’s serials in
evangelizing the city, which he explained as follows:
Evangelizing the city means that we have to show people how the Devil
works. Sometimes our parents want us to follow certain rules but they do
not know that they are doing what the Devil wants. We have to show them
that certain former practices from the village are in fact pagan matters.
(Dinghi, 20 December 2004)
Associating pagans and elders with the Devil on the one hand and born-
again Christians with God on the other significantly compares past and pre-
sent. The Devil occupies the realm of the past with its gerontocracy, while the
Christian God and his followers (mostly youth) are directed towards the
future. In the young Pentecostalists’ mindset, ‘the village’ (Li. mboka), which
many of them have never visited, and ‘the elders’ (Li. bankoko – father, mother,
classificatory parents and lineage representatives) constitute an association of
evil forces that belong to the realm of ‘the past’ (Li. eleki), a realm that no
longer has any meaning for ‘the future’ (Li. ndaka) that Kinshasa’s youngsters
long to inhabit. The future these youngsters aim to realize resides in a destiny
112 Katrien Pype

(also ndaka) given by God and is only possible when a Christian approach to 19. These observations
regarding ludic
‘development’ is embraced. Only then can God’s Will be enacted, when there action beg a
is no longer hindrance to the realization of God’s master plan. comparison with
Youngsters’ accusations that elders possess witchcraft are a phenome- Achille Mbembe’s
(1996) analysis of
non that today also occurs in other urban and rural African societies. Joseph the pervasive force
Tonda describes how Brazzaville’s (masculine) youth describe the elders as of laughter in Africa
‘basendzi (monkeys), uncivilized, illettrés (illiterate)’ (Tonda 2002: 39), but in subverting political
power. Mbembe
above all as witches. Even if they recognize that young witches do exist, describes how, in
according to Tonda, witchcraft is fundamentally considered to be an attribute Cameroon, derision,
of elders, in particular those who have failed in life. Sjaak Van der Geest (2002) obscene humour and
political cartoons
has documented the relationship between young rural Ghanaians and their serve to strip political
elders and argues that young people speak of elders as witches, a discourse leaders of their
which van der Geest explains as a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott 1985). authority in moments
of laughter.
According to van der Geest, ‘The younger generation, which is supposed to
show the elderly respect, cannot afford to accuse them openly of evil prac-
tices. Bayie (witchcraft) provides them with the opportunity to combine out-
ward respect with hidden resentment’ (van der Geest 2002: 458).
Witchcraft idiom is thus a powerful yet indirect site of venting frustration.
In the serials, these witchcraft accusations are combined with another
indirect technology: laughter. The portrayal of elders always evokes humour,
and actors often mock their seniors. Fictive elderly characters, who are
always performed by youngsters, are presented in a ridiculous manner: they
walk too slowly for the urban rhythm, speak in broken French or intersperse
their Lingala with words of ethnic languages and are poorly dressed (the men
wearing cloth which, in the city, only women are allowed to do). These signs
construct an image of an elderly population maladjusted to urban life and
visibly not in step with urban style. The humour in this portrayal subverts
the elders’ authority, in line with Rijk van Dijk’s (2001) observation that
among Malawian Pentecostalists youngsters often use humour to diminish
gerontocratic influence and create solidarity amongst youth against the
political authority of the elders.19
Conclusion
Kinshasa’s teleserials have always engaged with issues of development and
progress. However, different political regimes have favoured distinct visual
cultures and narratives. The general assumption that the nation and its cit-
izens are bewitched imposes a particular idiom of development that does
not derive from formal education, the acquisition of consumer goods or eco-
nomic progress. A bible-inspired ‘key scenario’ for the individual and the
larger collectivity is privileged and the major routes towards progress and
social change are exorcism rituals and conversion. The churches’ focus on
the individual and his or her responsibility in the development of the nation
renders the melodrama very successful in their evangelization campaign.
Our emphasis on the producers of these teleserials draws our attention
to the lived experiences of the city dwellers who daily experience the diffi-
culties of a nation in crisis. The young Christian actors use the space of
television to contribute in their own particular style to the reconstruction
of the city and the nation. Their reconstruction is acted out on a personal
and collective level: they aspire to attribute meaning to lived experiences,
to signify personal traumas and hardship. The Christian actors not only

engage in spreading biblical teaching through their mass-mediated stories,

but also through the translation of their private worlds into Christian nar-
ratives: they seek to transcend from the ‘existing’ mode into the ‘living’
mode (to use my interviewees’ words), into a life where meaning and sense
is created and articulated, both for themselves and for their audiences. In
an informal and playful but nevertheless pervasive manner, the artists
assist in the rewriting of the city’s morality.
When examining the ‘moral movement’ (Fernandez 1982: 301–309) of
the serials, we should keep in mind that the fictive re-enactments are not mere
representations of reality: they are in the first instance ‘selections’, a character-
istic that Kenneth Burke (1962) identifies for narrative in general. The emplot-
ment of the present grasps events from different times and worlds into a
meaningful storyline that transforms the lived uncertainties into decisive
moments for the evolution of the plot (Overing and Rapport 2000: 283–290).
These stories do not only reshape the past and the present but they also create
new paths for the future (Capps and Ochs 2001). We encounter here the
Kinois in interpretive and practical struggles to understand life as an unfolding
affair that holds a variety of moral and structural positions. The teleserials
stand ‘in time’, and yet they make the very time the city dwellers are in. In par-
ticular, the serials partake in the Pentecostalists’ qualification of the present as
an ‘apocalyptic interlude’ (cf. De Boeck 2004: 98).
Acknowledgements
This article was presented in various guises during the Leuven/Uppsala doctoral
workshop (October 2004, organized by the anthropology departments of the
Catholic University of Leuven and the University of Uppsala) on the production of
place and space, and at the ‘Media and Social Change’ conference at the University
of Westminster in February 2006. I would like to thank organizers and participants
of both meetings for their comments. Filip De Boeck has read and commented upon
various drafts of this article. Much gratitude also goes to the anonymous reviewer of
the JAMS journal and to Kinshasa’s dramatic artists and their audiences.
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Suggested citation
Pype, K. (2009), ‘We need to open up the country’: development and the Christian
key scenario in the social space of Kinshasa’s teleserials’, Journal of African Media
Studies 1: 1, pp. 101–116, doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.101/1
Contributor details
Since 2002, Katrien Pype is a teaching and research assistant at the Institute for
Anthropological Research on Africa (IARA) at the Catholic University of Leuven
(KUL). She just recently completed her doctoral dissertation on the production of
television serials in Kinshasa (2008). She has also studied and published on other
aspects of Kinshasa’s popular culture relating to religion, music, sports and gender.
Contact: IARA, Institute for Anthropological Research on Africa, Catholic University

of Leuven, Parkstraat 45, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium.
Tel: +32 16 320 463 (office)
E-mail: Katrien.Pype@soc.kuleuven.be
Web: http://soc.kuleuven.be/arc/staff/katrienpype.htm
www.africaresearch.be
116 Katrien Pype

JAMS_1.1_10_Schumann.qxd 8/5/08 11:54 AM Page 117

Popular music and political change in

Côte d’Ivoire: the divergent dynamics
of zouglou and reggae
Anne Schumann School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London
Abstract Keywords
In Côte d’Ivoire, popular music genres such as reggae and zouglou have served as a Popular music
domain for the articulation of ideas about politicians, corruption, citizenship, youth and politics
national history and identity. This paper specifically analyses the divergent dynamics political change
of reggae and zouglou. Reggae, in Côte d’Ivoire as in its country of origin Jamaica, patriotism
has characteristically been associated with commentary on socio-political issues. Côte d’Ivoire
Zouglou emerged in the 1990s in the context of the student demonstrations for
political liberalization and, along with reggae, served as a platform for criticism of
prevailing social and political conditions. Ivorian popular music has consequently
been associated with the return to multi-party politics. It has also been very outspoken
against divisive political rhetoric such as Ivoirité. However, after the outbreak of open
conflict in 2002, new themes have emerged in zouglou. In compilations that have
been termed ‘patriotic albums’, many well-known artists have aligned themselves with
the government and the Alliance of Young Patriots, depicting a partial, ‘southern’
portrayal of the conflict. Thus ideological positions in Ivorian music have varied over
time and across genres, and a category such as protest music is ill suited to fully
capture its dimensions.
Music does not exist autonomously of other social, economic and political
institutions. Music may still be able to change the world as well as reflecting
it, but, when we talk of music’s politics, we are not just talking of the way it
articulates ideas and emotion. We are also talking of the politics that shape it.
(Street 2001: 254)
The coup d’état in Côte d’Ivoire at the end of 1999 set in motion a period of
political instability that in 2002 resulted in a civil war dividing the coun-
try. To understand the circumstances leading to these political develop-
ments, it is essential not just to analyse transformations in the military
and the political elite, but also to understand popular conceptualization of
political issues. In West Africa, popular music functions as a means of
mass communication and its themes can reflect and contribute to the for-
mation of public opinion. In addition, music functions as a ‘trenchant
political site in Africa primarily because it is the most widely appreciated
art form on the continent’ (Allen 2004: 1). Radio, for example, has been
characterized as the most effective means of disseminating information

1. Some artists and ideas in Africa (Carver and Maja-Pearce in Campbell 1998: 14). The
maintain that
they wrote patriotic
spectacular growth in access to broadcast radio across Africa (see Fardon
songs to support and Furniss 2000; Tudesq 2002) led to music’s position as Africa’s ‘most
their country, rather salient popular art, one that is most comprehensively transmitted through
than its government.
the mass media, giving it exceptionally wide reach’ (Allen 2004: 2). As
Winston Mano (2007) demonstrated with regards to Zimbabwe, popular
music can usefully be considered as a form of journalism.
In order to fully grasp the implications of the Ivorian conflict, it is impor-
tant to understand the discourses used in Côte d’Ivoire that shape political
attitudes, since the debate on national identity is not confined to political cir-
cles, but is debated within Ivorian society at large. In Côte d’Ivoire, popular
music genres such as reggae and zouglou have played a critical role at signif-
icant turning points in recent Ivorian history and have served as a domain
for articulation of ideas and information about politicians, corruption, citi-
zenship, national history and identity. This paper analyses the divergent
dynamics of reggae and zouglou from democratization in 1990, through the
coup d’état in 1999 and the outbreak of civil war in 2002. Reggae, in Côte
d’Ivoire as in its country of origin Jamaica, has characteristically been asso-
ciated with commentary on socio-political issues. Zouglou emerged in the
1990s in the context of student demonstrations for political liberalization
and, along with reggae, served as a platform for criticism of prevailing social
and political conditions. Ivorian popular music has consequently been asso-
ciated with the return to multi-party politics under Félix Houphouët-Boigny
in 1990 and the overthrow of Henri Konan Bédié by General Robert Gueï in
1999. It has also been very outspoken against divisive political rhetoric such
as Ivoirité. However, after the outbreak of open conflict in 2002, new themes
have emerged in zouglou. In compilations that have been termed ‘patriotic
albums’, many well-known artists have aligned themselves with the govern-
ment and the Alliance of Young Patriots – Alliance des jeunes patriots – led
by Charles Blé Goudé.1 These patriotic songs have often depicted a partial,
‘southern’ portrayal of the conflict. Thus ideological positions in Ivorian
music have varied over time and across genres, and a category such as
protest music is ill suited to fully capture its dimensions. These dynamics in
popular Ivorian music also demonstrate the inadequacy of trying to under-
stand postcolonial power relations between the rulers and the ruled through
what Achille Mbembe describes as ‘the binary categories used in standard
interpretations of domination’ (in Nyairo and Ogude 2005: 246).
Democratization and the emergence of zouglou in the 1990s

On 30 April 1990 Houphouët-Boigny legalized opposition parties and rein-
stated multi-party politics in response to a widespread movement for
democratization. During this period, popular music, especially reggae and
zouglou, turned into ‘key channels for raising political awareness and mobi-
lization’ (Akindès 2002: 86). From February to April 1990, students at the
University of Abidjan, the Students’ and Schools’ Federation of Côte d’Ivoire –
Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (the student union
FESCI) – and other youth organizations were at the forefront of demonstra-
tions against declining living conditions and demanding political liberaliza-
tion (Akindès 2002: 87). Zouglou emerged in this context, and accordingly
most of its initial songs and first successes described the difficulties of
118 Anne Schumann

student life. As a new, urban musical form, zouglou distinguishes itself 2. However, due to
widespread piracy,
through its use of nouchi, the French street-slang spoken in Abidjan, and official sales figures
its use of very direct, outspoken texts, rather than of subtle, coded mes- do not necessarily
sages. This may partly be due to zouglou’s birth in the context of the liber- represent the actual
popularity of songs.
alization of the press, and a perception that a frank discussion of the
country’s problems was long overdue. This is, for example, the theme of
the song ‘Bouche B’ (‘Gaping mouth’) by the group Les Salopards:
Mes chers frères, oh, je vais vous My dear brothers, I will tell you
dire certaines choses, certain things,
On ne voulait pas parler, We didn’t want to speak, but
mais …je suis obligé, oh, I have to,
Il y a le feu au pays. The country is on fire.
Quand on voit tout ça là, If we see all this is,
C’est parce que on ne veut pas It’s because we didn’t want to
parler, oh. speak.
On voit tout ça, on ne dit rien. We see all this, but we say nothing.
On voit tout ça que vous faites, We see what you do, but we don’t
on ne veut pas parler, oh.… want to speak …
Maintenant on va parler, oh! Now we are going to talk!
Therefore, Karin Barber and Graham Furniss’ suggestion that new genres
often imply ‘new ways of looking at the world’ (Barber and Furniss 2006:
10) is demonstrated in the new sensibilities associated with the develop-
ment of zouglou. The song ‘Gblogblo Koffi’ by Didier Bilé (1990), describing
the difficulties of student life, was one of zouglou’s first big hits, selling over
90,000 copies2 (Solo 2003: 123). In the introduction, the singer exclaims:
Ah ! La vie estudiantine ! Ah, student life!

Elle est belle mais il y a encore It’s beautiful, but there are still
beaucoup des problèmes many problems
Lorsqu’on voit un étudiant, on When you see a student, you envy
l’envie him
Bien sapé, joli garçon sans Well-dressed handsome guy, without
produit ghanéen beauty products
Mais en fait, il faut entrer dans But in fact you have to enter his
son milieu pour connaître environment to know
La misère et la galère d’un The misery and the agony of a
étudiant. student.
Ohô ! Bon Dieu, qu’avons nous Oh, good God what have we done
fait pour subir un tel sort ? to be inflicted with such a fate?
Et c’est cette manière d’implorer And this way of imploring the Lord
le Seigneur
Qui a engendré le zouglou, danse Has created zouglou, a philosophic
philosophique dance
Qui permet à l’étudiant de se That permits students to enjoy
réjouir themselves
Et d’oublier un peu ses And to forget their problems for a
problèmes. while.
Dansons donc le zouglou ! So let’s dance zouglou!
Popular music and political change in Côte d’Ivoire 119

3. Many political In the context of economic deterioration, the state cut down on social ben-
actors in the
current conflict,
efits such as subsidized bus fares, rooms and catering for students. The song
such as Guillaume ‘Génération sacrifée’ (‘Sacrificed generation’), from an album by the same
Soro and Charles title from the group Les Salopards, reveals how students’ economic and
Blé Goudé as well
as other actors in
political grievances were expressed simultaneously:
the ‘patriotic galaxy’,
were leaders in Quand ça commence on dit When it starts they say students
student politics and
étudiant aime trop palabre. like too much palaver.
in the FESCI in the
early 1990s. This Quand ça commence on dit When it starts they say students
generation of political étudiant aime trop grever. like strikes too much.
actors emerged in
Au début ils nous ont arraché les First, they took away the bus
the same period as
zouglou music. bus, fares,
On nous fait payer les chambres, They make us pay for our rooms,
les tickets de restauration. for our catering tickets.
Au lieu de donner de cours, ils Instead of giving lectures, they
font des fascicules, make photocopies,
Rien que pour s’enrichir. Just to enrich themselves.
Ils créent le système pour nous They have recreated the system to
recaler. control us.
Les grands frères sont fâchés, The older brothers are angry,
Le vieux père veut pas Our old fathers don’t want to
s’aider. help us.
Étudiant dit de lui donner son Students say to give them their
argent, money,
Il ne sait plus comment manger. They no longer know how to eat.
Étudiant dit de libérer les Students say to free the prisoners
prisonniers who have not stolen,
Qui n’ont pas volé, ils ont que Who just have ideas.
des idées.
Etes-vous obligées de nous Are you obliged to pursue us,
pourchasser,
Nous tuer, nous emprisonner To kill us, imprison us
Pendant que nous demandent While we ask for better working
des conditions conditions?
Meilleurs pour travailler? … When we make demands, they
respond with tear gas.
Quand on revendique on nous
répond avec de la lacrymogène.
Zouglou presented itself as a genre of marginalized youth, and since zouglou

emerged in the context of political protests, zouglou’s many songs about the
adverse living conditions of students were associated with criticism of the
failing economy and the Houphouët-Boigny government. Zouglou emerged
in an ‘atmosphere of general struggle’ and animated the meetings of the
FESCI3 (Thiemélé 2003: 71). Through popular music, the youth of
Abidjan were expressing the desire for political agency. The deterioration
of the standard of living of course affected not only students, but also the
population at large, and widespread public unrest ensued, including
public sector and security forces strikes. Alpha Blondy, Côte d’Ivoire’s
most prominent reggae singer, had a reputation for addressing social
120 Anne Schumann

and political concerns in his songs.4 Starting in the 1990s, his songs 4. See Konaté (1987)
for a detailed
became increasingly confrontational. In ‘Multipartisme’ (‘Multi-party poli- account of Alpha
tics’), one of his biggest hits, he documented the social unrest and the eco- Blondy’s career.
nomic crisis that accompanied democratization. 5. Papier longuer = those
who study for a long
Les militaires sont fâchés parce The soldiers are angry because time (i.e. university
students), lé mourouti =
qu’ils ont mal payés they are underpaid
have revolted.
Les policiers sont fâchés parce The police are angry because they
are underpaid 6. Also see Dozon
qu’ils ont mal payés
(1997) for a detailed
Les professeurs sont fâchés, leurs The professors are angry, their account of the
droits syndicaux bafoués union rights flouted ethnic and migratory
Les étudiants sont fâchés, ils The students are angry, they want dynamics of the
development of the
veulent plus de liberté more freedoms plantation economy
Papier longueur lé mourouti, Students have revolted because in colonial Côte
parce qu’ils ont été cognés5 they have taken a beating d’Ivoire.
Les médecins sont fâchés parce The doctors are angry because 7. See Kipré (2005) on
qu’ils ont mal payés they are underpaid the Kragbe Gnagbe
affair, for example.
Les ouvriers sont fâchés parce The workers are angry because
qu’ils ont été compressés they were downsized
Le gouvernement est fâché, les The government is angry, state
caisses de l’état vidées, vidées funds are empty, empty
Furthermore, the song warns of the politicization of ethno-regional identi-

ties in a multi-party system: multi-party politics isn’t tribal politics (multi-
partisme c’est pas tribalisme). While zouglou was identified with the student
movement for democratization from its inception, similar criticism was
voiced in reggae songs, and both genres contributed to political conscienti-
zation in the early 1990s.
Ethno-regional politics
Houphouët-Boigny stood as candidate for the Democratic Party of Cote
d’Ivoire – Parti démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire – (PDCI) and was elected
as president on 28 October 1990. Ethno-regional political alliances were
already a feature in Côte d’Ivoire’s first multi-party election, and are worth
reviewing in more detail. Under the single-party system, Houphouët-
Boigny had aimed to make the PDCI into a national party, with a consid-
erable degree of success. He continued the historical alliance of Baoulé
farmers and northern Ivorian and Burkinabé migrant workers that had
started under French colonial forced labour regimes6 (Crook 1997: 222).
Inhabitants of the mainly Bété regions in the centre–west felt marginalized
as both northerners and Baoulé migrated to their region to farm cocoa,
and therefore these areas developed into centres of opposition to the
PDCI.7 As part of Houphouët-Boigny’s alliance, foreign Africans had been
allowed to vote in Ivorian elections, and this practice became hotly con-
tested after democratization. Thus, in 1990, Gbagbo, the leader of the
major opposition party Ivorian Popular Front – Front populaire ivoirien –
(FPI), accused the PDCI of unfair practices since it was likely that Sahelian
migrants would again vote for their benefactor and thus for the PDCI. The
FPI campaign attacked the PDCI as unfair Baoulé domination, accusing
the PDCI of being a partial regime that had ‘systematically favoured the

8. Original text: Nous interest of particular Ivorian ethnic groups – Baoulé and groups from the
ne voulons plus faire
partie de la république
north – and foreigners’ (Crook 1997: 222).
de Côte d’Ivoire après However, even before Houphouët-Boigny’s death, there were signs of the
Houphouët-Boigny. PDCI–Northern alliance breaking down, as demonstrated by the Charter of
the Greater North (Chartre du Grand Nord) issued by Blondy in 1992
(Konaté 2002: 301). The text states unambiguously that after Houphouët-
Boigny’s death, the author does not see a place for the north in the coun-
try: we no longer want to be a part of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire after
Houphouët-Boigny.8 Houphouët-Boigny died on 7 December 1993 and
was succeeded by Bédié, the leader of the National Assembly, as outlined in
the constitution. Alassane Dramane Ouattara, his main rival, who had
joined the Houphouët-Boigny government to implement structural adjust-
ment policies, quit his post as prime minister and left the country to rejoin
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A number of PDCI members who
had supported Ouattara’s economic policies left the PDCI to form the
Assembly of Republicans – Rassemblement des républicains – (RDR). With
the creation of the RDR, Bédié feared that disaffected northerners now had
their own regional party and that this would cost the PDCI dearly in
northern votes. This stance became a self-fulfilling prophecy, since by
pushing the RDR into the position of an ethno-regional party and by purg-
ing Ouattara supporters in the civil service and dismissing northerners
from positions in the media, Bédié drove northern Ivorians into the arms
of the RDR (Crook 1997: 226).
Ivoirité, autochthony, national history

The emergence of the RDR, viewed by Bédié as the greatest threat to the
PDCI, resulted in Bédié issuing an electoral code that restricted the vote to
Ivorian nationals, on the assumption of the conflation of the interests of
internal migrants from the north and foreigners from neighbouring
Sahelian countries. This code also barred Ouattara from running as candi-
date in the 1995 elections on the grounds that his Ivorian nationality was
in doubt, and that he might actually be from Burkina Faso. Bédié’s legalis-
tic strategy to exclude his major political rival from standing for election
also resulted in the revival of the concept of Ivoirité. This had the deleteri-
ous consequences of creating Ivorians of different degrees, ‘pure’ and
‘mixed’ Ivorian identity, and putting the Ivorian nationality of migrants
from the northern parts of the country into question. The bizarre effects of
this political use of Ivoirité are described in the zouglou song ‘Tu sais qui je
suis’ (‘You know who I am’) by the group Les Poussins Chocs, in the satir-
ical style typical of the genre.
Tu sais qui je suis ! You know who I am!

Si l’ivoirien te dit « tu sais qui je If an Ivorian tells you ‘you know
suis », who I am’,
Il veut dire qu’il est ivoirien que He wants to tell you that he is
toi. more Ivorian than you.
Nouveau millénaire arrive It’s the new millennium
Où chaque pays prépare son Where every country does its
bilan. assessment.
122 Anne Schumann

C’est là l’ivoirien a la peur au There, the Ivorian gets afraid.

ventre.
Affaire de l’ivoirité, Due to Ivoirité,
Parce qu’il ne sait pas s’il sera He doesn’t know if he’ll always be
toujours ivoirien. Ivorian.
Je connaissais un monsieur, il I knew a man, he was Ivorian,
était ivoirien,
Vers la fin il est devenu ghanéen. And in the end he became Ghanaian.
Il y a un autre aussi, There was another one,
Il était ivoirien et puis après il est He was Ivorian, and afterwards he
devenu mossi. became Mossi.
Même le chef du village, le gens Even the village chief, people have
ont commencé de dire started saying
Qu’il ne pas ivoirien aussi. That he isn’t Ivorian either.
In this song, Les Poussins Chocs highlight a fundamental dilemma in the

discourses of autochthony: the danger ‘that someone can always claim to
“belong” even more than you do’ and that ‘one can never be sure that one
“really” belongs’ (Geschiere and Jackson 2006: 6). This uncertainty of
national identity and the use of nationality to disqualify political oppo-
nents (those who have changed camps) are also mentioned by Tiken Jah
Fakoly in the reggae song ‘Plus jamais ça’ (‘Never this again’).
Quand ca commence et tu When it starts and you change

changes de camp camps
Tu deviens automatiquement You automatically become Liberian
libérien
Ou bien ghanéen, sinon on Or Ghanaian, or otherwise they
t’appelle le burkinabé call you Burkinabé
Tout simplement parce que tu Simply because you have changed
change de camp camps
The perception of the political use of Ivoirité is thus very similar across genres.
Additionally, both songs refer to the same events. Djény Kobina, a founding
member of the RDR, came from the south-western region of Côte d’Ivoire.
The electoral commission declared Kobina’s nomination invalid on the
grounds that he could not prove that he had Ivorian parents. Kobina had held
high positions in previous governments and served as PDCI national secre-
tary for external relations under Houphouët-Boigny and was able to produce
a certificate of Ivorian nationality. However, he could not produce birth docu-
ments of his parents, who were allegedly Ghanaians. His appeal to the consti-
tutional court was rejected in three days (Crook 1997: 238). The case of the
Ivorian who discovered that he was Burkinabé refers to Ouattara, as discussed
above. The political nature of these accusations of foreign nationality at
founding members of the RDR illustrates ‘that democratization seems to trig-
ger a general obsession with autochthony and ethic citizenship invariably
defined against “strangers”’ (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2006).
However, this ‘obsession with belonging’ (Nyamnjoh 2005) was not
simply a political strategy in Côte d’Ivoire, since this debate was continued

9. For a detailed in the society at large. Zouglou and reggae songs also engaged with theories
historical account
of the settlement of
of who came from where, when and why. ‘Tu sais qui je suis’ one such song:
the territory that is
now Côte d’Ivoire, A l’école primaire, l’histoire de la At primary school, the history of
see Kipré (2005).
For an account
Reine Pokou9, Queen Pokou
of the migration Les gens ont dit que les Akan People said that the Akan come
of the Akan under viennent du Ghana. from Ghana.
Queen Abla Pokou,
C'est pour éviter la guerre To avoid war
see pp. 39–42.
Que les Krou sont descendu du The Krou have descended from
Libéria. Liberia.
C'est aussi pour fuir la guerre It is also to avoid war
Que ces en haut sont descendu That those on top descended a bit
un peu en bas. further down
Et puis ensemble on a formé un And then together we formed a
joli pays. beautiful country.
Oú il y a pas palabre. Évitons Where there is no conflict. Let’s
l’injustice entre nous. avoid injustices between us.
Parce que beaucoup d’injustice Because lots of injustice
Peut entraîner un petit désordre. Can create a small disorder
Pourtant c’est les petits désordres Yet small disorders
qui entraînent souvent des Often create large bambams.
grands gbanban.
The reggae song ‘Nationalité’ (‘Nationality’) by Fakoly is more detailed in

its chronology, but just like ‘Tu sais qui je suis’, this song also warns that
injustice can create social conflict.
Il était une fois une terre There was once a cosmopolitan

cosmopolite land
Sur laquelle des peuples se sont On which different peoples met
retrouvés
C'est ainsi que les Sénoufo se sont Thus the Sénoufo settled there in
installés au 16ème Siècle the 16th century
C'est ainsi que les Krou étaient Thus the Krou were already there
déjà la avant le 16ème Siècle before the 16th century
C'est ainsi que les Baoulé se sont Thus the Baoulé settled there in
installés au 18ème 18th century
C'est ainsi que les Dioula se sont Thus the Dioula settled there in the
installés au 17ème Siècle 17th century
A propos de nationalité ils ont They have difficulties with regards
des difficultés to their nationality
Parce qu'ils ont des cousins en Because they have cousins in
Casamance Casamance
Même s'ils ont des cousins en Even if they have cousins in Sierra
Sierra Leone, Leone
Est ce qu'il n'y a pas de Kouamé Aren’t there also Kouamés in
au Ghana … Ghana …
Cultivons l'unité et la paix Let us cultivate the unity and peace
Il ne faut pas se contenter de le We shouldn’t be satisfied just by
dire saying it
124 Anne Schumann

Mais il faut l’avoir dans le But we also have to show it in our

comportement behaviour
Autant on peut fabriquer des You can manufacture rebels with
révoltés avec des doctrines doctrines
On peut aussi en fabriquer avec But you can also manufacture
l'injustice them with injustice
It is apparent that this song, which presents itself as opposed to Ivoirité,

does not fundamentally question its underlying logic. The claims of ‘hav-
ing been the first’ (Geschiere and Jackson 2006: 5) that make up the focal
point in arguments of autochthony are elaborated in its chronology. Just
as the ideologies of the PDCI declared that on ‘10 March 1893, at the
moment when the Côte d’Ivoire was born, the ancestors of all the great
ethnic groups were already there’ (Touré in Marshall-Fratani 2006: 23),
national identity in this song is also based on which ethnic groups had
historically settled in Côte d’Ivoire, excluding descendants of more recent
migrants. The song’s argument thus in no way addresses, or even recog-
nizes, the dilemma of second and third generation migrants from Burkina
Faso and other neighbouring countries.
The 1995 elections and the 1999 coup d’état

As a result of the exclusion of Ouattara, the RDR and FPI formed the Front
Républicain and together boycotted the 1995 elections. The political situa-
tion grew increasingly tense as the government claimed that the electoral
code was legal, and the opposition maintained that it was unacceptable. On
15 September 1995, the government banned all demonstrations, which led
to violent confrontations between the police and illegal demonstrators
throughout the country (Crook 1997: 232). The next day, Bédié called for a
round table conference of all the political leaders to find a compromise agree-
ment between the parties as a method by which the electoral campaign could
proceed peacefully. However, the government refused any change to the elec-
toral code and the opposition commenced what they termed an ‘active boy-
cott’ (boycott actif), in order to de-legitimize the entire election. ‘This was
a euphemism for a concerted attempt to actively sabotage the elections,
that is, to physically prevent them from happening’ (Crook 1997: 233).
By 22 October, their action had escalated into what can only be described as
an attempt to ferment a state of insurrection (Crook 1997: 233). The song
‘Plus jamais ça’ vividly describes the unrest associated with the 1995 elections:
Quand ça commence, les bus en When it starts, buses on fire

flamme
Lorsqu’il y a grève, les maisons When there’s a strike, houses on
en feu fire
Quand on est fâché on casse tout When we are angry, we break
everything
Est-ce la solution ? Is this a solution?
Arrêtez-moi tout ca là ! Nous Stop all that! We’ve gone crazy …
avons déconné …
Quand ça commence, les When it starts, cars on fire
voitures en flamme

Lorsqu’il y a marche, les villes When there’s a demonstration,

paralysées towns are paralysed
Quand on est fâché on brûle tout When we are angry, we burn
everything
Où est le sérieux ? Who is serious here?
Arrêtez-moi tout ca là ! Nous Stop all that! We’ve gone crazy …
avons déconné …
Mais pourquoi casser nos acquis ? Why break our assets?
Mais pourquoi réprimer les Why repress the citizens?
citoyens ?
Au nom de quelle politique faut- In the name of which policy do
il détruire ? you destroy?
Au nom de quelle politique faut- In the name of which policy do
il diviser mon peuple ? you have to divide my people?
In 1995, Bédié was elected president in an election without a credible opposi-

tion candidate, and in the context of widespread protest and his government
subsequently lacked legitimacy. By 1999, reggae and zouglou contributed to the
political demands that led to Bédié’s overthrow (Akindès 2002: 87). As men-
tioned above, a frequent criticism of Bédié was his use of Ivoirité to disqualify
political rivals, and his depiction of the RDR as a regional northern party and
the FPI as a Bété ethnic party. In Côte d’Ivoire, ‘where Houphouët-Boigny had
constructed a one-party state based on alliances between potentially opposed
regional groupings, to cast a political party as representative of only ethnic
interests was to de-legitimize it’ (Collett 2006: 623). Ultimately it was Bédié’s
practice of inciting ethno-regional politics that de-legitimized his own govern-
ment, as can be discerned from the following song, ‘Course au pouvoir’
(‘Race to power’), by Blondy.
Y'a du sang sur la route There is blood on the road

Qui mène a la tour du pouvoir That leads to the tower of power
Y'a du sang innocent There is innocent blood
Les partis en face disent la même The opposition parties are saying
chose the same thing
Pour la même cause For the same cause
Dans ce face a face In this face-off
Le peuple se retrouve face au The people find themselves
peuple confronting the people
Et le peuple massacra le peuple And the people will massacre the
au nom du peuple people in the name of the people
Les partis en face The opposition parties
Sont d'accord qu'ils ne seront Agree that they will never agree
jamais d'accord
Opposition radicale Radical opposition
Parti au pouvoir radical Radical ruling party
Le verbe devient inamical The verb becomes unfriendly
Et la démocratie tribale And democracy becomes tribal
Ils ont bété-ise le débat They have Bété-ized the debate
Ils ont baoulé-ise le débat They have Baoulé-ized the debate
Ils ont dioula-ise le débat They have Dioula-ized the debate
126 Anne Schumann

Les querelles de la personne Personal quarrels put the republic 10. That said, there
mettent en péril la république in danger are nevertheless
ideological differences
La désinformation intoxique Disinformation poisons public between the parties.
l’opinion publique opinion The RDR has a
rightist orientation,
and was initially
Thus, following Houphouët-Boigny’s legacy of ethnic and regional balanc- created in support of
ing and alliances, Bédié de-legitimized his own regime in his attempt to Ouattara’s economic
undercut the legitimacy of his rivals. Both ‘the FPI and the RDR were policies. Ouattara was
responsible for the
increasingly being forced into representing single ethnic groups, and elites implementation of the
in both parties began to use this to their advantage’ (Collett 2006: 624). structural adjustment
Furthermore, none of the parties distinguished itself through a thorough policies in the early
1990s, which partly
debate on an economic programme to alleviate the country’s economic crisis; caused the student
instead they became increasingly entrenched in their ethno-regional protests. The FPI is
positions.10 As zouglou singer Soum Bill remarked in ‘Nos problèmes’ (‘Our socialist in name and
has traditionally had
problems’): much support among
students.
Malgré tout nos problèmes, In spite of all our problems
Nos leaders on choisi de descen- Our leaders have chosen to
dre dans la poubelle … descend into the rubbish bin
Pendant que notre misère While our misery grows
grandit
On est à la recherche de notre We are searching for our Ivoirité
ivoirité …
On 24 December 1999, General Robert Gueï overthrew Bédié, stating that

he had no presidential ambitions and promising to organize free elections
in 2000, since Bédié had blocked this process. However, by 2000, he had
formed his own political party, the Union for Peace and Democracy in Côte
d’Ivoire – Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d’Ivoire – (UDPCI),
and was standing for election. The constitutional court again excluded
Ouattara on the ground of his doubtful nationality, as well as all of the
PDCI candidates. Before the votes were fully counted, Gueï declared himself
president. Mass demonstrations ensued and Gueï fled the country, as he no
longer had support from the army, since many of those who had supported
his coup felt deceived after Gueï started using the same rhetoric of Ivoirité that
he had previously criticized. Gbagbo was then declared president. However,
Ouattara’s supporters protested, calling for new elections. Two days of severe
violence between FPI and RDR supporters followed, and soon developed
into a north–south ethno-regional conflict, as the effects of the previous
years of divisive politics became evident. Ouattara and Gbagbo issued a
simultaneous call for peace to restore order in the country and to prevent
the immediate outbreak of a civil war (Banégas and Losch 2002: 150).
Again, the observations by both reggae and zouglou artists are discerning.
Fakoly remarks ‘Politicians […] light the fire, activate it, and later play at
extinguishing it’ (‘Les hommes politiques …allument le feu, ils l’activent, et après
ils viennent jouer au pompier’) in the song ‘On a tout comprisi’ (‘We’ve under-
stood everything’). Similarly, in the song ‘Bledji’, zouglou singer Soum Bill
points out the paradox of the circumstances ‘When those who divided us,
are the same ones who now want to reconcile us’ (‘Quand c’est eux qui nous
ont divisé, c’est encore eux qui veulent nous reconcilier’).

The 2002 rebellion and the civil war

As illustrated above, zouglou artists denounced the political use of Ivoirité. In
fact, the identification of zouglou with a non-ethnic Ivorian identity goes
beyond apparent song texts. Yacouba Konaté notes that, as an urban music,
zouglou is not referable to a particular portion of the national space, and not
associated with any particular region or ethnic group. It is a national music
in the sense that this music was born in Côte d’Ivoire and is internationally
recognized as Ivorian. Thus, a national music can be non-ethnic, non-
traditional and not associated with a particular religion (Konaté 2002:
791–792). However, after the outbreak of civil war in 2002, new themes
have emerged in zouglou. In compilations that have been termed ‘patriotic
albums’, many well-known artists have been expressing patriotism of the kind
that is associated with Gbagbo’s government and the Alliance of Young
Patriots. Zouglou artists have been depicting a partial portrayal of the conflict
and, consequently, the music is increasingly associated with the southern
region of the country. Eddie, Deza XXL and Kley Saley, for example, have
formed a group called Les Loyalistes. They addressed the rebels thus in ‘À nous
la victoire’ (‘Victory is ours’):
Vous pouvez encore vous You can still recover, guys,

ressaisir, les gars
Déposer les armes avant d’y être So put down your weapons before
forcés, being forced,
À vous de choisir. It’s your choice.
En voulant nous diviser Wanting to divide us
Vous avez réussi au contraire à You succeeded in bringing us
nous rapprocher together.
Tant le respect de la constitution The respect for the constitution
est devenu has become
Pour tout Ivoirien une priorité... A priority for all Ivorians …
Assaillants, terroristes, dehors ! Attackers, terrorists, out!
The popular singer Gadji Celi dedicated nearly the entirety of his most
recent album Special 19 Septembre 2002/La paix (19 September 2002 Special –
Peace) to the civil war. Additionally, the national broadcasting service,
Ivorian Radio-Television – Radio Télévision Ivoirien – (RTI), produced ten
versions of the song ‘Ode à la patrie’ (‘Ode to the country’) (Solo 2003: 127).
Another group including the well-known Petit Yodé, Soum Bill and
Pat Saco, among others, called themselves Haut les Cœurs, referring to the
legendary slogan that concluded the media statements of lieutenant colonel
Yao Yao Jules, spokesman of the National Armed Forces (Forces Armées
Nationales) (Solo 2003: 127). Using fragments of the Abidjanaise, the
national anthem, this group composed ‘Libérez mon pays’ (‘Free my country’),
a call to ‘free’ Côte d’Ivoire. Even though this song is presented as an appeal
for peace and unity, it nevertheless includes xenophobic lyrics:
Je te salue ô terre d’espérance, I salute you, oh country of hope,

pays d’espoir, pays hospitalier… country of hospitality
On aime bien les étrangers, mais We like foreigners, but in the end
à la fin on se préfère … we prefer each other
128 Anne Schumann

Notre hospitalité nous impose Our hospitality imposes the love of 11. Gadji Celi does not
l’amour des étrangers, foreigners on us sing zouglou per se,
but a style mixing
Mais, maman, méfions-nous de But mama, let’s be wary of these Congolese and Bété
gens étranges strange people musical styles.
12. BBC ‘Ivory Coast’s
charming rebel’
by Joan Baxter at
The portrayal of Côte d’Ivoire as a country of hospitality that is abused for http://news.bbc.co.
its openness and attacked out of envy is frequent in zouglou songs and in uk/1/hi/world/africa/
the portrayal of the conflict in other popular discourses, for example at the 2793729.stm
parlements and agoras in many quarters of Abidjan (Banégas 2007). ‘In the 13. Open letter by
regime’s eyes, it had done nothing to deserve this “unjust war” and has Ibrahim Padjofê.
‘J’aime mon pays
persistently projected the image through its media and public discourses of et j’ai décidé de ne
an Ivorian “people” assailed from all sides’ (Marshall-Fratani 2006: 35). plus le tuer’, in
Below are two examples of such a perception of the conflict in two popular Fraternité Matin,
10 March 2003.
zouglou songs:11 Original text: Je
voudrais dire ici
qu’aucun des chefs de la
rébellion qui endeuille
Je ne reconnais plus ma patrie, I no longer recognize my country, le pays n’a jamais mis
oh jolie Côte d’Ivoire oh beautiful Côte d’Ivoire les pieds sur une front
Aujourd’hui victime, victime de It is today a victim of these de guerre, ni conduit
une troupe au cours
ces manipulations manipulations d’un combat.
Aujourd’hui victime, victime It is today a victim of its prosperity
pour sa prospérité …
Aujourd’hui victime, victime de It is today a victim of great envy
grande jalousie
(NCM, ‘Pourquoi nous?’ – ‘Why us ?’)
Le pays le plus fréquenté The most frequented country

Le pays le plus accusé The most accused country
Il est plein d’hospitalité It is full of hospitality
C’est pour ça il est critiqué And for this it is criticized
Il est provoqué It is provoked
Le pays le plus convoité. The most desired country
(Gadji Celi, ‘Ne touchez pas à mon pays’ – ‘Don’t touch my country’)
Relations with the Gbagbo government

Another recurrent theme is that of politicians profiting from the conflict to
the detriment of the population. BBC correspondent Joan Baxter observed, for
example, that Guillaume Soro went from relative obscurity to driving through
Bouaké in a Mercedes as though he was its president.12 Ibrahim Padjofê,
the ‘repentant rebel’, remarked in his account published in the newspaper
Fraternité Matin on 10 March 2003 that ‘I would like to say here that none
of the leaders of the rebellion which aggrieves our country has ever put
their feet on the war front, nor led a troop during combat.’13 In the song
examples below, political leaders are charged with using the conflict to
further their interests while being the first to flee the war that they have
created.

14. Pat Saco and Valery À vous nos hommes politiques, To you our politicians
of Espoir 2000 Le pays n’est pas la boutique The country is not a shop
interviewed by
Patrick Méka, Où on vient acheter les articles. Where you go to buy things
Le Front, 10 January À cause de vos intérêts, Because of your interests
2007. Original text: Des enfants meurent sur le terrain, Children are dying
Non ! Nous n’en savons
rien. Pat Saco et ses On ne fait que les enterrer. We do nothing but bury them
camarades n’ont pas Si vous laissez nos pauvres If you leave our poor parents
signé de contrat avec parents,
des leaders politiques.
Ce n’est pas pour de Ils sont innocents, They are innocent
l’argent qu’ils ont Je vous ferez tous président. I would make you all president
chanté. Le pays est
attaqué donc en tant que (Gadji Celi, ‘Ne touchez pas à mon pays’ – ‘Don’t touch my country’)
fils de ce pays, ils ont
pris le micro pour
chanter. Mon vieux père Gohou, c’est toi My old father Gohou, you were
qui avais raison right
15. Petit Yodé interviewed
by José Téti, Declic Les vrais bourreaux de l’Afrique, The true executioners of Africa are
Magazine, 24 August ce sont les Africains Africans
2006. Original text: Ils commencent la guerre et sont They start war and are the first
Est-ce donc vrai que
vous n’avez jamais rien les premiers à fuir ones to flee
reçu du pouvoir comme Parce qu’ils ont des construc- Because they have buildings on the
l’a dit Pat Saco? Rien de tions sur les Côtes d’Azur Côtes d’Azur
qui que ce soit.
Mais nous on est là parce qu’on But we are here because we have
16. However, even a des constructions buildings
without direct finan-
cial compensation by Sur le mont Korhogo et les dents On the Korhogo mount and in
the authorities, the de Man Man
benefits of participat-
ing in ‘patriotic songs’ (NCM, ‘Pourquoi nous?’ – ‘Why us ?’)
included, for example,
extensive airplay on
state media.
However, these allegations of using the conflict for personal gain do not
stop at political leaders. Artists are also accused of being ventriotes (a fusion
between la politique du ventre and patriotes) (Banégas 2006: 544), i.e. of
profiting financially from their self-identification as patriots. It is widely
assumed that musicians are amply financially rewarded for their services
(Solo 2003: 126). Musicians deny this allegation. Pat Saco and Valery,
interviewed on this matter exclaim ‘No, we know nothing about this!
Pat Saco and his friends haven’t signed a contract with politicians. They
didn’t sing for money. The country was attacked, and as sons of the country
they took their microphones to sing.’14 In another interview, Petit Yodé
responded to the following question: ‘is it true that you have never received
anything from the government, just as Pat Saco said?’, with, ‘Nothing at
all.’15 Therefore, while there may have been a general expectation that singers
would be rewarded for their political support, the supposition that anti-
government music is inspired by genuine feeling and that pro-government
music is financially motivated does not necessarily hold.16
The post-September 2002 dynamics of reggae show that there is not
one political ‘position’ in this genre and that, in fact, it is to a great extent
determined by the individual positions and trajectories of artists. Fakoly,
for example, has fled the country and now lives in exile in Mali. He is
accused of supporting the rebellion and the Forces Nouvelles. He was,
however, very critical of Gbagbo, holding him responsible for the outbreak
130 Anne Schumann

of civil war in the song ‘Quitte le pouvoir’ (‘Quit power’), since Gbagbo accepted 17. The open letter
from Serges Kassy
the presidency under, in his own words, ‘calamitous conditions’, rather than to Tiken Jah Fakoly
organizing new elections. as published in the
newspaper Notre Voie,
on 16 November
Quitte le pouvoir, je te dis quitte Quit power, I tell you to quit power! 2005, provides an
example of their
le pouvoir ! differences.
Je t’avais prévenu que tu as été I warned you that you were badly
18. John Jay in the
mal élu, elected
newspaper Le Patriote,
Mais tu t’es accroché, aujour- But you stuck to power, today all is 16 February 2007.
d’hui tout est gâté spoilt
However, Fakoly’s position cannot be extended to represent reggae artists as

a whole. Since the outbreak of conflict, the relationship between himself
and fellow reggae singer Serge Kassy has been quite confrontational.17 Kassy
has often been referred to as the number two of the ‘Alliance of Young
Patriots’, and has received much media attention in this capacity. However,
Kassy is also accused of being a patriote alimentaire and of profiting from the
conflict to boost his failing musical career.18 Thus, the accusation of being a
ventriote is not exclusive to zouglou stars, and in fact not exclusive to singers:
it is a claim directed at many leaders of the ‘patriotic galaxy’ in Abidjan.
Blondy has taken a reconciliatory stance, and was nominated peace ambas-
sador by the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire.
Gbagbo, perhaps aware that the erosion of the legitimacy of Bédié’s
government was possibly accelerated through popular music, enrolled artists
in his support. According to Raoul Blé, loyalist politicians were delighted
about the contribution of zouglou music in resistance to the rebellion, since
the songs were successful in rousing public opinion. Gbagbo’s government
was able to recover legitimacy by using the airwaves of state media to contin-
uously broadcast messages in favour of the government, which had been
weakened by the crisis of September 2002 (Blé 2006: 180). Therefore, while
zouglou presented itself as resistance music against the Forces Nouvelles, it has
nonetheless supported the government.
Conclusion
To understand political developments in Côte d’Ivoire, it is essential not
just to analyse political developments but also to understand popular
cultural conceptualization of political issues. In West Africa, popular
music can function as a means of mass communication and its themes
can reflect and contribute to the formation of public opinion. In Côte d’Ivoire,
popular music genres such as reggae and zouglou have served as a
domain for the articulation of ideas about politicians, corruption, citi-
zenship, national history and identity. Ideological positions in Ivorian
music have varied over time and across genres, and a category such as
protest music is ill suited to fully capture its dimensions. These dynamics
in popular Ivorian music also demonstrate the inadequacy of trying
to understand postcolonial power relations between the rulers and the
ruled through what Achille Mbembe describes as ‘the binary categories
used in standard interpretations of domination’ (in Nyairo and Ogude
2005: 246).

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From Voice of the State to Advocate of Democracy. Westport: Praeger.
Collett, M. (2006), ‘Ivoirian identity constructions: ethnicity and nationalism in
the prelude to civil war’, Nations and Nationalism, 12:4, pp. 613–629.
Crook, R. (1997), ‘Winning coalitions and ethno-regional politics: the failure of
the opposition in the 1990 and 1995 elections in Côte d’Ivoire’, African Affairs,
96, pp. 215–242.
Dozon, J.-P. (1997), ‘L’étranger et l’allochtone en Côte d’Ivoire’ in B. Contamin and
H. Memel-Foté (eds), Le Modèle ivoirien en questions. Crises, adjustements, recom-
positions, Paris: Karthala-Orstom.
Fardon, R. and Furniss, G. (2000), African Broadcast Cultures: Radio in Transition,
Oxford: James Currey.
Geschiere, P. and Jackson, S. (2006), ‘Autochthony and the crisis of citizenship:
democratization, decentralization, and the politics of belonging’, African Studies
Review, 49:2, pp. 1–14.
Geschiere, P. and Nyamnjoh, F. (2000), ‘Capitalism and autochthony: the seesaw
of mobility and belonging’, Public Culture, 12:2, pp. 423–452.
Langer, A. (2005), ‘Horizontal inequalities and violent group mobilization in
Côte d’Ivoire’, Oxford Development Studies, 33:1, pp. 25–45.
Kipré, P. (2005), Côte d’Ivoire: la formation d’un peuple, Fontenay-sous-Bois:
Sides-Ima.
Konaté, Y. (1987), Alpha Blondy: reggae et societe en Afrique noire, Paris: Karthala.
Konaté, Y. (2002), ‘Génération zougou’, Cahiers d’etudes africaines, XLII:168,
pp. 777–796.
Mano, W. (2007), ‘Popular music as journalism in Zimbabwe’, Journalism Studies, 8:1,
pp. 61–78.
Marshall-Fratani, R. (2006), ‘The war of “who is who”: autochthony, nationalism,
and citizenship in the Ivorian crisis’, African Studies Review, 49:2, pp. 9– 43.
Nyairo, J. and Ogude, J. (2005), ‘Popular music, popular politics: unbwogable and
the idiom of freedom in Kenyan popular music’, Africa Affairs, 104:415,
pp. 225–249.
Nyamnjoh, F. (2005), Africa’s Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging,
London: Zed Books.
132 Anne Schumann

Solo, S. (2003), ‘Zouglou et nouchi, les deux fleurons pervertis de la culture

urbaine’, Africultures, 56, pp. 121–127.
Street, J. (2001), ‘Rock, pop and politics’ in S. Frith, W. Straw and J. Street (eds),
Pop and Rock, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Paris: Karthala.
Works cited
À nous la victoire – Les Loyalistes
Bledji – Soum Bill
Bouche B – Les Salopards
Course au pouvoir – Alpha Blondy
Gblogblo Koffi – Didier Bilé
Génération sacrifiée – Les Salpoards
Libérez mon pays – Haut les cœurs
La mère patrie – Gadji Celi
Multipartisme – Alpha Blondy
Nationalité – Tiken Jah Fakoly
Ne touchez pas à mon pays – Gadji Celi
Nos problèmes – Soum Bill
Ode à la patrie – RTI (Radio Television Ivoirien)
On a tout compris – Tiken Jah Fakoly
Plus jamais ça – Tiken Jah Fakoly
Pourquoi nous ? – NCM
Quitte le pouvoir – Tiken Jah Fakoly
Tu sais qui je suis – Poussins Chocs (Petit Yodé et L’Enfant Siro)
Suggested citation
Schumann, A. (2009), ‘Popular music and political change in Côte d’Ivoire: the
divergent dynamics of zouglou and reggae’, Journal of African Media Studies 1: 1,
pp. 117–133, doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.117/1
Contributor details
Anne Schumann is a Ph.D. Candidate in the School of Oriental and African Studies
at the University of London.
E-mail: a.schumann@soas.ac.uk

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JAMS_1.1_11_Lwanda.qxd 7/23/08 5:03 PM Page 135

Music advocacy, the media and

the Malawi political public sphere,
1958–2007
John Lwanda social and cultural historian, Dudu Nsomba
Publications, Glasgow
Abstract Keywords
Journalists and writers in Malawi were crucial in the resistance to Dr Banda’s Malawi media
hegemony between 1964 and 1993. The contested terrain was orality. This paper oratory
concentrates on the role of musicians and asserts that musicians in Malawi were, oral culture
and arguably are, much braver and more persistent political critics and social advocacy
change advocates than their counterparts in print journalism. While journalists politics
censored themselves, and were censored, oral practitioners’ lyrics and texts were public sphere
usually much more explicit. Musicians exploited aspects of traditional culture to
point out the political–economic suffering of the peasantry. While journalists’ cri-
tiques and analyses have, since 1995, become more muted, musicians have contin-
ued to provide more independent, forceful voices ‘on behalf of the poor’ in a country
where literacy levels remain low and English is the official legislative, political and
economic voice. This paper argues that an assessment of Malawi’s public sphere
excluding oral critiques misses significant and critical inputs important for social
and developmental change.
Language carries culture, and culture carries, particularly through orature

and literature, the entire body of values by which we perceive ourselves and
our place in the world […]
(Ngugi wa Thiongo 1981: 15–16)
Introduction
In line with Ali Mazrui’s ‘seven functions of culture’, this paper sees 1. ‘… lenses of
oral communication as a crucial determinant of development in perception and
cognition, motives for
Malawi.1 In 2007, Malawi remains a designated United Nations Least human behaviour,
Developed Country with high illiteracy rates (NSO 2002; Kerr and criteria for evaluation,
Mapanje 2002: 73–92; Malawi SDNP 2006). Consequently, orality a basis for identity, a
mode of communica-
remains an important feature of social, political and economic dis- tion, a basis for
courses in Malawi (Banda and Young 1946; Vail and White 1991; stratification, and a
Kamlongera et al. 1992; Lwanda 2003). So low were literacy levels system of production
and consumption’
that ‘much of the civic education in 1994 was communicated through (Mazrui 1990: 7–8).
cartoons, poetry, drama, jingles and music’ (Kasambara 1998: 246).
Despite this, English continues to be the dominant parliamentary, judi-
ciary and predominant mass media language (Kayambazinthu 1998:

389–392; Matiki 2001). Following on from Ngugi wa Thiongo (1997:

23), it would be best to describe Malawi oral literature as orature, since
it includes spoken, sung, dramatized and recorded oral literature. The
comparative role of orature in social, economic and political advocacy
is this – one of a trilogy – paper’s focus.
A brief background
Eng. Lit., my sister,
was more than a cruel joke –
it was the heart
of alien conquest.
(Mnthali 1989: 139–140)
The early colonial period

Malawi became a British protectorate in 1891, remaining a British colo-
nial entity until independence in 1964. Although beyond the remit of this
paper, it is worth noting that, self-evidently, oral poetry and orature pre-
date the written forms introduced by colonialism (cf. Schoffeleers and
Roscoe 1985; Chakanza 2000). Edrienne Kayambazinthu (1998: 392)
notes that from the early colonial phase, beginning with colonial settlers,
circa 1875, English was used as the horizontal mode of communication
between ‘the governing structures’, while the vernacular Nyanja became
the dominant vertical mode of communication linking ‘the authorities and
the population’ (after Heine 1977 and 1990). Thus the colonial era’s written
and electronic media in Malawi always catered for the government and pow-
erful interest groups, mostly missionaries or colonial planters, and no sus-
tained tradition of middle-class or rural African newspapers was established
(cf. Pachai 1972 and 1973). As Malawi experienced both ‘direct and indi-
rect’ colonization, the government media was used as a tool of control in pur-
suit of the colonial project (Pachai, 1973: 247–251).
Between 1912 and 1930, no fewer than nine native associations
were formed. These ‘native’ associations, which fought for African
advancement, were peopled by educated Africans including teachers,
medical assistants, messengers and clerks (Pachai 1973: 228). There
were thus two main public spheres: that of the Europeans – a largely
written one – and an indigenous oral one. There was a minor overlap-
ping sphere of educated Africans who, while sharing the indigenous
oral public sphere, could access part of the European public sphere
through direct interaction and through reading European oriented
papers, like the Nyasaland Times (Pachai 1973: 228). The indigenous
public sphere is often obliquely referred to in colonial literature in
terms of various ‘ethnological activities’ involving music, initiation cer-
emonies, commerce and traditional administration (cf. Johnston 1969:
409–472).
The John Chilembwe anti-colonial uprising in 1915 is both an illustra-
tion of the main African grievances of the period and an example of the
dynamics of the overlapping public spheres. Chilembwe’s grievances ‘on
behalf of his people’ involved land rights, education, working conditions
on the colonial estates and nationalism and were shared across ‘tribes’
136 John Lwanda

and ‘religions’ by educated Africans who led the rebellion (cf. Pachai 2. Banda argued that
these were in line
1973: 252–253; Shepperson and Price 1987: 218–263). They were also with Chewa culture
noted by those colonial administrators who read Chilembwe’s letter in the (cf. Banda and Young
Nyasaland Times: 1946; Short 1974;
Lwanda 1993).
Everybody knows that the natives have been loyal to all Nyasaland (colonial 3. See http://www.
nationmw.net/ for
Malawi) interests and Nyasaland institutions […] We have unreservedly
the Nation and http://
stepped to the firing line in every conflict … But in times of peace the www.dailytimes.
Government failed to help the underdog. bppmw.com/ for the
Daily Times.
(in Shepperson and Price 1987: 234–235)
Despite this brief exposure in the European public sphere, the limited size
of the educated African public sphere and the lack of media resources to
enable a significant galvanizing of the masses – at a time when govern-
ment media resources were on a war footing – were contributory factors
to the uprising’s failure.
The late colony and the fight for independence

Towards the late colony, as educated Africans took on the leadership of the
nationalist movement from chiefs, the native associations coalesced into
the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), formed in 1944 (cf. Pachai 1973:
251). The nationwide NAC required means of communication. Between
1944 and 1959, this communication was with mimeographed newspa-
pers like Zoona, Congress Circular and Mtendere pa nchito, which were essen-
tially ‘protest nationalist’ papers. Educated Africans and rural masses
communicated by oratory.
Between 1953 and self-government, in 1961, Dr Banda’s Malawi
Congress Party (MCP) gradually created, in its quest for hegemony, a
politically oppressive environment intolerant of political opponents and
viewpoints. The MCP was determined to build a nation based on the
concept of ‘unity, loyalty, obedience and discipline’.2 The media, as
agents of information dissemination, became particularly controlled
and constrained. As Lupenga Mphande asserts, orality, rather than lit-
eracy, was the tool of communication at the centre of Dr Banda’s mass
mobilization (Mphande, 1996: 80), a process that used music (Chirwa
2001: 1–27). Although this paper notes the comparative role that ora-
ture plays in information dissemination and politics in Malawi, it
focuses mainly on the role of musicians. Comparatively few textual
examples from the printed media, which can be sampled online, are
included.3
A state of emergency, declared on 3 March 1959, succeeded in consol-
idating the educated Africans’ and the rural masses’ public spheres into a
united, undefined but essentially nationalist one. The Malawi News, estab-
lished in 1959, became its mouthpiece and metaphor, being used by the
MCP to see off the rival Christian Democratic Party (CDP) in 1961. The
CDP was considered ‘pro-Catholic’ and ‘anti-independence’ (cf. Schoffeleers
1999: 17–90). Aspects of culture, ‘unity’ and ‘respect for elders and the
wise leadership of Dr Banda’, were dominant (cf. McCracken 1998:
231–250). An example of the printed input into the public sphere is shown
by newspaper contents of the time.
Music advocacy, the media and the Malawi political public sphere, 1958–2007 137
The people of Malawi want self-government … In order to enable Dr Banda to

guide them to their nationhood and independence, the people … have sur-
rendered themselves to him …
(Malawi News, 4 June 1960, in Muyebe and Muyebe 1999: 73)
Self-government and after

After self-government in 1963, the European-owned Nyasaland Times, pre-
viously critical of nationalism and independence, became more muted as
the Malawi white and Asian establishment, led by Michael Blackwood,
achieved an ‘understanding of elites’ with Dr Banda. This coming together
of ‘elites’ was sealed by Dr Banda’s acquisition of the Times, renamed Daily
Times, soon after. That same year, the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation
(MBC) fell under local management. Aleke Banda, who had led the Malawi
News’ assault on the CDP, became its first director general. MBC journalists
followed the tradition, set by their colonial predecessors, of loyalty to the
government of the day. Since 1964 the heavily government-controlled
MBC has been a ‘state core system’ broadcaster (cf. Raboy 2002: 6).
After the Cabinet Crisis of August–September 1964, when ministers
opposed to Dr Banda’s autocracy were defeated, the government clamped
down on all media. In 1968 a Censorship Act, monitoring all music, liter-
ature, film, radio, newspapers, drama and language and enabling the ban-
ning of 840 publications by 1973 (Africa Watch 1990: 70), was passed
(Chimombo and Chimombo 1996: 1–3). The MBC Act of 1991 effectively
gave the government an editorial hand via the minister of information.
Control of the media was intense between 1968 and 1993, under, succes-
sively, Albert Muwalo (MCP Secretary General) and John Tembo (Minister
of State) (Muluzi et al. 1999: 127). Both used to read advance proofs of
newspapers before they were printed (Mtegha et al. 1994). It is not sur-
prising that in the period 1960 to 1980, newspaper content included such
gems as: ‘It is the duty of party officials, chiefs and village headmen, mem-
bers of the Youth League and members of the Women’s League to see that
everyone buys cards’ (The Times, 30 November 1967).
And this is how the 1984 MCP Party Convention was reported:
(1) Delegates congratulate His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr

Kamuzu Banda for building the Great Hall at Chancellor College with his
own money […]
(2) Delegates applaud the Life President for this year’s Party elections, which
were by secret ballot. They note that the Ngwazi’s wisdom enabled ordinary
people to elect people of their own choice to serve in the party. Delegates
thank the Life President for approving their names.
(Anon, 1984: 1–5)
The role of journalists

It is important to note that many journalists were detained between 1964
and 1993 in the course of their duties. These exemplary detentions fur-
ther contributed to the ‘elitification’ of the media, as it was primarily those
middle-class elites related to the ruling group, and trusted to ‘self-censor’,
who were likely to succeed in the Malawi media. Certainly, most pioneer
journalist-newspaper owners, like Alaudin Osman (The Financial Post),
138 John Lwanda

Janet Karim (Independent) and Mike Kamwendo (Quest), were of elite back-
grounds.
During the one-party era, The Malawi News and Daily Times established
the future pattern of Malawi newspapers, demonstrating how three public
spheres could share the same newspaper. There was a structural dichotomy,
with the front page (aimed at the black masses) proclaiming Banda’s suc-
cesses and the economic pages and social notices catering to the elite Asian
and European communities. In the Malawi News a vernacular inset was
included but, given the limited circulation of the Malawi News, made little
impact in the rural areas. Free vernacular propaganda broadsheets like
Boma Lathu (Our Government) aimed at anthu wamba, azimwale (ordinary peo-
ple, peasantry) merely extolled government successes.
Unlike poets who could ‘riddle the censor’, journalists had little room
to manoeuvre. Instead, they perfected ‘propagandic prose’. But towards
the end of the 1980s a number of local and global factors – glasnost, the
end of Cold War politics, the ‘aid for human rights discourses’, poverty
and, paradoxically, the IMF ‘Structural Adjustment Programme’ (SAP) –
had the effect of stimulating ‘financial or economic’ journalism (Lwanda
2002), enabling journalist-owned papers like The Financial Observer and
Financial Post, to be established. Between 1994 and 2004 a number of reli-
gious and privately owned radio stations were established, producing
seven radio stations by 2006.
The natural expectation that the coming of ‘multiparty’ would in turn
lead to the creation of a vibrant and healthy press was only partially real-
ized (cf. Lwanda 1996; Chimombo and Chimombo 1996; Lwanda 2002).
A number of critical reasons affecting journalists were responsible for this:
some journalists had been ‘actors and reporters’ in the ‘fight for multi-
party’, a factor that affected their objectivity; given the long one-party era,
there were few unbiased journalistic archives and oral sources were often
used to fit political stances; journalists quickly became dependent on the
achikulire (businessmen-cum-politicians) who owned newspapers like The
Nation, The Herald, The Monitor, The UDF News, Malawi Democrat, Guardian,
The Mirror and The Enquirer; those journalists who chose to remain inde-
pendent found their newspapers starved of government advertorials;
finally, key journalists were co-opted into government service (cf. Lwanda
2002). Unlike musicians who sang whatever they wanted, journalists
were pulled towards partisan journalism. Effectively, then, ‘in the multi-
party’, financial and economic inducements contributed to the diminution
of the independence of journalists’ voices, reflecting ‘elite concerns’. As at
independence, journalists and the media in which they functioned,
remained, to a significant extent, dependent appendages of government or
the very achikulire they sought to report and critique.
The introduction of television in the post-Banda era – supposed to fill
the large gap left by newspapers and imagined as something that would
bridge the literacy gap – was delayed by the collusion between the print
media, the MBC and the government of the day. The government wanted
Television Malawi (TVM) to be inaugurated nearer the 1999 elections.
The print media did not want to lose advertising revenue. Inevitably, TVM
emerged, in 1999, as a televisual equivalent of the state-controlled MBC.
Since 1994 both ‘multiparty regimes’ have used the Malawi Communications
Regulatory Authority (MACRA) (cf. IFEX 1999) and the Ministry of

Information to control the MBC and TVM (cf. Kayange 2006).
A telling feature of journalists – and writers during the Second
Republic of Malawi – was their failure, despite international support, to cam-
paign for a change to the 1968 Censorship and Control of Entertainment
Act. George Padambo, the Chief Censoring Officer, attempted to reassure the
media and public in late 1994:
Our noble duty is to safeguard Malawian cultural values […] in the past cen-
sorship went over the line, largely because of the political climate at the
time … the board had made proposals to the Ministry of Justice to amend
the Censorship and Entertainment control act so that it is in line with the
constitution.
(Padambo, quoted in Moni, 1994: 2)
However, in 2008, the Act remains in place. The use of tradition was to be
noted in the composition of the Censorship Board itself. In 1996, the board
had four ministers of religion, a medical practitioner, two chiefs and one
woman, inevitably ensuring censorship via ‘moral and cultural judge-
ments’. Of relevance to the present paper is the fact that journalists – and
media barons – failed to address the orality/illiteracy issue by providing
simple and affordable reading materials in local languages.
A brief history of music in Malawi

Though ‘modernized’ in ‘context and form’, the Malawi popular musical
space has not lost most of its indigenous origins and functions (Lwanda
2002). Between self-government in 1961 and independence in 1964, sev-
eral socio-cultural themes influenced the formation of the musical public
sphere. First were the self-government and independence political and cul-
tural imperatives (1953–1961) stressing ‘a return to [undefined] African
cultural values’. Then there was the short-lived era of communalism and
self-help schemes (cf. Chisiza 1961) utilizing traditional music for con-
sciousness raising (1961–1963) without necessarily challenging the
established ‘traditional and gender order’. There then followed a rural led
postcolonial reassertion of indigenous culture, music and dance between
self-government in 1961, and independence in 1964. This was followed by
the one-party hegemony which constrained political, social and sexual
oral discourses from 1964 until 1994. Finally, there occurred the flower-
ing of ‘musical multiculturalism’ in the more liberal atmosphere of the
multiparty era (Lwanda 2003). Rurality, economics and foreign musical
imperialism were also formative (Lwanda 2003).
Popular music in Malawi is often pregnant with metaphors, symbols or
cultural signifiers (cf. ILAM 1973; Tracey 1973; UNESCO 1991; Malamusi
1999; Pamtondo 2007). The music, due to its languages and mainly dance
orientation, may be judged by its form or style rather than its content:
ignoring the meaning. Kwabena Nketia (1982: 241–245) made an early
recognition of the inevitable postcolonial adjustments to aspects of tradi-
tional African music ‘because of the close integration of music and social
life’. He predicted that as modern mass communication methods partly
replace or duplicate traditional rituals and dances the ‘problem of transfer
140 John Lwanda

of function’ would become manifested by musical hybrid formation and

the contextual transfer of musical function. I suggested that it is also man-
ifested by the appropriation of traditional forms and contents by popular
musicians (Lwanda 2003). Malawi’s rurality makes the transfer of func-
tion more a matter of context than content. Politicians, perhaps acutely
aware of the power of music, have always exploited the musical public
sphere to devastating effect. At the 1978 independence celebrations, Dr
Banda, his cabinet, the cream of elite Malawi, Christian and Islamic lead-
ers, diplomats and the public all watched and listened, after the fall of
Muwalo, with apparent enthusiasm and agreement as the Dowa MCP
women, the mbumba, danced and sang:
Muwalo is a confusionist
Gwede is a destroyer
Such people must be killed.
(MBC Archives)
These appropriated and transformed musical forms as sung by women

were politically potent, reducing men to complicit paralysis (cf. Mapanje
1981: 12–13). Peter Forster (1994: 491–20), Stanslaus Muyebe and Alex
Muyebe (1999: 236) and Chijere Chirwa (2001) have noted this ‘norma-
tive’, if transitory and quickly replaced by a new order, complicity in popu-
lar political music. But in its day, Mbumba music was an efficient method
of control, spreading oral information and propaganda, used as a tool of
inducing complicit inactivity amongst potential dissidents. Some who
hated the words often liked the music and the sight of dancing women.
Given the way musicians are socialized in both male and female envi-
ronments rather than (necessarily) schools and the way their composi-
tions are influenced by cultural, socio-economic, political, educational and
religious influences, an interesting general difference is noticeable between
Malawi oral practitioners and writers (Lwanda 2003). While writers and
journalists resorted to the human rights argument for preserving their
freedom to write, musicians and dramatists resorted to the alangizi argu-
ment to justify their freedom of expression. In traditional culture alangizi,
like court jesters, could counsel without getting into trouble.
Musical discourses, 1958–1963

More than literature, orature was also obsessed with the nationalist strug-
gle. Political songs from this era demonstrate that personality politics had
already taken hold in Malawi. By 1958 Banda was already a hero:
There is no other chief but Kamuzu Banda

He fights war only with words.
(MBC Archives)
An examination of non-political songs reveals that socio-economic con-

cerns, such as the effects of migrant labour, were being articulated in song:
The migrant labour bureau has no pity

It has taken my husband away
What will I do?

I weep sleepless all night.
(ILAM 1973: 195)
It was around this time that Ndiche Mwalale noted:
So many Europeans in Malawi now

but there is no money
People still migrate [to the mines].
(MBC Archives)
Many of Ndiche Mwalale’s songs contained commentaries on race, class,

economics and politics. After the attainment of self-government, music
became dominated by political songs mostly favourable to the leadership of
the MCP, such as the ubiquitous ‘Zonse zimene zaKamuzu Banda’ (‘Everything
belongs to Dr Kamuzu Banda’). However, a few detached musical observa-
tions can be found. Kasiya and Chironga’s ‘ABanda akangana ndi azungu’
(‘Banda has argued with the Europeans’) seems a rare exception. This
obsession with praising Banda was carried over into the independence era.
Independence and another dance, 1964–1971

An examination of songs from this era reveals a rich seam of open dissent.
Musicians began grappling with finding a role for themselves in an increas-
ingly constrained environment. Morson Phuka and his Jazz Giants syncre-
tised the soul classic ‘Hully Gully’ into ‘Gule Wina’ (‘Some kind of dance’)
There is some kind of dance

Dad can dance it, Mum can dance it,
Children can dance it too!
(Nzeru records 1968)
But the song, in this rumour-filled time, had touched a raw nerve con-
cerning the ‘hypocrisy of the ruling elite and their “Presbyterian” values’
(cf. Mapanje, 1971: 22). Debating sex was a contentious subject in
Banda’s Malawi. Soon after, the Jazz Giants backed Jack Allison on a
health promotion song ‘Ufa wa mtedza’ (‘Peanut butter’). Ufa wa mtedza
was soon turned into a jingle which apparently confirmed malnutrition,
via the repetitive refrain ‘morning, noon and night’ (‘mamawa masana ndi
madzulo’);
If you want your children

to weigh heavy on the scales
feed them peanut butter
Oh yes! morning, noon and night.
(Allison and the Jazz Giants 1968)
The ‘mamawa masana ndi madzulo’ part of the song was turned into a coded
symbolic jingle ridiculing poverty in Banda’s ‘well-fed Malawi’. By 1969,
Phuka, exploiting traditional Chiwoda sources for lyrics and rhythms, pro-
duced another troublesome hit, ‘Mtsinje’ (The River):
142 John Lwanda

The river, the river, the river is flooded

In the river are crocodiles: how shall we cross it?
The hillsides have lions: where shall we run to?
In the home there is illness, the medicine is in the hands …
(Phuka 1969)
This traditional resource had the effect of turning the song into a mine-
field of metaphors, unwittingly or wittingly contradicting Dr Banda’s
concept of a secure, well-fed and disease-free Malawi with its images of
predatory crocodiles, hillsides roaming with lions and diseased home-
steads. And yet the music dominating the radio was full of praise for
Dr Banda.
The jazz bands and gender, 1970–1983

This marked the height of the pervasive mbumba music praising Banda and
the MCP regime, illustrated by A ‘Pailoti’ (Mr Pilot), by Karonga mbumba:
Mr Pilot please take off

This is Banda’s wealth
We thank Banda, he is number one
And we wear his cloth with pride.
(MBC Archives)
As if in reaction to the mbumba music there was an eruption of mostly

male musicians performing in neo-traditional styles, including the highly
syncopated and performative jazz band genre (Lwanda 1998 and 2003).
Musicians used satire and humour to put everyday messages into the con-
strained political sphere. Take Joseph Nangalembe’s ‘ANangalembe ali
bwanji nanga?’ (‘Mr Nangalembe, how is he?’)
How is Nangalembe, how is he really?

He is indoors mending his rags!
Tell him to come out; today let him come out!
He is indoors mending his rags!
(MBC Archives)
The comic song blatantly talks about literal nakedness and poverty at a
time when Dr Banda was claiming that Malawians were now better fed
and dressed. Contemporaneously, Alan Namoko’s use of a ‘normative’
proverb Patse patse nkulanda (Give me! give me! is tantamount to plunder!)
was a subtle way of critiquing the prevailing culture of forced donations to
the MCP. The Mikoko Band, while apparently decrying polygamy in
‘Mitala’ (‘Polygamy’), offered another powerful rural critique of the prevail-
ing socio-economic dispensation:
I have problems, I earn nothing!

I have only one shirt, I earn nothing!
Poll tax money I do not have, I earn nothing!
I will evade the tax messenger, I earn nothing!
The wife cannot afford a chitenje cloth, I earn nothing!
My child has failed school, I earn nothing!

[…] I see nothing!
(MBC Archives)
Using a comic discourse, Mikoko were able to openly critique aspects of one
of the most politically constrained societies, including evading taxes and
failing to provide chitenje (cloth for political mbumba dancing), and were
able to express ‘despair for the future’ in palibe ndiona ine (I see nothing!).
To remove any lingering doubt, Jivacort Kathumba enumerated, in
‘Mabvuto simaliro okha’ (Death is not the only problem), the everyday socio-
medical problems;
Death is not the only problem, problems!

Be without food; that is a problem!
Be homeless; that is a problem!
Your children are ill, that is a problem!
Everywhere, there are problems …!
(Kathumba 1992)
In the song, Kathumba, in line with the Malawi concept of regarding

death as rest from problems (kupuma), declares ‘mabvuto simaliro’ (‘death is
not a problem’), later omitting ‘the only!’ All this was achieved without
upsetting Dr Banda’s censors.
The succession debates, 1983–1992

Despite the ubiquitous censors, some musicians felt able to, albeit not so
directly, address the political power struggles between Dr Banda’s possible
successors. Love Aquarius’ ‘Zosiilana’ (The inheritance) illustrates this well:
Brother!
let us not bother each other
all these things we shall leave behind!
(MBC Archives)
Perhaps one of the most surprisingly politically loaded songs came from the
Malawi Police Strings Band. ‘Supporter’ (‘Football supporter’) talked about
how people from different townships of Malawi supported different football
teams. As such, the song declared, they had to be left alone to their choices.
If there was some impediment to their free choice, the rapped middle section
of the song declared, then it was better not to support any team. Coming before
the time of calls for multi-party change, this was a brave statement indeed.
In Ndirande they support Bata Bullets

In Bangwe they support Wanderers FC
Leave them alone; it is their team they love it.
Is it wrong?
Is it wrong to support a football team you love?
If there is an impediment to supporting your chosen team
It is better not to support any team at all!
(PAM 090)
144 John Lwanda

The multi-party era, 1992–2002

During the political transition of 1992 to 1994, some musicians began to see
themselves as socio-cultural counsellors, alangizi, and yet others as aphungu
(prophets). As prophets, who communicate wisdom from antiquity, dreams or
gods, they would perhaps be seen to be beyond the reach of repression.
Another ruse was to declare oneself the ‘voice of the people’ as Lucius Banda
did. Lucius Banda used the legitimation that ordinary people ‘had sent him’
(Chirambo 2002: 113–122). Others, like Billy Kaunda, merely chose to use
biblical metaphors and ‘truths’ to critique the greed and wasted opportunities
of the post-Banda politicians. A minority, like Evison Matafale’s Black
Missionaries, used their Rastafarianism to critique the Muluzi regime to such
an extent that Matafale ‘died in police custody’. Some examples of the major
players are given here, beginning with Dennis Phiri’s 1999 hit about
HIV/AIDS, ‘Tikutha’ (‘We are perishing’), a song that criticizes the social
irresponsibility of the citizens, as well as the lack of action by the government:
Which relative will go next?

Death has always been with us
but now things are too much!
Ask grandmother
how things were in the old days.
(Phiri 1999)
Lucius Banda chose a more direct polemical approach. ‘Ali ndi njira zawo’
(They have their cunning ways), which suggested that, for historical rea-
sons, most Malawi politicians came from the same Banda mould, is typical:
In the past they killed us

Today they lie to us
But what do we do since they are the same people
They have merely altered the way they torture us
They have their cunning ways.
(Banda 1995)
The song also points out the difference between Banda’s physical repression and
Muluzi’s use of money for repression while neglecting the economy. Kaunda dis-
cussed Muluzi’s attempts at changing the constitution to give himself a third
term in ‘Agalatiya mwataya chipangano’ (‘Mr Galatiya, you have broken your
promise’). The use of proverbs and biblical discourses to reflect, advise, provoke
and prick social and political consciences has been noted previously (cf. Barber
1987: 4–6; Chirambo 2002: 103–122). In ‘Kale likati lidzibwelera’ (‘The past
threatens to return’), Kaunda noted the possibility of the fragile Malawi democ-
racy reverting to dictatorship. In 1995, Saleta Phiri had already noted:
Things have changed!

But the rules/laws remain the same!
(Phiri 1998)
The best example of the phungu (prophet) variety of musician has been
Joseph Nkasa. Nkasa uses rural discourses and proverbs to examine social,
economic and political issues. ‘Anamva’ (‘They heard’) is about the poor man
promised a car – an empty public rally promise – by the big chief/politician.
The poor man avoids calling the big chief a liar by merely reminding every-
one that the promise was heard at rallies all over the land, leaving people to
make their own minds. In ‘Nkhope’ (Face), Nkasa suggested that, in rela-
tionship to elections, in some ‘distant past’:
Long long ago …

Due to poverty and ignorance
They made the wrong choices.
(Nkasa 2003)
Nkasa’s use of proverbs, rural discourse and metaphors has been emulated
by younger musicians like Malume Bokosi. Ethel Kamwendo, one of the few
female Malawi stars, saw her ‘Zilikudula’ (Things are expensive) banned
from the MBC playlist in 1995 after it pointed out post-Banda price rises.
Before elections you said problems will be reduced

Poverty will be reduced, now what is this?
Everything is now expensive, no jobs
Money is in short supply, corruption is increasing.
(Kamwendo 1995)
But orature is most devastating when it addresses one of the most notice-
able characteristics of Malawi, its poverty, and the huge, ignored and
unaddressed, gap between rich and poor – and the rarely articulated resul-
tant class demarcations. Charles Nsaku’s 1999 ‘Ndiphike nyemba’ (Let me
cook some beans) is a good example. A driver, treated like dirt by the ‘big
man’, eventually reaches breaking point and stages a two-hour roadside
protest as he cooks nsima (maize meal) and beans.
We left Lilongwe the day before yesterday

Today I am amazed, sir
You are the only one eating
My body is so weak
I can no longer work
The hunger is biting
I will have to cook some beans
After that, some nsima
Whether you sack me or not
It is better I eat and live.
(Nsaku 1999)
Malume Bokosi comprehensively chastises his corrupt MP in ‘Phungu

wanga’ (My MP):
See today how he spends money,

One woman after the other
His long-suffering wife
Is now too ignorant to be an MP’s wife.
146 John Lwanda

What kind of MP avoids tackling economic development?

But instead spends time fighting women’s undergarments!
As for your style nowadays:
You think football trophies are development!
The problem with Malawi today is

We have turned politics into personal goldmines!
(Bokosi 2006)
But his anger was nothing compared to Lawrence Mbenjere’s. In ‘Liyanja

achuma’ (‘Suits the rich’), he complains:
When you are born poor:

Smelly unwashed body in morning;
People passing you pinch their noses
To avoid your body odour
Arising from lack of soap.
How can we care for ourselves
When we have to wash with salt?
And when the filthy rich
Waste Geisha soap?
Life on this earth suits the rich.
The ways things are
We should just depend on casual labour
Even if we wanted to rest
They would lasso and kick us
As if chasing trash.
As long as you eat
Rough maize meal, Namagetso dear
(Wife groans: mamma mia)
At dawn, on day break go
Straight to till the hard soil.
Money rules
But revolution day will come.
The workers strike
Will kill the rich/elite’s system
We are being patient
Hoping to see the snail’s eyes!
(Mbenjere 2006)
The song, citing body odour due to poverty, harks back to Nangalembe’s
‘Anangalembe muli bwanji’, which cited nakedness due to poverty. Mbenjere’s
2006 song, however, is notable for its ‘Marxist’ prediction that the workers
strike will kill – or bring down – the elite system. And Mbenjere is not
alone. The title of the Defao Collection: Tidzatuluka m’munda (We shall come
out of the field) will have echoes of ‘coming out of the [cotton] fields’ for
students of Afro-American studies. This CD features songs such as Nsaku’s
‘Chakufa chapita chatha’ (‘What is gone is gone’), an oblique reference to
political revisionism in Malawi; Katelele Ching’oma’s ‘Atithawa’ (‘They have
4. ‘Malawi’ means deserted us’), a song castigating MPs for neglecting the rural development;
‘flames’ – grassland
fire flames – in
and Nduna McLondon’s ‘Bwanji ndisowe’ (‘Let me commit suicide’). In
Chewa. ‘Bwanji ndisowe’, McLondon wants to escape from poverty by committing
suicide. McLondon laments the way poor people’s lives are not valued: a
rich man killing a poor man gets a ‘washout’ (let off at court). In the title
track, Evance Meleka sings:
My aim is to find
Food, clothes and shelter.
Malawi ooh!
My country!
Just like your name4
We are on flames of fire.
God did not create man to be a beggar.
One day,
We shall walk out of the fields.
We shall reap and sing a good song.
We went to school and have qualifications.
But see how unemployed we are.
And even when we work we have cruel bosses.
Counting our hell, they treat us as slaves.
We can’t even find a mouthful to eat.
We can’t even find a thread to wear.
I just cry!
Mamma mia, my heart aches!
What did I do wrong?
Riches are in the soil, but today nothing is promising.
Farmers take produce to markets and come back crying!
Even when we work the salaries are miserable:
The usual bad luck with money of the orphans and the poor.
Do these bad things only happen in our land of Malawi?
May be in the USA they experience similar things – I doubt it!
(Meleka 2006)
In ‘Umphawi’ (Poverty), Mbenjere confirms this theme of Marxist dreams

when he says ‘sitidziwa kuti zinthu zidzadzera pati’ (‘how will things go?’).
Poverty!
Friends, poverty!
Poverty does not discriminate!
Poverty is not a plaything!
Do not be proud when you are rich,
Just thank God when things are going well for you.
(Mbenjere 2007)
Such discourses are rarely, if ever, found in written reports, studies or

other literatures, despite these reports being on Malawi’s ‘dire poverty’.
And, as the last line of Tidzatuluka m’munda shows, the oral practitioners,
like the writers, are aware of regional and world contexts and the world
beyond them.
148 John Lwanda

Discussion
As elsewhere in Africa, the nationalist struggles resulted in the substitu-
tion of colonial officials and rule with the local elite, who were happy to
inherit the instruments, structures and practices of oppression (Onoma
2005: 1–3). One major instrument has been English, used by ‘the elite’ to
hold on to political power and, in the process, marginalize the majority
and thwart ‘social transformation’ (cf. Mamdani, Mkandawire and Wamba
1988). During the Banda one-party era, these instruments were held on
to by repressive force, even on the media. In the Malawi context, since
1994, Francis Nyamnjoh’s observations of a ‘partisan press, clientelist/ethnic
liberal democracy and the leveraging of collective over individual rights’
are largely applicable and have been exploited by authorities (Nyamnjoh
2005: 1–21).
Fackson Banda, quoting Claude Ake, suggests that a person is entitled
to ‘(i) citizenship, (ii) socio-economic rights, (iii) civil and political rights
and (iv) [freedom of] public discourse’ (Banda 2006: 5). He views ‘citizen-
ship in terms of juridical, political, economic and cultural freedoms avail-
able to individuals or collectivities to enable them to actively participate in
the body politic’ (Banda 2006: 16). These sentiments are palpable in post-
autocracy Malawi. Where the ‘media is a servant of the people’ and answers
‘to a higher calling’, namely ‘public interest’ or ‘public service’, Banda
identified ‘three sources of threats’ to this ideal, namely ‘media-centric,
state-centric and civil threats’ (Banda 2006). These threats, given the fre-
quency of injunctions against the media, the degree of state control and
the concentration of the private media in a few powerful hands, are, again,
prevalent in the Malawi context.
In the Banda and post-Banda periods, the poor have had to find, as
John Guidry and Mark Sawyer (2003: 273) would put it, ‘a variety of per-
formative and subversive methods’ to penetrate the public sphere. Given
that a public sphere is an area of contesting received and developing for-
mative and normative as well as subversive cultural, social, politico-economic
and religious beliefs, ideas and wisdoms, it is understandable that the state
would want to monopolize this space. Because of Malawi’s recent history,
daily discourses tend to reflect basic socio-political-economic realities as
well as moral and higher concerns, hence the predominantly ‘social’
nature of Malawi’s political public sphere. And being largely oral and
social, the Malawi public sphere enjoys that added advantage or burden of
orality: ambiguity. The ambiguity of orality lends itself to adaptability, sub-
version, dilution, appropriation and exploitation. It is these characteristics,
which musicians have exploited to great effect.
Malawi, with weak literate civil societies but strong oral traditions, has
seen musicians becoming advocates for the poor. Radio, with its built-in
orality, is crucial to the critical and positive, rather than ‘propagandist’,
exploitation of orality. Unfortunately, the state broadcasting corporation
has, for most of the postcolonial period, suited Nkosi Ndlela and Dumisani
Moyo’s Southern African stereotype:
Public service broadcasting in Southern Africa has been hijacked to serve

the narrow interests of those in power. When considering the full range of
expectations and requirements imposed on public service broadcasters by
their diverse set of stakeholders, the public as primary stakeholders have lost
out to governments and regulatory authorities.
(Ndlela and Moyo 2006: 32)
Because its major radio network has been subject to state control from its
inception, thwarting the development of what could be called ‘reliable
orality’, musicians, like poets in 1980s Malawi, have found creative ways
of addressing the oral public sphere without upsetting the authorities too
much – using their disguised but contentious voices.
In this paper a number of patterns are noticeable. First, there is an
obvious continuity in the oral forms of ‘independent’ political, social and
economic critiques, from Ndiche Mwalale’s ‘Ku Nyasalande’ (In Nyasaland)
through to Mbenjere’s ‘Umphawi’ (Poverty). On the other hand, an exami-
nation of print journalism shows that protest, social, economic or political,
tends to be intermittent and is – more often than not – allied to the socio-
political status of the elite, and the level of state control, at any given
period (Lwanda 2002). These observations mirror the class/rural divide in
Malawi society.
In the Malawi context, the musical public sphere, while appropriating
various traditional or ethnic musical roots, has been notable for being free
from ethnic tensions; its main thrust being the articulation of azimwale
(peasantry/poor) grievances and hopes. We could say that Malawi musi-
cians as advocates, at least until now, are behaving like a political commu-
nity rather than the diverse cultural groups they in fact are. Perhaps in the
Malawi context this is not surprising; various postcolonial leaders have
exploited various aspects of cultural performance for national political
unity, while at the same time trying to exploit traditional and ethnic cleav-
ages for partisan political ends. A second observation is that issues of class
are much more likely to be articulated in the orature than in print jour-
nalism, reflecting the ‘effects of language policies on social transforma-
tions in Africa’ argument. Third, political human rights issues tend to be
inherent in written texts, whereas basic economic rights – food, housing,
wages and health – predominate in the orature. This may partly explain
why politicians are keen to exploit, and ride, orality. Again this reflects what
other scholars have noted, the intelligentsia and their ‘anti-democratic
tendencies’ (Mamdani 1994: 253), leading to a proclivity for them to
become spin doctors for rulers rather than advocates for national develop-
ment. Fourth, while the orature may be proactive, such as Saleta Phiri’s
‘Zinthu zasintha malamulo sanasinthe’ (‘Things have changed but the
rules/laws remain the same’), written texts tend to be reactive and driven
by political vicissitudes. Journalists, as it were, worry about it ‘when the
hot shoe is on their foot’.
It is against this background that I suggest that, given globalization
and the inevitable cultural imperialism or colonialism of global languages
like English or French – which drive most African media, a partial answer
to the dichotomy between English and indigenous languages, and the lit-
erate and oral, may be found in the critical examination and use/exploitation
of the oral public sphere for positive developmental purposes. This leverag-
ing of orature, like music, may be part of the solution to the questions posed
by Thiong’o in Decolonising the Mind (1981), and by others since then. It is
150 John Lwanda

possible, after all, that had Malawi journalists used the vernacular more,
they may have found it much easier, like the musicians and poets, to ‘riddle
the censor’ and communicate between anthu wamba/azimwale (ordinary
folk/peasantry) and their rulers.
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Pamtondo.
Kaunda, B. (2002), Agalatiya mwataya chipangano, Balaka: Songs of Malawi.
Kaunda, B. (1999), Kale likati lidzibwerela, on the MC Muime kaye, Balaka: Songs of
Malawi.
Moya Malamusi (1999), From Lake Malawi to the Zambezi, CD, Frankfurt: PAMAP 602.
Malawi Broadcasting Corporation archives, Blantyre, Malawi.
Mbenjere, L. Liyanja achuma, On the CDBiliwita.
Mbenjere, L. Umphawi, On the CD Biliwita.
Meleka, E. Tidzatuluka m’munda. On the CD Defao Collection: Tidzatuluka m’munda,
Blantyre: Defao.
Michael, B. (2001), Tilire, Harare, High Density Records, HDBM5010.
Mwalale, Ndiche. (n.d.) Kunyasalande Azungu achuluiche, MBC Recording.
Nkasa, J. (2003), Nkhope, on the CD Tigwirane manja a Malawi, Blantyre: OG Issa.
Nsaku, C. (1999), Ndiphike nyemba, on the CD Popular Malawian songs, Lilongwe:
COSOMA.
Phiri, D. (1999), Ulangizi, Balaka: Sounds of Malawi, IY 1098043.
Phiri, Saleta (1998), Zinthu zasintha/Ndirande Blues CD, Glasgow: Pamtondo.
Phuka, M. and the Jazz Giants (1969), Mtsinje, Blantyre: MBC Records.
Tracey, H. (1973), The Sound of Africa Series, catalogue, Grahamstown: Rhodes

University.
UNESCO (1991), Musical traditions of Malawi CD, D 8265 (1991), Paris: UNESCO.
Suggested citation
Lwanda, J. (2009), ‘Music advocacy, the media and the Malawi political public
sphere, 1958–2007’, Journal of African Media Studies 1: 1, pp. 135–154,
doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.135/1
Contributor details
John Lwanda, MB, Ph.D., formerly Hon. Senior Lecturer, Glasgow University, is a
medical practitioner, historian and book and music publisher.
Contact: 5c Greystone Avenue, Rutherglen, Glasgow G73 3SN, Scotland.
E-mail: Lwanda2000@yahoo.co.uk
154 John Lwanda

JAMS_1.1_12_Rønning-1.qxd 7/23/08 4:54 PM Page 155

The politics of corruption and the media

in Africa
Helge Rønning Department of Media and Communication,
University of Oslo
Abstract Keywords
This paper explores the linkages between debates about corruption and the role of the African media
media in Africa. It advances arguments about how citizens in Africa encounter cor- corruption
ruption – both grand and petty – and how they perceive it, as well as factors that may bribery
contribute to the development of corrupt practices. These reflections are then linked to press freedom
a discussion of how the press in Africa deals with corruption and whether the media investigative journalism
may serve as a strong deterrent in combating this form of criminal behaviour. media democratization
Introduction
Corruption is manifest in a variety of forms in Africa and has arguably 1. For an overview of
contributed to the continent’s slow development. On 17 February 2006, the issues involved,
see also: Bardhan
the BBC reported that the Africa Union’s outgoing chairman, President (1997), Pradhan
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, had stated that corruption costs Africa an et al. (2000),
estimated 25 per cent of its combined national income, some US$148bn a Svensson (2005) and
Lambsdorff (2007).
year. The question is not whether corruption is a phenomenon that exists, Over the past decade
but rather how to combat it. Any analysis must not just assess the reasons or so there have been
for corruption, but must also look at what corruption entails in practice. a vast number of
contributions to the
First of all, it is important to be aware that most of the corruption that discussion of the role
exists in Africa is not the grand corruption that President Obasanjo refers of corruption in rela-
to, which involves the ruling elites and has led to state coffers being raided tion to the question
of development. See
and sent out of the continent into personal Western bank accounts.1 This among others the
type of corruption involves the complicity of the West, directly and indirectly. special issue of Third
Africa Week magazine, commenting on the effects of political corruption on World Quarterly on
corruption (Third
African economies, has observed: World Quarterly, 20:3,
1999), in which there
Western businesses are equally guilty of complicity. They not only offer huge is a useful feature
review: Doig, Alan
bribes to foreign politicians and public servants, but they also facilitate the and Stephanie
movement of stolen funds to Western banks. Peter Eigen, the chairman of McIvor, ‘Corruption
[Transparency International] TI, makes the point when he says: ‘[Political and its control; an
analysis and selective
corruption] has been sustained by the complicity of Western banks and the review of the
active bribe-paying of multinationals, in particular in the fields of public literature’. For Africa
works, arms and defence, and oil and gas.’ see: Hope, Kempe
Ronald and Chikulo,
(Africa Week 2007) Bornwell C. (eds)
(1999), Corruption and
This paper,2 though acknowledging the existence of political corruption in Development in Africa:
high office on the continent, and its negative effects on African economies

Lessons from Country and development, focuses on small scale corrupt practices: the sort that
Case Studies, London:
Palgrave Macmillan,
the perpetrators may regard as ‘normal’; the sort of corruption that
and Blundo, Giorgio, Africans face in their day-to-day lives; the corrupt practices of junior and
Olivier de Sardan, sometimes middle and possibly some senior officials in government and in
Jean-Pierre and Cox,
Susan (2006),
the private sector. This is the type of corruption about which former US
Everyday Corruption president Jimmy Carter wrote in Global Corruption 2004: ‘Democracies can
and the State: Citizens no longer tolerate bribery, fraud and dishonesty, especially as such prac-
and Public Officials in
Africa, London: Zed
tices disproportionately hurt the poor’ (Carter 2004).
Books. In this article, J. P. Olivier de Sardan (1999) uses the term ‘corruption complex’ to
however, only describe what goes beyond corruption, in the strict sense of the word. It
references that are
directly relevant to
includes among others “nepotism, abuse of power, embezzlement and
the arguments are various forms of misappropriation, influence-peddling, prevarication,
referred to. insider trading and abuse of the public purse.” de Sardan furthermore
2. An earlier version points out that in order to consider what these various practices have in
of this paper was common, and what affinities that link them together, they must be
delivered at the Media
and Social Change in
viewed as part of the same social fabric, and this is what ha calls the cor-
Africa conference, ruption complex, which “[…] has become, in almost all African countries
held at the a common and routine element of the functioning of the administrative
Communication and
Media Research
and para-administrative apparatus, from top to bottom. This being the
Institute (CAMRI), case, corruption is neither marginal nor sectoralized or repressed, but is
University of generalized and banalized” (de Sardan 1999: 27–28).
Westminster,
25 March 2006. The
What most people come across is what can be called ‘petty corruption’,
present article is a an institutionalized form of power abuse within the public sector that
revised version of the appears to be centred in law enforcement and the delivery of basic services
paper presented on
that occasion.
such as water, electricity and housing. It involves criminal justice person-
nel, customs, procurement, police and immigration/border control (Zvekic
3. This issue is being and Camerer 2002). This form of corruption has its origin in a situation
treated by Marcello
Mosse and Edson where it is often impossible or difficult to obtain services or get results from
Cortez in A pequena public organs or government departments without paying for it. Nothing
Corrupção no sector will be done unless one offers routinely hierarchically defined bribes or
da Educação em
Moambique. kickbacks for services rendered. This takes the form of ‘dashing’ (a pidgin
English word widely used in West Africa meaning ‘to give as a gift’) –
handing over something to an official to avoid paying a fine, customs duties
or value added tax. It is this petty corruption that ordinary people
encounter in their day-to-day lives. Further examples include a gift of
money discreetly handed over to a traffic cop who stops you because your
car is not in order, or paying the headmaster of a school for ensuring that
your child is accepted in a school, or indeed passes his or her school exam-
ination,3 or ‘entering into an agreement’ with a civil servant to have your
application for a passport or an ID processed, or having to pay a nurse
directly in order to receive the medicine you need.
Debating corruption
In November/December 2005, there was a debate on the Mozambican blog,
http://www.ideiasdebate.blogspot.com, about corruption in Mozambique.
Some of the most thought-provoking contributions to the discussion were
written by the respected sociologist Elísio Macamo, who is a professor in
Bayreuth in Germany but who is also a very frequent contributor to discus-
sions about the political and social situation in Mozambique, his home
country. The provocative and surprising question he asked was whether
156 Helge Rønning

there was corruption in Mozambique, despite the fact that Mozambique is

perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in Africa. It has a corruption
perception score of 2.8, the country was in 2007 placed as 111 in the over-
all list produced by Transparency International (TI) and it is in twentieth
place in Africa. (Transparency International Website)
Macamo’s argument was elaborate and sophisticated and centred
around three main points, the first point being that it is necessary to
define corruption before one starts to discuss its existence and ways to
combat it. Secondly, such a definition would be impossible without taking
into consideration the cultural values of society and the historical context
from which the phenomenon, if it exists, has grown. In this context, the
whole culture of gifts in African societies is a necessary precondition for a
full understanding of the ‘corruption complex’. Thirdly, much of what was
perceived as corruption, in reality, might be regarded as a part of the inter-
nal workings of a group of people who are specialists in rent extraction
from what might be called the development industry. This does not of
course mean that Macamo condones robbery in any form, but his argu-
ment is that much of what the development system provides for in a coun-
try like Mozambique does not contribute to its real development. Rather, it
plays into the interests of a particular group of people.
The development systems consists of many types of aid in the form of
budget support, projects, investments and conferences, amongst other
things, all contributing a form of revenue that is provided for the social
group that interacts with the development system. This social group
includes the political class – government and opposition, administration,
non-governmental organizations, businesses with particular interests, for
instance construction contracts. It is a relatively small and closed group of
people who specialize in extracting money from this revenue. Some of this
money goes directly into events or other smaller projects that are often
conspicuous, for the obvious reason that it is easy to justify the expendi-
ture. Those who form part of this group also interact with one another,
and do each other favours in order to make the system function smoothly.
This way, foreign financial assistance continues to flow into the country.
They can also continue to take out money from development revenues.
This group also knows what to say to please the development system, its
authorities and regulators at home and abroad. Right now the fight against
corruption is paid more lip service than followed through with action. This
rhetoric gives the impression that something is being done, and the reasons
for this are manifold. They include dissatisfaction among both donors and
local and international civil society activists with the way that local elites
enrich themselves through international political and business contracts,
pressure from electorates in donor countries who want to see aid used effi-
ciently and not corruptly and international pressure from a variety of orga-
nizations. Furthermore, the work of anti-corruption NGOs such as TI, in
conjunction with research into the phenomenon, highlighted its negative
role in proper and just development. Paradoxically, however, much of the
pressure and talk of instituting anti-corruption programmes actually plays
into the hands of those who belong to the corrupt elite, who manage to
delude the development system into believing that they are mending their
ways. One glaring example is how the government of President Mwai Kibaki,
The politics of corruption and the media in Africa 157

4. A report released in who came to power in 2002 in Kenya on an anti-corruption campaign, has
August 2007 from
TI’s Kenya branch
continued the practices that existed under his predecessor Daniel Arap
says that the Moi’s regime.4
government’s Several authors have pointed out the way in which the interrelation-
anti-corruption drive
has slowed down,
ship between the state and the private sector furthers personal wealth
and that many accumulation, and this must be dubbed ‘corruption’. Many people who
government ministers have achieved important positions in business and politics accumulated
have been embroiled
in allegations of graft.
capital from serving in a public office, either as civil servant or politician,
Kenyans have largely and thus gaining access to funds, either illegally or by means that would
come to accept petty ordinarily be questionable. The distinction between what goes on in the
corruption as part of
their lives. They can
state and what serves as private accumulation for business enterprise is
expect to pay at least thus extremely blurred (Harsch 1993). Some prominent Africans owe
2.5 bribes each year, their personal wealth to being at the right place at the right time, for
double what they paid
in 2005. Kenya is
instance when state enterprises were privatized, or to having access to
number 142 among development funds from Northern donors both at the national and local
163 countries on TI’s levels (Hanlon 2004; de Sardan 1999: 37).
global corruption list.
According to the
Defining corruption is not very difficult and there are many definitions
Transparency survey, that are remarkably similar. They usually involve unlawful and improper
the biggest bribes behaviour by officials in the public and private sectors, who abuse their posi-
were paid when high
school students
tions and power to enrich themselves and/or those close to them, or induce
sought to enrol in others to do so.5 The difficult part, however, is to examine why some societies
Kenya’s overcrowded are more corrupt than others, and examine what serves as incentive for the
university system.
People also reportedly
practice of corruption. Having considered this, the next question is: How do
paid large bribes you combat corruption? How do you create incentives that will discourage
when seeking jobs. corrupt practices?
Kenya’s police force
was seen as the most
It is difficult to research the extent and forms of corruption. It is an
corrupt agency in the illegal activity, and what it really involves in economic terms must be
country. based on indications rather than hard facts. Perceptions of what consti-
5. The World Bank tutes corrupt behaviour also vary from society to society. It ranges from
(1997) provides what, in some places, is only regarded as traditional gift-giving, to com-
useful definitions:
plicated schemes of transactions between public officials and business-
Corruption: “The men. The scope of corruption in any society is also difficult to establish
term corruption because it is often difficult to prove that corrupt activities have taken
covers a broad range
of human actions. To place. Consequently, most of the results in corruption research are based
understand its effect on perceptions of corrupt practices rather than on hard facts. Thus, for
on an economy or a instance, the tools that TI uses are based on assessments rather than on
political system, it
helps to unbundle the solid facts. The annual TI ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ (CPI) ranks
term by identifying more than 150 countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as
specific types of activ- determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. Other corruption
ities or transactions
that might fall within measurement tools developed by TI are The Bribe Payers Index (BPI),
it. In considering its which assesses the supply side of corruption and ranks corruption by
strategy, the Bank source country and industry sector, and the Global Corruption
sought a usable defin-
ition of corruption Barometer (GCB), which is a public opinion survey that assesses the gen-
and then developed a eral public’s perception and experience of corruption in more than 60
taxonomy of the countries around the world (TI website).
different forms
corruption could take
consistent with that Why corruption?
definition. We settled A revealing study on corruption in Mozambique found that there are two
on a straightforward
definition – the abuse main reasons for corruption in the public sector in Mozambique. The first
is low salaries; for those working in the public sector the temptation to
158 Helge Rønning

become corrupt is to supplement low incomes and to have a decent stan- of public office for
private gain. Public
dard of living. The second reason is political; there is a confusion of roles office is abused for
between the state and the ruling party Frente de Libertação de private gain when an
Moçambique (FRELIMO) to such a degree that all public servants are more official accepts, solic-
its, or extorts a bribe.
or less forced to be members of the party. One of the implications of this It is also abused when
confusion is the great difficulty of dealing with corruption at a high level private agents actively
in government because of patrimonial party links (MediaFax 2006). There offer bribes to circum-
vent public policies
are results from research conducted in Mozambique that indicate that and processes for
there is a system of forced payments to political parties (in practice this competitive advantage
means to the ruling party FRELIMO), and in a survey 15 per cent of the and profit. Public
office can also be
population confirmed this. (Austral Consultoria 2006).6 abused for personal
It is also clear, as Amartya Sen (1999) has pointed out, that: benefit even if no
bribery occurs,
through patronage
… the temptation to be corrupt is strongest when the officers have a lot of
and nepotism, the
power but are themselves relatively poor. This is the case at lower levels of theft of state assets, or
administration in many over-controlled economies, and explains why cor- the diversion of state
revenues. This defini-
ruption reaches down all the way in the bureaucratic system, encompassing
tion is both simple
petty officers as well as senior administrators. and sufficiently broad
(Sen 1999: 276) to cover most of the
corruption that the
Bank encounters, and
The practices that belong to what de Sardan (1999) regards as the ‘complex it is widely used in the
of corruption’ are often not considered illegitimate or corrupt by those literature. Bribery
occurs in the private
involved. Clearly, corruption, and what it is not, is deemed to be always fluc- sector, but bribery in
tuating. Many people, it seems, are daily involved in some sort of activity the public sector,
that strictly should be regarded as corrupt practice. Corrupt practice is very offered or extracted,
should be the Bank’s
difficult to avoid, partly because everyone else does it, and partly because life main concern, since
would be so much more difficult without it (de Sardan 1999: 34–35). the Bank lends
This also implies that, to a certain degree, there exists a form of under- primarily to
governments and
standing and even acceptance among many citizens of the corrupt behaviour supports government
of lower-level public officials. People actually are not really averse to such policies, programs,
behaviour, and would definitely do the same if they were to be in a similar and projects.
position. This does not mean that they pay bribes gladly, but that they Bribery: Bribes are
nevertheless often accept them as part of an unavoidable practice that is one of the main tools
of corruption. They
not possible to stop. In rural areas it is often not seen as corruption to bear can be used by private
a gift to someone with influence in order to obtain a favour. This is part of parties to ‘buy’ many
the cultural context that Macamo highlights. Surveys also indicate that urban things provided by
central or local
areas are perceived as being more corrupt than rural areas, and traditional governments, or
leaders as being less corrupt than modern officials and leaders. This in spite officials may seek
of the fact that there exist widely accepted practices in rural and traditional bribes in supplying
those things.
societies that, from a modern perspective, might be regarded as bordering
on nepotism and bribery. • Government
There is yet another question, and that is how much of what is per- contracts. Bribes
can influence the
ceived as corruption is real, and how much is just something that one has government’s
heard about, read in newspapers, or is just part of the general rumour choice of firms to
mill. Surveys in Southern Africa found, for instance, that there appears to supply goods,
services, and works,
be a considerable gap between perceived levels of corruption and people’s as well as the terms
actual experiences of corruption. of their contracts.
Firms may bribe
to win a contract
Perceptions of corruption are only tenuously linked to actual experience. or to ensure
Remarkably, relatively few people state that they have ever had to offer a that contractual

breaches are bribe, a tip, a gift, or a favour in return for a public good or service to which
tolerated. they were entitled. On an under-governed continent where contact with
• Government officials is low, the opportunities for offering a bribe may actually be few
benefits. Bribes and far between. And since all parties to petty corruption understand what
can influence the
allocation of is expected and exchanges of favours are conducted wordlessly as a matter
government of course, corruption may not always be recognized as such. Finally, citi-
benefits, whether zens surely interpret corruption, a catch-all term, to include not only open-
monetary benefits
(such as subsidies side payments, but also subtle sins like nepotism or embezzlement.7
to enterprises or (Bratton et al. 2005: 234)
individuals or
access to pensions
or unemployment There are many other explanations for discrepancies between perceived
insurance) or and real experiences of corruption. One of them is that stories about cor-
in-kind benefits ruption often make for good entertainment, and the press in many African
(such as access
to certain schools, countries frequently carry unsubstantiated reports of corrupt practices
medical care, involving, for instance, the police and customs authorities. Nevertheless,
or stakes in the practice is real enough, and it influences the workings of small busi-
enterprises being
privatized). nesses, for instance, making it costly to set up an enterprise and difficult to
obtain the necessary documents in some countries. In a recent survey
• Lower taxes.
Bribes can be from Mozambique, it came out that 16 per cent of enterprises paid bribes
used to reduce the in order to obtain licences, and 18 per cent considered that bribery takes
amount of taxes or place in more than 10 per cent of the contracts (Austral Consultoria
other fees collected
by the government 2006). Thus there is little doubt that many people both experience and
from private parties. perceive corruption as a problem in their day-to-day activities.
Such bribes may be In 2001, a survey conducted by Ética Moçambique, who questioned
proposed by the tax
collector or the 1200 people, showed that 45 per cent maintained that they had been vic-
taxpayer. In many tims of corruption in the past six months. The areas particularly affected
countries the tax were health (30 per cent), education (27 per cent) and the police (21 per
bill is negotiable.
cent) (Hanlon 2004: 755). In another example, from Uganda, it was
• Licenses. Bribes reported that over 80 per cent of Ugandan firms needed to pay bribes.
may be demanded
or offered for Another study from Uganda estimates that of the central government
the issuance of funds intended for local primary schools, only 13 per cent reached the
a license that schools in the period 1991–1995. Local officials and politicians sifted off
conveys an
exclusive right, the bulk of the grants (Svensson 2005: 30–31; Reinikka and Svensson
such as a land 2004). These studies also suggest that transparency might serve as an
development antidote to corrupt practices. When the central government began to have
concession or
the exploitation of newspaper reports published on how grants were dispersed to local schools,
a natural resource. the practice went down drastically, to only 20 per cent (Svensson 2005: 35).
Sometimes
politicians and
bureaucrats Corruption in high places
deliberately put in How then is petty corruption, which ordinary people regularly come into con-
place policies that tact with, related to the grander scheme of ‘extraction of revenue’ that takes
create control
rights which they place amongst the elite – be it within the development funding system or out-
profit from by side it? While it may be possible to view what goes on within the development
selling. system, for instance, as being tolerated quietly by all those implied, it is still the
• Time. Bribes may case that many high-positioned public officials and politicians have a lifestyle
be offered to and fortune that could not have been acquired solely on their public salaries.
speed up the
government’s There are cases where newspapers have carried reports about the finances that
granting of leading politicians control in governments, coupled with demands that all pub-
permission to carry lic officials be made to declare their assets, and nothing has come of this.
out legal activities,
Public exposure is not enough if it is not being followed up by legislation and
160 Helge Rønning

official practices. In another revealing research paper, first published in an such as company
registration or
abbreviated version in the weekly newspaper Savana, Marcello Mosse went construction
through all the assets of the then presidential candidate for FRELIMO, permits. Bribes
Armando Guebuza, later elected president. Much of his wealth had been can also be extorted
by the threat of
acquired in the period of the privatization of state enterprises in the early inaction or delay.
1990s. One of the aims of the research was to press for formal legal structures
• Legal outcomes.
to be established which would require all holders of public office to declare Bribes can change
their assets. This idea has not gained any formal recognition, nor does it seem the outcome of the
likely to become law as nothing has happened since Guebuza was elected pres- legal process as it
applies to private
ident in December 2004 (Mosse 2004). For now, those who are interested in parties, by inducing
seeing the formal declaration of assets by people contesting for public office the government
established as law and policy in Mozambique can only wait in hope. either to ignore
illegal activities
The benefits that often come with high office are usually very lucrative and (such as drug
completely disproportionate to any real sense of expenses incurred by the office dealing or
holder. In an era when much of the aid for African countries comes in the form pollution) or to
favour one party
of direct budget support from abroad, this is a problem. There have been cases over another in
where blatant abuse of funds has been discovered and has not led to the imme- court cases or other
diate sanction of the minister involved by either being immediately dismissed legal proceedings.
from office or arrested and investigated.8 The problem is that although these • The government
cases are reported in the local press, and the donors try to intervene, nothing benefits purchased
with bribes vary
is done at the political and judicial level. There is little doubt that techniques by type and size.
used to access public funds in this manner, though they may not be strictly ille- Contracts and
gal, border on illegality as their ultimate results are illegal and dishonest per- other benefits can
be enormous
sonal enrichment at public expense. This also makes public policies against (grand or wholesale
corruption ineffective. The behaviour of politicians and high public officials corruption) or
matters, because their conduct sets standards of what is proper conduct in very small (petty or
retail corruption),
public office and will be emulated by society as a whole. Corruption in high and the impact of
places has consequences in Africa that go beyond the harm it does to the econ- misinterpretation
omy and the damage it does to the principles of good governance. It serves as of laws can be
dramatic or minor.
an example for others less influential to to follow the ‘chefs’: Grand corruption
is often associated
How people behave often depends on how they see and perceive others as with international
behaving. Much depends, therefore, on the reading of prevailing behavioural business
transactions and
norms. A sense of ‘relative justice’ vis-à-vis a comparison group (in particular, usually involves
others similarly placed) can be an important influence on behaviour. politicians as well
(Sen 1999: 277) as bureaucrats. The
bribery transaction
may take place
The South African political analyst Moeletsi Mbeki (2005), in ‘Shield entirely outside
Africa’s wealth from self-serving political elites’, observes that: the country. Petty
corruption may
be pervasive
At the root of Africa’s problems is the ruling elite that have misused the eco- throughout the
nomic surplus generated over the past 40 years. African political elites have public sector if firms
and individuals
exploited their position in order to: regularly
experience it when
• Bolster their standard of living to Western levels they seek a license
or a service from
• Undertake money-losing industrialization projects that were not supported by government. The
the necessary technical, managerial and educational development bribes may be
• Transfer vast amounts of money from agriculture and mineral extraction retained by
individual recipients
to overseas private bank accounts, while borrowing vast amounts from or pooled in an
developed countries elaborate sharing

arrangement. The Many African states became corrupt through these and other similar
sums involved in
grand corruption
activities. Their elites have engaged and continue to engage in a form of
may make newspa- rent-extraction, as referred to by Macamo above, not because the states
per headlines are strong, but because the state apparatuses are weak (Migdal 1988).
around the world,
but the aggregate
The state is not able or willing to enforce the laws and property rights that
costs of petty provide the minimum underpinnings of a democratic and transparent
corruption, in society, with clear and ethical norms and practices for the relationship
terms of both
money and
between the state, the markets and civil society. The transition from one-
economic party states and controlled economies to multiparty systems and liberal-
distortions, may ized economies has often resulted in economic circumstances where social
be as great if not
greater.
and ethical limits are unclear. This has again resulted in a situation where
those who are in high positions employ corrupt practices to enrich them-
Theft: Theft of state
assets by officials
selves, and those in low positions do it in order to survive economically
charged with their with a basic standard of living.9 Thus the state and its servants have lost
stewardship is also respect. This has, as a consequence, disloyalty, abuse of power and out-
corruption. An
extreme form is
right theft among high and low public officials. In order to rectify this sit-
the large-scale uation it is necessary as an initial step to institutionalize accountability
‘spontaneous’ mechanisms at different levels of the government and society (Bardhan
privatization of state
assets by enterprise
1997: 1341).
managers and Surveys from Southern Africa show that the majority of citizens feel
other officials in some that their governments are not sufficiently committed to combating cor-
transition economies.
At the other end of
ruption (Ugjevic 2002). A survey from Mozambique listed a number of
the scale is petty theft reasons for not exposing corrupt practices. The highest score was that
of items such as office ‘there is no protection’ for whistleblowers – over 50 per cent of respon-
equipment and
stationery, vehicles,
dents agreed. Secondly, ‘it is not worth it’ to expose corruption. Thirdly,
and fuel. The and as Macamo highlighted, ‘it is not considered corruption in our cul-
perpetrators of petty ture’. Furthermore, an argument that suggests that corruption is not seen
theft are usually
middle- and
as entirely repulsive: ‘the economic situation justifies it’. And then three
lower-level officials, arguments that have to do with legal practices: ‘cases are not investigated’;
compensating, in cases ‘cannot be proved’; people ‘do not know the procedure’. All scored
some cases, for
inadequate salaries.
above 25 per cent from the respondents surveyed (Austral Consultoria
Asset control systems 2006).
are typically weak or
nonexistent, as is the
institutional capacity
Democratization and corruption
to identify and punish Much of the debate around corruption in the past decade or so has been cen-
wrongdoers. Theft of tred on the question of whether democratization contributes to curbing cor-
government financial
resources is another
ruption. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any clear answer to this. In
form of corruption. Africa, campaigns against corruption have very often been linked to regime
Officials may pocket change. Military coups have been staged with the pretext of getting rid of
tax revenues or fees
(often with the
corrupt politicians. Democratization has been advocated and democratic
collusion of the payer, movements have risen with the aim of, among others things, getting rid of
in effect combining the corrupt practices of one-party states. Often, drives against corruption
theft with bribery),
steal cash from
by the state were soon forgotten and the new leaders succumbed to the
treasuries, extend temptations of holding office and being able to use that same system to accu-
advances to mulate private wealth (Harsch 1993). A case in point might be the Chiluba
themselves that
are never repaid,
years in Zambia. The result is the now widespread and generalized concep-
or draw pay for tions and rumours about democratically elected politicians being corrupt.
fictitious ‘ghost’ Whether this is true or not, it reveals citizens’ deep misgivings about the effi-
workers, a pattern
well-documented in
ciency of the various anti-corruption campaigns conducted in many
the reports of audit African countries. These campaigns end either without any real results, or,
162 Helge Rønning

if those who conduct them are too diligent, with the sacking or resignation authorities. In such
cases financial control
of committed politicians, as happened in 2005 in the case of John systems typically have
Githongo. Githongo, Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics under broken down or are
the Office of the President of Kenya, had the special task of investigating neglected by
managers.
corruption.
Different forms of regimes have different forms of corrupt practices. But Political and bureau-
cratic corruption:
the problem is that ‘there does not seem to be any […] obvious correlation Corruption within
between extents of corruption on the one hand and the types of political government can take
regime, their degree of despotism and their economic effectiveness on the place at both the
political and the
other’ (de Sardan 1999: 33). Nevertheless, there are some aspects linked to bureaucratic levels.
processes of political transition, worldwide and in Africa, which are of par- The first may be
ticular interest to whether new corrupt practices emerge in transitional independent of the
second, or there may
societies, and there are some aspects of democratic states, such as trans- be collusion. At one
parency and free and independent media, that might contribute to the level, controlling
struggle against corruption (Pradhan et al. 2000). political corruption
involves election
The problem of corruption is itself intimately linked to the issue of what laws, campaign
type of state the new so-called African democracies are: finance regulations,
and conflict of
interest rules for
African citizens and international donors find themselves in rare agreement
parliamentarians.
that corruption corrodes government performance, undercuts satisfaction These types of
with economic growth, and eliminates trust in state institutions. The problem laws and regulations
lie beyond the
is that, in the absence of institutional alternatives to patronage, ordinary peo-
mandate and
ple are themselves too often complicit in corruption. Several approaches are expertise of the Bank
possible in realizing a rule of law: strengthening agencies of restraint within but nevertheless
are part of what a
the state; building non-governmental organizations devoted to watchdog func-
country needs to
tions; and guaranteeing free and fair elections. There is little doubt that initia- control corruption.
tives along these lines would help consolidate fragile new regimes because, At another level
corruption may be
even if political transition is not immediately followed by prosperity, democracy
intrinsic to the way
can still win popular legitimacy via the delivery of good governance. power is exercised
(Bratton et al. 2005: 353) and may be impossible
to reduce through
lawmaking alone. In
But if this does not take place, the new African democracies may well con- the extreme case state
tinue as a form of pseudo-democracies, conducting regular more or less institutions may be
infiltrated by criminal
free and fair elections, observing a minimum of human and citizens’ elements and turned
rights, but not really changing the way that the elite conducts their busi- into instruments
ness and the structure of power. of individual
enrichment.
Press freedom and anti-corruption struggles Isolated and systemic

In this context, the question of whether independent and pluralistic media corruption:
Corruption in a
are more likely to report on corruption than state-controlled media are is an society can be rare
important question. Furthermore, one must ask whether journalistic prac- or widespread. If it is
tice that upholds strong ethical standards tends to be more efficient in rare, consisting of a
few individual acts, it
uncovering corrupt practices than the form of journalism that lingers close is straightforward
to supporting one or the other of the new actors that have taken over power (though seldom easy)
during the transition. In an assessment of the situation in Eastern Europe to detect and punish.
In such cases non-
after the fall of Communism, it is maintained that free media are ‘… perhaps corrupt behaviour is
the most persistent institution in the fight against corruption’. (Pradhan et al. the norm, and
2000: 46). But the authors also explore the problematic aspects of this institutions in
both the public
statement, one of which is the danger to journalists involved in investigative and private sectors
journalism and other anti-corruption reporting and research. The many support integrity

in public life. Such journalists that have been murdered in Russia and other post-Soviet states
institutions, both
formal and informal,
since the 1990s serve as a clear indication of how dangerous and difficult
are sufficiently strong this type of journalism can be. Other impediments to a strong anti-corruption
to return the system agenda developing in the press may be sleaze within the media itself, and
to a non-corrupt
equilibrium. In
taking over of other media by strong and often fraudulent business interests.
contrast, corruption Furthermore, state pressure on the independent media in the form of libel
is systemic (pervasive laws, other legal restrictions and direct political threats from state organs
or entrenched) where
bribery, on a large or
have curtailed proper investigative journalism. Many of these practices
small scale, is routine have parallels in African countries going through similar transition
in dealings between processes.
the public sector and
firms or individuals.
Where systemic Freedom of the media is highest in countries with the lowest level of admin-
corruption exists, istrative corruption and state capture. A policy of openness, formalized laws
formal and informal
guaranteeing free access to information, strengthens tools for oversight and
rules are at odds
with one another; enlists the media as an ally in controlling corruption.
bribery may be illegal (Pradhan et al. 2000: 46–47)
but is understood
by everyone to
be routine in This implies, not unexpectedly, that the more authoritarian and despotic a
transactions with the state is, the more difficult it is for the press to function as an anti-corruption
government. Another
kind of equilibrium
agent.
prevails, a systemic In a study from 2003, Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder discuss vari-
corruption ‘trap’ ous indices of corruption and indicators of press freedom, and conclude
in which the
incentives are strong
that there seems to be a strong link between the level of press freedom and
for firms, individuals, the amount of corruption in different countries. More press freedom indi-
and officials to cated less corruption. The variables used suggested that a high degree of
comply with and not
fight the system.
press freedom might serve as a strong deterrent to corruption (Brunetti
And there may be and Weder 2003). This and other studies also referred to in Johan Graff
different degrees of von Lambsdorff ’s book The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform
coordination between
those taking bribes,
suggest that strong and free media serve as ‘[…] an impediment to corrupt
ranging from politics by making it difficult for elites to get away with corrupt behaviour’
uncontrolled (Lambsdorff 2007: 46).
extortion by multiple
officials to highly
Transparency and access to information are not sufficient measures for
organized bribe the press to efficiently curb corruption (Lindstedt and Naurin 2005). In
collection and order to get to the corrupt activities, increasing transparency must affect
distribution systems.
Anti-bribery laws
the probability of publicity, which in turn should raise the risk for policy
notwithstanding, makers of being held accountable.
there are many
countries in which
Transparency is no quick fix for anti-corruption reformers. In countries with
bribery characterizes
the rules of the game low levels of education, and in semi-democratic political systems, transparency
in private–public must be accompanied with additional reforms strengthening the capacity of
interactions. Systemic
people to process the information and execute sanctions if it is to have any
corruption may occur
uniformly across the effect. […] There seems to be a threshold effect of democracy on corruption, but
public sector, or it what determines the threshold? What does it take to make democracy start hit-
may be confined to
ting in on corruption? We argue that it is the interacting effect of having free
certain agencies –
such as customs or and fair elections and a free press (or civil liberties more broadly) which gives
tax authorities, public the necessary kick. Corruption researchers must acknowledge that democracy
works or other
is not just a question of elections. Only when we have in place a lively public
ministries, or
particular levels of sphere of educated people, where the risk for media scrutiny and bad publicity is
government. always present, free and fair elections will start to reduce corruption.
(Lindstedt and Naurin 2005: 25–26)
164 Helge Rønning

An example is Nigeria which through long periods of military dictator- Corruption in the
private sector: Fraud
ships, has had one of Africa’s freest, bravest and most outspoken media. and bribery can and
The Nigerian press has over the years revealed grand corruption schemes. do take place in the
But still the country is both in reality and in perception one of the most private sector, often
with costly results.
corrupt places in the world. Unregulated financial
systems permeated
Investigative journalism with fraud can
undermine savings
The constrictions that exist on what proper research into corruption involves and deter foreign
obviously also imply challenges to the press in covering such practices. investment. They also
While almost all discussions on anti-corruption strategies focus on the make a country
vulnerable to
important role that the media may have, it is also often difficult to establish financial crises and
how the press can really contribute to combating economic sleaze and macroeconomic
manipulation other than by exposing concrete cases and publicizing stories instability. Entire
banks or savings
of abuses of power and influence. Really, the only power of the press in this and loan institutions
context seems to be similar to putting people in the pillory, and the question may be taken over
is obviously how much of a contribution this really is. The real challenge by criminals for the
purpose of wholesale
for an analysis of the role of media in combating corruption is to see cor- fraud. Popular
ruption in a context of other social institutions and practices. This way, the support for
issue of moving from being stigmatized by the press to being prosecuted by privatization or the
deepening of financial
the law is the essential one. When there is little risk of being arrested and markets can be
charged, put on trial and found guilty of breaches of laws on corruption eroded if poor
that are enforced irrespective of who you are, corrupt officials will continue regulation leads to
small shareholders or
their activities with impunity. It is not enough to be put to shame in the savers withdrawing
public eye. This is particularly the case when what constitutes shame is a when confronted by
relative concept. Those involved often consider it less shameful to be stig- insider dealings and
the enrichment of
matized in the public sphere than not contribute to the welfare or affluence managers. And a
of one’s own family and clan (de Sardan 1999: 29–30, 46). ‘Shame is strong corporate focus
social morality, a morality based on other people’s opinions, rather than on profitability may
not prevent individual
one based on an individual examination of conscience’ (de Sardan 1999: employees soliciting
46). This constitutes a major challenge for investigative journalism that has bribes from suppliers.
the uncovering of individual corruption as its aim. It may not really lead Furthermore, when
corruption is systemic
anywhere. in the public sector,
A review of articles about the relationship between the media and cor- firms that do business
ruption shows that there are certain topics that come up for discussion fre- with government
agencies can seldom
quently in these articles.10 First, the role played by journalists in the media escape participating
industry, individually and as professionals. In general, journalists are seen as in bribery.
active participants in the struggle against corruption. Many examples are While noting the
given of individual journalists who have worked hard and under difficult and existence of fraud and
dangerous circumstances to expose abuse of power and corrupt practices. It corruption in the
private sector and
is important to place investigative journalism within the framework of the the importance of
movement to democratize the African continent. While it is true that inves- controlling it, this
tigative journalism is an essential tool in the ongoing process of democratiz- report is concerned
with corruption in
ing African societies, it is also true that investigative journalism can only the public sector.
exist in a society that respects democratic norms. In societies that are repres- Public sector corrup-
sive and blatantly dictatorial, investigative journalism cannot thrive. In fact, tion is arguably a
more serious problem
in such societies, investigative journalists, who are in pursuit of the truth, in developing
can easily lose their job, be jailed or killed.11 Here, I pay tribute to the countries, and
Mozambican editor and journalist Carlos Cardoso who was assassinated on controlling it may be
a prerequisite for
22 November 2000 for exposing vast corruption in relation to the privatiza- controlling private
tion of banks in Mozambique (Fauvet and Mosse 2003). The personal risk sector corruption.

Still, Bank activities involved in writing about corruption is enough to make many journalists
can also promote the
control of bribery and
not pursue any story leads they have, for very understandable reasons. As
fraud in the private the Mozambican survey showed, there is generally a considerable reluctance
sector by helping to expose corruption because there is no protection for those who do so
countries strengthen
the legal framework
(Austral Consultoria 2006).
to support a market The professional standards and ethics of journalists are important when
economy and by journalists are covering stories about corruption. Many stories that appear
encouraging the
growth of professional
in the African press attributed to investigative journalism do not adhere to
bodies that set proper standards of journalistic practice. Good investigative journalism does
standards in areas not sensationalize. It is not based on gossip, and it does not consist of
like accounting and
auditing. In the long
rumour-mongering. Much of what is presented as investigative journalism in
run, controlling Africa is based on poorly sourced material, often only one source, which has
corruption in the not been properly checked. Good and thorough research is frequently lack-
private sector may
require improvements
ing. Searching questions such as ‘why was this story leaked to me?’, or, ‘who
in business culture has an interest or stands to gain if this story is published?’ are not being
and ethics. asked by journalists. It is always prudent that the reporter seeks a reaction
(The World Bank from the person who is accused in the story. Often, sensationalist and
1997) accusatory language in stories about corruption damage the credibility of
6. The study was based the cases reported. The more outrageous the presentation, the easier it is to
on three parallel discredit the story. Exposing the personal lives of individuals should not be
surveys aimed at the main focus of journalistic investigations into corruption. Rather, they
households,
companies and should focus on the wider issues of systematic abuses of power, and on how
civil servants. 2,447 corrupt practices prevent development.
households, Proper investigative journalism is both difficult and costly. It involves
486 companies and
992 civil servants, extensive research and investigations into issues that are complex and must
distributed be covered comprehensively, taking into account legal and economic per-
throughout the spectives and financial data. It therefore presupposes that journalists and the
country, were
interviewed (Austral editorial staff have sufficient legal and financial knowledge and the compe-
Consultoria, 2006: 5). tence to get all aspects of the story right. Even with all this done, they still
7. The quotation is from face the threat of libel. It is often the small details that make or break a cor-
a book by Michael ruption story, and it is particularly important that all facts are correctly pre-
Bratton, Robert sented. The matter of whether something reported in these corruption
Mattes and
E. Gyimah-Boadi stories is true is interpreted in most laws on defamation as only a defence, if
(2005), Public there is sufficient supporting evidence, to any claims brought by the person
Opinion, Democracy, whom the story was about. Uniquely, in many African countries, in relation
and Market Reform
in Africa, whose to investigative journalism, African press corps are confronted by strict
empirical foundation defamation laws, which serve to curb both proper exposure of the abuse of
is The Afrobarometer. power and protect elite perpetrators. Most practising journalists in Africa
This is a comparative
series of national today are acutely aware of how breaches of libel laws can put them in jail, in
mass attitude surveys some cases for long periods, or open them up to intimidation and other
on democracy, threats to their lives or livelihood.
markets and civil
society. The project Defamation laws are important tools in the hands of corrupt and pow-
was implemented by erful elites who often resort to their use in countries where those in power-
an international ful positions – public or private – do not want their secret dealings and
network of
researchers in abuse of power exposed. It is in the interest of an open society that inves-
universities and tigative journalism should not be stifled by strict laws on libel and slander,
non-governmental particularly criminal defamation, which is usually written into libel laws
research institutes,
primarily based in with the sole aim of protecting those in powerful positions in government. It
Africa. Between mid- also has to be conceded that there is a balance to be achieved here, finding
1999 and mid 2001, laws that will allow proper investigative journalism but also protect those in
166 Helge Rønning

power so that they are not the subject of corrupt or spurious ‘investigative’ the Afrobarometer
Network conducted
stories aimed at character assassination. For the future, however, the surveys in twelve
increasing conflicts between the judiciary and the media in some African countries: Botswana,
countries suggests bleak prospects for investigative journalism.12 Defamation Ghana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mali,
laws constitute a threat to press freedom in many parts of Africa and the Namibia, Nigeria,
courts have a tendency, where cases come before them, to act with a heavy South Africa,
leaning towards recognition of the respectability, status and honour of Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia and
those who hold high office, rather than to act firmly and resolutely in the Zimbabwe. Known
public interest and assert the public’s right to information, disregarding as collectively as
best as possible ‘who’ is before them. Afrobarometer Round
I, these surveys cover
The landmark decision made by South Africa’s supreme court in 1998 is about 45 per cent of
instructive and should serve as an example, not only in Africa but elsewhere the sub-Saharan
around the world, of supporting the spirit of investigative journalism and rec- population. See:
http://www.
ognizing the difficulties involved. The ruling states that if journalists act in afrobarometer.org/
good faith and with due care they should not be held responsible for untruths
8. One case involved the
in their findings.13 This implies that journalists in South Africa should not be previous minister
held accountable in law if a statement made is untrue, as long as it can be of education in
proven that the journalist uttered the relevant statements in good faith and Mozambique who
used Swedish budget
was not negligent. It is unreasonable to hold journalists liable for untrue support funds for his
statements when they are under the impression that they have spoken the own private interests.
truth. Applying the rules of strict liability in law would have an unwarranted The funds were repaid
to Sweden, but the
stifling effect on public debate. minister kept his post
Truthful important information would not be made public by journal- in the government
ists or the wider public, whom this decision also favours, for fear of being long after the abuse
was discovered. The
unable to provide proof to the standards acceptable by the law courts case is now regarded
should the need arise. So a journalist who has taken all possible precau- as a past issue in the
tions, pursued all leads, checked, double and triple-checked sources, and relationship between
the two countries.
still comes up with a story where there may be untruths, but has come to But, in her farewell
all findings in good faith and has not been negligent in the process, should interview with the
not be guilty of libelling another provided that the story presents a case that weekly Savana, the
outgoing Swedish
should be reported as it is in the public interest. ambassador and
former minister of
Inside and outside development
cooperation, Mai-
Media organizations are linked to structures of bureaucracy and gover- Inger Klingspor,
nance that may be involved in corrupt practices. There is often a thin line pointed out that
separating who is inside and outside the media set-up. Sometimes owners of corruption was one
of the great problems
media organizations have legitimate interests in other businesses that hap- facing Mozambique
pen to be linked to the state and government. State officials, politicians and (Savana 24 August
journalists, not only in Africa, but elsewhere, often belong to the same 2007).
social or business circles and do meet in pursuit of shared social or business 9. Graham Harrison
interests. Corruption is not merely a phenomenon that exists outside the (1999) discusses this
newsroom: it exists and is practised within the media industry as well. It is aspect in relation to
the development in
in the way media organizations are structured, in the behaviour and prac- Mozambique.
tices of journalists in sourcing and reporting, in how decisions are made on
10. See for instance the
what lines of enquiry should be pursued or not and whether such decisions report Caught in the
are made on the basis of who owns what media, and which political, busi- Act: Corruption and the
ness or other interests have to be protected. In many media systems, there Media. Report from a
workshop organized
also exists a grace-and-favour attitude, which, though not necessarily cor- by the International
rupt in itself, contributes to a view of the media as not being objective and Federation of
not above the undue influence of interested parties. Inside journalism, there Journalists (IFJ) in

Brussels 21–22 are unethical activities, which ideally would be more extensively covered
September 1998.
and exposed. But when it comes to criticizing other media there is often
11. I have written about great reluctance to do so from within the media establishment. Ranks close
this in ‘African
journalism and
to protect their own. This practice is not unheard of in Africa but is also
the struggle for existent in more mature Western media systems, where it is more subtle
democratic media’, but real nonetheless.
in Hugo de Burgh
(ed.) (2005), Making
Journalists are not beyond the same temptations as other people and
Journalists, London professions. In many parts of Africa remuneration is low and the social
and New York: status of a journalist is not very high. This makes some journalists suscep-
Routledge.
tible to what has been called ‘the brown-envelope syndrome’, where some
12. This issue is treated in journalists and editors receive envelopes containing not press releases, but
MISA Moçambique remuneration for services rendered. This can involve ‘killing’ damaging
(2007) Relatório
Annual Sobre o Estado stories for interested ‘clients’, writing favourably about certain officials or
de Liberdade de politicians or extorting money by threatening to expose details that might
Imprensa, (2006). be detrimental to those being blackmailed. A case in point is that of a jour-
13. National Media Ltd. nalist in the Mozambican weekly Zambeze who was sacked from the paper
and others v Bogoshi in March 2006 for being involved in an extortion attempt (Zambeze 2006).
29 September 1998.
Jennifer Hasty (2005) discusses and gives examples of mutual favours
exchanged between journalists and officials in Ghana. Journalists ‘pay’ their
sources either directly or indirectly by way of giving gifts, buying meals and
doing other favours to obtain information. Both practices are against the
Ghana Journalists Association’s code of ethics, but nevertheless the practice
appears to be widespread. According to Hasty, the practice of so-called ‘soli’,
which is short for ‘solidarity’, is particularly widespread in the state-owned
media, and implies governmental ‘sweetening’ of journalists so that they
report government actions favourably and do not pose critical questions. The
practice apparently also exists in the private media, to a lesser degree, but
operates differently from state-owned media’s soli. Private media offer gifts
and incentives to people willing to come forward with information on what
goes on in the state apparatus. This practice of offering inducements and
gifts is representative of how the oppositional press often operates in African
countries, basing some of their reports of corruption in the state on
rumours, thefts, leaks and unverified source material and leaving out the
painstaking task of double checking sources, an important part of proper
investigative journalism. It has been suggested that the press, through such
activities, contributes to a culture where corruption is seen as normal;
though the transaction is not ‘official’, it is regarded as a normal mutually
beneficial social transaction.
In discussions on how to combat corruption, there is a general perception
that the media are important institutions needed to uncover the abuse of
power and economic malpractice. The media in Mozambique are, for
instance, currently regarded as the most trustworthy institutions in
Mozambican society (Austral Consultorias 2006). Uncovering corrupt
practices contributes to the public awareness of a problem, and the risk of
exposure might serve as a deterrent. Though this is by no means certain,
there is also a paradox: widespread media coverage of corruption, particularly
many unsubstantiated opinion pieces on the prevalence of sleaze, may also
contribute to the impression that corruption is on the rise, even in situations
where other indicators may suggest the opposite. The public in some
African countries may probably imagine, with the prevalence of press
168 Helge Rønning

reports on sleaze, a greater level of official corruption than they are actually 14. A new law on
public acquisitions is
ever likely to encounter in practice. It is also feasible to think that the an example of
general public in some African countries may suppose that there is more movements in such
corruption among the country’s elites than is really the case. This is partly a direction.
because what happens at the high levels of society is hidden from public view.
But at the same time, politicians and elites are constantly in the public eye.
Thus people generalize, on the basis of stories and opinions in the press, about
a small number of high-profile incidents and prominent public figures. ‘As
evidence, the consumption of all types of news media – notably newspapers,
and especially in combination with TV and radio – increases the extent to
which people perceive corruption’ (Bratton et al. 2005: 234).
Where reliable information is not available, people thrive on unsubstanti-
ated gossip, which sometimes includes snippets of true stories. The possibility
exists that popular perceptions of official corruption in African governments
are also sometimes inflated, but this should not detract from the importance
of addressing the high levels of perceived corruption. Confidence in the
transparency of government is of particular importance for any democracy,
but one should be cautious when it comes to what the press can achieve on
its own in combating corruption. First of all, there is every reason to be
aware of how important the press is as a centre for anti-corruption activities.
But it if reports in the media about corruption are not followed up by the
police or public prosecutors, and government only pays lip-service to the
struggle against corruption, the press reports about sleaze will be just that,
reports. Although it may lead to increased cynicism among members of the
public, being exposed in the media makes no difference; no action will be
taken by state prosecution authorities.
Consider the situation in Mozambique under former president Joaquim
Chissano, whose government practised what has been called ‘a política do
silêncio’ (the politics of silence), in connection with stories about corrup-
tion in the press. Nothing was done. Today there is hope that the govern-
ment of President Armando Guebuza is going to change this. He has, on
several occasions, said that his government is in the process of bringing in
new legislation14 to combat corruption and that it is absolutely necessary
to act against it with vigour (Meianoite 2006).
It is not possible to discuss policy issues on corruption without addressing
the larger issue of the nature of the state that is supposed to carry out the
policies of combating corruption. In contributing to change by uncovering
abuses of power and practices of gross self-interest, a press that has the
protection of strong freedom of expression legislation, and constitutional
guarantees for access to information, may be an agent for ensuring proper
democratic practices and transparency in business and state administration.
But news media cannot combat corruption without having the support of
the judiciary, an open government and an active civil society, all focused
on ending this destructive social practice. The power of the press should
not be overestimated.
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tion in Africa’’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 31 (1), pp. 31–48.
Hasty, Jennifer (2005), ‘Sympathetic magic/contagious corruption: sociality,
democracy, and the press in Ghana’, Public Culture, 17:3, pp. 339–69.
Ideaisdebate: http://www.ideiasdebate.blogspot.com/
Lambsdorff, Johan Graf (2007), The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform.
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lindstedt, Catharina and Naurin, Daniel (2005), Transparency and Corruption. The
Conditional Significance of a Free Press, paper prepared for the conference ‘The
Quality of Government. What It Is, How to Get It, Why It Matters’, the Quality
of Government Institute, Department of Political Science, Göteborg University,
Gothenburg, 17–19 November 2005.
Mbeki, Moeletsi (2005), ‘Shield Africa’s wealth from self-serving political elites’,
Business Day, 19 April.
MediaFAX (2006), Quarta-feira, ‘Corrupção em Moçambique’, 1 March.
Meianoite (2006), ‘Temos que agir com firmeza para que a corrupção não domine o
Estado’, interview with Presidente Armando Guebuza by Osvaldo Júnio and
Irene Braz, 7–13 March.
Migdal, Joel S. (1988), Strong Societies and Weak States, Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
MISA Moçambique (2007), Relatório Annual Sobre o Estado de Liberdade de Imprensa,
Maputo: Misa.
Mosse, Marcello (2004), Corrupção em Moçambique: Alguns elementos para debate,
paper distributed electronically in conjunction with an article in the weekly
newspaper Savanna (November).
170 Helge Rønning

Mosse, Marcello and Edson Cortez (2006), A pequena Corrupção no sector da Educação
em Moçambique, Maputo: Centro da Ingridade Pública da Mocambique.
Pradhan, Sanjay et al. (2000), Anticorruption in Transition. A Contribution to the
Policy Debate, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
Reinikka, Ritva and Svensson, Jacob (2004), ‘Local capture: evidence from a cen-
tral government transfer program in Uganda’, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
119:2, pp. 679–705.
Ronning, Helge (2005), ‘African journalism and the struggle for democratic
media’, in Hugo de Burgh (ed.) (2005), Making Journalists, London and New
York: Routledge.
Savana (2007), 24 August.
Sen, Amartya (1999), Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Svensson, Jacob (2005), ‘Eight questions about corruption’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 19:3, pp. 19–42.
Transparency International website: http://www.transparency.org. http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007. Accessed 18.06.2008.
World Bank, The (1997), Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World
Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, http://www1.worldbank.
org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/coridx.htm. Accessed 18.06.2008.
Zambeze (2006), N. 182. 16 de Março de 2006.
Zvekic, Ugljesa and Camerer, Lala (2002), ‘Corruption in Southern Africa: a surveys-
based overview’ in Ugljesa Zvekic (ed.) (2002), Corruption & Anti-Corruption in
Southern Africa, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Office for
Southern Africa.
Suggested citation
Rønning, H. (2009), ‘The politics of corruption and the media in Africa’, Journal of
African Media Studies 1: 1, pp. 155–171, doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.155/1
Contributor details
Helge Rønning (1943) Professor of Media Studies, University of Oslo, Norway.
Member of The Norwegian Government Commission for Freedom of Expression
(1996–1997); The Public Service Broadcasting Council (1996–2004). Research in
USA, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Mozambique. Books and articles on media politics, cul-
ture and literary issues, media and development and democracy.
Contact: IMK, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1993, Blindern. 0317 Oslo, Norway.
E-mail:helge.ronning@media.uio.no

JAMS_1.1_12_Rønning-1.qxd 9/11/08 9:31 AM Page 172
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Book Reviews
Book Reviews. English language. doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.173/5
Politics and Persuasion: Media Coverage of Zimbabwe’s 2000

Elections, Ragnar Waldahl (2004)
Harare: Weaver Press, 148 pages, ISBN 0 779220278,
Pbk, $24.95
Reviewed by Dumisani Moyo, Department of Media Studies, University of the
Witwatersrand, South Africa
Since the so-called democratization decade of the 1990s, there has been
increased scholarly interest in democratic elections and how they are con-
ducted throughout Africa (see for example Cowen and Laakso 2002; Bratton
and Van de Walle 1997). Most of this scholarship has focused on the sincerity
of these elections as a way of measuring the degree of democratization in par-
ticular African countries. However, except for expert reports, often including
sections on the media coverage of these elections as one of the indicators of
the level of democratization, there are very few, if any, scholars who have
attempted book-length analyses of the role of the media in Africa’s democra-
tic elections. Ragnar Waldahl’s book on Zimbabwe’s 2000 election is there-
fore pioneering in this respect. It looks at how the media in Zimbabwe – both
the pro-government and pro-opposition media – covered different aspects of
the election, including the treatment of the key election issues and the repre-
sentation of the protagonists in the contest.
The book starts from the premise that the media are important founda-
tions of any democratic society. Free and open media play the crucial role
of mediating a democratic political culture, communicating political infor-
mation, as well as imparting knowledge to citizens about political parties,
their candidates and agendas. Visibility of political parties and their candi-
dates is crucial to the exercise of democratic elections, as it enables citizens
to make informed choices. A clear example of the importance of publicity
is how political parties that were formed in Zimbabwe in the 1990s (namely
the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), Forum for Democratic Reform
(FORUM) and the Democratic Party (DP)) – remained what Waldahl called
‘political unknowns’, as they were denied the oxygen of publicity in the
dominant state-controlled media. As such, Waldahl emphasizes that, despite
their limited reach compared to the situation in most developed countries,
the media in Africa still play a critical role when it comes to wider and
faster dissemination of political messages. That they remain veritable sites
of contestation is evidenced by the fact that their ownership and control
continues to be strictly regulated on the continent.
The author offers a thorough and rich sociological analysis of how the
media went about putting ‘reality’ together. As Waldahl puts it, the book
seeks to analyse ‘the media’s version of reality’ and ‘not the events that

actually take place’ (p. 17). It is therefore an important work on the sociol-
ogy of the production of news in a politically charged environment. It takes
a unique approach, which enables the author to distance himself from the
subject, thereby allowing him to come up with a fairly balanced analysis of
the highly polarized Zimbabwean media environment. This is how he
describes his analytical approach:
And when a medium conveys a political party’s position in a particular way,

rather than judging whether the decision is correct or not, I simply establish
that this is how that medium wishes to present that party. Rather than
weigh up how much truth there is in the media’s coverage of the election
campaign, I am seeking to show what impressions they convey to the
public. (p. 17)
One of the most praiseworthy things about Waldahls’s book is its ability to
avoid the tendency to give a one-sided account of the electoral processes in
Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe’s ruling Zimbabwe African National
Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is always depicted as the main actor,
with other political parties as mere victims. Contrary to commonly held
perceptions that the ZANU (PF) government has overwhelming control of
the media in Zimbabwe, for example, Waldahl presents a picture of small
but robust and vociferous pro-opposition media that helped articulate
alternative viewpoints in the run-up to the 2000 elections.
The book starts with a brief background history and proceeds to deal
with theoretical arguments on the political importance of the media in a
democracy – focusing particularly on their role in the context of national
elections. One of the author’s major strengths is his ability to simplify com-
plex theories of democracy and apply them to an African context in a very
accessible manner. Though mostly Western derived, these theoretical
arguments are somewhat ‘naturalized’ or ‘domesticated’ in the book to
suit the context. At the same time, these theoretical arguments are also
presented in a way that provokes critical thinking about how the structur-
ing of the media has consequences for the conduct of free and fair elections
not only in Zimbabwe but everywhere.
The book provides a nuanced survey of the media situation in Zimbabwe
and illustrates how the ruling party enjoyed monopoly of the airwaves as
well as a dominant position in the print media sector. While historically
linking this to a colonial media structure designed to serve minority white
interests, Waldahl is quick to point to the dilemmas faced by most new
African governments at the dawn of independence from colonial rule and
apartheid: ‘Was it possible to retain private ownership of newspapers with-
out leaving control over them to white interests?’ and ‘Would it be possible
to establish media that would play a constructive part in the rebuilding of
the country without state dominance?’ (p. 32). In Zimbabwe, this led to a
state-dominated media landscape, where the media became important tools
for maintaining and extending (the government’s) political authority. Both
the BBC-styled broadcasting system and a supposedly independent press
owned through a public trust soon gave way to unbridled government
interference. This promoted the development of a unique form of journalism
that slavishly sang the praise of the rulers (p. 33).
174 Book Reviews

The book also provides a survey of the social, political and economic
environment in the period preceding the 2000 elections and describes
how economic decline in the wake of structural adjustment in the 1990s,
rising unemployment, increasing poverty and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Congo (DRC) intervention, among other factors, created an
environment favourable to growing political dissent. It illustrates how the
ruling party used the vast media empire at its disposal to set the agenda
for election issues – forcing both the opposition parties and pro-opposition
media to be more on the defensive, concentrating on the negative aspects
of ZANU (PF) policies instead of mounting a proactive campaign (pp. 44–45).
As Waldahl puts it, ‘Both the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
and other opposition parties concentrated much more on what in their
opinion was wrong with government’s policies than on what solutions
they themselves had to offer […] This amounted to a failure by the opposi-
tion to acquaint the voters with its own policies’ (p. 45). ZANU (PF) on the
other hand was forthright in making ‘land ownership and defence of national
sovereignty’ the main campaign issues (p. 145). This polarization was clearly
reflected in media coverage of these issues, with The Herald uncritically accept-
ing every aspect of ZANU (PF) policy, and the pro-opposition papers taking
every opportunity to attack government positions. As Waldahl writes, ‘The
pro-government media saw the farm occupations primarily as a struggle
between Zimbabwe’s landless proletariat and the farmers’ organisations.
The pro-opposition media were inclined to see them as a conflict between
the war veterans as the government’s political instruments, and the people
whose livelihoods were tied to the farms’ (p. 48). In the process, the pro-
opposition papers ‘neglected to tell the readers what the alternatives were’
(pp. 46–47).
Unlike most writers on the Zimbabwe media situation who tend to
distinguish government-controlled media from what they call the ‘inde-
pendent’ (meaning private) media, Waldahl makes an important distinction
between ‘pro-government’ and ‘pro-opposition’ media, suggesting that the
latter are neither ‘angelic’ neutral players nor mere victims of a repressive
system but positioned actors whose democratic contribution should never
be underestimated. The book illustrates how, for example, the pro-opposition
media, despite their size and reach, successfully set the agenda in terms of
reporting on politically motivated violence (p. 131). What is perhaps not
emphasized enough is the fact that what are described as ‘pro-government
media’ in the book are in principle public media, which are obliged to
serve the public interest – giving voice to people from either side of the
political divide. The author only goes as far as saying that, ‘In the period
leading up to the election, both the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
(ZBC) and the Zimbabwe Newspapers Group (Zimpapers) served as loyal
outlets for Mugabe and ZANU (PF), even though their attachment in terms
of ownership was to the state of Zimbabwe, not ZANU (PF) as a political
party’ (p. 129).
The book further analyses the treatment of major election campaign
issues in this polarized media environment. It looks at how both media,
from across the divide, addressed the legal, informational and political
aspects of the election to ascertain whether these provided a suitable envi-
ronment for the elections. The writer’s findings indicate that information
Book Reviews 175

from both pro-government and pro-opposition media was rather too

scant and inadequate to fully inform the voters about the election issues
(pp. 66–67). A form of attack journalism tended to limit their potential to
provide insightful information to the electorate.
Waldahl also looks at the representation of the main contestants,
Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, in the media in terms of their political
legitimacy, political skills and honesty. He illustrates how the govern-
ment’s control of a vast media empire enabled it to rubbish Tsvangirai as
politically unskilled, naive and lacking liberation war credentials and
hence legitimacy. Pro-government media successfully conflated ZANU
(PF) with Zimbabwe, projecting the party as the sole legitimate force to
rule the country: ‘Any politician who challenged ZANU (PF) was also
challenging the nation, and any enemy of ZANU (PF) was an enemy of a
free Zimbabwe’ (p. 86).
The author also focuses on violence as something that has become
common currency in Zimbabwean elections since 1985. He links the degree
of pre-election violence to the strength of the opposition to ZANU (PF) in
each election year, indicating that the unprecedented strength of the opposi-
tion in 2000 was met with an unprecedented orgy of violence in the run-up
to the election (p. 87). The book illustrates the polarity in media reports on
violence, particularly in terms of who its perpetrators were. In particular, the
deafening silence from the pro-government media and the ceaseless cover-
age of these incidences in the pro-opposition media is made apparent.
The book also focuses on the political affiliation of different media in
Zimbabwe. While this is very informative in terms of positioning the vari-
ous media, especially for the benefit of those unacquainted with the
Zimbabwean situation, this would have been more useful if it had come
earlier or been made part of the background to the media environment in
Zimbabwe. As such, it appears more of an afterthought in the book.
The book makes a final assessment of the conduct of the media in
terms of fulfilling their democratic role of providing an arena for public
debate as well as interpreting political developments for the electorate. A
mixed verdict is arrived at:
Although the political situation of two clear alternatives should have invited
lively exchanges of opinion, the media tended to exist in isolation from one
another. Each made important contributions to the social debate, but the
political front between the main opponents and their respective media sup-
porters was evidently so rigid that there was little basis for a constructive
media debate across it. (p. 135)
In the postscript, Waldahl illustrates how the ZANU (PF) government

sought, after the elections, to limit the impact of the pro-opposition media
in a number of ways, including the banning of the vociferous Daily News
and the expulsion of foreign correspondents – which is a clear sign that
the sting from these media had been more effective than is generally
acknowledged.
Although Waldahl warns his readers about his being a non-native of
the country under study, he has provided a sharp-eyed analysis of the
mediation of Zimbabwe’s 2000 election. What is more, the book is not simply
176 Book Reviews

about media coverage of the elections: it covers much more, by historically

locating what has come to be known as the Zimbabwe crisis. As such, this
is a highly recommended read for anyone who wants to understand con-
temporary Zimbabwean politics. Its catchy title, Politics and Persuasion,
aptly captures the political role of the media in a democratic election.
However, the reality of the 2000 election in Zimbabwe, which was charac-
terized by a lot of politically motivated violence where the media were not
innocent ‘mirrors’ of that reality, is such that one would need to look at
both persuasion and coercion as inseparable ZANU (PF) election strate-
gies. On another note, the book to me presents a missed opportunity in
terms of the possibility it offers for revisiting issues to do with media effects
that have for many years been at the centre of media studies. How, for
instance, can we interpret the rise in oppositional viewpoints in a climate
where the public sphere is not only severely restricted but also dominated by
government-controlled mouthpieces, as the case in pre- and post-2000 elec-
tions in Zimbabwe? It is noteworthy, though, that the book received a Book
of the Year Prize at the Zimbabwe International Book Fair (ZIBF) in 2005 –
a clear indication of its contribution to an understanding of Zimbabwean
contemporary politics.
References
Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. (1997), Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime
Transitions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cowen, M. and Laakso, L. (eds) (2002), Multi-party Elections in Africa, Oxford:
James Currey and New York: Palgrave.
Contributor details
Dr Dumisani Moyo is a Lecturer in Media Studies in the Department of Media
Studies, School of Languages and Literature Studies, at the University of the
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. He has published on Zimbabwean
and African media.
Contact: Department of Media Studies, School of Languages and Literature,

University of the Witwatersrand, P. Bag 3, Wits 2050, Johannesburg, South Africa.
E-mail: dumisani.moyo@wits.ac.za
Mixed Reception: South African Youth and their Experience

of Global Media, Larry Strelitz (2005)
Pretoria: UNISA Press, 199 pp., ISBN 1-86888-287-X,
Paperback, $34.78
Reviewed by Maria Way, Senior Lecturer in Media Theory, CAMRI, University
of Westminster, UK
While the word ‘globalization’ has become almost a jargon word through
its continual use in our media and in academic circles, perhaps too little
work has been undertaken on the audience and the effects that globalized
media have on it. Larry Strelitz here attempts to address this lack. Mixed
Reception: South African Youth and their Experience of Global Media is a book
Book Reviews 177

that will appeal to both undergraduate and postgraduate students of media

studies, but would, I suggest, be useful to others also. That this book comes
from research undertaken in an African context, even if in a country that is
the richest in Africa, means that it is particularly valuable. We cannot, of
course, take this book to reflect experiences in other African countries.
South Africa, however, is sociologically interesting since it is a country that
has undergone a great deal of political change recently and has a racially
diverse population who live at vastly different economic levels.
Beginning with a short introduction in Chapter 1, which also summa-
rizes the book’s structure, Strelitz discusses his own awakening to global
media by means of 1970s music and shortwave radio listening. He identi-
fied himself with the counter-culture movements of the United States. As a
graduate student in London, he realized that through this medium he had
symbolically escaped from his local culture’s oppression. Despite this sup-
posed ‘escape’, his political understandings had been affected by South
African mainstream, government-influenced media. On his return to South
Africa, he began to read the debates on contemporary media theory, and
understood the polarity in his thinking, polarity manifested by the ‘audi-
ence’ and ‘media power’ with which theorists were engaging.
Whilst emphasizing the paucity of research on global media’s effects on
audiences, Strelitz highlights the lack of research into youth, perhaps espe-
cially important in South Africa where 43 per cent of the population are
aged between fourteen and twenty, and 73 per cent are under the age of 35.
In 1998 he began a research project that utilized Grahamstown Campus
students at Rhodes University as research subjects. Strelitz indicates that
55 per cent of students were white, but the student body came from ‘[…] a
range of class backgrounds. I thus had access, in one space, to a cross
section of South African youth’ (p. 4). He displays an awareness that the
picture of media consumption that he obtained from this research might
not be comprehensive in regard to South African youth.
Chapter 2 investigates the theoretical frameworks that underlie rela-
tionships between media texts and audiences and then uses them to debate
his primary research data. Chapter 3 contextualizes the relationship of text
and audience against the contemporary economic and cultural processes
that the phenomenon of globalization raises. Strelitz does not consider the
media in isolation, but in conjunction with culture, politics, technology and
the economy, examining ‘cultural globalization’ and how global media
consumption has influenced consumers’ cultural understanding at a local
level. It is here that he places emphasis on the media imperialism thesis, as
he considers that this has played a key role in forming the initial under-
standings of the processes that occupy him here.
The socio-political context of South Africa is particularly remarkable
because of the effect that the social politics of apartheid had on the lives of
young South Africans specifically. In Chapter 4, Strelitz assesses research
from local and international studies on media consumption. If the reader
has special interests in South Africa’s political and social background,
then Chapter 5 – which discusses Strelitz’ research methodology choices –
has an interesting introduction to the country’s educational and political
history. Strelitz states that the book is aimed at students because as a
teacher he believes it is particularly helpful for them to appreciate the
178 Book Reviews

connections between theoretical research concerns and their application

to empirical research.
The remaining chapters discuss the outcome of Strelitz’ research and
Chapter 8 critiques the suggestion that, prior to the invasion of the devel-
oping world by American media and culture, developing countries had
been hardly touched by outside cultures and influences. Strelitz argues
that culturally related encounters frequently had links with coercive polit-
ical and military powers. The students surveyed in his book did not display
a cohesive national culture, but demonstrated deep divisions along lines of
race and class. He shows that global media assist students both through
reflection on their differences and by helping them to construct such dif-
ferences. He emphasizes the need that respondents perceived for media
products to be ‘realistic’. For some students, locally produced media seemed
to answer this need, but for others it was, ‘ironically, global rather than
local productions that most adequately and accurately reflect their “local”
lives and that are therefore experienced as being “realistic” ‘ (p. 6).
The book’s final section briefly summarizes the research and its results,
and prints in full the ‘Survey on student lifestyle and media usage: 1998’,
the instructions given to the project’s administrators and the explanatory
letter given to each participant. For those studying research methodolo-
gies, or embarking on a similar research project, this section – and the
remainder of the book also – would prove very useful. There are full notes
to the text and there is an extensive bibliography, which would be useful to
those intending to undertake such research. Strelitz’ book is well-indexed
and for the non-South African reader there is a glossary of abbreviations
of those acronyms that may be unfamiliar.
Contributor details
Maria Way is a Senior Lecturer in Media Theory in the School of Media, Arts and
Design, University of Westminster, in the United Kingdom. Her research interests
include media and religion, and particularly the media output of the Vatican.
Contact: University of Westminster, School of Media, Arts and Design, Watford
Road, Harrow, Middlesex HA1 3TP, UK.
E-mail: M.D.Way@westminster.ac.uk
Book Reviews 179

JAMS_1.1_13 Book Reviews.qxd 9/11/08 9:31 AM Page 180
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JAMS_1.1_14 Film Reviews.qxd 7/23/08 4:56 PM Page 181
Film Reviews
Film Reviews. English language. doi: 10.1386/jams.1.1.181/4
‘Bling bang’: diamonds for dummies

Blood Diamonds, Directed by Edward Zwick (2006)
USA: Warner Bros
Reviewed by Mona Pedersen, Hedmark University College
The film Blood Diamond is produced and distributed by Warner Bros and
had its premiere in cinemas in the United States of America in December
2006 and in a number of other countries in the beginning of 2007.
During the summer, the film was also released on DVD, with the docu-
mentary Blood on the Stone as the most interesting part of the extra material.
Edward Zwick, the director, is known for directing films like Glory (1989),
Legends of the Fall (1994) and The Last Samurai (2003), among others. The
reviews praised Blood Diamond mainly for its high action pace, and it was
nominated for Oscars in five different categories, but won none.
Blood Diamond is set in Sierra Leone during the civil war. It portrays
three very different people whose destinies become woven together in the
search for a big pink diamond. Solomon Vandy (Djimon Hounsou) is a fish-
erman and father of three children. In the opening sequence we see him fol-
lowing his oldest son Dia (Kagiso Kuypers) to school, when the village is
suddenly attacked by soldiers from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
Danny Archer (Leonardo DiCaprio) is the ex-Zimbabwean soldier of fortune,
now a cynical diamond smuggler, dealing diamonds and weapons for both
the RUF and the government. The American journalist Maddy Bowen
(Jennifer Connelly) is referred to as an ‘action junkie’, bringing her experi-
ences from the battlefields in Bosnia and Afghanistan to the war zone in
Sierra Leone.
Blood Diamond also depicts the RUF treatment of child soldiers, and the
psychic mechanisms that are at work between the military leaders and the
children. This depiction is very similar to that of Ishmael Beah (2007) in
his autobiographical book that addresses his youth as a child soldier.
Initially military leaders break the children down with fright and terror,
then offer false comfort and build seemingly new personalities with novel
names like ‘Baby Killer’ or ‘Master of Disaster’. As the third stage in the
process, the children are provided with drugs, weapons and violent
movies, and sent out to kill.
The title of this film refers to the term used to describe the illegal trade
of diamonds from conflict areas; jewels smuggled out of war-torn nations
with profits that further the bloodshed. Solomon is taken as a slave in a
diamond mining camp controlled by the RUF, and his son becomes a child
soldier in the RUF army. While searching for diamonds under the terrify-
ing surveillance of RUF soldiers, Solomon finds a large, pink diamond,

which he successfully hides in the mud while his guards are distracted by
government troops attacking the mining camp. Solomon is placed in
prison where he meets Danny, who is in jail for trying to smuggle dia-
monds over the border to Liberia. Danny sees the diamond as his ticket
‘out of this god-forsaken country’, while the diamond, for Solomon, repre-
sents an opportunity to get his family back. Maddy decides to help them in
exchange for information, because, for her, the quest for the diamond
could be the material for her big, Pulitzer-prize-winning story. Their
search takes the three of them through different situations and sceneries
that depict the brutal, violent actions and the horrifying consequences of
the civil war: battle scenes in Freetown; the slaughtering of ambulance
personnel; the slavery in the diamond mining camps in Kono; the refugee
camp in Guinea, with mutilated bodies everywhere. As is said in the film,
‘in the USA it is bling bling, but out here it is bling bang’.
Hollywood’s political turn

Once again Hollywood has taken a political turn. In the 1930s, the rise of
fascism and the threat of global conflict drove many (leftist) film-makers
to politicize their films. Later the Cold War had political ramifications in
Hollywood, which in turn led to Senator Joseph McCarthy’s infamous
‘red scare’. During the Vietnam War, another political wave washed
over Hollywood and established concepts of anti-war and human rights
among other things. After the attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001
we are now seeing a renewed interest in politically motivated films from
Hollywood, but Ben Dickinson (2006) argues that the ‘new radicalism’ of
today’s Hollywood started during the Reagan era, with Oliver Stone’s
Wall Street (1987) as a turning point. For the Oscar Award in March
2007, all films nominated in the category of best picture were described
as being ‘political’. DiCaprio also ‘lost’ in the competition for best male in
a leading role when the award was given to Forest Whitaker for his por-
trayal of Idi Amin. This political interest brings both domestic and foreign
affairs to the screen.
As Paul Virilio (1989) has shown in his intriguing essay, there are
close ties between the American film industry and wars and conflict, not
only on a political and economical level, but also in matters of developing
technology and – in the end – perception. Also, the Western concept of
Africa has been strongly influenced by popular Hollywood films, from The
African Queen (Huston, 1951) to Out of Africa (Pollock, 1985). Over the
last couple of years we have seen an increasing number of Hollywood
films set in Africa. Besides Blood Diamond, some examples of the new
‘African turn’ in Hollywood are: In My Country (Boorman, 2004), Hotel
Rwanda (George, 2004), Tsotsi (Hood, 2004), The Constant Gardener
(Meirelles, 2005), Catch a Fire (Noyce, 2006), Babel (Iñárritu, 2006), Last
King of Scotland (Macdonald, 2006) and Days of Glory (Bouchareb, 2007).
This is also reflected in the documentary genre, for example Bling: A
Planet Rock (Cepeda, 2007), which takes American hip-hop celebrities,
known as mega-consumers of diamonds, or ‘bling bling’, on a journey to
Sierra Leone, confronting them with the harsh realities of the diamond
mining communities, meeting with former child soldiers, refugees and
local hip-hop artists.
182 Film Reviews

What are the reasons for Hollywood’s renewed interest in Africa? Africa
is a continent seemingly overflowing with conflicts, and conflicts are the
main ingredient in the Hollywood drama. As Kevin Macdonald, director of
The Last King of Scotland, said: ‘Film-makers cast around. Should I make
another film in New York? It’ll be the 10,000th film to shoot in New York.
Or should I go somewhere else that hasn’t been filmed, where it’s literally a
different landscape, different people, different kinds of stories?’ (The
Independent, 28 October 2006). In this respect, Africa simply offers opportu-
nities to tell new, dramatic stories. Another reason is that the public is in
need for a deepened understanding of the conflicts that involve US politics
and economics around the world in a post-September 11 perspective.
Educating the audience

First of all, Blood Diamond’s intention is to entertain its audience. The film is
told in a classic Hollywood manner, action-packed and with a compulsory
romance plot between the characters of Connelly and DiCaprio. Second,
this film is concerned with educating and enlightening its audience. Blood
Diamond has its serious side, which is underlined by the producers’ decision
to co-sponsor an informative website on blood diamonds, together with
Amnesty International and Global Witness (see www.blooddiamondaction.
org). The film-makers want to enlighten the American diamond-buying
audience, and make them aware of the role they are playing in the buying
end of the illicit business. DiCaprio’s character formulates the core of this
purpose: ‘Who do you think buys the stones that I bring out? Dreamy
American girls, who all want a storybook wedding and a big rock, like the
ones in the advertisements of your politically correct magazines.’
The educational aspect of Blood Diamond is highlighted in both the
films’ dialogue – as the citation above exemplifies – and in its narrative.
After the intense opening sequence where the RUF attack Solomon’s vil-
lage, the next scene provides a calm, educational purpose, feeding the
audience with facts about the diamond trade and the overall importance
of the American market. The United States purchases about nine billion
dollars’ worth of diamonds every year, more than two-thirds of the world’s
sales. In many aspects, Blood Diamond serves an instructional purpose for
diamond purchasing consumers, a sort of ‘diamonds for dummies’.
The main characters function as ‘micro-advocates’ for the political and
cultural conflicts that make the backdrop for the film. This narrative strat-
egy of reducing larger problems on a macro level in society to seemingly
personal matters is well known, and as the drama evolves, strategies for
solving these problems are suggested through the characters’ actions. The
benefit of this strategy is the construction of identification and under-
standing for such impersonal large-scale issues among the audience, but
the drawback is often the simplifying of what are rather complex difficulties
in real life. In Blood Diamond it is the cultural and historical aspects that
suffer, as the film-makers choose instead to depict, for example, the char-
acters’ backgrounds, in unnecessary, sentimental detail.
Stereotyping Africa
While Blood Diamond is concerned with portraying the complex patterns of
the illicit diamond trade, the portrait of the country itself, and the civil
Film Reviews 183

war, is reinforcing stereotyped images of Africa. Although the action in

Blood Diamond is set in Sierra Leone, the filming took place at locations
mainly in Mozambique and South Africa, besides London. The film’s plot
could easily have been located in Angola, Côte d’Ivoire or Congo, for that
matter. ‘TIA: this is Africa’, as Danny puts it in the film, from a Western
point of view, and it’s not Sierra Leone per se. Africa is depicted as a conti-
nent devastated by war, cruelty and bad leadership. As Patrick Chabal and
Jean Pascal Daloz point out, the concept of a modern Weberian state is
non-relevant in most of Africa when trying to understand conflicts. The
problem is not that the state has collapsed or been privatized, ‘Rather the
state, and norms of impartial professionalism, was never properly estab-
lished in the first place. The notion that politicians, bureaucrats or mili-
tary chiefs should be servants of the state simply does not make any sense’
(Chabal and Daloz 1999: 15). Many of the characteristics of the war in
Sierra Leone reflect the weaknesses of the Sierra Leonean ‘state’, but in
Blood Diamond the complex ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of the civil war are not
spelled out.
The film’s insistence on depicting the RUF as the classic ‘bad guys’ who
are causing all the chaos, violence and fear in Sierra Leone alone is also a
simplification. As David Keen (2005) has pointed out:
Despite the almost universal condemnation of the RUF, a key problem has
been that some people – both inside and outside Sierra Leone – have found
the RUF to be a ‘useful’ phenomenon, not least because it has provided an
alibi for abuse and justification for various forms of undemocratic and abu-
sive rule.
(Keen 2005: 5)
In this perspective, Blood Diamond makes no exception.

The film ends with Solomon speaking at a meeting among politicians
and businessmen in Kimberley, South Africa, pointing forward to the
Kimberly process of 2003. The Kimberley process is a joint government,
international diamond industry and civil society initiative to stem the flow
of conflict diamonds. Kimberley-process participants account for approxi-
mately 99.8 per cent of the global production of rough diamonds, it is said.
Stability and security have increased in Sierra Leone since 2002 with the
end of the country’s decade-long war. However, significant challenges face
the establishment of a cultural and political system that honours and
defends human rights for Sierra Leoneans. The characteristics of Sierra
Leone’s war reflect the incompleteness of the country’s incorporation into
a global system – a system that has provided access to dreams of a
Western lifestyle, access to arms, access to quick money from diamonds for
a few and, increasingly, access to a discourse about rights and the need for
legal ‘justice’ alongside precious little access to development, dignity and
recognition (Keen 2005: 5).
Films like Blood Diamond will probably not increase the Western under-
standing of these challenges, but will maybe prevent some of the Western
public’s indifference towards Africa’s development, and will hopefully
enhance awareness about where diamonds come from, and prevent us
from buying ‘bling bang’.
184 Film Reviews

References
Beah, I. (2007), A Long Way Home: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier, New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux.
Chabal, P. and Daloz, J. P. (1999), Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Dickinson, B. (2006), Hollywood’s New Radicalism: War, Globalisation and the Movies
from Reagan to George W. Bush, London/New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
Gumbel, A. (2006), “Africa provides storyline for next generation of Hollywood
blockbusters” in The Independent, 28 October 2006 http://www.independent.co.uk/
arts-entertainment/film-and-tv/news/africa-provides-storyline-for-next-
generation-of-hollywood-blockbusters-421953.html. Down loaded 19 June 2008.
Keen, D. (2005), Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, New York: Palgrave.
Virilio, P. (1989), War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception, London/NY: Verso.
Contributor details
Mona Pedersen is Assistant Professor in Film and Media Studies at Hedmark
University College, Rena, Norway.
Contact: Hedmark University College, Faculty of Business Administration, Social

Sciences and Computer Science, N-2450 Rena, Norway.
E-mail: monap@hihm.no
Tsotsi, directed by Gavin Hood

South African release 3 February 2006; USA & Canada,
Miramax, 24 February 2006; UK, Momentum,
17 March 2006
Reviewed by Herman Wasserman, University of Sheffield
Watching a film from one’s own country win an Oscar is a bit like seeing
your home team score a goal in the World Cup – it elicits feelings of patri-
otism that could blind you to the faulty footwork and fouls committed
along the way. When Tsotsi was awarded the 2006 Academy Award for
best foreign film, one’s usual cynicism about the commercial aesthetics of
the Oscars momentarily made way for celebration of the fact that, for a
change, the South African landscape was not a stand-in for Los Angeles or
some unnamed desert, and its own actors and not Samuel L. Jackson or
James Earl Jones got to star in their own story. But the fact that the film
was Oscar material also meant that it conformed to the perspectives of the
global commercial film industry rather than offering resistance to it.
The film tells the story of a character known as Tsotsi (roughly trans-
lated, ‘thug’), leader of a criminal gang in Johannesburg. After a violent
altercation with one of his comrades, Tsotsi (movingly played by Presley
Chweneyagae) is confronted by his inner demons. He runs off into the
night, traversing the empty space between the township and the suburbs,
the no-man’s land that signifies what still seems like an insurmountable
(and growing) divide between rich and poor in post-apartheid South
Africa. In a series of flashbacks, hints are given to Tsotsi’s childhood expe-
riences of hardship. In a suburban street, Tsotsi, still in emotional turmoil,
Film Reviews 185

sees a woman get out of her car to buzz open the gate to her house and as
she turns her back, Tsotsi – in what seems like an involuntary, mechanical
action – shoots the woman, hijacks the car and speeds off. A few blocks
away he hears crying from the back seat – a baby had been left in the car.
For a moment Tsotsi hesitates, then stuffs the baby in a carrier bag and
takes him along. The rest of the narrative centres around the conse-
quences of this decision, both on a mundane level (some comic effect is
gained from the impracticalities of Tsotsi plying his trade as a gangster
while having to care for the infant), but, more significantly, on a psycho-
logical level. As the narrative unfolds, the child confronts Tsotsi with his
lost innocence, helps him rediscover empathy and finally leads him to a
kind of salvation. These Christian nuances are echoed in the film’s tagline –
‘In this world … redemption just comes once’ – as well as in Tsotsi’s
encounter with a beggar in a wheelchair, who he, albeit still in an abrasive
tone, commands to stand up and walk. If he doesn’t, it is Tsotsi that walks
away from what previously would have turned into a violent incident.
The key to understanding this change in Tsotsi, brought about by his
accidental relationship with the child, is provided in a scene between the
criminal mastermind Fela and members of Tsotsi’s gang. As the gang struc-
ture starts crumbling as a result of Tsotsi’s frequent absences, Fela invites
Tsotsi’s comrades to come and work for him. As they discuss Tsotsi’s change
of behaviour, one of them, the stereotypical educated-and-therefore-outsider
figure Boston, remarks that Tsotsi never went to school, and therefore does
not know the meaning of the word ‘decency’. He then asks Fela if he can
even spell the word, whereupon Fela proceeds to spit out the letters one by
one, offering an interpretation: ‘Do you know what decency means? Decency
means making a fucking decent living, sonny.’ To which Boston replies:
‘Respect. For yourself. It’s got nothing at all to do with your standard of living.’
What it all comes down to, the film seems to suggest, is an individual
road of self-discovery and regained respect, the ‘triumph of the human
spirit’ so typical of Hollywood’s feel-good gospel. Instead of taking a polit-
ical stance, of going below the surface of post-apartheid poverty and
exposing the structural mechanics of a society that continues to produce
the conditions for crime and violence, the film chooses to transcend
rather than engage with this messiness. In ignoring structure and cele-
brating individual agency, the narrative sheds the political resonance of
Athol Fugard’s original novel (in which Tsotsi was left homeless as a
result of the razing of their township and his mother’s arrest by the
apartheid police) and constructs the causes for Tsotsi’s criminality in
individual terms – the neglect by his alcoholic father and the inability of
his bedridden (perhaps as a result of AIDS, although this remains unspo-
ken) mother to care for him. Leaving politics behind, Gavin Hood’s adap-
tion buys into the more innocuous discourse of one man’s journey from
pathological criminal to conscientized citizen. This of course means that
Tsotsi has to succumb to the rationality of the modern state – a message
brought home powerfully in the final scene, where Tsotsi submits to the
police. He is surrounded by a veritable panopticon of spotlights and aimed
firearms, and has no choice but to raise his hands in surrender (or cruci-
fixion?) to the state-ordained surveillance. The possibility that the state
itself (the current democratic one as well as its historical oppressive
186 Film Reviews

antecedents) may be structurally complicit in the circumstances leading

up to this moment is excluded completely (the closest one gets to such a
suggestion is perhaps the ironic hint in the clothing label displayed on
gang member Aap’s dungarees: ‘State Property’). Instead, the primary
role of the police, as agents of the state, is portrayed as the protection of
‘our’ private property (the individual family struck by crime) against
‘them’ (the inchoate mass of township dwellers) that threaten the subur-
ban peace.
The shot of the sprawling township early in the film is indicative of
this binary: when the police find the car that Tsotsi had hijacked, the
camera first dwells on how the car has been stripped of all removable parts
that can be sold for scrap, and then pans to show a wide expanse of
shacks on the other side of an open field. The camera favours the vantage
point of the police, standing helplessly outside the massive township.
This perspective of individuals up against a mass is soon thereafter
affirmed by dialogue in which the police officers tell the despairing
mother of the missing child that they cannot even find a stolen car in
the township, never mind a baby. But the South Africa ten years into
democracy is also one in which the Freedom Charter’s ‘security for all’
has largely been narrowed down to those that can afford to pay for it,
one in which ‘private–public partnerships’ are the order of the day, and
as such it is no coincidence that it is a private security firm that is called
upon to save the good middle-class citizen from the claws of Tsotsi and
his gang.
When the narrative is seen to serve the hegemonic logic of individ-
ual responsibility for rampant crime, and the appropriate response by
the state (and by capital) is constructed as that of surveillance and ret-
ribution, some other choices exercised by the film-makers in retelling
Fugard’s story also start to make sense. The film is only populated by
black characters, with the exception of the one white policeman who
speaks Zulu fluently. By taking race out of the equation, the playing
field becomes levelled, history dissolves into amnesia and the explana-
tion for one’s social position (for instance as either a thug scraping by
in a township shack or a middle-class family man living in suburban
comfort) becomes thoroughly individualized. Through this process of
erasure, the continued correlation between race and class in contempo-
rary South Africa is rendered invisible.
On the topic of representation, much can also be said about the gen-
derized gaze of the camera, the colourful depiction of poverty and town-
ship life and so forth, although this could warrant a separate discussion.
That the film is problematic in many respects does not mean that it is
without merit. As a testimony to the technical prowess of the South
African film industry and the acting talent at its disposal, Tsotsi is a good
advertisement that will hopefully attract more international attention.
What it should also draw attention to, however, is the uncritical views of
individual agency vis-à-vis structural fault lines in society, the narrow
understanding of what post-apartheid democracy should come to mean
and the type of responses to poverty and crime that have become pre-
dictable in debates about contemporary South Africa. That this discourse
has been foregrounded in an Oscar-winning film should not obscure the
Film Reviews 187

less prominent but nonetheless pervasive manifestations thereof across a

wide spectrum of other media platforms as well.
Contributor details
Dr Herman Wasserman is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Journalism
Studies, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom. He edits Ecquid Novi: Journal of
African Journalism Studies and is a member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of
African Media Studies (JAMS).
Contact: Department of Journalism Studies, University of Sheffield, 18–22 Regent
Street, Sheffield, S1 3NJ.
E-mail: hwasserman@imasa.org
188 Film Reviews

Journal of ISSN 1751-7974
Journal of African Media Studies | Volume One Number One
Volume One Number One

Volume 1 Number 1 – 2009 1.1
3–7 Editorial
Articles
9–21 Repositioning African media studies: thoughts and provocations
Keyan G. Tomaselli Journal of
Media & Culture

23–34 Between journalism ‘universals’ and cultural particulars:

challenges facing the development of a journalism programme in
an East African context
Terje S. Skjerdal
35–54 Looking backward, looking forward: African media studies
and the question of power
Mohammed Musa
55–68 African media research in the era of globalization
Nkosi Ndlela
69–80 Missing links: African media studies and feminist concerns
Audrey Gadzekpo
81–90 The growth and development of African media studies:
perspectives from Nigeria
Abiodun Salawu
91–100 Fata Morgana: Mirage in the Desert - a sequence of images
Graham Evans
101–116 ‘We need to open up the country’: development and the Christian
key scenario in the social space of Kinshasa’s teleserials
Katrien Pype
117–133 Popular music and political change in Côte d’Ivoire: the
divergent dynamics of zouglou and reggae
Anne Schumann
135–154 Music advocacy, the media and the Malawi political public
sphere, 1958–2007
John Lwanda
155–171 The politics of corruption and the media in Africa
Helge Rønning
173–188 Book and film reviews
ISSN 1752-6299
11
intellect
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Volume One Number One

Media & Culture

African Media Studies

173–188 Book and film reviews

9 771752 629009 www.intellectbooks.com

JAMS_1.1_cover.indd 1 8/12/08 4:23:06 PM

Journal of African Media Studies

Journal of African Media Studies Volume 1 Number 1 © 2009 Intellect Ltd

JAMS 1 (1) pp. 3–7 © Intellect Ltd 2009 3

‘African media studies’ or ‘media studies in Africa’?

yet to extricate themselves from the methodological and theoretical

Media and social change in Africa

Nyamnjoh, F. B. (1999), ‘African cultural studies, cultural studies in Africa: how to

Journal of African Media Studies Volume 1 Number 1 © 2009 Intellect Ltd

Repositioning African media studies:

JAMS 1 (1) pp. 9–21 © Intellect Ltd 2009 9

national, in the education of a critical citizenry (Alzouma 2005; Thomas

the closure of meaning assumed by modernist narratives like ‘nation-

Teaching media studies

Repositioning African media studies: thoughts and provocations 11

informed by my having been an examiner at universities in Ghana,

• Industry regulators become de facto content censors (De Beer 2001).

approach harnessed to party political-led ‘nation-building’ and ‘patri-

The following further observations stand out:

• Many media researchers and lecturers strongly oppose political censor-

Repositioning African media studies: thoughts and provocations 13

anti-libertarian, Stalinist Marxism; those who study in the United

It may seem far-fetched to bring up [Habermas’] theories, which have their

Ronning further observes that: ‘Many intellectuals and political actors

Hegemony – the discourse of ‘African Values’

Repositioning African media studies: thoughts and provocations 15

definitional conflation is the utterly reductive assumption that cultural

A democratic state has no business in legislating for morality. Indeed, deeply

Defining culture in hyper-reality

create alternative meanings is itself a form of liberation. It is through this

Expatriates and analysis

Repositioning African media studies: thoughts and provocations 17

Kasoma, F. (ed.) (1994), Journalism Ethics in Africa, Nairobi: ACCE.

Repositioning African media studies: thoughts and provocations 19

Waldahl, R. (ed.) (1998), Perspectives on Media, Culture and Democracy in Zimbabwe,

Contact: Culture, Communication and Media Studies (CCMS), University of

Repositioning African media studies: thoughts and provocations 21

Journal of African Media Studies Volume 1 Number 1 © 2009 Intellect Ltd

Between journalism ‘universals’ and

JAMS 1 (1) pp. 23–34 © Intellect Ltd 2009 23

2. I am indebted to Point of departure: a critical donor agenda

The backdrop: vulnerable but emerging local media

2008). The government newspapers are the largest in terms of circulation,

The curriculum: emphasis on democracy and human rights

Table 1: Curriculum for MA Programme in Journalism, Addis Ababa University

Course title Credits

Between journalism ‘universals’ and cultural particulars 25

Students must choose between newspaper/web stream and radio/TV

Ideological preferences in the overall programme layout

Scandinavian countries has been through a demarcation process since the

Journalists as critical thinkers, not only skills workers

Between journalism ‘universals’ and cultural particulars 27

The decision to put the journalism programme – with its practical

Potential conflict with participatory communication ideals

Journalistic ‘universals’: what to adopt, what to rediscover,

Between journalism ‘universals’ and cultural particulars 29